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Volume IX

The Near and Middle East

(in two parts)

Part 2

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PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other Government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews

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the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government. The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

John P. Glennon supervised the preparation of this volume. Ralph R. Goodwin assisted in the initial planning. Paul Claussen prepared the section on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Carl N. Raether compiled the section on Egypt. The remainder of the volume was done by Joan M. Lee. Mr. Claussen and Nina J. Noring assisted in declassification and final editing.

Until his retirement in 1979, Deputy Historian Fredrick Aandahl directed the entire *Foreign Relations* project, including the preparation of this volume.

The Documentary Editing Section performed technical editing under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber and Rita M. Baker in the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief). The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A, airgram
ACSP, Arab Collective Security Pact
AC & W, Aircraft Control and Warning
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Office of African Affairs, Department of State
AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
ALCSP, Arab League Collective Security Pact
AmEmb, American Embassy
AMINCO, **AMINOIL**, American Independent Oil Company
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand
API, American Petroleum Institute
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Aramco, Arabian-American Oil Company
ARMA, **ARMAT**, **ArmAtt**, Army Attaché
AV, Aviation Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State
BAPCO, Bahrein Petroleum Company
bbl, barrel
BD, board
BDCC, British Defense Coordinating Committee (Middle East)
BG, David Ben-Gurion
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BOP, Board of Policy Planning, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
BP, British Petroleum Company (formerly Anglo-Iranian Oil Company)
bp/d, barrels per day
BPT, Business Practices and Technology Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CA, Offfice of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
CALTEX, California-Texas Oil Company
CFP, Compagnie Française des Petroles
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCSOUTH, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
cirtel, circular telegram
CMD, Command
Comdr, Commander
Comite, Committee
ConGen, Consulate General
Contel, Consulate telegram
coord, coordinated
CP, Crown Prince
CRANE, Committee on Regional Activities in the Near East
DAF, Dhahran Air Field
Decln, Declaration
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegations at the United Nations General Assembly; also used to refer to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Depagm, Department of State airgram
Depcirgram, Department of State circular airgram
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Deptel, Department of State telegram
desp, despatch
DirGen, Director General
DMS, Director of Mutual Security
DRN, Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia and Africa, Department of State
Dulte, series indicator for personal telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
DZ, Demilitarized Zone
E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
EDT, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State
EIMAC, Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission
Embdesp, Embassy despatch

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Embtel, Embassy telegram
ETA, estimated time of arrival
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Ex-Im, Export-Import Bank
FCN, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (Treaty)
Fed Gov, Fed Rep, Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
F.O., Foreign Office
F.O.B., free on board
FonMin, Foreign Minister, Ministry
FonOff, Foreign Office
Fr, France, French
FTC, Federal Trade Commission
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
G-2, U.S. Army Intelligence
G-3, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the divisional or higher level
GA, United Nations General Assembly
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GHQ, General Headquarters
GMT, Greenwich mean time
GOE, Government of Egypt
GOI, Government of India; Government of Israel
GOL, Government of Lebanon
GOP, Government of Pakistan
GOS, Government of Syria
Grk, Greek
GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State
H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Department of State
HICOG, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
HICOM, High Commission(er)
HKJ, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
HM, His/Her Majesty
HMG, His/Her Majesty's Government
HQ, Headquarters
HRH, His/Her Royal Highness
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICPA, International Cooperative Petroleum Association
IG, Government of Iraq; Government of Israel
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jlem, Jerusalem
JSSC, Joint Strategic Service Committee
KOC, Kuwait Oil Company
KUOCO, Kuwait Oil Company
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/E, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State
L/NEA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
Leb, Lebanon
Legdesp, Legation despatch
Legtel, Legation telegram
MAAC, Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Mixed Armistice Commission
MAG, Military Advisory Group
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MDS, Mutual Defense Security (Act)
ME, Middle East
MEC, Middle East Command
MECO, Middle East Command Organization
MEDLO, Middle East Defense Liaison Office
MEDO, Middle East Defense Organzatior.
MEDRECO, Mediterranean Refining Company
MELF, Middle East Land Forces
MinDef, Minister, Ministry of Defense
MinFonAff, Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MS, Mutual Security
MSA, Mutual Security Agency/Act
MSA/E, Mutual Security Agency/Europe
MSA/W, Mutual Security Agency/Washington
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MSTS, Military Sea Transportation Service
mytel, my telegram
NA, North Africa
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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NE, Near East; also, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NEACC, Near East Arms Coordinating Committee
NED, Near East Development (Corporation)
NE/E, Office of Near Eastern Affairs/Economics
niact, night action, immediate reply
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NSC, National Security Council
NZ, New Zealand
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy (E Bureau), Department of State
OFMA, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of State
OIR/OD, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
OMA, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
OMP, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
ONI, Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
OSA, Office of South American Affairs, Department of State
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission
PDTC, Petroleum Development Inc., Trucial Coast
PED, Petroleum Policy Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
PG, Persian Gulf
PL, Public Law
PLDC, Palestine Land Development Corporation
PM, Prime Minister
POC, Peace Observation Commission
PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
PriMin, Prime Minister
PWOC, Pacific Western Oil Company
R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
RAF, Royal Air Force
Rapun, series indicator for telegrams from or concerning the U.S. Member of the Advisory Commission to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
RCC, Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt
RECNE, Regional Coordinating Committee for the Near East
refdes, reference despatch
reftel, reference telegram
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/A, Office of the Ambassador at Large
SA, Saudi Arabia
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SACME, Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SC, Security Council, United Nations
SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
SE, Special Estimate
SEA, Southeast Asia
Secto, series indicator for telegrams for the U.S. delegation at Foreign Ministers' meetings
Secy, Secretary
SG, Standing Group, NATO
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
S/MSA, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
SONJ, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
STA, designation for Department of State briefing papers
SWE, Division of Southwest European Affairs, Department of State
Tapline, Trans Arabian Pipeline Company
TCA, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State
Tedul, series indicator for personal telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
Telac, series indicator for personal telegrams to Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation)

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in connection with international conferences

Totec, designation for telegrams dealing with technical assistance

TRC, Office of Transport and Communication Policy, Department of State

TS, top secret

TSO, Truce Supervision Organization

TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority

TWA, Trans World Airlines

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State

UN, United Nations

UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

unnum, unnumbered

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

Unrap, series indicator for telegrams to or concerning the U.S. Member of the Advisory Commission to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine and the Near East

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

urtel, your telegram

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USAFE, United States Air Force, Europe

USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe

Usfoto, series indicator for telegrams and airgrams from the Foreign Operations Administration to missions abroad

USG, United States Government

USGADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

USIA, United States Information Agency

USIE, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program

USMC, United States Maritime Commission

USN, United States Navy

USOM, United States Operations Mission

USOMJ, United States Operations Mission in Jordan

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UST, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

WE, Western Europe; Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

Weeka, weekly, interagency, summary analysis from United States diplomatic missions

Wirom, series indicator for certain Department of State administrative telegrams

YY, Yusuf Yassin

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LIST OF PERSONS

EDITOR'S NOTE: Throughout this volume, individuals generally are identified in context as their names appear. This list is designed to provide ready reference for identification, is generally limited to positions and circumstances under reference in the volume, and is confined to the years 1952–1954. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise noted. Where no dates are given, the individual usually held the position throughout the period covered by the volume.

ABBEY, Glenn A., Counselor of the Legation in Saudi Arabia until June 5, 1953; thereafter Consul General at Barcelona.

ABBOUD, Ahmed, Director of the Suez Canal Company and Member of the Industrial and Commercial Society of Egypt.

IBN ABDUL AZIZ, Faisal, Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Viceroy of Hijaz; Crown Prince and Deputy President of the Council of Ministers, November 9, 1953–August 1954; thereafter Crown Prince and President of the Council of Ministers.

ACHESON, Dean, Secretary of State until January 20, 1953.

ACHILLES, Theodore C., Vice Deputy Representative with personal rank of Minister to the North Atlantic Council until April 1, 1952; Deputy Chief of Mission with personal rank of Minister in France, April 1–September 18, 1952; Chief of Mission, September 18, 1952–August 25, 1954; thereafter Minister of the Embassy in France.

ACIKALIN, Cevat, Turkish Ambassador to the United Kingdom until 1952; Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952–1954; Ambassador to Italy from 1954.

ADAMS, Sherman, Assistant to the President from January 20, 1953.

ADENAUER, Konrad, Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

ALDRICH, Winthrop W., Ambassador to the United Kingdom from February 20, 1953.

ALI, Amjad, Pakistani Delegate to the United Nations, 1952–1953; Delegate to the United Nations Board of Governors, 1954; Ambassador to the United States from September 26, 1953.

ALIREZA, Sheikh Mohammed, Saudi Arabian Minister of Commerce and Industries from 1954.

ALLEN, Francis O., Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State, until March 1954; thereafter Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

ALLEN, George V., Ambassador to Yugoslavia until March 11, 1953; Ambassador to India and Nepal, May 4, 1953–November 30, 1954.

ALLEN, Sir Roger, Head of the African Department of the British Foreign Office until September 28, 1953; Assistant Under Secretary of State of the African, Eastern, and Levant Department, September 28, 1953–June 10, 1954; thereafter Deputy High Commissioner in the Federal Republic of Germany at Bonn.

AMER, Lieutenant General Abdul Hakim, Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces as of June 1953; Minister of War and Marine in the Nasser Cabinet from April 1954.

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AMER, Major General Hussein Sirry, Commander of the Egyptian Army Frontier Corps to July 1952.

AMIN, Lieutenant Colonel Abdel, participant in the Egyptian Revolution of July 1952 and member of the Rovolutionary Command Council.

AMMOUN, Fouad S., Director General of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ANDERSEN, H. Carl, Republican Representative from Minnesota; Member of the House Appropriations Committee from January 3, 1953.

ANDERSON, Frederick L., Deputy Special Representative in Europe at Paris from March 13, 1952.

ANDERSON, Robert B., Secretary of the Navy, February 4, 1953–May 3, 1954; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense.

ARGOV, Nehemia, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister of Israel.

ARMSTRONG, Willis C., Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until August 4, 1952; Deputy Director, August 4, 1952–May 19, 1954; thereafter Acting Director.

ASHA, Rafik, Syrian Delegate to the United Nations; Chargé of the Syrian Embassy in the United States, August 5–December 1952; Minister until March 1953.

AVRIEL, E., Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Finance.

AWALT, Frederick H., Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, 1952.

AZMI, Mahmoud, Chief of the Egyptian Delegation to the United Nations and Representative at the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1954.

BABAN, Ahmad M., Chief of the Iraqi Royal Cabinet, 1952; Minister of Justice, 1953; Deputy Prime Minister, 1954.

BADAWI (BADAOUI), Dr. Helmy Baghat, Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry, December 1952–April 1954.

BAGHDADI (BAGDADI), Abdel Latif, member of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council and Minister of War and Marine, June 1953–April 1954; Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs in the Nasser cabinet from April 1954.

BAILEY, Ronald W., Acting Chargé d'Affaires and First Secretary of the British Embassy in Lebanon until April 30, 1952; thereafter Near East Political Officer and First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.

BAKR, Abdallah Ibrahim, Minister and Chargé d'Affaires of the Iraqi Embassy in the United States until June 1953; Deputy Chief of the Royal Cabinet, June–September 1953; Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 1953–March 8, 1954; thereafter Chief of the Royal Cabinet.

BARCO, James W., Member of the Delegation to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1954; Adviser on Political and Security Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations from September 8, 1952; Member of the Disarmament Commission, 1952; Deputy Representative to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine from February 28, 1954.

BARNES, George A., Officer in the Department of Security Council Affairs of the United Nations until 1952; Member of the International Development Advisory Board of the Foreign Operations Administration from March 30, 1952.

BARODY, Jamil M., Alternate Representative of Saudi Arabia to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1954.

BARROW, John R., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Iraq until June 25, 1954; thereafter Consul General at Nairobi.

BARROWS, Leland, Deputy Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in Italy until May 22, 1952; Deputy Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in

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Greece, May 22–October 1, 1952; Chief of Mission in Greece, October 1, 1952–October 15, 1954; thereafter Chief of Mission in Vietnam.

BATTLE, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until October 13, 1952; Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs, October 13, 1952–January 30, 1953; Attaché of the Embassy in Denmark, January 30, 1953–July 26, 1954; thereafter First Secretary.

BAXTER, William O., First Secretary of the Embassy in Turkey until June 20, 1952; Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, June 20, 1952–October 10, 1954; thereafter Director.

BAYER, Celal, President of Turkey.

BEALE, Wilson T.S., Jr., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 20, 1952; thereafter Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs.

BECKETT, J.A., Petroleum Attaché of the British Embassy in the United States until 1953.

BECKNER, Earl R., Chief of the Chemicals and Semi-Manufactured Products Branch, Manufactured Products Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until February 15, 1954; thereafter Assistant Chief of the Petroleum Staff.

BEELEY, Harold, Counselor and Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy in Denmark, 1952; Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States from February 18, 1953.

BEIGEL, Edgar J., Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

BENARD, Jean P., Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States until February 1954.

BEN GURION, David, Prime Minister of Israel until December 9, 1953; Minister of Defense until January 4, 1954.

BEN-HORIN, Eliashiv, First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in the United States until summer 1954.

BENNIKE, Major General Vagn, Danish military officer; Chairman of the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission until June 9, 1953; Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Commission, June 9, 1953–September 2, 1954.

BERGUS, Donald C., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Lebanon until August 4, 1954; thereafter Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

BERRY, Burton Y., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until June 25, 1952; Ambassador to Iraq, August 11, 1952–May 3, 1954.

BERRY, James L., detailed to Air War College until September 2, 1952; Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, September 2, 1952–October 19, 1953; Deputy Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State, October 19, 1953–June 14, 1954; Consul General with personal rank of Minister at Singapore from June 18, 1954.

BIDAULT, Georges, French Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense until March 8, 1952; Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 8, 1953–June 19, 1954.

BIRGI, Nuri, Under Secretary General of Turkey; Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

BISHOP, Max W., Consul General at Dhahran until January 4, 1954; Staff Member of the Operations Coordinating Board, January 4–November 2, 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.

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BISSELL, Richard M., Jr., Deputy Director of the Mutual Security Agency, January 14–18, 1952; thereafter Consultant to the Director for Mutual Security.

BLANCHET, Jeremy, Committee Officer, Committee Secretariat Staff of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, January–May 1953; Foreign Affairs Analyst, Executive Secretariat, June–August 1953; thereafter Research Analyst, Foreign Operations Administration.

BLANDFORD, John B., Jr., Director with personal rank of Minister of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East until March 7, 1953.

BLANKENHORN, Herbert, Ministerial Director and Director of the Political Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

BOARDMAN, Francis, International Economist, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until April 13, 1952; thereafter Deputy Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs.

BOHLEN, Charles E., Counselor of the Department of State and Member of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council until March 1953; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 20, 1953.

BOLTÉ, General Charles L., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations until August 1952; Commander of the Seventh Army in Germany, August 1952–April 1953; Commander in Chief, U.S. Army in Europe, April–October 1953; thereafter, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

BOLTON, Frances P., Republican Representative from Ohio; Delegate at the 8th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953.

BONBRIGHT, James C.H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 15, 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Permanent Representative in Europe.

BONNET, Henri, French Ambassador to the United States.

BOWIE, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, and Member of the National Security Council Planning Board from May 18, 1953.

BOWKER, Sir Reginald J., British Assistant Under Secretary of State until January 13, 1954; thereafter Ambassador to Turkey.

BOWLES, Chester B., Ambassador to India until March 23, 1953.

BRADLEY, General of the Army Omar N., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Representative to the NATO Standing Group and Military Committee until August 14, 1953.

BROOK, John H., Petroleum Attaché of the British Embassy in the United States from 1953.

BROUGHAM, Robert I., Vice President for Finance, Arabian American Oil Company.

BROWN, Winthrop G., Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until June 13, 1952 Attaché of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, June 13–August 20, 1952; thereafter Counselor.

BROWNELL, Herbert, Jr., Attorney General of the United States from January 21, 1953.

BRUCE, David K.E., Ambassador to France until March 10, 1952; Under Secretary of State, April 1, 1952–January 20, 1953; Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 20–February 18, 1953; thereafter Political Officer and Observer at the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community at Paris and Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg.

BRUINS, John H., Counselor of the Embassy in Lebanon until August 12, 1954.

BRYAN, Belton O'Neal, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State, until June 7, 1953; Liaison Officer, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, June 7, 1953–May 9, 1954; thereafter Director, Office of Munitions Control.

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BUCKMASTER, Hon. Martin S., Acting Consul of Great Britain at Sharjah, 1952; Assistant Political Officer, 1952-November 9, 1953; thereafter Assistant Political Officer in Abu Dhabi.

BUNCHE, Ralph J., Principal Director, Department of Trusteeship and Information for Non-Self-Governing Territories, United Nations Secretariat; Under Secretary of the United Nations Secretariat, 1954.

BUNGER, Mills E., Chief of Water Resources and Development in Jordan from February 12, 1952.

BURDETT, William C., Jr., First Secretary of the Embassy in Iran until January 15, 1953; Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from March 2, 1953.

BURNS, Major General Fedon L.M., Canadian military officer; Deputy Minister of Rehabilitation, Department of Veteran's Affairs; National President, United Nations Association of Canada, 1952-1953; Director, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine from August 11, 1954.

BURNS, Robert L., Acting Political Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary of State in the Near East for Economic and Technical Assistance at Beirut, 1952.

BURROWS, Bernard A., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States until July 27, 1953; thereafter Political Resident in Bahrain.

BUTLER, Victor, British Under Secretary for Fuel and Power.

BUTTERWORTH, W. Walton, Ambassador to Sweden until December 9, 1953; thereafter Minister of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

BYROADE, Henry A., Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, until April 14, 1952; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

CABELL, Major General Charles P., USAF, Promoted to Lieutenant General July 5, 1952; Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until April 23, 1953; thereafter Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

CAFFERY, Jefferson, Ambassador to Egypt.

CANNON, Cavendish, Envoy to Syria until May 8, 1952; Ambassador to Portugal, June 2, 1952-August 1, 1953; Ambassador to Greece from September 2, 1953.

CAPOMAZZA DI CAMPOLATTARO, Benedetto, Minister of the Italian Embassy in Israel from December 16, 1953.

CARROLL, Brigadier General Paul T., USA (Colonel until 1953), Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer at the White House, January 21, 1953-September 17, 1954.

CARNEY, Admiral Robert B., USN, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe until August 17, 1953; thereafter Chief of Naval Operations.

CARRAUD, Pierre, Second Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States from April 1953.

CARVER, Leslie J., British; Deputy Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, October 19, 1952-March 7, 1953; Acting Director, March 7, 1953-June 15, 1954.

CASE, John C., Vice President and Director, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc.; President and Director, Colombian Petroleum Company; Vice President and Director, South American Gulf Oil Company.

CASSIN, Vernon, Assistant Attaché of the Embassy in Jordan until August 7, 1952; thereafter, Attaché.

CHAMOUN, Camille, President of Lebanon from September 22, 1952.

CHAPMAN, Alec, Representative of the Arabian-American Oil Company.

CHAPMAN, Oscar L., Secretary of the Interior until January 20, 1953.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CHARPENTIER, Pierre-Albert, Director General of Economic, Financial, and Technical Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chairman, Consultative Group in Export Policy; President, with rank of Ambassador, of the French Delegation to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

CHEHAB, Amir Khalid, Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, October 1, 1952–May 1, 1953.

CHEHAB, General Fuad, Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Army; Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, and Minister of Defense, September 1952.

CHERWELL, Lord (Frederick Alexander Lindemann), Paymaster General and adviser on Energy and Scientific Affairs to the British Prime Minister.

CHURCHILL, Winston S. (Sir Winston from April 24, 1953), Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury of Great Britain; Minister of Defense until March 1, 1952.

CLAPP, Gordon R., Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority at Knoxville.

CLARK, Harlan B., First Secretary and Consul of the Legation in Syria until October 19, 1953; Counselor, October 19, 1953–July 1, 1954.

CLAUZEL, Chislain, Deputy Director for Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

COLE, William E., Jr., Consul at Accra until February 5, 1954; Consul at Jerusalem, February 5–July 28, 1954; thereafter Consul General at Jerusalem.

COLEMAN, Stewart P., Director, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; Director of the Arabian-American Oil Company and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company.

COLLINS, General J. Lawton, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army until August 14, 1953; thereafter Representative to the NATO Military Committee and Standing Group.

COLLINS, Varnum L., Jr., Officer in Charge of Italian and Austrian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until August 15, 1953; detailed to National War College, August 15, 1953–June 20, 1954; thereafter First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Italy.

COLVILLE, John R., Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister.

COMAY, Michael, Director, British Commonwealth Division, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until 1953; Assistant Director General, 1953; Ambassador to Canada from 1953.

CORDIER, Andrew W., Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

CORSE, Carl D., Chief of the Commercial Policy Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State.

CORSON, Harland J., Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission at Jidda from August 24, 1953.

COTTMAN, James Stewart, Jr., Member of the Executive Secretariat Staff, Department of State, from February 22, 1953.

CRAWLEY, Desmond J.C., Principal First Secretary of the British Commonwealth Relations Office until February 18, 1952; Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, February 18, 1952–September 14, 1953; thereafter First Secretary for Commonwealth Relations Office Affairs of the British Embassy in the United States.

CROCKER, Edward S., II, Ambassador to Iraq until June 1, 1952; detailed to Air War College, August 9, 1952–July 19, 1953; detailed to Naval War College, July 19, 1953–September 12, 1954.

CUTLER, Robert, Administrative Assistant to the President, January 21, 1953–March 22, 1953; thereafter Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Chairman of the National Security Council Planning Board; Member of the President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

CZYZAK, John J., Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State.

DAGHISTANI, Brigadier General Ghazi Mohammed Al, Iraqi military leader; Military Attaché, Iraqi Embassy in the United Kingdom, 1953–1954.

DASPIT, Alexander B., Political Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until January 30, 1954; resigned January 30, 1954; reappointed as Attaché of the Embassy in Pakistan, April 15–September 27, 1954; thereafter First Secretary and Consul.

DAVIES, Fred A., Executive Vice President, Director, and Chairman of the Board, Arabian-American Oil Company; Vice President of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company.

DAVIS, Monnett B., Ambassador to Israel until December 26, 1953.

DAY, Brigadier General Edwin M., USAF, Commanding General, Military Air Transport Service, Dhahran Air Force Base, Saudi Arabia, until late 1952.

DAYAN, Brigadier General Moshe, Israeli Chief of General Staff, South Command, 1952; Chief of General Staff, North Command, 1952–1953; Head of G Branch, General Headquarters, 1953; Chief of General Staff, Israeli Defense Forces, from 1953.

DAYTON, M. Leon, Chief, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in Italy until July 6, 1952; Chief, Mutual Security Agency Mission in Turkey, July 6, 1952–1954; Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Missions in Italy and Trieste, 1953; Director of the United States Operations Mission in Turkey (Foreign Operations Administration) from 1954.

DILLON, C. Douglas, Ambassador to France from March 13, 1953.

DIVON, Shmuel, First Secretary of the Israeli Legation in France.

DIXON, Sir Pierson, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until February 1, 1954; Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations from March 13, 1954.

DIXON, Roger C., Acting Chief of Business Practices and Technology Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until March 30, 1952; thereafter Chief.

DORSEY, Stephen P., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, January 4–December 8, 1952; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, December 8, 1952–February 1, 1953; thereafter Deputy Director.

DRAKE, James F., Chairman of the Board and Director, Gulf Oil Corporation.

DROSZ, Edmund J., Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until June 20, 1952; thereafter Consul General at Nairobi.

DUCE, James T., Vice President of the Arabian-American Oil Company.

DUKE, Charles B., Counselor of the British Embassy in Egypt July 30, 1952–May 12, 1954; thereafter Ambassador to Jordan.

DULLES, Allen W., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 26, 1953; thereafter Director.

DULLES, John Foster, Consultant to the Secretary of State until April 1952; Secretary of State from January 21, 1953.

DUNCAN, Admiral Donald B., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

DUNCAN, Enoch S., Consul at Kuwait until June 27, 1953; thereafter Consul of the Embassy in Jordan.

DUNN, William C., Consul at Bombay until September 30, 1952; Chief, Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State, September 30, 1952–September 27, 1954; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Iraq.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

EAKENS, Robert H.S., detailed to Naval War College until August 10, 1953; thereafter Chief of the Petroleum Staff, Department of State.

EBAN, Abba S., Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Chairman of the Israeli Delegation at the United Nations.

ELDLEMAN, Major General Clyde D., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations, 1953–1954.

EDDY, Colonel William A., USMC (ret.), Consultant to the Arabian-American Oil Company; Former Minister to Saudi Arabia; former Chief of Special Diplomatic Mission to Yemen; former Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence; Political Adviser to Tapline at Beirut.

EDEN, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister.

EISENHOWER, General of the Army Dwight D., USA., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe until May 30, 1952; President of the United States from January 20, 1953.

ELATH, Eliahu, Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

EL EMARY (EMARI), Dr. Abdel Galil, Egyptian Minister of Finance and Economy in the Maher cabinet, July–September 1952, and in the Naguib cabinet from September 1952 to February 1954.

ELLIOT, Air Chief Marshal Sir William, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in the United States and British Representative on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of NATO.

ELTING, Howard, Jr., detailed to Naval War College until January 3, 1953; thereafter First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Egypt.

ELY, General Paul H., French Army; Representative to the NATO Standing Group until August 1953; Chief of the General Staff, August 1953–June 1954; Commander in Chief and General Commander in Indochina from June 3, 1954.

EMMERGLICK, Leonard J., Special Assistant to the Attorney General until September 1954.

EMMERSON, John K., Planning Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until July 28, 1952; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Pakistan.

ERALP, Orhan, Director General of the Second Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from January 31, 1953.

ERKIN, Feridun C., Turkish Ambassador to the United States.

ESHKOL, Levi, Israeli Minister of Finance from June 25, 1952.

EVANS, John W., Deputy Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until August 4, 1952; Director, August 4, 1952–May 1, 1954; Acting Director, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, May 1–September 10, 1954; thereafter Director of Commercial Policy, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Secretariat.

EVEREST, Lieutenant General Frank F., USAF, Commander, Fifth Air Force, Far East Air Force, Korea until May 1952; Deputy Commander, Tactical Air Force Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, May 1952–April 24, 1953; Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 24, 1953–March 18, 1954; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Air Force Headquarters from April 1, 1954.

EVELAND, Captain Wilbur C., Jr., USA, Assistant Army Attaché of the Embassy in Iraq, 1952.

EYTAN, Walter, Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

FAISAL (Feisal) II, King of Iraq.

FALCK, L. James, Assistant Shipping Adviser, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State, until August 11, 1953; thereafter Assistant Chief of the Shipping Policy Staff.

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AL-FAQIH, Sheikh Asad, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States.

FAROUK I, King of Egypt until abdication on July 23, 1952.

FARRA, Jamal E.D., Secretary General, Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until December 8, 1952; thereafter Minister to Sweden; also Minister to Norway from March 5, 1953 and Denmark from July 6, 1953.

FARRAQ TAYEH, Ahmed Mohamed, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, September-December 1952.

FAWZI BEY, Mahmoud, Egyptian Ambassador to the United Kingdom until December 8, 1952; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs.

FECHTELER, Admiral William M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until August 16, 1953; thereafter Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

FEISAL. *See* Faisal.

FERGUSON, John H., Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 12, 1953.

FIFE, Vice Admiral James, Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations until March 1953; thereafter Deputy Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.

FISCHER, Maurice, Israeli Minister in France until 1953; Ambassador to Turkey from 1953; Alternate Representative at the 9th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954.

FOLEY, James W., Vice President, the Texas Company (Part of the Arabian-American Oil Company).

FOLLIS, Ralph G., Chairman and Director, Standard Oil Company of California; Vice Chairman and Director of the Arabian American Oil Company; Chairman and Director of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company.

FOSTER, Andrew B., Deputy Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, January 4, 1952-September 26, 1954; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

FOSTER, William C., Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1953.

FOX, Major General Alonzo P., USA, Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FRANKS, Sir Oliver S., British Ambassador to the United States until February 13, 1953.

FRASER, Sir William, Chairman, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, and its subsidiary companies; Director of the Burmah Oil Company, Limited; Petroleum Adviser to the British War Office.

FRIED, Milton, Attaché of the Embassy in Israel until June 1954.

FRIEDLANDER, Major Arieh, Israeli Defense Forces; Senior Delegate to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.

FRITZLAN, Andrew D., First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Jordan until October 14, 1952; thereafter Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

FRYE, Theodore R., Attaché of the Embassy in India until August 20, 1953; thereafter Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

FRYER, E. Reeseman, Assistant Administrator, Near East and Africa Development Service, Technical Cooperation Administration, until 1953.

FUAD, King Ahmed II, infant son of King Farouk, proclaimed King of Egypt and the Sudan July 26, 1952. On June 18, 1953, Egypt became a Republic.

FUNKHOUSER, Richard, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until March 14, 1952; Acting Officer in Charge of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq Affairs, March 14-30,

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1952; Officer in Charge, March 30, 1952–August 1953; detailed to National War College, August 1953–June 10, 1954; Attaché of the Embassy in Rumania, June 10–July 26, 1954; thereafter First Secretary.

FURLONGE, Geoffrey W., British Minister in Jordan, February 8–September 23, 1952; thereafter Ambassador.

GALLMAN, Waldemar J., Ambassador to the Union of South Africa until August 15, 1954; Ambassador to Iraq from November 3, 1954.

GAON, Lieutenant Colonel Chaim, Senior Israeli Delegate to the United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission, fall 1952; Military, Naval, and Air Attaché of the Embassy in Turkey from 1953.

GARDINER, Arthur Z., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until July 6, 1952; thereafter Politico-Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Representative on the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1953.

GARGONI, Khalid Bey, Counselor to the King of Saudi Arabia.

GASS, Neville A., Managing Director, British Petroleum Company, Limited.

GASS, Oliver, Chairman of the Economic Advisory Staff attached to the Office of the Israeli Prime Minister.

GATES, Thomas S., Jr., Under Secretary of the Navy from October 7, 1953.

GAY, Merrill C., Representative with personal rank of Minister at the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East at Rangoon, 1952, and Bandung, 1953; Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State from September 30, 1953.

EL GEFEITLY (GERITLI), Dr. Ali, economist; Egyptian Minister of Finance and Economy as of 1954.

GEREN, Paul F., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Syria until February 21, 1952; First Secretary and Consul, February 21, 1952–February 11, 1954; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Jordan.

GETTY, J. Paul, President and principal owner of the Pacific Western Oil Company.

GIBSON, Sir Horace Stephen, Managing Director and President, British Institute of Petroleum, Limited, and associated companies.

GIFFORD, Walter S., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until January 23, 1953.

GILLETTE, Guy Mark, Democratic Senator from Iowa.

GLEASON, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

GLUBB, Lieutenant General Sir John B., British Military Officer; Chief of the General Staff of the Arab Legion at Amman.

GOHAR, Lieutenant Colonel (subsequently Colonel) Salah Gawhir, Senior Egyptian Delegate, Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission; Head of the Palestine Department, Ministry of War.

GOLDMANN, Nahum, Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

GREEN, Joseph C., Minister in Jordan, July 31–September 23, 1952; Ambassador, September 23, 1952–July 31, 1953.

GREENHILL, Denis A., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States until September 22, 1952.

GRIGOROPOULOS, Lieutenant General Theodoros, Head of the Greek National Defense General Staff, June–November 1952; forced to resign by Field Marshal Papagos' government.

GROVER, Brigadier General Orrin L., USAF, Commanding General, Military Air Transport Service, Dhahran Air Force Base, 1952–1953; Commander 1414th Air Base Group at Dhahran, 1953–1954; Commander, Second Air Division at Dhahran from late 1954.

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HABASHI, Saba, Egyptian barrister; Adviser to the Secretary General of the Arab League; Counselor to the Arabian American Oil Company.

HACKLER, Windsor G., Executive Staff Officer, Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until May 26, 1952; Consul at Dhahran, May 26, 1952–December 10, 1954; thereafter First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Japan.

HADSEL, Fred L., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State until February 28, 1954; thereafter Acting Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

HAIDAR, Selim, Lebanese Ambassador to Iran; Minister of Defense, October 1, 1952–May 1, 1953; Minister of Education, Health, and Social Affairs, 1952–1953.

HAIKAL, Dr. Yusuf, Minister of the Jordanian Embassy in the United States until December 14, 1953.

HAKIM, General Amir Abd al-, Member of the Egyptian Council of Revolution; Member of Free Officers Committee; Commander in Chief of Egyptian Armed Forces from June 1953; Minister of War and Marine from September 1, 1954.

HAKIM, George Bey, Counselor of the Lebanese Legation in the United States until May 1952; Minister of Finance, October 1, 1952–May 1, 1953; Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 1–August 13, 1953; Minister of Economy, 1953–1954.

HALLETT, Nez C., Jr., Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until July 1, 1953; thereafter Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

HAMILTON, Charles W., Vice President of the Foreign Production Division, Gulf Oil Corporation; Director, Kuwait Oil Company.

HAMILTON, William L., Jr., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.

HAMMARSKJÖLD, Dag, Swedish Minister without Portfolio until April 10, 1953; thereafter Secretary-General of the United Nations.

HARDING, Charles L., Director, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company and Director of the Arabian-American Oil Company and the Trans Arabian Pipeline Company.

HARE, Raymond A., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia until July 8, 1953; Ambassador to Lebanon, September 29, 1953–October 1, 1954; Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State, from October 19, 1954.

HARKABI, Colonel Yehoshafat, Israeli Defense Forces.

HARRIMAN, W. Averell, Director for Mutual Security until January 20, 1953.

HART, Parker T., Detailed to National War College until June 12, 1952; Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from June 18, 1952.

HASHEM, Ihsan, Jordanian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

EL-HASSOUNA, Mohammed Abdel-Khalek, Egyptian Secretary General of the Arab League from September 1952.

HAY, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Rupert, British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf until 1953.

HENDERSON, Loy W., Ambassador to Iran until December 30, 1954.

HERLITZ, Esther, First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in the United States.

HILALI, Ahmed Naquib, Prime Minister of Egypt, March–June 1952.

HERZOG, Colonel Chaim, Military, Naval, and Air Attaché of the Israeli Embassy in the United States.

HILDRETH, Horace A., Ambassador to Pakistan from May 19, 1953.

HILLINGS, Patrick J., Republican Representative from California; Member of the House Administration and Judiciary Committee.

HINKLE, Colonel Thornton M., USMC, Chairman, Egypt–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, February 1953–September 1954.

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HOLMES, Julius C., Minister of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until November 1, 1954; Senior Political Adviser to the Delegation to the 9th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly from November 30, 1954; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from December 20, 1954.

HOOD, Viscount Samuel, Head of the Western Organization Department, British Foreign Office.

HOOPES, Townsend W., Executive Director of the National Security Training Commission; Assistant to the Defense Representative of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council, 1952; Department of Defense Member, Psycological Strategy Board, March 1952–September 1953.

HOOVER, Herbert, Jr., Consultant to the Secretary of State, October 14, 1953–October 4, 1954; thereafter Under Secretary of State.

HOPPENOT, Henri, Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations; Representative on the Security Council; Chairman, in the absence of the Foreign Minister, of the Delegations to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the General Assembly, 1952–1954.

HOSKINS, Harold B., Consultant, Department of State until 1953; Operations Coordinating Board and United States Information Agency, 1954.

HOWARD, Harry N., United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

HUDA, Tawfiq Abu al-(Abul), Jordanian Prime Minister and Minister of Foregin Affairs until May 5, 1953; Minister of Defense, September 24, 1952–May 5, 1953; Prime Minister again from May 4, 1954.

HULL, General John E., USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 1952–1953.

HUMPHREY, George M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 21, 1953.

HUSSEIN, Ahmed, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States from May 4, 1953.

HUSSEIN, ibn Talal, King of Jordan from August 11, 1952.

HUSSEINI, Jamal al-, Second Secretary of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in the United Kingdom.

IBN SAUD, Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia until November 9, 1953.

ILAH, Abul Amir, Regent of Iraq.

IRELAND, Phillip W., Counselor of the Embassy in Iraq.

ISMAY, General Lord Hasings Lionel, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations until March 12, 1952; thereafter Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary-General of NATO.

IVES, Irving M., Republican Senator from New York; Member, Senate Banking and Currency Committee and Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee.

JACKSON, C(harles) D(ouglas), Special Assistant to the President, February 16, 1953–March 31, 1954; Member, President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953; Member of the Delegation to the 9th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1954.

JADDID, Lieutenant Colonel Ghassen, Head of the Syrian Delegation, Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission.

AL-JAMALI, Mohamed Fadjil, Permanent Representative of Iraq at the United Nations; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 1952–January 1953; Prime Minister and President of the Chamber of Deputies, September 1953–April 1954; again Minister of Foreign Affairs, April–August 1954.

JAVITS, Jacob K., Republican Senator from New York; Member of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

JAWAT, Ali El-Ayubi, Member of the Iraqi Senate; Vice Prime Minister, 1953–1954.

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JEBB, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations until March 1953; Ambassador to France from April 13, 1954.

JENNINGS, Benjamin B., President, Director, and Chairman of the Executive Committee, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company.

JERNEGAN, John D., Consul General at Tunis until May 16, 1952; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs from June 26, 1952.

JOHNSTON, Eric, Chairman, Advisory Board for International Development from 1952; Personal Representative of the President with rank of Ambassador to the Middle East from 1953.

JONES, G. Lewis, Jr., Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until June 18, 1952; Principal Officer at Tunis, June 18–27, 1952; Consul General, June 27, 1952–March 13, 1953; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Egypt.

JONES, J. Jeffferson, III, Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, until May 20, 1952; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, May 20, 1952–June 1, 1953; Counselor of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, June 1, 1953–November 22, 1954 thereafter Director Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

DE JUNIAC, Gontran, Minister of the French Embassy in the United States.

EL-KAISSOUNY (KAISOUNI), Abdel Moneim, Egyptian Minister of Finance from September 1954.

KALIJARVI, Thorsten V., Staff Associate and Consultant, Senate Foreign Relations Committee until September 1, 1953; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

KARRER, Wilfred L., Irrigation Adviser, Foreign Operations Administration Mission in Israel, summer 1953–summer 1954.

KEELER, Erwin P., Counselor of the Embassy in Israel until October 6, 1952; Principal Officer at Lagos, October 6–24, 1952; thereafter Consul General.

KENNEDY, Donald D., Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until June 24, 1954; Attaché of the Embassy in India, June 24–July 26, 1954; Counselor, July 26–29, 1954; thereafter Counselor with personal rank of Minister; also Counselor with personal rank of Minister of the Embassy in Nepal from August 30, 1954.

KENNEDY, W. John, Deputy Director, Mutual Security Agency, February–November 1952.

KEYES, Robert L., President and Director of the Arabian-American Oil Company, and Director of the Trans Arabian Pipeline Company.

KHALIDI, Hussein el-, Jordanian Foreign Minister, May 5, 1953–May 4, 1954.

KHAN, General Muhammad Ayub, Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army until October 27, 1954; thereafter Minister of Defense.

AL-KHOURI, Bishara, President of Lebanon until September 24, 1952.

KIRKPATRICK, Sir Ivone A., British High Commissioner in Germany until November 1953; thereafter, Permanent Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

KITCHEN, Jeffrey C., Assistant Chief, Policy Report Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until May 26, 1952; Acting Chief, May 26–November 9, 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 9, 1952–January 23, 1953; Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, January 23, 1953–October 10, 1954; thereafter, Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

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KOLLEK, Theodore (Teddy), Minister of the Israeli Embassy in the United States until May 1952; thereafter Director General of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office.

KOPPER, Samuel K.G., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until 1952; resigned during 1952; reappointed as Consultant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, 1953; Counsel for the Arabian American Oil Company, 1954.

KYES, Roger M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 2, 1953–May 1, 1954.

LABBAN, Abdel Shafi el-, First Secretary of the Egyptian Embassy in the United States, January 1952–April 1953; Counselor, April 1953–February 1954.

LABOUISSE, Henry R., Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in France, January 1952–July 1, 1953; Director, Foreign Operations Administration Mission in France, July 1, 1953–June 15, 1954; thereafter Director, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

LAKELAND, William C., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Egypt until November 1, 1954; thereafter, Consul at Aden and Second Secretary and Consul at Jidda and Sana'a.

LALIVE, Jean, General Counsel of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1954.

LASKEY, P.S., Alternate Delegate of the United Kingdom at the United Nations, 1953.

LAVON, Pinhas, Israeli Minister without Portfolio; Minister of Defense until 1953 and again from Janaury 4, 1954.

LAWSON, Edward B., Envoy to Iceland and Acting Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in Iceland until May 29, 1954; Ambassador to Israel from November 12, 1954.

LAWTON, Frederick J., Director, Bureau of the Budget until 1953; Commissioner, Civil Service Commission from 1953.

LAY, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

LEISHMAN, Frederick J., Assistant Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State until 1954; appointed as First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States, September 2, 1953.

LEMNITZER, Lieutanant General Lyman L., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, U.S. Army, from August 1, 1952.

LEWIN, Dr. Abraham E., First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in the United States.

LIEBHAFSKY, Herbert H., Office of International Materials Policy, Metals and Minerals Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until fall 1953.

LINDER, Harold F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until December 12, 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, December 12, 1952–May 15, 1953.

LLOYD, Rt. Hon. John Selwyn, British Minister of State until October 1954; thereafter Minister of Supply.

LOBENSTINE, James C., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Lebanon until September 5, 1954; thereafter, Financial Officer at Bonn.

LOCKE, Edwin A., Jr., Special Representative with personnal rank of Ambassador for Coordination of Economic and Technical Assistance in the Near East, at Beirut.

LODGE, Henry Cabot, Jr., Republican Senator from Massachusetts until January 1953; Permanent Representative at the United Nations from January 26, 1953; Adviser to the President from December 1953.

LOFTUS, John A., Attaché of the Embassy in India, January 24–April 10, 1952; Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs April 10, 1952–October 30, 1953; also

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Counselor of the Embassy in Nepal, April–October 30, 1953; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in France.

LONGANECKER, David E., International Economist, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until July 29, 1952; thereafter Director, Office of African Affairs.

LOURIE, Arthur, Israeli Delegate to the 7th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952; Assistant Director General, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1953; Alternate Representative to the 8th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1953.

LOURIE, Donald B., Under Secretary of State for Administration, February 13, 1953–March 5, 1954.

LOUTFI, Omar, Director (Minister Plenipotentiary) of the Department of Conferences, International Organizations, and Treaties, Egyptian Foreign Office.

LOVETT, Robert, Secretary of Defense until January 20, 1953.

LUDLOW, James M., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (subsequently Bureau of International Organization Affairs), Department of State.

LYNCH, Andrew G., First Secretary and Consul General of the Embassy in Libya until September 11, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in Jordan, September 11, 1952–September 9, 1954; thereafter Consul General at Bremen.

MACATEE, Robert B., Consul General at Istanbul from February 7, 1953.

MACGINNIS, Francis R., Second Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from April 30, 1952.

MAFFITT, Edward P., detailed to National War College, June 30, 1952–June 11, 1953; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Italy and Special Liaison to the Headquarters, Allied Forces in Southern Europe.

EL MAHDI, Sayed Sir Abdul Rahman, leader of the Umma (Independence) Party in the Sudan.

MAHER (MAHIR), Ali, Egyptian Prime Minister, Minister of War, and Marine, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 27–March 2, 1952, and again July 23–September 7, 1952.

MAILLARD, Pierre, Secretary of Conferences, Central Administration, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs until January 1953; Deputy Director for the Saar, January 1953–January 1954; thereafter Deputy Director for Africa-Levant Affairs.

MAK, Dayton S., Third Secretary and Vice Consul of the Legation in Libya until February 21, 1952; Second Secretary and Vice Consul, February 21, 1952–April 2, 1953; thereafter Second Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

MAKINS, Sir Roger M., British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until December 30, 1952; British Ambassador to the United States from January 7, 1953.

MAKLEFF, Mordechai, Israeli Army Officer; Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces until 1953; Chief, 1953–1954.

MALIK, Dr. Charles, Chairman of the Lebanese Delegation to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1954; Governor of Lebanon until 1952; Envoy to the United States and Cuba until May 4, 1953; thereafter Ambassador; Representative on the Security Council from January 1953; President of the Security Council, February 1953 and January 1954.

MALLABY, (Sir) George C., Under Secretary in the British Cabinet Office until 1954; Secretary, War Council and Council of Ministers, Kenya, from 1954.

MALLORY, Lester D., Counselor with personal rank of Minister of the Embassy in Argentina until August 3, 1953; Ambassador to Jordan from December 1, 1953.

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EL MARAGHI, Mortada, Egyptian Minister of Interior, War and Marine in the governments of Prime Ministers Ali Maher and Ahmed Hilali, January–June 1952; Minister of War and Marine in the government of Hussein Sirri, June–July 1952.

MARSHALL, General George C., USA, former Secretary of Defense and former Secretary of State.

MARTEN, Francis W., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States until August 1952; Foreign Office, August 1952–August 1954; thereafter First Secretary of the British Embassy in Iran.

MARTIN, Edwin M., Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until September 28, 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 28, 1952–June 25, 1953; thereafter Attaché and Deputy Chief of Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations at Paris.

MASSOUD, Mohammed Ibrahim, Saudi Arabian Consultant to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia.

MATTHEWS, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State until October 11, 1953; Ambassador to the Netherlands from November 25, 1953.

MAUER, Ely, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State.

MAYER, René, French Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs until January 20, 1952; Prime Minister, January 8–June 28, 1953.

MCAULIFFE, Lieutenant General Anthony C., USA, Assistant Chief of Staff, General Staff of the United States Army, 1952; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, 1953.

MCCARDLE, Carl W., Consultant, Department of State, January 21–30, 1953; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

MCCARTEN, Colonel Robert D., USAF, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saudi Arabia.

MCCLANAHAN, Grant V., Research Specialist, Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until December 6, 1954; thereafter Consul at Dhahran.

MCCLOY, John J., United States High Commissioner for Germany until July 18, 1952.

MCDANIEL, Bruce W., Director of the Technical Cooperation Administration Mission in Israel until summer 1954; thereafter Director of Technical Cooperation, Foreign Operations Administration Mission in Israel.

MCFALL, Jack K., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until September 9, 1952; Envoy to Finland, November 15, 1952–September 17, 1954; thereafter Ambassador.

MCGHEE, George C., Ambassador to Turkey until June 19, 1953.

MCGRANERY, James P., Attorney General of the United States, May 27, 1952–January 20, 1953.

MCGRIGOR, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roderick R., British First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

MCLEAN, Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth G., Chief Staff Officer, British Ministry of Defense until 1952; thereafter, Special Duty, British War Office.

MCLEOD, R.W. Scott, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, March 3, 1953–March 1, 1954; Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs, March 1, 1954–December 30, 1954; thereafter Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

McMASTER, William J., International Economist, Office of International Materials Policy, Petroleum Policy Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until late 1952.

McWILLIAMS, William J., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State until August 19, 1953; detailed to National War College, August 20, 1953–March 14, 1954; thereafter Staff Member, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

MELOY, Francis E., Jr., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State until January 10, 1953; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France, January 10–October 29, 1953; detailed to NATO Defense College in Paris, January 10–July 24, 1953; Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Vietnam, October 29, 1953–May 21, 1954; thereafter First Secretary and Consul.

MENDERES, Adnan, Prime Minister of Turkey.

MERCHANT, Livingston T., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until March 24, 1952; Deputy to the Special Representative in Europe at Paris, March 24, 1952–March 11, 1953; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

METZGER, Stanley D., Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs until August 3, 1952; thereafter Attorney-Adviser.

MEYER, Armin H., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Lebanon, February 16, 1952–June 28, 1954; thereafter, First Secretary and Consul.

MEYERS, Brigadier General Harry F., USA, Commander, 56th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade, Ft. Revins, Massachusetts, until February 1954; Commanding General, Eastern Army Anti-Aircraft Command, Stewart Air Force Base, New York, February–June 1954; thereafter, Commanding General, 56th Army Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Ft. Totten, New York.

MIKESELL, Raymond F., Chief, Foreign Minerals Division, President's Materials Policy Commission, 1952; Special Representative to Israel, summer 1952; Office of Financial and Development Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, fall 1952–summer 1953; Member, Staff of Foreign Economic Policy (Randall Commission) 1953–1954; Technical Cooperation Administration, summer 1953; Member, U.S. Mission to Israel and Ethiopia, summer 1953.

MILLS, Sheldon T., Counselor with personal rank of Minister of the Embassy in Brazil until July 31, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in India, September 19–October 2, 1952; Counselor with personal rank of Minister, October 2, 1952–July 2, 1954; Ambassador to Ecuador from August 19, 1954.

MINOR, Harold B., Minister to Lebanon until October 15, 1952; Ambassador, October 15, 1952–August 10, 1953.

MIRZA, General Iskander, Pakistani Defense Secretary until October 27, 1954; Governor of East Bengal, 1954; Minister of Interior, States, and Frontier Regions from October 27, 1954.

MISHAAL, Prince ben Abd al-Aziz, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation from October 9, 1953.

MODAI, Major Yitzhak, Israeli Assistant Military Attaché of the Israeli Embassy in the United Kingdom, 1952–1953.

MOHAMMED, Ghulam, Governor General of Pakistan.

MOLINE, Edwin G., Petroleum Attaché of the Embassy in the United Kingdom from January 4, 1952.

MOORE, C. Robert, Acting Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until May 28, 1952; thereafter First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

MOOSE, James S., Jr., Minister in Syria, June 25–September 30, 1952; thereafter Ambassador.

MORRISON, Herbert S., British Foreign Secretary, March 9–October 26, 1951.

MOSADEQ, Mohammed, Iranian Prime Minister until July 5, 1952; again July 11–16, 1952; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, July 22, 1952–August 15, 1953.

MOSTAFA, Mohamed Abdelmoneim, Egyptian Representative at the 7th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952; Ambassador to Switzerland from 1952.

MOUBARAK, Musa, Lebanese Foreign Minister, October 1, 1952–May 1, 1953.

MUHTASIB, Sheikh Mohammed, Second Secretary of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in the United States until July 1953; thereafter First Secretary.

EL MULKI (MULQUI), Dr. Fawzi, Prime Minister of Jordan, May 5, 1953–May 2, 1954.

MUNIZ, Joao Carlos, Brazilian Representative at the United Nations until 1953; Ambassador to the United States from October 20, 1953.

MUNTASSER, Mahmoud, Prime Minister of Libya to February 15, 1954.

MURPHY, Charles S., Special Counsel to the President until January 20, 1953.

MURPHY, Robert D., Ambassador to Belgium until March 19, 1952; Ambassador to Japan, May 9, 1952–April 28, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, July 28–November 30, 1953; Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 30–December 18, 1953; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

NACCAHE, Alfred, Lebanese Foreign Minister from August 15, 1953.

NAGUIB, General Muhammad, Egyptian Prime Minister and Military Governor, September 7, 1952–February 25, 1954.

NAHAS, Mustafa, a leader of the Egyptian Wafd Party; Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to January 1952.

NASH, Frank C., Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 10, 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, February 10, 1953–February 28, 1954.

NASHASHIBI, Azmi, Senior Jordanian Representative on the Jordan–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission; Under Secretary, Jordanian Foreign Ministry.

NASSER (NASIR), Colonel Gamal Abdul, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, June 18, 1953–April 18, 1954; Prime Minister, February 25–March 8, 1954, and again from April 18, 1954.

NEHRU, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs; Minister of Defense, February 10–March 15, 1953, and from December 7, 1954.

NELSON, Clifford R., Vice Consul at Salzburg until September 29, 1952; thereafter Second Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia.

NEWSOM, David D., Second Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in Iraq until February 21, 1952; thereafter Second Secretary and Consul; detailed to United States Information Agency as Public Affairs Officer, Embassy in Iraq, from August 1, 1953.

NIAZI, Anwar, First Secretary of the Egyptian Embassy in the United States until April 1954; Counselor, April–October 1954; thereafter Economic and Commercial Counselor.

NITZE, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until April 1953.

NOBLE, John, Vice President, Trans Arabian Pipeline Company; Associate General Counsel, Arabian-American Oil Company.

NOLTING, Frederick E., Jr., Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State until August 4, 1953; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs, August 4, 1953–January 4, 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs.

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NURI AL-SAID. *See* al-Said, Nuri.

NUSEIBEH, Anwar, Jordanian Minister of Education and Member of the House of Representatives until May 4, 1954; thereafter Minister of Defense.

O'CONNOR, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State, January 21, 1953–February 21, 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

OHLIGER, Floyd W., Director, Arabian-American Oil Company from 1952.

OHLY, John H., Assistant Director for Policy and Program Development, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, Mutual Security Agency, until April 17, 1952; Assistant Director for Programs, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, April 17, 1952–March 23, 1953; Deputy to the Director for Program and Coordination, Mutual Security Agency, March 23–October 1, 1953; thereafter Deputy Director for Programs and Planning, Foreign Operations Administration.

ORDONNEAU, Pierre, Counselor of the French Delegation at the United Nations; Representative to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine from May 14, 1952; Representative on the Security Council, 1953–1954.

ORTIZ, Nestor C., Petroleum Attaché of the Embassy in Lebanon, May 19, 1952–January 7, 1954; Economic Officer at Sao Paulo, January 7–July 26, 1954; thereafter Consul.

OSSEIRAN, Abdel, President of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 1953.

PALMER, Ely E., Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine until July 22, 1952.

PALMER, Joseph, II, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until October 15, 1953; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

FATRICK, Captain G. Serpell, USN, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense until August 1952; detailed to National War College, August 1952–June 1953.

PAUL, Norman S., Deputy Assistant for International Security Affairs, Mutual Security Agency until October 26, 1953; Officer in Charge of Asia, Africa, and Latin America Program Affairs, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, October 26, 1953–February 1, 1954; thereafter, Regional Director for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs, Foreign Operations Administration.

PELLY, Cornelius J., British Political Agent at Kuwait; Political Resident at Bahrein, 1952; Political Resident in Charge at Bahrein, 1952.

PENFIELD, James K., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until August 13, 1954; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission in Austria.

PENNIMAN, Howard R., Intelligence Research Officer, Office of Intelligence Research, External Research Staff, Department of State, until January 18, 1953; thereafter Chief of the External Research Staff.

PETER, Hollis W., Assistant Director, Program Planning and Advisory Staff, Technical Cooperation Administration, until March 3, 1952; thereafter Attaché of the Embassy in Lebanon.

PEURIFOY, John E., Ambassador to Greece until August 9, 1953; Ambassador to Guatemala, November 4, 1953–October 2, 1954; Ambassador to Thailand from December 3, 1954.

PHILLIPS, Captain Richard H., USN, Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1954.

PHLEGER, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State from January 30, 1953.

PLITT, Edwin A., Senior United Nations Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Member of the Delegation Staff of Advisers at the 7th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952; Member of the Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board at

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Bonn, October 19, 1953–October 27, 1954; thereafter Chairman of the Interim Mixed Parole and Clemency Board.

POPPER, David H., Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, until October 24, 1954; thereafter Director.

AL-QAZZAZ, Muhammed Said, Iraqi Minister of the Interior, September 17, 1953–June 15, 1954, and again from August 4, 1954.

QUEUILLE, Pierre, of the French Embassy in Canada until April 1952; of the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 1952–December 2, 1954; thereafter Central Administration, Secretariat of Conferences.

RADFORD, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands until July 10, 1953; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 15, 1953.

RAFAEL, Gideon, Member of the Israeli Delegation to the 7th and 8th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1953; Rapporteur, United Nations Peace Observation Commission, 1953; Adviser, United Nations and Middle Eastern Affairs, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1953.

RAHIM, Mohamed Kamil Abdul, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States until May 4, 1953.

RAMATI, Shaul, Head of the Israeli Delegation to the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission.

RATHBONE, Monroe J., Director, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

RAWI, Abdul Jalil, Counselor of the Iraqi Embassy in the United States; Chargé d'Affaires, June 3–September 26, 1953.

AL-RAWI, Najib, Iraqi Ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

RAY, George W., General Counsel, Arabian-American Oil Company and the Trans Arabian Pipeline Company.

RHOADES, Ralph O., Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation.

RIAD, General Mahmoud (Colonel until 1954), Expert of the Egyptian Delegation to the United Nations, 1953; Director, Department of Arab Affairs, Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and Alternate Representative to the 9th Regular Session of the General Assembly, 1954.

RICHARDS, James P., Democratic Representative from South Carolina; Delegate to the 8th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953.

RICHES, Derek M., British Consul at Jidda until March 24, 1953, also Chargé d'Affaires, 1952; Trade Commissioner at Khartoum from March 24, 1953.

RIDDER, Major General Bennett L. de, Belgian; Chairman of the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission.

RIDGWAY, General Matthew B., USA, Commander, United Nations Command in Korea, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan until May 1952; Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe at Paris, May 1952–August 15, 1953; thereafter Chief of Staff, United States Army.

RIFA'I, Abdul Monem, Jordanian Ambassador to the United States from December 14, 1953.

RIFAI, Colonel-General Noureddine, Inspector General and Director of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces.

RIFAI, Dr. Zafir, Syrian Foreign Minister, June 9, 1952–July 19, 1953.

RILEY, Lieutenant General William E., USMC, Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, until June 1953.

ROBERTSON, General Sir Brian H., Commander in Chief, British Middle East Land Forces until retirement, November 1953; Chairman, British Transport Commission from 1953.

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ROBERTSON, David A., First Secretary of the Embassy in the Union of South Africa until February 1, 1953; Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from March 9, 1953.

ROGERS, Major General Elmer J., Jr., USAF, Air Force Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ROOSEVELT, Eleanor, Representative to the 7th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952.

ROSS, John C., Deputy Representative to the United Nations Security Council.

ROUNTREE, William M., Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until June 2, 1952; Deputy Chief of Mission in Turkey, June 2, 1952–October 1, 1953; Counselor of the Embassy in Turkey, August 20, 1952–October 1, 1953; Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, October 1, 1953–September 25, 1954; thereafter Counselor with personal rank of Minister.

RUFFNER, Major General Clark C., USA, Deputy Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1952; Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1953.

RUSSELL, Francis H., Director, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, until October 13, 1952; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Israel.

SAAB, Hassan, Second Secretary of the Lebanese Embassy in the United States until September 1952; thereafter First Secretary.

SAAD, Ahmad Zaki, Egyptian Executive Director on the Executive Board of the IMF to 1953 and member of the Board of Governors of the IBRD to 1952; Governor of the National Bank of Egypt, 1951-1952; Minister of Finance from September 1954.

AL-SABBAN, Muhammad Surur, Saudi Arabian Minister of State; Adviser to the King from October 1953; Minister of Finance and Economics from August 30, 1954.

SABRI, Ali, Egyptian Air Force Squadron Leader and member of the Revolutionary Command Council; Chief of Air Force Intelligence from July 1952.

AL-SAID, Nuri, Iraqi Prime Minister until July 12, 1952; Minister of the Interior, 1952; Minister of Defense, January 29–September 17, 1953; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense from August 4, 1954.

SALAAM, Saeb, Lebanese Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of the Interior, May 1–August 13, 1953.

SALEM, Wing Commander Gamaleddin Mustapha, Egyptian Minister of Communications.

SALEM, Major Salaheddin Mustapha, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance and Minister of State for Sudan Affairs from June 1953.

SALIM. *See* Salem.

SALISBURY, Lord Robert A.J.G., British Lord President to the Privy Council from 1952; Leader of the House of Lords; Lord Privy Seal, 1952; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1952; Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June–October 1953.

SALTZMAN, Charles E., Under Secretary of State for Administration, June 29–December 31, 1954.

SASSON, Eliahu, Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Turkey until 1953; Ambassador to Italy from 1953.

SAUD IBN ABDUL AZIZ AL-FEISAL, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia until November 9, 1953; thereafter King.

SAWYER, Charles, Secretary of Commerce until January 20, 1953.

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SCHNEE, Alexander, Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Greece until February 21, 1952; thereafter First Secretary and Consul.

SCOTT, Sir Robert H., British Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until July 15, 1953; thereafter Minister of the British Embassy in the United States; also Chargé d'Affaires, 1954.

SCOTT, Walter K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration until March 22, 1954; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State.

SEELYE, Talcott W., Resident Officer at Frankfort-am-Main until August 5, 1952; thereafter Third Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in Jordan.

SELIM, Dr. Muhammad, Secretary General of the Egyptian National Production Council.

SELO, Colonel Fawzi (subsequently Major General), Syrian Chief of State, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense until July 10, 1953.

SERAQ ED-DIN (SERAGEDDIN), Fuad, Minister of the Interior in the Nahas cabinet to January 1952; Secretary General of the Wafd Party to October 1952.

SHABANDAR, Dr. Moussa al-, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States from September 26, 1953; Foreign Minister, March 8–April 29, 1954 and again from August 4, 1954.

SHALIT, Meir, First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in the United States until 1954.

SHARETT, Moshe, Israeli Foreign Minister; Prime Minister from December 9, 1953.

SHEPHERD, General Lemuel C., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

SHIHAB. *See* Chehab.

SHILOAH, Reuven, Special Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Ministry and also Liaison Officer with the Ministry of Defense until 1953; Minister of the Israeli Embassy in the United States from 1953.

AL-SHISHAKLI, General Adib, Syrian Chief of Staff and Deputy Prime Minister, 1952; Vice President, Minister of Defense, and Chief of State, 1953; President, July 10, 1953–March 1, 1954; also Prime Minister, July 19, 1953–March 1, 1954.

SHORT, Joseph, Secretary to the President until January 20, 1953.

SHUCKBURGH, Charles Arthur E., Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State until May 14, 1954; thereafter Assistant Under Secretary of State.

SHUKAIRY, Ahmad, Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States; Syrian Representative at the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1954; Chairman of the Syrian Delegation to the United Nations, 1954.

SIEVERS, Colonel Harry L., USA, Executive Officer, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

SIRRI, Husyan, Egyptian Prime Minister, July 2–22, 1952.

SLIM, Field Marshal Sir William, Chief of the British Imperial Staff until 1952; Governor General of Australia from May 8, 1953.

SMITH, Rear Admiral H.P., USN, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense until November 1953; thereafter Commander, Amphibious Group 2, Transport Squadron 2.

SMITH, General Walter Bedell, USA (ret.), Director of Central Intelligence until February 8, 1953; Under Secretary of State, February 9, 1953–October 1, 1954.

SNYDER, John W., Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the National Advisory Council of International Financial and Monetary Problems until January 20, 1953.

SNYDER, Lester M., Vice President of the Arabian-American Oil Company; Vice President and Director, Arabian-American Oil Company Realty Company; Director, Arabian-American Oil Company, Overseas Company from 1952.

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SOLH, Sami Bey, Prime Minister of Lebanon to September 9, 1952, and again from September 17, 1954.

SOUTHWELL, Charles A.P., Managing Director, Kuwait Oil Company, Limited.

SPIEGEL, Harold R., Assistant Treasurer for the Arabian-American Oil Company.

STAATS, Elmer B., Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, until 1953; Executive Director, Operations Coordinating Board, from 1953.

STABLER, Wells, Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until October 17, 1952; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, October 17, 1952–January 15, 1953; thereafter Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Italy.

STASSEN, Harold E., Director of the Mutual Security Agency, January 20–August 1, 1953; thereafter Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

STEELMAN, John R., Assistant to the President until January 20, 1953.

STEIN, Eric, Pacific Settlement Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State; Adviser to the Delegation to the 7th and 8th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1953.

STELLE, Charles C., Deputy Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until February 17, 1952; thereafter Member of the Policy Planning Staff.

STEPHENS, Thomas E., Appointment Secretary to General Eisenhower until January 20, 1953; thereafter Secretary to the President.

STEWART, Major General George C., USA, Deputy for Foreign Military Aid to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Army Headquarters, until March 1, 1953; thereafter Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.

STRANG, Sir William, Permanent Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until November 1953.

STRONG, Robert C., Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until January 4, 1953; Member, Policy Planning Staff, January 4, 1953–August 2, 1954; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Syria, August 2–3, 1954; thereafter Counselor.

[illegible]HILL, Robert G., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

[illegible]TESMAN, John H., Jr., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Iran until March 25, 1952; thereafter Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.

SULEIMAN, Sheikh Abdullah al-, Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance.

AL-SULH, Samih, Lebanese Prime Minister, February 11–September 10, 1952, and again from September 17, 1954.

SULTAN, Shaikh Shakhbut ibn, Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.

SUNDT, Olaf F., Petroleum Attaché of the Embassy in France until May 5, 1954; thereafter Attaché of the Embassy in Brazil.

SUROOR (SURUR) AL SABBAN, Muhammad. *See* al-Sabban, Muhammad.

AL-SUWAIDI, Tawfiq, Iraqi Foreign Minister until July 12, 1952, and again January 29–September 29, 1953; Member of the Iraqi Senate.

SWENSRUD, Sidney A., President and Director of Gulf Oil Corporation; Chairman of the Board from 1953.

SWIGART, Clyde A., President of the Trans Arabian Pipeline Company.

SWIHART, James W., Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, March 30, 1952–October 5, 1954; thereafter Attaché of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

TABET, Karim, member of the Husyan Sirri cabinet, July 1952.

TAIMUR, Sultan Said Bin, Sultan of Oman.

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TAKLA, Philippe, Lebanese Foreign Minister, February 11–September 10, 1952.

TALAL, Ibn Abdu'llah al-Hussein, King of Jordan until August 11, 1952.

TANNOUS, Dr. Izzat, Arab Representative of Palestinian Refugees at the United Nations, 1952; Secretary General of the Arab Palestine Office for Refugees at Beirut; Chairman of the Palestine Refugee Political Committee at Beirut.

TAXIS, Colonel Samuel G., USMC, Chairman of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission until April 1953.

TAYLOR, Paul B., Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State; Adviser to the Delegation to the 7th and 8th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1952–1953; also Principal Executive Officer, 1952–1953.

TEKOAH, Joseph, Assistant Legal Adviser, Israeli Foreign Ministry.

AL-THANI, Saidh Ali ibn Abdullah, Shaikh of Qatar.

TIMMONS, Benson E.L., Deputy Director of the United States Operations Mission in France until August 1, 1953; Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in France, August 1, 1953–November 1, 1954; thereafter First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France (detailed to the Foreign Operations Administration).

TOMLINSON, Frank S., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States.

TOUQAN. *See* Tuquan.

TRESIZE, Philip H., Chief, Division of Research for Near East and Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until August 3, 1952; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Intelligence Research.

TROXEL, Oliver L., Jr., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

TRUMAN, Harry S., President of the United States until January 20, 1953.

TSARAPKIN, Seme K., Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative at the United Nations until 1952 and again February 1953–September 1954; Representative on the Trusteeship Council, 1954.

TUQAN (TOUQAN), Ahmad Bey, Senior Jordanian Representative on the Jordan–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, 1952; thereafter, Minister of Education.

TURAIQI, Abdullah al-, Director of the Petroleum Supervisory Office, Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance.

TWINING, General Nathan F., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 30, 1953; thereafter Chief of Staff.

TYLER, S. Roger, Jr., Consul at Jerusalem until July 26, 1954.

ULUSAN, Rear Admiral Aziz, Turkish Representative on the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

UMAR, Ahmet, Counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Iraq, 1952–1953.

UNGER, Leonard, Political Officer at Trieste until January 3, 1952; Political Officer of the Embassy in Italy, January 3–March 13, 1952; First Secretary and Consul, March 13, 1952–December 13, 1953; thereafter Officer in Charge of Political Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

VANDENBERG, General Hoyt S., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 29, 1953.

VAN FLEET, General James A., USA, Commanding General, Eighth Army, Korea until February 11, 1953; retired from the Army, March 31, 1953.

VAN HOLLEN, Christopher, Member of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State until December 9, 1954; thereafter Attaché of the Embassy in India.

VIGDERMAN, Alfred C., Attorney-Adviser, Legal Office, Department of State, until May 1, 1952; Assistant Legal Adviser for Mutual Security Affairs, May 1–June

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27, 1952; thereafter Attaché of the Embassy in France; also Legal Adviser to USRO at Paris from September 14, 1953.

VIGIER, Henri, Political Adviser to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, 1954.

VILLARD, Henry S., Minister to Libya, March 6, 1952–June 24, 1954; detailed to the United Nations General Assembly from September 26, 1954.

VYSHINSKY, Andrei Y., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs until March 1953; First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, March 1953–November 1954; Representative on the Security Council and Chairman of the Soviet Delegations to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the General Assembly until November 22, 1954.

WADSWORTH, George, Ambassador to Turkey until January 2, 1952; Member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, April 19–October 8, 1952; Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, December 29, 1952–October 30, 1953; Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Yemen from January 9, 1954.

WADSWORTH, James J., Deputy Representative to the United Nations and Deputy Representative on the Security Council from February 28, 1953.

WAHBA, Hafiz, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

WALDO, John A., Jr., Attaché of the Embassy in Syria from February 25, 1952.

WALKER, Malcolm T., First Secretary and Consul of the British Embassy in Jordan until October 19, 1953; also Chargé d'Affaires, 1952.

WALLER, Fred E., Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from March 14, 1952.

WARD, Angus, Consul General at Nairobi until June 20, 1952; Ambassador to Afghanistan from November 8, 1952.

WARREN, Avra M., Ambassador to Pakistan until November 26, 1952; Ambassador to Turkey from September 17, 1953.

WAUGH, Samuel C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 5, 1953.

WEBB, James E., Under Secretary of State until February 29, 1952.

WEIZMANN, Chaim, President of Israel until December 8, 1952.

WELLING, Tracy R., Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in Jordan from April 2, 1952.

WHITE, Ivan B., Counselor of the Embassy in Spain until September 17, 1953; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Israel.

WHITEFORD, William K., Executive Vice President and Director of Gulf Oil Corporation; Director of the British American Oil Company; President of the British American Oil Producing Company.

WHITMAN, Ann, Personal Secretary to the President from January 21, 1953.

WILKINS, Fraser, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in India until October 28, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy for Political Affairs, October 28, 1952–August 2, 1953; Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, August 2, 1953–August 15, 1954; thereafter detailed to National War College.

WILLIAMS, Philip P., First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Costa Rica until October 26, 1953; thereafter First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Israel.

WILLIS, George H., Director, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury.

WILSON, Charles E., Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1953.

WILSON, Evan M., Consul General at Calcutta and Katmandu until September 14, 1953; thereafter First Secretary and Consul General of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

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WINTERS, Harvey J., Business Projects and Technology Staff, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State.

WOLF, Joseph J., Acting Officer in Charge of Political Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 20, 1952; Officer in Charge, July 20, 1952–July 1, 1954; detailed to National War College, 1953–1954; Special Adviser for NATO Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, from July 1, 1954.

WOLFF, Stanley B., Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until January 5, 1953; thereafter Second Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in Italy.

WOOLDRIDGE, Rear Admiral Edmund T., USN, Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Senior Staff of the National Security Council until January 1953; thereafter Commander of the Second Fleet and the NATO Striking Fleet.

WORCESTER, Douglas, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

WRIGHT, Edwin M., Intelligence Adviser, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until May 28, 1952; thereafter Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs.

WRIGHT, Vice Admiral Jerauld (Admiral from April 1, 1954), USN, Deputy Representative to the NATO Standing Group until June 14, 1952; Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, June 14, 1952–April 12, 1954; thereafter Commander in Chief, Atlantic, and Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

YADIN, Major General Yigael, Israeli Military Officer; Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces until 1952.

YAFI, Abdullah Bey al-, Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior until February 11, 1952; Minister of Defense, August 13, 1953–March 1, 1954; Prime Minister again, August 13, 1953–September 17, 1954.

YASSIN, Yussef, Secretary to the King of Saudi Arabia, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of State; Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia.

ZABARAH, Assayed Ahmad Ali, First Secretary of the Yemeni Embassy in the United States.

ZAFRULLAH KHAN, Sir Mohammed, Pakistani Foreign Minister and Minister of Commonwealth Relations; Chairman of the Delegations to the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regular Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1953–1954.

ZAHEDI, Ardeshir, Iranian Administrative Deputy in the United States Four Point Mission until 1952; Civil Adjutant to the Shah of Iran from August 1953.

ZAKKARIA, Dr. Yassin, Second Secretary of the Syrian Embassy in the United States from August 1953.

ZEINEDDINE, Dr. Farid, Syrian Ambassador to the United States and Mexico from December 18, 1952; Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

ZORLU, Fatin Rustu, Permanent Representative of Turkey on the North Atlantic Council; Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of State from May 1954.

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EGYPT

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONTROVERSY WITH REGARD TO THE SUEZ CANAL ZONE;[1] THE QUESTIONS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BY THE UNITED STATES TO EGYPT

A. United States Anxiety at the Impasse in the Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations Regarding the Suez Base; the Sudan Aspect; the Byroade Conversations in London, December 31, 1952-January 7, 1953; the Issue of United States Interim Military Aid to Egypt; the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12, 1953, Regarding the Sudan

No. 947

Conference files, lot 59 D 95 CF 100

United States Minutes of the Third Formal Session of the Truman–Churchill Talks, Washington, Cabinet Room of the White House, January 8, 1952, 11 a. m.–1 p. m. [2]

TOP SECRET

TCT MIN–3

Present:

U.S.	U.K.
The President	*Prime Minister Churchill*
Mr. Short	Mr. Eden
Mr. Murphy	Lord Cherwell
Mr. Lloyd	Lord Ismay
Secretary Acheson	Ambassador Franks
Mr. Matthews	Sir Norman Brook
Mr. Perkins	Sir Roger Makins
Ambassador Gifford	Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Leishman
Mr. Knight	Mr. Colville

[1] For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 343 ff.

[2] Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, and their staff came to Washington on Jan. 5, 1952, for a series of long, intimate, and frank discussions with President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and their subordinates to consider the international problems facing the two governments and to review their often diverging attitudes and prescriptions for solving these difficulties. Consequently, the two sides made no real effort to reach decisions on issues. For documentation concerning these Truman–Churchill talks, see volume VI.

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Mr. Berry
Mr. Allison
Secretary Lovett
General Bradley
Admiral Fechteler
Secretary Snyder
Mr. Willis
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Pitblado
Mr. Gore-Booth
Mr. Mallaby
Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Admiral Sir Roderick McGrigor
Air Marshal Sir William Elliot
Sir Kenneth McLean
Mr. Burrows
Mr. Tomlinson

[Here follows discussion of the Middle East Command.]

2. Coordination of US–UK Policies in the Middle East: Egypt and Iran.

After saying that it was vital that the UK and the US understand each other on all these matters, the President asked Mr. Acheson to speak.

Referring to Egypt, the Secretary of State said that he and Mr. Eden had discussed this situation at some length Saturday night on the *Williamsburg* [3] and that he expected to have other talks with Mr. Eden while he was here. The prime purpose of these talks would be to work out a new four-power approach to Egypt. [4] In view of the importance which the King of Egypt places on the matter this new approach should include his recognition as King of the Sudan. However, before granting this recognition to the King of Egypt, it would be necessary to assure ourselves of certain conditions beforehand. The King would have to agree to self-determination of the Sudan and to refrain from upsetting any Sudanese regime. He also would have to agree beforehand to accept the four-power proposal concerning the MEC. [5] Although not mentioned as a pre-condition, Mr. Acheson said that the King of Egypt should cooperate in dispelling the existing misconceptions in Egypt concerning the nature of the original four-power proposal. He expressed confidence that he could reach agreement with Mr. Eden as to the

[3] The memorandum of that conversation is scheduled for publication in volume VI.

[4] For previous documentation regarding the origins and development of plans to establish a Middle East Command and the conjunctive decisions leading to the four-power approach to Egypt, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol, v, pp. 1 ff. For further documentation regarding the continued interest of the United States in developing a regional security organization for the defense of the Near and Middle East, see Documents 55 ff.

[5] See footnote 4 above.

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course of action to be followed by that it was not clear as to the best moment for breaking the present deadlock.

Mr. Eden stated that he agreed with much that Mr. Acheson had said. However, the King of Egypt does not want the four powers to move now. He thought it was very important to make it quite clear that there had been full agreement at this meeting on the line which should be pursued by the US and UK in relation to Egypt and that this might so influence the Egyptian Government that it might advance the date when a new four-power proposal could advantageously be made. According to the British Foreign Secretary, the main complication for the UK in recognizing King Farouk as King of the Sudan lay in the fact that such recognition would be generally interpreted throughout Egypt as British acceptance of the abrogation of the Treaty of 1899 and of the resulting condominium over the Sudan. To make possible British recognition of King Farouk as King of the Sudan it would first be necessary for the Egyptians to return to the terms of the Treaty of 1899 and abide thereby.

Mr. Churchill then stressed the importance of making fully clear in the communiqué UK–US agreement as to the policy to be followed in relation to Egypt. [6]

Mr. Eden added that it would also be helpful if the communiqué made it crystal clear that the US and the UK had made up their minds to proceed vigourously with the establishment of the MEC. This should have many beneficial effects throughout the Middle East area.

Mr. Truman requested Mr. Acheson to pursue his talks with Mr. Eden concerning Egypt and then referred to his grave worries over the Iranian situation.

[Here follows discussion of the situation in Iran, Korea, China, Formosa, Pacific Security, Indochina, British Recognition of Communist China, Southeast Asia, and Japan, and Nationalist China.]

[6] The Joint Communiqué is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 83.

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No. 948

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100

United States Memorandum of Conversation Between American and British Representatives, Washington, Department of State, January 9, 1952, 10:30 a.m.[1]

TOP SECRET
TCT CONV-9

Present:

U.S.	*U.K.*
Secretary Acheson	Secretary Eden
Mr. Matthews	Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Perkins	Mr. Burrows
Mr. Berry	Mr. Shuckburgh
Ambassador Gifford	
Mr. Stabler	

Egypt

The Secretary said that Egypt was the first item on the agenda today. He said that we were in agreement on principles and that what he wished to raise this morning was the question of tactics. He believed that we should be prepared to move forward with the Egyptians in an attempt to break the present impasse. He felt that when the time came to do something, the question of King Farouk's title as King of the Sudan might be the means to ease the defense proposals through. He was not proposing that we do anything at the present time but that we merely prepare ourselves for the future. What was required was Four Power agreement on the substance of a move after which we would inform our Ambassadors in Cairo what we have in mind. The United States had no particular views as to whether the move should be made now or whether it should only be made after the Wafd is removed.

The Secretary said that the great problem in connection with the King's title, as indeed Mr. Eden had pointed out, was that if recognition of the title should in any way be considered an indication that we are accepting the Egyptian abrogation, it would not be possible to use it. However, we wanted to see if we could not work out an arrangement whereby recognition of the title could be justified by the United Kingdom on its terms and equally justified by the Egyptians on their terms.

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[1] This was the ninth in a series of meetings held in conjunction with the talks held between President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill.

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The Secretary went on to say that if Farouk had the right to the title at some time in the past and the 1899 Agreements in no way removed his right to the title, then perhaps the decision could be made, possibly through the International Court of Justice, that his claim to the title under the Condominium Agreements was justified. If some such decision could be made, then we could wrap up the whole proposal in one package. The title might be helpful in removing the Sudan as an obstacle to the defense proposals but, of course, the Egyptians would have to agree to the whole proposal before we went ahead on the title.

We proposed that Egypt agree to giving the Sudanese the right of self-determination. This right would be guaranteed by the United Kingdom, and possibly other powers, including the United States. Egypt would also have to agree that it would not upset the *status quo* of the administration of the Sudan. In other words, they cannot attempt to change the machinery of government. Lastly Egypt must agree to accept the Four Power Defense Proposals, recast in some form which might make them more comprehensible and acceptable to Egypt. If Egyptian agreement could be obtained to these three things, then arrangements might be made to recognize the King's title as "King of the Sudan".

Mr. Eden said that the Secretary's presentation was an excellant one and that he had these points in mind. He was not sure that from the King's viewpoint the title was really the most important. He felt that it was more important that we should persuade the Egyptians to discuss the defense proposals. Mr. Eden went on to say that he had told Salaheddin in Paris recently that what we wanted was to discuss the Four Power proposals with the Egyptian Government. We did not ask them to accept the proposals before discussion but we wanted to sit down and talk about them. Mr. Eden felt that if we could get the Egyptians to start discussing the proposals, we might be able to make a definite move forward in obtaining their acceptance.

Mr. Eden believed that the question of the King's title was a very difficult one. He doubted that it would be necessary to go to the International Court on this problem. In point of fact the British position had not changed with regard to Egypt's relationship to the Sudan. While the United Kingdom regretted that Egypt had torn up the Condominium Agreement, this had not changed the position, and the United Kingdom was prepared to call the King whatever was justified under the Agreements.

The Secretary then asked whether there had not been some decision by the British law courts that the King had the right to the title "King of the Sudan", and that the Condominium Agreements

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had not in any way destroyed this right. Mr. Eden said he thought there had been something of this sort.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Stabler to clarify this point. Mr. Stabler said that there had not been an actual court decision but that in 1946 at the time of the Bevin-Sidky discussions [2] the law officers of the Crown had decided that the King had the right to the title. Mr. Matthews asked whether that was in connection with the Condominium Agreements. Mr. Stabler replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Eden said that the King did have the right to some sort of title under the Condominium Agreements and believed he used the title "Sovereign of Nubia, the Sudan Darfur and Kordofan". However, this was somewhat different from the title of "King".

Mr. Burrows said that recognition of the title would probably raise the question of the constitution which the Egyptians had prepared for the Sudan. The Secretary said that it was our understanding that there was no constitution in effect. There had been several Egyptian laws passed in connection with abrogation, one authorizing the definition of the status of the Sudan by special law and the second one declaring that a constituent assembly should prepare a constitution for the Sudan which would guarantee certain specified principles. The legal situation was that no constitution for the Sudan existed at present.

Mr. Burrows said that while this might be true, the impression exists in the Sudan that a constitution has been prepared and he believed that if the title were recognized, the Sudanese might think that the constitution had been accepted by the UK.

Mr. Eden said that the King's title has become mixed up with the decrees concerning abrogation. In this connection he wondered whether the British Embassy in Washington had kept the State Department informed regarding the "squawks" from Khartoum on the reaction of the Sudanese to the Egyptian moves. Mr. Burrows replied in the affirmative and said that as a matter of fact Mr. Stabler was leaving today for the Sudan. Mr. Eden said he was glad to hear this and hoped it would be possible for Mr. Stabler to have a good look at the situation there and the difficulties with which the UK is confronted. He inquired whether the US had any representation in the Sudan and was told that we did not.

The Secretary said that the important thing to do was to make a move which would give the King some strength in order that he might do something with the Wafd.

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[2] For documentation regarding the Bevin-Sidky discussions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 69–78.

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Mr. Eden assured the Secretary that the British would look into this question with urgency and see what could be done about a move. He thought it was particularly important that we should get the Egyptians to look at the 4-power proposals. All we wanted to do was get them to discuss the proposals and as he had told Salaheddin, they would not be committed in advance to anything. He then asked whether the US was proposing any change in the 4-power proposals. The Secretary said that we were not proposing any change in substance but there were a few points which we thought could be clarified in order that the proposals might be more acceptable to the Egyptians. Mr. Berry commented that the proposals as presented to Egypt were not worded precisely as they might have been and that in recasting them we should take into account Egyptian prestige, sensibilities, etc. What we wanted to do was make the proposals more attractive to the Egyptian public.

Mr. Eden said that he would actually prefer to give more, if it were possible, in connection with the 4-power proposals than give way on the Sudan. The UK did not want to sell out the Sudanese. Mr. Berry said that as the United States also had no desire to sell out the Sudanese, we were in agreement on this point.

Mr. Eden then asked whether in connection with this move we wished to examine the matter, including the redraft of the Defense Proposals, in Washington or in London. It was recalled that Mr. Bowker had come over in September 1951 to assist in preparing the original proposals. He also inquired whether we had a redrafted text of the proposals which we might let them have. Mr. Berry said that we had not yet made a redraft. Mr. Eden went on to say that he would ask Mr. Bowker to start at once to work on the proposals. If it were necessary, he could send somebody here or we could send somebody to London. The Secretary said this would be entirely agreeable to him and he would be quite willing for Mr. Berry to go to London if it was decided to handle the matter in this way.

Mr. Eden then said that they would try to find some way around the question of the King's title and hoped that we would do likewise. He wished there were some other title besides "King" that could be used.

Mr. Berry said that we thought something on the King's title was necessary if we were to make progress on the defense proposals inasmuch as the Sudan question and the Canal Base problem were linked in the Egyptian mind.

The discussion on Egypt ended with the understanding that consultation would continue through our respective Embassies on preparing some sort of move.

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No. 949

874.00 TA/1-852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT CAIRO, January 8, 1952—5 p. m.

1017. Totec. Re Embtel niact 1005 Jan 7.[1] Further to Embtel 1005, following is translation of *aide-mémoire* in French recd from FonOff:

"The amendments which the Amer Govt wishes to introduce into the preamble of the general Point Four agreement for Technical Cooperation between the Royal Govt of Egypt and the Govt of the US of America, signed at Cairo the 5th of May, 1951,[2] constitute in reality important amendments to said agreement which had previously been submitted to the Council of Ministers and approved by the Egyptian Parliament as Law No. 125 of the year 1951, published in issue No. 73 of the official journal on August 23, 1951.

"It is therefore not possible to again submit the matter to the Council of Ministers except after a detailed study, which cannot be completed within the time fixed, that is to say, Jan 8 of the current year."

Signed in Cairo the 8th of Jan. 1952.

As mentioned in Embtel niact 1005, Article 8, para 1, of gen agreement provides that "it shall remain in force until 3 months after either govt shall have given notice in writing to the other of intention to terminate the agreement". Please advise urgently if Emb shld present written notice to the Egyptian Govt of intention to suspend technical assistance effective 3 months from midnight tonight.

I think it desirable point out that Egypt Govt will answer any publicity given suspension of technical assistance by publishing their version that US action as contrary to provisions of agreement (re last para mytel 1005, Jan 7).

CAFFERY

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[1] Not printed; Ambassador Caffery reported that the Egyptian Cabinet had decided on Jan. 6 to present him with an *aide-mémoire* protesting the possibility that the United States would suspend technical assistance to Egypt because of Egypt's apparent failure to comply with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, better known as the Battle Act. (874.00 TA/1-752)

[2] TIAS No. 2479, printed in 3 UST (pt. 2) 2960.

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No. 950

874.00 TA/1-952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1952—8:11 p. m.

1011. Totec. Embtel 1017 Jan 8. Dept desires no action now to terminate Gen Agreement for Technical Coop. Continue negots with Egypt Govt to obtain Sec 511 (b) assurances. [1] Inform Dept developments in negots to permit additional instrs re Technical Assistance Program and comply Deptel 996 Jan 8. [2]

Emb shld point out that assurances required by Act need not be considered as amendments to May 5 Gen Agreement. May be exchange notes reaffirming mutual support broad objective internatl understanding mentioned May 5 agreement, and projecting it, but only to extent mutually agreeable, by undertaking action that will eliminate causes of tensions between peoples.

Dept regrets Egyptians believe US attempting exercise big stick diplomacy through manipulation technical assistance, when simply obliged conform specific provisions MSA, including phrase from Sec 511 (b) quoted ur 1020 Jan 9. [3] In lieu that phrase you may wish suggest fol language which being suggested for final version draft exchange notes with Leb.

"The Govt of Leb, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, agrees to join in promoting internatl understanding and good will, and in maintaining world peace and to undertake such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes for internatl tension."

FYI exchange notes on 511 (b) signed with Jordan and Saudi.

Indication our desire reach understanding demonstrated by fact technicians continuing work on projects until agreement reached or clear no agreement possible.

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[1] This reference is to the Mutual Security Act, signed into law on Oct. 10, 1951, as Public Law 165. (65 Stat. 373)

[2] Not printed; the Department instructed the Embassy in Egypt to suspend new dollar expenditures for commodities and equipment for technical assistance until Egypt provided the necessary assurances called for under the Mutual Security Act. On the assumption that Egypt would give the proper assurances, however, the Embassy was instructed to allow the technicians in Egypt to remain and perform their duties. (874.00 TA/1-852)

[3] Not printed; the phrase in question is as follows: "and to undertake such action as they may mutually agree upon to eliminate causes for international tension". Ambassador Caffery reported that he thought the Egyptian Government would insist on the elimination or substantial modification of this phrase in the final exchange of notes signifying Egyptian compliance with the terms of the Mutual Security Act. (874.00 TA/1-952)

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If becomes definite assurances impossible termination Gen Agreement wld be on three months notice consistent with Art VIII para 1 said Agreement.

If Emb deems useful argument in answering contention US unilaterally violating Gen Agreement might point out that under its terms aid to be extended pursuant separate written agreements or understandings. Memoranda of Understanding for two projects state expressly they are subj to availability of appropriations. Since US appropriation not available for expenditure until assurances are recd US not in violation Gen Agreement or Memoranda Understanding entered into pursuant to Gen Agreement in suspending these. Memo of Understanding for development low cost housing and materials is conducted under lump sum contract with private contractor which will not be renewed or extended unless assurances are recd but which does not provide for immed cancellation by TCA and such cancellation is not now planned.

Assume Egyptians now clear that Jan 8 was deadline for Sec 511 (b) of Mutual Security Act (Deptel 996) whereas Jan 24 is deadline for Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, known as Battle Act, [4] which requires that US mil econ and fin be cut if assurances not given that certain arms and commodities of primary strategic significance not including cotton (see Depcirins of Dec 17 [5] entitled "Battle Act Lists") will not knowingly be shipped to Soviet bloc. After prelim look at Battle Act lists Egypt Emb told Dept Egypt not shipping any Battle Act items to Soviet countries. Memo that conversation sent Emb by air about Jan 3.

ACHESON

[4] Signed into law on Oct. 26, 1951, as Public Law 213. (65 Stat. 644)
[5] Not printed.

No. 951

641.74/1-2552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 25, 1952.

Subject: Visit of the British Minister and First Secretary

Participants: Sir Christopher Steel, K.C.M.G., M.V.O., British Minister
Mr. Greenhill, O.B.E., First Secretary of British Embassy
NEA—Mr. Berry

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NEA—Mr. Jones
NE—Mr. Kopper
BNA—Mr. Coe
NE—Mr. Ortiz

Problem: British military action in the Suez Canal Zone.
Action required: To inform the Secretary. [1]
Action assigned to: NE
Summary:

I told the British Minister that I was particularly happy to see him as important events were occurring in the Canal Zone, and we hoped that he might be able to give us information of them. I said that we had received a telegram last night at about 10:30 P.M. which informed us that a British action was about to take place, and then I read the substance of the telegram No. 3226, January 24 from London which we had received one half hour before the British action was scheduled to commence. [2]

Sir Christopher commented that our London telegram very accurately reported the plan. He then read a recently received report of the military action. This stated that the Egyptian police had surrendered after approximately half a day of intense resistance. The preliminary report had put the casualties at some 23 Egyptians and 3 Britons killed. He commented that the disarmament of the Egyptian auxiliary police had been "a very tidy operation".

The British Minister then read slowly from a telegram from London. He stated:

"Please inform Mr. Acheson (you should impress on him) that the measures taken by General Erskine are essential for maintaining the security of our troops in the Canal Zone and that I look confidently to him for full support in this respect and in any measures that may as a result be forced upon us to meet disorders in the Delta in which the lives of United States nationals will be threatened as much as the lives of British subjects."

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[1] Berry sent a copy of this memorandum of conversation to Secretary of State Acheson on Jan. 26 as an attachment to a separate memorandum, not printed. (641.74/1-2452)

[2] Not printed. The Minister of Embassy in London, Julius C. Holmes, had reported that Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had informed him that British forces at Ismailia would begin disarming the Egyptian auxiliary police the following day. Eden thought that the Egyptian Government would feel compelled to react in such a way that foreigners' lives might be endangered. Therefore, the British were making preliminary moves of naval units into positions to enable them to evacuate foreigners if necessary. Moreover, Eden was instructing the British Ambassador in Egypt, Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson, to warn King Farouk that he had to prevent his government from taking actions which would endanger foreigners. (641.74/1-2452)

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Reading from a separate telegram, Sir Christopher reported that further study had been made of the possibility of a new approach to the Egyptian Government with respect to area defense and the Sudan. In this connection he said the United States must appreciate that any approach on these subjects to the present Egyptian Government would be impossible.

Mr. Jones inquired as to the significance of the British naval moves reported in today's press. Sir Christopher replied that he had no knowledge of this but that it was a possibility that these moves were connected with the change from a 72 to a 48 hour notice of the putting into effect of operation "Rodeo". Sir Christopher stressed the "stickiness" of the Alexandria operation and said that naval support was imperative.

Mr. Jones asked if it were not the United Kingdom's plan to occupy sections of Alexandria rather than to evacuate British subjects by sea. Mr. Greenhill replied that this was true; that sections of Alexandria including the two airfields were to be occupied in this operation with evacuation later. This was to be the evacuation perimeter. Cairo was to be enveloped in a separate move from the Canal Zone.

I told the United Kingdom representatives that the position of the United States with respect to the evacuation of its citizens was set out in a telegram sent to London today. [3] I read portions of this telegram. I explained to the United Kingdom representatives that a decision on their suggestion for a United States warship to visit Tripoli was a separate but related subject which we would work out in the light of developments. The British reaction to the United States' views on evacuation was to the effect that it was up to the respective naval commanders in the Mediterranean to work out their own problems, but that a certain amount of confusion was likely.

In response to a question by Mr. Kopper, Mr. Greenhill said he believed all foreigners in Egypt were not safe from mob action if uncontrolled rioting should occur. Mr. Greenhill said it was possible that the reported naval movements did not necessarily mean that plan "Rodeo" was in progress. It is likely that the British ships are simply on their way from Malta to Suda Bay.

Mr. Jones asked if it was the British view that since the operation had terminated that we were back now to where we were before the inception of the operation. Mr. Greenhill said that he presumed so, and that the captured police were to be returned to Egyptian authorities.

[3] Not printed.

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Sir Christopher said that since Sir Oliver Franks had seen the Secretary only the day before yesterday, there would be no need to ask to see the Secretary tomorrow. However, perhaps the Secretary would want to discuss the matter and might wish to ask Sir Oliver to come to see him.

No. 952

774.00/1-2752

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle)

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 27, 1952—6 p. m.

Subject: Egyptian developments.

Participants: The Secretary
British Ambassador
(Mr. L.D. Battle
Mr. G. Lewis Jones—present)

The Secretary telephoned the British Ambassador about 6:00 p.m., today from his residence and spoke in the following sense:

The Secretary had received Mr. Eden's message of January 25 regarding the contemplated police action at Ismailia. He was sorry that that action had not worked out as Mr. Eden had hoped and expected. "The whole thing looks bad".

The Secretary understood Mr. Eden was considering the issuance of a conciliatory message: The U.S. favored the early issuance of such a message.

(The British Ambassador at this point advised the Secretary of the news over the radio that the King had formed a new cabinet.) [1]

The Secretary said that if the cabinet has changed, this would indicate even more strongly the need for a conciliatory message.

Speaking very personally the Secretary said that it did not impress him that the operation of Ismailia had been carried out with "unusual skill". He said the "splutter of musketry" apparently does not stop things as we had been told from time to time that it would. The Secretary said that Ambassador Caffery is doing everything possible to prevent Egyptians from taking such retaliatory measures as breaking diplomatic relations.

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[1] Ambassador Caffery in Cairo informed the Department of State in telegram 1166, Jan. 27, not printed, that Farouk had appointed Ali Maher Pasha to be the new Prime Minister of Egypt. (774.13/1-2752) This followed the Jan. 26 incident in Cairo in which mobs looted and burned without restraint for most of the day.

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The Secretary then recapitulated to the British Ambassador that (a) He had received message; (b) U.S. was disturbed by developments; (c) Conciliatory statement was a good idea; and (d) if King has taken strong stand we would be well advised to encourage him.

(British Ambassador expressed the view that now there is a new Government in Egypt there might be the "chance of a lifetime" to make progress on a settlement.)

No. 953

641.74/1-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, January 28, 1952—2 a. m.

3259. Fol is text of tel from Eden to Stevenson. Eden has expressed to me hope that Caffery will be able give Stevenson full support in premises.

"1. According to a press report King Farouk had dismissed Nahas and called on Ali Maher to form a govt.

"2. However the policies of the new govt may develop it must be a gain to be rid of the Wafd. We would wish to do everything in our power to reach agreement with the new govt. We are perfectly ready to undertake discussions at once on the basis of four-power proposals without any prior commitment to their acceptance. We could only do this with real hope of success if Egyptian Govt on their side would do all in their power to call a halt to terrorist activities and of course refrain from such anti-Brit measures as rupture of relations or expulsion of Brit subjects. I leave it to your judgment how to play the hand but if new Egyptian Govt will meet you on these conditions, you could indicate to them that within the above framework, the position of HMG is as stated in fol para:

"3. In present circumstances HMG must maintain their position in the Canal Zone and will continue to do so. HMG wish to make it perfectly clear, however, that they have no wish to maintain indefinitely British troops in the Canal Zone contrary to the wishes of the Egyptian Govt. It is their sincere desire to reach agreement with the Egyptian Govt on arrangements for the adequate defense of the Canal Zone which will provide for a gradual assumption of responsibilities by the Egyptian armed forces. If the Egyptian Govt wld agree to discuss matters HMG are confident that such an agreement could be reached.

"4. If Egyptian Govt were on their part prepared to refrain from the anti-Brit measures referred to and to seek to call a halt to terrorist activities, I shld be prepared publicly to state our policy in the terms set out in the preceding para.

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[1] Sent to Cairo as telegram 148 and repeated to the Department.

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"5. In all these matters we should, of course, continue to work closely with our American and other allies".

GIFFORD

No. 954

641.74/1-2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1952—7:58 p. m.

1098. 1. Dept authorizes you, to support action by Stevenson on Eden's message, London's 3259 Jan 28, which is clearly in right direction.

2. Dept hopes UK will maintain utmost flexibility in agenda discussions since there is possibility "four-power proposals" have a particularly unpleasant ring Egyptian ears this time. Proposals, of course, stand and would, we hope, be hub talks once started, but if play-down proposals would assist getting parties around table we think that proposals need not be stressed. Perhaps it might be more efficacious for UK to suggest talks on all outstanding differences including both defense and Sudan. We do not believe Sudan excludable from talks, however desirable that might be.

3. Dept believes there is no harm in UK attempting trade public statement for halt terrorist activities and anti-Brit measures (para 4 reftel) but believes UK well advised not to be too rigid if statement would reduce popular Egyptian pressure which new Govt attempting to combat. Long run capabilities new Govt unproven. Govt might not be able fulfill its side of trade unless assisted by Brit statement in advance.

4. Re para 5 we agree multilateral character defense proposals to Egypt very important element, significance of which Egyptians have largely failed appreciate and that in consequence this good line for UK. In this connection, however, we must avoid impression four-powers "ganging up" on Egypt to force upon it their combined will. On the contrary, idea four-powers is to harmonize interest of Egypt with interest free world in ME security.

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 3565. Drafted and approved by G. Lewis Jones, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

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5. Please convey above thinking informally Brit FonOff. Comments London and Cairo requested. [2]

ACHESON

[2] Ambassador Gifford reported on Jan. 30 in telegram 3294 from London, not printed, that the contents of this instruction had been delivered to the British Foreign Office on Jan. 28. The Foreign Office reaction was one of pleasure that Ambassador Caffery had been authorized to support Stevenson if and when an approach was made to the Egyptians along the lines of telegram 3259 from London (*supra*). With regard to paragraph 2, the British were cautious and noncommittal about the proposal to include the Sudan in any prospective talks with the Egyptians. And, lastly, Gifford reported that the Foreign Office essentially agreed with the contents of paragraphs 3 and 4. (641.74/1–3052)

No. 955

641.74/1–2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 28, 1952—7:59 p. m.

3566. 1. Pls tell Eden we warmly welcome his general ideas (Embassy's 3259, Jan 28) and that we will do all we can to help.

2. We have had a very close shave and believe we shld take advantage of present opportunity which may not last long. Furthermore, Maher may be our last chance. For this reason we are all the more pleased with Eden's initiative.

3. It seems to us that the most important thing at this moment is to get the talks going, and we wld be prepared to participate if UK and Egypt so desired. We think it doubtful however if situation would be met by discussions limited to Four-Power Proposals and believe that they shld include the Sudan and any other outstanding points. General order of discussions we have in mind outlined to Egyptian Amb by Secretary (para 5 Deptel 3460, Jan 22.) [2]

4. We are certain that Eden will share our belief that King has been key figure in recent days and that without his strong action situation would have got completely out of hand. It seems to us that he deserves all the support and encouragement we can give him at this critical moment. In our view this might take form of early recognition of him as "King of Sudan". We do not think Foreign Office position re title (Emb's 3253, Jan 26) [3] goes far enough

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1099. Drafted and approved by Jones.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed. In telegram 3253 from London, Jan. 26, Holmes reported that the Foreign Office was continuing its reassessment of its previous Sudan and defense proposals. With regard to the specific issue of Farouk's claim to be King of the

Continued

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to have beneficial effect. Both Caffery and Stevenson set great store by Sudan question.

5. We are far from being out of the woods, but we think that by working together we may find a path.

6. For further Dept views see Deptel 1098 to Cairo rptd London 3565.

ACHESON

Sudan, the British were maintaining their previous position that they were unable to recognize this demand but would no longer raise objections if other states acceded to the Egyptian claim. (641.74/1-2652)

No. 956

774.00/2-152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, February 1, 1952—3 p. m.

1234. It is apparent that throughout recent events in Egypt two separate courses have been developing.

The immed Egypt "experiment" originating after unilateral abrogation treaty of 1936 on Oct 8, 1951 was whether utilization of terrorism and destruction wld prove an effective aid in achievement Egypt's well defined national aspirations. It is not yet possible to say that this "experiment" is at an end but at the moment it wld appear that the use of force has received substantial setback in Egypt popularity.

More fundamental than the recent exercises in violence has been the ever-growing determination of Egyptians as whole to achieve their national aspirations. This determination has in no wise been affected by the substitution of one govt for another though it may well be that such substitution presages a change in approach. By their actions on Jan 26 and earlier the extremists and the Wafd Govt demonstrated that they were prepared destroy Egypt's economic and social well being if doing so would bring them to a quicker realization of Egypt's aims. It is probable in view of the records of the men who comprise the new govt that they will be less precipitous in their actions even if no less resolved on their objectives. The new govt is at least known to be strongly anti-Communist even if not actually pro-Western. This in itself is a definite gain. So long as the new govt is able to stand, its very existence

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 606, Paris as 427, Ankara as 305, and unnumbered to Rome, Moscow, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Tehran, and the Arab capitals.

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offers hope for a rational solution to the current near chaotic conditions. It is obvious, however, that it cannot long endure unless it is enabled through its own efforts and the cooperation of external forces to demonstrate in the relatively near future its ability to progress towards its disclosed ends. At this point it is useless and disturbing to contemplate nature of a future govt which wld take over if the presently constituted one is allowed to fall. The events of Jan 26 have not been favorably accepted by the Egyptian people. This fact in itself provides a background of a temporary period of grace for the new govt in which it will be faced with necessity of "producing or else".

CAFFERY

No. 957

641.74/2-852

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 8, 1952.

Subject: Summary of Current Status of Anglo-Egyptian Relations

The following summary of the current status of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy may be useful to you in your conversations on this subject.

The new Egyptian Government has been firm in maintaining order. An atmosphere favorable to a renewal of negotiations is being steadily created. In the Suez Canal Zone there are signs of a gradual return to normal conditions which lessen the possibility that Canal operations may be seriously impeded.

Prime Minister Ali Maher Pasha has publicly announced his belief in a settlement through negotiation as well as a willingness on the part of his Government to consider a regional defense system. The basis upon which the new Government will negotiate is not yet clear. Most observers believe, however, that the change of Government does not presage a radical departure from previous Egyptian policies. Ali Maher will probably press as strongly for satisfaction of Egyptian aspirations although he will try to keep firm control of internal events. Although the Government may be willing to negotiate, the settlement must be approved by the overwhelmingly Wafdist Parliament. Signs are increasing that the powerful Wafd is only awaiting the opportunity to attack the new Government for its moderation.

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The question thus arises as to how long Ali Maher will be able to last since he has unqualified support only from the King and the powerless opposition parties. The continued support of the Army is uncertain though probable. The possibility that the Wafd allied with leftist and extremist groups will openly oppose the Government raises the prospect of the King being forced either to dissolve the Wafd Parliament and rule by decree or to alter the present Government, since the constitution provides for Cabinet resignation upon a vote of no confidence.

It then appears that unless the present Egyptian Government were able quickly to achieve a settlement at least partially acceptable to the Wafd and while public opinion in Egypt is still fluid, the chances of the return of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean are slim.

Foreign Secretary Eden has publicly stated that a solution satisfying Egypt's legitimate national aspirations but not jeopardizing the free world's security should be possible. The United Kingdom has been generally conciliatory towards the new Government and is actively seeking to bring about a resumption of discussions. A position on the Sudan is still being formulated but on the question of the Suez the British believe that an international approach such as the MEC offers a satisfactory basis for discussion and settlement.

In general the two parties appear anxious to begin discussions leading to agreement. However, the internal tensions within Egypt which will increase with time indicate the desirability of an early and satisfactory solution which in itself will greatly facilitate the West's position in the Near East.

The United States is encouraged by the signs of a possible early resumption of discussions. It is our view, however, that significant moves on troop evacuation and the Sudan will be necessary for a satisfactory settlement. Regarding troop evacuation, a United Kingdom announcement fixing an early date when British troops (as opposed to Middle East Command troops) will commence partial evacuation will in our view materially assist the Egyptian Government in concluding a defense agreement. The British troops remaining under the Middle East Command would not exceed a numerical ceiling agreed between Egypt and SACME. The Sudan question must not again block a general settlement. On the general evidence that it would be the key to a long-term, overall solution, the United States believes that the Four-Powers should be prepared to accept Farouk's symbolic title as "King of the Sudan" with appropriate safeguards for early self-determination by the Sudanese.

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No. 958

641.74/2-1252

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 12, 1952.

Subject: Discussions with Mr. Eden re Egypt. [2]

We believe that in talks with Mr. Eden on Egypt early reference by you to the need for speed in starting Anglo-Egyptian talks on *all* outstanding questions will probably be most useful. NEA has prepared for your use a factual memorandum on the status of these negotiations (attached) [3] and Wells Stabler has prepared for you a memorandum on his observations in the Sudan (attached). [4] The gist of the latter is that the presence or absence of violent reaction in the Sudan will depend upon the faithfulness and earnestness with which the officials of the Sudan Government undertake to explain recognition of the King's title as being in the context of self-determination. Reassurances on the latter point will be needed but if riots should occur the Sudan Government is fully capable of restoring order.

Mr. Eden's greatest preoccupation is with the often repeated promise of the British Government to "consult" the Sudanese before making any changes in Sudan policy. This is a "moral" problem in the eyes of Mr. Eden and many other members of Parliament and hence the undertaking to "consult" must be respected. At the same time we should urge simple and rapid consultation as being of the greatest importance if the prospective Anglo-Egyptian negotiations are not to stall at an early stage for the lack of "something on the Sudan". We think this should be acceptance of the title "King of the Sudan" within the framework of early and free self-determination.

An opening gambit with Mr. Eden might be to ask whether there is any word yet regarding the resumption of negotiations and to tell him that your last information on the subject was Ambassador Caffery's comment on February 11 that "attempting to begin conversations on the Defense Proposals without frankly facing the

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[1] Drafted by Jones.

[2] See telegram Secto 7 from London, Document 960.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] Not printed. (110.22 NE/2-1052)

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Sudan question is neither practical nor realistic. It would be like starting a boxing match with one hand tied." [5]

Mr. Eden has been working very hard on Egypt and even though no positive progress has been made, he has instructed the British Ambassador in Cairo to approach the Egyptian Prime Minister with a view to resuming negotiations. [6]

A series of friendly nudges on various informal occasions may be all that is necessary at this stage. However, if there are no moves on the Sudan (such as the U.K. taking steps to "consult") within the next ten days, it might be desirable to give consideration to increasing the pressure.

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[5] This quotation came from telegram 1303 from Cairo, Feb. 11, not printed. (641.74/2-1152)

[6] Ambassador Gifford in London reported this information to the Department of State in telegram 3470, Feb. 8, not printed. (641.74/2-852)

No. 959

874.00 TA/2-952: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 13, 1952—5:29 p. m.

1234. Ref: Embtel 1296, Feb 9; [1] Sec. 511 (b) Mutual Security Act. Egyptian proposal appreciated, although wld be much preferable to insert "promote intl understanding and goodwill, maintain world peace and" before "remove causes for intl tension". Because of attn drawn by Egypt's delay, wld be desirable avoid presumably unwarranted implication of reservations re these points. Dept assumes omission inadvertent and that FonMin wld not refuse this. If however you feel further negots wld cause friction you may accept note. However, you shld ack note in fol terms: "the Govt of US understands that the Govt of Egypt, in accordance with its expression

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[1] Ambassador Caffery informed the Department in telegram 1296, Feb. 9, not printed, that the Egyptian Foreign Minister was prepared to deliver the following letter regarding Section 511 (b) of the Mutual Security Act, if it was acceptable to the United States:

"Pursuant to our discussions concerning an expanded program of technical assistance under the Point IV, my govt is interested in expanding the programs of technical assistance already initiated in accordance with the general agreement for technical operation, signed May 5, 1951. At the same time, I am pleased to confirm that it is the continuing policy of the Egypt Govt to support the principles of the United Nations Charter, and my govt is prepared to cooperate with the Govt of the United States and other peace-loving countries in taking such measures to remove causes for international tension as would seem consonant with the principles of the Charter." (874.00 TA/2-952)

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of support of principles of the Charter of the UN, is prepared to coop with the Govt of the US and other peace-loving countries in taking such measures to promote intl understanding and goodwill, maintain world peace, and remove causes for intl tension as wld seem consistent with the principles of the Charter". Wld be desirable to get confirmation of this, but confirmation may be waived in ur discretion.

Precedent for ack note in above terms established in case of Leb.

WEBB

No. 960

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 16, 1952—7 p. m.

Secto 7. Following summaries recent conversation Secretary had re Egypt.

General Eisenhower telephoned Secretary Thursday to report conversation with Prince Abdul Moneim, representative of King of Egypt to funeral. [2] General said to Prince that difficulties between Egypt and US tragic mistake at time when Western World shld present solid front against Communism. This led to what General described as broad invitation to US Govt to intervene by invitation to Br and Egyptian Govts to get together for talks aimed at solution difficulties. General did not attempt state what US position wld be re matter and reported conversation to Secretary. Secretary has since seen Eisenhower aide and reported to him that he has discussed matter with Eden who was, he felt, hard at work on problem. Secretary asked that General be thanked for information on call as well as his helpful "push".

Prince Moneim not regarded as person who has special authority or knowledge difficulty with Prime Minister and Cabinet who consider that Br have won victory which shld be taken advantage of and not inclined rush towards settlement. Eden considers highly desirable settle Egyptian problem earliest possible. Eden desires

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 186.

At this time, Secretary of State Acheson was in London attending the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. After a 6-day sojourn in London, Feb. 13–19, he then proceeded to Lisbon for another series of Foreign Ministers meetings and to participate in the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council. For documentation regarding the Foreign Ministers meetings and the Council sessions, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.

[2] The reference is to the funeral of King George VI.

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get regular army and infantry out of Egypt and reconciled to having only technical troops there.

Secretary has needled Eden re Sudan. Eden agreed something must be done. Eden mentioned possibility that Egyptians could send people to Sudan in effort work out agreement with Sudanese which wld prevent impression that British imposing solution on Sudanese. Eden agrees Sudan must be included in some form any agenda for talks between Br and Egypt. Expect talks to begin shortly. Secretary convinced Eden making every effort solve problem but being restrained by cabinet.

ACHESON

No. 961

774.56/2-1852

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 23, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The American Ambassador to Egypt has informed this Department of an urgent request from the Egyptian Government for assistance in procuring immediately equipment for three special mobile police "divisions" which that Government plans to create. These special units, in which King Farouk is taking a personal interest, will be located in Cairo and in Alexandria and will be designed to deal speedily and effectively with any attempt to subvert law and order. Ambassador Caffery has given his strong and unequivocal endorsement to this request and has expressed the hope that "it will be possible for us to get squarely behind this, to cut red tape, and get the required equipment on its way to Egypt". [2] There are enclosed for your information the pertinent communications exchanged between this Department and Ambassador Caffery in Cairo. Cairo telegram 1341 of February 15, 1952 sets forth the number of vehicles required and we are presently awaiting additional information with regard to quantities and specifications of the items needed. There is also enclosed a copy of

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[1] Drafted by Wells Stabler, Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs.

[2] This passage is quoted from telegram 1341 from Cairo, Feb. 15, not printed. (774.56/2-1552)

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telegram No. 3625 of February 20 from the American Ambassador in London which is pertinent to this subject. [3]

This Department considers that the request of the Egyptian Government is extremely important and should receive the favorable consideration of the United States Government on a high priority basis. The complete breakdown of public security in Cairo on January 26 and the evidence which points to Communist inspiration and organization of those riots emphasize the urgent need to strengthen the ability of the King and his Government to maintain internal security and stability in Egypt. The defection of large numbers of regular as well as auxiliary police in connection with the January 26 riots clearly indicates that special police measures are required to deal with public disorders or the threat of such disorders. While it is true that the Egyptian Army was able to deal with the riots when it was called upon to do so, it is evident that new and effective police measures are essential if future riots and disorders are to be prevented.

In addition to the importance to the United States and other Western powers that internal stability be secured in Egypt, this Department believes that assistance to Egypt in the creation of these special police units will contribute to a more favorable atmosphere for the resumption of the highly delicate and crucial negotiations with respect to strategic facilities in the Canal Zone.

This Department therefore proposes that:

1. The Defense Department concur in an immediate recommendation to the Director of the Mutual Security Administration that Egypt be declared eligible for assistance under the provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act; [4] and
2. The Defense Department undertake on a high priority basis to assist the Egyptian Government in the procurement of the desired items, it being understood that full reimbursement will be received.

This Department will be glad to work in close coordination with the Defense Department in developing this program.

In view of the high importance which is attached to this project, it would be greatly appreciated if the views of the Defense Department could be received on a most urgent basis.

Sincerely yours,

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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[3] Not printed. Ambassador Gifford informed the Department that he had discussed the Egyptian request with Foreign Office officials, who tentatively approved the United States supplying the equipment. The Foreign Office, however, wished to have the views of the British Chiefs of Staff before proceeding further. (774.56/2-2052)

[4] The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, was signed into law on July 26, 1950, as Public Law 621. (64 Stat. 373)

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No. 962

874.00 TA/2-2352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, February 23, 1952—7 p. m.

1412. Totec. ReDeptel 1234 February 13 and Embtel 1353 Feb 16. [1] Fol note recd from FonMin dated Feb 21 number 3.

"Pursuant to our discussions concerning an expanded program of tech assistance under the Point IV, my govt is interested in expanding the programs of tech assistance already initiated in accordance with the gen agreement for tech coop, signed May 5, 1951.

At the same time, I am pleased to confirm that it is the continuing policy of the Egypt Govt to support the principles of the United Nations charter, and my govt is prepared to coop with the Govt of the US and other peace-loving countries in taking such measures to promote internatl understanding and good will and maintain world peace and remove causes for internatl tension as wld seem consonant with the principles of the charter.

Signed Aly Maher."

I shall acknowledge note quoting context.

CAFFERY

[1] Ambassador Caffery reported the following in telegram 1353 from Cairo, Feb. 16: "Legal advisor Fon Min agrees insert clause on understanding good will and peace suggested by Dept. Fon Min ltr expected at early date." (874.00 TA/2-1652)

No. 963

641.74/2-2452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LISBON, February 24, 1952—midnight.

Secto 71. I have been discussing Egyptian situation with Eden this evening and am much encouraged by his open-minded approach to method of solving problem. He is searching for new idea which cld permit fruitful resumption of talks with Egyptian Govt.

Eden fully realizes that Aly Maher cannot accept same conditions and proposals refused by preceding govt without incurring serious political risks in current over-charged atmosphere. Searching for new proposals for discussion which might be made by the Egyptians he has suggested, on a purely personal basis to me, the possi-

[1] Sent to Cairo for Ambassador Caffery as telegram 1 and repeated to London as telegram 113 and to the Department.

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bility of a broader framework than the Four-Power proposals made and rejected by Nahas Pasha last Nov. Eden's thought is that the Egyptians might suggest talks associating the Arab States with the US, UK, Fr and Turk. Four Arab States joining the original four proposing states and Egypt might be a possible suggestion, but he has no set formula in mind.

I wish you [2] wld discuss this idea privately with Stevenson, and only with him, and let me have your reaction and any other suggestions at Lisbon by Tuesday morning, when I expect to meet again with my Brit colleague and perhaps later in the day with Mr. Schuman as well. [3]

ACHESON

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[2] i.e. Caffery.

[3] The next day, Feb. 25, Secretary Acheson, in telegram Secto 73, transmitted to Ambassador Caffery in Cairo as telegram 2, added the following:

"In addition points mytel 1, February 24 rptd Dept Secto 71, Eden said he appreciated urgency moving along as quickly as possible in finding solution of Sudan prog. Sudan is on tentative agenda for forthcoming talks with Egyptians." (641.74/2-2552)

No. 964

Editorial Note

On February 21 and February 25, the Foreign Minister of Egypt and Ambassador Caffery signed and exchanged notes concerning the Technical Cooperation Agreement of May 5, 1951, which had entered into force on August 15, 1951. For the texts of these notes and the text of the agreement, see TIAS No. 2479, printed in 3 UST (pt. 2) 2960.

No. 965

641.74/2-2452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Lisbon [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1952—7:42 p. m.

474. Dept believes that ur talks with Eden as reported in Secto 7 Feb 16 and Secto 71 Feb 24 have been most helpful and apparently have succeeded in bringing Eden a long way towards mtg squarely issues as presented by US and UK Ambassadors Cairo. At same

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 4079 and to Cairo as telegram 1310.

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time, Nitze just returned from London bringing word that Selwyn Lloyd is adamantly opposed to acceptance King's title at this time and this view is confirmed by London's 3661 Feb 22 rptd Lisbon, which has been read here with considerable disappointment. [2]

We remain convinced that unless UK can be more forthcoming re acceptance King's title negots will stand little chance success. We do not think Egypts will agree to placing King's title in question in manner set forth London reftel. We have made one further attempt press UK on Sudan (Telac 20 Feb 21) [3] and you may wish once again to rehearse to Eden basis of our concern re title question.

Re def we had thought that UK wld be more forthcoming than reported in London's 3661. [4] We believe that what Brit at outset are prepared to offer on this will not be acceptable to Egypts. We recognize that withdrawals will depend on security situation Egypt, but feel that if Brit agree to commence withdrawal soonest, this act may by itself improve security, particularly as present Govt apparently is determined reduce friction in CZ. We do not think UK shld refuse at least token withdrawal in advance agreement on NR forces to be allocated to SACME: latter may require months to work out.

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[2] Not printed. Ambassador Gifford reported that the British Government would not recognize Farouk's title as "King of the Sudan" until the Sudanese had been consulted. And the British did not believe that there could be effective consultation until the Sudanese had a representative Parliament. Gifford continued:

"It is planned hold elections Sudan this summer and HMG hopes Egypts will instruct their followers in Sudan to make themselves heard during electoral campaign to ensure their maximum representation in Sudanese Parl. When latter estab, HMG thinks question of King's title shld be put before Parl together with such guarantees as Egypts may wish give re exercise of sovereignty. Meanwhile, HMG wld have no objection if Egypt Govt desired to send out Egypt leaders to discuss future Egypt-Sudanese relations with Sudanese leaders. While King's title wld obviously figure prominently in these discussions, HMG wld suggest that discussions not be confined this ques but broadened to include such problems as Nile waters." (641.74/2-2552)

[3] Not printed. In telegram Telac 20, Feb. 21, sent to London as telegram 4046, the Department of State informed Secretary Acheson that it had instructed Ambassador Gifford once again to stress strongly to the British Government the U.S. view that if negotiations with Egypt on defense matters had any hope of achieving success, the British had first to accept the Egyptian demand that Farouk be granted the title of "King of the Sudan". (641.74/2-2152)

[4] Regarding the British defense proposals described in telegram 3661 from London, Feb. 22, Ambassador Gifford commented:

"Re defense, HMG at present time only prepared go as far as 6th point in four-power proposals, i.e. withdrawal only of Brit forces not allocated SACME in agrmt Egypt Govt. (For Dept's and Cairo's strictly conf info and not for discussion with Brit reps, we understand FonOff willing concede complete evacuation, except for admin and tech personnel, if this necessary obtain agrmt, but that Cabinet not willing auth going this far at present time. This supplements info contained sec [*Secto?*] 27 re Cabinet differences on this point)." (641.74/2-2552)

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Re Eden's suggestion that four Arab states join original MEC sponsors and Egypt, we feel great care shld be taken not to involve Western powers in any arrangement, excluding Israel because this wld destroy basic tenet of MEC as "Center of cooperative efforts for the def of the area as a whole".

In this connection it shld be noted that Egypt may suggest link with MEC through Arab League Collective Security Pact. This pact is entirely paper instrument and originated as anti-Israel measure. However, if Egypt produces plan involving Security Pact and if this is price we must pay to obtain settlement, we shld be prepared to consider adapting ourselves accordingly, but only on understanding four powers cld arrange parallel link between them and Israel which is integral part ME and therefore essential def ME. Matter will require most careful study, but we believe we shld not encourage Egypt to inject complication tottering Arab League which survives principally on hate for Israel.

WEBB

No. 966

774.00/2-2752

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1952.

Subject: Summary of Current Anglo-Egyptian Relations

The internal Egyptian political situation has remained uneasy. The truce between Ali Maher's Government and the ousted Wafd majority party gives every evidence of resting on very weak foundations. The Government has generally been able to maintain effective law and order with noticeable improvement in conditions in the Canal Zone where terrorist activities have dwindled and maritime activities have returned to near normalcy. There is rigid enforcement of martial law and curfew. In this connection the Egyptian Government has confidentially asked the United States for assistance in obtaining equipment for three special police divisions. This request, which has Ambassador Caffery's strong backing, is being urgently considered. The British have reduced their naval forces in the Suez Canal for the time being and a general, if uncertain, stability prevails in Egypt.

Both the Wafd and the Government appear anxious to avoid a showdown although an open Wafd attack on the Government ap-

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pears increasingly difficult to restrain. Rumor campaigns against the Government charging it with "extinguishing the flame of the national movement" reached such proportions that the Government was forced to decree severe punishment for those spreading false news. Wafd parliamentary cooperation has been grudging and Maher is reported to be considering recessing Parliament for a few months. The King is reported to be critical of the soft line Maher is following toward the Wafd. In this connection there are persistent rumors that the King is planning an early change of government, appointing Najib Hilali Pasha, formerly of the Wafd, as Prime Minister. It would be planned that some of the better elements of the present Cabinet would be retained. So far there is nothing definite on this change, and the Embassy is inclined to doubt whether it will take place in the immediate future. An early reasonable agreement with the British as well as the dissolution of Parliament and firm control of lawlessness are also reportedly desired by the King.

Instructions from the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Cairo to arrange for an early meeting with Maher with a view to resumption of negotiations were sent on February 8. The death of King George VI delayed Anglo-Egyptian conversations although the presence of an Egyptian delegation in London for the funeral resulted in a general exchange of views between Eden and Amr. Amr returned to Cairo with a letter from Eden stressing the United Kingdom's willingness to commence negotiations and informing Maher that the British Ambassador in Cairo had instructions and was ready for discussions. Supplementary instructions to Sir Ralph Stevenson were cleared by the Cabinet on February 22. These instructions include discussion with Ali Maher on: (1) decision regarding when and where negotiations can best be opened; (2) a proposed agenda based upon new defense arrangements in line with the Middle East Command concept and accepting the supersession of the 1936 treaty; (3) the proposed text of a joint communiqué. These instructions further stated that the United Kingdom could not recognize Farouk's title as King of the Sudan until the Sudanese had been consulted through a Constituent Assembly. However, the United Kingdom would not object if Egypt wanted to send officials to the Sudan to present their case at this time.

Public statements made by Maher indicate that talks may begin March 1 on a bilateral basis possibly with later participation by the United States, France and Turkey. These statements appear to indicate that Maher proposes to follow a determined course toward achieving Egyptian aims. It is believed likely that Egyptian counterproposals based on the Arab League Collective Security Pact can be expected as the basis of the Egyptian position.

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The United States, concerned by the delay and by the lack of agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, has: (1) urged the United Kingdom to arrive at a formula on the Sudan based on an acceptance of the King's title within the framework of self-determination by the Sudanese; (2) urged the United Kingdom to agree to token withdrawal of troops from the Canal Zone even though agreement on the number of forces to be allocated to SACME might not have been reached; (3) suggested that Maher refrain from making extreme public statements; and (4) indicated willingness to enter five-power discussions if and when the Egyptians so desire.

No. 967

774.00/3-352

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 3, 1952.

Subject: Significance of Change in Egyptian Government.

It is understood that at the time the Government of Nahas Pasha was dismissed on January 27 following the riots in Cairo, the King desired to appoint Neguib Hilali Pasha as Prime Minister. Hilali Pasha had been expelled from the Wafd in November 1951 and was considered a strong opponent of corruption and graft in the Government. However, Hilali Pasha would not agree to form a Cabinet until he could get some idea of what the British intended to offer in connection with Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Since time did not allow this, the King agreed to appoint Ali Maher Pasha, but with misgivings.

Since assuming office on January 27, Ali Maher Pasha has been under increasing pressure from the Palace and from those bitterly opposed to the Wafd to take a strong hand against the Wafd and the perpetrators of the January 26 riots. Ali Maher Pasha has resisted this pressure and has endeavored to be all things to all people. He would not suspend Parliament as the King desired as he felt he could work better with the support of the Wafd. The King became increasingly annoyed with Ali Maher's tactics and arrangements were made to replace Maher. On March 1, apparently on inspiration of the Palace, several newspapers close to Hilali and the Palace published the news that the predominantly Wafd Parliament had been suspended for thirty days. Ali Maher immediately

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denied this report. During a stormy cabinet session which followed this denial several of the Ministers demanded that Maher should take a stronger line with the Wafd and place on them the responsibility for January 26. Maher refused and resigned. Hilali Pasha, to whom the Premiership was offered on February 25, agreed within a few hours to form a new Government.

The significance in the appointment of Hilali Pasha is that the King now has a government in which he has confidence and one which according to all sources will deal sternly with corruption, graft and subversion. The members of the Cabinet are known principally as anti-Wafd. Most of them have previously been either ministers or under secretaries.

While Hilali Pasha has a reputation for honesty and integrity and is strongly anti-Communist, there is little reason to believe that Hilali will compromise on Egyptian nationalist aspirations. It is too early to know exactly what line Hilali will take, but evidence suggests that he will insist upon the evacuation of foreign troops from the Canal Zone and will require recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, possibly subject to later self-determination by the Sudanese. It may be expected that Hilali with the backing of the King will maintain internal security with a strong hand and will not tolerate the repetition of January 26 incidents. However, if Hilali is not able to achieve Egyptian nationalist aspirations, the Wafd may be expected to arise again, although this may take a considerable period of time.

No. 968

641.74/3-852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, March 8, 1952—3 p. m.

1525. I too am concerned present Brit misunderstanding of current Egypt situation (Deptel 1360, March 5). [2] This talk about

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 737.

[2] In telegram 1360 to Cairo, Mar. 5, not printed, the Department of State asked Ambassador Caffery to assess the situation as it then existed in Egypt and to provide firm recommendations which the Department could use vis-à-vis the British to achieve a satisfactory Anglo-Egyptian settlement of the Sudan and Suez Canal Zone issues. (641.74/3-452)

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cleaning up corruption and moving against Wafd is all very fine but as FonMin stressed to me repeatedly morning March 6, it does not mean a thing compared to the one question of whether or not the present govt is going to be able to live. The only answer to that will be in the results of the Anglo-Egypt talks opening shortly in Cairo. If nothing is to come of them (and nothing will so long as Brit retain their present attitude) we might as well forget any hope we may have for stability and pro-Western orientation in Egypt. The eventuality of revolt and utter chaos in Egypt cannot be dismissed.

We are rapidly getting to point of no return. If Egypt goes there is serious doubt whether rest of Middle East can stand. Whatever may be public conception, the US is squarely in picture whether we like it or not. We are in it in the sense:

(1) That we are the only power that can hope to move UK or Egypt off dead center;
(2) That US public opinion wld react most sharply to failure of West in Egypt.

Assessment of situation, analysis of alternative courses of action, and my recommendations and comments follow:

Assessment:

Following is detailed estimate situation facing Hilali Cabinet:

(1) Hilali Govt from our standpoint is an excellent govt, however, it came into being not as result of any popular appeal but as result of a political intrigue. Essentially the prosecution of the Wafd is a byline with the present govt and has resulted largely from the belief that the Brit demand it.

(2) Hilali's program of good govt has more appeal to Western eyes than to Egypt, which knows reform and good govt as political slogans only, and not as political reality.

(3) Hilali Govt, with all its good intentions in tilting swords with the Wafd must face the following disconcerting facts:

(a) That only Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood have strong organizations. Hilali has none with exception weak, very weak, Saadists and Liberal Constitutionalists.
(b) That govt reforms, especially those involving reduction of expenditures, dismissal of excess public servants, and abolition of exceptional promotions, for the short-term produce discontented group ripe for troublemakers. In the long-term reforms will produce popularity and a following. But Hilali does not have that much time.
(c) That there are large quantities of illegal arms still in private hands.
(d) That students, full of pent-up hatred and frustrated desire for action, are ready to turn to any demagogue who promises outlet for their frustration.

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(e) That Fellahin, whose conditions of life are too well known to necessitate repetition are looking on Cairo with watchful unease.

(f) That as long as army prepared to shoot, order can be maintained in Cairo, but if Wafd shld decide on tactic of causing trouble in provinces, govt does not have sufficient force to put out fires all over Egypt.

(g) That although some worthwhile reorganization of police has been accomplished during last month, the police organization as a whole is still a weak reed.

(h) Army has thus far been effective, but doubt exists whether younger officers wld effectively carry out orders involving use of force against Wafd.

(i) There is very real danger that Wafd might form unholy alliance with Muslim Brotherhood and/or Communists, which Hilali's Govt could not face.

(j) That present govt has inherited a complete mess in cotton market. Cotton is Egypt's principal crop. Economic situation of country is bad, could become desperate.

(k) Wafd is now busying itself with encouraging anti-Palace activities and painting Hilali as Palace and/or Brit stooge. This activity is causing decline in King's prestige which had been one of greatest sources of stability in Egypt following Jan 26.

(l) First condition prerequisite to reopening negots as stated by Brit has been met and Egypt auxiliary police and terrorists have disappeared from Canal Zone. Although this was inheritance from Aly Maher efficiency, disruptive elements are quiet only on "persuaded" basis which will collapse if Hilali govt fails to produce.

(4) With all this in mind, Hilali has come to logical conclusion that he cannot effectively move against Wafd unless he parallels move with a publicly successful coup in achieving "national aspirations."

(5) "National aspiration" consist of the tried and true formula of "evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley." Therefore, Hilali has to have something substantial on both from the Brit or his days as PriMin are numbered.

Alternatives:

I fully realize that our "advice welcome" but is wearing a bit thin in London, yet I believe we would be derelict if we did not have another attempt at convincing London where our best interests lie. Naturally, the strength of our representation to London must depend on our overall international commitments and interests.

(1) The optimum alternative facing us is the persuasion of the Brit to recognize the title of the King of Egypt as the King of Sudan. While position wld be far better if an alternative base were feasible, we are going on the assumption that the military consider other bases, notably Gaza, as out of the question. If Brit prepared

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recognize title King of Sudan without too many strings, present base can probably be saved for West in course negots.

(2) If current trend Brit thinking is not changed we must face the realities of the situation and determine how far our commitments elsewhere in the world wld permit us to tell the Brit that we will have to disassociate ourselves from them in Middle East because we believe they are wrong in what they are doing. Unless we are prepared to carry through with such a threat it wld best not to make it. It wld do us no good to have a bluff called. It is possible that US unilateral recognition of King's title to the Sudan might set stage to enable us single-handedly to hold Egypt this side of Iron Curtain.

(3) The third alternative is that of joining with the Brit in military occupation of Egypt (which they say they cannot do by themselves).

(4) The fourth alternative is that we prepare ourselves for the fact that we will have to get out of Egypt and the rest of the Middle East. If this is to be, it is time that we started to discuss liquidating our investments and drawing in our oars.

Recommendations:

I do not believe that we can afford any other alternative than that of a constructive one, i.e., para 1, (but I am convinced that if we fail on this line we wld have to rapidly return to alternative 4) and the sooner the better.

Cld we go to Brit along following lines:

(1) Here is our analysis of situation Egypt (see "assessment" above).

(2) We are cognizant that situation has strong domestic political implications both in Brit and Egypt.

(3) We have consistently stood by you, and have been successful in using our moderating influence to your advantage in the past. Notably, on two occasions preventing complete break Anglo-Egypt relations and/or mass expulsion Brit subjects from Egypt.

(4) We believe that situation may rapidly drift where our influence will be of no further use unless positive action taken in Egypt.

(5) As we see it, in order prevent further deterioration situation Egypt and to permit Hilali Govt continue in office, Brit and Egypt Govts shld make joint public declaration that negots being initiated with principle of evacuation established, principle self-determination future Sudan also established, that Brit under these conditions recognize title of King of Sudan. Egypt do its part to recognize principle cooperation in Middle East Defense.

(6) First gestures of cooperation cld consist of evacuation by stages of Brit troops in Zone beyond number set by 1936 treaty.

(7) Working out of eventual withdrawal of Brit troops as such from Canal Zone with "technicians" remaining as advisors to Egypt command of base within MEC framework wld be the next

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step. This problem is bristling with difficulties as to definition, number and duration of stay of "technicians" but at this juncture if Sudan title issue is settled we shld be able to find the answers to this one too.

Comments: I am cognizant foregoing wld represent major and difficult move forward on part of Brit vis-à-vis their own public, but I doubt if it as difficult as the explanation of "what happened" will be if any other course is followed.

If Brit "see the light," what should US policy be? At least preliminary conversations will, of course, be between Egypt and UK. If these are successful, however, it will be question of very few weeks before Egypts start coming to us with requests for detailed spelling out of meaning of our oft-promised cooperation. They wld not take kindly to our reacting to such questions as though it were first time we had ever heard of them. Egypt under these circumstances wld want to know "how much and when" with regard to US military and economic aid. In particular in the evolving of a balanced Brit withdrawal-Egypt take-over in the Canal Zone, Egypts are aware deficiencies their military training and equipment. Within what period time wld we be prepared assist Egypt these questions and in what volume? These are "iffy" questions but any preliminary work that cld be done now to prepare their answers might prove extremely valuable in future.

CAFFERY

No. 969

774.56/3-1252

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 12, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to Mr. H. Freeman Matthews' letter, dated 23 February 1952, regarding the eligibility of Egypt for assistance under the provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and further regarding Department of Defense assistance to the Egyptian Government on a high priority basis in the procurement on a reimbursable basis of the equipment desired by that Government.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded, and I concur in this conclusion, that a recommendation be made to the Director for Mutual Security that Egypt be declared eligible for reimbursable aid under the provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

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Subject to compliance with the provisions of the above stated Act and its amendments, the Department of Defense is prepared, on a high priority basis, to assist the Egyptian Government in the procurement of the equipment desired.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM C. FOSTER

No. 970

641.74/3-2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1952—6:46 p. m.

4762. From Secy for Amb. Pls deliver fol personal msg from me to Eden re Egypt soon as possible:

"I am greatly disturbed by situation in Egypt and by the fact that such a short time remains before elections in which to reach a settlement. Our info leads us to believe that as each day passes without definite progress towards resolving outstanding issues the eventual survival of the present Govt is placed increasingly in jeopardy. I fear that unless the situation is changed substantially in the immediate future, opportunity for negots with moderate elements will have been lost and achievement of Western objectives with respect to Egypt thrown into grave doubt.

I am fully aware of the problems which you are facing in connection with the Egypt situation, but I know from our talks in London and Lisbon that we are in accord that it is essential to move forward as quickly as possible in seeking a solution.

As we here see it, the problem falls into two main parts: The first part involves analysis of the necessity for and feasibility of various courses of action in order to determine what the terms of settlement wld have to be if agreement is to be reached and an appraisal of the risks which may be involved in those terms. The second part relates to the means of getting negots started without delay and the tactics to be employed in pursuing those negots.

There is attached our analysis and appraisal of the situation. If we are agreed on this analysis and appraisal, then it wld seem to me that it wld be necessary immediately to deal with the second part of the problem. In this connection I believe that unless negots are started soon there will be none at all for the reasons which I stated above.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1478. Drafted by Stabler and approved by the Secretary of State after being cleared with Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large; George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State; John H. Ferguson, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff; and Burton Y. Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

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The first thing that seems to be needed is an opening play which will convince Egypt that the UK seriously desires to discuss all outstanding issues with a view to their early solution. Since it appears that the text of the joint statement which Sir Ralph Stevenson has recently been authorized to negot has been rejected by the Egypts, it follows that if it is desired to start negots, such a statement will have to be more forthcoming, particularly with respect to the Sudan. The thought has occurred to me that since it has not been possible to come to any agreement re a declaration, either bi-lateral or unilateral, it might be possible to suggest agreement on an agenda which on one hand will contain all the elements of a declaration satisfactory to the Egypts, but which on the other does not give away the UK position. Such an agenda cld be made public jointly in a simple statement to the effect the two Govts have agreed to begin immediate negots on the pts listed with common resolve to reach agreement as quickly as possible. Our suggestion for such an agenda wld be as follows:

1. Arrangements for the assumption by Egypt for responsibility of the CZ Base in the interest of its def and the protection of the Suez Canal. [2]
2. Arrangements for the provision of assistance to Egypt in fulfilling such responsibility.
3. Arrangements for the withdrawal of Brit forces from the CZ, including the question of timing.
4. The role of Egypt in the def of the ME.
5. Brit recognition of the title King of the Sudan and Egypt recognition of the right of the Sudanese people to full, free and prompt self-determination.

With respect to Item 4 of proposed agenda, it wld be desirable to attempt to secure agreement with Egypt on the stationing of some non-Egypt forces, other than technicians, in the CZ Base and it is assumed that efforts will be made to negot toward this end. However, we feel that this question shld not be pressed to the pt where the negots might break down.

We believe that it wld be helpful if the UK wld at the time of discussion of an agreed agenda or a declaration inform the Egypts that Brit forces over and above the treaty limit wld be withdrawn as soon as possible, starting immed. This wld seem possible in view of the considerably improved security conditions in the CZ.

The immed thing shld be to come to grips with the main points on the agenda as quickly as possible and make the concessions which the UK is prepared to make in such a way that they achieve the maximum results in promoting the possibilities of a settlement. It seems to me that there are certain minima which have now emerged as inescapable for any Egypt Govt and that with any successor govt the price which is being asked wld increase.

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[2] The Department of State in telegram 4824 to London, Mar. 28, not printed, advised the Embassy that there was an error in the wording in paragraph 1 of the suggested agenda, and that it should read as follows: "Arrangements for the assumption by Egypt of responsibility for the CZ Base in the interest of its Def and the protection of the Suez Canal." (641.74/3-2652)

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I hope that the views that I have pressed in this msg will be of assistance to you. I shld be most interested in having ur comments on these views as well as ur ideas as to how it might be possible to move forward at the earliest possible moment."

Fol is analysis, appraisal and conclusion to be attached to msg to Eden:

"*A. Analysis and Appraisal:*

1. Western objectives with respect to Egypt are:

a. Free and unimpeded use of the Suez Canal at all times;
b. Maintenance of strategic facilities in peacetime in such condition that they cld be effectively and speedily used in event of imminent threat to the security of the ME;
c. Voluntary assoc of Egypt with the West in preparing to defend and in defending the ME against outside aggression.

2. The extreme sensitivity of the NE area as a whole to the Anglo-Egypt problem is a factor which must be borne in mind in endeavoring to achieve settlement. A solution of the Anglo-Egypt problem cld be the key to the solution of outstanding issues between the West and other NE countries, particularly re the MEC.

3. In spite of all actions which have been taken since Oct 1951 to maintain a fully operative base in the Canal Zone in face of Egypt hostility and non-cooperation, the base has operated at progressively reduced efficiency because of lack of labor, supplies, water, communications, etc. It is understood that Brit mil authorities have concluded that the base cannot be a satisfactory operative base without minimum Egypt cooperation and assistance which is now lacking or without prohibitive costs in manpower and money.

4. Since maintenance of the present position wld not only result in contd Egypt hostility and non-cooperation with adverse effect on operating capacity of base, but wld also tie up large nrs of Brit troops it wld seem that this as a continuing course of action will not achieve our objectives.

5. Since Egypt Armed Forces do not presently possess the capacity to maintain the base, it wld be necessary to reach agreement with Egypt on retaining fon technicians at the base to maintain it and to train Egypts. Under such conditions and provided the Egypts are willing to cooperate the base cld be maintained as a fully operative base. It seems probable that the Egypts wld agree to the retention of several thousand fon technicians.

6. It wld be desirable to retain at least some non-Egypt forces in the CZ Base against the contingency of aggression in the ME and as a deterrent to any action in Egypt which might endanger the maintenance of the base, the free transit of the Canal or Western interests in gen.

7. While it may be possible at some future time to secure Egypt agreement to the presence of non-Egypt forces in the base during peacetime, it appears doubtful that Egypt will agree to a settlement on this basis at the present time, either under MEC or otherwise.

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8. Even if Egypt agreement were secured at some future time to the stationing of non-Egypt forces in the base in peacetime the principles of MEC of Nov 10, 1951 wld complicate the use of such forces against possible irresponsible Egypt action with respect to the base, the Canal, or Western interest in gen.

9. A settlement which does not provide for the stationing of non-Egypt Forces, except technicians, at the base will involve certain risks. Although it may not be necessary on strictly mil grounds that non-Egypt forces be stationed at the base during peacetime, the position of Western powers will be difficult, if after the conclusion of a settlement and the transfer of responsibility for the base to Egypt, the Egypts shld act irresponsibly with respect to the base, the Canal or Western interests in gen.

10. Such risks cld be minimized by obtaining from Egypt satisfactory recognition in appropriate form of its responsibilities with respect to the base as a position of vital importance to the West in the def of the ME and with respect to the Suez Canal as a free internatl waterway. (While the problem of Israel is implicit in the latter pt, it shld not be made a specific part of discussion and it wld be hoped that the restrictions with regard to Israel wld disappear in the framework of the gen agreement.) In addition, Egypts participation in or assoc with arrangements for the Middle East Command (MEC) wld provide a further safeguard. If Egypt shld fail to meet the responsibilities it assumes, internatl action against Egypt, possibly involving the use of force, might become necessary. While such action wld present problems with respect to world opinion, it cld be undertaken with less difficulty if a proper foundation had been laid in terms of express recognition of the common interests involved.

11. It is possible, though not probable, that Egypt wld refuse to participate or associate itself with MEC even if it were agreed that non-Egypt forces wld not be stationed at the base. Egypt participation in or assoc with MEC is more likely if the West accedes to the absence of non-Egypt forces.

12. Egypt insists on recognition by the West of the King of Egypt's title as King of the Sudan and the Egypt claim appears to be valid. At the same time, Egypt apparently is willing to agree to self-determination by the Sudanese. The important pt is to secure recognition by Egypt of the right of the Sudanese to full and prompt self-determination.

13. It is recognized that Egypt intentions with respect to the degree of its participation in the admin of the Sudan during pd between recognition of the title and self-determination are in doubt. However, firm insistence on arrangements which will avoid disruption of the gen pattern of the admin in the Sudan, present plans for self-government, and the absence of any definite Egypt program for the Sudan shld serve to minimize the risks involved in recognition, provided the pd prior to self-determination is not long.

14. Since it is important that a settlement with Egypt be achieved as soon as possible, especially in view of Egypt elections now set for May 18, and since the new Sudanese Cabinet and Parliament will not be established until some time during the summer,

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time will not allow consultation with the Sudanese through the means recently suggested by the UK.

15. It is believed that other adequate means exist to discuss the question of the title with the Sudanese if such discussions are considered essential to honor UK promises and minimize public disturbances in the Sudan. Such means might be rapid and informal discussions with members of the Legislative Assembly and other polit leaders in Khartoum. Provided the necessary instructions are given to the Sudan Administration, it shld prove possible to explain adequately to the Sudanese the symbolic nature of the title and the fact that its recognition wld be conditioned on agreement by Egypt to the exercise by the Sudanese of full, free and prompt self-determination.

16. While disturbances in the Sudan are possible fol recognition of the title, it is within the power of the Sudan Govt to minimize the possibility and to deal effectively with them shld they occur.

17. In order to allay suspicions and fears amongst the interested parties, it may be necessary to estab an internatl Commission, including neutral members, to guide the Sudanese towards self-determination and to provide an internatl guarantee of a Nile waters agreement.

B. Conclusions

1. Since our objectives are the free and unimpeded use of the Suez Canal at all times, the maintenance of strategic facilities in Egypt in fully operative condition, and achievement of voluntary Egypt assoc in ME def, since it appears impossible to attain our objectives without minimum Egypt cooperation and assistance and since it is improbable that such cooperation and assistance can be obtained without agreement on the withdrawal of non-Egypt forces from the CZ base, it is likely that it will be necessary to come to a settlement with Egypt which wld not involve the contd presence of non-Egypt forces (other than technicians) in Egypt in peacetime. At the same time such a settlement wld have to assure the maintenance of the base in fully operative condition and provide for the clear assumption by Egypt of certain responsibilities.

2. The Sudan problem is a complicating factor in achieving a settlement of the base issue, but a solution of the Sudan problem involving recognition of the title King of the Sudan and self-determination for the Sudanese is essential to settlement of the base question.["]

ACHESON

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No. 971

641.74/3-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, March 28, 1952—noon.

4298. For immediate delivery to Perkins. Although I consider changes embodied Deptel 4762, Mar 26, constitute improvement in proposed message from Secretary to Eden, I nevertheless continue consider it would be unwise deliver it in atmosphere prevailing here at this time. I am still concerned about message both on gen grounds previously outlined mytel 4255, Mar 26, [2] and because of specific passages which I do not feel are tailored to situation here. For example:

1. First sentence fifth para of text carries implication that inadequacies of opening plays thus far indicate UK does not desire "seriously" discuss all outstanding issues with view their early solution. This I think unfortunate. I am sure UK is fully alive to dangers of situation and fully as desirous reach solution as we, but is inhibited by what are regarded as certain questions of principle which loom large in public and Parl opinion here.

2. Logical conclusion next fol sentence same para is that if Egypts remain intransigent, Brit must come up with increasing concessions until Egypt appetite satisfied. I do not dispute thesis Brit shld be more forthcoming, but I think statement of this kind without any corresponding indication that we intend exert influence on Egyptians to make them more tractable will not be helpful here.

3. I think idea of public agenda is attractive one and may offer possibility of way out of present impasse, but it seems to me as presently drafted items will create misapprehensions in public minds. For example, first item wld seem state responsibility for defense Canal Zone will be exclusively Egypt prerogative and therefore wld seem preclude possibility (despite item 4) of MEC overall resp. Further, I presume item 2 is supposed to cover question Brit technicians, but as presently worded I fear it wld be publicly interpreted as covering only financial and military assistance; at same time, item 3 wld seem indicate all Brit forces (i.e. including technicians) wld withdraw. Finally, with respect item 4, our understanding of present state of play is that Hilali unwilling accept publicly that Egypt will play any role in defense of ME at this time. How do

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 234.

[2] In telegram 4255 from London, Mar. 26, not printed, Ambassador Gifford thought it undesirable to deliver such a message to Foreign Secretary Eden because he believed the first 11 paragraphs of part A had, in essence, already been accepted by the British Cabinet, and because the Embassy had reason to believe that Eden was disposed to press for granting concessions to Egypt which were far in advance of the positions of the rest of his Cabinet colleagues. (641.74/3-2652)

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I answer Eden's anticipated inquiry as to how this obstacle can be overcome?

4. Re para 12 enclosure to message, Brit do not accept Egypt claim re King's title as valid and I do not think they wld take kindly this statement.

Foregoing are some of difficulties re message which come to mind readily. I think it important Dept realize Brit are just as disturbed re this situation as we are and perhaps more so, as they are tying up large numbers of their troops and rendering ineffective large base to which they attach great importance. They are not dragging their feet arbitrarily and they are exercising all ingenuity at their command, within limitations of principles that are hard for them to abandon.

I feel it wld be much more productive at this time for me to talk to Eden about this situation, utilizing suggestions contained in message for purposes discussion It may be that as result this conversation, I may be able to suggest lines of personal message from Secretary which wld be tailored to assist Eden in his problems with Cabinet. I realize time is short, but I think approaching problem this way wld be more productive toward goal we seek than transmitting present message which, in my considered opinion, wld not be helpful right now.

Please call me soonest possible after you receive this with your views. In that way I can try arrange see Eden before week end if necessary in order not lose time. [3]

GIFFORD

[3] Ambassador Caffery remarked in telegram 1677 from Cairo, Mar. 29, not printed:

"I am fully appreciative everything London has to say in its telegram 4298, March 28, as well as implications our overall relations with British, and perhaps I exaggerate importance of US interest in Egypt and the petroleum lands nevertheless I still believe message from Secretary to Eden should be delivered." (641.74/3-2952)

No. 972

641.74/3-2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET
NIACT PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1952—7:30 p. m.

4828. Personal for Amb from Secy. I have given careful thought urtel 4298 Mar 28 and have discussed it fully as well as re-exam-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1502. Drafted and approved by Perkins.

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ined the msg to Eden with my colleagues here. I attach great importance your analysis situation Lond but after our consideration in light all aspects situation I feel Eden ought to read in full views contained my personal msg as representing my own thinking. Naturally I want to have this done in way which wld prove most helpful in inducing appropriate action by HMG. We have made some changes in msg which we hope will meet some the points about which you concerned and have made one or two other changes which we believe also improve it. On other points you raised we feel on balance that text had better stand.

On question of agenda we are changing introductory sentence. Obviously the items in agenda are subject to change and improvement but we think as they stand they illustrate kind of thing we have in mind and points that shld be covered.

Re your numbered para three I think that since the five items merely constitute agenda, difficulties you envisage wld not arise. Specifically re item four you will note this merely contemplates discussion Egypt's role without any commitment on either side re outcome negotiation.

I hope you can arrange see Eden Sat because we feel matter is most urgent. When you see him I wish you wld tell him that I have personally spent a great deal of time on problem of Egypt, that I want to share my thoughts with him and that I want to do it in way that will be most helpful to him. If after reading full text my msg he feels it wld not be helpful have it left with him, such procedure is quite satisfactory to me, but in any event I do wish you leave with him our analysis situation and copy of suggested agenda.

It seems to me that this procedure cld get to Eden my personal feelings on matter and will provide him with factual part of document in event he prefers not to receive full text of a written msg on subject.

Pls substitute fol paras for paras 4 and 5 of text my msg as transmitted to you by Deptel 4762:

"There is attached our analysis and appraisal of the situation. It is the result of long and careful study and I should be much interested to know whether it is in accord with your own views. Whether or not we are agreed on all details of this analysis and appraisal I feel sure that we are agreed on the necessity of dealing immediately with the second part of the problem since, for the reasons stated above, unless negotiations are started soon there will be none at all.

The first thing that seems to be needed is an opening play which will convince Egypt, as we are convinced, that the UK seriously desires to discuss all outstanding issues with a view to their early solution. We understand that the text of the joint statement which

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Sir Ralph Stevenson has recently been authorized to negotiate has been rejected by the Egyptians as a means of starting negotiations. It seems to us that to have the desired effect any statement would have to be more forthcoming, particularly with respect to the Sudan. As an alternative to a statement, the thought has occurred to me that it might be possible to suggest agreement on an agenda which on one hand will cover the elements desired by the Egyptians, but which on the other does not give away the UK position. Such an agenda could be made public jointly in a simple statement to the effect the two governments have agreed to begin immediate negotiations on the points listed with common resolve to reach agreement as quickly as possible. Perhaps an agenda including the points listed below might accomplish the purpose."

Substitute fol para for numbered para 12 of Analysis.

"Egypt insists on recognition by the West of the King of Egypt's title as King of the Sudan. It is our understanding that in the UK the Egyptian claim is not contested so much on its substantial validity as for what it means in the context of UK undertakings to the people of the Sudan. However, Egypt apparently is willing to agree to self-determination by the Sudanese. The important point therefore is the concurrent recognition by Egypt of the right of the Sudanese to full and prompt self-determination."

ACHESON

No. 973

474.118/3-3152

The Director for Mutual Security (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 31, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to a memorandum of March 24, 1952, signed by Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, [1] with attachments, [2] in which the Department of State has joined with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a joint recommendation to the Director for Mutual Security that Egypt be declared eligible for reimbursable aid, under the provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

Section 408(e), above referred to, authorizes reimbursable aid to various categories of nations. One of these categories comprises a

[1] Not printed.

[2] There were three attachments. One, not printed, contained the latest revised list of equipment requirements for Egypt; the other two are printed: see Matthews' letter of Feb. 23 to Secretary of Defense Lovett, Document 961, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster's reply of Mar. 12, Document 969.

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nation whose "ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, is important to the security of the United States".

I agree with the conclusions reached by the Departments of State and Defense as to the advisability of providing assistance of the type indicated to Egypt, and under the authority delegated to me by Executive Order No. 10300, dated November 1, 1951, I hereby find and determine that Egypt is eligible to receive reimbursable military assistance under Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended.

I assume that the Department of State will proceed to obtain the necessary assurances from the Government of Egypt, as provided for in Section 408(e), and will consult with the Office of the Director for Mutual Security in the process of formulating any documents which are to be used for this purpose. I further request that this office be advised sufficiently in advance of the actual shipment of any equipment to Egypt so that appropriate letters can go forward to interested Congressional Committees.

I am sending an identical letter to the Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely,

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

No. 974

774.5 MSP/4-1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 11, 1952—1:17 p. m.

1581. Ref immed preceding tel para 2. [2]

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[1] Repeated to London via air pouch.

[2] In telegram 1580 to Cairo, Apr. 11, not printed, the Department of State informed the Embassy that the Director for Mutual Security had found Egypt eligible on Mar. 31 to receive reimbursable military assistance under Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, that Caffery was to inform the Egyptian Government of this fact, and that the United States was prepared to enter into an exchange of notes with Egypt as required by the Act. In paragraph 2 of this cable, the Embassy was told that the immediately following telegram contained the texts of alternative forms of notes. The Department observed that the short form was "limited to equipment desired for internal security only. Longer form covers whole range 408(e) reimbursable mil assistance, although initially equipment approved for purchase wld be limited to items for special police units. If Egypt prefers short form, US wld have no objection, although it shld be made clear that if mil as opposed police unit equipment desired by Egypt and purchase approved by US at later date, longer form wld have to be signed. Little leeway in long form is possible under existing laws and policies. You are authorized negot with Egypt Govt whichever of two texts you believe preferable, but distinction between two shld be clearly set forth to them." (774.5 MSP/4-1152)

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1. Short form "I have honor inform Your Excellency that Govt of Egypt has been declared eligible to receive from Govt of United States of America certain mil equipment and materials for police units, on a reimbursable basis under the authority and subject to the provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st Congress), as amended by Public Law 621, 81st Congress, and by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Public Law 165, 82nd Congress). The provisions of these laws and the policy of the United States Govt require that certain assurances be recd before completing any transactions under Sec 408(e) of the Act.

It is the understanding of the United States Govt that the Govt of Egypt is prepared to accept the fol undertakings:

1. Such equipment, materials or services as may be acquired from the US under this agreement are required for and will be used solely to maintain the internal security of Egypt, and Egypt will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.
2. The Govt of Egypt will not relinquish title to or possession of any equipment and materials, info or services furnished under this agreement, unless otherwise mutually agreed by the two Govts.
3. The Govt of Egypt will protect the security of any art, service or info furnished under this agreement.
4. It is understood that, prior to the transfer of any item or the rendering of any service under this Act, the US Govt retains the right to terminate the transaction.
5. The Govt of Egypt is prepared to accept terms and conditions of payment for any item or service which may be furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, which are in accord with the provisions of Sec 408(e) of that Act.

I have the honor to propose that this note, together with your reply confirming these assurances, constitute an agreement between the Govt of the US of Amer and the Govt of Egypt, effective on the date of your note."

2. Long form "I have honor to inform Your Excellency that Govt of Egypt has been declared eligible to rec from Govt of US of Amer mil equipment and materials, on a reimbursable basis under the authority and subject to the provisions of Sec 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st Congress), as amended by Public Law 621, 81st Congress, and by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Public Law 165, 82nd Congress). The provisions of these laws and the policy of the US Govt require that certain assurances be recd before completing any transactions under Sec 408(e) of the Act.

It is the understanding of the US Govt that the Govt of Egypt is prepared to accept the fol undertakings:

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1. The Govt of Egypt agrees to use any assistance furnished under this agreement to further internatl peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will enhance the ability of nations dedicated to the principles and purposes of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles. In furtherance of these objectives, the Govt of Egypt will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish as may hereafter be mutually agreed, equipment, materials, services, or other assistance to the US or to and among other nations whose increased ability to defend themselves against aggression is considered by the Govts of the US and of Egypt to be in their mutual interest.

2. The Govt of Egypt is prepared to assure the US Govt that such equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the US under this agreement are required for and will be used unless otherwise mutually agreed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations solely to maintain its internal security and its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

3. The Govt of Egypt will not relinquish title to or possession of any equipment and materials, info or services furnished under this agreement, unless otherwise mutually agreed by the two Govts.

4. The Govt of Egypt will protect the security of any art, service or info furnished under this agreement.

5. It is understood that, prior to the transfer of any item or the rendering of any service under this Act, the US Govt retains the right to terminate the transaction.

6. The Govt of Egypt is prepared to accept terms and conditions of payment for any item or service which may be furnished under this agreement which are in accord with the arrangements customarily made regarding such transactions.

I have the honor to propose that this note, together with your reply confirming these assurances, constituted an agreement between the Govt of the US of Amer and the Govt of Egypt, effective on the date of your note."

ACHESON

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No. 975

641.74/4-1852: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, April 18, 1952—noon

4707. I saw Eden and he asked that I forward the fol personal msg re Egypt to you in reply to your msg conveyed Deptel 4762 March 26 as modified by Deptel 4828 Mar 28:

"I share your anxiety over the Egypt sitn and I entirely agree on the need for speed in trying to reach an agrmt with the present Egypt Govt. It is most encouraging to receive this new evidence of your interest in promoting a solution of the present difficulties between Egypt and the Western world and I am grateful for your practical suggestions.

"Your appreciation of the present position and analysis of the various courses of action which seem to be open coincide closely with my own. The objectives which you set out at the beginning of your appraisal paper are indeed our main common objectives. I shld only like to add that HMG regard a solution of the prob of the Anglo-Egypt Sudan to be another major objective of the present negots. Because this wld involve in Sudanese eyes a change in the status of their country, I am pledged not to agree to recognize King Farouk as King of the Sudan except as the outcome of consultation with the Sudanese and I cld not modify that pledge without gravely impairing trust in the assurances of HMG among the Sudanese people and indeed among many other peoples on the African continent. There is strong feeling on this point in Parliament. I, therefore, regard the Sudan prob as something more than a complicating factor, altho I agree with you that what we need for our own purposes is an agreement on the def of the ME and the maintenance of free transit of the Suez Canal.

"On the tactics of starting negots you make the suggestion that if it is impossible to agree upon a joint statement or exchange of notes with Egypts an attempt might be made to reach agmt upon an agenda. We have had this in mind for some time, though I think that in drawing up this agenda we might encounter similar difficulties to those obstructions joint declaration. The idea of a declaration in any case was pursued only in order to help the Egypts.

"The truth is that the present Egypt Govt, for all Hilaly Pasha's sincerity and courage, are afraid to give away more than the Wafd would give away. For instance, they are reluctant to start discussing the MEC because the MEC proposals were an integral part of the four-power proposals rejected by the Wafd. Nevertheless Hilaly Pasha at least seems to recognize the necessity for defending Egypt

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 264.

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against outside aggression, even tho it is hard for him to undertake to do what is necessary to see that Egypt is defended.

"In regard to the withdrawal of Brit forces from the canal zone, you suggest that it might help if we wld agree, at the beginning of negots, to inform the Egypts that Brit forces over and above the treaty limit wld be withdrawn as soon as possible, starting at once. This wld involve a reduction of from over 70,000 men to 10,000. I am conscious of the psychological value of starting a withdrawal of forces now and wld be ready to do so at the appropriate moment. At the same time I am doubtful whether it wld make Egypts any more tractable if we were to reduce our forces to the treaty figure. Having abrogated the treaty and declared that they will not be satis until all fon troops are out, they are not likely to compromise on such a proposal. In any case we shld like to make sure of agreement at least on our leaving sufficient technicians to look after the mil equipment still in the canal zone and also on establishing an allied air def org, before agreeing to such substantial withdrawal of troops.

"The estab of an allied air def org, including both Egypt and Allied forces, is something to which I attach the greatest importance, not only from the point of view of the def of the canal against outside aggression, but also for the security of the ME in peace time. There are many people in the UK who wld be most reluctant to see the complete withdrawal of Brit land forces from the canal zone, since they fear that to leave the canal exclusively to the protection of the Egypt army wld put the canal itself and the canal company at the mercy of the Egypts, upon whose written promises past experience has taught us not to rely. If early elections are held and result, as they well might, in the return of the Wafd to power, this wld lend force to such arguments. I take rather less pessimistic view, but withdrawal of land forces will inevitably involve a risk unless the Western powers between them can apply sufficient internatl pressure upon the Egypt Govt to leave both the canal and the canal company alone. The presence of an Allied air def org on Egypt soil wld help to achieve this end and I wonder whether you can suggest any other steps which might usefully be taken.

"Examination of the question of redeploying troops from the canal zone led to the difficult prob of where they cld be moved to and still remain ready to defend the ME in the event of outside aggression. We have gone very carefully into the prob of constructing an alternative station in Gaza. The polit difficulties involved are possibly less formidable than the physical. No permanent accommodation cld be constructed there without very considerable expense. With such resources as we have at present available it wld be a long business, taking several years. It will also be necessary to find another home for the 200,000 Arab refugees at present in Gaza. The difficulties look almost insuperable; on the other hand, there is no other strategically suitable area at hand. All this does not make it easier for us to agree to a large and immediate withdrawal of troops for the canal zone, while continuing to prepare for the def of the ME against outside aggression.

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"If I have stressed the difficulties confronting us it is not because I think that you underestimate them. On contrary, I am always sure with you of a sympathetic audience, since this is a problem which we share. I am most grateful also for the continued support and coop which Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo has recd from Mr. Caffery. His assistance and his wise advice to the Egypts have played a part which it wld be difficult to overestimate. The plain truth however remains that, unless the Egypts are prepared to face facts which are admittedly uncomfortable from their point of view, all our efforts to help them may prove in vain. Although we are willing to withdraw our forces from Egypt upon certain terms, the Egypts cannot drive us out of Egypt; altho we are willing that Egypt shld play her proper part in developments in the Sudan, she cannot obstruct the progress which the Sudanese are making towards self-govt and self-determination, and she cannot expect us to help her by recognizing the King of Egypt's claim to the title of King of the Sudan against the wishes of the Sudanese. We have made these points clear to the Egypts again and again, at the same time emphasizing that we realize the difficulties of the present Egypt Govt and that we will do all we can to help them so long as this does not conflict with these principles. But the point, in my view, is that the only hope of settling our differences now is that the Egypts shld get to work with us upon the necessary practical arrangements. It is to this end that our efforts have been increasingly bent of late".

GIFFORD

No. 976

745W.00/4–3052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1952—8:43 p. m.

1680. From Secretary for Ambassador. Brit Amb called on me Apr 30 and gave me fol redraft Sudan formula: [2]

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 5596. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Burton Y. Berry.

[2] On Apr. 23 Ambassador Gifford reported in telegrams 4813 and 4814, neither printed, the contents of a conversation he had had that day with Foreign Secretary Eden and transmitted the text of a British formula which Eden and the Foreign Office hoped would lead to a successful negotiation and settlement of the Sudan issue with Egypt. Eden had also asked that the United States comment on the acceptability of the proposal's contents, as he hoped to have American support for it. (745W.00/4–2352)

Ambassador Caffery reacted to the new British proposal on Apr. 25 in telegram 1869 from Cairo, not printed. Caffery reported that neither he nor British Embassy officials in Cairo believed that the British draft would succeed with the Egyptians in

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"The Egyptian Government having declared that His Majesty King Farouk holds the title of King of Egypt and the Sudan, Her Majesty's Government reaffirm that they would accept either the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown or any other status for the Sudan, provided that it resulted from the exercise of the right of the Sudanese people freely to decide their future status, which right is recognized and accepted by both Governments.

H.M.G. realise that there are differences of opinion between the two Governments as to the question of the King's title during the interim period before self determination. They therefore also declare that they are ready to enter into immediate consultation with the Sudanese in regard to this matter, in order to ascertain whether any solution is possible, agreeable to the Sudanese and consistent with the pledges given by H.M.G. to them."

Full report conversation with Brit Amb in immed fol tel. [3]

We are eager to do everything possible to show understanding UK difficulties and appreciation distance they have come on this matter and efforts they have made bring about resumption negots as soon as possible. We therefore urgently request your views on: (a) possibility this formula being accepted if it shld receive support from us and (b) whether possible Egypt rejection formula wld make it more difficult induce Egypt negotiate without formula.

FYI we are convinced that given the situation existing in London Brit cannot reach any conclusion on recognition King Farouk's title without prior consultation with Sudanese and that this must be accepted by us as one of the facts in case. We also think it wld be of great assistance to Brit in their talks with Sudanese if they cld have prior discussion with Egypt and then be in a position reassure Sudanese that in event recognition King's title Egypt wld act in certain defined ways re status Sudanese and constitutional development.

We gather from Brit Amb Wash that Eden wld much prefer commence negots without formula. However because Egypts insist on the formula he has done his best to produce one. Such a formula has to reflect basic UK position re prior consultation. Having

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its present form and then proceeded to raise critical questions in an effort to clarify "the points in the formula we do not understand". He wanted "explanations, because if *we* do not understand it the Egyptians will understand it even less." (745W.00/4-2552)

Shortly after Department of State officials had received Caffery's telegram 1869 on Apr. 25, Secretary Acheson spoke with the British Ambassador, who had called to reinforce the views expressed by Foreign Secretary Eden to Ambassador Gifford on Apr. 23. In this interview, the contents of which the Department reported to the Embassy in London on Apr. 25 in telegram 5501, not printed, Acheson reiterated the substance of Caffery's remarks, and the British Ambassador said he would request clarifications from London. (745W.00/4-2552)

[3] Telegram 1681, *infra*.

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worked so hard on a formula Brit are now tending to crystallize on tactics its presentation since they believe some reply to this Egypt insistence is necessary. Therefore if you think there is any chance Egypt might accept formula or even if they reject it such rejection wld not do irreparable damage we wld be inclined urge you support it.

If however you believe that there is no chance of acceptance or that if presented it wld do irreparable damage we wonder whether procedure along fol lines wld be acceptable to Brit and wld work with Egypts. Such alternative procedure wld be: you wld seek early opportunity see King either before or after Stevenson depending upon agreement to be worked out with UK and say that US which has endeavored throughout Anglo-Egypt conversations play fair and open hand with our two friends wishes make clear that we are convinced that the UK has gone far towards meeting Egypt position. We are equally convinced that UK cannot agree to recognition of title without prior consultation with Sudanese and without conditional understanding with Egypt on guarantees. Consequently we feel that in advance of negots the Brit simply cannot go further. In US opinion the thing to do is to begin the negots and in this connection we know that the Brit are hopeful that during the course of such negots on the Sudan it wld be possible to find means: (a) of associating Egypt closely with UK in working out constitutional development of Sudan; (b) facilitating arrangements between Egypt and Sudan for control of Nile waters and (c) furthering closest possible cooperation between Egypt and Sudan in such a way contribute welfare and best interests two peoples. We understand Egypt difficulties but we believe that any formula which is devised on the Sudan at this time wld have to be within limits of Brit position as stated above. Therefore if Egypts insist on formula, then we wld urge they accept best UK has been able devise. But if Egypt cannot accept such formula then sensible thing is to get ahead with negots and try to work out settlement which we know is fully desired by Egypts as it is also by UK.

Re this alternative procedure it wld not be our idea that you wld support any specific formula but wld merely indicate limitations Brit position which wld have to be reflected in formula.

Emb London shld not discuss any of above with Brits until further instructed. [4]

ACHESON

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[4] On May 1, in telegram 1908 from Cairo, not printed, Ambassador Caffery responded to the specific questions raised in this cable. He did not believe the Egyptians would accept the British formula even with American support of it; an Egyptian rejection of the formula would make negotiations on the Sudan even more diffi-

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No. 977

745W.00/4-3052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1952—8:43 p. m.

1681. Calling on instr Brit Amb Apr 30 gave Secy text new Sudan formula reported by separate tel. [2] Ref Apr 25 discussion (Deptel 5501 to London, Apr 25, 1662 to Cairo) [3] Brit Amb said ambiguity phrase previous formula "pres status Sudanese people" avoided in redraft. [4] Amb believes now clear para refers to status Sudanese during entire interim period prior to self-determination. Amb reported Eden believed it useless consult Sudanese prior presentation formula or obtaining desired guarantees (para 2 reftel) from Egypt unless UK already had Egypt guarantees in form conditional promises. [5] UK intended it wld be made clear that Egypt guarantees wld not become operative until Sudanese assent to title recognition. Secy ptd out that redrafted formula made no mention guarantees tho UK undertook consult Sudanese immed and speculated on Egypt reaction this pt. [6]

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cult, and Caffery thought that the "damage wld be irreparable if United States throws in its prestige in attempt to sell unacceptable formula." (745W.00/5-152)

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 5597.

[2] Telegram 1680, *supra*.

[3] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[4] The reference is to the phrasing of paragraph 2 of the original draft of the Sudan formula. As transmitted in telegram 4814 from London, Apr. 23, not printed, paragraph 2 reads as follows:

"During the interim period, and without prejudice to the question of the right of the King of Egypt, pending such self-determination, to the title of King of the Sudan, HMG declare their readiness, in consultation with the Sudanese, to seek means of reconciling a possible recognition of this title during this period with their pledges to the Sudanese people, on the understanding that neither the REG nor HMG wld allow such recognition to change in any way the present status of the Sudanese people." (745W.00/4-2352)

[5] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[6] In telegram 4814 Ambassador Gifford also transmitted the text of a document which presented a series of undertakings which the British believed they had to obtain from Egypt in order to persuade the Sudanese to agree to recognize Farouk as King of the Sudan. The text reads as follows:

"(A) Public recognition of the right of self-determination.

"(B) A public declaration that assumption of title by the King and its recognition by UK wld not be regarded as affecting, or allowed to affect, in any way the present status of the Sudanese.

"(C) Recognition of the title will not be allowed to affect the administration of the Sudan.

Continued

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Turning to ques possibility delay constit devel as aid settlement Amb indicated no pub statement poss but said Brit Amb in Cairo wld be instr make clear to GOE that UK during negots hopes it poss find means (a) assoc Egypt closely with UK in working out constit devel; (b) facilitate Egypt-Sudan arrangement for control Nile Waters; and (c) further closest coop between Egypt and Sudan in way contribute to best interests both countries. Amb added that Caffery's statement to Farouk that UK approaches Sudan problem from this pt of view wld be most helpful. Thus thru fact Egypt assoc with constit devel, natural delay in its progress might result and also Egypt wld be in posit influence trend events. Reading from instrs Amb indicated Eden personally attached greatest imptce full US support UK efforts on Sudan formula. Unless Caffery prepared approach King with full conviction and make clear formula is limit UK can go in advance negots his approach wld be useless. UK cld not consider taking action conflicting with its pledges. If US support not possible UK wld then be obliged go ahead without it since half-hearted assistance worse than none.

If US decides support formula Caffery cld be instrd make clear to King, that if Egypt rejects formula only solution for UK wld be open negots without prior formula and during course bring in Sudan Reps consider matters of concern to them. Amb stressed UK interest in devel formula was to help Hilali Govt.

Amb reported Brit Amb Stevenson wld return Cairo May 1. UK hoped US cld instr Caffery by then so two Ambs cld consult May 2. On May 3 Caffery might go to King and later same day Stevenson wld see PriMin.

Secy believed timing may pres diffics as Caffery's views must be obtained on new formula. Chances for success this formula raised ques our minds partic since Caffery had expressed grave doubts re acceptability orig formula to Egypts. Secy said Dept wld give matter most urgent and careful consid and wld try reply to Eden over weekend. No doubt Stevenson and Caffery wld wish confer on matter after Brit Ambs return Cairo with latest London thinking.

Brit Amb said he entirely understood our desire consult Caffery and wld report to Eden and we were giving matter urgent attention and wld give reply as soon as poss.

ACHESON

"(D) The Egyptians will cooperate through a tripartite commission (or commissions) in establishing self-govt and arranging self-determination.

"(E) The Egyptians undertake to encourage the pro-unity parties in the Sudan to participate in the elections." (745W.00/4-2352)

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No. 978

874.501/4-3052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, April 30, 1952—8 p. m.

1898. Regarding Deptels 1581, April 11 and 1656, April 24. [2] Following informal negotiations I have today received note signed by Foreign Minister as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to your letter of 29 April 1952, number 397, concerning the assurances and undertakings required from the Government of Egypt prior to the completion of the transactions between the Egyptian Government and the United States Government, for the supply of certain military equipment and materials for police units, on a reimbursable basis, under the provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

"The Government of Egypt accepts the undertakings and assurances outlined in that letter and concurs with your proposal that this letter, together with your letter dated 29 April 1952, sub number 397, referred to above, constitute an agreement covering all transactions on this subject, between the two governments; the said agreement to enter into force on the date of this letter."

Foreign Minister's note was in response mine containing exact text "short form" of agreement set forth Deptel 1581, April 11. As agreed no publicity is being given to this. [3]

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 861.

[2] For telegram 1581, see Document 974. Telegram 1656 is not printed.

[3] This Egyptian note enabled the United States and Egypt to conclude this Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. For the texts of these notes, see TIAS No. 3564, printed in 7 UST 841.

No. 979

745W.00/5-252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 2, 1952—7:23 p. m.

5656. Secy informed Brit Amb May 2 that after most careful consideration US had concluded it not able present to King and Egypt

[1] Repeated niact to Cairo as telegram 1696. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Berry.

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Govt Sudan formula set forth Deptel 5596 Apr 30 [2] and as amended London's 4957 May 1. [3] Secy told Brit Amb that we had consulted with Caffery and outlined our thinking as contained Depreftel which indicated our desire to be as helpful as poss to UK. Secy said we did not believe formula wld be acceptable to Egypts even with US support and we therefore considered US assoc with specific text might greatly reduce our utility to assist in Anglo-Egypt prob. Secy also told Amb we felt presentation formula and its probable rejection by Egypts wld make further negots more difficult. However, formula might have already been presented but if not this was matter purely for UK to decide.

Finally Secy informed Brit Amb that regardless whether formula presented or not US prepared instr Caffery see King and speak along lines alternative procedure set forth Deptel 5596. However, Caffery wld not be so instrd until we had confirmation from UK either thru Gifford or Dept that it agreeable this procedure.

Brit Amb said he wld report above immed to FonOff. He added info from Cairo indicated Stevenson wld probably present formula to PriMin and FonMin together May 3 but this still subj final London clearance. [4]

ACHESON

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[2] Printed as telegram 1680 to Cairo, Document 976.

[3] In telegram 4957 from London, May 1, not printed, Ambassador Gifford reported that the Foreign Office had changed the last clause of the final sentence of the Sudan formula to read: "in order to ascertain whether any solution is possible consistent with the pledges which HMG have given to the Sudanese people, and to which they adhere." (641.74/5–152)

[4] Ambassador Gifford reported the Foreign Office reaction to Secretary Acheson's conversation with Ambassador Franks in telegram 4996 from London, May 3, not printed. It reads as follows:

"FonOff has informed us that Eden wld be grateful if Caffery wld see King as soon as possible and speak to him along lines alternative procedure set forth Deptel 5596 Apr 30.

"FonOff has instructed Stevenson proceed with presentation formula to Hilali and Hassouna, feeling HMG obliged to do so in view Egyptian attitude and fact that formula expected after last ten days' activity here in London." (745W.00/5–352)

The Department of State then transmitted the text of telegram 4996 to Ambassador Caffery in Cairo in telegram 1703, May 3. In addition, Caffery was instructed to pursue as soon as possible the alternative course of action outlined in telegram 1680, Document 976. (745W.00/5–352)

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No. 980

745W.00/5-452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 4, 1952—11:09 p. m.

1707. Dept understands from Brit Emb Wash that Stevenson has now presented formula to PriMin who stated it wld require careful study. In view Embtel 1920 May 3 [2] we believe it most desirable you see King soonest. Since formula has neither been rejected nor accepted as yet, it wld not seem opportune for you to suggest to King at this juncture (Embtel 1933 May 4) [3] that formula be given up. It wld seem more appropriate for you to talk along lines alternative procedure set forth Deptel 1680 Apr 30 which is not prejudicial to acceptance if Egypts are so minded but which at same time suggests coming to grips with substance question if rejection formula is course decided by Egypts. It is clear to us that during negots UK wld seek means not only achieve three points set forth alternative procedure (Deptel 1680 Apr 30) as a, b, and c but wld also deal with recognition question.

Since you are in best position determine what local circumstances require, Dept gladly leaves to ur discretion emphasis which you believe each point in Deptreftel merits.

ACHESON

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 5691.

[2] In telegram 1920 from Cairo, May 3, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that he had received assurances from the Egyptian Government that the Prime Minister, Hilali Pasha, would not act on the British formula until after he had consulted with Caffery. (641.74/5-352)

[3] Not printed.

No. 981

641.74/5-852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, May 8, 1952—9 p. m.

1965. I talked with His Majesty for some time this afternoon about the two messages I recd about his desire for my advice. He said that under no circumstances cld he agree to prior consultation with the Sudanese before recognition of the title by the Brit. He

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 882, to Paris as 643, to Ankara as 492, and unnumbered to Rome, Moscow, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tehran, and the Arab capitals.

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insisted that if he is to stay in his present job he cannot agree to that. "Further", he said, "neither this govt nor any other govt cld remain in office if they agreed to those conditions". "In that case" I said, "There is not much for me to say, however, I do counsel Your Majesty to drop the thesis that a formula shld be agreed to by both parties before resuming negots. Get on with the negots. The Brit will never agree to the sort of formula your PriMin wants". He did not commit himself but he did say "I understand what you mean and what you say is logical but I do not know just how the PriMin will react to it. The PriMin is a fine man, in fact all the members of the govt are fine men, they are the best available; but the PriMin is a temperamental individual and I might find myself with his resignation in my hands. For the first time since I have been on the job I wouldn't know what to do. In every crisis in the past I have had a new Cabinet in one of the drawers of my desk, but I haven't any now. The last time I saw you I told you this was the last chance and I tell you so again. I know that the Brit don't really believe that and I don't believe your people do either. Furthermore, I venture to say that you will all be sorry if I get turned out".

He then put on a tirade against the Brit which he said frankly was meant for me to repeat to Stevenson. He said that the Brit had broken 65 promises to Egypt. He cld not rely on their word. They had no intention of reaching an agreement. He recited the past history of the Sudan and emphasized the aspect I have spoken of before, that in Egypt the change in the title was from Viceroy to Khedive to Sultan to King. In the Sudan, he said, "it has always been Sahib which is a broader title than King for it means sovereign-proprietor. It is nothing new we are asking for, we are merely asking them to follow the same logic and slip over from Sahib to Malik. I don't want to threaten, or perhaps I do, but with things going as they are, to protect my own position in the country, or to reinforce it if you like, I may be forced to come out publicly soon with an all-around denunciation of the Brit".

We ended on his reiterating that only the US can prevent a catastrophe; that he has confidence in us, etc., etc.

CAFFERY

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No. 982

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 14, 1952.

Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Situation: Proposed Approach to the British on the Sudan

Discussion:

We have been informed by Ambassador Caffery that both the King and the Prime Minister have stated to him that the Sudan formula which was presented by Sir Ralph Stevenson will be rejected but that the door will not be closed to further negotiations. It had been anticipated that the rejection would be given to the British on Monday, May 12, but so far this has not been confirmed. However, it is believed that we should consider what further steps we should take once rejection has been definitely confirmed. It should be noted that even though the door may not be closed to negotiation, in practice it is doubtful there will be anything on which to negotiate until the question of the title is settled. The expected rejection of the formula will confirm once more that nothing short of recognition by the United Kingdom of the King of Egypt's title as King of the Sudan will be acceptable to Egypt as the "price" of negotiations on the base question.

Since Egypt is apparently unwilling to negotiate on the base question or on the Sudan without a formula acceptable to it (which means recognition) and since the British will not consider recognition without consulting the Sudanese which they hold can only be done after negotiations with Egypt on the intent and implications of recognition, it would appear that the Anglo-Egyptian conversations are at an impasse. This problem of recognition has become the one easily discernible and fairly well defined obstacle in the Anglo-Egyptian talks and it would therefore seem imperative that this obstacle be eliminated if progress is to be made. It is not only possible but likely that other obstacles to settlement will arise as we go along but we believe that every effort should be made to eliminate each obstacle as it becomes discernible and defined, such as in the case of the recognition of the title.

For the time being the question of a formula is in abeyance since no agreement on the Sudan can be reached. Consequently one of the parties will have to take action to move the problem off dead center. The British insist that they must have prior consultation

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with the Sudanese on any change of status of the Sudan and they state that recognition of the title constitutes such a change. However, the obligation to consult with the Sudanese is one which the British have unilaterally assumed and they are in no way bound to obtain Egyptian agreement to consultation. It would seem logical therefore that the British should move forward at once (regardless of whether or not the Egyptians agree to commence negotiations) to consult the Sudanese in order to discharge to their own satisfaction this unilateral obligation. They can make clear to the Sudanese during the process of consultation that recognition of the title would only be accorded within the framework of self-determination and irreducible minimum of other guarantees necessary to safeguard constitutional development in the Sudan. In connection with consultation it should be noted that if it is to be left to the Sudan Government, i.e. Sir Robert Howe, the Governor General, or Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary, it is doubtful that the desired results would be obtained. We are anxious that the consultations be carried on in an even-handed manner—not weighted against recognition.

Prior to the presentation of the Sudan formula to the Egyptians we suggested to the British the idea of immediate consultation with the Sudanese without further discussion of a formula or guarantees. To this Mr. Eden replied that unless it was possible to go to the Sudanese with firm guarantees, they (the Sudanese) would demand much more than involved in the attached list and than the Egyptians would be prepared to accept. While there may be justification for this position, we do not believe that the critical state of the negotiations permits this type of bargaining. It must be borne in mind that if the British did obtain Sudanese consent to recognition, it would still be conditioned on the Egyptian guarantees.

If as a result of immediate consultation with the Sudanese the British are able to offer recognition of the title to Egypt, then we may be able to move forward on the critical negotiations with respect to the Suez Canal base. On the other hand if the British state after consultation that they can under no circumstances recognize the title, then we shall have to face squarely the serious implications of a probable complete breakdown of negotiations.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that we go back to the British, preferably in Washington by you through talking with Sir Oliver Franks, along the following lines:

The Sudanese formula has now been rejected by the Egyptians. Ambassador Caffery did what he could in his talk with the King on May 8th to get the Egyptians to realize the limitations which

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would have to be reflected in any formula which the United Kingdom presented. He also urged that if the formula could not be accepted, then they should go ahead with the negotiations. These approaches have not been successful and we seem to be approaching an impasse.

We discussed the other day the possibility that the United Kingdom might proceed with consultations with the Sudanese without holding discussions with the Egyptians on the questions of guarantees. While we recall Mr. Eden's belief that it would be useless to consult the Sudanese without guarantees, we come back to the idea that the repidly developing impasse makes it desirable to offer recognition directly to the Egyptians requesting at that time such guarantees as may be considered essential to safeguard constitutional development in the Sudan and self-determination. This would mean immediate consultation by the United Kingdom with the Sudanese.

We believe that if consultations are carried out in a sincere and earnest manner, it should prove possible to convince the Independence-Front Sudanese that symbolic recognition of the title would not be prejudicial to their future since it would only be accorded under certain specified conditions. It is clear that the UK has strong influence in the Sudan which might be brought to bear in the interest of reaching settlement with Egypt which could be just as important to the Sudanese as to anybbdy else.

As to the method of consultation and who might do it, that is something for determination by the UK. However, it is essential that it be done in such a way to inspire confidence not only in the UK and Sudan but also in Egypt. We recall that Mr. Eden had thought of going to the Sudan and that might work very well. The thought also occurs to us that a distinguished British personage not politically committed, and with a reputation for impartiality might undertake the task. We are interested to learn that the Foreign Office feels that the consultation could take place with a representative group of Sudanese leaders rather than through more formal means, such as a Constituen Assembly or even a plebiscite.

We are convinced that the removal of this obstacle is very urgent and that every effort should be made to get ahead with consultations as quickly as possible in a manner which will result in an offer to the Egyptians on recognition. We are greatly concerned by what may happen if we do not remove this obstacle, for according to our information the King and the present Prime Minister are not limitless in their ability to maintain law and order.

Without sounding too pessimistic a note at this juncture we would be interested in the views of the Foreign Office as to how it envisages the situation developing should negotiations break down.

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[Attachment]

GUARANTEES ON THE SUDAN

(a) Public recognition of the right of self-determination.

(b) A public declaration that assumption of title by the King and its recognition by the UK would not be regarded as affecting, or allowed to affect, in any way the present status of the Sudanese.

(c) Recognition of the title will not be allowed to affect the administration of the Sudan.

(d) The Egyptians will cooperate through a tripartite commission (or commissions) in establishing self-government and arranging self-determination.

(e) The Egyptians undertake to encourage the pro-unity parties in the Sudan to participate in the elections.

No. 983

641.74/5–1952

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 19, 1952.

Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Situation: Proposed Approach to the British on the Sudan.

Discussion:

In NEA's memorandum of May 14 it was recommended that you call in Sir Oliver Franks and suggest that since Egypt had turned down the Sudan formula, the British should undertake consultation immediately with the Sudanese. This recommendation was based on the belief that the Egyptian rejection would be handed to the British on May 14 or 15 and on the assumption that Sir Oliver Franks would be in Washington. It is now learned that the Egyptian reply will not be handed to Mr. Eden until May 20 and that Sir Oliver Franks will be out of Washington until May 24. [1]

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[1] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 2066 from Cairo, May 20, not printed, that the Egyptian Ambassador in London had earlier in the day handed Eden a note in which the Egyptian Government formally rejected the British draft formula on the Sudan and alternatively presented Eden with the following text of three Sudan formulas which were acceptable to Egypt.

"1. The two govts will enter into negots to settle the question of the Sudan within the framework of unity under the Egyptian crown. Her Majesty's Govt welcome the

Continued

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In view of the timing of the delivery of the Egyptian reply, your imminent departure for Europe and Sir Oliver's absence from Washington, it would not seem desirable for the approach to be made in Washington.

EUR and NEA have read the draft telegram from you to Ambassador Gifford and believe that it sets forth exactly the points which should be made to the British. However, we consider that the approach would have far greater impact if you made these points directly to Mr. Eden. [2] In addition, there is the practical question of whether Mr. Gifford would be able to see Mr. Eden after the Egyptian reply is presented and before Mr. Eden leaves for the Continent. [3]

While it would not be desirable for Mr. Gifford to tell Mr. Eden the substance of your proposed comments, it might be useful for him to forearm Mr. Eden that you intend to raise the Sudan problem. Besides giving Mr. Eden the opportunity to prepare himself, this might also lessen the chances of a statement by the United Kingdom following the Egyptian reply which might make further moves more difficult.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

1. You sign the attached telegram to Ambassador Gifford (Tab A); [4]

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assurance of the Egypt Govt that the Sudanese shall have the right to decide their future status."

"2. The policy which the high contracting parties undertake to follow in the Sudan (within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt) will have for its essential objectives to assure the well being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-govt and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan."

"3. Text which the Brit Amb was instructed by Mr. Eden to submit to the Min FonAff on 5 April, 1952, as modified by the Egypt Govt.

"The two govts agree to discuss the question of the Sudan on the following basis: Both govts agree that the Sudanese shall have the right freely to decide their future status. The Egypt Govt having declared that His Majesty King Farouk holds the title of King of Egypt and the Sudan, Her Majesty's Govt reaffirm that they do not oppose the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown." (745W.00/5–2052)

[2] In the margin appears the following remark from H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State: "I concur HFM".

[3] Regarding Acheson's and Eden's trip to Europe, see footnote 1, *infra*.

[4] Not printed; Secretary Acheson signed the cable under reference, and it was transmitted to London as telegram 6027, May 19. In essence, Ambassador Gifford was instructed to inform the Foreign Office or Foreign Secretary Eden that while the Secretary of State was willing to give brief attention to the proposed British agenda items for tripartite discussions, he intended to raise bilaterally only the question of Egypt–Sudan and possibly Iran and preferred to focus his attention on these two subjects. (396.1 ST/5–1652)

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2. You speak directly to Mr. Eden along the lines of the attached paper (Tab B).

[Tab B]

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED TO MR. EDEN

The latest British gambit in Egypt has been played out. The result is stalemate. We see the situation this way:

1) The issues of the canal and defence cannot be settled without some solution of the Sudan—the King's title. Caffery and Stevenson have no doubt of this.

2) The British can agree to nothing on the Sudan without consulting the Sudanese and getting their acquiescence on the basis of conditions and guarantees safeguarding self-determination.

3) The British want the Egyptians to accept the conditions and guarantees first, since this would facilitate consultation with the Sudanese and might make their demands less.

4) The Egyptians refuse, and demand recognition of the title first. The British refuse this.

5) Result: An impasse which may well produce a renewal of militancy in Egypt, governmental collapse, weakening of the army's loyalty, of the authority of the King—another five-alarm fire in the Arab world.

6) Underlying all of this are undoubtedly real differences of intentions about the meaning of recognition of the King's title, and the meaning of self-determination for the Sudan. And these are founded, in part, on mutual distrust.

7) In this situation, is there any alternative to drift to disaster? We think that there may be one possibility. But it is only a possibility if it is seized promptly and pursued with the zeal and solemnity which comes from recognizing it as "the last clear chance."

8) This possibility is prompt British consultation with the Sudanese designed to bring about acceptance of the title in the pre-self determination period on a basis which in fact does safeguard the right of the Sudanese to decide their own future. These conditions should also make plain to the world an offer to associate the Egyptians in the constitution-making process or/and to provide some disinterested observation in order to meet the charges of mutual distrust.

9) This consultation—if it is to accomplish anything to aid solution of the problem—cannot be done by the Administration in the Sudan. It can only be done by some British person or persons, so eminent and detached that the British public, the Sudanese, the

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free foreign public, and even the Egyptians, will be impressed and reassured by the sincerity and objectivity of the effort.

10) This is a hard thing for the British to do. It can only be done on their own initiative. But the alternative—the drift towards general breakup in Egypt—will be harder. Harder not only for the British but for us too. For, as in Indo-China, these problems always come back to weaken the combined strength we are all trying to create. And they come back also, as in Iran, Tunisia and Morocco, to weaken an asset, which is not ours alone but belongs to all the West—the belief that the interests of the U.S. are broad enough to include those of other peoples. We have, I hope, demonstrated this to our British and French allies. We need imaginative and energetic help from them along the same lines.

No. 984

CFM files, lot M 88, "Signing Ceremonies in Europe"

United States Minutes of the First United States–United Kingdom Foreign Ministers Meeting, Paris, May 26, 1952, 9:45 p. m. [1]

SECRET

SCEM MIN 1

Participants: *U.S.*
The Secretary
Ambassador Jessup
Ambassador Dunn
Ambassador Gifford
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Stabler
U.K.
Mr. Eden
Sir Oliver Harvey
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Shuckburgh

[Here follows discussion of rubber, the Tripartite Declaration, the Saar, Israeli claims, the Soviet note, Spain, Trieste, the Korean armistice talks, and Dutch New Guinea.]

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[1] Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden were in Paris to attend the signing ceremonies of the European Defense Treaty on May 27. For documentation concerning the U.S. attitude toward the establishment of the European Defense Community, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.
This meeting took place in Ambassador Dunn's residence.

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Egypt

23. Mr. Eden said the UK had urged the Egyptians over a long period to talk to the Sudanese but that up until the present moment the Egyptians had refused on the basis that Sudan was under the Egyptian crown and therefore there was nothing to talk about. Mr. Eden said he thought Hilali deserved great credit for his decision to consult and said the UK had done what it could to urge the Sudanese to accept the Egyptian invitation.[2] Mr. Eden said word from Cairo indicated that Mahdi had dropped the conditions and that a Sudanese delegation would be arriving in Cairo in the next few days. The result of the consultations would be that either the Sudanese would receive an offer from the Egyptians which would release the UK from its pledges, or alternatively the Sudanese would reject Egyptian sovereignty and Egypt would then have a better understanding of the realities of the Sudan situation. Mr. Eden thought the Egyptians would offer the Sudanese delegation money which would be firmly rejected. Mr. Eden said that the UK Defense Minister had informed the Egyptians that the UK was prepared to deliver equipment to the Egyptian armed forces. The UK was now looking for this equipment and he referred to the fact that Egyptian armed forces were quite friendly to the UK. The present danger was frustration on the part of the younger officers who did not like Farouk. Mr. Eden believed prospects for settlement appeared to be better than ever before and expressed satisfaction that the talks had not been broken off by a rejection of the UK formula on Sudan. He seemed satisfied by the Egyptian "reply" and thought the third formula offered some hope, although it might still be open to misinterpretation.

24. The Secretary said that consultation between the Egyptians and Sudanese was of utmost importance and significance and the US felt this was a step in the right direction. However, the problem of King Farouk's title and the UK attitude toward it still remained. The UK on one hand felt it could not consult the Sudanese concerning the title until prior guarantees were received from the Egyptians. The Egyptians on the other hand demanded recognition of the title now and when approached regarding consultation, rejected it. The result was an impasse. The important thing was to find a solution not an obstacle. One possibility for avoiding an impasse was the UK's undertaking to consult the Sudanese now without prior guarantees. The consultation should be done in such a

[2] The Egyptian Prime Minister, Hilali Pasha, had extended an invitation several days earlier to Sayed Sir Abdul Rahman el Mahdi Pasha, the leader of the Sudanese UMMA (Independence) Party, to send a delegation to Cairo to exchange views with the Egyptian Government regarding the Sudan's political future. (641.74/5-2652)

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manner as would be designed to bring about acceptance of the title in a pre-self-determination period on a basis which would in fact safeguard Sudanese rights. The consultation should not be carried out by the Sudan Administration and the Secretary suggested the consultation be done by some British person or persons so eminent and detached that the British public, the Sudanese, and even the Egyptians, would be impressed by the sincerity and objectivity of the consultation. The Secretary emphasized that in our view time was the important factor and that the King and Prime Minister's position would become increasingly difficult if no settlement were reached.

25. Mr. Eden thought that the present Egyptian-Sudanese consultation plus a generally improved atmosphere reduced the urgency of this situation but said he would consider the Secretary's suggestion and see whether such consultation might not be a good way to proceed if the Cairo consultations got nowhere. Mr. Eden emphasized repeatedly that the UK would not "sell the Sudanese down the river" and that it could not push the Sudanese into a situation where they could be exploited by the Egyptians. The Secretary said the US fully supported the Sudanese right to self-determination and that we would not agree to any settlement which compromised that right. However, we thought the UK could use its great influence with the Sudanese to bring about a desired solution with respect to the title. Mr. Eden thought it would be necessary to await the November elections in the Sudan before consulting the Sudanese but agreed when the suggestion was made that it might be possible to consult with a representative group of Sudanese established for this purpose.

26. Mr. Eden believed that a problem which was more important than the title affecting the Sudan and Egypt was the Nile waters and hoped some agreement on this could be worked out. Mr. Eden also reviewed the strength of feeling in the UK over the Sudan (he said it was second only to the feeling concerning the Naval command in the Atlantic) which made a solution to this problem particularly difficult. Finally, Mr. Eden admitted he also had difficulties with the Sudan Administration and said he realized that they had been "naughty".

27. The Secretary ended by saying that in our view this was the critical point in the Egyptian situation. He realized that what we suggested was hard for the UK but if the situation deteriorated, the result might be worse.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Southeast Asia, and Tunis.]

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No. 985

745W.00/6–1752

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 17, 1952.

Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Question: A Proposed Further Approach to the British on the Sudan Question

Discussion:

Since your meeting with Mr. Eden on May 26 in Paris there have been almost no developments in the Anglo-Egyptian question. This is due in part to the lack of new proposals, in part to the continued stalemate on the Sudan and in part to the habitual summer doldrums in Egypt. The Egyptian-Sudanese (Mahdi) talks have now recessed and the Sudanese delegation has returned to Khartoum. The Egyptian Foreign Minister has informed Ambassador Caffery that the Sudanese "gave the impression that they were definitely sympathetic to the Egyptian point of view". [1] The Acting Governor General of the Sudan, Sir James Robertson, on the other hand has informed the Foreign Office in London that he doubts that the Sudanese delegation has been persuaded to accept Egyptian sovereignty and that in any event other groups in the Sudan have a powerful voice. While there is no definite information as yet, it appears that there is an inclination within the Egyptian Government to prolong and possibly extend the scope of the Egyptian-Sudanese conversations. Rumors circulating in Cairo regarding next steps include the possibility of a meeting between the Mahdi and the Egyptian Prime Minister, the sending to Khartoum of an Egyptian delegation, headed by the Egyptian Minister of Interior, and a visit to Egypt of Sayyed Sir Ali Al Mirghani Pasha, the head of the Khatmia and opponent of the Mahdi.

It does not appear that your suggestion regarding British consultation with the Sudanese has been given the attention in London it merits. This may be due partly to a misunderstanding of the nature of the proposal and partly to a definite reluctance on domestic political grounds to do anything which might subject the present government to an attack in Parliament in which probably

[1] Ambassador Gifford reported from London in telegram 5793, June 18, not printed, that the Foreign Office had told him that it had information to the effect that the Mahdi's representatives in the Egyptian-Sudanese talks made no commitments to the Egyptians, that they declined to accept Farouk's claim to be King of the Sudan, and that the Sudanese had tried but failed to secure Egyptian acceptance of the Sudan Government's constitution. (745W.00/6–1852)

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both Conservatives and Labor would join. You will recall that Mr. Eden informed you of the strong feeling in the UK regarding the Sudan and of Parliamentary difficulties. He also stated to me that the government could be brought down if there were the slightest suggestion that "the Sudanese had been sold down the river".

The Sudan still remains the principal obstacle to the commencement of negotiations. On the one hand, the Egyptians continue to demand recognition of King Farouk's title without further ado; on the other, the UK insists on consultation with prior guarantees, but is loath, nonetheless, to undertake consultations. There may be two reasons for the latter attitude: 1) fear that the consultation would produce the right answer, thereby opening the way for attacks in Parliament, and 2) fear that it would produce the wrong answer, thereby making the situation with Egypt worse.

The British probably believe that they can stretch out their present contacts with the Egyptians throughout the summer, particularly since there is a possibility that the Egyptians will have further talks with the Sudanese.

It may well be that the British hope to drag out the Sudan question until elections are held in the Sudan and the new Parliament is installed, which may be the latter part of this year. In that event, the British would say that any decision regarding the title would have to be made by the Sudanese Parliament.

It is also believed that the British consider that the Egyptian elections now set for October will not take place. In this connection there seems to be a difference of opinion between the UK and the US regarding 1) the urgency of the situation and 2) the ability of the Hilali Government to survive.

Recommendations:

I. That you speak to Mr. Eden along the following lines: [2]

(a) I have given considerable thought to the Egyptian situation since our talk on May 26 and Mr. Byroade has told me of his conversations with you on June 9. [3] It occurs to me that the suggestion

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[2] At this time, Secretary Acheson was preparing for his trip to Europe and Brazil, which began on June 22, to honor invitations from Oxford University where he was to receive an honorary degree, from Mayor Reuter to lay the cornerstone of the American Memorial Library in Berlin, from Chancellor Figl to visit Vienna, and from Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura to come to Brazil. In addition to fulfilling social engagements, Acheson and his party planned to conduct high-level policy discussions with his various hosts on a wide range of topics. One of the most important subjects for consideration in London was Egypt; for the minutes of the U.S.-British meetings, see *infra* and Documents 987 and 988.

[3] Assistant Secretary of State Byroade was in London on June 9 to conduct an exchange of views with Foreign Office officials and with Foreign Secretary Eden on a wide range of Middle East problems. (611.41/6-952)

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which I made to you in Paris on May 26, regarding consultations with the Sudanese, may not be entirely understood and may be viewed with some apprehension because of your domestic political situation. It might be useful if I clarified some of the points of this suggestion.

(b) We do understand the difficult political situation which you have described and I want to assure you that we have no desire to make this situation more difficult.

(c) It was precisely because of our desire not to make the situation of the government more difficult but at the same time to prevent an Anglo-Egyptian impasse that the suggestion regarding consultation was made.

(d) In essence, this suggestion was that the UK undertake consultation with the Sudanese now without prior guarantees from Egypt to determine whether Farouk's title can be recognized within the framework of self-determination by the Sudanese. It was suggested that consultation not be carried out by the Sudanese administration, but by a specially selected British person or persons. It was our idea that the person or persons selected be of such stature and such objectivity that he would inspire confidence not only in the UK, but also in the Sudan and even in Egypt. It would be hoped that this consultation would result in a UK offer to support recognition.

(e) It was not intended that the UK use any coercion with the Sudanese or that recognition in any way compromise self-determination. It was our idea that if the UK could explain the reasons for consultation, the meaning and intent of recognition and the guarantees to be sought before recognition, and make clear its reaffirmation of self-determination, the Sudanese might be willing to acquiesce.

(f) If consultation should come up with the right answer, critics in Parliament could be answered by reference to previous pledges which stated that any change of status in the Sudan wou'd only be agreed to after *consultation with* and *approval of* the Sudanese. If the Sudanese do not agree, the pledges would not have been fulfilled and the British Government would not move from its present position.

(g) As things stand at present, we do not know if the Sudanese would or would not accept the title. The only way to find out is consultation and this the UK is unwilling to do.

(h) The US for its part finds it most difficult to go to the Egyptians more than it has regarding the Sudan for we cannot say with full conviction that the Sudanese will reject the title. If consultation were carried out, we would be in a better position with the Egyptians regardless of the answer, assuming, of course, that every genuine effort were made to make the Sudanese understand why the consultation is being undertaken.

II. In the likely event that Mr. Eden indicates that it would be a mistake to make any move regarding the Sudan until the results of the Egyptian-Sudanese talks are known, it is recommended that you take the following lines:

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(a) We believe that the Egyptian-Sudanese talks are most important and significant, although we do not know what if any results have been achieved.

(b) We think it important that encouragement be given to the extension of these talks. The UK for its part may wish through the Sudan administration to urge other Sudan political parties to enter into contact with Egypt in the same manner as the Mahdi's delegation. Obviously, wider Sudanese representation would be desirable, since all points of view would then be represented and no one party could claim that its interests were being overlooked or compromised. We realize that this may be difficult, but we think it is worth a try by the Sudan administration. We, for our part, will be glad to tell the Egyptians of our hope that they will continue and expand their contact with the Sudanese.

(c) It may be desirable at some point to consider the possibility of a UK-Egypt-Sudan Round Table Discussion. We recall that this was suggested by the UK both in June and October 1951. We realize that this would have to be carefully handled, since such a suggestion at the present time might compromise the possibilities of further bilateral contact between the Egyptians and Sudanese.

III. If Mr. Eden's comments on I and II, above, reveal a wide gap between the UK and US views, you may wish to suggest a joint appraisal by our two embassies in Cairo:

Since there appears to be a difference of opinion between the US and the UK regarding the urgency of the situation and the strength of the Hilali Government, it might be useful for the two embassies in Cairo to undertake another joint appraisal. Mr. Eden will probably agree that this exercise, both in Egypt and Iran, has been useful. Since it has been six months since the last appraisal on Egypt was prepared, this might be a good time to have another joint look at the situation.

No. 986

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111

United States Minutes of the First United States-United Kingdom Ministerial Talks, London, British Foreign Office, June 24, 1952, 10:30 a. m.-12:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET
MTL USUK-1
Present:

United Kingdom	*United States*
Mr. Eden	Secretary Acheson
Sir William Strang	Ambassador Gifford
Sir Oliver Franks	Ambassador Jessup
Sir Pierson Dixon	Mr. Perkins

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Mr. F. K. Roberts
Mr. Denis Allen
Mr. Roger Allen
Sir Roger Makins
Ambassador Stevenson
Sir James Bowker
Sir Robert Howe
Mr. Harrison
Mr. Cheetham
Mr. Battle
Miss Kirkpatrick
Mr. Hooker
Mr. Palmer

[Here follows discussion of ratification of EDC, NATO, the German agreements, the Soviet note, Berlin, the Saar, and Trieste.]

Egypt

Mr. Eden referred to the conversations which recently took place in Alexandria between representatives of the Mahdi and Egyptian Government. He said that these discussions were now in a deadlock over the question of the recognition of the King's title. There had recently been an optimistic account in the London *Times* of the Sudanese attitude on this question but this optimism was not warranted. The indications are that the Sudanese are not prepared to accept the title and this raises the question of what the British should do next. As long as the Sudanese and Egyptian Governments were talking, the British had wanted to remain quiet. He did not want to say anything definite to the Egyptian Government at this time about the 3 alternative texts which had been presented to him by Amb. [1] He was thinking instead of referring to the draft constitution for the Sudan which the Sudan Government has submitted to the Co-Domini and of suggesting that the two Governments discuss this matter to see if they can decide on how the question of the constitution could be handled. The object of the discussions would be to try to reach agreement on the question of the constitution and not to handle the question of the title. He hoped that such talks might help to narrow the gap. He thought that Hilali had done a courageous thing in inviting the Sudanese to Cairo, but he did not think that there had ever been any possibility of the Sudanese accepting the title. The main accomplishment of the conversations has been to bring a note of realism into relations between Egypt and the Sudan. The difficulty is, however, that no Egyptian Government can dare agree to anything which does not settle the question of the title. It is a matter of importance that there should be close and friendly relations between the 2 peoples in view of their proximity and their joint interest in the Nile. The Egyptians appear to want to find some way of regaining their legal

[1] See footnote 1, Document 983.

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rights in the Sudan. Legally they have no leg to stand on as a result of their denunciation of the 1899 Agreement.

Mr. Acheson said that if it is true that some settlement of the problem of the King's title is necessary to solve the Anglo-Egyptian problem, what happens next? We seem to be in a circle.

Mr. Eden said that there is a time element involved. If the British can get the Egyptians to sit down and discuss the constitutional problem, it will be possible to hold elections in the Sudan by autumn. It has always been the question of the interim period about which the British have differed with the Egyptians. The elections will result in a wholly Sudanese Assembly. To that Assembly could be put the question of whether the Sudanese wish to recognize the King's title. Mr. Eden doubted that Hilali intended to consult with other parties in the Sudan. He seemed to think that if SAR accepted the title, the others would fall in line. The British did not agree that this would be the case. They would like to encourage the Egyptians to consult with other parties and segments of Sudanese opinion and persuade them that the question of the King's title should be put to the new Sudanese Assembly.

Mr. Acheson asked what the limits of the interim period were.

Sir James Bowker said that the period involved is from now until the Sudanese decide on their own status. This might be an extended period of time.

Sir Oliver Franks explained that what the British want is to see a sovereign representative body taking the decision.

Mr. Nitze asked if there was any agreed British view as to what decision they would like to see the Assembly take. Do they hope it would or would not recognize the King's title?

Sir Robert Howe entered the room at this point and was asked by Mr. Eden to explain about the legislature which would be set up in the Sudan under the new constitution. Sir Robert said that it would consist of 2 chambers, a Senate and a House of Representatives. In internal matters, the legislature would have "more or less complete powers". Certain functions are reserved to the Governor General, notably foreign affairs, the Southern Provinces and the Civil Service. The Governor General is empowered to suspend the constitution if there is a breakdown in constitutional processes, imminent financial bankruptcy or a breakdown in law and order.

Mr. Acheson asked if this were the final constitutional act for the Sudan.

Sir Robert Howe said that it was not. The final act was reserved until later. He recalled that Mr. Eden had stated publicly that HMG looks forward to the Sudanese achieving full self-government by the end of 1952 and thereafter taking steps looking forward toward self-determination.

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Mr. Eden asked how long this interim period is going to run. It seemed to him to be stretching longer and longer. Would the representative assembly pronounce on the question of the King's title during the interim period?

Sir Robert Howe said that it was the only body competent to do so.

Sir Ralph Stevenson expressed the hope that the Egyptians could be persuaded to cooperate in the steps leading toward self-government and self-determination.

Mr. Acheson asked how the Egyptians were likely to react.

Sir Ralph Stevenson doubted that they would be brave enough to accept an invitation to discuss the constitution. They don't like the constitution and they will undoubtedly take the line that the Egyptian constitution is better. What the British must do is to give the Egyptians a chance to participate and to urge them to assist in bringing the Sudan to self-government.

Mr. Acheson asked whether, assuming that the Egyptians agree to participate in the conversations on the constitution, they would agree to the title being put to the Sudan Assembly.

Sir Ralph thought it would be very hard for them to do so publicly. The present Government cannot identify itself with such consultations. The talks between the Egyptians and the Sudanese have been a big step forward and it is for this reason that the British Government has been encouraging them. The more Sudanese groups which talk to the Egyptians the better.

Mr. Acheson asked what the British thought the probable decision of the Assembly would be.

Sir Robert Howe thought that if the Assembly were composed as the result of free elections, the chances were pretty much against Sudanese acceptance of the title. Almost all the tribes would be opposed, as would the South. The political parties would be divided almost equally.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said that the Sudanese kept asking in Alexandria why the Egyptians attach so much importance to this question of the King's title. They seemed to feel that if it were so important to them, they must have something more in mind than titular sovereignty.

Mr. Eden said that for a long time the British had not known what the outcome of the conversations in Alexandria had been. Since the return of the Sudanese delegation to Khartoum, however, it had become quite apparent that they would not accept the title.

Mr. Acheson asked if the trend in the Sudan were adverse to the Egyptian aspirations.

Mr. Eden said that he felt that only insofar as the question of the title was concerned.

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Sir Robert Howe agreed and said the Sudanese recognized the need for close and friendly relations with Egypt.

Mr. Acheson asked what happens next in Egypt if there is no solution to this problem.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said that he doubted that the Government could survive beyond autumn. A caretaker Government would then probably take over, headed perhaps by Sidky or Maraghi. He did not think that this would in itself bring about a deterioration of the situation, since he did not think that any Government would risk a reoccurrence of the January 26 riots merely for the sake of the title. He felt that the situation would remain fairly stable, particularly if the British make constructive suggestions.

Mr. Acheson asked if the Wafd would be likely to come back in power if elections were held.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said that it depended on how they were rigged. He recalled that at the time of the last elections, Sidky had helped the Wafd return to power. He did not think that Sidky would make the same mistake again.

Mr. Eden reverted to the question of conversations with the Egyptians. If the Egyptians could be persuaded to come in and to cooperate in working out the remaining constitutional steps in the Sudan, then they could talk about the holding of fair elections in the Sudan preparatory to putting the question of the King's title to the Sudanese Assembly. He hoped that the US would find it possible to help in persuading the Egyptians. It seemed only sensible that since the constitution had been sent to both Co-Domini for comment, they should consult regarding their reactions.

Mr. Acheson asked what the situation would be if the Egyptians did not accept the Sudanese constitution.

Mr. Eden said that the present constitution permits the new constitution to be put into effect within 6 months unless both Co-Domini signify their disapproval of it. He went on to say that the British had also been thinking of the possibility of a supervisory election body to assure free elections to the Assembly. Such a body might consist of representatives of the UK, Egypt and the Sudan with a neutral chairman. He asked Sir Ralph Stevenson what he thought the chances were of getting the Egyptians to agree to participate.

Sir Ralph Stevenson doubted that the Egyptians would accept such a proposal. In many respects, the Egyptians are prisoners of their own tactics. He nevertheless thought it was worth trying.

In reply to Mr. Eden's question, Sir Robert Howe thought that the Sudanese would agree to participate in an election supervisory body. He went on to say that he understood that in the conversations between the Egyptians and the Sudanese in Alexandria,

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Hilali had said that he wished to recover Egypt's legal position in the Sudan from which Egypt had barred itself by its termination of the 1899 Agreement.

Mr. Eden said that he wanted to make it clear that the Sudanese feeling against the acceptance of the King's title was not the result of any doing of the UK. The UK had been trying to encourage a meeting of the minds between the Egyptians and the Sudanese and there would have been no conversation in Alexandria unless the UK had urged the Sudanese to go.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said that there was profound mistrust on both sides between the Sudanese and the Egyptians.

Mr. Eden said that the Sudanese also look at 22 million pound surplus which they have in their treasury and ask why they should share this with an Egypt which is on the verge of bankruptcy.

Mr. Acheson asked whether the British thought that the situation would not deteriorate in the fall.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said he did not think it would. The police were being strengthened by the anti-riot equipment which was being furnished by the U.S. If there were simultaneous risings all over Egypt, it might be beyond the Government's control but he did not think that this was a likely possibility. He thought any caretaker government would probably concentrate heavily on the problem of the redistribution of land, thereby diverting attention from the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.

Mr. Acheson said that if the Egyptians could deal with disturbances with their own forces, it would be better than the British doing it.

Sir Ralph Stevenson agreed. It was difficult to foresee the end of the use of British force in such circumstances. There are a quarter of a million foreigners in Egypt. Protection of this large number creates a frightful problem. It would not be possible for the military forces to bob into the Delta and bob right back out again. However, even the mere knowledge that the British were prepared to take such action in the event of necessity is a deterrent to trouble.

Mr. Acheson said that the use of British force in the Delta would have consequences in the rest of the Middle East which would be incalculable.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said that there was no question of the use of such force unless the situation were out of control or unless such forces were asked for by the King or Egyptian Government. He did not think that there was much possibility of the latter. The King had told him after the January 26 riots that he would never ask for British troops because it would brand him as a quisling, but

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that if the situation ever got beyond his control he would let Stevenson know.

Mr. Eden thought that it was not likely that the situation would get out of control and Sir Ralph Stevenson agreed, adding that he thought that January 26th had taught the Egyptians a lesson.

It was decided to adjourn the meeting and to take up Egypt at the beginning of the afternoon session.

No. 987

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111

United States Minutes of the Second United States–United Kingdom Ministerial Talks, London, British Foreign Office, June 24, 1952, 3:30 p. m.–4:30 p. m.

SECRET
MTL USUK–2

Present

United Kingdom	*United States*
Mr. Eden	Secretary Acheson
Sir William Strang	Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Stevenson	Ambassador Jessup
Sir Oliver Franks	Mr. Perkins
Sir Robert Howe	Mr. Nitze
Sir James Bowker	Mr. Battle
Sir Pierson Dixon	Miss Kirkpatrick
Mr. Roger Allen	Mr. Palmer

Mr. Eden reverted to Mr. Nitze's question in the morning session asking what decision the British would like to see emerge from the Sudan Assembly. He felt that when the Assembly met, it should express its opinion regarding the relationship of the Sudan to the Crown of Egypt. The answer which emerged might not be the answer the British want, but at least they would know where they stood.

Sir Ralph Stevenson was doubtful that the Egyptians would agree to putting the title to the Assembly but felt they should be encouraged to cooperate.

Mr. Eden said that he felt that it was necessary to throw the question into the Assembly and to encourage the Sudanese to give as close an approximation as possible of what the Egyptians want.

Mr. Acheson said that our interest in the problem derived from its effect on the peace and stability of the Middle East. We have no mission except to help the UK bring about a settlement. We are

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very disturbed that if the problem continues and talks break down, there will be serious trouble in Egypt which will spread to North Africa and the rest of the Middle East. We all hope this won't happen, but it might. He felt that a positive approach must be taken to the problem rather than simply encouraging the Sudanese to express their uninhibited views. . . . He felt that anything which could be done should be done to guide them in making a responsible decision. He noted that the British were contemplating encouraging and broadening the consultations between the Egyptians and the Sudanese and also that they were thinking of the possibility of bilateral talks between the UK and Egypt on the question of the Constitution. He wondered whether there was not a possibility of merging these two ideas and the discussions would thus become three-power talks. He felt that everything possible should be done to help bridge over this problem of the interim period. If a positive program could be developed we would be glad to pitch in and help. He wondered if there were not a program which would move more in the direction of a settlement than simply leaving the matter to the decision of the Sudanese.

Mr. Eden asked his advisers whether it would be possible to expand the discussions in this way.

Sir Robert Howe said that he thought it would be difficult to obtain a united Sudanese voice. The only satisfactory way of doing so is through the Sudanese Assembly. Other means have been tried, but they have always been unsuccessful.

Mr. Eden wondered whether it would not be possible to work through the same body of Sudanese with which the Constitution was discussed.

Sir Robert Howe thought that the Sudan administration could reconstitute the Constitutional Committee. This had consisted of the members of each of the political parties, with a British Chairman and a British Secretary. He doubted, however, that the Sudanese would agree to discuss the question of the Constitution in a three power forum. They would undoubtedly take the line that they are perfectly satisfied with the Constitution as it stands and that they do not want to see any changes made.

Sir Ralph Stevenson did not think that the Egyptians would be likely to agree to such a procedure unless there were prior recognition of the King's title through an agreed formula.

Sir Robert Howe asked whether it would not be possible to suggest to Hilali that he put forward the Egyptian views regarding the Constitution for the Sudan and then try to marry the two approaches.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said that the main difficulty is the fundamental one of getting the talks started without recognition.

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Sir James Bowker pointed out that the Egyptian decree regarding the Constitution for the Sudan was not a detailed Constitution but only a statement of certain basic principles.

Mr. Eden thought that an offer to discuss the whole question could be attractive to the Egyptians.

Mr. Acheson said that if it were not for the problem of the title, the British might say to the Egyptians "here is a constitutional proposal for the Sudan which has been submitted to both of us. Now let's discuss it. Afterwards we can discuss it with the body which drew it up. Since the whole question of the title is tied up in this problem, could we not discuss that at the same time?" Meanwhile the British could try to persuade the Sudanese to take a more forthcoming point of view with respect to the title.

Sir Ralph Stevenson said that the British had tried before to persuade Hilali to negotiate without a formula, but he continues to insist on one involving recognition.

Mr. Acheson suggested that perhaps it might be well not to mention specifically that the question of the title would be discussed.

Sir Ralph Stevenson felt that the Egyptians were nevertheless certain to insist on a formula.

Mr. Acheson asked whether, irrespective of the possibility of a blow-up in Egypt, the end of the road is not that the Egyptians lose the Sudan and the British lose their base at Suez.

Sir Ralph said that he would not go that far. For a long time the Egyptians have not taken an active interest in the Sudan. Nevertheless, their officials still continue to occupy their positions and the Egyptian flag still flies side by side with the British. He thought this state of affairs could go on for some time and that there would not be an abrupt break.

Mr. Acheson thought that there was a point beyond which this could not go.

Mr. Eden said that of the three formulae which Hilali had sent him through Amr, the third was not very far away from what the British might be able to accept.

Sir Ralph Stevenson recalled that the British wanted to add the words "provided the Sudanese agree" to the portion of the formula which referred to Farouk's use of the title.

Mr. Gifford recalled that the British had insisted on adding this phrase because the Egyptians had made it clear that they would interpret the formula as meaning British recognition of the title. He seemed to recall that if it had not been for this interpretation, the Foreign Office felt that it could have accepted the wording.

Mr. Eden confirmed that this had been the case. He felt that the British should leave the question of a formula in cold storage as long as possible.

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Sir Ralph Stevenson agreed, pointing out that the Egyptians are almost certain to interpret the formula as meaning recognition. At the same time, they will not agree to consultations with the Sudanese. They take the line that the British pledges to the Sudanese have nothing to do with them and that they were made improperly, since the British had no right to give such pledges without the consent of the Egyptians in view of their position as a co-dominus. He added that the Egyptians have not gone so far as to say that they will not talk unless the British recognize the title, but they have made it clear that recognition must emerge from the negotiations.

Mr. Nitze thought that it might be easier to get the Egyptians to change their interpretation of the formula. As an alternative, the British might try to persuade the Egyptians to enter discussions by undertaking to do their best to create the necessary pre-conditions for eventual Sudanese acceptance of the title.

Mr. Eden said that it was necessary to be very careful about this matter and that the British could not use pressure toward this end. He could not say he would try to persuade the Sudanese to accept Egyptian rule.

Sir James Bowker said that the use of pressure would have a bad effect both in the United Kingdom and in the Sudan. It might, in fact, have exactly the opposite effect in the Sudan from what it would be hoped to achieve.

Sir Robert Howe said that the Sudan administration had always given the Sudanese a free opportunity to express their views on the King's title. The Sudanese asked, however, why should they accept the title. They have nothing to gain from it and are already well along the path toward deciding their own future. They have great contempt for the Egyptians and do not forget that it was the Mahdi's father who threw the Egyptians out of the Sudan. It was a great accomplishment to get the Mahdi to send his representatives to Alexandria in view of all this.

Mr. Eden said, and Mr. Acheson agreed, that it was important to get the Egyptians working with the UK in the Sudan.

Mr. Eden indicated he felt that perhaps the draft communication to the Egyptian Government could be improved on. He wondered if it would be well to try to get Mr. Caffery to support it with the Egyptians.

Sir Ralph Stevenson seemed doubtful and pointed out that it was only intended as an interim reply.

Sir James Bowker said that what the British want to do is to get talks going with the Egyptians on the question of the Constitution. He did not have in mind negotiations, but simply talks. The British were encouraged by the conversations which SAR's representatives

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had had with the Egyptians. He thought they might have opened the eyes of both parties to the fact that the question of the title is not a simple one. Conversations between the British and the Egyptians might, however, lead to a new agreement setting forth anew the relationship between the two powers, and in this way fill the legal void brought about by the Egyptians' termination of the 1899 Agreement.

Mr. Eden said that the Foreign Office would re-draft its statement and give it to the Secretary before Thursday's meeting in order that he might examine it and see whether he thought that it was something which the United States Government could support.

Mr. Acheson agreed to this procedure.

[Here follows discussion of the situation in Iran.]

No. 988

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111

United States Minutes of the Fourth United States-United Kingdom Ministerial Talks, London, British Foreign Office, June 28, 1952, 12:30 p. m.-1:30 p. m.

SECRET

MTL USUK-4

Present:

United Kingdom	*United States*
Mr. Eden	Secretary Acheson
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd	Ambassador Gifford
Sir William Strang	Ambassador Jessup
Sir Pierson Dixon	Mr. Perkins
Sir Roger Makin	Mr. Nitze
Mr. Scott	Miss Kirkpatrick
Sir James Bowker	Mr. Battle
Mr. Allen	Mr. Ringwalt
	Mr. Palmer

[Here follows discussion of a British observer to the Pacific Council and United Nations facilities in Japan.]

Mr. Eden said that the Foreign Office has now prepared preliminary drafts of 2 papers. The first is a proposal for an international commission to supervise elections in the Sudan and the second is a proposed new agreement between the UK and Egypt for the administration of the Sudan. He was hopeful that these proposals might break the deadlock which presently prevails between the UK and Egypt.

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At Mr. Eden's request, Sir James Bowker provided further elaboration regarding the relations between the UK and Egypt. He said that the UK feels that the recent conversations between the Sudanese and the Egyptians may provide a back door for getting conversations underway. At least, the UK feels, Egyptians eyes have now been opened to the fact that the question of the King's title is not a simple issue. If the UK recognizes the title without consulting the Sudanese (which it can't do), its actions would be repudiated by the Sudanese. There is, moreover, the problem created b'sy Egypt having created a legal vacuum with respect to its position in the Sudan by its unilateral determination of the 1899 Agreement. The UK thinks that Egypt would like to see some means of legitimatizing its position once more. These thoughts, together with the submission of the proposed new constitution for the Sudan to both Co-Domini by the Sudan administration, have been foremost in British thoughts in studying the whole question and have resulted in the 2 drafts mentioned by Mr. Eden which were sent yesterday to the British representatives in Khartoum and Cairo for comment.

Mr. Eden said that Ambassador Amr regards the tearing up of the 1899 Agreement to have been a blunder, since it deprived Egypt of its position in the Sudan. Mr. Eden thought that the course of action outlined above might commend itself to Egypt, since the purpose of it would be to bring Egypt back into the situation with a legal standing.

Mr. Acheson asked how these new proposals tied in with what Mr. Eden and he had been talking about in the first and second Bilaterals, particularly with the question of encouraging an expansion of contacts between the Sudanese and the Egyptians.

Sir James Bowker said that the new suggestions are somewhat different. The UK is willing to let the Egyptians know of its willingness to bring the Sudanese into conversations on these questions at any time. The British understand, however, that Hilali is presently awaiting SAR's reply to the matters discussed at Alexandria with the latter's representatives before deciding whether the consultation should be expanded to include other segments of Sudanese opinion.

Mr. Eden said that the Foreign Office should have Khartoum's and Cairo's comments within a week. The whole question is under urgent study and he would let the US have copies of the proposals as soon as possible. [1]

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[1] Ambassador Gifford transmitted copies of the preliminary drafts of these two documents along with Foreign Secretary Eden's comments regarding them to the Department of State in telegrams 15 and 16 from London, July 1, neither printed. (745W.00/7-152)

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Mr. Allen indicated that the UK has now dropped the idea of an interim reply to the Egyptian Government's communication containing 3 formulae on the King's title. The Egyptian Government is not pressing for an answer at the present time and the UK therefore hopes to take further time to complete work on the foregoing papers before giving any reply. He hoped that the proposals would be in shape to put forward in about a fortnight. Both Howe and Stevenson had seen the 2 drafts and had approved them, but wanted their staffs to study them.

Mr. Acheson summed up by asking if he was correct in understanding that we were agreed that although the situation in Egypt is quiet now, it perhaps would not be by fall. Also that the question of the title is the most difficult one from the Egyptian point of view. Iraq, Pakistan and Greece have recently recognized the title and Italy, Belgium and Turkey might have to do so. The US and the UK have discussed the possibility of the UK talking to the Sudanese and encouraging them by means short of pressure to take a more forthcoming attitude. We understand that it is the UK desire that the Sudanese decision on the title should be as close as possible to what the Egyptians want. We also understand that the British are evolving proposals, of which the 2 documents mentioned by Mr. Eden are part, to open the back door by seeing what can be done about the title and about getting Egypt back into the administration of the Sudan.

Mr. Eden said this corresponded with his understanding of what had been agreed and discussed. He added that the British hoped that if conversations with Egypt could be gotten underway, they could be expanded into 3-Power talks. It may be difficult to get the Sudanese to come in, but further bilateral Egyptian-Sudanese conversations may help pave the way. Difficulties may also be encountered in finding Sudanese who would be representative of all points of view in the Sudan, but he was hopeful that this too could be overcome.

[Here follows discussion of MEDO, the situation in Iran, and the situation in Trieste. The text of the portion on Iran is scheduled for publication in volume X.]

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No. 989

774.00/7-252: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 2, 1952—11:05 a. m.

8. 1. Brit Emb last night gave Dept substance msg from FonOff to Brit Chargé Alexandria instructing him consult with you re possible action by US and UK to salvage situation brought about by Hilali resignation and apparent confusion resulting from inability Sirry or Barakat form new Govt. [2] Possible courses action suggested were:

a. Warning to Sirry or Barakat that they shld have nothing to do with formation new Govt;
b. Reinforcing Maraghi's refusal to join new Govt;
c. Approach to Afifi to persuade him convince King that his (Afifi's) inevitable resignation under present circumstances together with new Govt as presently proposed wld "reduce the chances of successful negots with UK to vanishing pt."

2. In addition above Brit Chargé Alexandria was instructed sound you out on possibility your approaching King and "without mincing words" telling King some "home truths", particularly re hopeless situation if Andraos and Tabet remain in palace.

3. Brit Emb Wash said FonOff most anxious appropriate instrs be sent you (presumably to see King) and quoted FonOff as fol: "It is essential that we shld work together at this critical juncture in doing everything we can to prevent the elimination of the only sound elements in Egypt polit life by this change of Govt and particularly elimination of Hafez Afifi from the Palace."

4. Emb London also reported last night that Eden had sent Strang to see Gifford and that Strang expressed Eden's deep concern and genuine apprehension re situation which might develop with return to power of corrupt palace elements and Wafd. Eden hoped we might be able assist.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 34. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade.

[2] Ambassador Caffery on June 28 reported in telegram 2303, not printed, that Prime Minister Neguib Hilali Pasha had unequivocally resigned and refused King Farouk's request to reconsider his action. (774.13/6-2852)

In subsequent telegrams, the Ambassador reported extensively upon the confusion and intrigue surrounding the efforts of Farouk and Egypt's politicians to create a new Cabinet. As of the evening of July 1, Caffery informed the Department in telegram 12 from Cairo, not printed, the King's choice for Prime Minister, Hussein Sirry Pasha, had abandoned his efforts to form a Cabinet and Farouk had called upon Barakat Pasha to make such an effort. (774.13/7-152)

Documentation regarding the Embassy's coverage of this crisis is in Department of State files 774.00, 774.02, and 774.13.

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5. Dept has informed Brit Emb here that we wld consult urgently with you re what action if any might be taken.

6. Dept deeply concerned by turn events and by possible return to power of corruption and vested interest. We believe King has acted most unwisely in paying heed to venal trio of Abboud, Tabet and Andraos and that as long as they hold present power, little progress in Egypt can be expected. While it is possible Hilali might never have carried out reform and purge program, we think King shld have given him fuller support and encouragement, particularly vis-à-vis palace intriguers.

7. At same time we recognize that had Brit during four months of conversations been able produce something which Hilali cld have accepted, his position wld have been far stronger and he wld have been able resist pressures from Abboud and his ilk.

8. While Dept shares UK concern and its hope that corrupt elements will in fact not again assume power, we do not believe that US shld involve itself in Egypt domestic polit crisis as UK suggests. Not only might our intervention be deeply resented by King and others with whom we may have to deal but in view history this change wld probably prove ineffective. Another important factor is that in intervening we wld for all practical purposes be assuming responsibility for definite and immed progress in A-E negots, i.e. recognition of Farouk's title as King of Sudan. Under present circumstances this seems most unlikely as recent tels reporting Secy's conversations with Eden wld indicate.

9. Dept wld appreciate your urgent views re above and your recommendations as to what if anything might be done at this juncture to help Egypt remain on balance. We recall numerous times you have singlehandedly salvaged Brit position and fact there is limit. However view your highly respected position with King and Egypt polit leaders, there may be some move which we cld make which wld assist situation but which wld avoid pitfalls intervention.

10. Only suggestion we can make for possible action here is that ActSecy might request Hassan Youssef Pasha in New York until July 3 or 4 to convey directly to King our concern and apprehension re present developments. Re this ActSecy saw Youssef July 1 but situation not sufficiently clear for anything but gen discussion on change of Govt. [3]

BRUCE

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[3] Ambassador Caffery responded in telegram 26, July 3, not printed. He expressed his wholehearted agreement with the Department of State position. He counseled against the Acting Secretary seeing Hassan Youssef Pasha in New York, as events in Cairo were developing too rapidly to allow for a fruitful conversation. And Caf-

Continued

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No. 990

774.00/7-352

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 3, 1952.

Subject: Change of Government in Egypt

The Embassy in Cairo has now confirmed that Hussein Sirry Pasha, reported to be a "King's man" by conviction, has formed a new government with himself as Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War and Marine. The rest of the Cabinet is composed of pro-Palace independents and technicians. The new Minister of the Interior, Mohammed Hashem Pasha, is Sirry Pasha's son-in-law and thus control of this important post really rests with the Prime Minister. The most disturbing aspect of the new Cabinet is the appointment of Kerim Tabet Pasha as Minister of State in charge of relations between the Government and the Palace. Tabet Pasha, a Lebanese by origin, is a disreputable adventurer whom, off and on, exercises a considerable and unfortunate influence on the King. It is reported that Sirry Pasha felt he could control Tabet better in the government than outside. While the government does not include any members of the Wafd Party it is known that the Prime Minister is closely associated with those who do have strong Wafd inclinations.

Now that the smoke has cleared somewhat, it is possible to assess the reasons for this change of government. Although we had received numerous reports of behind-the-scenes activity to force Hilali Pasha out, it was not expected that matters would come to a head before the fall when elections are scheduled. However, it appears that Kerim Tabet Pasha, Ahmed Abboud Pasha (one of the wealthiest men in Egypt and the only Egyptian for whom we have approved an Ex-Im Bank loan), and Elias Androas Pasha, a member of the Palace inner clique, looked with increasing dismay on the possibility that Hilali Pasha might carry through his purge program. Since the purge would have implicated these men, they

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fery struck a note of optimism about the last minute appointment of Sirry Pasha as Prime Minister, saying that although the Cabinet was filled with second-rate politicians and technicians, Sirry Pasha was capable and that Caffery's personal relations with him were such that he thought he could probably exercise a beneficial influence over Sirry's actions. (774.00/7-352)

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Stabler.

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did what they could to influence the King and others against Hilali. When Hilali got wind of these maneuvers, he demanded that he be allowed to carry out his purge program without regard to personalities. When it appeared that he would not receive this permission, he resigned.

Perhaps more important than the immediate reasons for his resignation is the fact that Hilali realized that his lack of progress with the British would have eventually forced him to resign. He therefore preferred to resign now with honor rather than later without. Ambassador Caffery believes that Hilali Pasha had in fact made up his mind sometime ago to resign because he could not get anywhere with the British and that he was merely awaiting a suitable moment. There is no doubt that, had Hilali been able to achieve even an illusion of progress with the British, his position would have been sufficiently strong to enable him to resist the effort of Tabet Pasha and others to dislodge him.

The significance of this Cabinet change is that no Egyptian Government can last too long without making progress, real or illusory, with the British. The uncertain state of Egyptian politics is revealed by the fact that it took Sirry Pasha four days to form a new government. It is apparent that there is a reluctance on the part of Egyptian politicians to join governments which have almost no life expectancy.

It is difficult to forecast Sirry Pasha's program. However, it may well be that the trend will be toward the return of the Wafd to power. This will depend, of course, upon whether the King permits elections to be held in October. The King's well-known dislike of the Wafd may cause him to postpone the elections again but on the other hand popular pressure may force the issue. In such event, it seems inevitable that the Wafd would once again return to power, although possibly chastened somewhat by its experiences of last January.

Even though Sirry Pasha is considered pro-British, there is no reason to believe that his advent to power will change the course of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Sirry Pasha did make a public statement on June 15 in which he recognized British difficulties in making concessions, but this was before he had governmental responsibility. It is probably safe to forecast that Sirry's government will insist on "evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley" just as strongly as previous governments. If anything, the change of government may be a backward step in the negotiations in that either Sirry may not wish to renew his contacts with the Sudanese or the Sudanese will be reluctant to start all over again. The situation will then return to where it was several months ago with the Egyp-

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tians insisting on recognition of the title and the British regretting they cannot do so without Sudanese approval.

If Sirry cannot make any progress with the British in the near future or if the King decides not to hold elections, he will probably go the way of Ali Maher Pasha and Hilali Pasha. While it is too early to forecast with any accuracy who the next incumbent might be, the name of Mortada el Maraghi Pasha, Minister of the Interior and of War and Marine under the last Cabinet, is frequently mentioned. Ambassador Caffery reports that Maraghi is the King's "last ace in the hole".

No. 991

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "DE"

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 14, 1952.

Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Question: Proposed Reply to the British Message of July 7

Background:

On June 29, the Government of Hilali Pasha resigned—ostensibly because of the activities of certain unsavory Palace intriguers but more probably because of Hilali's failure to make progress with the British. In this connection, the British assessment of the reasons for Hilali's downfall differ from ours in that they consider failure to make progress on the Anglo-Egyptian problem was purely secondary.

As a result of Hilali's fall the British Government suddenly became greatly exercised and besought our intervention in an attempt to retain Hilali. Both the Department and Ambassador Caffery did not favor such intervention in the belief that it would be dangerous as well as ineffective. The question was settled, however, when Sirry Pasha came into power and no reply to the British was necessary.

On July 7 the British Embassy handed the Department a paper (Tab A) [1] outlining Mr. Eden's deep concern over the situation in Egypt and requesting the United States to tell the King that "his present insistence on the question of the title can only lead to disaster for him and for Egypt." The United Kingdom has also asked us to endeavor to bring about the installation of a government will-

[1] Not printed; Tab A is telegram 4i to Cairo, July 8. (641.74/7-852)

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ing to accept the kind of settlement which the British are prepared to offer. This paper emphasizes that the only alternative to such a settlement is the maintenance by the United Kingdom of "its position at whatever cost and if necessary by force."

In commenting on this paper (Tab B) [2] the British Embassy said the Foreign Office was deeply concerned by what it believed were "chinks of light" in the Anglo-American front with regard to Egypt. The British Embassy said the Foreign Office felt that the road to deterioration in Egypt would eventually lead to disaster if the United Kingdom and the United States did not stand firm.

The British paper additionally stated that the Foreign Office is continuing to give study to the proposals for an International Commission and for the regularization of Egyptian relationships with the Sudan which were mentioned to the Secretary in London. The British regard these proposals as the farthest they can go. Mr. Caffery, on the other hand, thinks that they would be rejected out of hand. [3]

The Embassy in London in its comments on the British paper (Tab C) [4] believes that British concern is genuine but feels that the British will not move from their present position with respect to the title. The Embassy recommends that we tell the Egyptians "frankly and forcibly" that they would have to move from their extreme position and move further toward middle ground. At the same time the Embassy believes that we should insist on knowing as precisely as possible the best plan the British are able to put forward on both the Sudan and defense questions. Mr. Caffery believes, on the other hand, that to carry out the British proposal would be "a folly of tragedy" (Tab D). [5] Mr. Caffery indicates, however, that he will urge Sirry Pasha to reach agreement with the Mahdi.

Discussion:

The British have for the first time stated the Egyptian issue in the black and white terms of a settlement along British lines (which does not involve recognition of Farouk's title unless the Sudanese so desire) or, if necessary, the use of force to maintain the British position in Egypt.

It is apparent that the various suggestions which have been made by the United States over the past months with respect to

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[2] Not printed; Tab B is telegram 40 to Cairo, July 8. (641.74/7-852) See footnote 3, *infra*.

[3] Ambassador Caffery informed the Department of State of his opinion in telegram 29, July 4, not printed. (645W.74/7-452)

[4] Not printed; Tab C is telegram 185 from London, July 11. (745W.00/7-1152)

[5] Not printed; Tab D is telegram 64 from Cairo, July 11. (641.74/7-1152)

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the Sudan do not find favor with the British. It is obvious that we have failed in our attempts to move the British on the title and that they will not take unilateral action on the matter. It is also clear that they intend to wait until a Sudanese Parliament has been established in order that that body can consider the question.

Although it is a most unreal situation, the fact remains that the Sudan has so occupied the stage of the Anglo-Egyptian problem that until we can break the log jam, we cannot move forward on defense problems.

On the basis of the British paper, the point seems to have been reached where there are four possible courses of action: (1) A deal with Egypt involving recognition by the United Kingdom of the symbolic dynastic union between Egypt and the Sudan and replacement of British forces by technicians; (2) continuance of the present stalemate; (3) evacuation of British forces and possibly abandonment of the base or (4) use of force to maintain the British position.

In regard to the first alternative, it is our belief that so long as a settlement is theoretically possible no idea, suggestion or action which might contribute to the settlement should be overlooked. The British will not recognize Farouk's title without consultation with the Sudanese and apparently are unwilling to consult Sudanese until after self-government has become a fact. The Egyptians on the other hand insist on recognition now and do not consider that consultation is necessary. Notwithstanding this bleak picture, it may still be possible for the British to develop an approach which would be acceptable to the Egyptians. In this connection, it must be emphasized that acceptability to the Egyptians is about the only criterion by which we can judge the usefulness of any idea, proposal or action. This is primarily true because of the fact that the Egyptians have strong legal grounds for their present position and we consider it unlikely that any Egyptian government could recede substantially from this position.

With regard to continuing the present stalemate and abandoning any attempt to reach a settlement, this course of action would seem to lead to growing public frustration and possibly a return to the situation of October to January. In this event the British would then be faced with a choice between evacuation or the use of force.

With regard to evacuation, the Defense Department considers it most important that the British maintain base facilities in Egypt for use in time of war, but it has declined to give any indication as to the number of personnel which might be necessary for this purpose. On the other hand, if no deal with Egypt is possible, we may find it more in our long run interest if the British evacuate the base completely. This move might be likened to British action in India and Pakistan. While such evacuation is not perfect from the

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military point of view, it must be recalled that the invitation to Egypt to join the Middle East Command was based on the calculated risk of Egypt's good faith and intentions and not on the presence of large numbers of foreign forces.

With respect to the use of force to maintain the British position, the implications of this course of action in terms of the British as well as the entire Western position in the Middle East are so serious that the British should be left in no doubt that we cannot in any way accept this as the alternative to failure to find a settlement. It is true that use of force may be necessary under certain conditions but to select it *a priori* as a course of action would be contrary to United States principles, objectives and interests.

Recommendation:

That you speak to the British Ambassador along the lines of the attached paper (Tab E) [6] which you may wish to hand him as a record of your statement.

[6] Not printed.

No. 992

641.74/7-1552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 15, 1952—7:07 p. m.

83. Secy saw Brit Amb Jul 14 at latter's request. Amb said he had been instructed reinforce Eden's request contained Deptel 41 Jul 8 to Cairo. [2] Amb also showed Secy tel from FonOff replying to views expressed by Dept Reps on Jul 7 (Deptel 40 Jul 8 to Cairo). [3] FonOff considered that Brit consultation with Sudanese undesirable and believed it preferable await creation Sudanese legislative bodies.

[1] Also sent to London as telegram 321. Drafted and approved by Stabler.

[2] See footnote 1, *supra*.

[3] In telegram 40 to Cairo, July 8, not printed, the Department of State informed Ambassador Caffery not only of the British Embassy's comments which accompanied the delivery of Eden's request as reported in Department telegram 41 but also provided Caffery with a summary of the views expressed to British Embassy officials by the Department's representatives. The Department's analysis was that Hilali fell due to his lack of progress with the British; the Department's representatives again urged the British to consult with the Sudanese; they said that the United States strongly hoped to avoid a situation whereby the British could maintain their position in Egypt only by using force; and they declared that the Department seriously questioned the wisdom of intervening in Egypt in the fashion suggested by Foreign Secretary Eden. (641.74/7-852)

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Secy said he was concerned by strong implications in Eden's msg that (a) because UK unable make progress with Egypts, responsibility now rests with US to persuade King throw out Sirry Govt and put title question into "cold storage" and (b) that if US is not successful, full consequences for lack of success wld fall on US. Secy emphasized US does not accept these implications. We are not willing be put in such situation. Secy stated that we are bothered by rapid shifts in Brit attitude. When in London Secy was told all well in Egypt, then Hilali resigns and UK rushes to US with idea that either US persuade Egypt accept UK-proposed settlement or force must be used maintain position. US cannot take responsibility for these alternatives.

Secy then went on to analyze request contained in Eden's msg. Re change of Govt Secy said Caffery's view which more often right than FonOff is that it not possible bring about change of Govt through intervention, that new Govt wld probably not be better and that Sirry not doing too badly. We wld not consider advice to King to change Govt good advice.

Re telling King put title question in "cold storage" Secy said that we had tried this before but it has not worked. We are faced with real dilemma which we try to get around by denying one of premises which appears to be accepted by all i.e. it not possible achieve settlement Canal Base without something on King's title which wld satisfy Egypts. In our view it is difficult if not impossible try to persuade Egypts re putting title in cold storage when they regard title as a matter of right and when they have no real desire for anything except to get Brit out of Egypt and Sudan.

Secy said that we wld be delighted assist in any way possible to create better atmosphere and that we wld gladly ask Caffery go to King if there was some new element, real and concrete, which cld be used. Secy added that he fully understood FonOff concern re possible Egypt moves in Sudan and fact one cld not rule out possibility Egypt "skulduggery". However he thought something might be done which wld not run appreciable risk.

Byroade expressed great US concern over implications of use of force and effect such course of action wld have on world opinion and Western position in ME.

Brit Amb indicated that he wld inform London that US unable to do what had been requested. He added that he wld report general tenor Secy's remarks and fact Dept unable to offer any new ideas this stage. Speaking personally, Franks said he imagined FonOff thinking tended toward view that UK shld make no move at this time unless Egypt requested talks and that next action wld be in December when Sudan Parliament installed and cld consider sovereignty question.

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Secy expressed belief that if establishment Sudanese Parliament awaited, Sudanese wld be so strongly headed toward policy of no Egypt sovereignty that favorable response to title cld not be expected. It wld then be necessary to deal with Canal Base question in bad atmosphere and this in itself might lead to more rioting. This in turn wld raise use of force to protect base and possibly UK and Fon nationals. Secy emphasized that once one gets started on this road it is most difficult to stop.

Secy ended discussion by saying that we wld continue, in consultation with Caffery, to see if there was any way we cld help do impossible i.e. separate Sudan and Canal Base issues so that somehow Base question which is heart of matter cld be dealt with.

ACHESON

No. 993

745W.00/7-1752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 18, 1952—7:05 p. m.

437. Dept believes forthcoming visit Mahdi to Egypt may offer good opportunity for Egypts and pro-independence Sudanese work out their diffs and mutual suspicions. We believe UK might well take occasion formally encourage Egypts and Sudanese in these contacts. Utility so doing underscored by Sirry approach to Brits reported London's 315 July 17 [2] and his conv with Caffery reported Cairo tel 91 July 17. [3] It wld also seem offer 'peg" sought by FonOff (London's 354 July 18). [4] Dept most concerned by statement

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 108. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Secretary Acheson.

[2] In telegram 315 from London, July 17, not printed, Ambassador Gifford reported the Foreign Office had told him the previous evening that several days before Sirry Pasha had suggested to a British Embassy representative in Cairo that the two governments should resume conversations on the Sudan and the Suez Canal defense questions. (745W.00/7-1752)

[3] Ambassador Caffery, in telegram 91 from Cairo, July 17, not printed, informed the Department that he had spoken with Sirry Pasha the previous day, and that Sirry had expressed the conviction that the Mahdi would do whatever the British told him to do; therefore, he would refuse to recognize Farouk's title. Sirry, however, declared his determination not to "let matter of Sudan title be put in moth balls." (774.00/7-1752)

[4] In telegram 354 from London, July 18, not printed, Gifford reported that the British Minister of Embassy in Cairo, Creswell, had just had a conversation with Sirry Pasha, who repeated his charges that the British were influencing the Mahdi not to recognize Farouk's title. Creswell denied the charge, and Sirry, later in the conversation, indicated he might be willing to conduct conversations about the de-

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reported London's 325 July 17 "UK cld not even give Sudanese lead". [5] While we understand UK reluctance use pressure, statement attributed FonOff official not consistent with Eden statement to Secy that what Brits want is Sudanese decision on title which wld be close to what Egypt desires. Fact remains that Brits have taken some satis that they have been able persuade Mahdi send del to Egypt without conditions and that generally Mahdi seeks and expects Brit advice.

Since Brits do welcome Egypt efforts consult certain sections Sudanese opinion (London's 271, July 15) [6] we believe might be helpful if Brits made their point view more formally known to Egypts. We have in mind that possibly Eden or Churchill might send personal msg to Sirry Pasha to reach him prior or during Mahdi's visit. Msg might develop fol pts: Express satis over mtg with Mahdi. UK most anxious reach agreement with Egypt. It fully approves and encourages direct consultation between Egypt and reps various sections Sudanese opinion which UK sincerely hopes will lead to agreement. If Egypt and Sudan can reach agreement on acceptance of symbolic dynastic union between Egypt and Sudan prior to eventual self-determination by Sudanese UK for its part wld consider its pledges to Sudanese fulfilled (i.e. recog of title wld be poss).

We believe above msg wld have desirable effect as evidence UK's sincerity. We also believe Brit shld send similar msg to Mahdi order both he and Sirry cld start talks on common ground re Brit attitude.

We for our part wld be willing urge Sirry accept msg in same spirit it was sent and do utmost move away from extreme position.

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fense question if the British would make a statement to the effect that they had no objection to the unity of Egypt and the Sudan. The British Foreign Office did not interpret this remark to mean that Sirry was willing to shelve the question of the King's title, but merely that he might be willing to start talks on the defense problem first as part of a general overall settlement. The American Embassy representative who was given this information then suggested that the British should make a statement to offset the impression that the British did not want the Sudanese to recognize the title. The Foreign Office official responded that consideration was being given to this suggestion, but "one difficulty is to find peg on which to hang it since to make seemingly gratuitous statement this effect might arouse more suspicions than it allays." (645.74/7–1852)

[5] The context of the quotation from telegram 325 from London, July 17, not printed, is as follows: a Foreign Office official was repeating the position that the British could not apply pressure to the Sudanese to guide them in the desired direction to achieve a settlement of the Sudan problem. In underscoring his meaning, the Foreign Office representative "reiterated UK cld not even give Sudanese lead." (641.74/7–1752)

[6] Not printed.

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Pls put above sugg urgently to highest FonOff off, preferably Eden if avail.

ACHESON

No. 994

774.00/7-2152

Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 21, 1952.

Subject: Weekly Summary of Events, Egypt and the Sudan, July 15–21, 1952

Second Change of Government Within Three Weeks

It was announced over the weekend that Sirry Pasha had extended his resignation to the King.[1] On Monday, July 21, after 36 hours of waiting, the King's acceptance of the resignation was announced. Reports from our Embassy in Cairo indicate that the reason for Sirry's resignation stems from a discussion over control of army policy. This dissension was brought to a head by attempts to force acceptance of Palace favorite Major General Sirry Amer as a member of the Board of the Officers' Club and resistance against this by Board members under the leadership of Club President Major General Muhammad Nagib. The King took a hand in support of his favorite by replacing the elected Board with a new nominated Board, headed by Major General Ali Nagib, brother of Muhammad. Ousted members of the old elected Board immediately contacted officers in Cairo, Alexandria, Al Aris and Manzabad where excited barracks room meetings of junior officers were held. A last minute attempt to soothe the discontented officers was made when Muhammad Nagib was offered the cabinet post as Minister of War, which he refused. Sirry Pasha went to the King to persuade him to withdraw his support of Sirry Amer and the July 16 order (which abolished the elected Board). This the King refused to do without also dismissing Muhammad Nagib, whom he considered one of the ringleaders against the King's influence in the army. Sirry tendered his resignation and the King later accepted it.

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[1] On July 21, Secretary Acheson informed President Truman of the facts surrounding the resignation of Sirry Pasha as Prime Minister of Egypt. (774.13/7-2152)

For documentation regarding the coverage of this crisis, see Department of State files 641.74, 774.00, and 774.13

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There are no indications as yet as to who will be called upon to be the new prime minister. [2]

Sirry's Program

Prior to his resignation, Sirry Pasha in an interview with UP had outlined his Government's program as including:

(1) Resumption of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations;
(2) Concentration on the country's economic problems;
(3) Non-violation of the Constitution and hence "100 per cent free" elections; and
(4) Continuation of martial law "as long as necessary."

Our Embassy comments that while Sirry was noncommittal or evasive in handling questions on Egypt's participation in Middle East defense, he did not respond to such questions with the usual restatement of national aims as a precondition for Egyptian participation.

[2] In telegrams 126 and 129 from Cairo, July 21, neither printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that, to the amazement of all in Cairo, Hilali Pasha announced his willingness to become Prime Minister once again. (774.00/7–2152)

No. 995

774.00/7–2152

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 21, 1952.

Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Problem: Proposed New Approach [2]

Discussion

As in 1946, at the time of Bevin–Sidky negotiations, the Sudan is still the principal stumbling block to negotiations on future arrangements for the Suez Canal Base. [3] It is clear that our informal attempt to persuade the British Government to move from its extreme position on the Sudan have not succeeded. Our somewhat less strenuous efforts vis-à-vis Egypt have also not succeeded. It is our judgment that continuance of the present stalemate would lead to riots and disorders which the Egyptian authorities might not be

[1] Drafted by Stabler.

[2] The following handwritten remark by the Secretary of State appears at the top of the memorandum: "This has to be reconsidered now. DA"

[3] For documentation regarding the Beven–Sidky negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 69–78.

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able to control. These in turn could well result in the use of force by the British, not only to protect the Base but also to protect United Kingdom and other foreign nationals in Egypt. Since the use of force would have the most serious consequences with respect to the Western position in the Middle East and since the alternative, i.e., total evacuation of the Base, would not achieve our objectives, it must be concluded that a new approach is necessary if there is to be any hope of producing a deal with Egypt.

At the present time the United States has a position of high respect and influence in Egypt. This is due in part to the efforts of Ambassador Caffery and in part to the usual fluctuation in popularity as between the United States and the United Kingdom. The British recognize our position in Egypt and have endeavored to exploit it for the purpose of supporting whatever position they believe correct. It is becoming more and more difficult to give support to the British in the measure they desire since we are less and less convinced of the correctness of this position.

It is our belief that the time has come when we ought to make greater use of our position in Egypt to see whether we can evolve a deal which would be acceptable both to the United Kingdom and to Egypt. It will be recalled that in November and December 1951, Ambassador Caffery had a number of meetings with the then Minister of Interior, Serageddin Pasha, regarding possible elements for an agreement on the Canal Zone Base. [4] They discussed the possibility of technicians replacing British forces and even made some mention of a joint Anglo-Egyptian air defense scheme, provided that to all outward appearance the planes had Egyptian markings. Perhaps the United States should now try to work out directly with the Egyptians a settlement to the Anglo-Egyptian problem. In view of the desirability of some privacy and informality our efforts should be short of *formal* good offices. It would, of course, be necessary that the general approach as well as specific details be agreed with the British prior to going to the Egyptians.

Since the Sudan is the principal stumbling block, we must find some way to offer a salable concession to the Egyptians on this point. In addition, we might also have to offer some assistance to Egypt to develop its armed forces, probably in the form of training missions and token equipment. The latter could perhaps be done in conjunction with the British. In essence we would try to devise an approach which would give the Egyptians sufficient [apparent omission] on the Sudan at this time so that they would not continue to insist on UK recognition of the title as the *sine qua non* to

[4] For documentation regarding these conversations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 421 ff.

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negotiations on the Base issue. The approach would not actually split the Sudan and base problems but would provide the means whereby there could be a shift of emphasis.

While it is quite possible that with the frozen positions of the British and the Egyptians a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian problem is not attainable, we believe that so long as it remains theoretically possible to find a solution we should err on the side of trying every within-reason approach. In addition to this belief we consider that from the point of view of US interests we should not lose sight of the necessity for building up a "record" for ourselves in attempting to find a reasonable avenue to solution. The "record" might be most useful if a stalemate, with all that implies, is reached. We may well need this "record" for the maintenance of our position with other Near Eastern States.

Proposed New Approach

Assuming that it has been possible previously to work out an agreement with the British on a government-to-government basis, we might go to the Egyptians along the following lines:

The United States would recognize King Farouk as King of the Sudan within the framework of self-determination by the Sudanese at an early date and would assist in the development of the Egyptian armed forces through training missions and token equipment within an appropriate program to be agreed upon, if Egypt, for its part, would:

(a) defer detailed discussions on all phases of the Sudan problem with the UK for the time being;
(b) proceed with negotiations on the Base question with the view to reaching an agreement on the replacement of British land, sea and air forces with technicians (mostly British, but perhaps a few Americans) and on a joint Anglo-Egyptian air defense scheme; and
(c) participate without commitment in discussions relating to Middle East defense.

We would also say to the Egyptians that deferment of detailed discussions on the Sudan and our offer to recognize the King's title would be for the purpose of permitting negotiation and agreement on the Base question, which is now being blocked by the Sudan impasse. We would add that as soon as the Base question is settled (or otherwise, as the time may be appropriate), discussions on the Sudan would continue and that we would hope that agreement could be reached on the various points at issue, i.e., interim status of the Sudan prior to self-determination, constitutional development, water rights, etc. We might indicate that if it were considered useful, we would be prepared to assist in such discussions.

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We would also tell the Egyptians that in our view the suggested approach and line of settlement is highly reasonable and that the United States has proposed it because of our conviction of its reasonableness. In addition we would say that Eden's message to Sirry regarding the Mahdi's visit (if it is sent) represents, as we understand it, the limits to which the UK can go at this time. We would also say that if the offer is turned down, we believe the results would be the continuance of the stalemate which in turn might lead to a situation involving disorders, riots and attacks against the British which the Egyptian Government might not be able to control. In such event, the British would probably react firmly to defend themselves against these attacks and the United States for its part would not only think them in the right in so doing, but would give them its support. Throughout this approach we would emphasize the theme that United States and Western collaboration with Egypt along the lines Egypt is constantly seeking is only possible if Egypt accepts certain realities, as well as those responsibilities which devolve upon it as a result of its strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

For tactical reasons it might be better not to let the Egyptians know at the outset that the approach had been discussed with the British. We might indicate that if the Egyptians would accept this arrangement, we would try to obtain United Kingdom agreement (this, of course, having been obtained previously).

Assessment of Recommended Approach

I. A. *Advantages for Egypt*

1. The King's title as King of the Sudan would be recognized by a Great Power.
2. Egypt would be offered for the first time in a number of years the facilities to train and equip its armed forces (even though in a limited way).
3. The basic cause for turmoil in Egypt, the presence of British troops, would be removed.
4. Egyptians interests in the Sudan would not have been surrendered or compromised.
5. A closer relationship with the United States would be established.

B. *Disadvantages for Egypt*

1. Egypt would have lost out in its efforts to make the British acknowledge the sovereignty of Farouk in the Sudan.
2. Egypt would probably receive far less than it would expect in the way of United States training and equipment.
3. The joint Anglo-Egyptian air defense scheme would represent the continuation of foreign occupation.
4. The leverage with respect to the Sudan which has been afforded by refusal to discuss the Base question would be lost.

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5. Egypt would probably not consider the price offered sufficient to withstand Wafd and other attacks, particularly regarding participation in discussions on Middle East defense.
6. The possibility of closer US–UK relationship would be a difficulty.

II. A. *Advantages for the United Kingdom*

1. The United Kingdom would be taken off the hook with regard to recognition of the title.
2. The large military establishment in the Canal Zone could be substantially reduced.
3. The door to discussions on Middle East defense and MEDO might be opened not only for Egypt, but also for the other Arab States.
4. The United States would become further involved in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and if the Egyptians rejected the approach, the United Kingdom could count more firmly on United States support.
5. Constitutional development in the Sudan could proceed more easily and there would in fact be less pressure to reach agreement on the Sudan.
6. The price in general would be small.

B. *Disadvantages for the United Kingdom*

1. Disagreement between the United Kingdom and United States over the King's title would become a public fact.
2. United Kingdom agreement to United States recognition of Farouk's title would probably cause acute political embarrassment to the British Government.
3. Failure to agree to the approach would widen the differences between the United States and United Kingdom on the handling of the Anglo-Egyptian problem.
4. United States training missions and token equipment would reduce Egyptian dependence on the United Kingdom for these purposes.
5. The United Kingdom has no particular desire to see concessions made to the Egyptians because of their general attitude toward Egypt and because they fear that the Egyptians might try to raise the price.

III. A. *Advantages for the United States*

1. Removal of the Sudan as a stumbling block to negotiations on the Base.
2. Possibility of early agreement on Canal Zone Base.
3. Egyptian participation in discussions on Middle East defense possibly leading to participation in MEDO.
4. Opening the door to general Arab participation in MEDO.
5. Strengthening United States position in Egypt.
6. Closer working relationship with the United Kingdom.

B. *Disadvantages for the United States*

1. Direct involvement in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.

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2. Strong British popular reaction against US recognition of title.
3. Impairment of United States position in Egypt and the Arab States if the approach fails and United States support is given to the United Kingdom.
4. Further commitment of United States equipment and facilities.
5. United States would be unpopular with large sections of the Sudanese opinion.
6. "Last-gasp" nature of approach.

In summation, probably the biggest difficulty for the United Kingdom would be to agree to United States recognition of Farouk's title. In any event, should the UK agree to this approach, it is extremely doubtful that Egypt would consider the price high enough, even at the risk of offending the US. However, it is believed that there are sufficient possibilities in the approach to take soundings with Ambassadors Caffery and Gifford.

Recommendation

That you approve the proposed new approach for the purpose of consultation with Ambassadors Caffery and Gifford.

No. 996

641.74/7-2352: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, July 23, 1952—6 p. m.

407. In Eden's continued absence, I saw Strang this morning and, in accordance Deptel 460 July 22, [2] outlined Dept's suggestions contained Deptel 437, July 19 re msg from Eden or Churchill to Hilali and Mahdi. I emphasized that if Brit were willing take this action, we for our part wld be willing urge Hilali accept it in spirit in which it was sent and do our utmost move him away from extreme position. In putting suggestion to Strang I particularly recalled Eden's statement to Secy that what Brit want is Sudanese decision on title which wld be as close as possible to what Egypt desires.

Strang confirmed Eden's statement represents UK desire. He said FonOff wld give careful consideration our suggestion re msg

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 22.

[2] In telegram 460, July 22, not printed, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in London to act on Department telegram 437 (Document 993) in view of the fact that Hilali had just been reappointed Prime Minister. The Department believed that a personal message from either Eden or Churchill to Hilali would be most useful and might give him needed support. (745W.00/7-2252)

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and wld consult Eden. He thought wording would have be looked at carefully as wld question of timing in light reports received from Creswell re army coup in Cairo. I am reporting separately info which Strang gave me re Creswell's reports on sit in Egypt over last couple days.

HOLMES

No. 997

774.00/7-2852

Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 28, 1952.

Subject: Weekly Summary of Events, Egypt and the Sudan, July 22-28, 1952

Background

In 1929, the Egyptian Prime Minister decided to send Egyptian Army Officers to England for Staff school training, but discovered that none of the regular officers were scholastically equipped to meet Aldershot standards. Young college graduates were then chosen to take the Staff course on the condition that they become regular Army officers. Thus for the past twenty years there has grown up within the Egyptian Army a middle-echelon of well-educated officers who resent the fact that the older ill-educated top-ranking officers were apparently keeping them from promotion.

During the Palestine War the extent of the graft and corruption among these older officers became apparent to an alarming degree, and during 1950 the younger officers succeeded in forcing a thorough investigation of the Arms Scandal, resulting in the retirement of the majority of the top-ranking generals, including Haidar Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief, Osman Mahdi Pasha, the Chief of Staff, and Sirry Amer Pasha, Commander of the elite Frontier Corps.

However, not long ago after the retirement of these officers, they were quietly reappointed to their old positions by the King, and the junior officers again found themselves the victims of graft, corruption and favoritism by the Palace clique. One of the more recent flare-ups of discontent was registered when, in January 1952, the younger officers elected General Mohamed Naguib Bey President of the Cairo Officers' Club, thus frustrating the machinations of the Commander-in-Chief, Haidar Pasha.

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About two weeks ago King Farouk tried to persuade the Governing Board of the Officers' Club to make a place for General Sirry Amer, one of the more unsavory of the older officers. When this request was refused, the King attempted to replace the elective Governing Board with a new appointive board. Prime Minister Sirry Pasha tried to quell the discontent occasioned by this Palace interference in Army affairs by appointing Mohamed Naguib Minister of War in his Cabinet, but the King vetoed this conciliatory move, and agreed to retire Sirry Amer permanently if Naguib Bey were retired at the same time. Sirry Pasha resigned over this issue on July 20, and Hilali Pasha agreed to form a new government.

Military Coup [1]

During the night of July 22–23, Major General Naguib Bey led a quiet and effective coup which took over control of armed forces in Cairo and later the whole country. The avowed purpose of the coup—carried out by approximately 300 Army and Air Force officers—was to purge the armed forces of corrupt elements ("thieves and traitors") and work "for the interests of the nation in the light of the constitution."

During the course of the first day—July 23—the heads of the Army and Air force were arrested, but later on during the week many other officers, high government officials and Palace favorites were detained or prevented from leaving the country.

At first blush, the militarists seemed determined to keep out of politics, but within twelve hours Naguib Bey had presented to the King three demands: (a) that Ali Maher should lead the government; (b) that there should be immediate elections; and (c) that martial law should be abolished. The King acceded to these demands, and Ali Maher formed a new government consisting of most of his previous "technician" cabinet (February 1952) with the exception of his strongest minister, Mortada el Maraghi Pasha.

The situation deteriorated during the next two days: the Army continued its bloodless cleanup campaign of arrests, but the King through several of his entourage (including Maraghi) attempted to persuade the British and American Ambassadors to counsel intervention by British forces. The coup leaders apparently received word of these machinations and on the morning of July 26 Ali Maher Pasha was sent with an ultimatum to King Farouk forcing him to abdicate in favor of his baby son and leave the country by 6:00 p. m. Cairo time. Farouk acceded, signed the Royal Decree designating his son, Ahmed Fuad II, King of Egypt and the Sudan, ap-

[1] Information on the coverage of the coup and the abdication of King Farouk is in Department of State files 774.00, 774.11, and 774.55.

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pointed a Regency Council, and sailed from Alexandria on the Royal yacht, *Mahroussa,* bound for Italy.

From the very beginning it was apparent that Naguib Bey had the upper hand and that the military intended to keep effective control of the situation: "I appeal to the people," read Naguib's first declaration, "to allow nobody to abuse this move nor to do anything that will be detrimental to the cause of the country as a whole. Any attempt of this sort will be dealt with firmly and those responsible will be severely punished." With an eye to British forces in the Canal Zone poised for moves to protect British lives, Naguib concluded, "I seize this opportunity to assure foreigners that their interests, their lives, their property and their money will be safe and that the Army holds itself responsible for them."

Ali Maher Pasha later reaffirmed his government's intention to protect foreign lives and property when representations were made by Ambassador Caffery regarding United States interest and concern in this respect.

Throughout the past week, the Army leader has reiterated that he has no intention of interfering in political matters—these are the affairs of the new Prime Minister—and that he is interested only in cleaning out corruption and graft in the armed forces and government and in forming a new, well-equipped and well-trained army. It remains to be seen whether Naguib and his junta of officers can resist the temptation to meddle in politics, outside of the cleanup, or the temptation to feather their own nests as so many others have done in the past.

Influence of Ikhwan el Muslimin, Communists, Wafdist Elements

There is apparently little or no Communist influence in the army, and there have been no evidences of Communist elements at work in this latest upheaval. However, wherever there is change, the Communists are certain to have a try at turning the change in their direction.

The Ikhwan el Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) has a certain amount of strength among the armed forces, and is entirely likely to have had a strong influence in last week's coup because the aims of the Ikhwan, like those professed by the coup group, are in the direction of a purge of all corruption, whether in material, moral or religious matters. Several of the leaders of the coup are known to be members of the Ikhwan.

The Wafd has been sitting on the sidelines for the past six months, waiting for an opportunity to regain the power wrested from it after the burning of Cairo on January 26. Nahas Pasha and Serageddin Pasha, the two most powerful members of the Wafd executive, have just returned to Cairo from Europe. They hailed

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Naguib as "Savior of the Nation," but it is not yet known how much of a savior he will be to the Wafd Party, which is obviously more important to them.

No. 998

641.74/8–452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 4, 1952—6:50 p. m.

811. 1. Future course events Egypt still remains sufficiently unclear to prevent formulation any firm policy re possible coop with present Egypt regime.

2. Such signs as decision not convoke Wafd Parl, statements by Egypt mil officials re desire coop with West, gen restrained atmosphere and continuance constit monarchy (when radical change was possible) are encouraging.

3. On other hand, possibility of dissension among junta surrounding Naguib, complications and difficulties in formulating and executing anti-graft and corruption program, Wafd attitude as revealed in Party manifesto, civilian versus mil stresses and strains, and other uncertainties wld seem to pt to probable future difficulties tending to make structure present regime shaky.

4. Notwithstanding question marks and obscurities re Egypt future, we believe there is possibility that Egypt mil may wish to come to understanding with UK on Canal Base. While polit shibboleths "unity and evacuation" are standard among all groups, there is some reason to believe that Egypt mil coopn with the West involving West mil assistance wld have sufficient appeal so that Sudan problem might be handled separately from Base issue.

5. In view potentialities (altho we admit not necessarily probabilities) new sit created by coup, we think UK wld do well lose no time in formulating in detail settlement they wld like achieve with respect to CZ Base, i.e., technicians, phasing of evacuation, etc.

6. Reason we make this suggestion is that if new Egypt regime shld appear ready resume negots and adopt reasonable line, UK wld be in position move quickly take advantage favorable atmosphere.

7. We hope UK in formulating detailed settlement wld be as forthcoming as possible since important in discussion with Egypt

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 236. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade.

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mil wld be initial favorable impact UK offer settlement. We feel Brits wld stand to gain in long run if they decided beforehand what pts they are likely have to concede and offered them in generous spirit, thereby creating climate favorable to successful negots.

8. Pls discuss above with FonOff soonest and say that we shld be glad to have oppy study proposals in hope reaching common agreement. This in turn wld enable us if and when time comes to help put them over.

BRUCE

No. 999

641.74/8–552: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, August 5, 1952—7 p. m.

648. In course conv today, Emb off discussed with FonOff gist of Deptel 811, Aug 4. FonOff official expressed opinion that many of indications which had come to it of willingness younger mil officers connected with coup to coop with West in def matters were prompted by desire obtain equip. He said FonOff view is that it wld be mistake comply with such requests until it were clear that Egypt wld coop in ME def. Nevertheless, FonOff agreed there is some hope in present sitn of splitting def and Sudan questions at proper time. He confirmed that renewed consideration being given UK def proposals at present time so that UK wld be prepared insofar as possible take advantage of any break in sitn as soon as it occurred. There are still many aspects of prob which UK must clarify before entering negots, but FonOff fully aware of this and working levels are doing necessary spade work. He was sure that in any event UK wld want discuss def proposals with US before putting them to Egypts, since close US–UK coordination might well be crucial in persuading Egypts to accept them.

Official then noted that Ali Maher has indicated he does not want discuss Sudan prob at present time. This raises problems for UK, since it must submit its comments on new Sudan constitution by Nov 8, which is expiry date of six months. Comments shld really be submitted before that time, since present plan is to hold elections in Sudan in Nov and time will be required to make necessary preparations. It wld still seem logical that UK and Egypt shld co-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 47.

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ordinate their comments insofar as possible before submitting them to Sudan Govt. Ali Maher's preference for delaying talks on Sudan therefore poses difficult question. Robertson returning from Sudan next week end on leave and FonOff plans discuss prob with him at that time.

Emb off asked whether it might not be possible postpone elections in Sudan for a time, since it wld appear that any UK move to try to get Egypts into convs on this ques might well prove to be self-defeating. If there is possibility splitting def and Sudan questions, it wld appear better to try to find some means of postponing question of Sudan question altogether until after def issue solved.

FonOff official saw little possibility postponing elections, since this wld inevitably raise howl in Sudan. Altho no formal commitments have been made, it is generally understood in Sudan that HMG favors attainment Sudanese self-govt by end of this year. Nov elections necessary to adhere to this goal. He did not think it necessarily followed that UK move to discuss Sudan constitution with Ali Maher wld result latter's tying two questions together again, since Ali Maher wld undoubtedly realize that Sudan will have self-govt by end of year in any event and that it is better make Egypt point of view known on constitution.

HOLMES

No. 1000

874.501/8-752

Memorandum by Major General George H. Olmsted [1] to the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs (Martin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, 7 August 1952.

Subject: Police Equipment for Egyptian Government

1. Reference is made to memorandum from your office, dated 1 July 1952, subject as above. [2] In this memorandum, your office requested that the Department of Defense explore every possibility of making available all items required for equipping three mobile police divisions for the Egyptian Government.

2. A study has been made of the list of equipment required by the Government of Egypt. It has been determined that all items required could be made available immediately upon receipt of an ap-

[1] Major General Olmsted was Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense.

[2] Not printed.

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proved request and funds. An administrative allocation was made of these items.

3. However, in accordance with the desire of the Department of State made known to this office, 28 July 1952, all action on this transaction has been stopped and the case is now being held in abeyance. The Department of the Army has removed the items from the agenda of the Allocations Committee (Army) and suspended all action which had begun to prepare the equipment for shipment.

4. This memorandum confirms verbal request of the State Department to suspend all action. It is requested this office be informed of any change in the aforementioned status which may be desired.

GEORGE H. OLMSTED

No. 1001

774.00/8–752: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 7, 1952—7 p. m.

295. Re Deptel 230, August 4. [2]

1. Present relations between Wafd and new regime is definitely not running as smoothly as Nahas and Serageddin had hoped when they took initiative in returning to Egypt re mytel 294, August 7. [3] Whereas Army feared power of Wafd at beginning of coup, now that coup has succeeded, it has lost much of that fear and envisages a Wafd-less future for an Egypt led by Ali Maher with strong army support as his more or less silent partner. In his previous premiership, Maher placated Wafd because of his complete lack of support from sources other than Palace. Today he has awakened Army behind him and is in less need of Wafd. So long as there is possibility of his making a go of governing in collaboration with military, Nahas and Serageddin can expect only trouble from him.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 91 and unnumbered to Paris, Ankara, Rome, Moscow, the Arab capitals, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Tangier.

[2] In telegram 230 to Cairo, Aug. 4, not printed, the Department instructed as follows:

"Dept wld appreciate ur present evaluation (1) relationship between new regime and Wafd as repd by Nahas and Serageddin; (2) relationship new regime and Moslem Brotherhood; and (3) possibility Salaheddin and younger elements Wafd may be able reach understanding with new regime." (774.00/8–452)

[3] Not printed.

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2. Members of Moslem Bros were undoubtedly among orig Army coup group and are still in position some influence. That this influence is not predominant is indicated in such programs supported by Army as (1) favoring MEC, (2) looking toward West for mil equipment and aid, (3) agreeing to Moneim as one of three regents. Bros are, of course, implacably opposed each of these.

3. Salaheddin forming new "young" Wafd in collaboration with new regime seems improb. Wafd org and money still held firmly in Serageddin, Nahas and Abboud hands and reasoning first para above wld indicate Army in any event wld be little interested so long as poss Maher-army collab's success remains.

CAFFERY

No. 1002

774.00/8-2052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 20, 1952—2 p. m.

406. At their invitation I dined last night with Naguib and nine of his principal officers.

1. They again emphasized their desire to be particularly friendly with US; they affirmed again they hope in due course to receive "help" from US. I again assured them of our sympathy, congratulated them on the order they are maintaining and fact there was no violence or bloodshed either at time of their coup or since; also on moderation they are demonstrating all along line. They avowed they firmly intend to continue a policy of maintaining law and order and to pursue their aims of raising standards of living, cleaning out corruption in govt as well as in polit parties, reorganizing army on an efficient basis with no extravagances.

2. We discussed agrarian reforms. On one hand they say in view of pertinent popular excitement among fellahin all over Egypt they must do something about this and do it immed. On other hand, they now realize that they can spoil the whole Egypt econ picture by going too far. In other words, literally you cannot give 17 or 18 million fellahin plots of land and produce anything worthwhile. They are somewhat embarrassed at having spoken too much on the subject publicly.

3. They realize that they were too quick in releasing too many Commies and have re-arrested lot of them.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 142 and unnumbered to Paris, Ankara, Rome, Moscow, the Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Tripoli, and Tangier.

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4. As for Moslem Brotherhood Naguib admitted to me apart from others that there is some danger there because a number of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers belong to Brotherhood. However, he believes he can keep it under control.

5. They will pursue their endeavors to weaken Wafd.

6. They are convinced that recent Kafr El Dawar incidents were inspired from outside, but have not laid hands on real instigators. The man they court-martialed was unquestionably guilty of leading rioters, but was tool of someone else. It has not yet been decided whether to hang him or to commute his sentence to life imprisonment. Naguib asked my opinion as to what he shld do, but I dodged that one.

7. Aside from Naguib these young men look all to be in their thirties-forties. I believe they are well intentioned, patriotic and filled with desire to do something for Egypt. On other hand, they are woefully ignorant of matters economic, financial, polit, and international. However, they seem anxious to learn and have learned a lot in last few weeks. Their respect for Aly Maher seems to be growing because they do realize they themselves cld not handle Govt and are inclined lean more and more on him. Of course, in a situation like this when so many military involved this happy relationship with Aly Maher cld be upset by some unfortunate accident or incident.

8. I purposely did not discuss ME defense matters last night as I shall be in position to do that more effectively when I know them better. As my recent reports have shown, some of military approach Evans practically every day and he will of course maintain his contacts.

9. From my conversation last night, much of which was alone with Naguib, I concluded that stories that Naguib is only a figurehead are untrue. He is not brilliant, but he has good common sense and some qualities of leadership.

CAFFERY

No. 1003

774.5 MSP/9-252

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 2, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to correspondence between the Department of Defense and this Department concerning the desire of the Egyptian Government to purchase police equipment in this

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country. It will be recalled that an agreement under Section 408(e) of the DAA of 1949, as amended, was reached with the Egyptian Government whereby it could purchase certain equipment with the United States Government's assistance.

The Department of Defense has been most cooperative in making available the equipment desired by Egypt. However, as a result of the *coup d'état* of July 23, 1952 it was decided to suspend action on this project pending clarification of the situation.

This Department has now received an urgent communication from Ambassador Caffery in Cairo to the effect that the Egyptian Prime Minister is most anxious to have this project completed. [1] This Department considers that it is in the interest of the United States that the Government of Ali Maher be supported and that the internal security arrangements of Egypt be strengthened. Efforts of the present Egyptian regime to stabilize the situation have been encouraging and we believe that evidence of a friendly attitude, both morally and materially, would make more hopeful the prospects of obtaining Egyptian cooperation with the West.

Consequently, this Department would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would reinstate the police equipment project and grant to it the priorities which were granted at the time the project was originally conceived. This Department will be glad to cooperate with the Department of Defense in arranging the details.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Deputy Under Secretary

[1] Under reference is telegram 497 from Cairo, Aug. 28, not printed. (774.00/8-2852)

No. 1004

874.501/9-652: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, September 6, 1952—2 p. m.

1319. EmbOff today informed FonOff of Dept's decision re police equipment as contained Deptel 1620, Sept 5, [2] stressing Dept-envis-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 78.

[2] Not printed. In telegram 498 to Cairo, repeated to London as telegram 1620, the Department instructed the Embassy in Cairo to inform the Egyptian Government

Continued

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aged move as possibly assisting Ali Maher in problems which he is facing with military.

FonOff expressed concern re this development. On basis conv reported Embtel 1302, Sept 5, [3] FonOff last night had instructed Brit Emb Wash also discuss matter with Dept. While FonOff also anxious strengthen Ali Maher, it is not clear how this action will assist. If Ali Maher utilizes equipment to form new independent mobile units, it is likely bring him into new area of friction with military. If he does not set up independent police units, equipment will fall into control mil with repercussions FonOff fears (Embtel 1302). Altho Ali Maher might reap some kudos in such circumstances for obtaining arms for military, FonOff thinks they would be short-lived in any event and fears encouragement to military re further shipments.

At one point, FonOff asked how Dept's decision fitted into obligations under NEACC which EmbOff had earlier been discussing in another connection (Embtel 1318 today).[3] EmbOff pointed out project had been cleared between us early in year but never implemented. FonOff replied that situation had changed since then.

Comment: Unless implementation Dept's instructions clearly necessary to save Ali Maher, Emb hopes that in view strong FonOff feelings and in interests Anglo-American coop, notification of decision to Ali Maher can be postponed until US and UK have had opportunity consult further on this project.[4]

GIFFORD

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that the Department of State and the Department of Defense were prepared to complete the police equipment project. (774.00/9-552)

[3] Not printed.

[4] In telegram 577 from Cairo, Sept. 6, not printed, Ambassador Caffery informed the Department of State that in view of the rapidly changing political situation in Egypt, he was deferring notification in Cairo that the United States was prepared to provide the police equipment. (874.501/9-652) The Department replied in telegram 505, Sept. 6, not printed, that it concurred with Caffery's course of action, and told him not to proceed in the future until he had checked with the Department beforehand. (874.501/9-652)

No. 1005

774.00/9-852

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 8, 1952.

Subject: Reaffirmation of September 3 statement on Egypt.

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Discussion

Over this past weekend there has been a great deal of political activity in Egypt, culminating in the demand by the military group High Committee for the resignation of Prime Minister Ali Maher and the appointment of General Mohamed Naguib, the Commander-in-Chief, as Prime Minister. Throughout the course of the discussion and decision, members of the High Committee have made a point of keeping our Ambassador informed of developments (Tab A). [1]

Ambassador Caffery strongly recommends that in response to press questions the Department reaffirm your statement to the press of last Wednesday (Tab B) [2] regarding our interest in developments in Egypt, "including the reform program announced by the Egyptian Government". The program of the armed forces (Tab C), [3] the details of which must be agreed to by all members of the new Naguib Cabinet prior to acceptance of their portfolios, is essentially the same as that contemplated by Ali Maher with the reform measures even more sweeping than those of the former Prime Minister.

The following "line to be taken in response to press questions" was telegraphed to Ambassador Caffery for his comments (Tab D). [4] He has replied that "this is exactly what we wished" (Tab E). [5]

"The Department has been informed of the September 7 cabinet change in Egypt involving the replacement of Ali Maher by General Naguib as Prime Minister. The Department sees no basic alteration of Egyptian policies in this development. Since the program of the Egyptian Government remains based on principles rather than personalities, there is no change in the United States attitude as expressed in the Secretary's statement of September 3, 1952 wishing that Government success in this program, including the reform movements."

Recommendation

That you approve use of this reaffirmation of your September 3 statement in answer to questions from the press on the United States attitude toward the most recent developments in Egypt. [6]

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[1] Not printed. Tab A is telegram 593 from Cairo, Sept. 7. (774.00/9-752)

[2] Not printed. For the text of Secretary Acheson's statement of Sept. 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 15, 1952, p. 406.

[3] Not printed. Tab C is telegram 596 from Cairo, Sept. 7. (774.00/9-752)

[4] Not printed. Tab D is telegram 510 to Cairo, Sept. 7. (774.00/9-752)

[5] Not printed. Tab E is telegram 597 from Cairo, Sept. 8. (774.00/9-852)

[6] Secretary Acheson spoke with the President on Sept. 8 regarding the new developments in Egypt and informed President Truman that this new statement was going to be issued to the press. (774.00/9-852)

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No. 1006

774.00/9-852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, September 8, 1952—4 p. m.

605. It is unfortunate but fact that Ali Maher simply failed to understand fundamentals of what happened in Egypt as result of the coup. Concentration on why various steps could not be taken instead of on realization some steps had to be taken cost him the PriMin. Notwithstanding our warnings he had no real understanding of danger he was in until last minute. He then rushed thru the Cab agreement on prin of restricting max agric landholdings but it was too little and too late. This calling of a meeting of landowners after 6 weeks of delays and giving them another 48 hours to submit their views was last straw with mil who were also incensed when they heard Maher at Stevenson's suggestion was contemplating assisting Prince Mohamed Ali in getting funds out of Egypt.

With Maher fall Brit are at present literally out in cold here in Egypt. Mil will not only have nothing whatever to do with them but are convinced Brit are attempting sabotage their movement. Altho this is of course fantastic Egypts are impermeable to argument or reason on this score. Most civilians who have dealt with Brit in past with any attempts at understanding are now under arrest.

It is not pleasant to have men long on extremism and short on admin experience such at Fathi Radwan and Mureddin Tarraf in the Cab or a rep of the Ikhwan such as Bakkury. On other hand Bakkury is from more moderate section of Brotherhood and Radwan and Tarraf are only 2 of 16. I had previously indicated personal objection to the inclusion of Sanhouri (a signer of Stockholm peace appeal) [2] or of Commie Barawi and mil honored my objects and left them out. The carry-over of MinFin Emary is a good sign and others are gen moderates.

Mil this morn tell us their full program (remytel 596) [3] will be published within few days.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 205 and unnumbered to Paris, Ankara, Rome, Moscow, Tehran, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, the Arab capitals, and Tangier.

[2] For documentation on the Stockholm peace appeal and other matters related to the Soviet "Peace Offensive", see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 261 ff.

[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

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No. 1007

774.00/9-752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1952—7:47 p. m.

515. Brit Emb Rep today expressed regret that State Dept Rep had indicated to press US policy re Egypt mil regime remains as stated by Secy last Wed. Rep partic upset because Dept did not consult Brit Govt prior reaffirmation. Fol is summary msg from Eden to Brit Emb Wash left at Dept today.

Begin summary. Prior Maher's resignation, Eden approved draft instrns to Brit Emb Wash discuss with Dept Egypt ques emphasizing in gen pres need for caution and firmness toward mil junta in dealing with Egypt. Eden suggd really firm admonition by Caffery needed warning mil they must allow Maher produce sensible reforms, making clear USG wld be deeply disturbed if mil proceed to ill-considered action against Maher meanwhile. Land reforms must be practicable and take into acct spec nature Egypt econ. Dangers foreseen by Eden of ill-considered reforms upsetting Egypt econ and soc structure and leading to assumption complete control by extremist members mil are even more pressing now, partic view "indiscriminate arrests" in Cairo and inclusion two new extremist mbrs (Mins Propaganda and Wafds) in Cab.

Eden "fully realises desire USG stand well with Gen Naguib". Since latter seems "be already to some extent prisoner more extreme elements", in Eden's view there is real danger serious deterioration now in internal econ and polit sit, increase in xenophobia, gen diminution chances of understanding between Egypt and Western Powers, perhaps even recrudescence terrorism and anti-Brit attacks. "In these circumstances it is even more impt than ever that Brit and US policy shld keep in step, and anything that Egypts can interpret as appeasement by US is likely encourage extremists at our expense."

Eden believes Egypts think USG giving them free hand fol Secy's statement Sep 3 and that Caffery's recommendation (final para Embtel 593) [2] entirely wrong line for US to take. "I do beg USG

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 1682. Drafted by Fowler and approved by John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[2] In the final paragraph of telegram 593 from Cairo, Sept. 7, not printed, Ambassador Caffery recommended that the Department, in responding to press inquiries regarding the impending deposition of Ali Maher as Prime Minister, should continue to praise the military's reform efforts in Egypt. (774.00/9-752)

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consider whether encouragement more extreme elements in Egypt this stage may not lead eventually to repetition last autumn's events. In my view pres Egypt sit is full of dangerous potentialities and needs be handled by Amers and us with greatest caution." *End summary.* [3]

Brit Chargé desires discuss subj further soonest.

(*Note:* Deptel 510 used as guidance, [4] not full statement to press.)

ACHESON

[3] Ambassador Caffery reacted to Foreign Secretary Eden's message in telegram 632 from Cairo, Sept. 10, not printed, as follows: "London FonOff tactics have been wrong and over and over again I have predicted consequences. They are wrong again." (774.00/9-1052)

[4] See footnote 4, Document 1005.

No. 1008

774.02/9-1052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, September 10, 1952—4 p. m.

645. We discussed Deptel 515, Sept 8 with Brit Min Creswell this morning. Dept might feel repetition of these views to Brit both in London and Wash wld serve as oral rejoinder to Eden's note as allegations made therein are not substantiated by fact. In first place policies advocated by this Emb incl final para mytel 593, Sept 7, [2] were predicated on the fact that Ali Maher through his own procrastination and deviousness cld not be saved. They were predicated on further fact that a new PriMin Gen Naguib, had taken off. It was essential to move quickly and to develop rels of confidence with new govt especially as there had been no change in principles of the reform movement in Egypt which we had explicitly approved in Secy's statement Sept 3. In consequence first portion of Brit note as summarized reftel seems to be entirely beside the point.

Re Brit allegation of "indiscriminate arrests in Cairo" we wld say that contrary was the case. Mil struck at their greatest enemy, the Wafd Party, in no uncertain terms rounded up leaders of Saadist and Liberal Parties and thus effectually silenced opposition from politicians who were seeking to oppose reform movement.

Re allegation that Naguib is "to some extent prisoner more extreme elements" I told Brit this morning that this was not true.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 219.

[2] See footnote 1, Document 1005.

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Mytel 644 [3] today reporting Naguib's own comments on his mins substantiates this fact.

As for Eden's allegation of grave danger increase in xenophobia gen diminution chances of understanding between Egypt and Western powers incl possible recrudesence terrorism these are simply speculations which facts thus far do not substantiate.

In particular we trust Dept will refute Eden's innuendo that US encouraging "more extreme elements in Egypt". US is encouraging a reform movement headed by an honest soldier who presides over a civil cab and who is after all in control of Egypt.

Extraordinary sensitivity of Brit as for example their concern over relatively minor shipment of pol equipment suggests that they feel much less secure in this part of the world than one might suppose from their muttering of the threat of mil intervention being best deterrent on Egypt Govt. We trust they can be made to see that their own security posit in Egypt can best be preserved if US now and they later maintain rels of confidence with Egypt Govt.

CAFFERY

[3] Dated Sept. 10, not printed.

No. 1009

774.02/9-1052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1952—7:40 p. m.

538. Cairo tel 645, rpt London 219. Steel Brit Emb called on Byroade Sept 9 to express Brit concern failure Dept consult London before issuance Dept reply press inquiry Sept 8. Steel asserted Egypt constantly striving drive wedge between Brit and Amer and this instance illustrated tactic which might now be exploited. Apparently different assessments Egypt sit existed London and Washington and it could have been possible that at same time US praising current Egypt regime London might have been issuing press statement with very different tone.

Byroade replied he felt very little if any harm could have been done by furnishing Dept press officer with necessary answer to inevitable question which in any case could not have been brought London's attn in time. He stressed Dept's complete confidence Caffery's assessment Egypt sit and indicated Dept's conviction adop-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 1747. Drafted and approved by Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

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tion attitude of reserve preferred by Brit would have helped no one includ Brit but would have merely dashed cold water on close current US–Egypt relations to disadvantage both US and UK. US felt Naguib regime not extremist although impatiently reformist, and deserved our general encouragement.

Steel did not pursue matter very intently and appeared not excessively disturbed. Byroade pointed out US–UK basic objectives Egypt really the same.

ACHESON

No. 1010

774.00/9-1852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, September 18, 1952—7 p. m.

730. Lt. Col. Amin came to me today with msg from Gen Naguib and mil group running Egypt. Msg was as fols:

1. After eight weeks concentration on domestic issues mil now believe time has come to move into next stage of revolution and consider Egypt's internatl position.
2. They are completely on side of US and unalterably opposed to Communism.
3. Their first problem is "selling US to Egypt public" and educating average Egypt on dangers of Communism.
4. To sell US to Egypt public they need "mil supplies and fin assistance from US".
5. In exchange they are prepared give in secret certain commitments concerning long-term objectives of movement including MEDO and/or partnership with US.
6. They believe giving commitments openly at this time wld destroy chance of achieving objectives, but want to work as rapidly as poss toward open commitments.

Col. Amin said mil's questions were:

(1) Wld US be interested in such coop?
(2) What sort of secret commitments wld US want and wld Naguib be acceptable as their author?

Group had obviously not worked out definitions of "fin and mil assistance" as this was a "feeler" conversation on principles involved. Amin had in mind "Cld you perhaps buy our cotton?" on financial side and "tank parts, armoured cars, gun tubes, small ammunition and radio sets" on mil side. He reiterated again and

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 251 and unnumbered to Paris and Rome.

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again Egypt had no intention renewal hostilities with Israel or Brit, and that ample guarantees wld be provided re use of material. He said also Egypt wld accept help from Brit.

I expressed appreciation group's sympathy for US and said it was reciprocal. Re specific program, I suggested mil give thorough consideration to type of commitments they wld be prepared to undertake and concomitantly prepare tentative list exact assistance they require. Meanwhile, I assured Amin I wld report approach to Dept and wld recommend its careful and sympathetic consideration "in principle." Amin was pleased with this response.

Speaking as "one friend to another" Amin referred to highly satis daily working relations entire group now had with my Emb and asked me if in my personal opinion time had come when they shld establish some sort of relation with Brit, even though they cld admittedly never be so close. I said time had come and agreed to suggest to Stevenson that member of his Emb be assigned as liaison with mil. This is important step forward from only two weeks ago when mil responded to similar suggestion from US by saying "Not yet."

I once again made it clear to Amin that our ultimate objective is realization of MEDO and that this cld not be accomplished without Brit participation. He made noises about "evacuation" but in essence agreed.

I made no promises about an immed reply from Dept and suggest Dept may wish discuss whole matter with Stabler after his return to Wash 23. [2] He has participated deliberations here and knows men involved.

CAFFERY

[2] At this time, Stabler was in Egypt.

No. 1011

745W.00/9-2452: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, September 24, 1952—9 p. m.

783. Brit Amb saw Gen Naguib today and left with him FonOff documents on Sudan. [2] He stressed that this was a prelim step and

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 270.

[2] Ambassador Gifford in telegram 1501 from London, Sept. 15, not printed, had reported that the Foreign Office had advised him that it had sent instructions to

Continued

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did not mean that Brit Govt was launching into negots. However, it was essential that elections be held shortly in Sudan and in consequence that views of Brit Govt be made known to Egypt Govt under [*sic*] Naguib, whom Stevenson described as "favorably disposed", said that he was practical man but that there were other of his countrymen who looked on things from a more involved viewpoint. He could take no decisions on the Brit note without consultation with his colleagues. Speaking offhand and without such consultations he cld discern three difficulties in respect to agreement on the Sudan: First was legal problem devolving from the denunciation last year by Egypt of 1899 treaty; second difficulty was fact that Pro-Unity Party in Sudan and Egypt del last UNGA had clamored for a plebiscite as guidepost toward self-determination; third difference was popular feeling in Egypt aroused under slogan "unity of Nile Valley" (we note with interest that Naguib did not mention question of royal title to Sudan).

Naguib promised Stevenson reply by Wednesday Oct 1. He said meanwhile he had no objection if offs of Mil High Comite discussed question with members of Brit Emb.

Naguib laid great stress on his desire that no publicity attach to fact that Stevenson had discussed Sudan with him. It was therefore mutually agreed that Brit Amb shld state to press he had discussed resumption of training facilities and supply of spare part to Egypt mil in his interview PriMin.

CAFFERY

Ambassador Stevenson to discuss with General Naguib the proposed British reply to the Sudan Government regarding the new Sudanese constitution. (641.74/9–1552)

In telegram 1502, Ambassador Gifford provided summaries of the British Foreign Office documents under reference, transmitting full texts to the Department in despatch 1374, Sept. 17, neither printed. (641.74/9–1552, 641.74/9–1752)

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No. 1012

774.00/9-1852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1952—6:51 p. m.

678. Fol are draft instrns [2] refd immed preceding Deptel: [3]

"1. Dept, Def and DMS have given careful consideration to Gen Naguib's msg Sept 18 (Embtel 730). We have also studied joint appreciation Sept 16 prepared by you and Stevenson. [4]

2. We agree that material as well as moral support present Egypt regime is policy best calculated to lead toward attainment US and West objectives vis-à-vis Egypt, i.e., generally closer identification Egypt and West interests and specifically: a) Egypt participation in common def planning, b) settlement Anglo-Egypt controversy and c) peace with Israel.

3. We also believe that if our support is to be effective, it will have to be given without delay since demonstrable progress is important plank in new regime's platform.

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[1] Also sent priority to London as telegram 2293. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade after being cleared by Byroade; by G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs; by James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; by Edwin M. Martin, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs; by W. Averell Harriman, Director of the Mutual Security Agency; by William C. Foster, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and by Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

[2] Prior to the transmission of these draft instructions, Secretary Acheson sent President Truman a copy on Sept. 30. Acheson said that he believed these orders were in harmony with previous instructions and invited the President to make additional comments and suggestions. (774.00/9-1852)

[3] In telegram 2292 to London, repeated to Cairo as telegram 677, not printed, the two Embassies were informed that Secretary Acheson had given the British Ambassador the text of the draft instructions which the Department was sending to Ambassador Caffery for his possible use in replying to General Naguib's message of Sept. 18. The two Embassies were also told that the Secretary of State had requested that the British provide comments regarding this draft as soon as possible, and that the Embassies were to provide their observations as well. (641.74/9-3052)

[4] Not printed; the Embassy in Cairo transmitted a copy of the joint appreciation to the Department in despatch 477, Sept. 19. (774.5/9-1952) Prior to sending this despatch, Ambassador Caffery presented the Department with the conclusions reached in this paper in telegram 734, Sept. 19, not printed. The text is as follows:

"The Embs conclude from the foregoing analysis that support of the Naguib regime is called for. On the purely negative side the paper has shown that no prospect exists of any other govt assuming control of Egypt which wld not be likely to produce a state of anarchy in the country. On the positive side altho risks are endemic in any Egypt sit there is a poss that more forthcoming policies in London and Wash incl a decision to grant reasonable material assist wld be conducive to the maintenance of stability in Egypt and wld favor the devel of a more reasonable attitude in fon affs." (774.00/9-1952)

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4. At same time regime's somewhat sudden disposition to consider internatl questions, generality and vagueness approach as well as question marks which normally arise from nature and origin this type movement clearly indicate that we must make certain as we proceed that precision and detail take the place of vagueness and generality. We recognize it is important our insistence on precision shld not be misconstrued as lack of confidence.

5. We wld be willing to accept secret commitments and/or assurances if stated with some precision as satis basis for policy of coop and material support. We wld expect that objective wld be to work toward open commitments and we wld naturally carefully assay performance. While we wld expect commitments and/or assurances to be in writing, we recognize that insistence on such form might be considered lack of faith and might pose difficulties for Naguib with Cab, etc. We wld therefore be prepared consider alternatives including possibility oral commitments and/or assurances.

6. We believe that in addition to secret commitments Egypt for its part shld undertake certain gestures which wld be reassuring to public opinion this country and elsewhere, such as support UN action in Korea, compensation to countries concerned for Jan 26 deaths, etc. These gestures, which shld not in themselves be too difficult for regime, wld be additional public evidence that new regime is in fact "new broom" and has broken with past. We are certain that effect on public opinion here and UK wld be most important in connection efforts to help Egypt.

7. In light above comments, ur reply Naguib's msg shld be along fol lines:

Begins: a. USG has given careful and sympathetic consideration to msg from Gen Naguib and wishes reaffirm that its attitude towards the present regime remains as stated by the Secy of State on Sept 3. [5]

b. The US fully reciprocates the desire of Egypt for coop and will be glad to enter into discussions immed with PriMin Naguib and Egypt Govt with view to determining the scope and nature of such coop.

c. Progress toward this end wld be accelerated if Egypt Govt wld define more clearly its views with respect to both mil and econ assistance. The USG will consider such views with utmost care taking into acct the many factors involved in building the def of the free world and limitation on available supplies of equipment and funds and the numerous other demands upon the US.

d. It is noted that it is proposed that Egypt give certain secret commitments concerning the long-term objectives of the new regime. In this connection we believe that Egypt shld consider whether it wld be prepared to give commitments and/or assurances

[5] See footnote 2, Document 1005.

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to the effect that one of the ultimate objectives of its policy is participation with the US, UK and other free-world powers in planning for the common def of the area. Additionally, and since settlement of the Anglo-Egypt problem is closely related to ME def, we believe that Egypt shld consider whether it wld also be prepared to state as another of its objectives the settlement of the Anglo-Egypt problem with respect to the CZ on the basis that strategic facilities in CZ wld be maintained with assistance to the extent required to insure that they cld be speedily and effectively used in event of a threat to security of the area.

e. While the US is desirous of assisting Egypt within the limits of its ability, it is not in a position in view of its world commitments to undertake a purely bilateral program of coop. It wld therefore hope that Egypt wld continue also to look to its habitual sources of supply.

f. Finally we believe the Egypt Govt wld wish to consider whether it might not undertake certain public gestures aimed at creating an atmosphere of public opinion abroad conducive to the implementation of a program of coop. *Ends.*

8. FYI furnishing of arms to Egypt armed forces prior to peace settlement with Israel will raise nr difficult questions domestically. We fully understand delicacy of discussing Israel question with regime, but believe that no doubt shld be permitted linger re our views on validity armistice agreement and Tripartite Declaration. [6] We wld hope that at some time regime wld find it possible to make public declaration re nonaggressive intentions generally, or better, specifically." [7]

ACHESON

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[6] See footnote 2, Document 1017.

[7] Ambassador Gifford in London responded to this telegram in telegram 1925, Oct. 2, not printed, saying that the Embassy considered these draft instructions "to be well drafted document and right initial approach to problem." (774.00/10–252)

Ambassador Caffery in Cairo remarked in telegram 834, Oct. 2, not printed, that "I believe Dept's well-formulated proposed msg to Naguib is excellent initial response to his inquiry." (774.00/10–252)

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No. 1013

774.00/10-352: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 3, 1952—2:23 p. m.

699. 1. Dept last night recd Brit views re draft instrs contained Deptel 678 to Cairo, 2293 to London: [2]

"It seems to us that these instrs meet the situation admirably and that when carried out, they shld give us a clearer indication of the intentions of the present Egyptian regime in Fon Affairs. We have therefore no major comments.

FonOff comments on minor points are as follows:

(a) It wld seem here essential to try to work for some written assurances by the Egyptians, though Mr. Eden realizes that it may be difficult to get them, and in any case they are not likely to be very precise. But oral assurances given by way of secret commitments wld, the FonOff feel, provide an insufficient basis for an understanding.

(b) By support for UN action in Korea, the FonOff take it that the USG are thinking in terms of support in the GA and other organs of the UN and not of mil support.

(c) Mr. Eden is particularly grateful for the reference to compensation for the deaths in the Jan 26th riots and confirms that a gesture by the Egyptian Govt in this direction wld have a good effect upon public opinion in the United Kingdom towards the Naguib regime."

2. Re (a) Dept stated we wld work towards written commitments stated with as much precision as possible. However we wld not wish insist on this to pt prejudicial to new relationship we are endeavoring estab with Egypt. Re (b) we had in mind gen support in UN, not troops.

3. Instrs contained Deptel 678 now confirmed and you authd transmit to Gen Naguib reply contained para 7 Deptreftel. [3]

ACHESON

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 2376. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade and Secretary Acheson.

[2] Secretary Acheson informed President Truman on Oct. 3 that the British Government had informed the Department that it was in accord with the draft instructions sent to Ambassador Caffery. He told the President further that the Department was authorizing Caffery to reply to General Naguib along the lines of the draft instructions. (774.00/10-352)

[3] Ambassador Caffery informed the Department in telegram 881, Oct. 7, not printed, that he had delivered the message to General Naguib the previous day (Oct. 6). (774.00/10-752)

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No. 1014

641.74/10-352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, October 3, 1952—2 p. m.
[Received 3:05 p. m.]

848. Brit Amb saw Naguib last night on Sudan. It was mutually agreed PriMin and Amb wld indicate to press that this was topic of their conv.

Naguib told Stevenson that he cld not give him answer to Brit *démarche* of Sept 24, prior to his consultations yesterday and today with reps of Sudanese polit parties. He also indicated that pressure of recent domestic polit events, including his tour of Delta, had made it impossible for him to give personal consideration to Brit proposals. He desired to consult his Mil and Cab advisors before making reply.

Stevenson told Naguib that his govt wld have to send its despatch to GovGen of Sudan by Oct 10. Furthermore, it wld be helpful to Eden in his next interview with the Mahdi to have indication of Egypt thinking on this problem. Naguib said he hoped to be able receive Stevenson by Oct 8 or 9 and give him answer. However, even if Brit communication to GovGen had been sent, this wld not preclude Egypt communication fol subsequently altho there were difficulties to be overcome in connection with Egypt declaration that 1899 condominium agreement was abrogated.

When Stevenson referred hopefully to convs his officers had had with Major Salah Salem (Embtel 822, Sept 30 [2] and London's 1907 Oct 2 rptd Cairo 100) [3] PriMin replied that these were Salah Salem's personal opinions and he had no comment on them.

Stevenson sought to draw out Naguib's opinions on nature of forthcoming elections and demand of unity parties for plebiscite. He reported Naguib was agreeing that indirect vote in South was

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 283 and unnumbered to the Arab capitals, Paris, and Rome.

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 822, not printed, that Ambassador Stevenson's representatives had had dinner on Sept. 29 with Major Salah Salem and had discussed the Sudan. Major Salah Salem declared, among other things, that the Egyptians agreed with the British on the importance of independence for the Sudan before there would be a determination of its eventual relationship with Egypt; that Egyptians thought elections should be postponed for a month or so while they persuaded all the Sudanese parties to participate; that an international commission should supervise the elections; and that the Sudanese problem could be solved in the near future as soon as General Naguib could talk to Ambassador Stevenson about it. (641.74/9-3052)

[3] Ambassador Gifford's telegram 1907 from London, Oct. 2, not printed, essentially covered the same ground as that in telegram 822 from Cairo. (641.74/10-252)

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advisable because of nature of population there while direct system of voting wld be feasible for Northern Sudan.

We are inclined to take with very large grain of salt Naguib's asserted statement that he wld not discuss Brit proposals of Sept 24 with Sudanese polit leaders. He is seeing members of all Sudanese parties except Umma today.

CAFFERY

No. 1015

745W.00/10-1252: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, October 12, 1952—1 p. m.

921. Last night Emb officers with Burdett had dinner mtg with Col Nasir, Major Hakim Amir, Chief of Cab of Naguib, and Major Salah Salem, member of mil high comite who is charged with coordinating activities leading to formulation of new Sudan policy.

It quickly became apparent that these officers had impression that Gen Naguib in his two most recent interviews with Brit Amb on Sudan had made it clear that Egypt had serious reservations to draft statute for Sudan and did not approve statute as now written. Offs also had impression that new constitution for Sudan wld not be promulgated until Egypt Govt had made its reservations known to Brit Govt. They said that purpose of consultation with reps of all Sudanese parties, including Mahdi who arrives Cairo on 19th, was expressly to ascertain Sudanese views on draft statute as well as on broader issues of (a) self-govt and (b) self-determination. Until these consultations were complete they were not yet ready to say specifically what objections they had to draft statute but it was already evident to them that Egypt wld have strong reservations as to wide powers granted Gov Gen under the new constitution.

In presence Emb officers Major Salem telephoned Gen Naguib and confirmed his understanding in terms set forth above.

Stevenson has of course given an accurate account (cf. mytel 910, Oct 10 rptd London 298 [2] and previous) of what Naguib told him.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 299.

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 910, Oct. 10, not printed, that Ambassador Stevenson had seen General Naguib regarding the Sudan the previous evening. Stevenson told Caffery that Naguib had said he believed it possible to achieve a "practical solution" to the Sudan problem. However, he also stated that he had not finished his consultations with the representatives of the Sudanese political parties; therefore, he was not yet able to provide a final answer to the British *démarche* of Sept. 24. Meanwhile, if the British Government felt it essential to

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We feel however that the Gen, whose knowledge of English is limited, may sincerely feel that he entered his govt's caveats in clear language whereas Stevenson has reported him as saying that he had no objection if Brit Govt immed sent its views on draft statute to the Gov Gen, Egypts views to be made known at later date, and that he was silent on the question of postponing elections. On contrary Naguib's offs last night said they felt that question of deferring elections shld be held in abeyance until views of Sudanese parties were known.

This difference in tactical emphasis assumes greater importance from fact that Naguib and his offs clearly realize that they are departing from policy of past Egypt govts in demanding "unity of Nile Valley". They aim at real self-determination for the Sudan realizing that this may result in Sudanese independence free of Egypt suzerainty as well as, of course, (their real objective) free of Brit *de facto* sovereignty.

Naguib's officers also said that aim of self-govt in the Sudan which wld lead to real self-determination was "Sudanization" of Sudan Govt. By this term they meant that admin and judicial posts shld be held by native Sudanese. This did not however exclude possibility of tech posts still remaining to some extent in present hands. Once Sudan Govt was in higher echelons run by the Sudanese themselves way wld be clear for an objective and honest attempt at self-determination.

An informal mtg was held this morning in office of Emb Counselor between Col Sabri, staff officer Egypt troops in Sudan, Major Salah Salem and Duke, Counselor Brit Emb. Purpose of mtg was to apprise Brit rep of views Egypt offs as set forth above. At same time Brit counselor was able to explain that draft constitution will not be officially promulgated before Nov 8 altho fact of his govt's approval of the constitution will undoubtedly be made public before that time. Egypt offs said they were certain views of Naguib govt on draft statute and other issues in the Sudan problem cld, after current consultation with Sudanese polit parties, be made known to Brit Govt prior to Nov 8.

CAFFERY

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inform the Governor General of the Sudan of its views on the draft statute, he, Naguib, had no objection, as such action would not preclude Egypt from providing the Governor General with its own views at a later date as to the possible modification of the draft statute. Stevenson also reported that Naguib did not raise the question of deferring the upcoming elections in the Sudan. (641.74/10–1052)

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No. 1016

745W.00/10-1352: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 13, 1952—10 a. m.

2161. FonOff today gave us fol account of Eden's interviews Oct 11 with SAR and Ashigga delegation:

Eden emphasized to both delegations that no change UK pledges to Sudanese. He added that UK desirous see Sudanese achieve self-govt and told them in confidence that HMG wld shortly reply to Governor General substantially accepting new constitution. (FonOff informs us that this info conveyed delegation on basis Stevenson's report that in his Oct 9 conversation with Naguib, latter had indicated he saw no objection UK transmitting its reply to Governor General. In view somewhat contrary info subsequently reported by Brit Emb on basis conversations covered by Cairo's 921, Oct 12, FonOff reconsidering position. Working level thinking is that UK might submit reply soon with provision reserving right submit further views when terms Egyptian reply known. [2])

FonOff states that SAR pressed Eden to set date for self-determination. Eden took line that this was matter for Sudanese themselves to decide after self-govt attained. SAR also taxed Brit with support Social Republicans and asked for changes in number of seats in new parliament to be chosen by direct election. SAR maintained system of indirect elections, particularly in north, favored Social Republicans at his expense and intimated he felt this deliberate on part of Brit. FonOff has told us it is doubtful further changes cld be made in proportion direct to indirect elections.

Ashigga delegates left memo which maintained whole constitution was farce and requested that no steps be taken toward implementing it until all Brit officials and troops removed from Sudan and plebiscite held. They announced their intention of refusing participate in elections on the new constitution. Eden took line that suspension constitutional steps wld mean undoing all progress which has been made in recent months in Sudan and that HMG

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 112.

[2] In telegram 2216, Oct. 15, not printed, Ambassador Gifford informed the Department that while the British had not as yet reached a final decision regarding the substance of their reply to the Governor General about the Sudanese constitution, the Foreign Office working-level recommendations to Eden were in fact reflecting the thinking outlined in telegram 2161. (745W.00/10-1552)

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cld not agree. He urged Ashigga to participate in elections, but apparently made no impression.

GIFFORD

No. 1017

774.5 MSP/10-1552: Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 15, 1952.

A-139. There follows a suggested text for an exchange of notes between the United States and Egypt extending the 408(e) agreement of April 30, 1952. Acceptance by the Egyptian Government of the terms of the suggested note would allow Egypt to purchase military equipment, materials and services on a cash reimbursable basis for units other than police units:

"I have the honor to refer to the notes exchanged between our two Governments on April 29 and April 30, 1952, [1] concerning certain understandings relating to the furnishing of military equipment, materials, and services to the Government of Egypt on a reimbursable basis. My Government understands that equipment, materials, or services may be made available under that Agreement for use by units of the Egyptian armed forces other than police units, subject to the understandings set forth in numbered paragraphs 1 through 5 contained in my note of April 29, 1952. My Government also understands that, for the purpose of paragraph 1 of that note, any equipment or materials or services which may be acquired by the Government of Egypt from the Government of the United States are required for and will be used solely for Egypt's internal security and legitimate self-defense or as may be further mutually agreed between our two Governments for the promotion of international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations. In this connection, my Government wishes to reiterate its adherence to the joint Declaration by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, issued on May 25, 1950. [2]

"I have the honor to propose that, if these understandings are acceptable to your Government, this note and your Excellency's note in reply will be considered as confirming these understandings, effective on the date of your Excellency's reply.

"Accept, etc."

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[1] See telegram 1898 from Cairo, Document 978.

[2] The reference is to the "Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East", the text of which is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886. For further documentation regarding the Tripartite Declaration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 122 ff.

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The above form would obviate the necessity for the long form 408 (e) agreement contained in Deptel 1581 Apr 11. This suggested draft is intended for discussion with the Egyptian authorities at such time as the Embassy might believe useful. It is felt that this draft would be more acceptable than the previous long form.

BRUCE

No. 1018

774.00/10-2152: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 21, 1952—7:05 p. m.

826. On Oct 20 Dept gave Egypt MA Wash substance our reply Naguib msg Sep 18 and explained in detail what we had in mind. MA's main query was whether we wld be prepared to meet immed requirements of Egypt Armed Forces in return for "verbal" assurances from Naguib. Dept stated best way handle this type question is immed discussions between Emb Cairo and High Comite reps, and indicated that we wld probably look favorably on reasonable immed mil requirements. Dept stressed, however, that so far, we had no idea what Egypt requirements might be. MA concerned lest Naguib be required give assurances with no prior promise US wld do something. We endeavored to make clear that we are prepared to do something, but do not know what Egypts want. Ghaleb seemed concerned re commitments outlined our reply and felt they went too far, particularly re Anglo-Egypt question. Dept explained that it was Naguib who had raised question of commitments and we were merely responding to this, trying to make it as easy as possible for Naguib. In return, we only asked that Naguib make coop which we desire as easy as possible for us. Dept also told Ghaleb that we had already prepared and transmitted to Emb Cairo suggested text to broaden present 408(e) agreement to cover armed forces.

Ghaleb said High Comite particularly concerned we had given Egypt Amb Amin's name. [2] High Comite had hoped keep question confidential between it and USG. Dept indicated to Ghaleb we had naturally assumed that since Egypt Amb represents Egypt, he shld

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 2822.

[2] This is a reference to Colonel Amin's approach to the Embassy in Cairo described in telegram 730, Document 1010.

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be brought into picture. Ghaleb agreed, but inferred that in future High Comite expected him to be contact on this question.

BRUCE

No. 1019

645W.74/10-2252: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, October 22, 1952—2 p. m.

1013. Further to para one mytel 1008 yesterday. [2] We have now seen subsequent tel wherein Stevenson reports that Naguib told him his constit advisers lead by Pres of Council of State had made an exhaustive exam of draft statute. He had found however that their recommended changes had been very largely met by Brit suggested amendments as set forth Eden's desp to Gov Gen Oct 22. [3] Naguib went on to say that some of his advisers had suggested an intl commission composed either of 3 rep UK Egypt and Sudan or 5 mbrs including external rep to have gen supv over Gov Gen. He said however that Stevenson wld recall difficulties he himself had had with 3-man provisional regency of Egypt and that his mind was far from made up on utility of a commission for Sudan. Stevenson likewise discussed apparent absence of consult by Naguib and his colleagues with reps of South Sudan. Naguib said that there had been some consultation with politicians who might be construed as representing this area but admitted that polit ldrs from that part of Sudan had not been fully heard in Cairo. He said it wld be easier to ascertain true status of Sudanese opinion once there were a Sudanese Parl. Stevenson quotes him as agreeing that this was agreement in favor of speedy elections.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 334 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and the Arab capitals.

[2] In telegram 1008 from Cairo, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that General Naguib had told Ambassador Stevenson that he had not completed his talks with the Sudanese political leaders, but he promised to give Stevenson a reply on the draft constitutional statute by Nov. 1. Caffery also reported that Stevenson had left with Naguib a copy of the despatch dated Oct. 22 from the British Government to the Governor General of the Sudan informing him that the United Kingdom had approved the draft constitutional statute for the Sudan. (641.74/10-2152)

[3] The Embassy in London transmitted the complete text of Eden's despatch of Oct. 22 to the Governor General in despatch 1978, Oct. 27, not printed. (745W.00/10-2752)

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No. 1020

645W.74/10-2652: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, October 26, 1952—2 p. m.

1044. As I set out in mytel 1031, Oct 24 [2] the Egyptians are fighting hard to save face on the Sudan. Naguib told me at some length last night of his recent convs with various Sudanese dels here. He said even if he is successful he will be bitterly attacked by Wafd, Moslem Bros, Commies and "others too" for having sold the Sudan down the river to the British.

Egyptians will be forced to accept in essence present Brit program but are working to reach agreed position with all Sudanese factions re amendments to draft constitution and electoral law. Altho number of hurdles remain to be overcome Naguib and his advisors are optimistic that Sudanese will reach agrmt on proposals which GOE will then support as representing real wishes of Sudanese.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 346 and unnumbered to Paris, Ankara, the Arab capitals, Rome, Moscow, and Tehran.

[2] Ambassador Caffery in telegram 1031, Oct. 24, not printed, informed the Department that the Egyptians now realized that the British had "soundly routed them in Sudan battle and Brit are going ahead with their Sudan arrangements as planned during recent years." (641.74/10–2452)

No. 1021

745W.00/10-3052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

RESTRICTED CAIRO, October 30, 1952—3 p. m.

1078. Following is summary of agreement signed yesterday between GOE and Mahdi's reps and furnished us by Maj. Salah Salem. (Embassy understands detailed Arabic text released last night exclusively to Arab News Agency):

"1. Egyptian Govt firmly believes in right of Sudanese to self-determination and effective exercise thereof in the proper time and with necessary safeguards.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 357 and sent unnumbered to Paris, Ankara, the Arab capitals, Tehran, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, and Khartoum.

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"2. To attain the above aim there should arise forthwith a transitional period envisaging two objectives:

(a) To secure full self-govt for Sudanese.
(b) To provide requisite free and neutral atmosphere to exercise self-determination.

"3. Transitional period, being a preparation for effective termination of dual admins, shall be considered as a liquidation of that administration. Egyptian Govt declares that sovereignty of Sudan shall be reserved for Sudanese, during transition period, until self-determination is achieved.

System of govt during transitional.

"4. Supreme constitutional auth in Sudan shall be vested in body composed of:

(a) Present GovGen (or chief commissioner proposed by British Govt and appointed by Egyptian Govt).
(b) A commission consisting of five members, two Sudanese designated by Parliament, one Egyptian, one British, and one Pakistani or Indian, each respectively proposed by his own govt and appointed by Egyptian Govt.

"5. GovGen shall exercise his powers in manner set out in statute save as regards the discretional powers delineated in appended amendments which shall be either exercised by him with aid of Comm or delegated to Sudan Cabinet as case may be.

"6. GovGen shall remain responsible to two liquidating govts as regards:

(a) All except purely internal affairs.
(b) Any change requested by parliament as regards any part of this statute.
(c) Any resolution passed by five member Commission which he might regard as inconsistent with his responsibility. Two govts must give their answer within one month of time of notice. Comm's resolution shall stand unless two govts agree in objecting to it.

"7. There shall be constituted an international comite of seven members: three Sudanese, one Egyptian, one British, one American, designated by respective govts and an Indian or Pakistani designated by his own govt, who shall be chairman of comite. Duties of which Comm shall be to appoint sub-comites for each electoral constituency and to decide its own rules of procedure and methods of work in order that it effectively observe the reparations for elections and conduct of elections and insure integrity of results.

"8. Direct election constituencies shall be increased according to appended amendments.

"9. As final aim is to provide free and neutral atmosphere requisite for self-determination, a Sudanization comite shall be established (as proposed in appended amendments), the function of which shall be to complete within three years a Sudanization of all such posts as are deemed imperative to insure integrity of self-determination.

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"10. Duration of transition period shall not exceed three years."

In giving foregoing to Embassy off Col. Zulficar Sabri and Maj. Salah Salem said that pro-unity Ashigga parties have agreed participate in elections. Egyptian negotiators confident unity politicians will shortly give formal assent to points outlined above. Salem also said Socialist rep leader Ibrahim Badri has agreed make public statement accepting Egypt-Sudanese agreement.

GOE and Mahdi agree elections should begin before end 1952 but want wide extension direct suffrage and envisage staging elections over three or four months to permit proper supervision by international electoral comite.

Re para 4(b) Egypts, with Mahdi's verbal agreement, will propose interim appointment by two govts of Sudan members to permit immediate establishment this commission. Sudan Parliament once convened would have power confirm or change Sudan membership.

Egyptian officers stressed desire reach amicable settlement with British along foregoing lines. Naguib will probably see Stevenson Nov. 1. [2]

CAFFERY

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 1086, Oct. 31, not printed, as follows: "The Mahdi saw Stevenson yesterday afternoon and expressed his profound satis at agrmt reached with Egypt Govt over Sudan. He said significantly Egypt had agreed that Sudanese shld be sovereign in their own country and had concurred with his view that direct elections be held in North Sudan. He felt elections cld be spread over period of three to four months and that self government cld be reality early next year. He said unity parties wld do what Egypt told them and that his own and social republican parties were in complete accord with principles set forth as outlined Embtel 1078 Oct 30, rptd London 357. Mahdi concluded by expressing hope that Brit Govt wld agree with these principles." (641.74/10-3152)

No. 1022

641.74/11-352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, November 3, 1952—2 p. m.

1103. Naguib handed Stevenson yesterday Egypt-Sudan proposal substantially as reported mytel 1078 October 30, rptd London 357.

Stevenson showed me this morning tels to London setting out his admiration for Naguib's "courage and statesmanship" and recommending:

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 369 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Moscow, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Tehran, and the Arab capitals.

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1. That London go along with reasonable postponement of elections.
2. That London join with Egypt in joint statement.
3. That London accept "advisory commission".
4. That London authorize Stevenson with assistance Gov Gen's advisers to discuss with Egypt Govt their proposed amendments to statutes.

CAFFERY

No. 1023

745W.00/11-352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, November 3, 1952—3 p. m.

1106. Altho Egyptians have "turned the tables" on Brit in facing them with proposals endorsed by major Sudanese parties which are designed bring to early end Brit control of Sudan, fact remains that Brit have won battle to keep Egyptians out of Sudan and Egyptians know it (mytel 1044, October 26).

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 372 and unnumbered to Paris, the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Tehran, Rome, Moscow, Tripoli, Tunis, Tangier, and Khartoum.

No. 1024

611.74/11-1052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, November 10, 1952—2 p. m.

1167. Fol is text of Egypt memo handed me today by rep of Gen Naguib:

"A. The Egypt Govt appreciate the reaffirming by the USG that its attitude towards the present regime remains as stated by the Secy of State on Sept 3. [2]

"B. The Egypt Govt reaffirms its desire for coop and will be glad to enter into discussions with the Govt of the US to determine the nature and the scope of such coop immed upon the termination of the withdrawal of Brit armed forces from Egypt territory.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 394, to Paris for Reinhardt as 102, to Rome for Unger as 51, and unnumbered to Ankara and the Arab capitals.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 1005.

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"C. The Egypt Govt aims at building up the econ and the mil strength of the country in such a way and to such an extent as to make it an area of strength and a bulwark of peace and security. The Egypt Govt primarily believes in self-help to the extent which is possible according to the country's econ and social conditions. There will remain, however, a gap which it will be urgently vital to fill through assistance from countries that are interested in seeing a strong and friendly Egypt. To express this point in a more concrete fashion, Annex I is herewith enclosed and Annex II (econ help) will fol soon. [3]

"D. The Egypt Govt earnestly hopes that an agreement will soon be reached as to the stages and the final date of the effective withdrawal of Brit armed forces from Egypt territory. Immed upon the conclusion of such an agreement the Egypt Govt will be prepared to give assurances that one of the ultimate objectives of its policy is participation with the US, UK and other free-world powers in planning for the common defense of the area within the framework of the charter of the UN.

"The Egypt Govt wld equally be prepared to take over and maintain the canal zone base, with whatever technical assistance as will be agreed upon in the light of the immed requirements and of the time necessary for training Egypt personnel to supersede Brit technicians.

"E. Egypt will continue to look to its habitual sources of supply. The Egypt Govt wishes, nevertheless, to point out the fol facts: (1) That those sources of supply have so far persistently proved to be both inadequate and unreliable. (2) That the standardization of arms is of the greatest importance. (3) That whatever assistance the US wld extend to Egypt in this respect, will be very little in comparison to what the US does in relation to other friendly countries and will, at the same time, be invaluable as a contribution to the build-up of vital strength and goodwill in the area.

"F. The present Govt of Egypt has not failed to make one gesture after the other with a view to the amelioration of the atmosphere for a satisfactory solution of the outstanding problems. More gestures wld be made in response to any convincing ones from other friendly countries. It is superfluous to enlarge, in this connection, upon the fact that time is pressing and that a speedy solution of the outstanding problems is, therefore, indispensable."

CAFFERY

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[3] Neither annex is printed. In telegram 1166 from Cairo, Nov. 10, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that Annex I dealt with the types of military equipment the Egyptians wanted to obtain from the United States. Annex II, he reported, had not yet been formulated, but it would deal with Egypt's aspirations for economic aid. (611.74/11-1052)

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No. 1025

745W.00/11-1052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, November 10, 1952—4 p. m.

1173. Brit Emb states that as of Nov 8 prelim exchanges of views have taken place between Brit Emb Cairo Gov Gen Khartoum and FonOff London on Sudan. Genl tenor of observations is that trends set forth in Egypt Sudanese proposals are acceptable but that there are considerable practical difficulties in way of implementations.

Gov Gen in addit to his prin criticisms of proposals as set forth mytel 1139 Nov 6 [2] states that proposals for direct elections if carried out as formulated in Egypt note wld in effect require postponement of elections for at least year. He states that districts involved are inhabited by nomads who wld have to be rounded up and placed on electoral lists—a time consuming process.

Brit Emb Cairo has recommended that rep of Sudan Govt come to Cairo to consult with Emb and prepare joint recommendations to FonOff.

Brit are therefore as yet not in posit to make definitive answer to Naguib.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 396 and pouched to Khartoum as telegram 16 and to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome, Ankara, and the Arab capitals.

[2] In telegram 1139 from Cairo, Nov. 6, not printed, Ambassador Caffery informed the Department that the Governor General of the Sudan had taken exception to two main points of the note embodying the Egyptian proposals on the Sudan: 1) the removal of the South Sudan from its present status as a responsibility of the Governor General; 2) the constitutional limitation on the Governor General's special powers which, under the draft statute, had been reserved to the Governor General in case there was a breakdown of authority in the Sudan. (745W.00/11-652)

No. 1026

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 133

Memorandum of Conversation, by Wells Stabler, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET [NEW YORK,] November 15, 1952.

Subject: Secretary Acheson's Conversations with Foreign Ministers of the NEA area Attending the 7th General Assembly of the United Nations

Participants: Ahmed Farrag Tayeh, Foreign Minister of Egypt

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Mohamed Kamel Abdul Rahim, Egyptian
Ambassador to the U.S.
The Secretary
Wells Stabler, U.S. Delegation

After an exchange of amenities the Foreign Minister said that the new regime in Egypt is endeavoring to settle outstanding issues. There is a new spirit in his country and it is important that progress be made to underscore this spirit. The Secretary replied that we were encouraged by the many signs of progress and remarked that the new Sudanese proposals seem to be a particularly hopeful sign.

The Foreign Minister said that the Sudan proposals had been a result of an agreement with all the Sudanese parties and he was hopeful that an agreement with the UK could be reached shortly. He pointed to the fact that elections are scheduled to be held in the Sudan at the end of this year and that therefore it is necessary to arrive at an understanding with the British as soon as possible. He understood that the British find certain difficulties with the proposals, particularly with respect to the limitation on the Sudanese on the choice of either independence or unity. The Minister asserted that the Sudanese did not desire dominion status and therefore no reference was made in the proposals to dominion status as a possible choice. While Mr. Farrag hoped that it would be possible to reach an understanding with the British, he felt that U.S. pressure on the UK would assist.

The Secretary said that the U.S. would try to be as helpful as possible in this, and mentioned that he had discussed this question with Mr. Eden a few days ago who appeared to be favorably inclined. [1]

Mr. Farrag then said that while Egypt appreciated U.S. sympathy for a new regime, Egypt hoped that this sympathy could be turned into material support. Egypt was in need of financial, economic and military assistance. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would find it possible to purchase additional cotton from Egypt for stockpiling purposes. He also hoped that military equipment might be made available. He asserted that Egypt had been endeavoring to create a favorable atmosphere for such a program and cited the approval of his government for payment of compensation to the British for those who had lost their lives during the January 26 riots.

The Secretary said that Egyptian action approving compensation had been most helpful in creating a favorable atmosphere. Turning

[1] Presumably the reference is to the Secretary's conversation with Foreign Secretary Eden in New York on Nov. 12. (Memorandum of Conversation; Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 134)

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to a possible program of assistance the Secretary said that the U.S. was prepared to discuss this matter with the Egyptians with a view to determining what might be done. He informed the Foreign Minister that export licenses for commercial police equipment had already been approved. Mr. Stabler said that we had gone into the question of cotton purchases and found that at the present moment there was no further need for stockpile purchases. With regard to commercial purchases it appeared that at least for the time being, there was no commercial need for Egyptian long staple varieties. The Ambassador inquired whether it might not be possible to purchase cotton, even if the U.S. did not need it, for the purpose of assisting Egypt financially. The Secretary then inquired as to the possibilities of Japanese purchase of Egyptian cotton since Japan had considerable sterling balances. Mr. Stabler said that that matter had been looked into and it appeared that a Japanese trade mission was either in Cairo or on its way for the purpose of working out a trade agreement. Mr. Stabler stated his understanding that previous negotiations between Egypt and Japan had been made difficult by problems of financing and exchange.

Mr. Farrag said that Egypt needed dollars and that was the reason for his request to the Secretary. The Secretary assured the Minister that we would follow this question closely and see whether there was anything that might be done.

Referring to the police equipment the Minister said that the Ambassador would be receiving instructions regarding this question but he wondered whether it might not be possible to extend the scope of these purchases. In this connection he said that Egypt found it very difficult to purchase military equipment in the U.S. and that other sources such as Sweden and Switzerland had been cut off. It was only recently that some progress had been made with some of these countries. The Secretary again said that we were prepared to discuss this whole matter with the Egyptians and asked Mr. Stabler to follow these matters with the Minister before the Foreign Minister's departure for Cairo on November 21. The Minister said that he would report the conversation to General Naguib and arrangements for discussions would be worked out. The Secretary said it might be desirable to do this through military channels.

[Here follows discussion of German-Israeli reparations.]

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No. 1027

745W.00/11-1552: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 15, 1952—1 p. m.

2798. Following points emerged from conversation with FonOff yesterday re Sudan:

1. FonOff hopeful Brit Emb Cairo and Sudan admin close to agreement re recommendations on future course of action on Egypt proposals which can then be considered by Eden prior replying Naguib. Robertson going Cairo within next day or two in effort complete agreement and FonOff hopes be able reply Naguib end next week. (Embassy regards this timetable as overly optimistic.)

2. FonOff generally applauds approach to Sudan problem reflected Egtyptian note. It recognizes that it took great courage on Naguib's part to alter policies of previous govts. Naguib has now been astute enough to realize that through this kind of approach to problem, Egypt has opportunity within next three years to reestablish position of influence in Sudan.

3. Consideration of Egyptian note has been somewhat hampered by inconsistencies between its provisions and agreements with various Sudan parties. Most of these differences can probably be resolved quite easily, altho some may prove troublesome (e.g., agreement with SAR provides Sudanese members Advisory Council shall be chosen by Sudan Parliament, while note says they shall be proposed by UK and Egypt subject subsequent approval by Sudan Parliament, etc.).

4. On more fundamental aspects of Egyptian proposals, FonOff preliminary views are that following require close examination with Egyptians:

a. Proposal that Govt-Gens responsibilities for South should be subject Advisory Council procedure. FonOff feels this will be unpopular in South and administratively undesirable, feels present provision of new constitution should be obtained whereby South is among Governor Generals reserved powers.

b. Provisions of new constitution relating to Gov-Gens emergency powers should be retained substantially as they are at present and not made subject Advisory Council procedure which would be too slow and cumbersome in event quick and decisive action necessary.

c. Sudanisation Committee procedures, if adopted, wld undoubtedly result injection political factors into dipl service with conse-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 151, to Khartoum as telegram 2, and unnumbered to Rome for Unger and to Paris for Reinhardt.

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quent dissatisfaction and widespread resignations. FonOff prefers public service commission provided by new Sudan constitution, possibly with addition Egyptian member. Alternatively Egyptian Sudanisation Committee might be set up but merely empowered make a report for consideration of Sudanese Ministers on how Sudanisation should proceed.

d. Other lesser points, such as proposal that elder of Sudanese Commissioners should act in Govt-Gens absence.

5. Re Advisory Council, FonOff sees no objection this procedure in principle (with exceptions outlined above) but feels new Sudan Parliament should have opportunity express its views on relationship Gov-Gen to Council. FonOff maintains, in this connection, that Council procedure is after all fundamental constitutional innovation which representative body of Sudanese should have opportunity examine in same way as rest of constitution.

6. In light foregoing, FonOff considering proposing to Egypt that following steps be taken in order set forth:

a. UK and Egypt should issue joint public statement recording principles which guide them, i.e., self-government, self-determination within three years, etc. It would further state that immediate problem is to hold elections and would announce intention to set up election commission to oversee them. Finally, it would agree in principle to setting up an Advisory Council and announce intention Brit and Egyptian Govts to work out between them their ideas re relationship between Council and Gov-Gen on which Sudanese Parliament would then be given opportunity to express its views.

b. Electoral Commission would be set up as soon as possible and decide districts in which direct elections should be held. Constitution would be amended accordingly and elections held as soon as possible.

c. Meanwhile UK and Egypt would endeavor agree on relationship between Gov-Gen and Advisory Council, including problems outlined para 4 above, with Sudanese Parliament expressing its views thereon when established.

7. FonOff expresses optimism Naguib might agree some such program as foregoing in view his oft-repeated comments to Stevenson that his proposals are not immutable. FonOff recognizes South and emergency powers likely prove very troublesome but hopes with goodwill both sides difficulties can be ironed out.

GIFFORD

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No. 1028

774.5/11-1852

Memorandum for the Record by Leighton A. Cain, Chief of the Reimbursable Aid Section, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 18, 1952.

Subject: Meeting regarding Military Assistance to the Government of Egypt

1. A meeting was held this date between representatives of the Department of State and the Department of Defense regarding subject assistance. The discussion centered on two lists of equipment which in the view of the Egyptian Government comprise an overall list of military equipment desired by their Armed Forces. The first list of equipment which has been pending since March 1952 comprises items originally intended for three mobile police divisions, operating in Alexandria and Cairo, but now desired for the Egyptian Army. The equipment has previously been allocated and earmarked by the Department of the Army for this project. The Department of Defense has been awaiting instructions from the Department of State concerning the release of this equipment for sale to the Government of Egypt since early September 1952. The second list comprises additional equipment for the Egyptian Armed Forces and is contained in a State Department Dispatch from Cairo dated 24 October 1952. [1] This list is quite elaborate and extensive as to quantities and types of equipment desired. With respect to the first list of equipment the following actions will be taken:

a. The Department of State is currently negotiating with the Egyptian Government the necessary agreement to enable the U.S. Government to make available the equipment on the original list to the Egyptian Army rather than to the police divisions.

b. At the conclusion of the agreement the State Department will approve the original request as a reimbursable aid transaction and authorize the Department of Defense to negotiate directly with the foreign government concerned.

c. Upon receipt of the approval of the Department of State the transaction will be approved by OMA and forwarded to the Department of the Army for necessary pricing and availability study and letter of offer to the military representatives of the Government of Egypt.

d. Upon acceptance by the Egyptian Government of the terms and conditions in the letter of offer, and deposit of funds for the equipment desired, the Department of the Army will make prompt

[1] Not printed. Under reference is despatch 754 from Cairo, Oct. 24. (774.56/10-2452)

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shipment to the designated shipping agent of the Egyptian Government.

2. With respect to the second list of equipment an official request will be forwarded by the Department of State to the Secretary of Defense inclosing the list of equipment and requesting the views of the Department of Defense as to the desirability of supplying the equipment, what type of aid it should be, i.e., Grant or Reimbursable, data concerning the cost and availability of the equipment and other pertinent points which will be outlined in the aforementioned letter.

3. All agencies of the Department of Defense concerned with the aforementioned lists of equipment have been alerted.

LEIGHTON A. CAIN

No. 1029

780.5/11-1852: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1952—8:06 p.m.

3409. Dept handed fol *Aide-Mémoire* to the Brit Amb Nov 18:

Verbatim Text.

"1. The Secretary of State transmits for the information of the British Government the text of a memorandum handed to the United States Ambassador in Cairo by the Egyptian Government on November 10, 1952. [2] This communication is the reply to a memorandum delivered by the United States Ambassador to the Egyptian Government on October 6, 1952. [3] It will be recalled that this memorandum was discussed with the British Government prior to its delivery. There is also transmitted Annex I of the Egyptian memorandum which sets forth requirements for the Egyptian Army and Air Force. [4] Annex II which deals with economic assistance has not yet been compiled, but Ambassador Caffery has been informed that it will be forthcoming in the near future.

2. The United States Government has given careful consideration to the Egyptian memorandum and believes that while it is not as forthcoming as might be wished, it nevertheless provides the basis for a limited program of assistance at this time with the object of supporting and strengthening the present regime.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1040 and to Paris as telegram Topol 396.

[2] See telegram 1167 from Cairo, Document 1024.

[3] See telegrams 678 and 699 to Cairo, Documents 1012 and 1013.

[4] Not printed, but it was attached to the Department of State file copy of this *aide-mémoire*. (774.5 MSP/11-1852)

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3. The United States Government considers it most important that such evidence of support be given without delay. While recent United Kingdom approval for the shipment of 15 Jet Aircraft is a valuable contribution in this respect, the United States Government believes that it also must take positive action in support of the Naguib Government beyond the mere approval of export licenses for a limited amount of commercial police equipment.

4. Consequently, the United States Government intends to inform the Egyptian Government that it is willing to make available for the use of the Egyptian Armed Forces that equipment which was originally intended for special Egyptian Police Units and which was to come from United States Government stocks. A list of this equipment is attached. [5] This equipment would be offered to Egypt on a cash-reimbursable basis following the conclusion of an exchange of notes which would expand the present MDAP agreement with Egypt to include military equipment in general in addition to police equipment.

5. The United States Government wishes to make clear that the equipment referred to in Paragraph 4 is in the nature of token assistance. The larger lists (Annex I to the Egyptian memorandum of November 10) are being considered within the United States Government and action on them will depend in large measure upon the development of the approach which was suggested in the *Aide-Mémoire* handed to His Excellency the British Ambassador on November 5, 1952. [6] The United States will wish to keep in close touch with the United Kingdom in this connection. It is the expectation of the United States Government that it will be possible to develop this approach in the near future and that the token assistance mentioned in Paragraph 4 would in fact become the first installment in a more general program of assistance to the present Egyptian regime.

6. In discussions with Egyptian authorities with respect to the exchange of communications with General Naguib, every effort has been made by United States representatives to stress the fact that Egypt must continue to look to its habitual sources of supply for military equipment. It has also been emphasized to the Egyptian authorities that any program of assistance must be within the framework of eventual Egyptian participation in common defense planning. The United States Government is convinced that the Egyptian memorandum of November 10 and developments in connection with the Anglo-Egyptian questions are encouraging signs and that positive support to General Naguib is essential to the continuation of the present favorable trend."

FYI, only addition to Police Equipment from Govt stocks is 5 to 10,000 steel helmets.

The Brit Amb said that while FonOff wld probably not be happy over US proposal, he believed it wld understand reasoning leading us to this conclusion. He also requested confirmation that beyond

[5] Not printed; it was attached to the Department of State file copy of this *aide-mémoire*. (774.5 MSP/11-1852)

[6] For text, see Document 105.

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this token assistance US did not intend to embark upon larger program until more detailed approach re Base and MEDO worked out and Egypt attitude clarified. He also requested confirmation US wld continue support UK posit on arms supply to Egypt in NAC and other arms supplying countries such as Switzerland. Dept confirmed both assumptions.

Re interim Brit reply (Depcirtel 539, Nov 12) [7] US *Aide-Mémoire,* Nov 5 (Deptel 3155, Nov 5), [8] Brit Amb said UK concerned Egyptians wld not agree to discussions re common defense planning until Brit evacuation completed. Cursory examination Naguib reply Nov 10 seemed, in Brit Amb's opinion, lend weight UK concern. Deptl reps replied US had envisaged that secret approach as suggested Dept's *Aide-Mémoire* Nov 5 wld remove this concern as we wld hope secret agreement wld be reached before any public action necessary on either evacuation or Egyptian participation common defense planning. Dept said much wld depend upon developments during negots and indicated our belief Naguib msg left way clear for approach suggested to UK Nov 5.

Brit Amb expressed hope that US and UK views on timing cld be brought closer together and confirmed that Brit Chiefs of Staff now giving consideration to importance Canal Zone Base and future UK attitude this problem.

FYI Emb: Dept's present intention is to inform Egypt Govt re offer of equipment and suggest exchange notes within next few days. Emb Cairo will receive further instru this regard.

BRUCE

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[7] Not printed; in circular telegram 539, Nov. 12, the Department transmitted an account of a conversation with British Embassy officials during which the British conveyed their interim reply. (780.5/11-1252) In that reply, the British expressed the desire that a program of military and economic aid to Egypt should be linked with an acceptance by Egypt of the principle of joint defense, preferably worked out through MEDO. For the memorandum of conversation of that meeting, see Document 106.

[8] Not printed; telegram 3155 to London, Nov. 5, transmitted the text of the *aide-mémoire* to the Embassy. (780.5/11-1252)

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No. 1030

741W.00/11-1952: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 19, 1952—6 p. m.

2861. Fol is abbreviated text statement on Sudan (Embtel 2798 Nov 15) which Stevenson has now been instructed discuss with Naguib, probably tomorrow:

Begin Text.

HMG and Egypt Govt firmly believe in right of Sudanese to self-determination and effective exercise thereof at proper time and with necessary safeguards.

2. Two govts agree that in order enable Sudanese to exercise self-determination in free and neutral atmosphere, transitional period proved in full self-govt for Sudanese shall begin forthwith.

3. Two govts further agree this transitional period shall be considered as period of preparation for effective termination dual administration and that during transitional period sovereignty of Sudan shall be kept in reserve for Sudanese until self-determination achieved.

4. Further agreed between two govts that in order give effect soon as possible to principle enunciated above, a mixed comm shall be appointed forthwith in connection with elections to be held in Sudan in accordance self-govt statute which will shortly be promulgated. Function this comm will be to observe and supervise preparations for and conduct of free and impartial elections. Comm shall consist three Sudanese appointed by Governor General, one Egypt, one Brit, one Amer and one Indian or Pakistani, nominated by respective govts, and Indian or Pakistani member shall be chairman.

5. Two govts also agree establish advisory comm of five members to advise Gov-Gen in exercise certain his powers under new interim constitution. Members commission shall be two Sudanese, one Egyptian, one British and one Indian or Pakistani. Egyptian and British Goverments now urgently considering how this comm shld be constituted, its functions and its terms of ref.

6. Two govts agree preparations for elections in Sudan shall go forward notwithstanding these discussions and that newly elected Sudan Parliament shall be consulted re functions of advisory comm.

End Text.

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 154, to Khartoum as telegram 5, and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt and to Rome for Unger.

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FonOff considering instructing Stevenson alter foregoing before discussion with Naguib by specifying Indian member for election comm in para 4 and Pakistani on advisory comm in para 5.

GIFFORD

No. 1031

611.74/11-1052

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 21, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The situation in Egypt has now developed to a point which makes it necessary for the United States to define more specifically the measures it is prepared to take to assist in promoting a favorable settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.

You will recall that in mid-September representatives of General Naguib, in a secret approach to the United States Embassy Cairo, stated the willingness of the Egyptian Government to cooperate with the United States and to undertake certain commitments, including participation in a Middle East Defense Organization, in return for military and economic assistance. In replying to this overture, the United States declared its willingness to enter into discussions to determine the scope and nature of cooperation between the two Governments and requested the Egyptian Government to define more clearly its views concerning military and economic assistance. We emphasized the importance we attach to Egyptian willingness to participate with the United States, United Kingdom and other free world powers in planning for the common defense of the area and to a settlement of the Canal Zone problem on a basis that would assure the effective maintenance of strategic facilities in the Zone.

While the Egyptians were formulating their reply to this message, we carried on an exchange of views with the United Kingdom concerning the problem of the Egyptian settlement in relation to the establishment of the Middle East Defense Organization. In an *aide-mémoire* presented to the British Ambassador November 5, 1952, [2] we urged that the United Kingdom Government formulate the terms of a base settlement which would be strategically acceptable to the Western powers and at the same time stand a chance of

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[1] Drafted by Alex B. Daspit, Politico-Military Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[2] For text, see Document 105.

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acceptance by the Egyptian Government. We proposed that when this had been done the United States should approach General Naguib and suggest that the United States, the United Kingdom and Egypt work out in secret a base settlement and Egypt's adherence to a common defense plan. We also stated our conviction that material assistance by the United States and United Kingdom, including the provision of military equipment, would be essential to the successful conclusion of the proposed negotiations.

We have now received a reply from the Egyptian and the United Kingdom Governments respectively to the messages cited above. In its reply handed to the Department of State November 10, 1952 (Attachment A), [3] the United Kingdom welcomed our offer of assistance and undertook to produce as soon as possible proposals for a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute which they would discuss with us. The reply of the Egyptian Government is contained in Cairo's telegram 1167 November 10 (Attachment B). [4] Although it is not as forthcoming as we might have wished, this Department considers that it provides a basis for continuing discussions. Annex I, mentioned in paragraph C of this message, sets forth a detailed list of the military equipment which the Egyptian Government desires to secure. This list, together with analyses and comments by the United States Service Attachés in Cairo, forms Attachment C of this letter. [5] The Egyptian reply will be completed by a second annex providing details of the economic assistance desired, which is expected shortly.

As the Department of Defense is aware, this Department considers that a satisfactory settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute will make it possible to secure the participation of the Arab States in the Middle East Defense Organization and that from such a beginning more favorable developments in the entire Near East area might reasonably be expected to flow. This Department is convinced, therefore, that everything possible should be done to assure such a settlement. When the proposed United States-United Kingdom-Egyptian conversations begin, the United States and United Kingdom, ideally, should have their positions fully prepared on three points: 1) the elements of a Suez settlement strategically satisfactory to the West, which would have a reasonable chance of acceptance by Egypt; 2) the mutual defense arrangements and other possible commitments to which it is desired that Egypt should agree; 3) details as to the military and economic assistance which

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 7, Document 1029.
[4] For text, see Document 1024.
[5] Not printed.

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the United States and the United Kingdom would be prepared to provide to Egypt.

As indicated in their note at Attachment A, the British are now studying the first problem, and we are hopeful that they will inform us of their conclusions at an early date. The general form and structure of a Middle East Defense Organization has been the subject of an exchange of views among the sponsoring powers and a position on the second point can be readily prepared. The remaining problem—the military and economic assistance to be provided to Egypt—requires urgent consideration by the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Department of Defense has several times stated its willingness to consider favorably a program of military assistance to Egypt, if this were an element in a generally satisfactory solution of the Suez base problem and would assist in the establishment of cooperative defense arrangements in the Middle East. At the same time, the Department of Defense has made clear the difficulties involved in considering any specific program of assistance in the absence of an approved strategic plan and force requirements for the area.

The Department of State fully appreciates these difficulties. Nevertheless, this Department is convinced that it will be essential to develop for negotiating purposes some estimate of the general character and dimensions of a program of military aid the United States would undertake to supply Egypt in the event satisfactory general arrangements for area defense can be worked out. As a basis for these estimates, we now have not only the statement of Egyptian requirements (Attachment C), but studies of strength and equipment requirements of the Egyptian Armed Forces prepared by the United States Service Attachés in Cairo during October 1952.

The Department of State would appreciate the Department of Defense undertaking promptly a study of the problems involved in preparing a program of military aid for Egypt, with a view to determining what can reasonably be done in preparation for the United States-United Kingdom-Egyptian negotiations now foreseen. I suggest that after preliminary consideration of these problems within the Department of Defense it would be desirable for representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director for Mutual Security to discuss the matter informally with a view to deciding upon the most promising course open to us, given the various complicating factors involved. It is our hope that it may be possible through this means of procedure to work out some action that may be taken on the list of requirements at a fairly early date. For example, while a conclu-

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sive answer to the total list of requirements should be reached as soon as possible, the time element may dictate accepting a portion of the requirements which appear most reasonable and proceeding upon that portion of their request without completion of the final detailed analysis.

In this connection, the Department of State invites attention to the reported availability of approximately $45,000,000 of military aid funds found excess to the requirements of the approved programs for Greece, Turkey and Iran. In the view of this Department, serious consideration should be given to the possibility of tentatively programming some portion of these funds for Egypt, on the assumption that negotiations will develop sufficiently rapidly to make definite action possible in the course of this year's operations. In any event, given the prospects in Egypt described above, it would appear desirable to maintain flexibility with respect to the final use of those funds for the maximum period consistent with efficient operations.

The limited amount of equipment intended for special Egyptian police units, which was authorized under the terms of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and which is now awaiting shipment, was of course programmed prior to the developments described in this letter. It is now contemplated that upon signature by the Egyptian Government of the appropritae agreement, this equipment will be made available to the Egyptian Army. Most of the items in this program are included by the Egyptian Government in its official request for military assistance mentioned above. Thus, deliveries of this equipment will in effect constitute a part of any general program of military assistance to Egypt which may be authorized. As the Department of Defense is aware, the Department of State considers that the early delivery of this equipment would demonstrate the confidence of the United States in, and its desire to cooperate with the Naguib Government, and would improve the atmosphere within which the proposed three-power negotiations take place.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter and its attachments to the Director for Mutual Security. [6]

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Deputy Under Secretary

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[6] Under Secretary of State Matthews transmitted a copy of this letter to Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, that same day, Nov. 21. (611.74/11-1052)

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No. 1032

745W.00/11-2152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, November 21, 1952—3 p. m.

1266. Brit Amb yesterday found Naguib "digging in his toes" on Sudan proposals. PriMin indicated unwillingness to issue statement until agreement reached on all major issues. He took exception to omission from proposed Brit text of ref to "liquidation of dual administration". Stevenson is recommending London accept Naguib's wording in this connection.

Naguib declined to accept Brit proposals on order of procedure (agreement on principles, electoral commission to begin preparatory work immed, establishment of advisory comm after taking views of Sudanese parl). Naguib refused to call Gov Gen's comm "advisory" and insisted comm must be established at time constitution is promulgated, i.e., before elections. He rejected Brit contention that establishment comm with mandatory powers constituted change in status of Sudanese and Brit Govt therefore bound by promises consult Sudanese people. PriMin pointedly remarked that establishment comm with power specified in Egypt proposals "little enough in return for relinquishment Egypt's legal rights in Sudan".

On question of Gov Gen's powers to act in emergency, Naguib suggested possibility of defining "emergency". Brit Amb is making proposal to London in this regard, effect of which wld be to leave Gov Gen free to suspend constitution only in event of imminent financial collapse or threatened breakdown of law and order.

Naguib agreed to need for early elections, Indian membership on electorate comm (London's 2861 to Dept Nov 19) and informal consultation about composition this comm.

Stevenson notes that there has clearly been a hardening of Egypt position on Sudan due to deterioration of GOE's internal position. (See mytel 1268 today's date) [2] Throughout interview Naguib referred to domestic enemies who are watching for him to make slightest slip. PriMin was also clearly concerned about reaction Sudanese pro-unity elements to any further concessions (Khartoum's 12 Nov 13).[2]

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 433, to Paris for Reinhardt as 108, to Rome for Unger as 57, and unnumbered to the Arab capitals, Ankara, Moscow, Tehran, and Khartoum.

[2] Not printed.

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Brit Amb correctly surmises that Naguib will be unable make any major concessions and is prepared to go to breaking point on issue of Gov Gen's comm. In view of crucial importance reaching settlement on Sudan question, Stevenson is recommending Brit Govt go long way to meet Egypt viewpoint.

Next mtg with Naguib scheduled Nov 24. In meantime working level discussions on minor points will be undertaken by Brit Emb off, Sudan legal advisor and Egypt offs.

Lt Col Abd Al Nasir told Emb off last night that Major Salyh Salem has been summoned back from Khartoum to take hand in negots. His presence will be helpful.

CAFFERY

No. 1033

780.5/11-2552: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

CAIRO, November 25, 1952—8 p. m.
[Received 5:38 p.m.]

1295. Re mytel 1282, Nov 24. [2] I delivered Dept's message re police equip to Naguib [3] this evening. He said "although this is the so much discussed police equip I am most appreciative and I ask you to tell the State Dept so."

He then reiterated what he has frequently said before that he would cordially welcome from us definite gesture in way of mil or econ aid which he could present to the people as proof of our good intentions and as giving the lie to statements which are being circulated here by word of mouth in the press and by clandestine pamphlets to the effect that our good will goes no further than words, etc. He reiterated that Commies, the Wafd and the Moslem Brethren are trying hard to upset this regime. He repeated that his regime is opposed to communism, is determined not to be allied with Moslem Bros cannot coop with Wafd. He spoke also as so many others have done in recent days about critical cotton sitn.

He said that some progress is being made with Brit on Sudan but he is convinced that the Sudanese admin is doing everything to

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 443 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt and to Rome for Unger.

[2] Not printed.

[3] The reference presumably is to telegram 1070 to Cairo, Nov. 21, not printed, in which the Department sent Caffery the list of police equipment which the United States was willing to make available to Egypt on a cash reimbursement basis. (780.5/11-2152)

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delay, that the London FonOff tactics seem to be delaying tactics also. He denies the Brit contention that in his agreement with the Mahdi the comm with GovGen was to be merely advisory. He says there is no difference between his agreement with the Mahdi and his pertinent note to the Brit.

He wound up by saying "I may be dreaming but if you could find a way to let us have 100 tanks various doors would be opened including one leading to Middle Eastern Defense."

CAFFERY

No. 1034

745W.00/11-2552: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 25, 1952—7 p. m.
[Received 7:11 p.m.]

2970. In course conversation on Egypt today, Emb off reverted to indications of deterioration in internal position Naguib regime as compelling reason for earlier and fuller support. (Embtel 2919 Nov 22) [2] Emb off found FonOff appreciative problems involved. Official to whom we spoke expressed awareness Naguib's need for some political triumph and thought settlement Sudan issue would help him. Official somewhat apprehensive, however, that Naguib had so impaired his flexibility as result public statement which made subsequent Robertson's conversation with him, that necessary give and take in negotiations lacking on Egyptian side. Official govt asked Naguib's assurances prior Robertson conversation that Sudan proposals not immutable, with hardened attitude reflected in latter conversation with Stevenson. UK prepared be as flexible as possible in negotiations, but could not grant everything Naguib desired.

Reverting to present indications of instability in Naguib regime, FonOff official felt most of these were economic in cause. While appreciating long range desirability of arms aid for Egypt, he ques-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 157.

[2] Ambassador Gifford reported in telegram 2919, Nov. 22, not printed, that an Embassy representative had advanced the argument at the Foreign Office that the deteriorating domestic position of the Naguib regime was a compelling reason to exert every effort to reach an early agreement on the Sudan. Foreign Office officials were aware of the situation but were unable to move quickly because of Eden's absence in New York. Therefore, the Foreign Office would be unable to give Stevenson guidance by Nov. 24 on the points which had arisen in his conversation with Naguib on Nov. 20. (745W.00/11-2252)

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tioned whether in Egypt's present financial condition it made much sense to be talking in terms of substantial arms program for which Egypt would have to pay when she was having difficulty in paying for essential imports. He indicated FonOff is beginning give urgent attention to possibility economic assistance for Egypt, including, we gather, possibility HMG using its influence with raw cotton commission re resumption purchases. (This was told us in great confidence and with usual caveats re commercial difficulties involved as outlined Embtel 2793 Nov 14.) [3] He also mentioned possibility further sterling releases to Egypt which would permit govt purchase cotton and hold it for future sale. He admitted, however, that this did not get at heart of economic problem, which is essentially how to get cotton moving again in world trade channels. Extent to which UK would help in any program of economic assistance to Egypt is obviously limited by its own economic and financial position and he would welcome any thoughts which we might have on how effective program could be gotten under way. This, it seemed to him, was matter of first priority. Once economy back on its feet, discussion of substantial arms program would have more reality.

Emb off said he was sure Dept would welcome examination this subject. He knew we were already giving considerable thought to question of economic aid and, as memo dated November 18 which Dept had handed Brit Emb Wash indicated, we were awaiting paper from military Junta on subject. He pointed out, however, that even if US were in position undertake program of economic aid in Egypt, prolonged negotiations would probably be necessary. He mentioned Syria as case in point. Meanwhile, to help buttress Naguib regime and to provide evidence of western support, it might be necessary give Egypt assistance in arms procurement. FonOff official admitted this might be necessary, but felt it should be on very limited scale if for no other reason than its effect on Egypt economic and financial situation.

Comment: It seems logical that, in view of mounting indications of deterioriation in situation, primary emphasis on aid to Egypt should be on economic side. While emphasis on military aid is undoubtedly psychologically important it appears, in effect, one putting cart before horse. Emb would welcome Dept's and Cairo's thinking on this subject.

GIFFORD

[3] Not printed.

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No. 1035

774.00/11-2652: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, November 26, 1952—2 p. m.

1300. We concur with logic final para London's 2970, Nov 25, rptd Cairo 157, but there are certain peculiarities of present Egypt regime which require special consideration. First is fact that regime is itself a military dictatorship and officers composing Mil High Comite are convinced that they can only maintain support of armed forces by tangible show of mil aid from West powers. In this assessment, I believe they are right.

Second point is that Mil High Comite is finding difficulty in expressing Egypt's requirements for econ assistance. Officer charged with drafting Annex B to Naguib's memo of Nov 10 this morning informed Emb Counselor that he had not yet been able to complete a draft. This derives largely from econ ignorance and inability of young colonels to formulate a sensible program for econ development which cld be appropriately supported by US or UK.

From gen context of *aide-mémoire* set forth Deptel 3409, Nov 18 to London rptd Cairo 1040, we query whether time might not be ripe to give serious consideration to suggesting that Egypt Govt sign agreement with US under provisions of Sec 511(a) of Mutual Security Act of 1951 in order that way might be opened for grant of econ or mil assistance to Egypt under Title 2.

As immed stopgap measure it is imperative that Brit buy cotton. Prompt action in this sphere will redound immeasurably to their benefit as polit gesture. Delay, however, followed by eventual action will negate polit capital which might otherwise be made.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 444 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, to Ankara, and to the Arab capitals.

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No. 1036

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 134

Memorandum for the Executive Secretariat by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Kitchen)

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, November 27, 1952.

The Secretary told me that Mr. Eden talked to him regarding Egypt on Tuesday afternoon. Mr. Eden said that he had a number of reports indicating internal difficulties which were making things difficult for Naguib and his group. Mr. Eden was of the opinion that Naguib needed help. Eden said that his Government favored economic assistance as soon as possible in order to stabilize the situation. The British could not provide economic assistance, but they could provide some arms and military equipment. If the United States had a choice between providing military equipment or economic assistance, the British hoped that the United States would concentrate on the latter. He remarked that the United States could leave the procurement of arms from this country in commercial channels, thereby freeing United States governmental assistance to concentrate in the economic field.

The Secretary told Mr. Eden that this seemed a reasonable proposition to him and that he would tell the Department of State to see what could be done and get on with the job as quickly as possible. [1]

JCK

[1] The following handwritten notation appears on this memorandum: "Telephoned to Washington to S/S–Meloy 11/28/52, a. m., MA".

No. 1037

774.5/11-2852

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 28, 1952.

Subject: Arms Assistance for Egypt

I talked with Frank Nash and General Olmsted this morning on the arms list which has been submitted to us by General Naguib. I told Mr. Nash that it is important from a political point of view that a small interim program of arms assistance for Egypt be de-

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veloped as quickly as possible. I told him that we realized that the development of a large scale program would depend upon more careful analysis of the Naguib list, [1] but that we believed a sensible interim program in the magnitude of $10,000,000 could be devised. I suggested that the major share of such an interim program be cash reimbursable but that a small portion should be grant. In this connection I indicated that if Defense could draw up an interim program we could then go to the Egyptians with that and the suggestion that 511(a) agreement be signed.

Mr. Nash instructed General Olmsted to have OFMA draw up as quickly as possible a list of equipment which could be made available within the next several months in the amount of approximately $10,000,000. It was agreed that the important thing is to produce equipment which would have a psychological effect on Egypt, i.e., tanks as opposed to hand grenades. It was also agreed that this Department would send over as soon as possible a letter requesting that Egypt be found eligible for grant assistance. It was suggested that we propose grant assistance for the present fiscal year in the amount of approximately $5,000,000. Mr. Nash said that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would give strong support to such a finding. It was also agreed that it might be necessary to send one or two Ordnance Officers to Cairo to confer with the Embassy and Military Attaché there in connection with the interim program.

With regard to a larger scale program of military assistance, it was felt that either an Egyptian mission should come here or we should send a mission to Egypt to survey more closely Egyptian requirements. General Olmsted suggested that we follow somewhat the same pattern as was followed in drawing up the Yugoslav program. I said that such procedure might be all right in connection with a larger scale program but that to follow this procedure with respect to the immediate program would cause long delays which I did not believe we could afford if the Naguib regime is to be strengthened.

Mr. Nash and General Olmsted felt that more could be done in connection with the Egyptian Army list than with the Air Force list. However, it was agreed that the Air Force people would study the possibilities of some assistance.

With respect to the British, I told Mr. Nash we would hope to work in close coordination with the British and that we would, of course, consult with them in connection with any interim stop-gap program we might devise. I told him that the British seem anxious that we take care of the Egyptian economic problems while the United Kingdom would be responsible for the military program. I

[1] See Document 1028.

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told him that we could not agree to splitting responsibility and that we would hope to deal with economic and military assistance on an integrated basis.

I also raised with Mr. Nash the problem of cotton purchases for our stockpiling program. I explained to him the problem and the urgency of getting some economic aid to Egypt. He gave the necessary instructions that this question be explored immediately with the Munitions Division. I hope to have an answer either today or Monday.

No. 1038

645W.74/11-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, November 28, 1952.

1315. Brit Amb has sent very lengthy reports rptd to Brit Emb Washington re his discussions on Nov 26 with Naguib on Sudan.

In tel sent yesterday Stevenson informs his govt that negots have now reached point of breakdown unless some concessions can be made on Brit side. This wld have incalculable repercussions not only in Egypt and Sudan but in ME generally. He represents Naguib as convinced that he can make no basic concessions on governor's advisory commission in view of Egypt public opinion. Naguib insists that he made major prior concession in jettisoning concept of "unity of Nile Valley under Egypt crown" and that, in consequence, he must have at least some public recognition that Egypt control of Sudanese affairs has been restored to position occupied before 1924. [2]

Brit Amb feels that compromise can be worked out on question of governor's special powers in case of breakdown of law and order and that Egypts will in substance accept principle of governor's special powers to protect Sudan. However, Egypts refuse mention south in any public document as special region requiring special treatment as they claim this will vitiate concept of unity of Sudan.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 447, to Khartoum as telegram 25, and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, and to Ankara and the Arab capitals.

[2] In 1924 the British Governor General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was murdered in Cairo (Nov. 19). In swift retaliation the British among other things caused all Egyptian military forces and officers to be withdrawn from the Sudan, and virtually eliminated all Egyptian personnel from the civil administration.

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Brit Amb feels that if his govt will go along a compromise can be reached on formula which wld in effect give veto power to either one of co-domini over actions or recommendations of governor's commission which might run contrary to governor's own decisions. Formula wld run that in case where act of governor was overruled by commission or Sudanese Parliament fact of difference in view wld be notified to co-domini and dissenting opinion of advisory commission or Parliament wld not be sustained unless both co-domini agreed.

Another point at issue is phraseology on Egypt proposals of Nov 2 under which self-determination of Sudanese is limited to one of two alternatives: (a) complete independence, or (b) union with Egypt. Brit feel that this is too restrictive and advocate wording which is merely silent on various alternatives of self-determination.

A point yet to be discussed is so-called Sudanization commission proposed by Egypts.

Stevenson urges that his govt yield in its apparently very rigid views on restricting governor's commission to advisory powers only and that it accept formula outlined above. On point raised by FonOff, London that there has been no consultation with Sudanese as required by previous Brit statements, he advances Egypt argument that in effect, under Article 101 of draft statute, Sudanese Parliament has right to review position and to express its assent or dissent to Anglo-Egypt arrangements for self-govt and self-determination. We have suggested to Brit Emb that possibly an even stronger point is that in effect Naguib has already consulted virtually all shades of Sudanese polit opinion and that he can claim before international opinion that Sudanese were for first time really consulted before Egypt proposals were made to Brit.

Stevenson agrees with me that "it is now or never" for Brit on Sudan. If they allow negots to break down their situation in Sudan will steadily deteriorate and there will be trouble, followed by eventual forced withdrawal.

CAFFERY

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No. 1039

645W.74/11-2852: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1952—1:50 p. m.

3645. Dept has read Cairo's 1315, Nov. 28, rptd Lon 447, with considerable concern. We had hoped, as set forth in Deptel 3117, Nov. 4, to Lon, rptd Cairo 940, [2] that it wld be possible for UK to arrive at an early understanding with Egypt re Sudan on basis Naguib's proposals of Nov. 2. Stevenson's report that negots have now reached point of breakdown is most alarming since it is clear that breakdown wld gravely prejudice all US–UK efforts now in train or under contemplation to create new relationship between Egypt and West. We had been encouraged by talks between Secy and Eden as latter had expressed himself as favorably inclined toward Naguib's proposals.

Pls express urgently to FonOff Dept's grave concern re reported impasse and our hope that Brit will do everything in their power to make agmt with Egypt possible. We are certain that if this opportunity for agmt is allowed to slip out of hand, we shall not soon have another opportunity to settle Sudan problem and open way to agmt with Egypt on other matters. We recognize UK desire to have as "tight" an agmt with Egypt as possible, but it will not be possible in practice to produce an agmt which is 100% acceptable to all. Therefore in the interests of reaching agmt with Egypt which wld have so many favorable repercussions, confidence in the Egyptians in the form of concessions wld seem to be indicated. [3]

BRUCE

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1121 and to Khartoum as telegram 8. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade.

[2] Not printed.

[3] In telegram 3152 from London, Dec. 5, not printed. Ambassador Gifford informed the Department that he had spoken to Eden the previous evening along the lines of telegram 3645 and emphasized to him that if the present opportunity were lost, it would be a severe and perhaps fatal setback to Western objectives in Egypt and in the Near East in general. Eden was conscious of these considerations and thought that considerable progress had been made in the negotiations; moreover, Eden was optimistic that an agreement could soon be reached over the Sudan. (645W.74/12-552)

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No. 1040

774.56/12-352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 3, 1952—3 p. m.

1352. Eden's comments on aid to Egypt (Deptel 1129 Dec 2) [2] parallel recent suggestions from Brit Emb Cairo that US concentrate on econ assistance and leave arms supply primarily to Brit. Reason is that arms are practically sole remaining Brit bargaining counter.

EmbOffs have assured Brit here that US has no desire replace UK as principal arms supplier. We have further pointed out that Egypt request for arms from US (EmbDesp 754, Oct 24) [3] was limited to items which Egypts believed available only from US sources.

Fol comments may be useful to Dept in considering timing, nature and extent of US–UK assistance to Naguib regime.

1. Our verbal support of Naguib, if not promptly followed by tangible assistance, may backfire (a) because of disillusionment on part of Naguib and colleagues, and (b) by rendering regime more vulnerable to attacks from extreme nationalists and Communists.

2. Both mil and econ aid are desired and needed by GOE. Most prompt and effective econ aid, and one which wld produce most favorable psychological reaction in Egypt, wld be immed purchase of cotton by UK and/or US, however, I know this is not likely. Direct econ assistance in form of loans or grant aid shld follow in due course.

3. Question of arms supply also falls into two phases. Making available immed a modest quantity of arms wld strengthen Naguib internally (Mytel 1300, Nov 26) and go a long way toward binding regime to cooperation with West. To be properly effective this first phase shld be in nature of concrete gesture of confidence and good will which wld set the stage for phase two, i.e., bargaining phase, when more substantial supply of arms may be offered in return for Suez base facilities and Egypt participation in ME defense plans.

4. While I fully urge maximum coordination with Brit I believe it wld not be in our joint interest to leave arms supply entirely to UK for fol reasons:

(a) Psychological factors on part of both Egypt and Brit greatly reduce probable effectiveness of any purely Brit gesture (as evidenced by reaction to release of LE 5 million sterling and 15 jet aircraft).

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 452 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt and to Rome for Unger.

[2] Telegram 1129, Dec. 2, not printed, was simply a paraphrase of the contents of Kitchen's memorandum of Nov. 27 for the Executive Secretariat. (774.56/12-252) For Kitchen's memorandum, see Document 1036.

[3] Not printed.

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(b) US failure to come through with some mil equipment after preliminary discussions which have taken place (including Foster-Naguib conversations) wld without helping Brit injure US position in Egypt and reduce chances of our playing useful role in connection with base and area defense negots.

For foregoing reasons I urge Dept not delay plans for immed limited mil assistance to Naguib. Discussions today with Emb program officer Robert Black strengthen my thinking (Embtel 1300) that consideration of agreement under Sec 511(a) MS Act to permit limited assistance under title two is now advisable.

CAFFERY

No. 1041

774.5 MSP/11-2152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 4, 1952—5:14 p. m.

1160. Re Emb desp 982 Nov 21 [2] Dept hopes you will point out to Egypt Govt that until such time as notes exchanged in accordance Dept A139 Oct 15 we cannot complete formalities re equipment listed Deptel 1070 [3] Nov 21. Since development overall program and therefore our reply to Naguib's memo of Nov 10 may take some time we wld hope that during interim at least police equipment wld move. We wld therefore urge that Egypt Govt sign short form agreement now. It shld be pointed out that our reply to Naguib Nov 10 memo will also depend to some extent upon receipt Annex II.

ACHESON

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 3755.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 1033.

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No. 1042

780.5/12-552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 5, 1952—7:43 p. m.

1171. Rep Brit Emb Wash Dec 5 orally gave Dept preliminary UK views re US *aide-mémoire* Nov 18 (Deptel 3409 to London) on exchange messages GOE concerning US assistance to Egypt. Brit reply along fol lines:

UK welcomes Dept's initiative and interest in discussions with GOE. UK no less anxious in principle than US that discussions be started. UK however not ready start preliminary talks with US (prior to talks with Egypts) until review UK mil position in NE completed. This shld be about mid-Dec. Meanwhile UK considering what they cld supply Egypt in way arms as part pkge solution (which wld of course include satisfaction UK defense requirements). UK hopes be in position talk US shortly.

It was suggested that talks might be of pol-mil variety similar to those held on Egypt in Sept 1951. Dept proposed it see Brit proposals prior to such mtg. London slightly favored over Wash as site.

Brit indicated interest our plans mil, econ, assistance Egypt. Were told US actively considering such assistance altho nothing concrete had yet been devised.

ACHESON

[1] Also sent to London as telegram 3802 and to Khartoum as telegram 13. Repeated by pouch to Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

No. 1043

645W.74/12-852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 8, 1952—3 p. m.

1385. Brit Amb has appointment with Naguib Dec 9 to resume Sudan discussions. [2]

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 462, to Khartoum as telegram 29, and unnumbered to the Arab capitals, Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Ankara.

[2] In telegram 1403 from Cairo, Dec. 10, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that Stevenson and Naguib at their meeting on Dec. 9 had reached agreement on a number of points with the result that the British Embassy in Cairo had telegraphed the text of a proposed draft agreement based on the Egyptian note of Nov. 2 to London. (641.74/12-1052)

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Re London's tel 3164, Dec 5, [3] Brit EmbOff today pointed out that GovGen's special responsibility towards south is only real stumbling block remaining. He remarked that Naguib himself appeared appreciate force of Brit position re south and Egypts are prepared to agree to GovGen's special powers but insist that no public mention thereof be made.

Brit plan leave question of south until last, meanwhile tying up on other points still at issue.

CAFFERY

[3] Not printed.

No. 1044

774.5 MSP/12-952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 9, 1952—3:14 p. m.

3860. 1. Dept appreciates points made Embtel 2970 Nov 25 and recognizes that close attention must be given econ side Egypt problem. This connection it is hoped some immed assistance can be given both by US and UK to relieve pressure created by failure cotton to move. However, permanent solution cotton situation lies in resumption purchases on world wide scale which cotton marketing experts believe will occur in near future. Meanwhile, Dept awaits with interest Egypt formulation its requirements for econ assistance. We feel such formulation necessary in order nature Egypt econ problem can be more precisely defined and we can decide scope our assistance.

2. Dept believes it impracticable and undesirable give priority econ aid at expense mil assistance. As Cairo points out in its 1300 Nov 26 present regime is mil one and came into power on basis reform Egypt Armed Forces. Since regime attaches great importance mil aid from West, it will be inclined measure success or failure relationship with West in terms mil aid recd. We now know nature mil assistance desired and we are therefore in position work on mil aid program. This we feel must be done without delay if Naguib and his regime are to continue in power. This connection we are encouraged by fact UK considering what mil equipment it might supply Egypt (Deptel 3802 Dec 5 to London). We reaffirm it always been US intention encourage Egypt continue look UK as habitual source supply. Moreover whatever US program may be de-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1180 and to Khartoum as telegram 15.

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veloped from our consideration Naguib communication Nov 10 will not be intended alter that general pattern.

3. At same time we know there are dangers in increasing Egypt's mil expenditures. We wld not wish see mil assistance program reach point where it wld cause deterioration econ situation (with consequent additional claims for US econ aid) and reforms already instituted in Egypt upset. As soon as we know more about econ assistance desired by Egypt, program of econ aid can be considered and integrated more directly with mil program order evolve overall assistance project for Egypt.

4. Dept has given further thought to suggestion made by Eden to Secy re division responsibility for mil and econ aid programs (Deptel 3680 Dec 2 to London).[2] We believe such division wld not be politically wise, since Egypts with some reason have come expect mil aid from US as well as UK and we are certain they wld resent implications involved such division. We think, as we have since beginning exchanges with Naguib, that US and UK shld undertake, in consultation, and wherever possible in coordination, with each other, own mil and econ aid programs within framework objectives we are seeking in Egypt.

5. Discuss above with FonOff.

ACHESON

[2] Telegram 3680 to London, Dec. 2, not printed, was repeated to Cairo as telegram 1129. (774.56/12-252) See footnote 2, Document 1040.

No. 1045

Editorial Note

The Prime Minister of Egypt, General Mohamed Naguib, and the American Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, exchanged formal notes on December 9 and 10, respectively, in order to bring into force a Mutual Defense Assistance Understanding under Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (64 Stat. 373) and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 373). For the texts of these notes, see TIAS No. 3565, printed in 7 UST (pt. 1) 844.

Additionally, Naguib's note of December 9 was identical to the proposed short form agreement set forth in Department airgram 139, Document 1017, except that the reference to the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, was deleted from the final text.

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No. 1046

874.00 TA/12-1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

SECRET CAIRO, December 11, 1952— 1 p. m.

1407. Re para 1 Deptel 3860, sent London Dec 9, rptd Cairo 1180. Fol is text of Appendix 2 to Naguib's memo Nov 10:

"Most immediate item economic aid which would render tangible benefit to Egypt would be grant of wheat. It is estimated on basis of present calculations that Egypt's wheat requirements for 1953 will be of order of 800,000 tons. During past year most of wheat needs have had to be imported from dollar areas which has involved heavy drain on dollar reserves. With continuing crisis in export of cotton foreign exchange drain involved in meeting essential wheat needs for 1953 will place heavy burden on their financial position. Furthermore as long range objective and with view to furthering projects for economic development and industrialization of Egyptian Govt the sum of $100 million is needed for fol projects:

Construction of new Aswan dam.
Hydroelectrical installations at new Aswan dam.
Establishment of iron and steel industry utilizing iron ore deposits and electric power from new Aswan dam.
Construction of essential roads.
Rehabilitation of railways.
Improvement of telecommunications facilities.
Land reform scheme.

"On certain of foregoing project surveys have been requested from Tech Coops Admin through Country Director of TCA Amembassy Cairo Egypt. If needed Egyptian Govt may desire avail itself of similar tech asst with respect to other projects." [1]

CAFFERY

[1] In telegram 1409 from Cairo, Dec. 11, not printed, Ambassador Caffery characterized these proposals as "irrealistic" and offered the opinion that the only common-sense project was the request for wheat which would relieve the demands being made on Egypt's dollar reserves and would also be a popular gesture. (874.00 TA/12-1152)

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No. 1047

774.56/12-1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 11, 1952—5 p. m.

3251. EmbOff yesterday talked to FonOff re econ and mil assistance to Egypt along lines Deptel 3860 Dec 9. FonOff appreciative this statement Dept's views and said it wld look forward further discussions on this subj when Egypt memo on econ assistance recd.

Altho official to whom we spoke appeared understand Dept's views re impracticability giving priority econ assistance to Egypt, he expressed concern re Egypt's ability pay for arms [garble] equipment which it might desire from the West. He cited as case in point recent Egypt cancellation request for 20 Balliol advanced trainers on grounds it unable pay for them. FonOff official felt we wld encounter increasing problems arising from Egyptian inability to pay for arms. EmbOff said it might well believe that we wld encounter many such problems, but even indication of willingness to facilitate arms purchases might have beneficial effect in promoting understanding and paving way our common objectives.

FonOff official said that UK is proceeding with its study of ways in which UK might be able to help Egypt with its econ problems. Among alternatives being considered are: (1) further sterling releases; and (2) possibility HMG stockpiling cotton. Official reiterated previous indications that objections to bringing pressure to bear on raw cotton auth [garble] take that line of action impracticable, since, (1) it wld create precedent of introducing polit factors into RCC activities, which HMG anxious avoid as principle (2) it wld create demand for similar favorable treatment by such countries as Pak and Brazil which are also encountering difficulty in disposing of their crops and (3) RCC wld certainly insist that HMG guarantee it against any loss as result any subsequent drop in price cotton. Latter factor raises strong Treas objections and might require special parliamentary approval. Further objection is that UK trend has been away from stockpiling. Nevertheless HMG continuing examine stockpiling as possible line of action and understands USG also considering it. [2] Official somewhat skeptical efficacy further

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 165.

[2] In telegram 3478 from London, Dec. 23, not printed, the Embassy in London reported that the Foreign Office had told American officials that the British Government had concluded that it could not purchase Egyptian cotton for stockpiling for the reasons advanced in telegram 3251. (874.2321/12-2352)

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sterling release which wld not strike at heart of problem, namely movement of cotton crop. Moreover, further release of pounds 10 million will be made next month in any event under existing agreement and this shld relieve sterling shortage problem.

FonOff official gave impression FonOff working levels appreciated difficulties involved in Eden's suggestion re division responsibility between US and UK re econ and mil assistance and realized that such division between US and UK is in fact impracticable. Emb of opinion Eden's suggestion was probably spur of moment idea prompted by concern re limitations on UK ability to help economically because of its own econ and finan situation. On basis working level reactions, Emb doubts UK will continue push this idea.

GIFFORD

No. 1048

774.5 MSP/12-352

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 12, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to Mr. Matthews' letter of November 21, 1952, and to Mr. Foster's reply of December 3, 1952, [1] concerning a possible program of military assistance to Egypt and the list of military equipment desired by the Egyptian Government. It is noted that the Departments of the Army and Air Force have been asked to select from the list items valued at approximately $10,000,000 which might be available for shipment by March 1, 1953, or 90 days after appropriate arrangements have been made with the Egyptian Government.

This Department believes that the furnishing of military assistance to Egypt is an essential element in negotiations for the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute on the Canal Zone Base and Egypt's adherence to and participation in the proposed Middle East Defense Organization. It is the view of this Department that

[1] Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster, in his letter of Dec. 3, not printed, requested that "the Department of State furnish us with a recommendation from the political point of view as to whether Egypt should now be made eligible for grant military aid". Foster added that if the Department of State recommended extending grant aid to Egypt at that time, the Department of Defense would also want to know if the Department of State desired to furnish such aid in accordance with normal procedures and after receipt of the Section 511(a) assurances required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended (66 Stat. 141), or whether the situation warranted the use of Section 513 of the Mutual Security Act, as amended. (774.5 MSP/12-352)

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Egypt's participation in MEDO would open the way for more general participation by the other Arab states and would greatly assist the United States in achieving its goal of increasing stability in the Near East area as a whole. It will be recalled that in his message of November 10, 1952, General Naguib indicated that upon conclusion of the agreement with the United Kingdom on the disposition of British forces in the Canal Zone he would be prepared to give assurances that "one of the ultimate objectives of its (Egypt's) policy is participation with the United States, the United Kingdom and other free world powers in planning for the common defense of the area within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations".

It is the belief of this Department that a program of military assistance for Egypt should be a combination of both cash reimbursable and grant assistance. With respect to cash reimbursable assistance the United States Ambassador in Egypt has been authorized to exchange notes with the Government of Egypt to complete the formalities for such assistance under Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

With respect to grant assistance, this Department considers that Egypt fully meets the criteria for such assistance under the terms of Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, namely, (1) the strategic location of the country makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area, (2) such assistance is of critical importance to the defense of free nations, and (3) the immediate increased ability of the recipient country to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the area and to the security of the United States.

This Department considers that if Egypt is found eligible for grant aid at this time, such aid should be furnished in accordance with normal procedures and after receipt of the 511(a) assurances. However, this Department also believes that the achievement of an understanding between Egypt and the West is so important that should the provisions of 511(a) prove onerous to the point that agreement cannot be reached, the use of Section 513 of the Mutual Security Act, as amended, might be warranted.

This Department envisages that a grant military aid program for Egypt for fiscal year 1953 would be within the range of $5 to $10 million. Such grant assistance would supplement a cash reimbursable program under the terms of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and would be limited to items required in the Egyptian communication of November 10 unless a determination to the contrary is made. This Department would wish to consult with the Department of Defense and the Di-

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rector for Mutual Security on the scope of a grant military aid program for Egypt for fiscal year 1954.

It would be greatly appreciated if the Department of Defense would consider the above question as a matter of urgency in order that an appropriate recommendation may be made to the President that he find Egypt eligible for assistance under Section 202 of the above-cited act.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to the Director for Mutual Security.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

No. 1049

745W.00/12–1352: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 13, 1952—3 p. m.

1433. Wing Comdr Hussein Xulfiqar Sabri and Major Salah Salem called this morning to discuss Sudan question with EmbOff. Egyptian officers confirmed Brit Emb analysis that agreement now in sight on all points except Gov Gen's responsibilities for southern Sudan. Officers pointed out Egyptians had already accepted formula giving Gov Gen broad powers to prevent discrimination against any area or segment of Sudanese people.

Sabri and Salem stated Egyptian refusal to accept public mention of "south" is based upon: (1) Egyptian belief that such mention wld only tend to perpetuate separationist thinking (2) that having abandoned traditional unity of Nile Valley slogan, present regime cld not publicly acknowledge split within Sudan itself without exposing itself to wrath of Egyptian public opinion.

Officers pointed out that if Brit mean what they say in stating they wish to assure protection of southerners, this is amply provided under formula which Egyptians accept. Mention of south is not necessary to attainment such protection and Egyptians feel Sudan admin, if it wishes make the effort, can persuade southerners their interests will be amply protected under proposed formula. Officers further pointed out Egypt's major interests as regards Nile water lie in south Sudan and Egypt, therefore, is even more anxious than Brit to avoid alienation of southern Sudanese. They insist however, that Natl Unionist and Umma Parties will boycott elections if

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 477 and unnumbered to Khartoum, Paris, the Arab capitals, Rome, and Ankara.

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south is mentioned. Sabri and Salem, in reply to direct question stated Egypt willing to go to breaking point over question of public mention of "south". They pointed out that Naguib feels he has already gone too far towards mtg Brit views and made it clear he wld not be unhappy if Sudan negots shld break down over Brit obstinacy re south Sudan, as such a turn of events wld strengthen his popular position in Egypt.

Comment: This is not first indication that mil are tempted to chuck up the difficult path of negot and revert to "natl struggle" as the more popular and appealing "solution" to Egypt's foreign affairs problems. The question of which way the tide will turn in Egypt, and consequently the whole Arab East, thus hinges in a very real sense on the use of a word.

CAFFERY

No. 1050

774.5/12-1652: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 16, 1952—6:43 p. m.

1227. Re Deptel 1171 to Cairo Dec 5 concerning proposed Anglo-Amer talks on Egypt Rep Brit Emb Dec 15 informed along fol lines:

"FonOff wld like start these talks as soon as possible after Christmas. Scope of talks (as Dept has suggested) wld be:

> "1. Terms upon which Her Majesty's govt cld agree to withdraw from CZ, 2. collaboration of Arab states with MEDO, 3. mil aid to Egypt as part of gen settlement, 4. econ aid to Egypt.

"Mr. Eden wld greatly prefer them to take place in London, since the relevant info is all readily avail there and since it is after all the Brit who will be putting forward their ideas on the mil side at any rate."

BRUCE

[1] Also sent to London as telegram 4050 and to Khartoum as telegram 16.

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No. 1051

874.501/12-1852

Memorandum by the Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs (Battle) to Major General George H. Olmsted

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 18, 1952.

Subject: Request Involving Reimbursable Military Assistance Under Section 408(e) of the MDAA, as Amended.

Reference is made to copies of cable number 2217 dated June 13, 1952 from the American Embassy in Cairo [1] containing an official request from the Egyptian Government for police and military equipment as shown in the attached list,[1] Egypt Case No. 3.

This equipment was originally intended for the use of Egyptian police divisions but an amendment to the existing agreement now permits its use by the Egyptian Army.

The Department of State approves, from an economic and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request under the provisions of Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. The foregoing approval is subject to clearance with respect to any patent and proprietary rights, if such rights are involved.

L. D. BATTLE

[1] Not printed.

No. 1052

745W.00/12-1852: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 18, 1952—5 p. m.

3406. Embassy yesterday discussed Sudan negotiations with FonOff against background Cairo's 1433, Dec 13 and Deptel 4054, Dec 16. [2]

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 170 and to Khartoum as telegram 8.

[2] In telegram 4054 to London, Dec. 16, not printed, the Department suggested that the Embassy in London give the Foreign Office the substance of telegram 1433 from Cairo and advanced the idea of suggesting to the Foreign Office that the British and Egyptian Governments should exchange secret communications accepting the Brit-

Continued

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FonOff official maintained formula which Sabri and Salem had indicated Egypt had accepted was open to major objection that Governor General's broad powers to prevent discrimination against any area or segment of Sudanese people would still be subject in last respect to overriding control of advisory commission. FonOff says Egyptians have been adamant on this point, which is real heart of UK-Egyptian differences over South Sudan. Of somewhat lesser magnitude, but still of importance, is UK feeling that south should be specifically mentioned in any formula. Words "any area or segment" so vague in themselves as not to provide any reassurance to south that term applies to that area. To make it clear, it would be necessary to make some kind of supplementary public statement and this procedure would seem to have no advantage over specific reference in constitution to Governor General's responsibilities for south.

FonOff official emphasized throughout conversation that feeling in south is such that it must be made clear to southerners that Governor General will, in fact, exercise special responsibilities with respect to region. Separate secret understanding with Egyptians along lines suggested Deptel 4054, Dec 16 would not fulfill that criterion. Moreover, FonOff opposed in principle to secret understanding of this kind and leery of vague formulas capable of different interpretations which might subsequently arise to plague both parties in same way as Bevin-Sidky agreement. On other hand, UK willing agree formula which would reassure Egyptians that no intention split off South Sudan.

FonOff points out that there have recently been indications that Egyptians less concerned about specific mention of south than about relationship between Governor General and his advisory council on this problem. FonOff showed us recent telegram from British Embassy Cairo reporting approach which Creswell had made to Major Salem urging more flexible Egyptian approach. Salem indicated Egypt was willing take new approach to problem and agreed on importance avoiding legal quibbles. He stressed importance early solution Sudan problem and expressed opinion that agreement to different arrangements for south would result in boycott of election by unity and Umma Parties.

Creswell doubted Umma's attitude clear on this point and felt Egypt could handle unity parties. He went on to suggest that question might be dealt with by inclusion of paragraph stating it is de-

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ish interpretation of the Governor General's powers in the Southern Sudan at the time a British-Egyptian-Sudanese agreement was signed. Such an exchange would possibly satisfy the British concern that the south be protected and would also satisfy Egypt's concern regarding publicity. (745W.00/12-1652)

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clared policy of two govts to maintain unity of Sudan as single territory and that Governor General's special powers not be exercised in manner which would conflict with this policy; and also by redrafting definition of Governor General's powers in Article 100 in less autocratic way.

Salem pointed out there are three main issues in Article 100: (1) existence of Governor General's special responsibilities; (2) Governor General's right to withhold assent to legislation; (3) Governor General's right to issue administrative orders regarding south. Of these three issues, Egypt's greatest concern is implied diminution in authority of Sudan Cabinet and Parliament represented by (2) without provision for subsequent action, and point (3).

In reporting foregoing, Stevenson has suggested to FonOff possible compromise whereby in case of Governor General using powers to suspend legislation, issue would then be reconsidered by Sudan Cabinet on directive of Governor General who would, in drawing up directive, obtain advice of commission in purely consultative capacity.

FonOff somewhat encouraged by foregoing conversations between Creswell and Salem, although it recognizes that latter often much more reasonable in his approach to Sudan problem than other members of military junta. It is, nevertheless, considering Stevenson's suggested formula to which its first reaction appears favorable.

GIFFORD

No. 1053

745W.00/12-2452: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 24, 1952—5 p. m.

3528. Following regarding Sudan obtained from Foreign Office.

1. Foreign Office "cautious optimism" reported Embtel 3479 Dec 23 [2] based primarily on what it regards as more flexible Egyptian approach reflected in working level discussions. Foreign Office indi-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 177.

[2] In telegram 3479 from London, Dec. 23, not printed, Ambassador Gifford reported that the Foreign Office was optimistic about the chance for an early settlement of the Sudan question. Foreign Office officials indicated that much progress had been made in Cairo on the basis of the formula reported in telegram 3406 from London, *supra*. (641.74/12-2352)

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cates this may be somewhat illusory in view Salem's disposition be more reasonable than higher committee.

2. Her Majesty's Government has decided and so informed Stevenson that United Kingdom must stick on essence of principles involved in: (1) Governor-General's emergency powers; (2) Governor-General's responsibility for South; and (3) Sudanization as one but not determinant factor in self-determination at end three years. Despite Foreign Office characterization of these as "sticking points", it continues express mild optimism that compromise formulas can be evolved to which both sides can agree.

3. Reports from Governor-General continue stress increasingly strong fears in South that United Kingdom will give up "safeguards" in course negotiations. Foreign Office says Northern Journalists now visiting South have been given "rough reception". Governor-General has suggested Her Majesty's Government consider making statement to reassure South regarding "safeguards," but Foreign Office not inclined do so, except possibly after agreement with Egyptians at which time might consider saying regard agreement as providing satisfactory safeguards for South.

Foreign Office does not appear concerned regarding Naguib's protest at slowness of negotiations. Embassy has not mentioned Naguib's approach to Ambassador Caffery (Cairo's 1506 Dec 23) [3] since it is unsure whether matter has been mentioned to Stevenson. [4] Embassy suggests Cairo may wish inform British Embassy in order offset apparent British impression from Stevenson's use of word "mild" that Naguib not particularly concerned.

GIFFORD

[3] Not printed.

[4] Ambassador Caffery informed the Department in telegram 1516, Dec. 26, not printed, that the Embassy had informed the British Embassy of Naguib's approach to Caffery. (745W.00/12-2652)

No. 1054

874.00 TA/12-1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 24, 1952—6:18 p. m.

1287. At inter-agency mtg to consider problem econ assistance Egypt raised urtels 1407 and 1409, [2] it was suggested:

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 4236.

[2] Regarding telegram 1409, see footnote 1, Document 1046.

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1. That in connection projects listed reftel, impending industrial survey mission [3] might be utilized to advantage. Shld Emb agree, it might prompt requests by GOE for additional staff members Cabot group. Early recruitment cld be undertaken particularly in fields (a) engineering (re Aswan request), (b) steel, (c) public roads (member preferably from BPR group in Turkey), (d) telecommunications, and (e) finance (possibly from Treas). Recruiting additional staff members wld take place after informal consultation IBRD to prevent duplication. Presumed Emdpts will request such technicians chargeable TCA program funds. Dept hopes thus expanded, industrial survey group wld give tangible evidence US interest assist GOE meet long-range econ problems. However, it shld be made clear US not yet prepared give opinion on feasibility these projects nor shld this demonstration our interest be misconstrued as commitment.

Bearing in mind present limitations, Emb requested recommend which one these projects most feasible for early action or which wld give concrete evidence US interest.

Fol para for urinfo only.

2. That clarification be requested from Emb re need for wheat assistance along fol lines:

a. Egypt present exchange position;

b. Rate at which exchange position has been deteriorating;

c. Prospects exchange position in near future and over next 18 months;

d. Ability Egypt support a tolerable import program over this period;

e. Effect on stability Naguib Govt on further deterioration fon exchange reserves;

f. Whether Egypt fon exchange controls are reasonably administered, so that US assistance will not in its practical effect permit diversion of resources to wasteful ends;

g. What minimum amt and type wheat assistance (loan or grant), wld in Emb judgment suffice for the present to meet the need, in conjunction proposed mil aid, pending further measures which can only follow passage 1954 MSP legis.

Ghiardi due Cairo after Christmas, can assist. [4]

ACHESON

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[3] The TCA industrial survey mission was scheduled to leave the United States for Egypt on Jan. 6, 1953. Thomas Cabot was to be its head.

[4] In telegram 1518 from Cairo, Dec. 27, not printed, the Embassy expressed the hope that the Cabot group could study several of the fields in particular, and the Embassy reported that it was undertaking a full-scale review of the wheat assistance project in consonance with the Department's instructions. The Embassy was able to say that Egypt's total wheat import needs for 1953 would be approximately 800,000 tons worth roughly $80 million. (874.00 TA/12-2752)

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No. 1055

774.5/12-2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1952—1:32 p. m.

1292. From Byroade. Brit Emb Wash has now given us UK paper on defense negots Egypt. We understand Brit Emb Cairo has been instructed discuss paper with you soonest after its arrival Cairo Dec 27. We wld appreciate ur urgent comments for my use during London conference now scheduled begin Dec 31 (reDeptel 1227 Dec 16 Deptel 4205, 4206 Dec 23).[2]

I believe it wld be helpful if member ur staff cld come London for talks with Brit. If you believe you can spare staff member, pls cable urgently and TO's will be issued. I plan depart for London Dec 29.

ACHESON

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 4246.

[2] Telegrams 4205 and 4206 are not printed.

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No. 1056

774.5/12-2952: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (McClintock) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, December 29, 1952—noon.

1524. Re Deptel 1292, December 26 [2] and mytel 1522, December 27 to Department rptd London 515. [3]

Following is our working level comment on UK memo on defense negotiations with Egypt. [4] You will recall that this is still subject to Ambassador Caffery's approval on his return.

We are in general agreement with basic paper. However we trust that London meeting will be able to develop concrete lists under paragraph 1(c) [5] since basis of Naguib's original approach to US and his memo of November 10 was request for military and economic aid in return for which he was willing to consider placing Egypt on side of western allies. Meanwhile we hope Department and Defense will go ahead with plans for interim assistance.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Sent priority to London for Byroade as telegram 516 and repeated to the Department.

From Dec. 31, 1952, until Jan. 7, 1953, an American delegation of experts headed by Assistant Secretary of State Byroade was in London for a series of talks on Egypt with their British counterparts drawn from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, and the military. Seven meetings were held during this time and the participants kept minutes of them, calling them an "Agreed Record." Appended to this record were six appendixes, which consisted of American and British working papers. The participants also considered and approved *ad referendum* five policy papers containing various annexes and appendixes. Record copies of the five official papers and the agreed record of the sessions plus the appendixes are in Department of State file 774.5/1-1453. Neither the verbatim texts of these minutes nor the documents are printed.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In telegram 1522 from Cairo, Dec 27, not printed, Chargé McClintock reported to Byroade that Ambassador Caffery agreed that Embassy officials should discuss the British defense paper with the British Embassy and prepare working-level comments on it, subject to the Ambassador's approval upon his return to Cairo from Baghdad on Dec. 31. McClintock also said that he had already had two conferences with British officials and that the Embassy's preliminary comments on the defense document would be sent on Dec. 29 to Byroade in London. (774.5/12-2752)

[4] According to the "Agreed Record" of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt, the document under reference became Paper No. 1 and was entitled "United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt". (774.5/1-1453)

[5] Paragraph 1 of the "United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt" reads as follows:

"1. The United Kingdom is proposing to negotiate with Egypt a settlement that would involve:—

"(a) Agreement over the Suez Canal base and an evacuation formula.

"(b) The participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defence Organisation.

"(c) A programme of military and economic assistance to Egypt." (774.5/1-1453)

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Essence of Brit paper is to devise ways and means of maintaining Suez base in peace in manner to make it available for use in war. Thus, its premise is sound that participation of Egypt in MEDO is essential since obviously key to use of base in peace or war is acceptance by Egypt of MEDO concept. However, here it is necessary to turn to paragraph D Naguib's memo November 10 (Embtel 1167, November 10 to Department, repeated London 394). Egyptians make their condition precedent to eventual entry into MEDO conclusion of agreement for "effective withdrawal of British Forces from Egyptian territory". Department and Foreign Office London will, of course, recognize that unless satisfactory assurances can be given on this vital point it will be idle to expect Egyptian entry into MEDO or that essential Egyptian agreement and cooperation mentioned paragraph 8 without which base cannot function. [6]

We welcome paragraph 11 [7] which indicates that alternatives A, B and C set forth in appendix C [8] are not inflexible. In our view some elements of alternatives A and B might be made acceptable to Egyptians provided evacuation commences and progress is made on program of military and economic assistance. For example, second paragraph of section D Naguib's memo of November 10 states Egyptian Government would be prepared to take over and maintain canal zone base "with whatever technical assistance as

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[6] Paragraph 8 of the "United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt" reads as follows:

"8. A working base in Egypt is essential to the Allies in war, and it cannot function except with Egyptian agreement and co-operation. In order to obtain this, and also the naval facilities that will be required, considerable concessions will have to be made so as to secure Egyptian goodwill and promise of assistance in war." (774.4/1-1453)

[7] Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the "United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt" read as follows:

"10. It is clear that negotiations with Egypt will have little chance of success unless requirements are kept to the minimum essential for the defence of the Middle East. Appendix D lists three different cases illustrating the concessions that may have to be made and their implications. Case 'A,' the optimum requirements, is militarily and financially by far the best, but Egyptian agreement is believed to be unlikely. Case 'B' is worse, both militarily and financially. Should the Egyptians prove completely intransigent Case 'C' might have to be accepted although this involves the abandonment of any effective control over the facilities which are essential to the Allies in war and which the Egyptians are considered incapable of maintaining. Acceptance of Case 'B' would therefore involve risks and delay before the Allied base could be made operational in war. The implications of Case 'C' would be very much more serious in that the Allies would not have a working base for at least 90 days after the outbreak of war.

"11. The above Cases are not meant to be inflexible. It may be that the Egyptians will be prepared to accept some compromise between these, and we think that we should stand fast where we can, and give way where we must, without necessarily attempting to obtain the requirements all at the same level." (774.5/1-1453)

[8] In the final agreed version of the "United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt", alternatives "A", "B", and "C" were set forth in Appendix D. For text, see Document 1061.

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will be agreed upon in light of the immediate requirements and of time necessary for training Egyptian personnel to supersede British technicians." Acceptance of this principle goes far to meet requirement in paragraph 4 of case A cited in appendix C. In this regard we trust that US and UK authorities will give consideration to possibility (a) of giving some assurances regarding training of Egyptian personnel and (b) possibility of US participation in supplying at least a portion of "technicians" left on base. As Embassy Despatch 1002, November 26 [9] indicated present Egyptian Charge London has given strong hint that participation of other than British technical personnel might be palatable to Egyptians.

Similarly re para 5 in case A and 11 in case B might it not be possible if only to win Egypt acquiescence that some of integrated base air def might be given to USA? We assume of course that "integrated Anglo-Egypt air defense" contemplates maximum use of Egyptian squadrons.

Likewise on question of air def we feel that one of strongest selling points from psychological pt of view wld be at once to assure Egyptians that anti-aircraft gun defense would forthwith be placed in Egyptian hands. Comdr. of ack-ack is prominent member of mil high comite and such a move wld strongly appeal to professional pride of comite.

In all three alternatives it is reiterated that Royal Navy cld maintain equip for def of Egyptian ports and have access to commercial bunkers. In view of cordial relations between Egypt and Brit navies, this statement which is so obvious might in fact be deleted and could be replaced with assurance of intent of allied powers to rely on Egypt naval forces for minesweeping and harbor defense purposes.

Alternatives A and B require allied-manned "staging post" in Egypt. We question necessity of such a field in light of (a) facilities Libya, Cyprus and elsewhere in ME and (b) numbers of personnel such operation would require (alternative cited para 18 under case C wld seem adequate).

In light of paras B and D Naguib memo Nov 10 Egyptians will most certainly not accept paras 1 and 2 of case A but we feel they might buy remainder of case A and most of B (with modifications suggested above) provided they have feeling they were being treated as equal partners. In this regard we revert to suggestions previously made that language of Arab Security pact which was copied almost directly from NATO might assuage feelings of *amour propre* and provide us with language formula for use of Suez base both in peace and in war.

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[9] Not printed.

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Foregoing comment in pursuance of reftel is directed solely to Brit def paper. We do however wish strongly to emphasize that manner in which this negotiation is posed to Egyptians is almost as important as substance of the negot if there is to be any chance of success. We recommend accordingly that question of tactics be given important place on agenda of forthcoming London discussions.

McCLINTOCK

No. 1057

774.5/12-2952: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (McClintock) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 29, 1952—4 p. m.

1528. Last night I told three members of the Military High Committee of my contemplated departure for London. They were Colonel Gama abd Al Nasir, number two man to Naguib, Colonel Amin, and Major Hakim Amer. I said that Byroade's visit to London and desire of British Government to discuss overall defense problem was additional proof of serious intent on part of United States and United Kingdom to achieve positive results which would be mutually beneficial to Egypt as well as to the western powers.

On Sudan, Egyptian officers were most skeptical as to British motives. They have pathological distrust of British administration in Sudan and said quite frankly that reason they attached such importance to question of south was their fear that, even in brief three-year period of liquidation of present Sudan Government, British would so excite southerners that they would opt for secession from Sudan and possible annexation to adjoining British colonies.

We explained that British were not as Machiavellian as Egyptians supposed and that British Government had made concession after concession in sincere endeavor to reach meeting of the minds on Sudan. We urged that Egyptians were within striking distance of achieving their strategical objective, which was ultimate British withdrawal from Sudan and that it would be folly for them to break off negotiations on the three "sticking points" on which British Cabinet had taken its decision. On discussing these points we found that the colonels regarded question of Governor General's emergency powers as one of [*on?*] which agreement could be reached, and that they felt issue of "Sudanization" could be met by

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 518 and to Khartoum as telegram 36.

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some formula. However, on south, they said that no public statement could be made which would imply that south was any different from rest of Sudan. We pointed out that British had already evidenced their willingness to include formal assurances as to unity of Sudan in agreement which would be reached with Egypt. We likewise suggested that possibly secret protocol to published accord or perhaps even a letter from British Prime Minister to Egyptian Prime Minister allaying Egyptian fears that south would be encouraged to secede might be a way out of present dilemma.

I called this morning on British Ambassador and gave him substance of above. He said that last night Naguib had telephoned for him and later he had called on Fawzi who said that reports had reached Egyptian Government suggesting that there might be demonstrations or even bodily attack on Major Salah Salem and Minister of Works, Bakhouri, during their present tour of south. Stevenson had sent urgent telegram to Khartoum reporting this *démarche* and calling attention of Governor General to deplorable effect such an incident would have on negotiations. First Secretary Burroughs of the British Embassy is now in Khartoum assisting Governor General in preparation of latter's comments on London's draft of proposed agreement. Once these have been considered by London, Stevenson expects to present final draft to Naguib.

McCLINTOCK

No. 1058

774.5 MSP/12-2952

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 30, 1952.

Subject: Israel and Grant Arms Assistance for Egypt

Discussion

The Department has written the Department of Defense proposing that a joint recommendation be made to the President that Egypt be found eligible for grant military assistance under Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and that $5 to $10 million dollars be allotted for this purpose for fiscal 1953. The JCS have approved these recommendations and we have received a formal notification to that effect from the Secretary of Defense

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Stabler.

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dated December 29.[2] Defense is presently preparing an interim military aid program for Egypt in the amount of $10 million dollars, of which a portion would be grant, provided Egypt is found eligible. This program is based on the list of requirements of the Egyptian Armed Forces which was attached to General Naguib's communication of November 10 (Tab A).[2]

In preparation for the submission of the joint recommendation to the President, Mr. Byroade had a conversation with Mr. Tannenwald of the Office of DMS several days ago.[2] He was informed that the President is under heavy pressure from American Jewish groups and from Israel to find Israel eligible for grant military assistance.[3] Failing that, these groups and Israel do not wish that any Arab state be found eligible unless it has agreed before hand to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Mr. Tannenwald believed that the White House would find it difficult to agree to Egypt's eligibility unless Israel is similarly treated.

This situation raises many serious implications because we understand that the Department of Defense is strongly opposed to grant assistance to Israel. This opposition is based on the consideration that Israel's armed strength is already out of proportion to the defense and security needs of the Near East. NEA also considers that under existing circumstances it would be prejudicial to the security of the Near East and to our attempts to "direct sunshine" on Egypt, to recommend that Israel be found eligible at this time for grant assistance. There exists then the danger that the grant assistance programs for Egypt would be undermined if it should be insisted that Israel be accorded similar treatment at this time.

There may be some suggestion that all the Near Eastern states be found eligible for grant military assistance. NEA would find no difficulty in such a finding as a matter of administrative convenience, but not necessarily for active use at this time. We have been informed by the JCS that it would not favor grant military assistance to any Near Eastern state without justifiable overriding political considerations. In the case of Egypt, we have expressed the view that there are such considerations and the JCS have concurred. It may also be determined that Saudi Arabia should be made eligible. NEA does not believe, however, that there are such considerations at the present time in the case of Israel, and we are concerned lest the difficulties foreseen by Mr. Tannenwald frustrate our efforts in connection with Egypt.

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[2] Not printed.

[3] For documentation regarding Israeli efforts to obtain U.S. military aid, see Documents 381 ff.

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Attached is a proposed letter to Mr. Harriman asking him to seek a presidential determination of eligibility for grant military assistance to Egypt.[4]

Recommendations

It is recommended that you discuss this question urgently with the President and Mr. Harriman with a view to clearing the way for expeditious action on the Egyptian matter.

The following points may be useful to you:

1. We are convinced that Egypt is the key to the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization and to a new relationship between the West and the Arab states.
2. We believe that in order to achieve Egyptian participation in MEDO, it will be necessary to initiate a military and economic aid program (in which grant assistance will play an important part) and to reach a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian question.
3. General Naguib has shown himself both reasonable and skillful and we believe that he represents our best chance to establish a relationship of confidence between his country and the West. We must support him if he is to overcome opposition which will undoubtedly increase unless he has something to show for his present reasonable and courageous attitude.
4. A cash reimbursable military program alone would not be practical in the light of the Egyptian foreign exchange situation. Consequently, we shall have to supplement it with grant assistance. In all events, we shall carefully measure our assistance against Egyptian performance.
5. Amongst our principal objectives vis-à-vis Egypt, is a settlement between Israel and Egypt. We believe if we can bring Egypt into MEDO and establish this new relationship, such a settlement can be achieved. In fact, Ambassador Caffery has been told that peace with Israel is an objective of General Naguib's regime. However, premature action on this matter might destroy what we are now trying to do.
6. We have not overlooked or in any way forgotten Israel's situation, but consider that to deny Egypt grant military aid or military aid in any form until peace is signed is impractical and not in accord with the realities of the present situation.
7. We consider the development of a military aid program for Egypt a matter of great urgency and believe the next few months will be particularly sensitive insofar as the stability of General Naguib is concerned.
8. A simultaneous finding of eligibility for both Egypt and Israel (which would probably become public knowledge) would greatly lessen the psychological impact of a finding in favor of Egypt alone at this time.

It is recommended that you sign the attached letter.

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[4] Not printed.

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No. 1059

774.5 MSP/12-3152

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Kitchen)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 31, 1952.

Participants: Mr. Harriman
Mr. Acheson

Secretary Acheson telephoned Mr. Harriman. Mr. Acheson said that he had a letter addressed to Mr. Harriman asking Mr. Harriman to ask the President to have Egypt made eligible for grant military assistance. The JCS want to send between 5 and 10 million dollars of material for the Egyptian Army and it has been worked out with the JCS and representatives of Naguib. The Secretary said that there would be a great deal of pressure on Mr. Harriman and the President to have Israel brought into this. Mr. Harriman agreed that pressure was already on.

Mr. Harriman said the Israelis were talking about two conditions: (1) that we won't give grant aid to Egypt unless we bring Israel into it; and (2) Egypt starts peace discussions. The Secretary said that those conditions are both impossible, as far as public announcements were concerned, and would defeat the aim of helping Naguib. If they were put on, it would be better not to offer aid at all.

Mr. Harriman inquired as to how much 5 or 10 million would do, and the Secretary said that it gives Naguib something from us, something for internal security and prestige of the army—the continuing support of which he badly needs. We haven't been able to do much for him economically.

Mr. Harriman inquired what the nature of the material was. The Secretary said that he did not know, but he could have that information developed for Mr. Harriman. Mr. Harriman said that if it is for internal security, that is different.

Mr. Acheson asked Mr. Harriman if he wished him to send a letter over to him, or wait until he got the list of items. Mr. Harriman said that either way was all right. He thought that both he and the Secretary would have to talk to the President about it, after talking it over with each other. The Secretary said he would send the letter over, and that Mr. Harriman would probably get it on Friday, the second. The Secretary asked Mr. Harriman when he would be working on the matter. Mr. Harriman said that he thought on Friday, in so far as he could work on it.

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Mr. Harriman asked what the President's plans were, and the Secretary said he would be seeing him on Monday. The Secretary said he thought they should talk about it beforehand and see where they stood.

The Secretary said he would have Mr. Jernegan get the facts in the case and Mr. Harriman suggested that Mr. Jernegan see him on Friday. Mr. Harriman would call the Secretary afterward.

No. 1060

611.41/1-253

The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State-designate (Dulles)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 31, 1952.

DEAR FOSTER: Attached are notes on various items in which Mr. Churchill or the British Government have shown interest in the past [1] and which it is possible Mr. Churchill may bring into the conversations with General Eisenhower. [2] We have attempted to make these comments as brief as possible and in some cases we have condensed the original papers to the best of our ability. Some of them, such as atomic energy, are not susceptible of condensation. On the others we have attached the original comments in case you want to refer to them for more ample statements than the brief notes for the General.

In preparing this list of subjects we have no idea that General Eisenhower will want to take any of these subjects up with the Prime Minister but simply that he may want to be informed of the present status of the problems in case the Prime Minister raises them. If the information is not adequate we will be ready to supply promptly anything further which you want.

As some of the items are Top Secret, I am sending this data to the UN Delegation in New York, asking them to bring it to you at your convenience and to wait for it so that they can return it for safe keeping. They will bring it to you at any time or times that you wish the material.

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[1] Besides the attachment entitled "Egypt", there were also memoranda, none printed, entitled "Brief Notes on Questions Prime Minister Churchill Might Raise"; "Iran"; "Note on the Situation in Indochina and Malaya"; "Atomic Energy"; "General U.K. Attitudes and Policies in the Far East"; and a background memorandum relating to and a copy of the invitation received from the United Kingdom for the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.

[2] President-elect Eisenhower and Secretary of State-designate Dulles were scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Churchill in New York on Jan. 6, 1953.

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Since the above was dictated we have received a wire from Walter Gifford as follows:

"Personal for the Secretary
"I lunched with Churchill at Checquers on December 27 and from all I could find out I do not think Churchill has any specific matters which he is to take up with either Eisenhower or President. In conversation with Eden, yesterday, he confirmed my understanding. However, I should remind you that Prime Minister's unpredictability has not decreased with the years. Eden also said he did not expect Churchill would go to US when he and Butler plan their trip, but my impression is they will want to go as soon after inauguration as may be acceptable to new administration. Gifford" [3]

I also enclose for your information the communication from the Foreign Office about the coronation. We have told Walter Gifford that we thought it was unlikely that the Special Mission could be named until after January 20 or that we could give the names of people occupying the seats allocated to us before that time. We have, of course, been careful to avoid any commitments regarding seats.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE W. PERKINS

[Attachment]

EGYPT

Egypt is the key to the Arab States and therefore to the problem of area defense and solution of the Arab-Israeli quarrel. The assumption of power by General Naguib has created perhaps the first real opportunity for a reasonable settlement of the problems which threaten stability in the Near East. However, a satisfactory understanding with Egypt requires solution of the Anglo-Egyptian disputes over the Sudan and over maintenance of British military bases in the Suez Canal area. It will also require provision of a certain amount of military and economic aid to Egypt.

1. The Sudan:

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for an agreement on self-government and self-determination for the Sudan are in their final stages. There is danger, however, that they will break down over certain points connected with powers to be retained temporarily by the Governor-General and, especially, his power to protect the . . . peo-

[3] This is a verbatim quote of telegram 3608 from London, Jan. 1, 1953. (033.4111/1-153)

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ples of the Southern Sudan against possibly harmful actions of the northern Sudanese majority.

The United States is not directly involved but is deeply concerned lest failure of these negotiations should make impossible a resolution of the over-all Egyptian question. We do not believe that vague fears for the future welfare of a relatively small number of . . . Sudanese should be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement deeply affecting, not only the security and other interests of the Western Powers, but also the security and welfare of many millions of Near Easterners. British rigidity on this issue could be disastrous.

2. The Suez Canal Bases:

British military installations in the Canal area are by far the largest anywhere in the Middle East and are the only ones presently in the area, outside of Turkey, capable of supporting a substantial military force. Britain presently has stationed in the Canal region about 81,000 troops, despite the fact that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 allows her only 10,000. There are indications that morale among the troops is low and that financial and practical difficulties in maintaining the bases at their present level make the British anxious for an early settlement.

The Egyptian Government denounced the Treaty of 1936 in October, 1951 and demanded that all British forces be evacuated from Egypt. However, General Naguib, present head of the Egyptian Government, has indicated that he would permit a certain number of "technicians" to remain in the Canal Zone to maintain the installations if the bulk of the British forces were withdrawn and other conditions met. The British Government has recently intimated to us that it would be prepared to withdraw all of its forces by the end of 1954 if satisfactory arrangements could be worked out for the participation of Egypt in a Middle East defense organization and for the maintenance of the base installations in such a way that they would be available to Allied Forces immediately after the outbreak of war.

Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade is this week in London at the head of a team to discuss possible proposals to Egypt regarding the Suez base question. These proposals would be combined with offers of military and economic aid from the United States and Great Britain in return for satisfactory political and military commitments on the part of the Egyptian Government.

3. Aid to Egypt:

The United States Government is planning to offer Egypt a small military aid program, to a value of about $10,000,000, the greater proportion of which will be on a cash-reimbursable basis, as an evi-

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dence of friendship and good faith without awaiting the conclusion of formal negotiations or commitments. However, we intend to withhold any large-scale or continuing program of military aid until the Canal question and Egyptian participation in Middle East defense are settled, at least in principle.

Our main divergence with the British over the question of aid to Egypt is with respect to timing. In general, they are inclined to be more cautious and demand more in return from the Egyptians for such assistance.

Our plans for economic aid to meet the pressing social and economic problems which face Egypt are still in the exploratory stage. However, the Point Four Program is now expanding its operations in Egypt and is becoming a widely accepted indication of United States interest in Egyptian problems.

4. Background:

Mr. Churchill has a great personal interest in the Egyptian question, particularly the Sudan problem, which has nostalgic connotations for him. On his last trip to the United States, in his speech to the Congress, the Prime Minister asked for a "token" number of American troops in the Suez Canal Zone, although he did not specify whether or not these troops would be there under Middle East Defense Organization auspices.

No. 1061

Editorial Note

Appendix D of the final agreed version of the "United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt" contained alternatives, or "Cases" as they were soon to be called, "A", "B", and "C". It reads as follows:

FACILITIES REQUIRED IN PEACE AND WAR

PEACE

Case "A"

1. The Canal Zone would be handed over to Egypt and the base area would be placed under Egyptian control. Within this base existing depots and installations would be retained and would be run and controlled on the analogy of our base in Belgium or the United States base in the United Kingdom.

2. The depots and installations would act as a working maintenance base for a proportion of the Middle East Land Forces in

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peace. The R.A.F. would not, however, carry out any maintenance from installations in Egypt in peace.

3. The Royal Navy would retain equipment in Egypt for the defence of ports and maintain it under British supervision and have the use of the existing commercial oil storage facilities and pipelines.

4. The Army would retain not more than 5,000 personnel to run these installations and the R.A.F. not more than 2,000 for the same purpose.

5. There would be an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation, including Headquarters, two British Day Fighter Squadrons and one British Night Fighter Squadron, C. and R. Organisations, &c.

6. An Allied-manned staging post would be maintained in Egypt.

7. *Implications.*—If the Egyptians could be persuaded to accept these conditions in peace-time, the Allies would be assured of having a working maintenance base in peace to which they could return and operate immediately in war, and which would be protected by an efficient air defence system.

Case "B"

8. The base would remain in Egypt and be placed under Egyptian control. The Egyptians would take over such depots and installations as the Allies wished to retain in Egypt for war, assuming full responsibility for keeping all communications, &c., in working order and for maintaining Allied war reserves and heavy workshops in a state to be reactivated at short notice. There would also be some turnover of stores and equipment for use by the Middle East Land Forces in peace.

9. In order to assist the Egyptians in their task a rather smaller number than under Case "A" of Allied supervisory and technical Army and Air Force personnel would be required.

10. The Royal Navy would retain equipment in Egypt for the defence of ports and maintain it under British supervision and have the use of the existing commercial oil storage facilities and pipelines.

11. There would be an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation, including Headquarters, two British Day Fighter Squadrons and one British Night Fighter Squadron, C. and R. Organisation, &c.

12. An Allied-manned staging post would be maintained in Egypt.

13. *Implications.*—Under these conditions there would not be a fully satisfactory working base in Egypt in peace, but it should be possible to reactivate it within 60 days. Some stocks for the initial

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maintenance of Allied forces in the Middle East in war would have to be located outside the Canal Zone.

Case "C"

14. The base would remain in Egypt and be placed under Egyptian control. The Egyptians would assume the same responsibilities as for Case "B" (paragraph 8 above) except that there would be no turnover of stores and equipment for use by the Middle East Land Forces in peace.

15. The right of periodic inspections of reserves and installations should be retained. The military personnel to carry out these inspections should, if possible, be stationed in Egypt. However, if the Egyptians were adamant that they would not allow this, agreement might be given to Service personnel wearing plain clothes or to the use of civilians. Failing this it might be necessary to agree that inspecting personnel should be stationed outside Egypt and carry out periodic visits.

16. The Royal Navy would retain equipment in Egypt for the defence of ports and place it under Egyptian supervision for maintenance, with the right of periodic inspection. They would have the use of the existing commercial oil storage facilities and pipe-lines.

17. No R.A.F. units would be left in Egypt, but agreement could be given to seconding to the Egyptian Air Force some instructors and advisers. No guarantee of participation in the air defence of Egypt could be given, but agreement might be reached to send units in peace-time to take part in exercises with the Egyptian Air Force.

18. The Allies would require the use of an Egyptian-manned staging post in Egypt and the necessary overflying rights for peacetime movements and training.

19. *Implications.*—In these circumstances, it is estimated that it would take at least 90 days to reactivate the base. It would be necessary therefore to retain at least 90 days' stocks for the whole of the Middle East Garrison in locations outside the Canal Zone. In addition, the United States use of Abu Sueir and Farouk airfields in the very early stages of war might become impracticable since the equipment would not be adequately maintained there in peacetime.

IN WAR

20. Under all cases the use of a working base in Egypt in war, together with Egyptian assistance and co-operation, is an essential requirement. In addition, allied Naval Forces will require the use of Alexandria, Port Said and Suez.

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21. To obtain these facilities is the paramount object of the negotiations. (774.5/1–1453)

No. 1062

774.5/1–153: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 1, 1953—9 p. m.

3610. Following is abbreviated text UK paper entitled "Military Assistance to Egypt—Supply of Arms and Warlike Equipment" [2] handed to us today by Foreign Office for discussion during talks on Egypt. Such comments as Department and Cairo may wish make urgently would be appreciated.

"*I. Supplies from United Kingdom.*

1. Since October 1951 when Egyptian Government denounced 1936 Treaty UK has maintained, subject to certain recent exceptions, complete embargo on supply arms and warlike equipment Egypt. Chief exceptions are:

(a) In October 1952 embargo on supply maintenance spares, other than arms, for operational aircraft was lifted. At same time HMG agreed to release consignment Chipmunk trainer aircraft to Egypt.

(b) In November we agreed to release 15 Meteor jet aircraft (12 fighters and 3 trainers).

(c) In December we approved export certain machine tools, engines, and sets of components required in connection with manufacture of Vampire aircraft in Egypt and some spares and minor items, mostly non-lethal, for Egyptian army.

2. All above equipment had been on order for several years. It was released as gesture goodwill towards GOE.

3. As regards remainder equipment on order by Egypt in UK it is by no means certain that she still requires all. At suitable moment she will probably be invited to submit up to date list her requirements. Meanwhile of greatest importance security UK forces in Egypt should not be prejudiced until prospects defence agreement become clearer. Also important to make as much capital as possible in course negotiations out of such releases of arms from UK as may be made for present intention therefore not to release any further supplies from UK until negotiations are under way. Thereafter they would be released in phases. Timing each release would depend on course of negotiations well as availability equipment

[1] This telegram was repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 181.

[2] This British paper was Appendix D of the "Agreed Record" of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. (774.5/1–1453)

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concerned (none of army equipment could be delivered without some detriment to needs of UK and her allies, but may well be necessary to accept some detriment as price agreement), and most important items wld be withheld until agreement reached.

4. Existing orders from UK have been divided into following phases:

Army equipment.

Phase A.

Major items:

(i) Some static 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns;
(ii) Spare parts for Centurion tanks already held by Egyptians;
(iii) Wireless sets from War Office stocks;
(iv) One or two radar sets Mark III.

Phase B.

Major items so far known:

(i) Centurion tanks Mark III and armoured cars (these could be supplied without detriment to active forces but at some detriment to first contingent of territorial army);
(ii) Machine guns, with some small arms and other ammunition from War Office stocks.

Equipment in these phases would be drawn in roughly equal proportions from trade, new production and War Office stocks. Total estimated value known requirements some five million pounds of which Egyptians have already made down payments to value one million pounds.

Air Force equipment.

Phase A.

(i) Remaining jet aircraft and components already ordered: 12 Meteor Mark VIII fighters, 22 Vampire fighter bombers, 16 Vampire night fighters;
(ii) 21 Spitfires for which Egyptian air force recently enquired;
(iii) Further components and parts for production of Vampire aircraft.

Phase B.

Ammunition and arament spares now on order for existing aircraft of Egyptian air force.

Value equipment phases A and B above about pounds three million sterling.

Phase C.

Any new orders for jet aircraft and for armament spares.

Naval equipment.

Quantity naval equipment required by Egyptians so small it may be ignored for present purpose.

II. Supplies from US.

5. Apart from her requirements from UK, Egypt has submitted to US list of requirements. Many these items could be supplied

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from UK sources, some at once from War Office stocks and some from new production over period one to two years. Regarding phasing, bulk warlike items for army, and jet day and night fighters with spares and ammunition, would come under phase B (army) and phase C (air force), in paragraph 4 above, and remainder could mostly be supplied now without contravening UK arms embargo policy.

6. Only warlike equipment which US have supplied to Egypt since denunciation of 1936 Treaty has been consignment of weapons and armoured vehicles originally ordered by Farouk equip personal bodyguard which he proposed to form.

III. Financing of Supplies.

7. Arms from UK would only be supplied for cash. This connection UK side would be glad know whether US Government might be willing make special release dollars to Egypt for purchase military equipment in UK. Such arrangement would have additional advantage according considerable incidental financial assistance to UK.

IV. Phasing of Supplies.

8. Proposals for phasing UK arms supplies described in paragraph 4 above were drawn up in accordance with principle, suggested by State Department, that supplies of arms should form part of package solution. For this phasing to be effective necessary any arms which US may decide supply to Egypt should be similarly phased. UK side would be glad know if US Government could agree to coordinate phasing on these lines.

9. Also necessary in due course inform North Atlantic powers and other friendly countries such as Sweden and Switzerland, which maintaining total or partial embargo on supply arms Egypt at request HMG of above intentions, and invite them keep in step. This could be done shortly before Egyptians due be informed first release. To do so earlier would be to risk premature collapse embargo imposed by these countries and so lose much of advantage in negotiations to be gained by US and UK releases arms. Moreover it would be unfortunate if news these intentions leaked to Egyptians."

GIFFORD

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No. 1063

774.5 MSP/1-253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, January 2, 1953—8 p. m.

1552. Following are my comments on United Kingdom paper re military assistance to Egypt contained London's 181 January 1. [2]

It is imperative that we comprehend situation clearly and speak frankly. British proposals are based upon mistaken premise that if United States and other potential arms suppliers will continue to accept British arms embargo policy toward Egypt United Kingdom will be able to use "phased" release of arms as effective bargaining weapon in extracting from Egypt some sort of "package" deal on evacuation and Egypt participation in MEDO. (Paragraph 8 section 4 represents obvious attempt by British to turn Department's phrase to their own uses.)

All our efforts to date in urging prompt action on interim program of military and economic assistance have been based upon the conviction that an overt gesture of confidence in Naguib and tangible support for his regime is essential to give him basis from which to move in the direction of kind of agreement we and British desire. Such a policy admittedly involves calculated risk. Every day's delay in replying to Egyptian request for aid increases that risk. Our December 5 on basis Department's 1154 [3] I told Naguib he should expect answer in ten days. Department therefore should choose and choose immediately whether to press on with program of interim assistance or to agree to "coordinate phasing" of United States arms supplies along lines proposed by British.

Latter alternative entails United States acceptance British premise outlined above. Old mutual suspicions reawakened by British stalling on Sudan and by somewhat exaggerated Egyptian reaction thereto have so poisoned atmosphere as to preclude successful bilateral Anglo-Egyptian bargaining. (Colonel Amin stated this morning: "Our confidence in British has sunk so low that we will not sign any agreement unless United States is also partner thereto".)

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[1] Repeated niact to London as telegram 525.

[2] Printed as telegram 3610, *supra*.

[3] In telegram 1154 to Cairo, Dec. 3, 1952, not printed, the Department informed Ambassador Caffery that the various agencies involved were working up an interim military assistance program for Egypt which would be both cash reimbursable and grant in nature, and that the Department expected to be able to inform Caffery in the following ten days or so just what the scope of the program would be. (774.5 MSP/12-352)

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We are exerting utmost efforts here to keep temperature down (see my next following telegram) [4] but I must warn Department that danger of open Anglo-Egyptian blowup exists. If it takes place all hope of Arab cooperation with West in foreseeable future will vanish.

Under these circumstances I can only recommend:

(1) That we resist British effort to delay our interim aid program which these proposals entail;
(2) That we redouble our efforts at all points to allay growing mistrust between British and Egyptians;
(3) That with absolute minimum of delay we implement program of interim military and economic assistance which I understand Department has in advanced stage of preparation.

This is the only policy which I can envisage that holds possibility for effective United States role as active mediating participant in most difficult negotiations ahead and which in the event of an Anglo-Egyptian impasse might preserve for the West through the United States some shreds of a residual position in Middle East. I fully appreciate strain which such course of action will place upon our relations with British. The stake is the Middle East and a good part of Africa. The Department can alone decide what price it is worth.

CAFFERY

[4] Not printed.

No. 1064

774.5/1–353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 3, 1953—noon.

3635. There follows summary of two meetings held so far with British on Egypt. British delegation headed by Bowker with services group headed by Air Chief Marshal Baker, Vice Chief Air Staff.

First meeting December 31 was on UK memo on defense negotiations with Egypt. [2] Byroade expressed general agreement with

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 183 and unnumbered to Khartoum.
[2] See telegram 1524 from Cairo, Document 1056.

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paper although doubted whether case A could in fact be obtained. [3] Following points of detail discussed:

1. *Technicians*

British said command of Canal Zone base and responsibility for its maintenance could be in Egyptian hands but if to be fully operative at opening of hostilities would be necessary to have foreign technicians and supervisors. Neither supervisors or technicians would have command of functions. British also suggested possibility other allied powers providing technicians. They thought it extremely important to impress upon Egyptians the idea that even if they possessed all necessary equipment some foreign technicians still be needed on continuing basis in view of rapid technical changes. Byroade stated he considered it important psychologically to get across to the Egyptians at least in principle that non-Egypt technicians were there to train Egyptians to eventually handle all functions themselves. Said we should do everything possible to make Egyptians feel equal to us. British agreed that paper should be more precise regarding technicians and agreed elaborate principles underlying technical aid concept in separate papers.

2. *Redeployment of troops*

British explained that total evacuation of Canal Zone would take approximately eighteen months. First troops to leave and their withdrawal could start immediately after agreement reached—were non-garrison troops brought in since crisis last November. These probably be redeployed to UK. Main redeployment difficulty concerned garrison troops, both from standpoint of locating base for them and providing accommodations. At present their redeployment be confined to Cyprus and Libya. Before withdrawal from Canal Zone reached an advanced stage, British hoped to have agreement with Libya permitting stationing there of additional British troops. Headquarters would be probably moved to Cyprus. Gaza strip as redeployment area been for moment abandoned due to tremendous cost of constructing base there and political complications involved (i.e. refugees, etc).

3. *"Integrated Anglo-Egyptian air defense organ"*

British stress creation this or similar organ vital as defense of area depended adequate air defense for Canal Zone base at outbreak of war. Explained air force currently staging fighter-bomber exercises and of utmost importance from defense standpoint that such exercises be continued. As Egyptians had no modern bomber squadron and as they not sufficently proficient in fighter tactics British saw no alternative to British having *de facto* responsibility for air defense of Egypt although probably have to grant Egyptians have nominal responsibilities. At least in initial stages hoped to have British squadrons stationed Egypt. It was recognized that Egypt acceptance such air defense scheme would depend in large measure on its presentation which would have to stress Egypt responsibilities and UK technical and operational assistance.

4. *Approach*

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[3] For the text of Case A as agreed to by both sides in Appendix D of the "United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt", see Document 1061.

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British believe it inadvisable approach Egyptians on specific points outlined British paper. They thought it preferable explain that proposals constitute package including evacuation British troops, MEDO and military and economic assistance. Their target would be to come as close as possible to case A but realized case A would probably prove unacceptable to Egypt. They hoped that if they made clear to Egypt their strategic requirements, problems operating base etc., it might be possible arrive at figure supervisory and technical personnel which would in fact give British necessary protection their interest.

US–UK meeting on British draft MEDO paper (Embtel 3605, December 31) [4] and draft paper on military assistance (Embtel 3610 January 1) [5] took place morning January 2.

Regarding MEDO paper US said they did not believe we should try establish MEDO in manner British paper envisaged. We believe that most it would be possible to obtain initially from Egypt in return for British agreement on evacuation would be Egypt acceptance in principle to common defense planning. We felt it essential that we work towards public statement by Egypt accepting this principle which would be made at same time UK announcement evacuation. Following such acceptance negotiation would then proceed with Egypt re nature and scope its participation.

US also believed that as soon as negotiations with Egypt on MEDO had reached suitable point, approaches should then be made to other Arab states. British argued that unless they had adequate assurances about Egyptian participation in MEDO, it is not possible to agree to evacuation since if Egypt refused common defense planning, defense vacuum would be created. US side considered that Egypt could be brought to discuss form of MEDO and extent their participation before evacuation had progressed very far but believed that evacuation would have to start prior to negotiations on form of MEDO itself. British agreed that MEDO could not be established until negotiations with Egypt and other Arab states on form had been undertaken and indicated they would redraft for discussion at subsequent meeting. Re British paper phrasing military assistance to progress in negotiations (Embtel 3610 Jan 1), Byroade expressed concern at this procedure as philosophy of "little steps for little people". He emphasized our approach somewhat different. We felt that stakes in Egypt are such that we must be prepared take risks and give concrete evidence of our good

[4] For text, see Document 113. The British draft paper on the Middle East Defense Organization and Egyptian participation in it, not printed here, was Appendix A of the "Agreed Record" of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. (774.5/1–1453) It subsequently became "Agreed Paper No. 2" of the United States–United Kingdom Talks.

[5] Document 1062.

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faith to present Egyptian regime. This all more important because of military character that regime. Egyptians some time ago presented us with list arms and equipment they required. Thus far, we have failed respond their appeal. As condition precedent establishment proper atmosphere for productive negotiations, we have been examining possibility interim military assistance of magnitude of approximately $10,000,000 of which part might be grant assistance. Our inability thus far extend substantial economic aid gives added importance our being forthcoming military assistance.

British reacted strongly to this suggestion. They argued supply of arms now would (1) reduce bargaining effect of arms assistance in negotiations, (2) stimulate supply of arms to Egypt from other countries, (3) have bad psychological effect on UK troops in Canal Zone, (4) present difficulties with Parliament, (5) cause difficulties with Israel, and (6) past experience (release of jets and sterling) indicated such attempt improve atmosphere unrewarding.

Byroade emphasized that risks involved offset by facts (1) deliveries would be slow and (2) if the Egyptians prove uncooperative supply of arms could be cut off at any time.

Bowker said Eden had strong views this point and matter would have to be further explored. British military appeared take less concerned view this problem than FonOff, although military wish know what types equipment US had in mind.

GIFFORD

No. 1065

774.5 MSP/1–353: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 3, 1953—4:38 p. m.

4399. Further re London's 3610 Jan 1, and re Cairo's 1552 Jan 2. Fol represents present Dept views re interim arms program for Egypt. These views should not be considered as final since interim arms list itself (Deptel 4374 Jan 2) [2] still subj discussions in De-

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 1324.

[2] In telegram 4374 to London, Jan. 2, not printed, the Department provided Assistant Secretary of State Byroade with a tentative arms list which was serving as the basis of discussions in Washington with two Egyptian officers representing General Naguib. The Department informed Byroade that the Egyptians had indicated a preference for the United States, as opposed to the United Kingdom, as their major source of arms. The Department, however, also told Byroade that the substantive American positions on the British conception of arms assistance as reported in telegram 3610 from London, Document 1062, still had to await the receipt of further

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fense and conversations London may bring new factors to bear on question.

Dept fully aware importance immediate if restrained arms assistance Naguib regime and tentative list such arms program had been largely drawn up. Arrival Egypt officers [3] who apparently speak with auth has resulted in discussions which already have led to extensive if not total revision police equipment list as well as previously conceived interim assistance list. It is believed that if polit developments re Egypt warrant, we will also be able make available expanded arms program based on 12 month period.

Interim arms program which it is believed wld be composed certain items amounting to about $10 million or 1/3 potential 12 month program and which cld be made available shipment 60 to 90 days, in Dept's thinking wld constitute overt gesture of confidence in Naguib which Dept believes important. Among earliest releasable items agreeable to Egypt team wld be armored cars, helmets and jeeps.

Calculated risk of possible later large scale arms shipment Egypt wld be minimized by attempt coordinate arms shipment over and above interim program with progress negots with Egypt since Dept believes that up to point arms deliveries have some bargaining significance.

To summarize: Subj further discussion Dept Defense and possibility new factors arising from London in talks Dept considers interim arms program as being distinct from long-range arms assistance, which latter wld accompany Egypt cooperation NE defense and wld be discussed with Egypts only in context of negots re such cooperation. Interim program now near finalization, however nr complicating factors not least of which are changes in Egypt requests as well as gen problem NE area relationships must be taken into account. London talks shld be most helpful to Dept in making final decision this regard.

This tel being sent in attempt to clarify situation as viewed Dept. Above position represents Dept's views only and does not attempt speak for Defense or DMS, which will be consulted further fol conclusion London talks.

ACHESON

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information gained from the talks in London. Therefore, the attached list of American arms was being sent to London to help Byroade determine how far British and American policies regarding arms assistance for Egypt could be brought into line. (774.5 MSP/1–253)

[3] Squadron Leader Ali Sabry and Lt. Col. Aly H. Niklawy.

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No. 1066

774.5 MSP/1-353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, January 3, 1953—6 p. m.

3640. From Byroade. Greatly concerned at implication in Deptel 4374 (repeated Cairo 1318) [2] that United States official proceeding with Egyptian officers on list of military equipment totaling approximately $30,000,000 and that list and cost thereof may already be in hands of Egyptians.

I had assumed one of primary objectives in talks here on Egypt was to make certain that talks ended with United States free to proceed immediately and prior to UK-Egyptian negotiations in Egypt with an interim program of military assistance totaling approximately $10,000,000 to $11,000,000. I explained our position to British yesterday and found them greatly disturbed that we would propose proceed with any commitment to Egyptians prior to United Kingdom-Egyptian negotiations. They have asked for a paper outlining our intentions in this regard which I will send by separate message. [3] Although I presented matter in such a way that I did not specifically ask their agreement, I believe it is doubtful that on this level I can conclude Egyptian talks without an express objection on their part to our proposal.

Problem may well be considered at cabinet level and I would not be surprised that an appeal will be made to the Secretary asking that we not proceed with plans for interim military aid. I do not propose to change position I have presented (see Embassy telegram 3635) unless instructed to contrary.

In face of above, if we are now engaged in actual conversations with Egyptians on either $30,000,000 or $11,000,000 program, we shall have placed ourselves in position to be accused of bad faith by British. I had understood before leaving Washington that no discussions would be held with Nikbawy and Sadry on arms aid except re "police equipment" and regarding general technical questions arising from Naguib's list of November 10 until talks here completed and green light could be given for interim arms aid program. I consider it most important that no discussions on interim arms aid program be held with Egyptian officers until firm decision re such program has been taken.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 185.

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] See telegram 3642 from London, Document 1068.

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Please clarify urgently as I am committed to present paper to British no later than Monday morning on proceeding with an immediate interim program in order magnitude of $11,000,000.

British Joint Chiefs of Staff give every indication of moving quickly upon military supplies to Egypt once base problem and defensive arrangements are well under way. They indicate they are prepared to give sufficiently high priority to Egyptians to make equipment roll rapidly.

They feel that Britain should be the primary source of military equipment for Egypt but do not seem averse to some assistance from United States providing matter properly coordinated. I also believe they are not as averse to $11,000,000 project as their Foreign Office officials.

There is one point here that must be borne in mind as we consider the composition of any list of United States equipment. British feel strongly about type of weapons being given to Egypt at this time which can readily be used in guerrilla warfare by Egyptians against them. I believe, even if we can secure agreement here in principle that we proceed without delay upon $11,000,000 program, that we should reconsider our list in this regard after my return. [4]

GIFFORD

[4] In telegram 4409 to London, Jan. 4, not printed, the Department expressed the hope to Byroade that telegram 4399, which had crossed London's 3640, made the thinking in Washington regarding the interim arms program reasonably clear. (774.5 MSP/1–453)

No. 1067

641.74/1–353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 3, 1953—7 p. m.

3641. From Byroade. Afternoon January 2 we continued talks with British on Egypt and covered following points:

1. *Economic Assistance.* British said they had looked into this question urgently, particularly from following points of view: (a) Increasing cotton purchases; (b) Stockpiling cotton; (c) Further sterling releases. Results largely negative. Re (a), raw cotton commission operates as independent agency on commercial lines, and HMG cannot interfere. Main difficulty is Sudanese cotton is six pence per pound cheaper. Present indications are that RCCs may

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 186 and unnumbered to Khartoum.

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not move into Egyptian market this year. Re (b) HMG has also encountered considerable difficulty. In first place it would require further legislation. Secondly, military not particularly interested since difficult to store and since could continue purchase in event emergency without too great strain on shipping. Re (c), main difficulty re substantial sterling releases is that all other countries in similar position would demand similar treatment.

I said that we had not been able to make much progress re economic assistance either. I said that defense was arranging increase current requirements which would result in purchase 14,000 bales cotton for approximately $5,000,000. We are also expanding scope of industrial survey to be carried out by Cabot. Consideration now being given to possibility limited wheat loan for grant, but this might take some time to work out.

During course of meeting, we inquired whether there would be any possibility of British permitting Egyptians to utilize remaining sterling balances to purchase arms in United Kingdom. British indicated could not make such arrangement, since other holders frozen balances would demand similar treatment. India, in particular, would demand similar treatment. British admitted, in this connection, that they have committed India's purchase surplus military equipment from frozen balances and said it might be possible to do same for Egypt in event agreement reached re defense. British also pointed out their strong domestic political objections to further sterling releases, in view Egyptian import restrictions. British stated that 10 million pounds due Egypt beginning of year were released yesterday. This draws balance down to 169 million pounds.

2. *Military Equipment.* Meeting reverted briefly to this matter. British asked us for paper, [2] which is in course preparation, explaining why we feel it desirable extend interim arms assistance before negotiations, form of such assistance and items which might be furnished.

British inquired whether, leaving aside for moment question of interim assistance, we objected to phrasing in British military paper transmitted Embtel 3610 January 1. I reiterated that I was not sure this was correct way to go about matter. However, this was question of primary concern to United Kingdom, affecting material to be supplied by them, and I was not sure that I could properly object. Neither did I feel I could agree. I suggested that minutes should make clear that I did not feel I could express opinion re phasing of United Kingdom aid.

Bowker emphasized United Kingdom hope that we would agree in principle that United Kingdom should be principal supplier of arms to Egypt, partly because this is only type of assistance which United Kingdom likely to be able to give and partly because much of present Egyptian equipment is of United Kingdom origin anyway. I said I thought we could agree in general with this concept but that we could not tie ourselves down precisely because of Egyptian request for arms to United States. I further indicated that we thought it would be highly undesirable to make any sort of

[2] See telegram 3642, *infra*.

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decision such as United States having primary responsibility for economic aid and United Kingdom for military assistance.

GIFFORD

No. 1068

774.5/1-353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, January 3, 1953—7 p. m.

3642. Following is text of paper entitled "United States position on immediate extension of military aid to Egypt" which we propose to give Britain Monday [2] in response to their request:

"1. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States are in agreement that the Government of General Naguib in Egypt affords the West Powers their best opportunity of working out satisfactory arrangements for the common defense of the area, not only with Egypt but eventually with the other Middle East States.

"2. The United Kingdom Government has concurred in the answer which the United States made to General Naguib on October 6, 1952, in response to his inquiry of September 18, indicating that it was ready to examine the possibility of extending material aid to Egypt, if Egypt for its part was ready to examine the possibility of entering into arrangements with the West Powers for mutual aid.

"3. General Naguib in a memorandum to the American Ambassador at Cairo dated November 10, 1952, indicated the willingness of his government to consider the eventual entry of Egypt into a system of Middle East defense with the West Powers, provided some solution could be found to the problem of British evacuation from the Canal Zone. With this communication he made formal request for military and economic assistance from the United States.

"4. The United Kingdom and the United States Governments are in agreement that it is in their best interests to maintain the Naguib regime in power. General Naguib has on numerous occasions indicated to the United States and United Kingdom Ambassadors in Cairo that, if he is to remain in power, he urgently needs aid from the West. He has made specific requests of the United

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 187.

[2] This U.S. paper appears in its original form as Appendix E of the "Agreed Record" of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt (774.5/1-1453), and it eventually became Annex A to Paper No. 4 of the United States–United Kingdom Talks with the following title: "United States Position on Extension of Military Aid to Egypt". (774.5/1-1453) For further information regarding its adoption as Annex A to Paper No. 4, see telegram 3691 from London, Document 1071.

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States for military and economic aid which have thus far met with no response.

"5. The United States is convinced that an immediate interim response to General Naguib's request for aid is essential not only to maintain the General's confidence in the West, but also to set the stage for the forthcoming negotiations between Egypt, the United Kingdom and the United States for settlement of the defense problem. Since it does not appear possible to formulate a program of economic assistance which could be carried out with any effect in the next few months, it is the belief of the United States that an interim military aid program is required. The military character of the present regime would seem to underscore the importance of such a program.

"6. In light of these circumstances the United States Government proposes therefore to make available to Egypt arms and military equipment to the approximate value of $10 million, some of which might be furnished as grant aid.

"7. Arms and equipment in the $10 million interim program of military aid would be selected from the list submitted in Annex I of the Egypt memorandum of November 10, 1952, and would so far as possible comprise arms and equipment which could not be used by the Egyptian armed forces in guerrilla or other armed attack on British troops stationed in the Canal Zone.

"8. In informing General Naguib of the readiness of the United States immediately to make available the $10 million shipment of military equipment in addition to the million dollar order of so-called 'police equipment' the furnishing of which has already been agreed to by the United Kingdom Government, the American Ambassador at Cairo would inform General Naguib that this step was taken as earnest of the friendly attitude of the United States and its desire to bring to a successful conclusion negotiations with Egypt which would place that country on the side of the free West Powers in some system for mutual defense of the Middle East.

"9. The position of the United States Government with respect to any future programs for military assistance for Egypt is that such programs will have to be carefully coordinated with the progress made in obtaining Egyptian adherence to any participation in a system of common defense planning. The scope and nature of United States assistance will therefore depend in the future in large measure on Egyptian performance.

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"10. While the United States will continue as a matter of policy to impress upon General Naguib and his government that the United States will expect Egypt to look to habitual sources of arms supply, the United States cannot agree that such a policy should exclude Egyptian purchases from the United States. The United States would also be prepared to consider the possibility that its military assistance to Egypt might in part take the form of material of British type purchased by the United States in the United Kingdom for transfer to Egypt. The United States will, of course, undertake to maintain close consultation and coordination with the United Kingdom in the formulation of any arms program." [3]

GIFFORD

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[3] In telegram 4408 to London, Jan. 4, not printed, the Department advised the Embassy that it approved the text of this paper, subject to suggestions. With regard to paragraph 5, the Department suggested that it might be helpful to point out to the British that immediate military aid would improve morale in the Egyptian armed forces and help bolster Naguib's position vis-à-vis them. Concerning paragraph 10, the Department suggested that the following words be inserted in the final sentence after the phrase "formulation of any arms program": "insofar as possible". The rationale for this additional phrasing was to avoid being too tightly bound by the British arms aid program. (774.5/1–353)

In telegram 3660 from London, Jan. 5, not printed, the Embassy reported that the following textual changes had been made in the United States paper on arms aid which had been handed to the British that day:

"Word 'immediate' omitted from title.

"Following two sentences inserted between second and third sentences in numbered paragraph 4: 'The only foreseeable force able to overun General Naguib would appear to be dissatisfied elements in the Egyptian armed services. The morale of the Egyptian services therefore is an important element in the [garble].'

"In numbered paragraph 6 after words 'United States Government' substitute 'considers it most desirable' in place of 'proposes therefore'.

"Following final sentence added to numbered paragraph 8: 'The Ambassador would make it clear that the United States would not make any additional shipment of equipment to Egypt unless definite progress had been made in the negotiation.'

"Final clause reading 'and on the general question of area relationships' added to last sentence numbered paragraph 9.

"First sentence paragraph 10 amended as follows: 'While the United States cannot agree that such a policy should exclude Egyptian procurement from the United States, the United States will continue as a matter of policy to impress upon General Naguib and his government that the United States will expect Egypt to look to its habitual sources of arms supply.'

"Final sentence numbered paragraph 10 amended as follows: 'The United States will, of course, undertake to maintain close consultation and coordination with the United Kingdom also far as possible in the formulation of any arms program.'" (774.5/1–553)

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No. 1069

774.5/1-353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, January 3, 1953—8 p. m.

3643. Following is UK paper entitled "procedure for negotiation agreement with Egypt on defense issues" handed to us by Foreign Office January 3 [2] for discussion Monday:

"*Objectives of the UK and US Governments.*

"1. The Governments of the UK and the US intend to enter into negotiation with the Egyptian Government in order to secure the voluntary association of Egypt with the West on arrangements for the defense of the Middle East against outside aggression. They will therefore propose a general settlement comprising:

"(a) A phased withdrawal of British armed forces from Egyptian territory;

"(b) The maintenance of the Canal Zone base in peace with a view to its immediate reactivation in the event of war;

"(c) An arrangement for the air defense of Egypt;

"(d) The participation of Egypt in a Middle East defense organization; and

"(e) A program of military and economic assistance to Egypt.

"*Tactics.*

"2. The negotiations would begin by the US and UK Ambassadors at Cairo informing the Egyptian Prime Minister that the two governments are willing to discuss a general settlement on the above lines, since they believe it to be in the interest both of the Middle East and of the West Powers that such a settlement should be speedily brought about. The Ambassadors could indicate that if British troops are to be withdrawn from the Canal Zone, it is imperative that alternative arrangements be made at the same time for the defense of the Middle East as a whole. It is for this reason that all the items comprising the proposed general settlement should be treated as inter-dependent and discussed simultaneously. Once this is agreed in principle, technical committees could be set forthwith to deal with items (a), (b), (c) and (e) above. However [garble].

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 188.

[2] The document presented below in general formed the basis for Paper No. 3 of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. Subject to certain changes in it, some of which are described in telegram 3691 from London, Document 1071, this document officially became a paper entitled "Procedure for Negotiating Defence Agreement with Egypt", and was approved by the representatives of the United States and United Kingdom, subject to the approval of their governments. (774.5/1-1453)

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["3.] As regards item (d) (the participation of Egypt in the Middle East defense organization) it is likely that the Egyptian Government will prove reluctant to discuss it at all until arrangements for British withdrawal have been agreed, and will not wish to discuss it in detail until the withdrawal itself has been completed. Nevertheless, a binding commitment from the Egyptian Government to join an organization on the general lines contemplated by the sponsoring powers is essential, not only in order to avoid a vacuum in Middle East defense, but also to enable us to maintain our position in the other Arab States, and to justify the supply of arms to Egypt; the British and US Ambassadors should therefore obtain the concurrence of the Egyptian Government in principle to participate in a Middle East defense organization and at their discretion might hand the Egyptian Government a paper on the lines of the memorandum attached to Annex A. They could make it clear that if the Egyptian Government thought it desirable first to consult the other Arab Governments there would be no objection so far as we are concerned, and indeed we would be prepared ourselves on behalf of the sponsoring powers to make a prior approach to these governments in order to enable the Egyptian Government to discuss the position with them on the basis that the other Arab Governments will equally have the opportunity to participate in MEDO.

"4. Attached as Annexes B and C are drafts of general principles agreed by the US and UK Governments on the question of maintaining the Suez Canal base and the setting up of an air defense organization, which might serve as a basis for the discussions between the two Ambassadors and the Egyptian Government. [3]

"5. The US and UK Governments would at appropriate stages of negotiations, be prepared to provide military aid.

"6. Egypt's economic difficulties should also be reviewed by the US and UK Governments with a view to seeing what economic aid could be provided.

"7. These secret exchanges should, if successful, result in the issue of three governmental communiqués:

> "(i) By the UK Government stating their intention to evacuate their armed forces from Egypt by the end of 1954;
>
> "(ii) By the Egyptian Government announcing their intention to enter a regional organization for Middle East defense, and to assume general responsibility for keeping the base in working order;
>
> "(iii) By the US Government publicly endorsing the positions taken by the UK and Egyptian Governments."

GIFFORD

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[3] The Embassy in London reported to the Department in telegram 3700, Jan. 7, not printed, that Annexes B and C of this British paper had been withdrawn. (774.5/1-753)

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No. 1070

774.5 MSP/1-453: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, January 4, 1953—3 p. m.

1566. Although Department 4399 to London, repeated Cairo 1324, answers many of questions raised by Byroade in his 3640 to Department repeated Cairo 185, following comments may be of help in dealing with British on this issue:

1. While US cannot accept British veto over our determination to proceed at once with interim aid program (on order of $10 million) both Department and Byroade seem to be in agreement that final formulation of list should take into account British views as expressed in course of current London talks. Meanwhile program could get under way without further delay by releasing relatively non-controversial items (e.g. armored cars, helmets, jeeps).

2. It was to be expected from beginning that British would attempt to retain initiative in their own hands in dealing with Egyptian question. London's recent telegrams demonstrate that London FonOff has no clue as to pathological bitterness of Egyptian feeling towards British. Only very active US initiative offers promise of security kind of agreement we all want and need. We cannot hope successfully to undertake such a role unless we are prepared to provide immediate concrete demonstration of our confidence in Naguib. (Naguib's acceptance of such aid, incidentally, will have effect of putting him publicly in Western camp.)

3. I presume British will be actively discouraged from thinking that appeal to Secretary can be expected to reverse wheels on interim aid which is keystone of our Egyptian policy. To do so would be to disregard in toto our own estimate of Egyptian situation and policy analysis as to best plan for dealing therewith. Furthermore, any public inkling of Anglo-American disagreement would redound to disadvantage of British. It would not hurt US position unless we gave into British pressure—in which case we would no longer have a position.

I fully concur with proposed text of paper set forth in London's 3642 to Department, repeated Cairo 187.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated niact to London as telegram 531 for Byroade.

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No. 1071

774.5/1-653: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 6, 1953—8 p. m.

3691. From Byroade. Reference Embtel 3641 January 3.

US–UK meeting re Egypt afternoon January 5 covered following:

1. *British paper "procedure for negotiation agreement with Egypt on defense issues"* (Embtel 3643 January 3). I agreed on whole with paper except phrase in paragraph 5 appropriate stages of negotiation. Explained Ital most impossible lay down specific rules for moving from one phase to another. Thought best we could do was in general tie arms supply to negotiations but actual type of arms and supply time table should be played by ear. Added that we also wanted to go ahead with interim arms aid program. British agreed could not be specific on this point and thought phasing would have to be governed by such general principles as Egyptian capacity to absorb arms, lethal character of arms, likelihood Egyptians using arms against UK forces and availability arms. On availability, British aid program have to be considered in light requirements other NATO members.

On long-term arms aid, I explained we accepted principle that British be main supplier but could not accept that such policy should exclude Egypt procurement from US. On this general subject, British felt mention should be made in paper re arms standardization along UK lines. I agreed in principle.

British emphasized they hoped US would restrict its arms program as far as possible as British considered their arms program to Egypt as entree to obtaining Egyptian acceptance of technicians. Large supplies of US arms during negotiations would weaken their position.

It was finally agreed that paragraph 5 of paper under discussion would refer to both US paper (Embtel 3642 January 3) and a redraft UK paper (now under preparation) which would include British objections to our interim aid program. [2]

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 192.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 1069. The phrasing of paragraph 5 of this paper was changed to read as follows: "The United States and United Kingdom Governments would be prepared to provide military aid on the basis of paper No. 4." (774.5/1-1453)

Regarding the reference to Paper No. 4, see footnote 2, Document 1068.

According to the "Agreed Record", Byroade's reference here must be to the British paper orignally entitled "Military Assistance to Egypt—Supply of Arms and Warlike Equipment" which the Embassy had transmitted to the Department in telegram 3610, Document 1062, and which was Appendix D of the "Agreed Record". In effect the British now withdrew this paper in favor of a new document which became Annex B to Paper No. 4 and was entitled "United Kingdom Position on Extension of Military Aid to Egypt". (774.5/1-1453)

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2. *US interim military aid.*

British continued voice strong objections to this program. General Redman (Vice CIGS) said Chief of Imperial General Staff dead set against program. Although he realized problem primarily political matter he did not think any gain would be achieved by gesture this nature before commencement negotiations. Bowker voiced Foreign Office objections and again reiterated that it would create problem with NATO and other arms-supplying countries. He thought we should tell the NATO countries what we were doing and that it would be easier if we could tell them arms supplies were part of negotiations. He feared it would be difficult to prevent other countries from supplying arms to Egypt if US was making military aid available before negotiations.

I pointed out that arguments contained paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 in our paper on extension of military aid to Egypt [3] might be used in explaining program to NATO countries. At any rate, I said should Egyptians decide to buy arms from countries other than US and UK, there was little we could do to stop them. I again explained philosophy behind interim program and pointed out that even if we decided to supply arms, by time arms were dockside in US negotiations might have already started. Emphasized US did not consider interim program as "sweetener", but rather US attempt to assist with its position in Egypt to obtain US–UK common objectives.

Bowker replied that although he considered interim aid program "heresy", he thought it was our position that interim aid program was actually tied to negotiations in that we would cut program off if Egypt should attack British or prove intransigent. He thought it of extreme importance Egypt's be left in no doubt on this score. Order make this point clear I agreed strengthen paragraph 8 of our paper (Embtel 3660 January 5). [4] British also wanted see list of equipment before it finalized. I agreed although I made no commitment that they would have veto power over any of the items.

Our paper on arms aid was amended as explained Embtel 3660 January 5. British MEDO paper was amended to remove inconsistency between paragraph 1 of the covering paper on Egypt participation in MEDO and paragraph 3 of procedure paper (Deptel 4407 January 4). [5] Text amendment will be telegraphed as soon as revised British paper given us.

GIFFORD

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[3] Byroade was referring to the U.S. paper transmitted in telegram 3642 from London, Document 1068.

[4] See footnote 3, *ibid.*

[5] Not printed.

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No. 1072

774.5 MSP/1-753

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 7, 1953.

Subject: Grant Military Aid for Egypt

Participants: The President
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Acheson

Following my conference with Mr. Harriman yesterday afternoon, he and I called upon the President at 10:45 to present the problem and our recommendations to him. At his request, I outlined the problem and made my recommendations, and Mr. Harriman then added his observations and his recommendation. I sketched for the President the present situation in Egypt, the great importance of supporting and strengthening Naguib and his régime as the best hope for a western orientation of Egypt, the solution of the Sudan and base problems with the British, the creation of the Middle East Defense Organization and the establishment of peace and an increased degree of stability and security in the Middle East. I referred to Mr. Caffery's cables and stressed the critical nature at the present time and the succeeding two or three weeks of the discussions which were going on with the British in London. I recognized quite frankly the difficulty of an outgoing administration taking an initial step of considerable importance without the ability to carry this step through or to work out in sufficient detail and make public the subsequent steps, of which this may be a part. I recognized the legitimate concern of the Israeli Government, but pointed out that the best hope for peace in the Middle East depended upon the Naguib régime, which was in difficulties, and that all chances of peace and the security of Israel would be greatly threatened by a collapse of the Naguib régime and the rise of uncontrollable nationalism in Egypt.

Mr. Harriman stressed, as he had last night, the importance of doing what I had suggested and said he would unhesitatingly support the recommendation if this Government had sufficient time to carry the whole program through. He thought that, under the circumstances, it would be unwise to act at this time and that we should leave the matter with our thoughts upon it for the incoming administration. He said that he would recommend to the President the immediate granting of economic assistance to Egypt, and if the President would work at once with officers of the State Department in making this available without delay, he thought that up to

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$10,000,000 could properly under the existing law be made available for wheat purchases with the counterpart going to the Point IV programs in the field of irrigation.

The President, after discussing the matter thoroughly with us, concluded that it would not be wise for him to make the finding of eligibility for Egypt for military grant assistance. He recognized that the step should be taken as a part of the program which I had outlined and hoped and trusted that his successor would take it. He approved Mr. Harriman's recommendation for economic assistance and said that he would support us both in carrying this through promptly. I recalled to the President that he had found Egypt eligible for reimbursable military assistance and that we were proceeding under that authorization within the limits of what Egypt could afford. He expressed approval of our actions in this regard. He did not believe that their modest purchase program would raise security problems unless the Egyptians wished to get extensively into the airfield, which might require some further consideration. [1]

Mr. Harriman is ready to proceed along the lines authorized by the President, and Mr. Jernegan should get in touch with him at once.

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[1] The Department informed Cairo and London in telegrams 1369 and 4556, respectively, Jan. 9, neither printed, that the President had decided not to find Egypt eligible for grant military aid at that time, but that the Department was urgently considering a program of immediate economic assistance. (774.5 MSP/1-953)

On Jan. 15, Edwin M. Martin, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs, informed General Olmsted of the President's decision of Jan. 7 regarding grant military aid for Egypt. (774.5 MSP/12-2952)

No. 1073

774.5 MSP/1-753: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 7, 1953—7 p. m.

3720. From Byroade. Reference: Embtel 3691, January 6.

Final US–UK meeting re Egypt today confined largely to preparing position papers in final form. Copies will be air-pouched Friday. Other points covered in meeting as follows:

1. US interim military aid.

Bowker said he did not think meeting could carry matter much further and that he would have to refer problem to Eden. He

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 175.

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thought Eden be strongly opposed to program and if so, Bowker could see no alternative but continued discussion between London and Washington. In order make sure Eden fully understood US reasoning on program, I said I would appreciate opportunity discuss program with Eden before my departure. Bowker said he endeavor arrange such meeting.

2. Sudan negotiations.

I said I wanted make clear that we conducting present talks on basis there be progress on Sudan negotiations. Without successful conclusion Sudan negotiations, present talks might well prove fruitless. Consequently I felt I should warn them that should Sudan negotiations fail or should long delays ensue, US would have to retain freedom of action as far as Egypt concerned. I emphasized I had nothing specific in mind but did think I should make point clear to them. [2] Bowker replied they also working on assumption of agreement with Egyptians on Sudan and early commencement defense negotiations. If Sudanese negotiations failed UK also would have to take another look at their position. (British have promised discuss latest Sudan developments at meeting probably tomorrow.)

3. Timing of Anglo-Egyptian defense negotiations.

Bowker said British planned start defense negotiations as soon as Sudan negotiations completed, altho exact timing depended on developments.

4. Approach to other sponsoring powers on MEDO.

Meeting decided that as soon as position papers of meetings approved by UK and US Governments and timetable on approach to Egypt definitely known, British would then inform other MEDO sponsoring powers of intention start negotiations with Egypt and give them copy of MEDO paper. [3] We indicated we should like be informed British plans this connection so US could take similar action with French and Turks. I reminded UK that US had not reached agreement with French re steering group, but did not believe this should prejudice planned approach to Egypt re MEDO.

GIFFORD

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[2] In telegram 4638 to London, Jan. 13, not printed, the Department indicated that it concurred fully with this position. (745W.00/1–353)

[3] See footnote 4, Document 1064.

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No. 1074

774.5 MSP/1-853: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 8, 1953—11 p. m.

3739. From Byroade. Met this morning with Bowker and other Foreign Office officials on Sudan. Bowker said that British are now working on clean draft of proposed UK-Egyptian agreement on Sudan which it was hoped could be presented to Naguib within next few days. [2] Bowker confirmed there are three difficult issues and number minor ones which might prevent reaching agreement with Egypt. Main difficulties are (1) Governor General's reserved powers for south, (2) Governor General's emergency constitutional powers, (3) Sudanization. One of minor issues is appointment of Deputy Governor General.

Bowker made clear that UK would find it most difficult, if not impossible, make further concessions re south and expressed belief that if Governor General did not have powers, north Sudan would neglect, if not exploit, south and southern provinces would almost certainly boycott parliamentary elections. UK had endeavored make Egyptians understand UK had no hidden motives re south and that it firmly upholds principles of Sudan unity. Bowker gave us in utmost confidence (and specifically asked that this in no way be revealed to Egyptians) text of article in draft UK-Egyptian agreement re reserved powers which reads as follows:

"The two contracting governments are agreed that, it being a fundamental principle of their common policy to maintain the unity of the Sudan as a single territory, special powers with regard to the southern provinces which are vested in the Governor General by the self-government statute shall not be exercised in any manner which is in conflict with this principle".

Bowker expressed hope that Caffery might be helpful in persuading Egyptians re British attitude on unity of Sudan.

Re emergency constitutional powers Foreign Office working on formula whereby Governor General could exercise such powers in event administrative breakdown without prior approval advisory commission. After execution emergency powers Governor General then would discuss matter with advisory commission and if over-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 198 and to Khartoum as telegram 11.

[2] Not printed. According to despatch 1405 from Cairo, Jan. 15, not printed, the British draft agreement on the Sudan was given to the Egyptian Government on Jan. 12. (745W.00/1-1553)

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ruled, would take matter to Codomini. British hoped have formula whereby Governor General's actions would remain valid unless Codomini agreed to object. British believed this formula would be acceptable to Egyptians although recognizing that Egyptians would prefer prior approval advisory commission for exercise Governor General's emergency powers.

Foreign Office officials admitted that Sudanization issue might also prove "sticky" since UK could not permit this principle to be held as a "pistol to the head of the Sudan Government" to hasten departure of such British officials as new Sudan Government might wish retain as advisors. However, UK is entirely willing to agree that in three years time after constitution is promulgated, Sudanese shall be given right of self-determination.

I told Bowker that we attached greatest importance to earliest settlement Sudan problem and hoped UK would do all in its power to achieve agreement. I pointed out disastrous effect to all our plans in Egypt and Middle East if Sudan negotiations ended in failure.

GIFFORD

No. 1075

774.5 MSP/1-953: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 9, 1953—7 p. m.

3774. From Byroade. Ambassador and I discussed Egypt with Eden after lunch today and explained to him why we considered interim arms program for Egypt essential if US is to give full support it desires to UK in achievement common defense objectives Egypt and Middle East. I emphasized that equipment under $11 million program would not actually reach Egypt for four months or so. I stressed that without interim arms program we would find ourselves in greatly weakened position vis-à-vis Egypt since it would mean that we had in fact ignored Egyptian request of November 10 which was in response US–United Kingdom agreed line. I recognized that we might have difficulty with Israel on this matter but felt that in the interests of western objectives, and even of Israel itself, we must take brunt of criticism and go ahead with arms program.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 201.

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Eden recalled that he had suggested to Secretary in New York that most important aspect Egyptian problem is economic situation and had expressed hope that US might assist economically rather than militarily. He believed that Naguib was making mistake in concentrating on military needs while economy of country deteriorating. He felt $11 million arms aid was excessive and might cause difficulties both with respect to British opinion and with Israel which was already making strong representations not only about British jets to Arab states but also now re proposed US arms program. Eden indicated that United Kingdom release jets to Egypt had been made over very strong objections Churchill. Eden said that he would much prefer that US limit its arms aid if we believed we must go ahead at all, to smaller amount than $11 million. It might be possible, Eden suggested, for us to offer Egyptians about $5 million program now, follow up in several months with another $5 million depending upon developments.

I explained to Eden that we are having a difficult time devising economic assistance although there is possibility that we might do something on wheat. I could, of course, not agree that we should limit ourselves only to economic aspects. Re his suggestion that we phase $11 million program, I said that we would look into this matter but in no way made commitment on such course.

Summary, my belief is that in view Eden's attitude we probably can go ahead with $11 million program but I should like Department urgently to give consideration to whether there is any way we can meet Eden's point without emasculating program.

Re Sudan, Eden said Stevenson would be authorized probably today to put clean draft (Embtel 3739 January 8) to Naguib over weekend. [2] He emphasized that he could not agree to go further than he has in the new draft on governor's powers South Sudan.

GIFFORD

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

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No. 1076

774.5 MSP/1-1053: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 10, 1953—5 p. m.

3786. Foreign Office gave Stabler this morning following informal memorandum re possible US interim arms program. Foreign Office official explained this based on Ambassador's aid Byroade's conversation with Eden reported Embtel 3774, Jan 9 and represented UK position this question. Foreign Office was told that Byroade had referred question to Department but that no commitment could be made that Eden's suggestion re phasing would be found practicable.

"If, in spite of the views of the UK, which have been explained to Mr. Byroade, the USG decide to offer the Egyptian military equipment before negotiation of defense start [*start of defense negotiations*], the UKG hope that this would be done on the following lines:

1. The USG would tell the Egyptians that they are ready to make available to them $5 million worth of arms, of which deliveries would be spread over two or three months, and after that would consider the possibility of supplying material to the value of further $5 million.
2. In making this offer to the Egyptians, the USG would make it clear that: (a) The offer of further material would be considered in relation to the forthcoming negotiations with the UK about the canal base, which was as important to the Americans as to the British; (b) the USG were most anxious that the Egyptians would reach a settlement with the UK about the base; (c) Egypt would in general look towards her habitual source of supply (i.e. the UK) for arms.
3. The USG would, moreover, give the UKG the opportunity of examining any list of material which it is proposed to offer to the Egyptians before an offer is made, so as to ensure, as far as possible, that it does not include material which could be used against UK forces in guerrilla warfare or which could be better supplied by the UK."

GIFFORD

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 202.

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No. 1077

874.00 TA/1-1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, January 13, 1953—6:50 p. m.

1388. Re Deptels 1369 Jan 9,[2] 1287, also urtels 1407, 1409,[3] 1518.[4]

Dept agrees to urgent need for immed econ assistance to Naguib regime and approx $10 million available this purpose over and above TCA approved program. This amt can be made available immed for wheat shipments at market, not at IWA prices. GOE in accordance usual practice when this type aid provided wld deposit equivalent amt Egypt currency in special counterpart fund acct, this fund to be used subsequently for econ development projects in Egypt. Current thought here is that local currency thus provided shld be used for implementing irrigation projects although counterpart might also be used in related fields particularly road improvements, drainage, land reform implementation etc., as set forth Naguib request.[5] Dol funds will be available obligation immed subj to approval in principal by govt of Egypt to utilize local currency counterpart for econ development projects mutually agreed upon. Field negot of agreements covering specific use of counterpart fund cld take place as soon as agreement covering wheat purchases executed.

Dol funds for wheat purchases wld be made available under Sec 503 of Mutual Security Act of 1951 as amended as def support operation, e.g. designed facilitate creation of regional def arrangements in which Egypt wld participate. Since Sec 511(a) above Act requires special assurances eligibility for econ assistance to further mil effort, we wld propose avoid necessity seeking these assurances from Egypt at this time by use of authority in Sec 513(b). (Discussions being held with DMS looking toward Presidential determination as required by Sec 513(b).)

Gen lines this proposal have approval of President. You urgently requested comment this proposal and usefulness this sum this juncture.

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[1] Repeated priority to London for Byroade as telegram 4644.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 1, Document 1072.

[3] Not printed; see footnote 1, Document 1046.

[4] Not printed; see footnote 4, Document 1054.

[5] In telegram 1637 from Cairo, Jan. 14, not printed, Ambassador Caffery described this idea as highly constructive and suggested that initially the counterpart funds should be spent for a 400,000 feddan reclamation project which the Egyptian Government was prepared to launch shortly. (874.00 TA/1-1453)

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Re urtel 1606 Jan 10 [6] notwithstanding Embtel 1518, no further action will be taken re expansion Cabot mission pending consultations urtel 1606. As you aware Dept had conceived expanded Cabot mission as immed indication US interest and evidence our taking action on econ annex Naguib message Nov 10.

ACHESON

[6] Not printed.

No. 1078

874.00 TA/1-1553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 15, 1953—3:55 p. m.

1412. Further 1388. In amplification but not modification of 1388, and in order avoid any misunderstanding of word "counterpart" fol is put forward for Emb consideration:

Landed price wheat Alex today at market about $108 per ton, allowing $95 for wheat fob US port and about $12 freight US flag vessel, plus insurance. Important to understand that proposal reftel envisages Egyptian deposits equivalent Egyptian pounds at current exchange rates. If wheat cannot move in Egyptian markets at such prices in Egyptian currency, what substitute materials might be sold readily with resultant realization for counterpart funds full value of dollars expended at current exchange?

Wld appreciate Emb views on whether wheat likely realize full commensurate dollar value; if not, whether GOE wld in any case deposit full commensurate value, or whether other items might be substituted for wheat.

Another detail requiring your comment is whether counterpart fund shld be assessed for local currency costs of US administrative expense at time general agreement re $10 million is reached, or later, when individual project agreements covering counterpart fund are negotiated. [2]

ACHESON

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 4694. Drafted by Stabler and by Arthur Z. Gardiner, Politico-Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and approved by Gardiner.

[2] Ambassador Caffery replied in telegram 1650, Jan. 16, not printed, that the wheat would be sold for local currency at prices approximately 39 percent below cost, but the Embassy was confident that the Egyptian Ministry of Finance was prepared to deposit the full commensurate value of $10 million to the counterpart fund by employing funds already appropriated in the budget. Caffery also said that if an

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No. 1079

745W.00/1-1653: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 16, 1953—9 p. m.

3927. Eyes only Secretary and Jernegan. In short farewell conversation with Byroade this evening, Eden expressed strong hope Caffery could be instructed to support Stevenson re latest alternative British suggestions for handling problem of South Sudan. Byroade said we would be glad give careful consideration Eden's request and asked that formulas be given Embassy officer in further detail than necessarily brief terms in which Eden outlined them.

Foreign Office subsequently outlined to Embassy officer Stevenson's current instructions as follows:

1. In his meeting with Naguib tomorrow, Stevenson should initially make every effort obtain agreement to formula re South contained latest British draft agreement, text of which we understand British Embassy in Washington has given Department. [1]

2. If Naguib unwilling accept (1), Stevenson should suggest that British proposal re South remain as in latest UK draft agreement, but that Sudanese Parliament when convened should make any amendments which it might desire to Article 100 by procedure contained Article 101, i.e., by three-fourths majority vote.

3. If (2) not acceptable to Naguib, Stevenson should suggest that Article 100 be left blank and no special responsibilities for South provided for in draft constitution, but that Sudan Parliament should be asked when convened to write in whatever special safeguards it wants for South, employing Article 101 procedure. Parliament resolution would then be referred back to two governments, each of which must give answer within one month. Unless both agree to contrary, Governor-General shall then make an order amending draft statute in accordance Parliamentary resolutions.

4. If (3) is not acceptable to Naguib, then Stevenson should inform him that in circumstances UK feels it will be necessary to leave any Anglo-Egyptian agreement aside for present and that Governor-General will have to call conference between Northern and Southern leaders to find out what they want.

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assessment for administrative expenses was necessary, it would be helpful at the initial negotiating session if Embassy officials were able to indicate the amount involved. (874.2311/1-1653)

[1] See footnote 2, Document 1074.

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Alternatives (2) and (4) have not been reduced to texts, but (3) has and can be obtained by the Department from British Embassy Washington. [2]

GIFFORD

[2] On Jan. 19, the Department, in telegram 1450 to Cairo, not printed, reported that it had considered alternatives (1), (2), and (3) and believed it was possible for the Egyptians to agree without too much difficulty to one of them. The Department also assumed that Caffery would continue to urge the Egyptians to consider carefully the British proposals and suggested that he hint that Naguib's request for assistance would be prejudiced by the lack of a Sudan agreement based upon one of these three alternatives. (745W.00/1-1653)

No. 1080

874.2311/1-1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1953—4:25 p. m.

1434. Further reference Deptels 1388 and 1412 and re Embtel 1650. [2]

President in accordance Sect 513(b) Mutual Security Act 1952 has now formally determined Egypt eligible economic assistance in amount 10 million dollars without regard conditions eligibility specified 511(a) Mutual Security Act 1951. By letters to chairman Congressional Committees designated Sect 513(b) President has recorded this determination.

You are consequently authorized inform GOE formally that USG has approved grant assistance in amount 10 million dollars for purchase of wheat with provision that GOE make deposit of counterpart commensurate in value. You should not refer to action under 513(b). Draft program agreement follows probably Monday, covering general nature use counterpart. [3]

Re publicity, Department believes joint release re proposed assistance by GOE and USG desirable at early date to be mutually agreed. Draft release will follow by cable for your consideration. [4] Release will probably not mention use Sect 513(b), and will of

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 4762, to Baghdad as 724, to Tel Aviv as 691, to Amman as 546, to Beirut as 1288, to Jidda as 433, to Damascus as 417, and to Paris as 3927.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 1078.

[3] Not printed. The Department transmitted a copy of the draft program agreement in telegram 1479. (874.2311/1-2253)

[4] Not printed. The Department sent a copy of the draft press release in telegram 1455. (874.2311/1-1953)

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course avoid reference to confidential reasons for action stated in letters from President to Congressional Committees. Sect 513(b) is being used for first time, but this fact should preferably not be made known since it affects other countries.

FYI. Brit have expressed concern to Byroade re economic assistance program prior initiation defense negots. While we cannot of course agree with principle that immed econ assistance be tied in with "package" approach, we wld not wish US offer coincide with or be immed subsequent to unreasonable or extreme Egypt position on Sudan agreement. We therefore leave timing of approach to Naguib on this matter to your discretion knowing you wld take above into account and wld in any event do all possible exert influence on Egyptians in manner to prevent breakdown Sudan negots. [5]

ACHESON

[5] In telegram 3962 from London, Jan. 19, not printed, Ambassador Gifford reported that he had informed the Foreign Office that the President had found Egypt eligible for economic assistance in the amount of $10 million, but that the timing of the approach to Naguib had been left to Caffery's discretion to obviate the possibility that the offer would coincide or would follow an unreasonable Egyptian position on the Sudan. British officials found this latter point reassuring, and said that Eden hoped that this offer would obviate the necessity of granting $10 million in interim arms assistance. (874.2311/1-1953)

In light of this telegram from London and telegram 1434, Ambassador Caffery took action, reported in telegram 1687, Jan. 20, not printed, that he had told the Egyptians informally that the wheat grant had only been approved in principle. (874.2311/1-2053)

No. 1081

641.74/1-1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 17, 1953—4:26 p. m.

1435. We believe that British approach re Sudan reported urtel 1652 Jan 16 [2] is hopeful sign. As you know, Byroade in London urged British to be flexible re Governor-General's powers re South and Department has done same with Egyptians. (Deptel 1413 Jan 15) [2]

While you are in best position to judge timing, Department considers that any help which you might be able give shld Egyptians prove unreasonable wld be most helpful contribution toward settle-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 4763 and to Khartoum as telegram 28.
[2] Not printed.

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ment Sudan question. We know that you are leaving Egyptians in no doubt that they wld be wrong to believe that they can count on our support for unreasonable action tending to frustrate a Sudan agreement.

ACHESON

No. 1082

774.5/1-1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 19, 1953—12:51 p. m.

4781. You may assure Foreign Office (Embtel 3919 Jan 16) [2] that we still in agreement that all elements of package as outlined in Paper No. 3 in "U.S.-U.K. Talks on Egypt" should be linked together and that aim negotiations should be achievement these objectives. [3] Stabler read Cairo's 1599 Jan 8 [4] simply to emphasize Caffery's views, which we share, that emphasis and order of items discussed with Egyptians most important and that it would be prejudicial to success of negotiations if we endeavored in advance of negotiations to determine with rigidity how we should proceed at some unknown date. Stabler recalls that during his conversations

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1442.

[2] In telegram 3919 from London, Jan. 16, not printed, Ambassador Gifford reported that Sir James Bowker of the Foreign Office, acting on special orders from Eden, referred to Stabler's visit to the Foreign Office on either Jan. 9 or 10, at which time Stabler read telegram 1599 from Cairo. The contents of this telegram concerned Eden, who wanted the United States to know that in the view of the United Kingdom, all the elements of the package as outlined in telegram 3643 from London, Document 1069, should be linked together; that points a and b would not be negotiated without being connected with points c, d, and e. (774.5/1-1653)

[3] The objectives referred to in Paper No. 3, "Procedure for Negotiating Defence Agreement with Egypt", of the United States-United Kingdom Talks read as follows:

"*Objectives of the United Kingdom and United States Governments*

"1. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States intend to enter into negotiation with the Egyptian Government in order to secure the voluntary association of Egypt with the West in arrangements for the defence of the Middle East against outside aggression. They will therefore propose a general settlement comprising:—

"(*a*) a phased withdrawal of the British armed forces from Egyptian territory;

"(*b*) the maintenance of the Canal Zone Base in peace with a view to its immediate reactivation in the event of war (see Annex);

"(*c*) an arrangement for the air defence of Egypt;

"(*d*) the participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defence Organisation; and

"(*e*) a programme of military and economic assistance to Egypt." (774.5/1-1453)

In addition, see telegram 3643 from London, Document 1069.

[4] Not printed. (774.5/1-853)

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with Allan on Jan 9 and Bowker on Jan 10 he endeavored make point that while elements should be linked, precise tactics for negotiations would be governed in large measure by degree of receptivity of Egyptians to proposals when negotiations first opened.

FYI Papers on "U.S.-U.K. Talks on Egypt" are being transmitted to Defense for approval on Jan 19. [5] We hope to be able to obtain USG decision re papers within ten days or so. End FYI. [6]

ACHESON

[5] The papers from the United States-United Kingdom Talks were transmitted to the Department of Defense under cover of a letter from Secretary of State Acheson to Secretary of Defense Lovett dated Jan. 19, not printed. (780.5/1-1953)

[6] The Department informed the Embassy in London on Feb. 17 in telegram 5460, not printed, that the Department of Defense had advised the Department of State that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in general accord with those portions of the agreed positions set forth in papers 1 to 5 inclusive which had military implications. Moreover, the Department instructed the Embassy to consider this telegram to be the formal U.S. Government approval of the general positions agreed to during the course of the London talks. (780.5/2-1753)

No. 1083

774.56/1-1953: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 19, 1953—7:44 p. m.

4805. After careful consideration Department has decided it would be unwise from point of view U.S. position Egypt and our desire to be of maximum assistance in attainment West objectives to link interim arms program with defense negotiations. We are, therefore, proceeding with staff work necessary develop interim program in final form. British may be assured however that when we make final decision re timing our offer to Egyptians, we shall most carefully examine situation existing in Egypt both in light of possibility of outbreaks involving British soldiers and in light status Sudan negotiations.

Immediately following Deptel contains list and quantity of Army and Air Force equipment desired by the Egyptians. [2] List total well over 11 million dollars and includes items which could be used for guerrilla warfare. Before we attempt scale program down to fit within 11 million dollar ceiling, we should appreciate British views as to what items they would object to with respect guerrilla activi-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1456. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade.

[2] Telegram 4806 to London, Jan. 19, not printed. (774.56/1-1953)

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ties. Their views would be helpful to us in devising final list which, as British will see, may contain items which would not be available for two years. While we shall of course bear in mind general question of which items might be better supplied by U.K., we cannot agree this should be limiting factor in connection with such 11 million dollar list as we may finally decide upon.

Once we have British views we shall then screen our list, both from point of view of cost and guerrilla weapons. We shall of course make available final list to U.K. at time we inform Egyptians of our approval this interim aid. We should appreciate receiving British views before end this week.

ACHESON

No. 1084

774.56/1-2153: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 21, 1953—4 p. m.

4001. While I appreciate factors in Egyptian situation which led Department to conclusion that we should proceed with interim arms program in Egypt (Deptel 4805, January 19) I feel that I must nevertheless express my strong doubts re wisdom of our making this move over British objections.

I have understood that it is our policy that United Kingdom has primary military responsibility in area. I entirely recognize that United Kingdom capabilities for discharging this responsibility are severely handicapped by existence of Anglo-Egyptian dispute and I approve our desire to do everything possible to promote a settlement. I feel it highly important, however, that our efforts in this direction should be within the framework of our overall obligations to British as an ally. It seems to me that when we decide on course of action over British objections which will have profound effect on security of their armed forces, we are imposing strain on alliance which exposes us to justifiable criticism. British public opinion would react as strongly as would American opinion were the situations reversed. I do not mean to say that concept of interim arms assistance is wrong, I merely mean to say that it is wrong to proceed with it over objections of our ally.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 212.

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I appreciate importance of our responding affirmatively to Naguib's request for aid from West. At time of recent US–United Kingdom conversations on forthcoming defense negotiations with Egypt, I understood that one reason why Department felt it necessary that this response would take form of arms assistance was that we had not found it possible to be forthcoming with economic assistance. Apparently, however, that difficulty has now been overcome, since I now note from Deptel 4762, January 17 [2] that we are in a position to render $10 million worth of economic aid to Egypt. It seems to me that this constitutes a not inconsiderable response to Naguib's appeal and I would sincerely hope that a re-examination of this whole question would result, in view of the strong British feelings about arms assistance, in our regarding economic as a sufficient initial response in itself.

I should add that Eden spoke to me again yesterday (prior to the receipt of Deptel 4805) of his concern over this question and of his hope that we could extend any interim assistance in the form of economic rather than military aid.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I am refraining from acting on Deptels 4805 and 4806 [3] pending the Department's further instructions.

GIFFORD

[2] Printed as telegram 1434, Document 1080.
[3] See footnote 2, *supra*.

No. 1085

774.56/1-2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, January 22, 1953—8 p. m.

1703. I fully sympathize with my colleague's concern over what he anticipates will be British reaction to interim arms program (London's 4001 to Department repeated Cairo 212). [2] However, again London Foreign Office completely misjudges situation in Egypt.

If after encouragement we have given Naguib about arms, aid program is now scrapped, Egyptians will surely lose their present perhaps exaggerated faith in us.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 585.
[2] *Supra*.

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Foregoing merely leads up to crucial point, namely that if we destroy our position in Egypt by accepting British veto (or even emasculation) of interim arms program there will be no Anglo-Egypt settlement and no MEDO. On the contrary, faced with impending collapse, this regime will seek to expel British from Suez by force and will incite revolt in Sudan.

CAFFERY

No. 1086

774.56/1–2153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, January 23, 1953—7:14 p. m.

4894. 1. Interim Arms Program for Egypt was reviewed yesterday at highest level [2] and full weight was given to Embtel 4001. US position has now been finally determined that such interim program in amount of $11 million will be carried out. Program will be on cash reimbursable basis and Egypt will not be found eligible for grant military assistance at this time. Additionally, jet aircraft will not be offered for purchase by Egypt pending further review.

2. You should therefore proceed on basis Deptels 4805, 4806 [3] and 4814. [4] Jets should be deleted from list contained Deptel 4806 but Department does not desire that British be informed re decision on jets since we may wish to discuss this question with them again later. You should inform British that the decision not to find Egypt eligible for grant military aid has been made partly out of deference to British wishes. You should also tell them that in determining timing our formal notification to Egyptians we shall take fully into account status Sudan negotiations and general condition

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[1] Repeated niact to Cairo as telegram 1486. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade.

[2] According to a memorandum from Byroade to Douglas MacArthur II, Jan. 29, not printed, the interim arms program for Egypt was brought to the new Secretary of State's (Dulles) attention by the new Under Secretary of State, Walter B. Smith, about Jan. 23. The Secretary of State, in turn, took up the matter with President Eisenhower, but the decision to allow some grant aid and to place jet planes back in the list of equipment was not forthcoming. The decision, however, to proceed on a cash reimbursable basis was reaffirmed. (611.41/1–2953)

[3] Not printed; see footnote 2, Document 1083.

[4] In telegram 4814 to London, Jan. 21, not printed, the Department reiterated to the Embassy the fact that the economic aid and interim arms assistance programs were two separate and distinct plans; that it had never been the Department's intent to substitute the $10 million grant for wheat in lieu of the interim arms program; and that the Department believed that this point had been made quite clear while Byroade was in London. (774.56/1–2153)

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public order in Egypt. At any rate earliest we could give formal approval would probably not be before week or ten days.

3. We should appreciate British comments on list contained Deptel 4806 minus jets by January 28. As indicated Deptel 4805 we shall give due consideration to these views since we fully recognize desirability of restricting items purchased by Egyptians to those which could not be easily adapted or used for guerrilla activities. However, British must understand that since Egyptians are buying rpt buying equipment, we may have some problem, which we shall do our best to minimize, in tailoring list to meet British specifications.

4. FYI. Chairman JCS has received communication from British Chiefs of Staff representative in US recording objection to interim arms program. [5] Chairman JCS replied Jan 23 to effect JCS consider matter primarily governmental and that negots between US and UK shld be left to State Dept. Reference also made to fact list being submitted for Brit screening.

DULLES

[5] Presumably the reference is to a letter from Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot to General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Jan. 16, not printed. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Egypt, 1950–1953")

No. 1087

774.56/1-2853: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 28, 1953—7 p. m.

5001. British Ambassador day before yesterday received message from Eden instructing him to urge upon Secretary that no final decision be reached as regards interim arms assistance to Egypt prior to direct Dulles–Eden talks in London, [2] and that in any event such assistance from US be delayed until after agreement on Sudan. We were informed of this development subsequent to decisions made

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 1530. It was drafted and approved by Byroade.

[2] Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Agency Director Harold E. Stassen were in Europe from Jan. 31 until Feb. 8, 1953, to conduct a series of meetings. While in London, Dulles spoke with Eden about Egyptian policy on Feb. 4. For information regarding this conversation, see telegram 4308 from London, and telegram 1583 to Cairo, Documents 1091 and 1092. For further documentation regarding the Dulles-Stassen trip to Western Europe, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1548 ff.

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here resulting in dispatch of Deptel 4894 to London, rptd 1486 to Cairo and Deptel 1493 to Cairo, rptd 4907 to London. [3]

Secretary's schedule has been such that appointment with Makins this subject prior to his departure impossible. After consultation with Secretary, Byroade discussed subject with Makins this afternoon.

Byroade explained Secretary hoped to avoid specific problems such as this upon his brief trip to Europe. Department felt for reasons outlined in recent London discussions that we should not withhold support of this nature from Naguib until after defense and base negotiations with Egyptians were completed or had progressed to a certain point. We were not however retaining our initial position that a portion at least of this interim program be in the form of grant.

Byroade told Makins however that he believed a new factor had arisen since conclusion of London talks on Egypt in that tensions over Sudan had become more acute and Naguib had made several statements which appeared to be threatening against British troops. We realized if this situation should grow steadily worse that we should not offer Naguib military equipment. The staff work necessary before commitment could be made to Egyptians would take several days and it would be our hope that notification to the Egyptians would coincide with a better atmosphere resulting from agreement on the Sudan, or at least sufficient progress to alleviate present tensions. We did not however feel that we could commit ourselves to wait until agreement had been reached upon all aspects of the Sudan situation. He also said that if by the time we are ready to proceed, the Egyptians on their side are being quite unreasonable in the Sudan negotiations and the British position, as represented by their latest three alternatives, [4] appeared reasonable, we could consider notifying Naguib that we were ready to proceed but that obviously we could not be in a position of giving him weapons at same time he was taking unreasonable positions on the Sudan and continuing to make statements about the possibility of Egyptian moves against British forces.

At the conclusion of conversation it was agreed (a) that the British would screen the list of equipment already in their hands in London without delay and that all staff work would be completed as quickly as possible, and (b) that prior to notification to Naguib we would contact the British in London to discuss with them the situation at that time in Egypt as regards the tenseness of the atmosphere, the status of Sudanese negotiations and the internal se-

[3] Not printed.
[4] See telegram 3927 from London, Document 1079.

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curity situation. It was clear in the conversation that this commitment did not imply a British veto if after such discussions we felt we should proceed. Makins seemed satisfied with this arrangement.
DULLES

No. 1088

774.56/1-3053: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1953—8:46 p. m.

5083. Representative British Embassy handed Department today following message from Foreign Office:

"Her Majesty's Embassy have been instructed to give the State Department the comments of Her Majesty's Government on the list of military equipment whose delivery to Egypt is contemplated and which was communicated to the Foreign Office by the United States Embassy in London. [2] The list has been examined by British experts and the following conclusions reached:

> All items in List A, except jeeps and helmets, all items in List B except rocket containers, dozer assemblies, trailers and helmets, and all items in List C would greatly assist the Egyptians in operations against Her Majesty's forces in the Canal Zone. In fact, the list looks as if it had been especially chosen by the Egyptians with such operations in view. Practically all the items could be supplied from British sources, with similar delivery times.

"Mr. Eden is grateful for the assurance given to Her Majesty's Ambassador by Mr. Byroade that no communication will be made to the Egyptians until there has been further discussion on the timing of the delivery of such equipment. Mr. Eden remains convinced that no delivery should be made until a suitable stage has been reached in the defence negotiations and that the embargo on the supply of arms to Egypt should not be entirely lifted until these negotiations have been concluded. Mr. Eden sees the greatest possible objection to the arms in the list which was communicated to the Foreign Office being offered to the Egyptians at this juncture. He intends to speak on these lines to Mr. Dulles when he comes to London."

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[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 1556 and priority to Paris for the Secretary of State as telegram 4150. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

[2] Presumably the reference is to telegram 4806 to London, Jan. 19, not printed. See footnote 2, Document 1083.

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It would of course be quite impossible to proceed at all with any military assistance to Naguib if we followed the above views of British.

It is well to recall that in Deptel 4805 to London, rptd Cairo 1456 and Deptel 4894, rptd Cairo 1486, we served notice to British that while we would meet their views where possible as to specific items on list, we did not agree that we would necessarily be bound to meet their views. As British screening suggestions have amounted to complete emasculation of program it will now be necessary for us to use our own discretion in screening task in which we had hoped British views would be more helpful.

In view of background this problem we plan to take no action here prior to forthcoming discussions between Secretary and Eden in London. Please convey to Secretary Department's recommendation that he take the same position with Eden as that given Makins by Department representative on 28 January, reported in Deptel 5001 to London, repeated Cairo 1530. [3]

MATTHEWS

[3] In telegram 5093 to London, Jan. 31, not printed, the Department informed the Embassy that the Department thought it quite possible to arrive at a list of equipment amounting to $11 million which would go a long way toward meeting the British objections as to the type of equipment which was made available to the Egyptians; moreover, the Department, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, had prepared such a list. But the Embassy was instructed not to show it to the British at that time, as it did not have final Defense Department approval and did not take into account the fact that the Egyptians might desire to make acceptable alterations. (774.56/1-3153)

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No. 1089

745W.00/1-3053: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1953—1:28 p. m.

5104. Re Cairo's telegram 1742 Jan 29 [2] and London's telegram 4215 Jan 30. [3] "Sudanization" issue as understood here shapes up in essence as Egypt wanting all Brit officials removed from Sudan Govt by end of three year period preceding Sudanese self-determination while UK maintains that should govt posts not filled by Sudanese at end of three years still be held by Brit officials at time of self-determination, Sudanese should then be free decide whether or not retain these officials.

If above correct (your comments welcomed) it then appears that Egyptian position, undoubtedly based on suspicion of Brit motives is unreasonable since it appears undertake make decision which Sudanese Parliament should make. On other hand Brit position if we understand it does not seem realistic to us since they have often made the point that few Brit officials would care to remain in Sudan once political control no longer their's, since Brit professional future would then be uncertain.

Foreign Office views on importance to final settlement of "Sudanization" issue would be received with interest here as Dept had been under impression that rights of South Sudan were main UK preoccupation.

Increasing reports from Sudan tend to confirm possibility of outbreak of violence in Sudan in event of rupture in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Effect such an outbreak would have in Egypt and Canal Zone not difficult to visualize and our hopes for speedy settlement Anglo-Egyptian problem would be seriously set back. Dept therefore hopes that Embassies London and Cairo will continue to exert every effort prevent failure Sudan negotiations. Embassy

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[1] Also sent priority to Cairo as telegram 1561 and repeated to Khartoum as telegram 34.

[2] In telegram 1742 from Cairo, Jan. 29, not printed, Caffery reported that Naguib had agreed to examine the formula outlined in paragraph 3 of telegram 3927 from London, Document 1079, as a possible way out of the impasse over the South Sudan. This was a hopeful sign, but Caffery reported that Sudanization was now an equally crucial issue for the British, according to British Ambassador Stevenson. (745W.00/1-2953)

[3] The Embassy in London transmitted approximately the same information to the Department in telegram 4215, Jan. 30, not printed, that Caffery had in telegram 1742. (745W.00/1-3053)

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London should advise Foreign Office our concern re possibility violence Sudan.

Ambassador Caffery's effective intervention with Egyptians re Brit compromise formula on South has been valuable. Dept hopes he will be able to continue urge moderation and reasonableness upon Egyptians.

MATTHEWS

No. 1090

745W.00/2-353: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 3, 1953—7 p. m.

4288. Embassy today discussed Sudan problem with Foreign Office in light Deptel 5104 February 2. On basis this and other recent conversations, following Embassy comments may clarify specific points raised by Department:

1. Department's understanding "Sudanization" issue essentially correct as stated Department's reference telegram. Reasons for British stand are three-fold:

(a) They do not feel that situation should be created whereby Sudanese would be debarred from retaining experienced British officials at time of self-determination, even though Sudanese might desire keep them. To some extent, British position ties in with problem of south since it is in this area that they feel there will be greatest need for qualified personnel.

(b) British suspect that main reason for Egyptian insistence on removal all British officials is to pave way for Egyptian hegemony at time of self-determination.

(c) For prestige reasons, British would find it most difficult to agree to procedure which would in fact be discriminatory against British nationals by making it impossible for them to continue service with Sudanese Government.

2. British admit that many and perhaps most Sudan civil servants would not be willing remain after self-determination. Extent to which this would be true would depend in large measure on Sudan's future status. Closer association to Egypt, less likely British officials would desire remain. Nevertheless, this consideration does not destroy in British eyes validity points set forth (1) above.

3. In British minds, Sudanization has always been point of approximately vital importance to that of south. Main emphasis has been on south merely because it had appeared earlier that Egyp-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 225 and to Khartoum as telegram 15.

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tians did not have strong views on Sudanization and that problems could probably be worked out (Embtel 3164, December 5). [2] With re-statement of hardened Egyptian attitude in recent note, these earlier hopes have been somewhat dissipated and Sudanization problem now seems as difficult of solution as south.

4. British indicate concern re possibility violence in Sudan in event breakdown negotiations and have this danger clearly in mind in studying problem. They are also perturbed re possibility outbreaks in south if Governor General's special responsibilities are given up.

Following additional points also emerged from conversation today:

5. British encouraged by progress being made in drafting committee on minor points contained in Egyptian note (Cairo's 1773, February 2).[2] Stevenson regards this and other indications as evidence that Naguib sincerely desirous of reaching agreement and Foreign Office inclined agree with Stevenson.

6. Fawzi has been most helpful in connection subcommittee conversations and in number of other recent problems arising from negotiations. For example, he recently helped obtain recall Commanding Officer Egyptian Forces Sudan for statement inciting Sudanese to violence in event agreement not reached between UK and Egypt.

7. Howe has now completed first phase his conversations with Sudanese leaders re Egyptian note and re British position (Embtel 4242, January 31). [3] Foreign Office says results of consultations are unclear, as expected. SRP leaders appear have considerable doubts re wisdom Agreement, UMMA some doubts and pro-Egyptian parties no doubts at all. Most leaders seem to feel that there would be no problem for Sudanese to obtain subsequent changes in agreement if present provisions do not work. Howe pointed out that this might be difficult since agreement would be between UK and Egypt and Sudanese would not be parties to it.

8. Egyptian note has been considered by two recent Cabinet sessions here and is before Cabinet again today at which time it will be decided whether send Stevenson new instructions now or whether await results Howe's further consultations Sudanese leaders. [5]

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[2] Not printed.

[3] In telegram 4242 from London, Jan. 31, not printed, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office reiterated its assessment that Sudanization and the South Sudan problems represented the two major obstacles to the Sudan settlement. Moreover, the Foreign Office repeated that the principle at stake was whether the Sudanese should be consulted through their own representative Parliament regarding these two points at issue, and the Foreign Office felt strongly that they should. However, the matter was still being studied, no new instructions had been sent to Stevenson, and it was unlikely that any would until Sir James Howe had consulted the Sudanese leaders. (745W.00/1–3153)

[5] Ambassador Caffery reported on Feb. 4 in telegram 1784 from Cairo, not printed, that Stevenson had just received further instructions on the Sudan and had requested a meeting with the Egyptians. According to the British Embassy official,

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In response our inquiry, Foreign Office official to whom we spoke said in greatest confidence that while he could not speak with certainty prior Cabinet decision, he thought it likely UK would find it possible make some further adjustments toward Egyptian point of view.

HOLMES

Stevenson was "authorized accept Egyptian version of 'Sudanization' with proviso that self-determination shall take place under 'international supervision.' In return British will insist on Egyptian acceptance of their proposal on southern safeguards". (745W.00/2-453)

No. 1091

745W.00/2-453: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 4, 1953—8 p. m.

4308. From Secretary. [2] Eden informed us this afternoon that he had persuaded Cabinet to go a long way in meeting Egyptian position re Sudan. Instructions have been sent to Stevenson and have been repeated British Embassy Washington telling Makins to bring them immediately to Byroade's attention. Eden said that he felt that United Kingdom had gone a long way and could go no further and expressed hope that Caffery would urge Egyptians to accept latest British proposal.

Since we have not actually seen latest instructions to Stevenson, decision re capacity to support should be taken by Department. I suggest that after examination these instructions if Department concurs that they are reasonable Caffery be told to speak to Egyptian Government along following lines:

United States considers United Kingdom position to be eminently reasonable and assumes that Egyptian Government will find them so and that speedy settlement of Sudan question may follow. Because it assumes that there will be a settlement on Sudan United States Government is prepared to begin immediately consideration of interim arms supply to Egypt. If this assumption should later prove to be incorrect the United States Government would feel free to reconsider its position.

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[1] Also sent priority to Cairo as telegram 226.

[2] Regarding the Secretary's visit to London at this time, see footnote 2, Document 1087.

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I have told Eden that if foregoing is satisfactory to Department we would proceed to the immediate supply to the Egyptians of non-objectionable items.

HOLMES

No. 1092

745W.00/2-453: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 5, 1953—4:22 p. m.

1583. For the Ambassador.

Representatives of British Embassy have just delivered following papers on the Sudan in accordance with discussions between Secretary and Eden, reference London telegram 4308 repeated Cairo 226. Report of discussion and our comments will be dispatched shortly by separate cable.

"*Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations on the Sudan*

Two major points so far unresolved between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government in these negotiations are: the question of safeguards for the South, and that of the completion of Sudanisation.

2. As regards the question of safeguards for the South: Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept either of two alternatives. These are: either the Egyptians accept (a) the proposal which has already been put to them, namely that it should be left to the Sudanese Parliament to write in what safeguards they consider necessary for the South; or (b) the proposal that Article 100 [2]

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[1] Drafted and approved by Byroade.

[2] An Annex containing the original version of Article 100, was not attached to the record copy of this telegram. The following is a verbatim text:

"*Annex—(Special Responsibilities of Governor-General)*

"100. (1) The Governor-General shall have a special responsibility for the public service and for the Southern Provinces. It shall be his duty to ensure fair and equitable treatment both for members of the public service, whose contractual rights and interests shall be safeguarded, and for the Southern Provinces, whose special interests shall be protected.

"(2) The Governor-General may refuse his assent to any bill which would in his opinion adversely affect the performance by him of his duties under the preceding Sub-section; and may from time to time make such orders as may appear to him to be necessary in the performance of the said duties.

"(3) Every such order shall be in writing under the Governor-General's hand, and shall recite the purpose of the order.

"(4) An order hereunder shall have the force of law, and to the extent of any repugnancy or inconsistency between any such order and any existing or future legislative enactment, or administrative or executive act of the Government, the order shall prevail, and the Courts shall give effect thereto accordingly." (641.45W/2-553)

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in the Statute should be retained, altered to give Governor General powers in respect of any or all Provinces, but making the exercise of his powers subject to the advice of his Commission.

3. As regards Sudanisation, despite the difficulties Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to accept the Egyptian draft on Sudanisation provided that the Egyptians agree that the detailed preparations for the process of self-determination, including all arrangements designed to secure a free and neutral atmosphere, should be made subject to international supervision. It is not perhaps necessary to decide immediately what form this supervision should take but it would be our understanding that some form of International Commission would have, at the appropriate time, to consider the position as regards Sudanisation in the light of reports from the Sudanisation Committee and any views expressed in the Sudanese Parliament, and that Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government would give full weight to the Commission's recommendations."

"*Egyptian Redraft of Annex III of the Draft Agreement*

1. The duties of the Sudanisation Committee shall be to complete the Sudanisation of the Administration, police, the Sudan defence forces, and any other Government post that may affect the freedom of the Sudanese at the time of self-determination. The Committee shall review the various Government posts with a view to cancelling any unnecessary or redundant posts held by Egyptian or British officials.

2. The Committee may co-opt one or more members as it deems fit to act in an advisory capacity without the right to vote.

3. The Committee shall take its decisions by majority vote. The Committee's decisions shall be submitted to the Governor-General for his assent. If the Governor-General does not agree with any such decision he may, with the approval of his Commission, withhold his assent and in the event of disagreement between the Governor-General and the latter, the matter shall be referred to the two Governments. The Commission's decision shall stand unless the two Governments agree to the contrary.

4. The Sudanisation Committee shall complete its duties within a period not exceeding 3 years. It shall render periodical reports to the Governor-General who shall consider them in conjunction with his Commission. These reports with any comments thereon shall be transmitted to the two Governments for such joint action as they may consider proper. Without prejudice to the special powers of the Sudanese Council of Ministers as set out under Article 19(2) of the Statute for Self-Government, the two Governments shall give every possible assistance for the completion of the Committee's task.

5. The salaries and allowances of the members of the Committee shall be assessed by agreement between the two Governments and the Sudan Administration. The Sudan Administration will pay the expenses of members of the Committee travelling within the Sudan in the course of their duties and supply the necessary offices and secretarial staff."

MATTHEWS

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No. 1093

745W.00/2-453: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, February 5, 1953—7:16 p. m.

1585. Subject is Interim Arms Program for Egypt, reference London telegram 4308, repeated Cairo 226.

We have considered latest British proposals on Sudan received here this morning and, although one or two minor points might cause trouble, they do not appear to us to be of sufficient consequence to warrant withholding full US support these proposals unless you perceive overriding considerations not apparent here. Text of revision Article 100 is not available here but British informed [us?] that Stevenson instructed provide Caffery with all documents concerned. We have wired Cairo separately texts British left with us with exception Article 100. [2]

While we desire leave tactics and timing in hands of Caffery it is our understanding that Stevenson–Naguib meeting on British proposals will take place on Friday or Saturday. British have expressed hope that Caffery could see Naguib prior to this meeting.

We suggest Caffery consider adding to statement along lines in London telegram 4308 something to effect that disagreement on Sudan, accompanied by uneasiness of public opinion in West, caused to some extent by bellicose statements by members Military High Committee, has not been favorable factor in assisting US to move forward rapidly on question of arms assistance, and we are proceeding on basis satisfactory turn in Sudan negotiations will be accompanied by cessation threatening statements. It seems to us such an addition would be welcomed by British and could be phrased in manner which would indicate US has been impeded by factors over and above our control in attempting assist Egypt. This

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 5220. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

[2] Minister Holmes in London in telegram 4338, Feb. 6, not printed, transmitted the text of the revised version of Article 100 of the draft Sudan statute. It reads as follows:

"A joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament shall be held immediately after it assembles, in order to consider what further special provision shall be made in this statute for the southern provinces. Its decision shall be in the form of a resolution adopted in accordance with the procedure in Article 101 below. This resolution shall be referred by the Governor General to the two govts, each of which must give answer within one month of the date of formal notice of the resolution. Unless the two governments agree to the contrary, the Governor General shall then make an order amending the statute in accordance with the resolution adopted by Parliament." (745W.00/2-653)

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might take away some of ill effect of giving appearance we rush forward now solely in an effort get agreement satisfactory to British.

In British report of Dulles-Eden discussions there was a statement we had agreed that list of equipment should again be examined between HMG and US with a view towards eliminating items objectionable to British. Telecon with Holmes has confirmed this was part of the agreement. We have had considerable discussion here today with British on this subject as we do not wish be placed in a position of letting Caffery make a commitment which would in fact be impossible fulfill if British continue to insist that almost everything Egyptians really desire be deleted from list. We made point that if Caffery proceeded in manner suggested by British we could not agree that British would have a veto on items of equipment which might make it impossible for us to follow through. It was finally agreed after British telecon with London that they realized that we would have the final power of decision on the assumption we would go as far as possible to meet British comments on list. They agreed furnish comments quickly as possible.

Embassy London should therefore present to British our preferred list as contained in Deptel 5093, repeated Cairo 1559. [3] We have also presented them here with our suggested further breakdown of remainder of items on list that was previously furnished British (Deptel 4806 to London, rptd Cairo 1457). [4] We have divided remainder of larger list into two categories, i.e., (1) that we should avoid if at all possible and (2) items which are doubtful but on which there should be greater flexibility in dealing with Egyptians. These two lists will be transmitted separately and should be given British as well. We continue to hope that British realize difficulty in attempting to work out a list prior to views of Egyptians as to what they would desire included in a list totaling about $11 million.

It is assumed here that after Caffrey has made his commitment to Naguib and after we have received new British comments on list of equipment, we will open negotiations in Washington with Egyptian officers in attempt to work out a list.

MATTHEWS

[3] Not printed; see footnote 3, Document 1088.
[4] Not printed; see footnote 2, Document 1083.

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No. 1094

745W.00/2-753: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, February 7, 1953—1 p. m.

1800. Stevenson presented new British proposals yesterday. Fawzi last night told me that five hour session resulted in narrowing differences very nearly to zero. Subcommittee is meeting this morning to work out several slight changes in drafting.

Fawzi said he would be prepared sign agreement if British will accept one change requested by Egyptians in proposed paragraph 4 of Article 100 of draft statute [2] relating to special powers of Governor General toward southern provinces—i.e., deletion of phrase "or administrative or executive act".

Fawzi made point that Governor General will have sufficient power to prevent discrimination without this specific reference while retention this wording would give him legal right to set aside almost any act of Sudanese Government on grounds he deemed it discriminatory.

He added that even if Egyptians were inclined accept this wording they would be obliged first seek approval of Sudan parties. Door might thereby be opened to further delays and present opportunity for quick agreement lost.

Fawzi gives Secretary principal credit for new British proposals, but Egyptians have, as expected, interpreted *démarche* reported mytel 1795 [3] as US pressure on behalf of British. I trust Department will strongly urge British now to accept this small change which Egyptians desire for reasons set forth above. [4]

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 609 and to Khartoum as telegram 57.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 1092.

[3] Caffery reported in telegram 1795 from Cairo, Feb. 6, not printed, that the point of view expressed in the Secretary's telegram 4308 from London, Document 1091, had already been made known in appropriate Egyptian quarters. (745W.00/2-653)

[4] In telegram 1809 from Cairo, Feb. 8, not printed, Caffery reported that Stevenson had recommended that London accept the "change" in the phrasing of paragraph 4 of Article 100 of the draft Sudan statute. (745W.00/2-853)

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No. 1095

745W.00/2-953: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 9, 1953—noon.

4385. Reference Department's telegram 5259, February 7. [2]

Embassy has spoken to Foreign Office along lines Ambassador Caffery's recommendation contained Cairo's 1800, February 7. Foreign Office official said deletion which Egyptians desire would have been put Cabinet, probably today, but he did not anticipate great difficulty.

Foreign Office official also referred to British draft protocol submitted Egyptians last month providing the UK and Egypt agree Sudan Parliaments will be free discuss principal provisions of agreement and that two governments undertake give full consideration to Parliament's views. Foreign Office says Egyptians have dropped this protocol in their counterproposals and that Governor General considers it most important that it be restored in order assuage feelings of south Sudanese. Foreign Office emphasizes this is not a "sticking point" and that if Egyptians refuse sign such a protocol, British will merely make unilateral statement at appropriate time to effect that Her Majesty's Government considers Sudan Parliament free discuss provisions of agreement if it so desires. However, British would prefer handle problem in agreement with Egyptians. Foreign Office understands Stevenson has discussed this problem with Ambassador Caffery and wishes identify itself with Stevenson's hope that Ambassador Caffery will find it possible help persuade Egyptians to accept it. [3]

HOLMES

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 231.

[2] The Department in telegram 5259, Feb. 7, not printed, asked the Embassy in London to present Caffery's recommendation in telegram 1800 from Cairo, *supra*, to the British Foreign Office without delay, since it appeared that this change alone stood in the path of a final agreement. (745W.00/2-753)

[3] Caffery reported in telegram 1821, Feb. 10, not printed, that he had spoken to the Egyptians as requested by Stevenson regarding the proposed draft protocol. (745W.00/2-1053) In this same vein, Caffery reported in telegram 1833, Feb. 11, not printed, that the Egyptians refused to agree to the use of the draft protocol. Stevenson acquiesced and told Caffery as well that present plans called for initialing the agreements the next day, Feb. 12. (745W.00/2-1153)

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No. 1096

774.56/2-953: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 9, 1953—6:58 p. m.

1601. Egyptian Military Attaché Ghaleb, accompanied by Officers, Sabri and Niklawi, called at Department's request today re arms purchases. It was evident they were disillusioned by lack progress obtaining arms. Sabri announced his departure for Cairo Feb 12 with Niklawi following on 17. In course friendly discussion Egyptians were told we would be in position within few days to discuss details of program under which Egypt could purchase arms up to $11,000,000. Egyptians also informed that Department foresaw ways and means to draw out the terms of payment in a manner which would not require immediate full payment. (See previous Deptel re this subject) [2]

Egyptian reaction this news, while not wildly enthusiastic, was one of pleasure and they seemed anxious to get down to details. They did not object to limit of $11,000,000 when they were assured that depending upon developments this did not necessarily constitute a final ceiling on their purchases for this year. Sabri seemed reconciled that he would be unable to obtain aircraft and he scarcely referred to subject. Niklawi appeared concerned re the composition of the list which they would be allowed to purchase as well as to the availability of components such as spare parts and ammunition.

On the whole Department believes that conversation was reasonably successful and during week, upon receipt British comments which we anticipate by Feb 12, hopes be able to present suggested interim arms program to Egyptians and begin working out details with them.

DULLES

[1] Repeated noforn to London as telegram 5285.

[2] In telegram 1600 to Cairo, Feb. 9, not printed, the Department told the Embassy that it might be possible to make a financial arrangement whereby the Egyptians would be able to draw out the time of payment for the interim arms program by opening an irrevocable letter of credit on an American bank which would be subject to phased drawings by the Defense Department prior to the delivery of the equipment. (774.56/2-953)

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No. 1097

774.56/2-1053: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 10, 1953—7 p. m.

4430. Following is abbreviated text memorandum dated today from Foreign Office in response Embassy's memorandum February 6 based on Deptel 5220, February 5 transmitting lists contained Deptel 4806, January 19 [2] and Deptel 5221, February 5: [3]

"1. Her Majesty's Government most grateful to United States Government for reconsidering lists of arms and military equipment which United States Government contemplating supplying Egypt.

"2. They have, however, following further comments on lists annexed United States Embassy's memorandum February 6:

> "(1) Her Majesty's Government feel bound record once again their view that supply of armoured cars and tanks in list A (Deptel 4806) would still be objectionable, since they would greatly increase potential of Egyptian force which could be used against Her Majesty's forces in Suez Canal Zone.
>
> "(2) All equipment in list B (Deptel 5221) is open objection on same grounds, though strength of Her Majesty's Government's objection would depend to some extent on timing of deliveries and quantities involved. It would, for example, be deplorable if United States Government were to provide Egyptian Government with machine guns within next 45 days in appreciable quantities, and if those machine guns were subsequently used in action against Her Majesty's forces.
>
> "(3) If, on other hand, delivery of items objected to in lists a and the items in list B could be postponed until such time as our two governments within sight of general settlement on defense with Egyptian Government, Her Majesty's Government would not feel obliged maintain their objections, if however, it should not prove possible withhold these items altogether for time being, Her Majesty's Government's view is that anything sent should be in very small quantities, such as could be justified on grounds they would be used for training purposes only, and such as would not set precedent which might lead to break-down of understanding between signatories of North Atlantic Treaty to withhold lethal weapons from Egypt.

"3. Attention of United States Embassy invited to additional arguments advanced by Her Majesty's Government against supply of lethal weapons to Egyptian Government at this juncture, namely:

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 234.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 2, Document 1083.

[3] Not printed.

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"(a) Concern of Government of Israel; and

"(b) Adherence of both Her Majesty's Government and United States Government to principle that Egyptian Government would normally obtain their armaments from their habitual sources of supply;

"(c) Objection to giving prematurely what is likely to be chief inducement to Egyptians to join MEDO.

"4. Her Majesty's Government presume that this question will be referred to NEACC in Washington if that has not already been done.

Embassy officer, after receiving foregoing, said he wished ensure that there was no misunderstanding re our intention proceed immediately with arms negotiations with Egypt. Foreign Office official confirmed Her Majesty's Government understands this to be our intention. He expressed hope that Foreign Office could be kept informed re progress negotiations and would be particularly grateful for any indications which we could give during course negotiations of intention release any objectionable items.

HOLMES

No. 1098

745W.00/2-1253: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 12, 1953—6 p. m.

4486. Eden made statement to crowded House this afternoon re signature Sudan agreement. Statement was, for most part, factual account of agreement, introduced by short history of dispute in which Eden contrasted Naguib's attitude toward Sudan with that of previous government. After referring to unilateral abrogation of 1899 condominium agreement and insistence of previous governments re unity of Nile Valley and recognition King's title, Eden spoke of "decisive step" taken by General Naguib in recognizing that Sudanese should have self-determination and that sovereignty should be reserved for Sudanese until that time. Eden said "I should like the House to realize the significance of this step. It completely changed the situation." Towards end of statement, Eden expressed hope that House would agree that arrangements constitute reasonable settlement of question which had "long bedevilled our relations with Egypt." He hoped agreement would be happy

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 237 and to Khartoum as telegram 18.

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augury for future Sudanese and have its beneficial influence on Anglo-Egyptian relationships. Eden added that Her Majesty's Government will give full consideration any views Sudan Parliament may express on this agreement.

In ensuing question period one or two discordant notes of misgiving were expressed, but on whole arrangements were welcomed. It is thus apparent that government has been successful in enforcing party discipline, at least for time being. On Labor side, Morrison welcomed agreement in principle although indicating that after examination its complicated provisions, it might be desirable to have debate.

Embassy wishes stress importance effect which reaction of public's opinion may have in next week or two on defense negotiations. There is little doubt that much of uncertainty in Conservative Party circles in last few days (Embtels 4463, February 11, [2] 4466, February 12 [3]) has resulted from bellicose and ill-timed statements by members of Egypt Government. We appreciate strenuous efforts of Ambassador Caffery to persuade Egypt Government to moderate statements (Cairo's 1825, February 10) [4] and we particularly hope that Egyptians will show restraint in this matter in next few weeks. Morrison also indicated in House this afternoon that Laborites would like have debate next week, possibly Tuesday, on supply of jet aircraft to Middle East states, stressing Egypt particularly. Any unfriendly Egypt statements prior to that time could, of course, affect tenor of debate, revive doubts re Sudan agreement, and generally complicate governments task in getting on with defense negotiations. [5]

HOLMES

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[2] In telegram 4463 from London, Feb. 11, not printed, the Embassy reported that certain members of the Conservative Government and Party had doubts about approving the Sudan agreement and that Eden had returned urgently to London to secure a favorable decision from his Cabinet and Party colleagues. (745W.00/2-1153)

[3] In telegram 4466 from London, Feb. 12, not printed, the Embassy informed the Department that instructions had been sent to Stevenson in Cairo to initial the Sudan agreement. Prior to the issuance of these orders, however, Eden had had a difficult time persuading his colleagues to accept the final accord. (745W.00/2-1253)

[4] Not printed.

[5] On Feb. 16, the Embassy in London, in telegram 4562, not printed, reported that it had been endeavoring to ascertain from the Foreign Office the present status of the package proposals on Egyptian defense problems, which had been agreed on *ad referendum* in London in January. The Embassy said that the British were still considering the matter, and that they did not wish to take a final decision on the package proposals until after they had had an opportunity to assess the public's reaction to the Sudan agreement. (774.5/2-1653)

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No. 1099

774.56/2-1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1953—4:03 p. m.

1626. Your 1829. [2] For variety of reasons Department does not believe it advisable that interim arms equipment agreement list be discussed both Washington and Cairo. Department therefore proposes today to present arms list to Egyptian representatives Washington. This list will be substantially same as that contained Deptel 1559 to Cairo. [3] Additions made in limited quantities 50 cal., 30 cal. and 37 mm. ammunition for tanks and armored cars for training purposes. Number of helmets reduced substantially as well as cut made in 76 mm. ammunition to bring cost figure under $11 million.

Above for your information only. You will be advised further when interim list finalized with Egyptians.

DULLES

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 5389.

[2] In telegram 1829 from Cairo, Feb. 10, not printed, Ambassador Caffery welcomed the suggestion that it might be possible to establish a system of deferred payments for the Egyptians' interim arms aid program, and he asked the Department to inform him when the formal list of interim arms equipment could be discussed with the authorities in Cairo. (774.56/2-1053)

[3] Not printed; see footnote 3, Document 1088.

B. THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO RESUMED ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE AGREEMENT REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL ZONE ON OCTOBER 19, 1954

No. 1100

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower, February 1953 thru March 1955"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, February 18, 1953.

MY DEAR FRIEND: Thank you very much for your kind letter of February 12. [1] I now write to you about the Suez Canal and M.E.D.O.

(1) We reached an agreement with the late United States Administration about the minimum arrangements necessary before we began to withdraw our forces. I do not know the level on your side

[1] Not printed here.

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which our discussions with your people had reached; Acheson and Bradley certainly knew. The talks took place here between December 31 and January 7 and the conclusions were set out in agreed papers copies of which I enclose. [2] I have given my assent to these plans, epitomized on page 11, paragraph 1, in the five sub-heads a, b, c, d, and e, [3] and in A in the Appendix on page 7, [4] because of the enormous advantages which might flow from our joint action.

(2) There is no question of our seeking or needing military, physical, or financial aid from you. Alex [5] assures me that our forces in the Canal Zone are in ample strength to resist any attack, and even if necessary, in order to prevent a massacre of white people and to rescue them, to enter Cairo and Alexandria, for which all preparations have been for some time at 96 hours' notice. Moreover, nearly half the effective Egyptian Army, about 15,000 men, stands on the Eastern side of the Canal watching Israel. They could be easily forced to surrender perhaps indeed merely by cutting off supplies. As for Egypt herself, the cutting off of the oil would, as you know, exercise a decisive effect. There is therefore no question of our needing your help or to reinforce the 80,000 men we have kept at great expense on tiptoe during the last year. The advantages of our working together on the lines agreed with your predecessors are so great that a successful result might be achieved without violence or bloodshed and without exposing you to any military obligation.

(3) We feel however that our Ambassador, Stevenson, requires to be guided by one of our strongest military personalities. The Socialist Government sent Field-Marshal Slim out there in 1949 and 1950, and he did extremely well in his visits. He has profound knowledge of the military situation and was indeed until recently responsible as C.I.G.S. for advising us upon it. I am sure you know him well. He would head our delegation if the Australian Government will agree to postpone for a few weeks his assumption of their Governor-Generalship. If not, it might be Slessor or Portal or Tedder as the Air has a lot to say. I wonder whether you would consider favourably placing a first class American military figure with Ambassador Caffery? You have many versed alike in policy and defence.

(4) Thus we should present to the dictator Naguib an agreed plan which represents far-reaching concessions on our part, sustained by Britain and the United States and by outstanding representatives thoroughly soaked in the Middle East problem. This would, I am sure, give the best chance of making a tolerable arrangement for M.E.D.O. without a renewal of Anglo-Egyptian strife. Let me repeat that if all fails the United States would in no circumstances be involved in military operations.

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[2] The reference is to the agreed papers of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt, not printed. See footnote 1, Document 1056.

[3] The reference is to Paper No. 3 of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1082.

[4] The reference is to Case A in Appendix D to Paper No. 1 of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. See Document 1061.

[5] Field Marshal the Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, Minister of Defense in Churchill's Conservative Government.

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I shall be most grateful if you will let me know what you think of these ideas. [6]

Yours ever,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

[6] On Feb. 20, the British Ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, delivered by hand another brief message, which is not printed, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower reiterating Churchill's desire for an early answer to his message dated Feb. 18. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower, February 1953 thru March 1955")

On Feb. 23, Makins sent another message to the President from the Prime Minister, which is also not printed. In it, Churchill informed Eisenhower that the British Government was announcing that same day that it had retained the services of Field Marshal Sir William Slim, the former Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to have him available to advise British negotiators on the military issues involved in any discussions which might begin with Egypt about the Suez Canal Zone. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower, February 1953 thru March 1955")

No. 1101

774.5 MSP/2-1953

The Secretary of State to the Director for Mutual Security (Stassen) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 19, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. STASSEN: I am sure you are aware of the importance which we attach to Egypt in the area of the Near and Middle East. It is the key to the problem of Middle East defense and the general problem of relations between the United States and the Arab States. The present Egyptian Government under General Naguib, which came into power on July 23, 1952, has given many evidences of its desire to cooperate with the United States, including participation in the defense arrangements for the area, provided it can first settle the outstanding Anglo-Egyptian disputes. We believe it is absolutely essential to our interests that General Naguib remain in power and be encouraged to co-operate with the West.

We have already taken first steps to support the Naguib regime by offering $10 million in economic assistance and by agreeing to sell $11 million worth of military equipment. The recent signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan has opened the way for closer understandings with Egypt and makes it additionally important to demonstrate continued support for the Egyptian Government.

[1] This letter was drafted by Ortiz and Jernegan.

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As a small next step, it is the view of the Department of State and of Defense that a program to train approximately fifty Egyptian jet pilots should be undertaken. Our present program of interim military aid does not include anything for the Egyptian Air Force, it having been decided by the President that jet aircraft should not be furnished to Egypt at this time. This could have unfortunate repercussions, since the Air Force has great influence in the present military regime and since it will play an important role in the arrangements we anticipate for the future defense of the Suez Canal area. These effects may be offset if we demonstrate genuine interest in the Air Force by the proposed training program, which would both strengthen its eventual efficiency and constitute a gesture of political goodwill.

Both the Department of State and the Department of Defense, however, believe that maximum results can be obtained only if the training is conducted at the expense of the United States. While the Egyptian Government might feel able to pay the cost involved, (estimated at $400,000) past experience with other States in the area has shown that much of the goodwill which would otherwise be engendered is lost if the local governments are required to foot the bill. This is especially true in the case of States like Egypt which have very limited foreign exchange holdings and are in budgetary difficulties.

I believe, therefore, that we should make Egypt eligible for grant military aid, it being understood that this eligibility would be limited to training programs for personnel of the Egyptian Armed Forces in United States military installations. We would, of course, make it clear to the Egyptians that they would have to pay cash for anything other than training, unless a new arrangement is worked out.

In the light of the foregoing, it would be appreciated if you would recommend to the President that Egypt be declared eligible for grant military aid specifically limited to training. [2]

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[2] According to a memorandum from Jernegan to the Secretary of State on Feb. 28, which is not printed, Under Secretary of State Smith actually signed this letter. Jernegan continued, saying that he had spoken to Stassen about this letter on Feb. 27, that Stassen indicated his general concurrence with its recommendations, but that he said he wished to raise certain points with the President concerning possible repercussions in Israel if such assistance were extended to Egypt. Jernegan informed Dulles that the Departments of State and Defense had considered fully the possible Israeli reactions to a program of grant aid to Egypt, but concluded that the larger objectives involved with respect to Egypt's key position in the Arab world and her possible leadership in Ara' acceptance of membership in MEDO far outweighed the repercussions in Israel. (774.5 MSP/2-1953)

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No. 1102

774.5 MSP/2-1953: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 19, 1953—6:33 p. m.

1668. At his press conference, Feb 18, Secretary replied along following lines to question whether Department had plans for providing some limited economic and military help to Egypt:

There has been discussion of allowing the Egyptians to purchase here a small amount of military equipment of a type which would not be suitable for any war against Israel or anything of that sort. There has been no definite decision yet as to what Egyptians want or what could be spared.

If the press insists on amplification of the Secretary's remarks, it has been agreed that statement by Department will be along these lines:

Secretary's statement made it clear that amounts and types military equipment which Egypt sought to buy here under the Cash Reimbursable Military Assistance Agreement, concluded between the two governments on December 10, 1952, [2] would not create a war potential against any other state. U.S. Government is firmly of the belief that Egypt harbors no aggressive intentions against state of Israel, just as Israel is believed to harbor none against Egypt.

If question should arise whether Secretary's statements constitute further limitation on interim arms program for Egypt, answer should be negative. We plan no alterations on list furnished Egyptians and are continuing await their comments. [3]

DULLES

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 5543 and by air pouch to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv. Drafted by Ortiz and was approved by Byroade.

[2] See Document 1045.

[3] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 1905 from Cairo, Feb. 20, not printed, that no publication had been made in Egypt of the Secretary of State's remarks, undoubtedly because the Egyptian Government had imposed censorship. (774.56/2-2053)

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No. 1103

774.5/2–2053: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, February 20, 1953—8 p. m.

4688. We have been inquiring frequently re Her Majesty's Government's position with respect "package proposals" for Egyptian defense negotiations and have again been informed today no decision yet reached by Cabinet. Both Eden and Churchill are now informed US approval (Deptel 5460, February 17) [2] and Foreign Office working levels hope this will precipitate early decision.

Embassy increasingly of opinion that unhappiness within Conservative Party over relations with Egypt is main reason for delay. We have had several indications recently from Parliamentary sources that mood is such among backbenchers that they are likely be more exacting in their requirements re acceptability defense arrangements than in case Sudan agreement. What this means to us in practical terms is that government may find it impossible in present situation to give any indication of intention to evacuate unless it is is accompanied by announcement of satisfactory alternative arrangements for defense of base.

in light foregoing it would be at least premature and probably entirely unwarranted for Egyptians to gain impression that they might be able exchange secret assurances re participation system mutual defense for actual evacuation or even announcement intention evacuate. Secret Egyptian assurances re MEDO were never envisaged, so far as Embassy aware, to make it "much easier" for US and UK to aid Egypt (Cairo's 1892, February 19). [3] They were regarded as essential *quid pro quo* for secret British assurances re evacuation and other elements of package in US–UK agreed paper No. 3. [4]

ALDRICH

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 250.
[2] Not printed; see footnote 6, Document 1082.
[3] Not printed.
[4] Not printed; see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1082.

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No. 1104

641.74/2-2453

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 24, 1953.

Subject: Procedure for Negotiations with Egypt

Background

At the London talks in January, it was agreed that the American and British Ambassadors in Cairo would open negotiations on the Suez Canal question by informing General Naguib that our two Governments were willing to discuss a general settlement based on five points: [2]

(a) A phased withdrawal of British armed forces from Egyptian territory.
(b) The maintenance of the Canal Zone Base in peace with a view to its immediate reactivation in the event of war.
(c) An arrangement for the air defense of Egypt.
(d) The participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defense Organization.
(e) A program of (US and UK) military and economic assistance to Egypt.

If the Egyptian Government accepted these points as a basis for discussion, it was proposed that technical committees be set up to deal with items (a), (b), (c), and (e). The question of Egyptian participation in a Middle East Defense Organization, which is a key point for us, would be handled by the two Ambassadors, who would have considerable discretion in their tactics. (The agreement on these procedures is to be found on Page 11 of the paper enclosed with Mr. Churchill's letter to the President.)

The immediate question raised by Mr. Churchill is whether we should send a high-ranking military officer to accompany our Ambassador in joint discussions with the Egyptians, the British representatives being Ambassador Stevenson and Field Marshal Sir William Slim. A broader question raised by his letter is how closely our representatives should be associated with the British in all phases of the negotiations.

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[1] Jernegan drafted this memorandum, and it had the concurrence of Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

[2] See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1082.

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We understand that Mr. Eden intends to discuss the Egyptian negotiations with you during his forthcoming visit [3] and that negotiations with Egypt will not be begun until his return to London.

As you may be aware, both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden attach great importance to the Egyptian problem, especially because of the strength of public opinion in Great Britain. Even in the Conservative Party, there is considerable opposition to Mr. Eden's conciliatory policy. He is having much difficulty in getting Parliamentary backing for the impending negotiations.

Discussion

We have already agreed, and there seems no reason to change that decision, that our Ambassador should act in concert with the British Ambassador in making the initial approach and endeavoring to get Egyptian agreement to the five points as a basis for negotiation. To go beyond this and associate ourselves closely with the military negotiations by sending a high-ranking military representative to join Ambassador Caffery would have both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, if the negotiations should break down, which is quite possible, we will incur a greater share of blame from the Egyptians. On the other hand, these negotiations will be conducted with a military regime and the combined weight of British and American military representatives might be an important contribution to their success.

If a special military representative is sent, he should be both exceptionally able and of sufficient stature to command the respect of both the Egyptians and the British. Otherwise, he would not be able to exercise real influence and we would then incur all the disadvantages of military representation without the advantages.

Recommendation

I suggest you advise the President to fall in with Mr. Churchill's suggestion, provided a suitable officer of sufficiently high rank can be made available. I assume the President would wish to consult the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this regard.

In informing Mr. Churchill of his decision, the President might well indicate his strong hope that the negotiations can be begun quickly to take advantage of the momentum created by the recent Sudan settlement and to avoid the danger of rash Egyptian statements and actions which might seriously prejudice the chances of success.

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[3] Foreign Secretary Eden and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, R. A. Butler, were scheduled to come to Washington early in March 1953, for a series of high-level meetings. See Documents 1111 ff. For additional documentation regarding these talks, see volume VI, Part 1.

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It might also be well for the President to express gratification at Mr. Churchill's assurances that no American military or other assistance will be needed or called for in the event of failure of the negotiations and to say that he would deeply regret the necessity for British forces in Egypt to enter into action.

No. 1105

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 133d Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, February 24, 1953

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 133rd meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding, the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Under Secretary of State, General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President, the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations, the Military Liaison Officer, the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

British-Egyptian Negotiations

The President referred in his opening remarks to two letters from Prime Minister Churchill—one some time ago and another received yesterday [1]—which expressed extreme urgency with regard to the part to be played by the United States in the current negotiations between the British and the Egyptians. The President said he was somewhat puzzled as to the nature of the problem, but he deduced from these letters that the Prime Minister anticipated urgently an American decision. He had therefore felt it best to call the Council together and to get everybody's advice. The first question, which he put to the Secretary of State, was the nature of the problem Mr. Churchill was concerned about and why a solution was so urgent.

Secretary Dulles replied that he thought he knew the subject of Mr. Churchill's letters, but that he could not see why the matter

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[1] See footnote 6, Document 1100.

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was so urgent. He guessed that the Prime Minister was concerned with the part that the United States was to play in the current British-Egyptian negotiations for the evacuation of the Suez area and for the setting up of the Middle East Defense Organization. Secretary Dulles pointed out that just prior to the time when the new administration had taken over, this Government had discussed the program for the British-Egyptian negotiations and had reached agreement on the subject with the British Government. These negotiations were to take place in several phases. The first of these phases was to be direct negotiations between the British Government (on a two-party basis) and the Egyptian Government with respect to the withdrawal of the British forces from Suez. The United States Government was to take no part in this phase of the negotiations. Subsequently, however, when the negotiations began on the defense structure in the Middle East and on a program for supplying military and economic assistance to Egypt, the United States Government had committed itself to take part in the negotiations. What Prime Minister Churchill seemed to want, thought Secretary Dulles, was confirmation that the present administration would abide by the commitments made by the former administration at the end of its term of office. Furthermore, Mr. Churchill wished this Government to designate a military man of high rank to proceed to our Embassy in Cairo to engage in discussions there. So far as he knew, Secretary Dulles thought this was the only point which required decision at this meeting, and he didn't think the problem very important.

The President disagreed with the latter statement, and felt that it was a matter of great significance to this Government to appoint at this time a high-ranking officer to take part in the Cairo negotiations.

At this point Secretary Dulles passed to the President the paper, prepared in the Department of State and Defense, which had been used for discussions with the British Government on this problem in London a few weeks back. [2]

The President again indicated his concern lest the urgency and somewhat frightening phraseology in Mr. Churchill's letter to him should be the means of securing this administration's agreement to something more than had been agreed to last January.

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[2] The paper under reference is presumably Appendix C of the "Agreed Record" of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt, entitled "Paper Tabled by United States Side on Tactics in Securing Over-all Agreement with Egypt", not printed. (774.5/1-1453)

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Secretary Dulles pointed out that if we do send this high-ranking American officer, it would have a favorable effect on Egyptian morale.

The President agreed, but thought that perhaps Mr. Churchill in his letters was trying to tie our hands in advance to something about which we were not very clear, even though Mr. Churchill's letter had stressed the fact that he did not anticipate that the United States would become involved in any possible military operations by the British against the Egyptians.

The President then asked whether this administration had agreed to support the plans of the preceding administration with respect to the British-Egyptian negotiations.

Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative, so far as these plans were set forth in the paper which he had passed to the President.

Under Secretary Smith then read a cable in this morning from the Cairo Embassy, indicating that, despite his recent inflammatory statements, Naguib had indicated readiness to negotiate with the British at once on the withdrawal of British forces from Suez. [3]

Secretary Dulles confirmed this report, and said that information from Mr. Caffery indicated that the Egyptians desired to negotiate directly with the British on the evacuation problem, whereas the British preferred to intermingle the evacuation issue with the setting up of the defense arrangements (MEDO). Furthermore, Secretary Dulles expressed some concern about the implications of sending a high-ranking officer at this time.

Mr. Stassen expressed the view that the Egyptians desperately hoped to get military assistance from the United States immediately, instead of receiving it in a later phase as a reward for reaching agreement with the British.

The President stated that the answer to this problem seemed to be to inform the British Government that this administration is prepared to reaffirm the agreements reached by the previous administration in early January.

Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with this statement, but went on to recommend that we make no decision at this time to send a high-ranking officer to Cairo, but to discuss this with Foreign Secretary Eden, who is coming to Washington next week. [4] In any case, it was easier to deal with Mr. Eden than with Mr. Churchill in such matters.

In response to a question from the President as to the officer which Defense had in mind to go to Cairo, General Vandenberg re-

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[3] Not printed.

[4] For documentation regarding Eden's conversations with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles regarding Egypt, see Documents 1111 ff.

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plied that the obvious candidate was Admiral Austin, who was well versed in the British-Egyptian problem.

Secretary Dulles wondered whether a Naval officer was logical for discussions of what seemed to him essentially a land problem, and whether the choice of Admiral Austin would be agreeable to the Air Force and the Army.

General Vandenberg replied in the affirmative, and stated that Admiral Austin was the choice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Dulles again expressed the opinion that decision on this issue should be postponed.

The President concluded by stating that he proposed to tell Mr. Churchill that we are ready to reaffirm the prior agreement, but that the further points raised in his letter to the President should await Mr. Eden's visit.

Under Secretary Smith volunteered to draft a cable for the President to send to the Prime Minister along the lines suggested by the President. [5]

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the President's report on two letters from Prime Minister Churchill.

b. Noted the President's decision that he would reply to these letters by indicating that this Administration is in general accord with the position arrived at during the January 1953 conference in London, but that further decisions by the United States on this subject should await the visit to Washington of Foreign Secretary Eden. [6]

[Here follows discussion of the Department of Defense budget for the coming fiscal year.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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[5] Not printed; the telegram in question is telegram 5647 to London, Feb. 24. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill, February 1953 thru November 1958")

[6] These final two paragraphs regarding British-Egyptian negotiations were adopted verbatim as NSC Action No. 722. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, "Record of Actions by the NSC, 1953")

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No. 1106

774.5/2-2553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1953—9:44 a. m.

1694. On highest level Brit have given assent to those plans summarized on Page 11, Paragraph one, and in A in the Appendix on Page 7 of the agreed papers on the London talks. [2] In addition, in view of fact that Field Marshal Slim will be associated with Ambassador Stevenson in negotiations, Brit ask the U.S. to consider sending a high-ranking military figure to assist Ambassador Caffery.

Reply has been made that decision on the question of U.S. military representation for the Suez discussions will be deferred until there has been opportunity to discuss entire question with Mr. Eden in Washington.

Your comments are requested on:

(a) Advisability U.S. military representation for defense negotiations.

(b) Extent we should participate in the military negotiations, bearing in mind the tortuous road which lies ahead. [3]

DULLES

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 5660. Drafted by Ortiz and Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and approved by Under Secretary Smith.

[2] References are to Paper No. 3 and Case A in Appendix D to Paper No. 1 of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. See, respectively, footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1082, and Document 1061.

[3] Ambassador Caffery replied in telegram 1959, Feb. 28, not printed, that there was no chance of the Egyptians accepting *in toto* the plans summarized in Case A. He thought it possible that the Egyptians might be persuaded to accept something approximating Cases B and C. He also recommended caution in having the United States participate in the military negotiations at all, and he opposed any U.S. military representation during the initial negotiating stages. (774.5/2-2853)

No. 1107

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, February 26, 1953—10 a. m.

4780. Eyes only Secretary. Please deliver the following message from Prime Minister to President:

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Begin text. "1. I had a talk with Aldrich when he delivered your message this morning. (February 25.) The time factor is important to me and Menzies as Slim is needed in Australia by the end of April, but of course if you so prefer, the decision can await Eden's talks with you and Dulles.

"2. I am sure you will consider my suggestion in relation to Ridgway's front now so advantageously extended to Turkey. All the Egyptian theatre lies behind Ridgway's right wing and if cut away might be source of weakness to the whole position in Western Europe. The Canal of course is a lateral communication in the whole potential front which we believe you would wish to see sustained southward from the North Cape to Korea. Our British interest in the Canal is much reduced by the post-war changes in India, Burma, etcetera, and we got on all right round the Cape for a long time in the war. I cannot regard it as a major British interest justifying the indefinite maintenance of 80,000 British troops at immense expense. There are lots of places where they could be used better or the money saved.

"3. On the other hand we are not going to be knocked about with impunity and if we are attacked we shall use our concentrated strength to the full.

"4. It seems to me that you might be standing with us in the approach to Naguib on the lines on which we have agreed bring about a peaceful solution in the truest harmony within the military and moral interests of the anti-Communist front. This is no question of British imperialism or indeed of any national advantage to us, but only for the common cause. If an Anglo-American team, military and diplomatic, puts our agreed plan firmly to Naguib all may come well without bloodshed, and other blessings would flow from the success of this decisive accord. Please think of a potential regrouping of forces as a part of your bitter problem in Korea.

"5. We were very pleased to see the line Ambassador Caffery has taken since your hand was on the tiller.

"6. Please talk everything over with Anthony, including the atomic point I made to you. I hope that he can be shown the same kind of picture I was given at the Pentagon last year.

"7. Every good wish, your much older friend, Winston."

ALDRICH

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No. 1108

774.5/2-2753: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State

SECRET LONDON, February 27, 1953—7 p. m.

4840. Eyes only Secretary. Re final paragraph Embtel 4774, [1] February 25 to Department and Deptel 1694 to Cairo.

There has been much confusion in Foreign Office as to whether Churchill messages constitute Her Majesty's Government's approval *ad referendum* agreement on Egypt reached here in January. We have just ascertained that prior his departure last night, Eden left note for his officials which indicates that pending outcome discussions between Eden and you, no final decision will be taken by Her Majesty's Government on January agreement. Foreign Office, in informing us of foregoing admits there may on face be inconsistency between this statement and Churchill's allusions to "lines on which we have agreed" and "our agreed plan" in paragraph 4, Embtel 4780, February 26, but regards Eden's statement of position as definitive.

I feel you should know for your own personal and confidential background in connection any talks you may have on this subject that there is some evidence that Eden and Churchill have had serious disagreement on handling defense negotiations, that Slim announcement was Churchill's own brainchild and that Eden not aware of first Churchill letter to President until after President's reply (Deptel 5647, February 24) [2] was delivered to Prime Minister. It is difficult confirm these points but recent announcement that Eden will remain in charge of Foreign Office while in US rather than Churchill assuming charge as formerly custom, may indicate Eden has put his foot down.

If it would be proper, I would be grateful if you could transmit to me the text of Churchill's first message to the President. [3] As indicated Embtel 4774, Churchill showed this to Aldrich but did not give him copy and I do not consider it appropriate to ask for one here.

I would be grateful if none of this message (with exception actual position re January agreement referred to in first paragraph) were

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 5, Document 1105.

[3] The Department complied with this request by transmitting the substance of Churchill's letter of Feb. 18 to the Embassy in London on Mar. 3 in telegram 5834, not printed. (774.5/2-2753)

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alluded to in any way in any conversations with British since various points involve personal confidences by officials who are not supposed to be aware of differences within the Cabinet.

HOLMES

No. 1109

774.5/2-2853: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, February 28, 1953—11 a. m.

4848. Eyes only Secretary. I do not regard following encrypted telegram from Aldrich from RMS *Queen Elizabeth* regarding US-UK *ad referendum* agreement on Egypt to be inconsistent with paragraph 1 Embassy's telegram 4840, February 27:

"Eden stated that while Blue Agreement has never been formally approved by Cabinet action HMG in fact desires have it put into effect and desires our full support as indicated to accomplish this."

I believe position to be as follows: (1) There is no Cabinet opposition to agreement per se; but (2) Churchill strongly desires military association with negotiations and, in this situation, Cabinet has not given formal approval to agreement pending resolution this question.

I feel confident that regardless our decision re military participation, Eden would want proceed with negotiations on basis [*bases?*] agreement. However, I am sure that you will bear in mind that factors outlined second paragraph Embassy's telegram 4840 together with Churchill's upredictability, might create complications, and delay. In long run, however, I think Eden would have his way.

HOLMES

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No. 1110

874.00 TA/3-353

Memorandum by the Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration (Andrews) to the Deputy to the Director of the Mutual Security Agency for Program and Coordination (Ohly) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 3, 1953.

Subject: Request for Program Reauthorization in the Amount of $10,000,000 of Fiscal Year 1953 Funds for the Point 4 Program in Egypt

The Point 4 program in Egypt has never been commensurate with the magnitude of the social and economic problems of that country. One reason for this has been the attitude of the regimes in power up to July 23, 1952, which severely restricted opportunity and did not permit programs to be based on Egypt's needs or potentialities.

The assumption of power by General Naguib and his reform Government last July, however, led to a clear change in the situation, culminating in the past two weeks with the Government of Egypt's request for an expanded and balanced Point 4 program specifically designed to deal with some of Egypt's major social and economic problems. The Egyptians made their request for such a Point 4 program in preference to an earlier proposal for a special economic program involving the provision of wheat or other import commodities in a similar amount of U.S. funds. Moreover, our Embassy, having weighed the two proposals on its own, and on the basis of questions submitted by the Department, has cabled that in its judgment an expanded Point 4 program would have "an even greater political and economic impact on our policy objectives than the wheat deal" authorized under Section 503.

We wish now to seize this newly presented opportunity without delay as a decisive attempt on our part to create a stable and friendly Egypt. The decision to act affirmatively in Egypt was made at the Cabinet level in January when it was determined to allocate a further $10,000,000 to Egypt and to waive eligibility conditions if necessary. On January 17, we authorized our Embassy to inform the Government of Egypt formally that the U.S. Government had approved assistance to Egypt in the amount of $10,000,000. On January 20, our Ambassador cabled that he had in-

[1] According to a note attached to the record copy of this memorandum and addressed to Arthur Z. Gardiner, this memorandum was taken to the Mutual Security Agency that same day. Moreover, Johnston Avery, Assistant Administrator for Programs, Technical Cooperation Administration, had signed the document for Andrews.

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formally told the Government of Egypt that the wheat grant had been approved in principle in Washington. Subsequently there were American-Egyptian talks on programming the $10,000,000 under the Act for International Development. [2] In light of what has been said above, we consider that in effect we are committed to giving Egypt $10,000,000 in economic aid at this time.

It is requested, therefore, that the recent authorization of $10,000,000 for the purchase of wheat under authority of Section 503 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, now be modified to permit the same amount to be made available for the purpose of carrying out a general Point 4 program in Egypt under the Act for International Development. Since discussions have been initiated with the appropriate representatives of the Government of Egypt concerning the type of economic assistance now needed, it is assumed that negotiations along these lines may be continued. However, authority to sign these program agreements has been held in abeyance pending your approval of this request for reauthorization of funds and a weighing of the effect of notification to the appropriate Committees of Congress of the changed circumstances described herein. Our Embassy in Cairo has been instructed accordingly.

The proposed Point 4 program consists of a $10,000,000 joint-fund agreement for community development and rural rehabilitation, including housing, health, agricultural extension, farm-market roads, cooperatives, vocational education and training in the province of Beheira, near Alexandria, and in the province of Fayoum, south of Cairo. It will be carried on primarily by Egyptian technical and custodial personnel with heavy emphasis on training at each step. The Egyptian contribution is currently estimated at 5,500,000 Egyptian pounds (equivalent to 15.7 million dollars), or more than half again as much as our $10,000,000.

The program in Fayoum involves the reclamation of approximately 60,000 acres of land and the resettlement of approximately 10,000 landless families. The program in the province of Beheira calls for the reclamation by drainage of 20,000 acres of land and the resettlement and housing of approximately 4,000 landless farm families.

The funds contemplated under the present Point 4 program of $3,000,000 would not be affected by this new program.

The information presently available regarding the program, the opportunity involved in and the need for this expanded technical cooperation program in Egypt, and the factors making prompt

[2] Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, signed into law on June 5, 1950, as Public Law 535. See 64 Stat. 204.

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action essential are contained in the following cables exchanged with Embassy Cairo:

Deptel 1434, 1-17,	Secret
Embtel 1687, 1-20,	"
Deptel 1646, 2-17,	"
Embtel 1876, 2-18,	"
Embtel 1898, 2-20,	"
Embtel 1901, 2-20,	"
Deptel 1680, 2-20,	"
Embtel 1914, 2-21,	"
Embtel 1940, 2-25,	"
Embtel 1948, 2-26,	"
Deptel 1712, 2-27,	"
Embtel 1958, 2-28,	" [3]

In closing, I should like to say that this is a rare opportunity to take a big step forward in our relations with Egypt. The Government of Egypt is ready to negotiate and sign a joint-fund agreement to carry out this proposed Point 4 program. Moveover, Ambassador Caffery is of the opinion that it would "give the same emergency financial support to the Egypt balance of payments deficit, but will associate us with a continuing program of more effective benefit to Egypt." The one thing that is now holding us back from taking this very significant step forward in Egypt is the lack of authority to sign the necessary agreements.

Action Requested

We respectfully urge you to insure this program reauthorization so that authority to sign the agreements may be given to our Ambassador as soon as possible. [4]

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[3] Of these 12 telegrams, only telegram 1434 to Cairo, Document 1080, is printed. The others are in Department of State file 874.00 TA.

[4] The Department on Mar. 4 in telegram 1749 to Cairo, not printed, informed Ambassador Caffery that the new program had been approved in Washington, but that he was not to sign the program agreement until the allocation funds had been received. (874.00 TA/3-353) The Department in telegram 1761 to Cairo on Mar. 6, not printed, authorized Caffery to sign the program agreement. (874.00 TA/3-553)

This special Technical Cooperation Administration agreement was signed and entered into force on Mar. 19, 1953. For the text, see TIAS No. 2843, printed in 4 UST (pt. 2) 1761. This program was separate from and did not supersede the funding and development of the other Point IV projects in Egypt which were being funded in the amount of $3 million.

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No. 1111

611.41/3-453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 4, 1953

Participants: The President
Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain
Ambassador Makins
Secretary Dulles

The meeting was essentially social and held in the living quarters of the White House. There was a general exchange of views with reference to the world situation, the effect of Stalin's death, and finally the discussion settled primarily on Middle Eastern matters.

Mr. Eden [1] emphasized the importance of developing MEDO as a bulwark against possible deterioration of conditions in Iran. The President emphasized, in this connection, the importance of peace between Egypt and Israel without which MEDO would be rather meaningless. Mr. Eden agreed but felt that the first thing to do was to push through the Suez settlement and that Naguib could not make peace with Israel without first the prestige of getting the British out of Suez.

Mr. Eden urged that we should promptly send a high-ranking general to begin the negotiations with Slim. The President suggested that if we did this, it might be in order to ask General Hull to go but the President did not in any way commit the United States to participation in the initial phases of the negotiations.

The President suggested that the United States might have to exercise a freer hand with relation to Iran and the oil situation.

[1] Regarding Foreign Secretary Eden's visit to Washington, see footnote 3, Document 1104.

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No. 1112

774.5/3-753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 7, 1953—3:58 p. m.

5956. Part 1 of 2. Major portion Secy's mtg with Eden, Mar 6, devoted discussion problem negots Egypt. UK indicated desire start promptly but confirmed Cabinet unwilling go beyond case "A" [2] except for minor modifications. Eden expressed strongly view anything much less than "A" which wld not provide base too risky defense point of view. Also political impossibility in UK. Expressed view Brit rather stay in Canal present basis than to give up treaty rights in exchange for arrangement which to UK meant no base or inoperative base in time war.

Secy urged strongly need for greater flexibility in view of our belief Egyptians practically certain reject plan "A". He indicated we wld have to restudy without military question all-out support shld negots be restricted to case "A". He said we wld not feel we cld be completely identified therewith pending further study.

In further meeting at White House it was agreed Eden wld put to London for approval following formula:

Verbatim text. "Negotiations with the Egyptian Govt will be undertaken in Cairo by representatives of the two Govts, including military officers of high rank. The objective will be to secure an agreement on the basis of case "A". Should this prove impossible, the U.S. Govt wish to make it clear that in their view, it may be necessary to fall back on an arrangement lying between case "A" and case "B" [2] and in the last resort on case "B". If the Egyptians prove completely intransigent, a new situation will be created which the two Govts will discuss."

It was pointed out to Brit that U.S. participation in UK-Egyptian negots arising out of treaty relationship wld depend on friendly desire Egyptian Govt to receive U.S. participation. Eden confident Egyptian Govt wld welcome U.S. participation.

Brit informed at White House mtg military representative will be General Hull who will be designated military adviser to Caffery.

Part 2 this tel (Deptel 5957) will contain further analysis of special interest Cairo.

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[1] Also sent priority to Cairo as telegram 1775. Drafted by G. Hayden Raynor, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, and approved by James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

[2] See Document 1061.

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Secy raised with Eden problem of need for developing peace between Israel and Arab states. Genl agreement reached that shld Egyptian negots go well stage wld be reached where this issue cld be raised actively as Naguib wld then feel strong enough begin deal with it. Also agreed solution refugee problem on resettlement basis important aspect this problem.

Secy pointed out new administration requires additional time study MEDO plan before it can be committed to it. Raised question as to wisdom giving Arabs virtual veto on possible admission Israel. Question adherence Pakistan also discussed and general sentiment both sides appeared to be unwise have Pakistan initial member particularly in view probable complications with India.

DULLES

No. 1113

774.5/3-753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 7, 1953—3:58 p. m.

5957. Part 2 of 2 (continuation Deptel 5956).

Dept's Comments: White House formula cited Part 1 reached only after lengthy discussion between Secretary and Eden which made clear that original alternative cases B and C [2] had never received Cabinet approval London and C now politically impossible in UK. Eden particularly emphasized UK unwilling consider case C since this meant base would be abandoned and he disagreed with earlier UK working level position London talks that case C better than no base agreement. He now believed very questionable whether Cabinet could even accept case B although modifications case A possible for example by reduction number of men listed.

Secretary emphasized this constituted fundamental shift UK position since original UK papers for London talks themselves outlined all three alternative cases. Dept pointed out US Chiefs of Staff also disliked case C but US felt case A almost certainly impossible achieve and believed C should be taken as last resort. Secretary stated believed negotiators should be given authority make best arrangement possible since six months from now we probably unable get what could today. He felt it unrealistic divide matter into set formulae as would inject undue amount rigidity.

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[1] Also sent priority to Cairo as telegram 1776. Drafted by Parker T. Hart, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, and approved by Byroade.

[2] See Document 1061.

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Decision join with British in negotiations conditioned on UK acceptance formula which provides considerable latitude re exact arrangements for base. Dept wishes assure negotiators flexibility in tactics and avoid presentation fixed plan re base to Egyptians.

Provided formula accepted by UK, assurances will be required Egypt would welcome US participation in negotiations including presence high ranking military man (Gen John E. Hull now Army Vice Chief of Staff). As soon as answer received from UK, Department expects instruct Caffery to approach Egyptian Government this matter. Secretary has agreed with Eden that Stevenson should call on Naguib or Egyptian FonMin accompanied by Caffery and explain reasons why US Government should be associated in negotiations (mainly that it is hoped negotiations will lead to settlement Middle East Defense problems and building up Egyptian economy). Caffery would confirm willingness US Government that he so participate. Department relies on Caffery to coordinate with Stevenson best manner approach Egyptian Government without giving impression US and UK have decided on US participation regardless Egyptian opinion, which of course is not the case.

Eden stated MEDO part of package and reference to it might be required early stage negotiations. Department emphasized it did not envisage MEDO outline as fixed document for Egyptian acceptance. Eden agreed tactics in presenting MEDO concept should be left to negotiators.

DULLES

No. 1114

774.5/3-853: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, March 8, 1953—2 p. m.

2008. I am in hearty agreement with views expressed by Secretary, as reported Deptels 1775 and 1776, repeated London 5956 and 5957, March 7.

As I have previously indicated there is no possibility that Egyptians will accept plan "A". [2] As Byroade pointed out in London, there is some possibility that elements of "A" and "B" can be achieved provided UK and United States Governments are able to produce an acceptable program of economic and military assistance.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 679.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 1106.

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As for Eden's view that British would rather stay in Canal on present basis than give up treaty rights for formula less satisfactory to them than case "A," I pointed out that in any event they will have to get out in three years and, meanwhile, would have to carry on in hostile territory.

On tactics, I trust Department will keep in mind that negotiation would be considerably enhanced from both UK and United States point of view if I did not enter immediately with Stevenson in joint *démarche* on problem of evacuation and terms for turn-over of base. We shall have much more leverage if I should be free in initial phases of negotiation to intervene "behind the scenes" as I did in case of Sudan. Stevenson and I appearing jointly at outset at negotiation table will get nowhere. If we are to get anywhere, it will be by my "behind the scenes" talks with Naguib, members of RCM [*RCC*] and Fawzi. Department will undoubtedly also have in mind disadvantages to United States interests if evacuation and base negotiations fail completely and we should be identified in Egypt, as well as Arab, mind as being on par with British in insisting on occupying Zone until expiry of 1936 treaty.

Subject to observations set out above, White House formula, which Eden will put to London, is something to work on. However, it would be most unfortunate if once more, as in 1951, exigencies of British domestic politics should spoil presentation of our case to Egyptian Government.

Re penultimate paragraph Deptel 1775, sent London 5956, recent letters to Byroade [3] have pointed out that Naguib and his officers are increasingly aware of need to seek peace settlement with Israel, if only for practical reasons.

CAFFERY

[3] Not printed; for documentation on the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Documents 947 ff.

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No. 1115

774.5/3-953: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 9, 1953—4:29 p. m.

1781. Following is text telegram sent by Eden to Foreign Office after discussion with Secretary referred to Deptel 1776 Mar 7. [2]

Verbatim text. I have had further discussion with Mr. Dulles on this point. We have agreed that the best procedure would be for Sir Ralph Stevenson to call on the Egyptian Prime Minister or Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by his U.S. colleague, and explain to him the reasons why it is proposed that the U.S. Government should be associated in the negotiations. Mr. Caffery would confirm the willingess of the U.S. Government that he should so participate.

Sir Ralph Stevenson would base his argument broadly on the fact that these negotiations will, we hope, lead up to a settlement of Middle East defense problems and the building up of Egyptian economy, in which the U.S. Government are bound to take a prominent part.

No action should be taken on this telegram into Cairo pending further instructions. *End verbatim text.*

SMITH

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 5972. It was drafted by William C. Burdett, Officer in Charge, Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, and was approved by Hart.

[2] Printed as telegram 5957, Document 1113.

No. 1116

774.5/3-953: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, March 9, 1953—6 p. m.

4995. Eyes only Secretary. [1] Re Embtel 4840, February 27.

I feel following additional details affecting Egyptian defense negotiations may provide useful confidential background for you in connection with further conversations with Eden.

[1] This telegram was transmitted as Tedul 3 on Mar. 10 to Secretary of State Dulles at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York. (774.5/3-953)

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Embassy continues receive indications from reliable sources which confirm its earlier reports re concern within government and Conservative party re such negotiations. It seems clear to us that segment of backbench opinion which has been so privately critical Sudan agreement is tending to solidify in opposition to any defense arrangements which would not in its opinion provide adequately for defense of area or which can be interpreted as damaging to British prestige.

Probably not directly related to backbench unrest is attitude of Churchill himself toward defense settlement. We have been told that Churchill increasingly concerned, in light his scornful criticism of Labor "scuttle" from Abadan, at interpretation by some quarters of Sudan agreement as constituting Conservative "scuttle". It is said that Churchill doubted Sudan agreement was possible and therefore did not pay much attention to negotiations until differences were narrowed to point where agreement was about to be reached. At this point, he began to find objections to it, buttressed by attitude his backbenchers, it was only as result Eden's strenuous efforts that Churchill withdrew his objections.

We understand that in light foregoing situation, Churchill is strongly opposed to any defense arrangements which could be termed another "scuttle". Re Deptels 5956 and 5957, March 7, he apparently feels case A does not fit this definition, but that case B does. We regard it as doubtful that Eden wedded to case A as strongly as he put it forward in conversation with you. It seems probable, that in view of difficulty of persuading Churchill by cable, Eden does not feel he has any other alternative at this time than to press Churchill's preference for case A. It would be in character if Eden, under circumstances, bent his efforts after his return to obtain softening of Churchill's attitude to permit more flexible approach to problem in negotiations.

HOLMES

No. 1117

774.5/3-953: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 9, 1953—7:44 p. m.

1785. Eden now seeking London's approval on somewhat different formula than that quoted Paragraph 4 of Deptel 5956, repeated

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 5989. It was drafted and approved by Byroade.

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Cairo 1775. This was a result of White House discussion and Eden believes London will accept the change. New formula has not been developed in agreed text but its purpose is to divert attention from the technical points listed under the alternatives in London papers and to focus attention upon implication of the various cases as described in that paper. In brief, implications of Case A as listed in the paper would be that a working base would be immediately operable in event of war and in Case B it would take 60 days to reach same operating conditions. If London approves new formula our negotiators would attempt to obtain as an optimum an agreement which would allow an operable base immediately upon outbreak of war. As a minimum they could agree upon arrangements which would insure that the base could be brought to this condition within 60 days after outbreak of hostilities. Within that framework our negotiators would not be bound to strict application of any of technical arrangements listed under the various cases in London papers. They would have flexibility to work out upon spot and between themselves such arrangements as would meet the desired objectives.

For info Caffery: Eden states that Slim is ready depart London any time. We do not wish Gen Hull depart until (a) we receive word from London that latest formula is acceptable, (b) you have ascertained in accordance with agreed procedures that our participation is welcomed by Egyptians, and (c) we know Slim is departing. It appears to us that this process could not be completed prior to Thursday [2] at earliest. Will inform you of size of party, time of departure, etc. subsequently. [3]

SMITH

[2] Mar. 12.

[3] Ambassador Caffery responded to this telegram and to telegram 1781, *supra*, in telegram 2022, Mar. 10, not printed, warning that he believed that if he and Stevenson together approached the Egyptian authorities about American participation in the negotiations, the Egyptian reply might well be unsatisfactory, as "they might suspect British had sold us bill of goods". On the other hand, Caffery thought that if he approached the Egyptians unilaterally, their reply could well be satisfactory. (774.5/3-1053)

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No. 1118

774.5/3–1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, March 11, 1953—3:04 p. m.

1793. Department informed by British Embassy Cabinet approval given for negotiations with Egypt on basis formula quoted Deptel 1775 to Cairo, 5956 to London Mar 7, as modified and interpreted by White House discussion with Eden reported Deptel 1785 to Cairo, 5989 to London Mar 9. Cabinet approval based on understanding formula constitutes part of "package" approach of five phases of negotiations as listed on Page 11 to London papers. [2] British Embassy states Stevenson instructed concert with Caffery in approach Egyptian Government.

For information Caffery, Department concurs that approach he outlined in Cairo 2022, repeated London 683, [3] as being best method of approach. In view of apparent strong feelings of Churchill on this matter, we believe further attempts on governmental level to clarify this point on tactics likely to be unproductive. From our knowledge of Stevenson's instructions, we believe it may not be impossible for him to agree locally to follow your suggestion. We believe next step therefore is that you consult with Stevenson to work out best possible approach. Whatever decision is made between you with regard to formal approach, you have our authority to make such additional informal approaches as you consider wise. The President was very clear in his remarks to Eden that we would participate in the negotiations only upon Egyptian concurrence and invitation.

British Embassy has been informed that last paragraph of proposed Foreign Office press release (London tel 5018, March 10, repeated Cairo 269) [4] unacceptable to us. It has been agreed with Makins that the last paragraph should be dropped and that wording of penultimate paragraph should be along following lines: "In view of American interest in the questions involved, HMG and the Egyptian Government have suggested that the US Government participate in the discussions. The US Government has agreed to do so. To this end, General Hull, Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army, will be a member of the US Delegation".

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 6032. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

[2] The reference is to Paper No. 3 of the United States-United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1082.

[3] See footnote 3, *supra*.

[4] Not printed.

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Last paragraph of proposed US press release sent Cairo as Deptel 1789 [5] and being repeated to London has been changed as follows: The Honorable Jefferson Caffery, American Ambassador to Egypt, will be the principal American representative in the talks and General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army, has been designated as a special military adviser to the Ambassador. General Hull expects to leave for Cairo on March [6] 1953.

It has been agreed with the British that it probably would be desirable to have simultaneous releases in Washington, London and Cairo providing Egyptians plan a release. It has also been agreed that the timing of such release should be recommended by Cairo.

We as well as the British here have been surprised at status given Slim in proposed London press release. This will in no way change the Caffery-Hull relationship as specified in the US release. It should be understood, however, that on technical military matters regarding base arrangements, the understanding of the two Governments is that Slim and Hull will have freedom to obtain best deal possible within their terms of reference as specified above.

We have now been informed that Slim probably cannot depart before Sunday. Unless there is some change in this General Hull will probably likewise not depart before that date. You will be kept informed.

DULLES

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[5] Not printed.

[6] The day of the month was left blank on the source text.

No. 1119

Editorial Note

Representatives of the United States and Egyptian Governments signed and thereby brought into force an agreement for a technical cooperation program for public works development on March 12, 1953. For the text, see TIAS No. 2842, printed in 4 UST (pt. 2) 1746.

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No. 1120

774.5 MSP/3-1453

The Director for Mutual Security (Stassen) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 14, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with the recommendation of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, concurred in by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Director for Mutual Security, the President has made the determination with reference to Egypt indicated in the enclosed copy of his memorandum to the Director for Mutual Security of March 14, 1953.

All documents are being continued with a confidential security information classification, and it is suggested that no release will be made until the Department of State indicates to the Director for Mutual Security that publication should be made.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD E. STASSEN

[Attachment]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

In accordance with the recommendation contained in your memorandum of March 2, 1953, [1] I hereby determine, pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, that it is essential for the purpose of that Act that the Government of Egypt be provided limited military assistance, pursuant to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. In making this determination, I find that (1) the strategic location of Egypt makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area, (2) the assistance to be furnished is of critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and (3) the immediately increased ability of Egypt to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the Near East area, and to the security of the United States.

Under the foregoing declaration of eligibility, assistance is to be limited to training programs for personnel of the Egyptian armed forces in United States military installations. [2]

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[1] Not found in Department of State files.

[2] The Department notified the Embassy in Egypt of the President's determination on Mar. 17 in telegram 1833, not printed, and pointed out that the Egyptians would have to sign an agreement under the terms of the Mutual Security Act. (774.5 MSP/ *Continued*

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The Secretaries of State and of Defense are to be notified by you of this decision.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

3-1753) Caffery replied on Mar. 19, in telegram 2106, not printed, that he had notified the Egyptians that they were eligible for grant military aid for training, and that the Egyptians expressed appreciation and agreed in principle to sign an MSA agreement. (774.5 MSP/3-1953)

No. 1121

774.5/3-1553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, March 15, 1953—3 p. m.

2064. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs told me this morning that the news of the joint approach yesterday had been extremely badly received all over Cairo. [2] By the time they met with the Cabinet Ministers and members of the RCC in the evening the feeling was so strong that those present were unanimous that the joint approach must be rejected.

I have previously on several occasions warned that the joint approach might be unhappily received. (re my telegrams 2008 and 2022) [3]

As example of the pathological distrust of the British Naguib told me it was alleged in the meeting last night that this was simply a maneuver on the part of the British to endeavor to transfer some of the animosity now directed against them to us.

The Prime Minister and Minister Foreign Affairs then went to great pains to assure me of their great friendship for us, their pro-Western sympathies their intention eventually to cooperate in ME defense and their strong hopes that we could continue our friendship. They particularly asked that I continue during the Suez negotiations the same role that I played during the Sudan negotiations.

[1] Repeated niact to London as telegram 693.

[2] In telegram 2060 from Cairo, Mar. 14, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that he and Stevenson had seen General Naguib and the Foreign Minister; that they were both personally disposed in favor of having the United States participate in the negotiation; and that they pledged that they would recommend to the Council of Ministers and the Revolutionary Command Council that they accept the U.S. offer. (774.5/3-1453)

[3] For telegram 2008, see Document 1114. Regarding telegram 2022, see footnote 3, Document 1117.

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"We believe" they said, "that you can accomplish more in your behind-the-scenes role than you could have accomplished as an active negotiator."

CAFFERY

No. 1122

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, international file

President Eisenhower to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 16, 1953.

DEAR ANTHONY: Thank you very much for your nice message, which was sent to me by Sir Roger Makins. [2]

I was really disturbed this morning to find that the question I had personally raised about the planned Joint Conference in Cairo had obviously not been successfully answered. [3] You will recall I expressed a reluctance to get publicly involved in the initial phases of this matter until the United States could be assured of the agreement of General Naguib—preferably an official invitation from him—to participate in the negotiations.

It seems to me that we should have been able to achieve this. Now we are told the proposal—apparently coming jointly from our two governments—is not acceptable. I feel we have been clumsy.

This brings to mind again my concern over the way we present to the world the picture of British-American association, which association in our joint view will mean so much to progress in the development of collective security and to the best interests of the whole free world, including, of course, ourselves.

We must, by all means, avoid the appearance of attempting to dominate the Councils of the free world. This, I think, is just as necessary as is the prior study of common problems, by joint effort, before we go into multilateral conferences. Over the past decade I

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[1] The draft copy of this letter, also dated Mar. 16, in the Eisenhower papers clearly indicates that this message was addressed to Foreign Secretary Eden. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

[2] No copy of Foreign Secretary Eden's message to President Eisenhower has been found in Department of State files. However, according to a telephone conversation which Secretary Dulles had with President Eisenhower on Mar. 16, "The President said that he has a message from Eden, thanking him for courtesies while here, etc. Wouldn't this give him [the President] an opportunity to write Eden rather than Churchill about the Egyptian thing? Mr. Dulles said that there was a feud on between them and it might strengthen Eden's hand. He then read a message which General Smith had about the Egyptian situation, and also said that Smith agreed that writing to Eden would be good." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Telephone Conversations")

[3] See telegram 2064, Mar. 15, *supra*.

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have had some experience, in the military field, with international conferences. I am certain that nothing infuriates an individual in one of these meetings so much as an insinuation or implication that they may be representing a country, whose convictions, because of some national reason, are not really important. I know, for example, that the French frequently feel that the United States and Britain are guilty of power politics on this point, and they resent it fiercely. (You remember the Malta Conference!) At the same time their willingness to go along with us is tremendously important; not only because of their responsibility in the Indo-China war but because of their central, key position in Western Europe.

I am repeating these thoughts merely so that you and your associates will not forget the conviction we hold that our two nations will get much further along toward a satisfactory solution to our common problems if each of us preserves, consciously an attitude of absolute equality with all other nations, in every kind of multilateral conference in which we jointly participate.

I am, of course, hopeful that the Egyptian tangle will be straightened out and that we can get forward with our negotiations. The proposed plan, if adopted, will operate to the advantage of Egypt and is in keeping with their just claims to sovereignty and equality. It will likewise give the free world assurance that the Canal will remain available for use. I feel certain that no justifiable criticism of the plan itself can be made; consequently it is doubly important that the methods we use do not defeat it.

I once had a very wise commander who would use a very simple illustration to point out to me the difference between "command" and leadership. Maybe you can try it sometime on some your associates and assistants, just as I do on mine. It goes:

"Put a piece of cooked spaghetti on a platter. Take hold of one end and try to push it in a straight line across the plate. You get only a snarled up and knotty looking thing that resembles nothing on earth.

"Take hold of the other end and gently *lead* the piece of spaghetti across the plate. Simple!"

I did not mean to get into a long letter like this in acknowledging your nice note, but in conformity with our agreement to unload our minds when we feel like it, I send this on to you.

As ever,[4]

P. S. My warm regard to W. C.

[4] No signature on the source text.

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No. 1123

774.5/3–1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 16, 1953—5:16 p. m.

1827. Following statement of US views re current Egyptian situation was handed British Embassy today.

Verbatim text. General Naguib stated that Egypt cannot agree to the participation of United States in the proposed negotiations regarding the Suez Canal base. According to the report from the British Ambassador in Cairo, Naguib said that: "The Egyptian Government have come to this decision on the grounds that United States participation in the talks from the beginning would be interpreted in Egypt as involving the country in the negotiations for Middle East Defense. This, Egypt is not prepared to contemplate unless and until the question of withdrawal of British troops has been settled".

This raises two questions:

One. Whether the participation of American representatives in the talks should be insisted upon, and

Two. Whether agreement to discuss Middle East Defense shall be made a prerequisite to discussion of other parts of the package proposal.

Mr. Eden has telegraphed the British Embassy in Washington as follows: "I propose to instruct HM Ambassador at Cairo to inform the Egyptians that we are not prepared to proceed any further so long as they maintain this attitude. We must insist that the United States representatives participate from the outset in any talks, and our negotiator must be free to put forward our proposals in their entirety."

As has been made clear in previous conversations, the United States Government would not participate in the proposed Anglo-Egyptian negotiations unless there was clear agreement on the part of the Egyptian Government. It seems evident that the Egyptian Prime Minister has definitely rejected the suggestion of American participation. Therefore, the United States does not concur in Mr. Eden's suggestion that Ambassador Stevenson be instructed to insist on United States participation from the outset of negotiations. In the light of the developments of the past few days, the United States believes that its role must be limited to one of activi-

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 6152. Drafted and approved by Jernegan.

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ty behind-the-scenes, to the extent acceptable to both the British and Egyptians. We should, of course, endeavor to be as helpful as possible and would be prepared to join in the formal discussions at any time when they may be desired by the two participants.

The United States Government believes that it would be a great mistake to insist flatly upon discussion of a Middle East Defense Organization simultaneously with discussion of the other four points of the "package proposal", [2] While recognizing that the five points are in fact interdependent from the British and American point of view, we must also recognize that they are not so linked together in the Egyptian mind. In view of the publicity which has recently tied evacuation to Middle East Defense, it has now become even more difficult for the Egyptian Government to accept a formal linking together of the two questions.

It has always been the opinion of the United States Government that the questions of evacuation and future maintenance of the Suez Canal base could, if desired by the Egyptians, be considered first and that after satisfactory tentative agreements have been reached it would then be practicable to broach the question of Middle East Defense. In our view, this need not be an unduly risky procedure since final and binding agreements on evacuation need not be signed until satisfactory understandings had been reached on the other points. In this connection, it is to be noted that the Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs took pains to assure Ambassador Caffery on March 15 of their pro-Western sympathies and their intention eventually to cooperate in Middle East Defense.

We believe that the best present hope lies in the immediate commencement of conversations between British and Egyptian representatives without insistence by the British Government on prior formal agreement that Middle East Defense must be considered simultaneously with the problem of troop withdrawal and without insistence on public participation by the United States in these discussions.

We are greatly disturbed at the possibility that the present situation will develop into an impasse in which public opinion will prevent either side from making any move toward an understanding. We believe that the longer the delay in initiating the negotiations the greater the danger of such an impasse, which would put matters back into the situation of last year when all progress was held up by the dispute over the title of the King of Egypt. *End verbatim text.*

DULLES

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[2] See footnote 3, Document 1082.

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No. 1124

774.5/3-1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 16, 1953—6:01 p. m.

1829. Text informal memo to British on Egyptian situation has been transmitted in preceding message. British Ambassador upon receiving memo questioned if we were still in agreement with them upon necessity for having all five phases tied together in single package. [2]

We explained we believed there was no disagreement between us upon policy objectives. Question Middle East Defense arrangements was obviously linked in our minds with question of Suez Base and troop evacuation questions. We had often told British, however, these questions must not be publicly linked in a manner which would make impossible successful negotiations with Egyptians. It had been our view that as questions of the Base proper, evacuation, and integrated air defense were discussed, conversations would naturally flow into broader aspects of problem. If a degree of secret diplomacy could have been utilized we felt these subjects would naturally become linked together and that a satisfactory over-all agreement could have been reached. As subject of US participation and tie-in of defense arrangements with evacuation had now been leaked to Press and hence are public issues, great effort will now be required to get things back under control, if that is indeed possible.

British Ambassador was informed only course open in our opinion was for British to start discussions on bi-lateral basis at earliest possible moment. This should probably be done without Slim's participation. If they could start talks quickly and quietly on first three phases, there was still chance that subject of ME Defense could be negotiated as part of the package. If discussions on first three were proceeding satisfactorily, it appeared to us that our own open entry into conversations at later time might be helpful. We could then be in position of saying that arrangements contemplated for Suez Base, etc. appeared satisfactory to us provided there were over-all arrangements into which local solutions would fit. In this manner we might be able help British in broadening the discussions.

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 6156. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 1082.

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We are aware political situation in London may not leave this degree of flexibility to British. Consequences of failure (which might result in even Sudan Agreement coming unstuck) are so great however that we must do all we can to prevent either British or Egyptian positions from solidifying. Request Caffery therefore do all possible keep matters fluid in anticipation British may be induced start talks immediately without us, and to facilitate on Egyptian side such an eventuality.

DULLES

No. 1125

774.5/3–1753: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, March 17, 1953—3 p. m.

2076. Position taken by Department (Deptels 1827 and 1829) is clearly the only constructive line of approach which remains.

Regardless of press speculation on United States participation, fact is that the adverse reaction was set off by my joint call with Stevenson. Public is still not sure what we called about, but terrified by a joint approach.

I should like to invite Department's attention to fact that MEDO was originally conceived as means of assuring continued availability of Suez base to West following British withdrawal. It now seems that by insisting on particular mechanism openly the Western powers run grave risk of losing the desired end (continued availability of the base) which might actually be achieved by other means, i.e., direct agreement.

Subsequent to my March 15 meeting with Naguib and Fawzi, Colonel Abd al Nasir reiterated to Embassy officer, in most explicit terms Egyptians have yet used, that if British will agree to withdraw, Egyptians are prepared to discuss arrangements for maintaining the base and, in connection with agreement on evacuation and maintenance of base, to guarantee its availability to the West in the event of future hostilities. Nasir also said he understood that any substantial military assistance to Egypt would be conditional upon Egyptian cooperation in Middle East area defense plans. He saw no reason why that could not be worked out following agreement on Suez base.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 694.

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While domestic political considerations unquestionably make it difficult for British Government to proceed promptly with bilateral negotiations on basis outlined by Department, implications for real interests of West in policy of "sitting tight" are too somber to warrant entertaining it as acceptable alternative.

CAFFERY

No. 1126

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower [1]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, March 18, 1953.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I am very sorry that you do not feel that you can do much to help us about the Canal Zone. Naturally I am glad that we are broadly speaking agreed upon the merits and upon what we must get. I know that we can count on your goodwill. A month has passed since I wrote my first letter to you and I fear it will be impossible for us to keep Field Marshal Slim any longer from his task in Australia. I hope however that though you may not be able to help us positively it will not look as if the United States is taking sides against us. I am like the American who prayed "Oh Lord, if You cannot help me don't help the bear". It would be a very great pity if differences about the method of approach were represented as differences of policy between our two countries and still worse if they became public.

We are discharging an international duty and are resolved not to be bullied any further by Naguib either in the Canal Zone or in the Sudan. I have reached my limit. We are neither unable nor afraid to deal with Naguib ourselves. But even if we have to continue keeping 80,000 troops in the Canal Zone I assure you that in no circumstances will Her Majesty's Government abandon the United Nations crusade in Korea. At present we seem to be heading for a costly and indefinite stalemate both in the Middle East and the Far East instead of helping each other to reach conclusions agreeable to world peace at both ends.

Tito seems full of common-sense. He is definitely of opinion that the death of Stalin has not made the world safer, but he believes that the new regime will probably feel their way cautiously for some time and even thinks that there may be divisions among

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[1] Sir Roger Makins delivered this message to the White House on Mar. 19. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower, February 1953 thru March 1955")

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them. Malenkov and Beria, he says, are united but Molotov is not so closely tied. Anthony and I are doing all we can to urge him to improve his relations with the Italians and also with the Romans. [2] He is very anxious about what would happen if he were attacked all alone. We have said we do not think a local war in Europe is likely or even possible. He was not therefore in particular danger. I pointed out to him the risks we had shown ourselves ready to run by having an American bomber base in this island. The point did not seem to have occurred to him. [3]

Kindest regards,

WINSTON

[2] The Embassy in London in telegram 5155, Mar. 19, not printed, reported that the word "Vatican" should be substituted for "Romans". (774.5/3-1953)

[3] In telegram 5154 from London, Mar. 18, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich said that Churchill had sent for him that afternoon to show him the "telegram which he is sending to President re Egypt and also re Tito's visit. He said he felt compelled send cable in order emphasize to President his strong feelings re Egypt, even though Eden is asking through regular channels for reconsideration US position on approach to Egypt." (774.5/3-1853)

No. 1127

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill February 1953 thru November 1958"

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 19, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON: I am a bit puzzled as to the real meaning of your recent note to me. [1] By no means have I, or my associates, indicated or implied that we are not in agreement with your Government in what you are trying to do in the Canal Zone. On the contrary, Anthony and I reached a clear understanding of what we should strive to get under the various alternatives laid down by the staff, and both of us were very clear that the offer we would be making would be so fair to the Egyptians that we *hoped* it could not possibly be rejected.

While he was here, I raised one question involving procedure. The question was: "How does the United States get into this consultation?"

It was obvious that no one had thought very much on this point and it was recognized a very awkward situation could result for our representative, and, indeed, for the negotiations themselves, if an American should show up without some prior invitation and

[1] Reference is to Churchill's message of Mar. 18, *supra*.

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agreement between the principals, namely, your Government and the Egyptian Government.

My point is this: If the United States walks into a conference with you, against the wishes of the Egyptian Government, then the only obvious interpretation would be that our two governments, together, are there to announce an ultimatum. An uninvited guest cannot possibly come into your house, be asked to leave, and then expect cordial and courteous treatment if he insists upon staying.

So far as I know, this is the only point that has blocked the initiation of the conference. But until it is ironed out, I do not see how we can possibly get into it.

I am sure that Anthony will confirm to you that I expressed exactly these sentiments to him when he was in my office.

Please be assured that I have no idea that either of us should be bullied by Naguib. We have objectives in common and they are vital objectives, so vital indeed that I do not think we should be inflexible on procedure.

I am much interested in what you say about Tito. I am glad that you and Anthony have been urging him to improve his relations with some of his neighbors.

With warm personal regard,

Sincerely,

DE

No. 1128

774.5 MSP/3-1853: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 19, 1953—7:28 p. m.

6255. During visit U.S. two Egyptian officers discuss interim arms program, they queried Defense (London's 5151 Mar 18) [2] possibility U.S. training fifty jet pilots. With concurrence Defense, Department recommended grant aid this purpose. Department felt this would compensate in part for inability U.S. include Air Force items in interim arms program. Also high cost training would nullify political effect if Egypt required pay. Defense considered jet training of little military value since Egyptian Air Force not

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1854.

[2] In telegram 5151 from London, Mar. 18, not printed, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office was very concerned about the approval of grant military aid to Egypt. (774.5 MSP/3-1853)

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equipped U.S. type planes and recommended grant training for all three Services.

Department realizes difficulties extension grant aid at present but feels this may assist Caffery's effort prevent Egyptian position solidifying on whole question Defense talks. Also wishes avoid giving Egyptians impression U.S. withdrawing from efforts assist Egypt. Jet training of little military significance and no other requests yet received.

DULLES

No. 1129

774.56/3-2053: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 20, 1953—7 p. m.

5207. When I saw Eden on March 16 (Embtel 5110) [2] he said he had recently had report to effect that US was about begin shipment lethal weapons to Egypt. He did not have details at his finger tips and was vague, but seemed concerned. I told him I had no recent information which would indicate that negotiations with Egypt regarding $11 million program had reached this point. If, however, he wished send me memo on subject, I would be glad to transmit it to Washington for verification.

There is quoted below abbreviated text memo which Embassy has not received from Foreign Office. While much of information for which Foreign Office requests confirmation is contained in our files, Embassy is somewhat uncertain how current it is. Embassy would appreciate Department's confirmation its understanding or, where Embassy information incomplete, Department's guidance for our use in replying. To assist Department, Embassy comments follow parenthetically after each item.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 283.

[2] In telegram 5110 from London, Mar. 16, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich reported that Eden that morning had emphasized to him the depth of feeling that the British Government had regarding the following points contained in telegraphic instructions sent to Ambassador Makins in Washington: that the British Government could not accept the Egyptian position on opening the defense negotiations; that the British could open negotiations on the basis of American participation from the outset and on the basis that the Egyptians accept the British wish to put forward all elements of the package proposal; and that the British wanted to have Stevenson put these points forcefully to Naguib and hoped that the United States would not object. (774.5/3-1653)

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"In memo 10 February HMG offered certain comments on lists of arms and military equipment which USG contemplated supplying Egypt.

"2. HMG understands present position as follows:

"A. USG has indicated Egyptian Government willingness supply $11 million worth of military equipment. (Correct. See Deptel 5415 February 13) [3]

"B. This equipment to be paid for. (Correct. See Deptel 4894 January 24 [*23*])

"C. No firm commitment has yet been entered into for supply of any item. (Apparently correct. See Deptel 5849 Mar 4) [3]

"D. List containing items, quantities and tentative delivery dates was handed Egypt representative Washington on 13 February. This list included:

"(I) 70 armored cars for delivery within 45 days; (II) 100 medium tanks for delivery within one year; and (III) 152,000 rounds .76 mm ammunition for tanks for delivery within two years. (Correct except that amount of .76 mm ammunition should be something less than 100,000 rounds. See Deptels 5093 January 31 [4] and 5389 February 13.[5] It would be helpful if Department could indicate precise amount offered.)

"E. USG now awaits Egypt comments on list. (Apparently correct. See Deptel 5849 March 4).

"F. Meanwhile small quantities of .30 and .50 caliber and .37 mm ammunition, all for training purposes have been added to list and quantity of .76 mm ammunition reduced. (Correct, except that this section should be moved up to D above since items are part of original offered Egyptians. See Deptel 5389. It would be helpful if Department could indicate amount of .30 and .50 caliber and .37 mm ammunition.)

"G. In practice, neither tanks nor armored cars would be delivered for a year and ammunition not for two years. (Foreign Office says this based report Secretary's conversation with Makins February 19. However, we understand armored cars would be for delivery within 45 days. Delivery period on all items indicates only that no substantial deliveries likely be made until latter part of period indicated. See Deptel 5258 February 7.) [3]

"H. On 18 February US Secretary of State informed press correspondents that there had been discussion but no definite decision on allowing Egypt buy in US small amount military equipment of type not suitable for war with Israel. (Correct. See Deptel 5543 February 19.) [6]

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[3] Not printed.

[4] See footnote 3, Document 1088.

[5] Printed as telegram 1626, Document 1099.

[6] Printed as telegram 1668, Document 1102.

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"3. Also understanding of HMG that USG does not contemplate delivery to Egypt of any lethal weapons while political situation in Egypt, and relations between Egypt and UK, remain disturbed. (While I have impression this understanding is correct, Embassy cannot find this precise wording in records which, however, indicate that an afternoon meeting at Foreign Office February 4, Secretary told Eden we would take steps to delay delivery of more lethal items so that deliveries could be held up if any hitch developed. [7] Also Byroade's conversations with Makins reported Deptel 5001 January 28 in which Byroade referred to tensions over Sudan and threatening statements against British troops and said he realized if this situation should grow steadily worse, we should not offer Naguib military equipment. Also Department's instructions to Caffery contained Deptel 5220 February 5 [8] that we are proceeding with offer military equipment on basis that satisfactory turn in Sudan negotiations will be accompanied by cessation threatening statements. In light these and any other information contained Department's files, Embassy would appreciate guidance regarding reply it should make on this paragraph.)

"4. HMG would be grateful if US Embassy could confirm that this is present position. They would also be glad know if there have been any recent developments in this matter." (Please provide information for reply this point.)

ALDRICH

[7] See telegram 4308 from London, Document 1091.

[8] Printed as telegram 1585, Document 1093.

No. 1130

774.56/3-2053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 24, 1953—11:03 a. m.

6321. Comments or confirmation points from British memorandum cited London's 5207 Mar 20 following:

A. correct.
B. correct.
C. correct.
D. correct except for 76mm ammunition. 90,000 rounds offered.
E. Department awaiting submission revised list by Egyptians and details Egypt's ability pay.
F. Single list submitted Feb 13 included 50,000 rounds 37mm ammunition, 945,000 rounds .30 Cal., 145,000 rounds .50 Cal. all for delivery one year.

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1879.

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G. Delivery times cited reftel and above correct. Periods approximate only.

H. Secretary's statement based on fact no formal arrangement yet completed with Egyptians.

3. Important objective U.S. interim arms aid program is amelioration present state U.K.-Egyptian relations. If at actual time delivery U.S. believes weapons likely be used against U.K. forces, delivery will not be made. U.S. reserves right judge whether conditions "disturbed" to degree delivery weapons inadvisable. U.S. position still essentially same as set forth Annex A paper four London talks. [2]

4. Grant aid for training offered. (Deptel 6168 Mar 17) [3]

DULLES

[2] The reference is to Annex A, "United States Position on Extension of Military Aid to Egypt", not printed, to Paper No. 4 of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. (774.5/1–1453) See telegram 3642 from London, Document 1068.

[3] Not printed; telegram 6168 to London, Mar. 17, was also transmitted to Cairo as telegram 1833. See footnote 2, Document 1120.

No. 1131

774.5/3–2453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 24, 1953—6:35 p. m.

1883. From the Secretary to Caffery. British Embassy delivered note March 21 stating UK considering renewed approach to Egypt on basis "package proposal." [2] Said UK would not seek to define in advance order discussion five points, but would not sign binding agreement pending satisfactory understandings on all. Note emphasized UK belief success approach depends largely on attitude US, and requested US support in following ways:

Verbatim text. "A. By making it plain to the Egyptian Government that they (US) will provide no further economic or military assistance to Egypt unless the Egyptian Government are prepared to open negotiations on the basis set out above;

"B. By making it clear to the Egyptians that they give their full support to the 'package proposal' and that they regard agreements on the five points as interdependent;

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 6341 and by pouch to Paris and Ankara. Drafted and approved by Byroade for transmission after obtaining clearance in draft from the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 1082.

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"C. By refraining from giving any indication to the Egyptian Government, while the negotiations are in progress, that they believe anything less than 'Case A' [3] to be acceptable;

"D. By not making any further offer of military or economic assistance to the Egyptian Government pending the outcome of the negotiations, except by agreement with H. M. Government." *End verbatim text.*

We have informed British that we wish to be of all possible assistance in their forthcoming discussions with Egyptians. Hence we are willing inform Egyptians on a high level of our own interest in successful outcome these negotiations. Specifically we will stress free world need for an available base in Middle East area as well as need for organization for defense of Middle East as a whole. We are willing in this manner to explain to Egyptians why, from our own point of view, various matters coming up for discussion are in fact interrelated. We also willing to take position at appropriate time that such military assistance as US may be able furnish (over and above present commitments) must of necessity be based upon role Egypt is willing to play in defense of area, as well as progress towards peace in area.

British informed that while we thus have common purpose we cannot agree to tactics involved in above note which would cause US to approach Egyptians with threat that no further assistance could come from us unless they agreed open negotiations. We consider such an approach would retard rather than advance possibility successful negotiations. This should not imply that US has any intentions of offering further assistance to Egypt at this stage. Besides disagreeing with British in principle such approach, it would certainly be awkward to threaten withhold something we don't plan give in any event. Other side of the coin is that such an approach would imply that if Egyptians opened talks US assistance would be immediately forthcoming. US Government in no position give this impression at present time. He could also not agree in point D to give British veto over our future actions. Here again do not believe there is real difference between us but do not consider any nation should be asked to give up freedom of action in a situation where no one can tell trend of future events.

We have also informed British that we understand their point C in above note implies no change in previous US–UK agreement regarding flexibility on Base problem.

I believe success depends in large part on personal efforts by you in informal behind-scenes conversations to induce Egyptians to consider entire UK presentation, and once negotiations underway, to

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[3] See Document 1061.

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reconcile conflicting viewpoints. I know therefore you will make maximum effort, endeavoring especially prevent any hasty Egyptian rejection proposals. Prior formal British action and at earliest feasible moment, request you call on Naguib and present letter from President, text of which will be transmitted in subsequent telegram. I wish you would verbally indicate that US Government has reasons to believe UK prepared open discussions with Egypt in immediate future. US convinced sincerity Birtish intention remove their garrison from the Canal Zone and their wish complete this movement as soon as possible. Problem lies in carrying out this intention in manner consistent with area defense and under circumstances which will not suggest to widespread elements of British opinion that a retreat has been made in face of a challenge, rather than an honorable agreement reached on basis of friendly understanding.

I realize there are involved in these discussions difficult political and public relations problems for both principals but am convinced that frank discussion and statesmanship can see matter through. You should also elaborate upon the President's message as to why in our opinion there is an inescapable link between what happens as regards evacuation and arrangements for the base and the defense of that area as well as of whole Middle East.

If things go well, it is my hope that at some stage a favorable opportunity may arise to introduce subject of Egyptian-Israeli peace.

DULLES

No. 1132

774.13/3-2453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1953—6:35 p. m.

1884. Personal for the Ambassador. Personal and confidential letter from the President to General Naguib referred to in preceding message is quoted below. Please deliver letter in accordance instructions contained that message.

Verbatim text.

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 6342. Drafted and approved by Byroade for transmission after obtaining clearance in draft from the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under Secretary of State.

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Dear Friend: I am writing in the sincere hope and conviction that discussion between your Government and the United Kingdom on matters of great importance can now soon begin. On such an occasion I wish to send you my warm greetings and my prayer that God will guide the efforts of both parties to a true understanding and to the beginning of a new era of mutual friendship.

I should like to give you some of my own thoughts on these matters which are of such profound importance to all of the Free World. The people of the United States, realizing more clearly than ever before the importance to themselves of harmony and strength in the Near East, have a deep interest in the success of your discussions and in the establishment of greater security of the area. The United States Government, responsive to this interest of our people, stands ready to assist you and the Government of the United Kingdom in any way you may both feel to be appropriate. Lest there is any doubt in your mind, I wish to reaffirm that the United States Government at no time ever entertained the thought of direct participation in these discussions except in response to your wish.

I have been kept fully informed by Mr. Caffery of the attitude of the Egyptian people and assure you that this Government and the American people understand and appreciate the natural aspirations of Egypt for full sovereignty over its own territory. Similar aspirations have their deep roots in the traditions of America. I am also informed of the state of public opinion in Britain, where the Government is grappling with a difficult problem. I firmly believe that it is the genuine intention of the British Government to meet Egypt's basic requirements. The problem lies in carrying out this intention in a manner consistent with area defense. The British people want to be assured that a military vacuum has not resulted; that the immensely costly base facilities can be readily usable by the Free World in time of crisis; and that Egypt herself will stand militarily with the Free World in defense against a possible Communist aggression. I can understand this attitude, as I am certain that you can, for it makes sense if we are to discourage or meet attack.

America's desire in this situation is to see disappear a long misunderstanding between two friends, and to see it supplanted by arrangements under which Egypt, as an equal partner, will take her key position with other members of the Free World in building an effective defense of your area. No defense organization has been drawn up to which Egypt would be asked to give her consent in advance, although as a soldier I have personal views on this subject which I believe would recommend themselves to you. It is my strong hope that after tentative agreement has been reached be-

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tween Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding evacuation and future maintenance of the Canal Base, you will wish to discuss at once the broader problem of defense of the Middle East area. I believe it to be in the best interest of all of us to see joint defense planning, among nations of the area and those of us who are in a position to assist, start at the earliest practical moment. It would seem to me to be a great tragedy if circumstances were such as to preclude the beginning of such cooperative effort prior to the completion of evacuation, which as you know will necessarily take some time.

The great strides made by Egypt in solving her internal and external problems under your leadership have won the admiration and respect of the American people. The solution in the short space of a few months of the Sudan problem, which has plagued Egyptian-British relations for more than one-half a century is a monument to your statesmanship, patience and courage. Being therefore fully convinced of the good faith of both parties to the forthcoming talks, I feel confident of their success. America will stand ready to assist Egypt materially in fulfilling its new role which nature has accorded her as a keystone in any structure which may be built for the defense of the Middle East. Sincerely yours, signed Dwight D. Eisenhower. *End Verbatim text.* [2]

DULLES

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 2150, Mar. 27, not printed, that he had delivered the President's message, and that General Naguib had told Caffery that the letter would receive serious and immediate attention. (774.13/3-2753)

No. 1133

774.5/3-2453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1953—6:36 p. m.

6343. For your information US views on British note contained in Deptel 1883 presented to British in writing inform contained above reftel in three paragraphs in middle of message immediately subsequent to the phrase "End Verbatim Text." British were not shown copy of personal message from the President to Naguib but were given orally summary of points it covered. We felt it improper show text to British and were fearful of leak that personal confi-

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 1885. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

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dential message to head of third State had been coordinated with them.

DULLES

No. 1134

774.5/3-2753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1953—1:46 p. m.

1905. British Embassy stated today following instructions sent Stevenson Mar 26:

Verbatim text. Please arrange to see General Naguib after Mr. Caffery's interview with him and inform him of the five points in our package proposals. [2]

2. You should say that Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to open negotiations on the basis of these five points. We do not seek to fix beforehand the order in which the points are discussed. No final or binding agreement would be signed upon any single point until satisfactory understandings had been reached on all the points, which in the view of Her Majesty's Government are inextricably bound together. [3] *End text.*

Embassy added Stevenson expected consult with Caffery re timing and take into consideration Naguib's reaction President's letter.

DULLES

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 6425.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 1082.

[3] Ambassador Caffery in telegram 2153, Mar. 28, not printed, reacted negatively to the phrasing of the last sentence of the Foreign Office instructions to Stevenson, declaring that he thought that the stating of the interrelationship of the five points substantially reduced the likelihood of the Egyptians accepting the British proposal for opening negotiations. (774.5/3-2853)

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No. 1135

774.5 MSP/3–2853: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 28, 1953.

A–329. Re Deptel 1833, March 17 to Cairo, 6168 to London. [1] Proposed text agreement with Egypt for grant military aid limited to training given below. Provided atmosphere propitious and taking into account Naguib's reaction letter recently delivered, Embassy authorized at its discretion negotiate and execute agreement in form given. Advise proposed date any press release. Any changes in text of agreement will require clearance here.

Begin text. I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our Governments concerning the training in United States military installations of certain members of the armed forces of Egypt and to inform your Excellency that the Government of the United States is prepared to furnish such training assistance to the Government of Egypt in accordance with such arrangements, terms and conditions as may be agreed, and subject to legislative authority and the following understandings:

1. The Government of Egypt undertakes to take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of any training assistance provided by the Government of the United States in support of the following purposes and principles under which the Government of Egypt agrees to:

a. Join in promoting international understanding and good will, maintaining world peace, and in supporting the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and arrangements for the preservation of world peace undertaken thereunder;
b. Take such action as may be mutually agreed to eliminate causes of international tension, including measures to control trade in strategic materials with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace;
c. Make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic conditions to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
d. Take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its own defense capacities.

2. In the interest of their mutual security, the Government of Egypt will take such measures as are necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure or compromise by Egyptian personnel of United States classified military information ob-

[1] See footnote 2, Document 1120.

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tained during their courses of instruction, and to extend appropriate facilities and assistance, including where necessary the furnishing of local currency, in such amounts as may be agreed, [2] to United States personnel in Egypt engaged in carrying out United States responsibilities under this agreement.

I have the honor to propose that, if these understandings meet with the approval of the Government of Egypt, the present note and your note in reply constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, effective on the date of your Excellency's reply, to remain in force until one year after the receipt by either Party of written notice of the intention of the other Party to terminate it. [3]

Accept, Excellency, etc.

DULLES

[2] On Apr. 8 in telegram 2207, not printed, Caffery requested that the phrase "including where necessary the furnishing of local currency in such amounts" be deleted from the text of the proposed agreement even before it was presented to the Egyptians. (774.5 MSP/4–853) The Department concurred in telegram 2003 to Cairo, Apr. 14, not printed. (774.5 MSP/4–853)

[3] On May 6 in telegram 2374, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that the revised text of airgram A–329 had been handed to Ali Sabry on Apr. 18, who, in turn, had given it to Nasser for his consideration. Caffery went on to say that Nasser had not as yet considered it. (774.5 MSP/5–653)

No. 1136

774.5/3–3053: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, March 30, 1953—3 p. m.

2162. Egypt as predicted mytel 2153 [2] consider British proposal for negotiations on five points of package deal completely unacceptable.

In lengthy discussion last night between Embassy officer and Lt. Colonel Nasir and Majors Salah Salim and Hakim Amir following facts emerged:

1. Nasir stands almost alone in RCC in urging continuing attempt to arrive at negotiated settlement with British. He himself has little hope of success but wishes leave no course untried.
2. Egyptians allege that British performance in Sudan (Embtel 2163) [3] is rapidly convincing them that any base agreement reached with British would soon prove unworkable.
3. "Impossible" British proposal coming directly on heels of President's letter to Naguib looked to Egyptians like collusion be-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 718.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 3, Document 1134.

[3] Not printed.

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tween Washington and London. This illusion was dispelled by Embassy Officer.

Although net effect of Creswell-Selwyn Lloyd *démarche* on Suez has been further to convince Egyptians that British will never peacefully quit their territory on terms acceptable to Egypt I am hopeful that Colonel Nasir will carry the day with his colleagues to the extent that they will make an acceptable counterproposal.

Egyptians made it clear however that they consider British "enemies" as long as they remain in Egypt by force and that they cannot agree to cooperate militarily with British as a condition for evacuation of Egyptian territory. ("This is blackmail".) Under these circumstances Egyptians say Naguib regime is not prepared to stop "mobilizing" Egyptian people while undertaking lengthy and perhaps fruitless negotiations with British.

CAFFERY

No. 1137

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, International file

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to President Eisenhower

SECRET LONDON, 1st April, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you for your personal letter to me about Egypt dated the 16th March, which Winthrop delivered to me on the 23rd March. [1] Let me say at once how much encouraged I am by the assumption, which it seems to me underlies everything you say, that you and we must maintain co-operation in these as in all other matters.

As of course you know, our representatives in Cairo have now made futher separate approaches to try to get the Egyptian Government to open discussions with us, and we have given the Egyptians a note of the five points in the package proposal, and told them that we are ready to start talks on the basis of these five points, and that we do not seek to fix beforehand the order in which the points are discussed. At the same time we have made it clear that no final or binding agreement would be signed upon any single point until satisfactory understandings had been reached on all the points, which in our view are inseparably bound together. It does seem to me that it would be unreasonable of the Egyptians to refuse to start talks with us on this basis, and we would hope that, once talks had begun, we should be able to convince them of the

[1] Document 1122.

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justice and practical need of our reaching a settlement on all the different points.

I am particularly glad to see from your letter that you yourself feel that no justifiable criticism of our plan can be made; and I carried away from my talks with you the clear impression that you agreed with us on the need for sound arrangements to maintain in being our Middle East base.

I also understand what you say in your letter about the need to avoid the appearance of our attempting to dominate together the councils of the free world. As you know, we certainly do recognize the rights of Egypt, and we are fully ready to negotiate with her as with an equal. In return, we must expect that the Egyptian Government should face the facts of life. After all, we are being asked to give up something of real value; it is something which we have created as a result of the experience which we gained in the last war at the cost of so many lives and so much expenditure of effort, time and money. We are being asked to substitute for this, which we now hold, an agreement which must be in part an act of faith in Egypt. And on this agreement will rest an essential element in the defence of the free world against aggression. That is why your help is so necessary.

I am sure that neither of us have any illusions about the people we are dealing with. Of course they are out for their own ends, but we have got somehow to try to lead them to see that those ends must and can be reconciled with the wider interests involved. I do not believe that the process will be an easy one, and I am quite sure that the Egyptians will take every opportunity to exploit any real or even imaginary difference between you and us. If they think that they can get better terms by appealing to you to use your influence with us, they will not hesitate to do so.

You and we have agreed broadly on what we think is the minimum which we can accept if we are to maintain our ability to defend the Middle East. We cannot, for the sake of avoiding unpleasantness, allow that minimum to be whittled away. And if it is not to be whittled away, you and we will need to stand together and present a united front. If we allow the Egyptians to imagine, by any differences in our methods of approach to them, that in the last resort they can rely upon you to rescue them from the unpleasant consequences of their own obstinate refusal to face facts, then I believe we shall fail to secure any satisfactory and lasting agreement. Together, we cannot help wielding immense influence, and there is no question of domination here; but if the Egyptians think we can be divided, they will go on trying to play us off against one another until in the end they lose all control of a situation which they themselves will have created. I am sure that we

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are agreed upon fundamentals, but it is important also that we agree upon tactics, since our experience shows that the Egyptians are only too ready to mistake any divergence in tactics for disagreement on our basic aims.

I hope you will forgive me for having written at such length. I have done so because I believe that Egypt is a test case. If we can get a settlement there, which the world will see has been achieved by our united efforts, the benefits both in the Middle East and elsewhere may spread out like ripples on a pond. I hope we can achieve it, but I am sure it will be a tough job.

Yours ever,

ANTHONY

No. 1138

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

LONDON, April 5, 1953.

MY DEAR FRIEND: 1. Thank you so much for your letter. [1]

You know the importance I attach to our informal interchange of thoughts.

2. Of couse my Number One is Britain with her eighty million white English-speaking people working with your one-hundred-and-forty million. My hope for the future is founded on the increasing unity of the English-speaking world. If that holds all holds. If that fails no one can be sure of what will happen. This does not mean that we should seek to dominate international discussions or always try to say the same thing. There are some cases however where without offending the circle of nations the fact that Britain and the United States took a joint initiative might by itself settle a dispute peaceably to the general advantage of the free world.

3. It was for this reason that I hoped that Anglo-American unity in Egypt and also in the Levant including Israel, would enable us without bloodshed to secure our common military and political interests. I did not think it would have been wrong for Slim and Hull with our two Ambassadors to have presented the package to Naguib and then seen what he had to say about it. This was on the basis that you would not be asked by us to contribute money or men to any fighting if things went wrong as they may well do now.

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[1] Presumably the reference is to Eisenhower's message of Mar. 19, Document 1127.

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4. However, you have decided that unless invited by Naguib, who like all dictators is the servant of the forces behind him, we cannot present a joint proposal. We therefore have to go on alone. I think however that the fact that Britain and the United States are agreed upon what should be done to preserve an effective base there, seems as far as it has gone, already to have had a modifying and helpful influence. Mere bluster by Naguib has not so far been accompanied by any acts of violence.

5. There is a view strongly held on the Opposition side of Parliament that we ought to abandon Egypt altogether. It is argued that the interests in the Middle East which we bear the burden of defending are international and NATO interests far more than British. The post-war position of India, Pakistan and Burma makes the Suez Canal in many ways more important to them than to us. Even in the War, as you will remember, for three years we did without the Suez Canal. We can keep our contacts with Malaya and Australasia round the Cape as we did then. We could maintain our influence in the Levant and Eastern Mediterranean from Cyprus and our interests in the Persian Gulf from Aden. The great improvement of the right flank of the Western Front achieved by the Yugo-Tito-Greeko-Turko combination has made the danger of a physical Russian attack upon Palestine and Egypt definitely more remote in distance and therefore in what is vital, namely in (Capitals) TIME. It is pointed out that if we brought our troops home and under their rearguards our worthwhile stores valued at about 270 million pounds and also cancelled the 200 million pounds so-called sterling debts (incurred in defending Egypt in the War) we should experience great relief.

6. If your advisers really think that it would be a good thing if we washed our hands of the whole business I should very much like to be told. It is quite certain that we could not justify indefinitely keeping eighty thousand men over there at more than 50 million pounds a year to discharge an international task in this area. If with your influence this burden could be largely reduced the great international Canal could continue to serve all nations, at any rate in time of peace, without throwing an intolerable burden upon us. It is for these reasons which have nothing to do with Imperialism that I persevere.

7. As all this seems to have something to do with history in which we have both occasionally meddled, I am sure you will not mind my putting the matter before you as I see it.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

WINSTON CHURCHILL

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No. 1139

774.5/4-853: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, April 8, 1953—2 p. m.

2211. 1. British Embassy informed us today of London's reply to Fawzi's proposal transmitted by Creswell April 4 (Embtel 2196). [2] London has replied that five points are interdependent and must be so maintained. However, points can be taken up in any order thought desirable. UK insists, however, on no signature on any one point without satisfactory agreement regard other points. British Embassy regards this as "slight loosening of the strings" of package proposal. Creswell meeting secretly with Fawzi this afternoon.

2. British Government instructed Creswell to make clear the importance it attaches to both sides using a "neutral form of words" in publicity regarding talks. Thus UK would like to agree on some neutral phrase for use by both governments. (Note British Embassy says no phrase suggested but they believe London means something like "if arrangements" or "future of Suez base".) Creswell is to tell Fawzi that if Egyptians state publicly after talks begin that they are discussing evacuation only (underline only) British Government will be impelled to deny this.

3. If Fawzi will agree British are ready to start talks at once.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 726.

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 2196 from Cairo, Apr. 4, not printed, that Foreign Minister Fawzi had suggested that Anglo-Egyptian talks begin without previous commitments or undertakings having been made by either side as to the signing on the first four points. Fawzi believed that if progress could be made on these portions of the five-point British package, especially with regard to the maintenance of the Suez base, most of the defense questions would be solved, and that whatever questions were left in suspense could easily be negotiated. (774.5/4-453)

No. 1140

774.5/4-953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, April 9, 1953—3 p. m.

2216. 1. Creswell said today that Fawzi was "receptive" to Foreign Office message (Embtel 2211). He promised discuss it with

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 727 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, to Ankara, and to the Arab capitals.

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Naguib today and see Creswell privately this evening. Fawzi promised to consider what "colorless phrase" might serve both governments re publicity and at one point said "negotiations must go quickly because the government is in difficulties." (*Embassy comment*: Colonel Nasir told Embassy officer yesterday that while not hopeful for successful outcome, he favors early start of talks. Statement to press by Minister National Guidance published today also indicates Egyptian readiness to talk. Thus on Egyptian side prospects for starting negotiations appear to have improved in past few days).

2. Reading from his notes Creswell quoted Fawzi as having said yesterday that all five points are interrelated and that discussion of evacuation and future of the base would inevitably lead to discussion of the future role of the base in Middle East defense. Egypt's financial capabilities are limited and Egypt will require financial and equipment assistance in order to maintain the base. For these Egypt must turn to others and it is here Fawzi believes the United States should become associated with discussion. (*Embassy comment*: British say that base costs them between 14 and 17 million pounds annually in Egyptian money. When base transferred to Egyptians some part of this sum will be an additional charge on Egyptian treasury unless alternate means for financing base can be worked out. Fawzi knows this but not many Egyptians appear to have considered this point.)

CAFFERY

No. 1141

774.5/4-1053: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, April 10, 1953—3 p. m.

2222. 1. At "cloak and dagger" meeting yesterday with Creswell Fawzi agreed to go ahead on basis suggested by British (Embtel 2216, repeated London 727). They agreed tentatively that talks should begin April 20. They foresaw that at initial meetings UK would be represented by Stevenson, General Robertson, and possibly Creswell; Egypt by Fawzi, Naguib and "some military officers." Purpose early meeting would be to define terms of reference for subcommittees composed of British and Egyptian officers. Creswell said April 20 based on date when Stevenson might be out of hospi-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 729 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, to Ankara, and to the Arab capitals.

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tal; he thinks Egyptians might wait few days or longer for Stevenson. (*Comment:* When I saw Stevenson today at hospital he told me that he might not be out before April 24.) General Robertson departed yesterday for London to consult War Office and Prime Minister re talks.

2. Creswell was less happy about Fawzi's ideas re "neutral form of words" (paragraph 2, Embtel 2211, April 8) and it is uncertain whether London will go along with Fawzi's ideas. Fawzi suggested "outstanding military questions" in communiqué with further explanation by Egypt that this means "all aspects of the evacuation problem." Creswell persuaded Fawzi to make this "all aspects and implications of the evacuation problem" but he is not sure that "implications" will stick. Fawzi told him that "any mention of joint defense is impossible;" Creswell again warned Fawzi that if Egypt asserts that discussions deal with evacuation *only* British would have to make clear their five point position in House of Commons.

CAFFERY

No. 1142

774.5/4–1153: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 11, 1953—2 p. m.

5533. Reference Cairo's 2222, April 10, Foreign Office has instructed Creswell merely to confirm to Fawzi HMG's hope talks can begin 20 and to avoid being drawn into discussion regarding substance any Egyptian announcement. Foreign Office says, in this connection, that its main interest is in avoiding situation in which UK placed in position of having contradict Egyptians regarding scope of talks. This has been made quite clear to Egyptians and UK can only hope, therefore, they will show proper restraint. For its part, Foreign Office says it presently plans no announcement regarding opening conversations and hopes to be able get away with anodyne statement in response any inquiries resulting from Egyptian publicity. Foreign Office emphasizes, however, extent to which government can do this depends Egyptian restraint.

Foreign Office says Robertson's role will be seat of adviser to Stevenson with full responsibility for coordinating military aspects of problem. Fawzi has suggested talks open in Cairo and that techni-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 299.

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cal committees adjourn to Canal Zone soon thereafter in order facilitate inspection facilities, etc. Foreign Office seems think this is sensible procedure.

Forethought if Stevenson's discharge from hospital delayed much beyond 20, Churchill would probably authorize Creswell open negotiations.

ALDRICH

No. 1143

641.74/4-1453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 14, 1953—5 p. m.

5574. Foreign Office has given us following details of plans for opening negotiations with Egypt, some of which modify earlier position as set forth Embtel 5533, April 11:

1. British Embassy Cairo being instructed suggest April 27 as date for opening negotiations. Foreign Office believes this date will be acceptable Egyptians for reasons set forth Cairo's 2238, April 13. [2]

2. UK delegation will be headed by Stevenson and Robertson is being designated as co-delegate.

3. Robertson leaving here tomorrow night for Fayid. On April 16, Her Majesty's Government will issue statement stating that Robertson relieved as GOC MELF and Stevenson and he appointed conduct talks with Egypt "on outstanding problems" between two countries which are to begin "shortly". Statement will also announce General Festing will be acting GOC until arrival General Nicholson.

4. Foreign Office will try "fob off" further press inquiries re substance conversations and strongly hope Egyptians can do likewise in order avoid situation such as that mentioned first paragraph Embtel 5533. In this connection, Foreign Office aware dangers 11-day hiatus, but feels they are less than those involved in postponing announcement opening negotiations until nearer 27th.

5. Churchill considers it essential there should be full and formal meeting at outset negotiations at which UK delegation would make

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 302.

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 2238 from Cairo, Apr. 13, not printed, that the Egyptians were willing to postpone the start of the conversations for several days until Stevenson had been released from the hospital. (641.74/4-1353)

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"proper exposition" UK views before adjourning into sub-committee. Foreign Office thought Stevenson and Robertson would be able handle this exposition in such way as not to convey impression to Egyptians that they are being asked at that point to agree to interrelationship five points. Foreign Office added that Robertson has shown acute understanding during his consultations here of difficulties which Egyptians face.

ALDRICH

No. 1144

774.56/4-1453: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 14, 1953—6:21 p. m.

6804. Egyptian arms request (Deptel 6614 Apr 6) [2] now screened to eliminate "guerrilla warfare" items. Delivery times approximately same as first list. Embassy requested inform British main items as given below requesting comments soonest. Department will consider any points British wish make but continues reserve right make final decision on sale all items. Department informing British Embassy here.

Tanks—111, with spares; tank trainers—6; dozers—12, with spares; armored cars—60, with spares; mine detectors—200; exploders—40; radios—273, various types mainly for above equipment; ammunition—37mm, 76mm, 50mm, 30mm, in same or less quantity than first list.

SMITH

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2006.

[2] In telegram 6614, Apr. 6, not printed, the Department informed the Embassy in London that the Egyptians had just presented the Department with a revised interim arms list which included a considerable number of potential "guerilla warfare" items. This development represented a drastic change from Egypt's previous list; consequently, the Department was in the process of analyzing it. (774.56/4-653)

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No. 1145

741.13/4-1553

Prime Minister Churchill to the Under Secretary of State (Smith) [1]

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL LONDON, 15 April, 1953.

MY DEAR BEDELL: Now that in Anthony's unfortunate illness I have had to take over the Foreign Office, I shall look forward to corresponding with you and your chief, Foster Dulles. I like the news which Makins conveys me of his talks with you about the Persian tangle, and have cabled you to this effect officially.

2. I hope you will give real help in our attempt to solve the Canal Zone problem on the lines we have agreed with you. This gives far the best chance of an agreement meeting our joint strategic needs. But I hope if you do come in, you will act as a reinforcement on major points, and not as a mediator, remembering that we went a long way in our joint talks to reach agreement with you. I do not feel like being whittled on substance.

3. There is a point of detail on which I shall have to insist, namely that the British military personnel left to guard or look after the base shall be in uniform and carry personal arms. If not, they would simply be hostages and could be arrested at any time by the Egyptian police. On the other hand, if armed, such an aggression and breach of the agreement would amount to an act of war, and would therefore in all probability not occur. There are sure to be disagreements in the future about Sudan, and they cannot remain defenceless yet charged with great inter-allied responsibilities, at the mercy and good faith of any Egyptian dictator who may jump or crawl into office overnight. I am sure you will think of these points in a realistic way.

4. It is very nice to be working with you again.

5. I am very glad you will look at the excerpts from my final Volume [2] which the President tells me he will entrust to you. I will have them sent you shortly.

Yours sincerely,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

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[1] According to a memorandum from Ambassador Makins to Under Secretary of State Smith dated Apr. 15, Smith received the Prime Minister's signed letter on Apr. 16. Makins, however, provided an advance draft of the Prime Minister's message to Smith on Apr. 15 as an attachment to his memorandum. (741.13/4-1553)

[2] Presumably the reference is to volume VI of the Prime Minister's *History of the Second World War.*

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No. 1146

741.13/4-1553

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to Prime Minister Churchill

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL [WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: It was very much like old times to receive your personal message transmitted to me by Roger Makins. I have been laid up myself for a couple of days which accounts for my delay in answering.

The latest news from Egypt seems promising, at least of a start, and as you know our feeling has been that if we can just get these talks under way there is a reasonable chance for success. I have told Roger Makins, and I can assure you, that there is no intention here of nibbling at you on substance. We disagreed with you on initial tactics, but whether or not we were right or wrong only time can tell. The main thing now is to get started. We ourselves have a Canal problem as you are well aware, and while there are certain basic differences in status, we, like you, are very sensitive to the strategical impact of control.

I look forward with selfish pleasure to having an early look at parts of your final volume. You must know, I am sure, that the President would have been perfectly willing to defer to your own keen sense of international relations, and I am afraid it is partly due to the fact that I so enjoy reading what you write that I offered to "look" at the excerpts. You shall have them back with great promptness.

Faithfully,

BEDELL

No. 1147

774.56/4-2253: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 22, 1953—2 p. m.

5731. We learn from Foreign Office that it will probably be instructing its Embassy in Washington shortly to raise with Department its concern re US proposal train 50 jet pilots (Deptel 6252,

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 305.

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March 19). [2] Foreign Office's concern arises from (1) military considerations (which Embassy has emphasized would be of little significance), (2) effect on UK bargaining position in negotiations with Egypt, and (3) encouragement to Egypt to turn to US as source supply for jet aircraft.

Embassy also understands that British comments on latest interim arms list (Deptel 6804, April 14) will probably take form of "high level communication" to be delivered early next week. [3] Foreign Office now appears concerned re delivery periods for armored cars and amount of ammunition, in addition to more general considerations such as those outlined above.

HOLMES

[2] Not printed. In telegram 7012 to London on Apr. 23, not printed, the Department informed the Embassy that it had already been approached about the jet pilot training by the British Embassy, but that the Department had held out no hope that the training offer would be withdrawn. (774.56/4-2253)

[3] The Embassy in London informed the Department on Apr. 29 in telegram 5846, not printed, that the Foreign Office said that it hoped to be in a position to give the Embassy its comments on the Egyptian arms list within the next day or so. (774.56/4-2953)

No. 1148

641.74/4-2853: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, April 28, 1953—6 p. m.

2323. The Minister of Foreign Affairs says that the atmosphere of the meetings yesterday and today was not heavy. There was no disagreeable incident. Neither side took an entrenched position. Each side stated its case but with moderation.

Yesterday's meeting was confined to statements of position. At the meeting this morning it was agreed to proceed with the discussion of three questions: First, evacuation, second, maintenance of base, third, air defense, and that a committee should be set for each of these and that each committee should thereafter set up its own pertinent, technical sub-committees. Considerable progress was made as to terms of reference for these but final agreement as to wording was not reached. It is hoped to reach final agreement tomorrow.

(The Egyptians will propose for discussion a little later the subject of requirements of the Egyptian Armed Forces.)

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 753 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, to Ankara, and to the Arab capitals.

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Fawzi then said he would like to emphasize the urgent need of speed especially in view of the inimical attitude of certain elements of the Egyptian public, Communists and some of the Wafd, to the present negotiations and to the fact that some members of the regime have been very doubtful about the government's undertaking these conversations. Also he has secured a promise from the RCC members to make "no big noises" in public that might have bearing on the negotiations.

He talked about the British charges of attacks on British cars and drivers in the Canal Zone. He firmly denied any Egyptian official responsibility and contended that they were probably the work of Egyptian individuals unfriendly to the present regime. He added that in any event the government would take immediate appropriate steps.

CAFFERY

No. 1149

741.56374/4-3053: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 30, 1953—8 p. m.

5875. Foreign Office today expressed concern at what it regards as Egyptian efforts to establish and gain British acceptance at this stage of negotiations of matters of principle. It says Stevenson and other members UK delegation have made synthesis Egyptian views, which emerged in clearest form at yesterday's meeting, and which Foreign Office outlined as follows:

1. Egyptians insisting on arrangements for maintenance base which approximate case C, with perhaps some modification (as yet unclearly defined) along lines paragraph 9, case B. [2] Thus, while Egyptians show willingness accept some technicians, they insist they be under complete Egyptian control. Any release of stores or maintenance of facilities which British might require would have to be requested on governmental level by British and, if approved by Egyptians, latter would order technicians to perform work.

2. Egyptians refuse recognize any right of British access in event of war and, even if such access should be granted, insist on Egyptian right of veto re use to which base is put and even re withdrawal of stores.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 310 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, to Ankara, and to the Arab capitals.

[2] Regarding "Cases B and C", see Document 1061.

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Foreign Office says Stevenson has been told any such principles as these totally unacceptable. Embassy officer expressed hope that each side could avoid at this crucial stage of proceedings either demanding acceptance its set of principles or rejecting those of other side. Greatest hope seemed to be to try agree on activating subcommittees, with neutral terms of reference, in which problems could be explored in effort reach common ground.

Foreign Office officials said difficulty is that Egyptians attempting reflect unsatisfactory principles in terms of reference. This may, of course, be initial try-on from which Egyptians will retreat. Although Stevenson has been told Egyptian principles unacceptable, manner and form in which he conveys this to Egyptians is (except in unlikely event his instructions changed) still in his discretion. Foreign Office thought he would, therefore, try get Egyptians agree put questions of principle aside for present and get on with subcommittees.

ALDRICH

No. 1150

774.56/5-153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 1, 1953—6:16 p. m.

7150. Egyptian Military Attaché states he instructed endeavor obtain Department reply Egyptian arms request before departure for Cairo May 7.

Department feels obliged comply. Negative report to RCC likely create doubt re US intention assist Egypt thus adversely affecting discussions with UK and creating unfavorable atmosphere Secretary's visit. [2] Accordingly, Department will inform Military Attaché May 6 US prepared sell Egypt items listed Deptel 6804 to London. Embassy London should advise British adding we hope receive British comments beforehand but impelled proceed in any case.

DULLES

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2115.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 1155.

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No. 1151

774.56/5-553: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 5, 1953—noon.

5928. Last evening Selwyn Lloyd called me to Foreign Office and, at Churchill's request, gave me Her Majesty's Government's comments, as outlined in my immediately following telegram, re latest United States arms list for Egypt. (Embtel 5899, May 2.) [2] In emphasizing to me Her Majesty's Government's concern re United States supply of arms at this time, Lloyd also showed me partial list of incidents in Canal Zone since April 1, involving attacks on British service vehicles. I am also transmitting this list in second following telegram.

Lloyd emphasized that Her Majesty's Government has been most anxious avoid publicity re these incidents, because of effect which they might have on British public opinion during present delicate state of negotiations in Cairo. Nevertheless, April 27 incident, involving death of British sergeant, has received some press attention and is subject of Parliamentary question which Minister of War will answer in Commons this afternoon. It is possible further incidents will come to public attention and, in this atmosphere, it would be most difficult for British public to understand why United States furnishing military assistance to Egypt at time when latter is behaving in this manner. Lloyd added in this connection that UK cannot prove official Egyptian complicity in all these incidents, but at least Egyptian Government has obligation to take appropriate steps to prevent them.

Comment: I feel that I must emphasize in strongest terms my concern from Anglo-American standpoint of our proceeding with supply of arms to Egypt until such time as it is much clearer than at present that Anglo-Egyptian agreement is in sight. If situation were reversed and these were United States troops being subjected to attacks by nationals of another country, I cannot believe United States official or public opinion could look with equanimity on British announcement re supply of arms to that country.

We have repeatedly assured British that we would withhold deliveries of arms if, at actual time of delivery, conditions are disturbed to degree which would render inadvisable delivery any type of equipment. It seems to me, however, that we have more immedi-

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 312.
[2] Not printed.

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ate problem involving public announcement any successful conclusion arms negotiations with Egypt at time such incidents as those outlined by Lloyd are taking place. I assume we could not, without nullifying any favorable effect in Egypt, publicly state at time of announcement that we have concluded arms agreement with Egypt but that we intend withhold delvieries as long as there is threat to security British forces. Yet only such a statement would, in my opinion, mitigate unfavorable impression here and lessen strain which I fear on United States–UK relations.

Given all aspects this problem, I strongly urge Department find some pretext for protracting negotiations until such time as Anglo-Egyptian agreement is clearly in sight.

ALDRICH

No. 1152

774.56/5–553: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 5, 1953—noon.

5929. Following is abbreviated text British *aide-mémoire* regarding Egyptian arms supply, handed me yesterday by Selwyn Lloyd:

"HMG have studied list of arms which USG propose offer Egyptian Government, given in *aide-mémoire* which US Embassy was good enough hand Foreign Office April 15. [2]

"As Embassy aware, HMG do not consider offer or supply of important quantities of arms to Egypt at this moment will be conducive to success of negotiations now proceeding Cairo, a success as important to free world as whole, including United States, as to UK. They would much prefer, therefore, that no firm offers of equipment should be made to Egyptian Government until it is clear that latter seriously intend cooperate with free world in defense of strategic area of ME. They would hope that United States Government could at last delay any decision to make equipment available by protracting discussions with representatives of Egyptian Government.

"HMG would see particular objection to early supply of tanks, armored cars or ammunition of type listed in Embassy's *aide-mémoire*. It there appeared that armored cars to be supplied would be for delivery within 45 days and tanks and some of ammunition for delivery within one year. This conflicts with what HMG Ambassador at Washington had previously understood from United States Secretary of State, that is, that none of these items would in any

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 313.

[2] See telegram 6804 to London, Document 1144.

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case reach Egypt for at least another year. HMG very much hope this statement by Secretary of State still holds good if, despite objections mentioned in preceding paragraph, any offer made to Egyptian Government."

Foreign Office states assurances mentioned final paragraph were given Makins by Secretary on February 19.[3] We have reminded Foreign Office that, in response similar statement Foreign Officer's *aide-mémoire* March 17, Embassy replied in *aide-mémoire* March 25 (Embassy's despatch 4963, March 25)[4] that armored cars are for 45-day delivery. Foreign Office says it noted conflict with Secretary's assurances at time but did not raise it because of news that new list would be forwarded soon as result study Egyptian comments on February 13 list.

ALDRICH

[3] Not printed.

[4] The despatch under reference is actually telegram 4563 from London, Mar. 25, not printed. (774.56/3–2553) In regard to the *aide-memoire* of Mar. 17 and 25, see telegram 5207, Document 1129, and telegram 6321, Document 1130.

No. 1153

774.56/5–553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 5, 1953—8:21 p. m.

7198. We do not plan any announcement at this time regarding sale of arms to Egypt (urtel 5928). Negotiations are still two or three stages removed from that point. Next step is to submit for Egyptian consideration revised arms list, following which Egyptians will presumably indicate their agreement or make further requests for revision. After informal agreement reached, Egyptians must make formal request, whereupon Defense will determine exact costs and we will take another good look at entire picture. If we decide favorably, Egyptians will then have to make necessary financial arrangements for payment.

This process certain to take some time, and it is only at its conclusion that public announcement contemplated. Even after that point is reached, delivery time for first item (30 armored cars) now estimated as ninety days and for bulk items (including additional 30 armored cars) as one year. During all this period we would have complete freedom to hold back or refuse delivery at any time.

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2138. Drafted and approved by Jernegan.

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In light of this picture, we believe there is no need for British alarm and we propose therefore to hand Egyptian Embassy revised list on May 6. [2]

DULLES

[2] On May 6 the Department, in telegram 2147 to Cairo, not printed, sent the following information:

"In response high level request from London transmitted by telephone, Department refrained (Deptel 2138 May 5) from giving Egyptians arms list today on pretext last minute administrative difficulties prevented final approval." (774.56/5-653)

No. 1154

741.56374/5-653: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 6, 1953—8 p. m.

5966. Foreign Office has given us following version, based on Stevenson's report, [2] of yesterday's meeting in Cairo:

1. At beginning of meeting, Fawzi said he wished enunciate certain principles:

a. That sovereignty, property and possession of base should belong exclusively to Egypt;

b. That British equipment left behind should be in Egyptian custody and to greatest possible extent handled by Egyptians with aid minimum number non-Egyptians who during their stay, fixed duration, should train Egyptians to take their place.

2. British replied that Fawzi was going against the understood purpose of the conversations which was to set up technical committees forthwith. The British found unacceptable the following Egyptian proposals:

a. That technical control of installations and contents base which were British-owned property should be in other than British hands;

b. That British technicians should be replaced by persons other than British after short period (or indeed, during duration of agreement).

c. That channel for technical instructions should be diplomatic.

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 316.

[2] In his telegram 5965, May 6, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich reported that the Egyptians had succeeded in precipitating a deadlock in the Cairo talks; that the Foreign Office added that the talks had adjourned with no date set for their resumption; and that the Foreign Office had made no decisions as to its next move. (641.74/5-653)

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3. British said they could not compromise on foregoing points, but could make effort find formula which would preserve full respect of Egyptian sovereignty and at same time meet British technical requirements. They thereupon tabled draft terms of reference of which following is abbreviated version:

"To draw up plans for transfer present military base area in Canal Zone under Egyptian control. Plan will ensure base area kept in working order at all times and in such condition as enable it be put into full operation immediately when needed. Recommendations will be made re installations within base area and their contents on following basis:

"a. Egypt will undertake to ensure security British property therein.

"b. British experts needed shall be limited absolute minimum number required for efficient operation installations.

"c. Any arrangements proposed for working installations shall not be inconsistent Egyptian sovereignty nor with British ownership property concerned.

"d. Committee will not concern self with duration of time of arrangements it proposes. This will be determined by delegations".

4. Fawzi indicated that unless British prepared accept Egyptian principles, it would be better for them to leave Egypt "bag and baggage". After Fawzi had repeated this phrase several times, British remarked they had hoped avoid having comment on it when first used, but now wished point out that if this had been initial Egyptian position, it would have been useless enter discussion.

5. British then proceeded deal with Egyptian principles (see 1a and b above):

a. They agreed re sovereignty. Re property, they presumed Egyptians were not asking contents which belonged UK should go to Egypt. Re buildings, facilities and communications, British were prepared discuss transfer Egyptian ownership and technical committee should be instructed work out modalities of transfer. Re possession, British did not know what this term was intended imply. If Egyptians had sovereignty and property, what more was required?

b. Agreed that British equipment should be under Egyptian guard and that handling should be done as far as possible by Egyptian personnel. Question of duration could be for sub-committee to decide.

6. At end of meeting it was agreed that what was required was means of expressing terms of reference so that committee could devise practical way of combining efficiency of maintenance with Egyptian sovereignty.

ALDRICH

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No. 1155

641.74/5-753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 7, 1953—7:10 p. m.

2156. Department confronted by suspension UK-Egyptian talks, high level communication from London (Deptel 2147), [2] Egyptian position as presented by new Ambassador Deptel 2138) [3] and declared intent Egyptian Government solicit Secretary's support for its views on his arrival Cairo. Despite fact Secretary's Middle East trip [4] planned solely as fact finding one, above factors will give major substantive importance to any action or inaction by Secretary in Cairo.

Department wishes forestall Egyptian request to Secretary for US support position similar to one outlined by Egyptian Ambassador. This would inevitably require negative reaction based on US national interests in Middle East regardless any commitment to UK.

Accordingly Caffery should immediately call on Naguib and appropriate members RCC to develop following points:

1. US sympathizes Egyptian desire for evacuation SC Base and convinced genuineness UK intention carry this out consonant with free world security requirements.
2. As stated President's letter to Naguib base question inevitably linked to Middle East defense.
3. In present period world-wide threat communist aggression in which latest evidence is unprovoked assault on Laos, US attitude toward any nation is affected by such nation's resolve to cooperate with free world in common measures for common protection. US welcomes repeated assurances this is Egyptian intention.
4. However to permit US military and economic assistance to Egypt under existing circumstances definite alignment of Egypt with West essential going beyond suggestions made by Egyptian Ambassador.
5. Dependence on affirmation Egypt will resist communist attack on own territory is insufficient. In twentieth century warfare definitive forward defense commitments and plans required.
6. If Naguib intends to raise with Secretary question UK discussions and Middle East defense, he should be prepared advance con-

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 7259. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 1153.

[3] Printed as telegram 7198, Document 1153.

[4] Secretary of State Dulles and Mutual Security Director Stassen visited the Near and Middle East from May 9 to May 29, 1953. They were in Egypt from May 11 to May 13 and held extensive discussions with Egyptian leaders. For additional documentation regarding the Dulles-Stassen visit to Egypt, see Documents 1 ff.

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crete proposals for defense arrangement aligning Egypt and Arab States with West in more explicit fashion than previous Egyptian suggestions.

7. Above comments are made in view strong US friendship for Egypt and admiration Naguib regime, and in confidence he will feel able in interests of Egyptian people adopt position permitting US support Egypt in achievement its national aspirations. [5]

DULLES

[5] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 2396, May 9, not printed, that he had developed the points set forth in Department telegram 2156 for the Egyptians, who were unhappy with these positions. He also informed the Department that the Egyptians did not expect Dulles to make any commitments or promises while he was in Cairo, but they planned nonetheless to explain fully their position to him. (641.74/5–953)

No. 1156

774.56/5–853: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 8, 1953—8:04 p. m.

7292. Text follows personal message from British Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Secretary to Secretary delivered by British Embassy May 7.

Verbatim text. 1. I have just heard from Aldrich that you are proposing to give the Egyptian Embassy in Washington today a list of arms and equipment which you would eventually be prepared to supply to the Egyptians. I have been following this matter very closely myself and I had hoped that you would be able to postpone any offer to the Egyptians.

2. I know that the first of the equipment will not be supplied for ninety days but this is a moment when the negotiations have reached a temporary breakdown. We have confined ourselves to the case agreed between us and the United States both under the late and the present American Administrations. We hope indeed that the negotiations may be resumed and I am sure you would greatly regret it if your intervention with an offer of arms contributed to a complete breakdown and this was followed by bloodshed on an indefinite scale. I cannot understand what can be the urgency of your presenting the list to the Egyptians or sending them the weapons. I trust therefore that you will reconsider your proposal. Surely you could in any case refrain from coming to a decision until after you yourself have had an opportunity in the next few days of seeing things on the spot and judging the situation at first-hand.

3. Apart from the above we have definite information that quite a number of German Nazis, possibly even the notorious Remer, have actually been engaged by Naguib and are training the Egyp-

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tian Army and irregulars in guerilla and sabotage operations. Do you wish to give them American arms as well at a moment when so much hangs in the balance and when we are faithfully working on a joint plan about the Suez Canal on the case agreed between us? *End verbatim text.*

Text Secretary's reply delivered to British Embassy May 8 follows:

Verbatim text. I have received your personal message of May 7, 1953 regarding the arms and equipment which we indicated to the Egyptian Government they can buy in this country. In consideration of your strong feeling of concern, I have instructed the Department again to delay delivery of the list until after I have had the opportunity to assess the situation in Cairo. However, after discussion with the President, we feel that it may not be possible to continue these dilatory tactics without serious consequences in our relations with Egypt and charges of bad faith. Therefore, I am leaving the situation here in such shape that, if it seems desirable, I can say at Cairo that the decision to submit the list had already been taken prior to my departure. I want to be in this position so that such action, if it is to be taken, cannot be interpreted as approval or disapproval of any Egyptian viewpoints I may learn at Cairo. [1] *End verbatim text.*

DULLES

[1] The text of the Secretary of State's reply handed to the British Embassy on May 8 was transmitted to the Embassy in Cairo in telegram 2168, May 8. (110.11 DU/5–853)

No. 1157

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill"

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 8, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON:

[Here follow the President's remarks about Churchill's possible visit to the Soviet Union, the situation in Korea and in Southeast Asia, and British Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler's rebuff of a possible new solution of the Iranian oil crises.]

Foster showed me your communication about the Egyptian affair. [1] It is possible that I have not thoroughly understood the background in which should be viewed the existing impasse. I was told that some very protracted negotiations between the Egyptians and ourselves, looking toward the supply to them, by us, of a meager quantity of arms, had been held up for a long time pending a satisfactory solution of the Sudan problem.

I had understood that by agreement with your Government, we were to proceed with the transfer of a small amount of equipment

[1] See telegram 7292 to London, May 8, *supra*.

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(finally reduced to about five million dollars worth) upon the satisfactory completion of that agreement. It is my impression that the Egyptians knew of this general intention on our part.

Later, when there began to appear in press reports some intemperate remarks—even threats—by the Egyptian authorities against our British friends, we began to drag our feet on fulfilling our part of the bargain. The Egyptians, of course, have pressed us again and again on the matter, and we get a bit embarrassed because of their right to charge us with failure to carry out an agreement. We can, of course, adopt the attitude that, because of some of their extraordinary and threatening statements, we are compelled to make certain that they do not intend to use these arms against our friends. In fact, it is my impression that we have long since done this. It is, however, quite difficult to refuse even to talk about the matter or to go so far, for example, as to decline to allow the Egyptian officials to see a list of the kind of articles that would be available. I believe that the initial items to be transferred involved only such things as helmets and jeeps.

Now, of course, we can continue to drag our feet for a while. But I do most deeply deplore having gotten into a position where we can be made to feel like we are breaking faith with another government. It is possible that some years ago we may have been too hasty in promising to include Egypt among those countries to whom we would give some help in preparing necessary defense forces, but that is water long over the dam.

With respect to this particular item, we will at least do nothing further until after Foster has had his talk with Naguib. While it is possible that some hopeful break will develop out of that meeting, I must say that I am extremely doubtful.

As of this moment I still think that we have no recourse except to continue the steady buildup of Western morale and of Western economic and military strength. This is the great "must" that confronts us all, but whenever you have an idea—even a piece of one—that might suggest a possibility of us diminishing the burdens that we are compelled to lay upon our collective peoples, please let me know about it. I should certainly like to ponder it.

I hope my comments do not offend—I assure you again I welcome yours.

Won't you please convey to Anthony my very best wishes and the earnest hope that he will soon be returned to full health?

With warm regard to your good self,

As ever, [2]

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[2] No signature on the source text.

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No. 1158

774.56/5-953

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 9, 1953.

You will have seen the Department's 7292 to London giving the text of a message from Mr. Churchill to the President on the subject of arms for the Egyptians and text of President's reply.

With regard to the latter, the first sentence of the President's reply was discussed by Jernegan and myself with Mr. Matthews and Mr. Matthews recommended it to the Secretary. The portion which I have marked in brackets must have been put in by the Secretary himself after, as indicated in the message, his discussion with the President. [1]

I discussed this problem with Mr. MacArthur this morning prior to his departure and expressed the view to him that this issue contains more dangers for our relations with the British than any other single thing I could think of. If the base negotiations break down and guerrilla warfare starts with Egyptians shooting British soldiers with American ammunition, the results could be catastrophic. Mr. MacArthur entirely agreed and he is going to take the position with the Secretary that the delivering of arms to any country should be tied directly to that country's willingness to participate and contribute to mutual defense. If the Secretary will buy this position, it will mean that the arms program for Egypt will not go forward unless there is agreement between Egypt and the UK on the evacuation and some security tie-in with the West.

In view of the pressures to which the Secretary will be subjected in the next three weeks not only from the foreign representatives he will be meeting but from our own representative in the area, I also gave Mr. MacArthur a hastily drawn up list of the major issues between the British and ourselves at this time [2] together

[1] The copy of the cable which Bonbright had presumably attached to this memorandum with marked brackets was not attached to the record copy in the Department of State files.

[2] The list was not attached to the source text.

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with some of the helpful things the British are doing for us. I thought that when the going got rough, it would be useful to Mr. MacArthur to have such a list. As you can imagine, he has very much in mind the EUR interest in the area and I hope will be in a good position to give the Secretary a more balanced view than the one he is likely to be presented with on this trip.

No. 1159

641.74/5-1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

SECRET CAIRO, May 12, 1953—1 p. m.

2416. For the President from the Secretary. UK-Egyptian negotiations on base agreement presently stalled on issue of whether British technicians shall receive instructions direct from London or whether they shall be communicated through Egyptian authorities. British are sticking to so-called "case A" of joint US–UK London paper. Believe some modification along lines "case B" [1] might permit agreement on this issue, however, complete distrust and ill will both sides constitute continuing major obstacle. Also no easy way to break present deadlock without loss of face for one side or another. Tension mounting daily and situation dangerous. Robertson told me yesterday that if the negotiations break down there will undoubtedly be serious incidents. He said "this means war although we may not call it such." Was with Naguib about five hours yesterday afternoon and evening. [2] He greatly appreciated your letters and gift. While my personal relationship with him most agreeable it does not correct deep basic distrust of British which is dominant consideration overriding any fear of Soviets. Exploring situation further today and will send you my further thoughts tomorrow.

CAFFERY

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[1] Regarding "Cases A and B", see Document 1061.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 1155.

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No. 1160

110.11 DU/5-1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, May 12, 1953—5 p. m.

2417. From Secretary.

1. Secretary and Stassen spent more than three hours yesterday (May 11) afternoon discussing with General Naguib and Foreign Minister Fawzi Egyptian ideas Suez base. Conversation continued at dinner with Nasir and other principal lieutenants of Naguib.

2. During call at Foreign Office Fawzi first gave recital of Egyptian case. Since we were to meet subsequently with Naguib, Secretary did not attempt to expand United States thinking regarding base, but confined himself largely to asking questions.

3. Fawzi touched briefly upon other matters: meeting of Arab League Finance Ministers soon to study cooperative economic developments; Arab-Israel border difficulties; Arab refugees; and threat of Israel which "partitioned" Arab world. Fawzi mentioned that Arab leaders disturbed by Secretary's visit Jerusalem and Secretary replied they should not attach political significance to his visit to Jerusalem.

4. Two hour conference with Naguib had more substance. After Secretary gave him President's gift (it was evident he was very pleased), Naguib launched into exposition Egyptian case saying he would speak with complete frankness.

5. His government seeking effect economic, social and political reforms so that peaceful Egypt can play useful part in modern world.

These reforms are hindered by "aggression" of United Kingdom in Egypt. Only social and economic advancement, by rectifying differences between rich and poor, by democratic processes, and by liberty could living standards of people be raised, and thus strength achieved. British occupation and "stubborness" has aroused everybody. Arabs have always considered United States as country of freedom, friend of weak nations and sympathizer with national aspirations. Emergence Israel weakened United States position and now considerable Arab bitterness (previously reserved for United Kingdom) has now shifted to shoulders United States. Arabs see miserable refugees and feel United States always supports Israel. Egypt (and Arabs generally) have had bad experience with agreements not kept by United Kingdom. Only week after Sudan agree-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 778.

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ment British officials began to undermine it. It is not surprising, therefore, that Egypt and Arabs fear to enter into agreements such as one for Middle East defense. Agreements are only "respectable" when made between equals. Master-slave relationship is impossible basis. Egypt and Arabs inhibited by this idea when confronted with proposals for MEDO. "If I and my people feel oppressed, there is no point in making an agreement with us." Popular will must be respected. Agreement regarding defense only possible if these suspicions allayed and confidence re-established between United Kingdom and Egypt. Because of its strength United States has capability of "doing anything". Nevertheless, "if I say I will make a pact I will lose all my supporters" and compliance with pact would be impossible. However, once liberty achieved, Egypt would be willing to have confidence in everybody—even United Kingdom.

6. Naguib said defense Egypt is Egyptian responsibility which country desires to undertake with strength and enthusiasm. Regardless number of United Kingdom troops in canal area, without an agreement they will "never be safe" from 22 million Egyptians who see them as aggressors. He foresaw worsening situation because "agreement I could make with United Kingdom now, I will not be able to make in month or two".

Naguib then outlined discussions with United Kingdom regarding establishment technical committees and said that root difficulty was terms of reference for base committee. United Kingdom wanted to start committee without terms of reference, but Egypt insisted on establishing "broad lines of principles" for guidance. Egypt accepted British technicians ("a courageous act in the light of popular feeling") until they could eventually be replaced by trained Egyptians, but insisted on "full control of base" because "otherwise it would be an infringement on our sovereignty" and eventual replacement all British technicians. Sovereignty vital to Egyptians.

7. Naguib said no government in any Arab country can go against will of people "who hate British" and who are bitter against United States and to some extent France for supporting United Kingdom. Egypt knows in modern world "no country can stand alone and therefore must look for friends. Russians not our friend". Solution of Anglo-Egyptian problem will unlock door to the solution of many problems confronting other Arab states such as Israel, area defense (he mentioned ALCSP), and communication. If problem not solved world may be faced with chaos in Egypt suitable for exploitation by "United Kingdom, Communists and others who have an interest in chaos". Naguib said he faces problem vis-à-vis United States because Communists are already saying his government selling out Egypt to United Kingdom at United States

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behest. "We welcome loans from United States, but as long as Egypt weak people, fear repetition 1886 [2] when foreign powers intervened to collect Khedive Ismail's debts."

8. Secretary thanked Naguib and said straight talk was just what he had come to hear. When new administration in United States took over it was faced with established foreign policies. Some were good and others needed revision or change. Effective foreign policies cannot be made in Washington without knowledge of what is in minds of other people. Secretary said our policies would be based on confrontation of Communist threat: we had no evidence that Communist philosophy had changed and felt that threat of further Red expansion real and present. To cope with this threat we need help of others. We consider Middle East as danger area hitherto neglected by United States which has focused, perhaps, excessive attention Israel. We want balanced Middle East policy directed against neither Arabs nor Jews.

9. Secretary said what happens in Egypt is Egypt's business. We cannot dictate to Egypt. Nevertheless, we have concluded from studies world strategy in Department and NSC that Egypt under Naguib's guidance has the capability of providing kind of leadership and example Arab world lacking for long time. He stressed President's personal esteem for Naguib and indicated we would like to assist Egypt to take lead in Arab world through economic and military assistance even though arms desperately needed many places (e.g., Siam, Laos, NATO, et cetera). Egypt might become example for other Arab states to follow. We were open to any ideas Naguib might wish to advance in these spheres.

10. Anglo-Egyptian differences real problem for United States. United States not ashamed close United States–United Kingdom ties. We have differences with United Kingdom and do not automatically accept British policies as our own, but we are fundamentally agreed on broad principles. We have no colonial ambitions as proved by freeing Philippines et cetera.

11. When Suez base discussed last March with Eden (as Truman administration had done earlier) we agreed with United Kingdom that there must be a prompt change in situation of the base which would fully recognize Egyptian sovereignty both in theory and fact. However, to United States it vitally important that change in base status not create power vacuum and that base should be instantly available at high level of efficiency in event of war. Base in such a state is a necessity and in view United States greatest deterrent to

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[2] The Dual Control of Egyptian finances by the United Kingdom and France was first established in 1876 and was renewed in 1879. This system was abolished by the British at the outset of the British Occupation in 1882.

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aggression this area by USSR. Secretary reminded Naguib of Stalin's statement in 1940 to Hitler that the center of Soviet aspirations lay in general area of Persian Gulf. He said that as General to General the President sent Naguib word that impetuousness must be avoided if the base is to continue as a deterrent to aggression and as a point of free world strength. Therefore, United States believes in phased withdrawal British troops, but in instant readiness of base—readiness in three to six months might be too late. British technicians to handle British equipment represent system which United States does not want to see broken up without adequate and appropriate replacement arrangements. We asked whether Naguib agreed regarding instant availability.

12. Naguib and Fawzi both assured Secretary that they believed in instant availability and that they were confident Egyptians could be trained to keep base adequately. Latter said best deterrent to Soviets would be seeing relationship between Egypt and United Kingdom—then Soviets would never dare attack. However, during negotiations, United Kingdom had said there must be British technicians in base as long as British property remained there. Why this desire for control? "We cannot accept anything which infringes our sovereignty." Egypt prepared to take over base gradually and would not abuse Egyptian control, but without Egyptian control United Kingdom might increase number of technicians or in other ways remain indefinitely, thus impairing Egyptian sovereignty.

13. Byroade referred to expeditiousness of base and asked Egypt's views regarding United Kingdom sending supplies to Arab Legions, Libya, et cetera. Naguib and Fawzi thought a moment and then replied that stores were British property and that they could do with them as they liked.

14. Secretary remarked that it seemed stupid to think that the great vision of a new Egypt can collapse on the point of who directs inventory-keepers. Agreement resulting in evacuation of British troops would be a great political victory. Control appears sticking point.

Can Egyptians assure efficient control by them and would base be available if needed? They replied that committees could study control matter and work out efficient system. Secretary said that he had not come to Egypt to involve himself in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations: He was interested in the role Egypt might play in their future and wanted to discuss this again with Naguib. He wanted to see present impasse between Egypt and United Kingdom cleared away. It must be plain to Egypt that "United States cannot allow Egyptians to fight British". He wanted it out of the way also so that he could talk about such matters as collective security and peace with Israel. Regarding collective security, he was interested

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in strong Egyptian view that MEDO proposal was out of date and something new must be found.

Regarding Israel, Naguib said that everything depends on confidence and Jews have long record of noncompliance with United Nations resolutions. Nevertheless, "after British get out, I am pretty sure I can reach an agreement". Naguib said that even now Egypt prepared to discuss informally with United States planning for area defense.

15. As meeting about to break up, Naguib was handed partial press report on Churchill's speech [3] which he read aloud, but did not comment on specifically.

CAFFERY

[3] Prime Minister Churchill made extensive remarks about Egypt in a speech at the House of Commons on May 11. For documentation regarding the Prime Minister's statements, see Department of State files 641.74 and 774.56.

No. 1161

Editorial Note

Telegram 2421, May 13, personal for Acting Secretary Smith from Dulles in Cairo, transmitted the Secretary's comments on the British-Egyptian negotiations. For text, see Document 6.

No. 1162

641.74/5–1353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

SECRET CAIRO, May 13, 1953—noon.

2422. Personal for Smith from the Secretary. The following is formula referred to in preceding message as possible acceptable compromise in UK-Egyptian dispute.

"In order to clarify certain points of misunderstanding that have arisen in recent discussions between Egypt and the UK the following memo of understanding is hereby agreed and constitutes the terms of reference for the 'Base Committee:'

"To draw up plans for the transfer of the present military base in the Canal Zone to Egyptian control and for keeping it in working order and use so that it may strengthen the area by continuing to supply forces outside Egypt and be available for immediate use in the event of hostilities endangering peace and security of area.

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"Recommendations will be made regarding the installations and the equipment within the base area and the equipment in the base under the following considerations:

(a) That the Egyptian Government in exercise of its sovereignty over base will undertake by the agreement to insure the security of British property therein.

(b) That the present level of depot stocks may be maintained but not increased except by consent of the Egyptian Government.

(c) That the British experts needed shall be limited to the absolute minimum numbers required for the efficient operation of the installation and the maintenance and current withdrawals and additions of British equipment left in the base.

(d) That arrangements will be proposed for the training of Egyptian personnel to replace British personnel utilized for the above purposes within a minimum period to be agreed upon between the two delegations. At the end of this period British personnel will no longer be stationed within the base area except as may be agreed to at that time by the Egyptian Government. It is understood that at the end of the above time period British inspectors may be attached to the staff of the UK Ambassador to Egypt and will be allowed to inspect Egyptian maintenance of British-owned supplies in the base and examine the measures taken by the Egyptian base commander to carry out British directions regarding the maintenance and disposition of such supplies, equipment and facilities.

(e) It is understood that channels from London effecting the above matters will be to the UK Military Attaché attached to the UK Embassy in Egypt. These instructions will be forwarded to the Egyptian base commander through such channels as the Egyptian Government may prescribe, it being realized that efficiency and speed of communication is of the utmost importance in matters of this nature.

(f) That any arrangements proposed above shall not be inconsistent with Egyptian sovereignty nor with British ownership and use of the property concerned.

(g) That the Egyptian Government is conscious of the responsibility placed upon it as custodian of the base area, the purpose of which is to deter aggression against Middle East, as a whole, to supply forces beyond Egypt's borders and to increase the defenses of Egypt itself including the Suez Canal waterway. The Egyptian Government is of the opinion that arrangements for the defense of the Middle East as a whole including Egypt should be arranged at the first feasible opportunity. These should allow for the combined efforts of the Associated States in the area and such other forces as may be available to help protect the territorial integrity and full sovereignty of the States in the area. The Egyptian Government further recognizes that an interim period of transition will be needed to effect the change-over from strategic plans that may be in being at the present time and the coming period in which new plans will be prepared by cooperation among all the various parties concerned. During such a transition period the Egyp-

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tian Government recognizes and has no intention of interference with, the right of the British Government to direct the shipment of its equipment and supplies in the base to areas and forces outside Egypt.

(h) That the Committee will not concern itself with the duration in time of the arrangements which it proposes. This will be determined by the two delegations."

CAFFERY

No. 1163

Editorial Note

Telegram 2423, May 13, personal for Acting Secretary Smith from Dulles in Cairo, reported on discussions between British and Egyptian officials. For text, see Document 7.

No. 1164

774.56/5–1353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, May 13, 1953—noon.

2424. Personal for Smith from Secretary. In view of situation in Egypt which I am reporting Washington by separate messages do not believe Department should present list of equipment which they may purchase to Egyptian authorities at this time. Suggest you explain Egyptians Washington that matter must be held until my return. While subject this particular equipment did not arise I made it clear here that United States could not furnish Egypt equipment in present tense situation.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London for the Ambassador as telegram 779.

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No. 1165

641.74/5-1353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, May 13, 1953—5 p. m.

6065. In order further allay indications of concern along lines outlined Embtel 5990 May 8, [2] I sought interview with Churchill this morning and conveyed to him substance Cairo's 2417 May 12 re Secretary's conversation with Egyptians. Churchill expressed his great appreciation, on basis this and similar reports from British Embassy Cairo for line which Secretary has taken both publicly and privately in Cairo on Suez base problem.

Churchill said that, in event question of Secretary's visit to Cairo is raised in Commons, he intends read to House public statement which Secretary made on May 11 re US interest in future of base.

I am sending separate letter to Acting Secretary with copy to Secretary at Karachi re reaction here to publicity, which has been both widespread and unfavorable, to gift of pistol to Naguib. Churchill has confided to me his concern over this publicity but stated that if he is forced to refer to this matter in Commons, he will try to make light of it.

ALDRICH

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 321 and to Tel Aviv as telegram 52 for the Secretary of State.

[2] In telegram 5990 from London, May 8, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich requested authorization to convey to Prime Minister Churchill the instructions which the Department had sent to Ambassador Caffery in telegram 2156, Document 1155. (641.74/5-853) The Department had granted this permission in telegram 7270, May 8, not printed. (641.74/5-853)

No. 1166

641.74/5-1353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, May 13, 1953—7 p. m.

2428. At Secretary's direction I told British Ambassador and General Robertson this evening that as result of conversations with Egyptian leaders he has come to following conclusions:

[1] Repeated to Amman priority for the Secretary of State as telegram 73 and to London as telegram 780.

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1. We should continue publicly to stand with British;
2. "Case A" is unobtainable and therefore he believes a move should be made in direction of "Case B"; [2]
3. Egyptians did not raise question of $11 million interim arms purchase and US does not plan to give arms list to Egyptians at this time;
4. It is Secretary's intention to discuss whole situation with President and JCS upon his return to Washington and thereafter get in touch with London and endeavor to agree on new approach;
5. Naguib indicated he will endeavor in meantime to avoid all violent activities on part of Egyptians;
6. MEDO is completely unacceptable to Egyptians. [3]

CAFFERY

[2] Regarding "Cases A and B," see Document 1061.

[3] In telegram 2434 from Cairo, May 14, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that Stevenson and Robertson had little to say in reply to the contents of this telegram. He said they did not seem surprised, and he believed that their opinions regarding Case A and MEDO approximated those held by American officials. (641.74/5–1453)

No. 1167

774.56/5–1453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, May 14, 1953—7 p. m.

6092. I saw Chruchill again this afternoon and conveyed to him substance Cairo's 2424 ad 2428, May 13. Prime Minister, who was in very ebullient frame of mind because of yesterday's Conservative by-election victory, expressed his gratification re these messages. He said he had sent message of congratulations to Secretary re his visit Cairo. It was obvious Churchill was reassured and pleased.

Churchill also said he believed pistol publicity here has probably blown over (Embtel 6065, May 13).

ALDRICH

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 324 and to Damascus for the Secretary of State as telegram 34.

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No. 1168

Editorial Note

Representatives of the United States and Egyptian Governments signed and thereby brought into force a Technical Cooperation Agreement to establish programs for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries on May 21, 1953. For the texts, see TIAS No. 2480, printed in 4 UST (pt. 2) 1716.

No. 1169

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 145th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 20, 1953

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 145th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; the United States Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger, USA (Ret.) (for item 2); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for item 3); the Chief of Naval Operations (for item 3); General Twining for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (for item 3); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for item 3); Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA (for item 2); Lt. Col. Edward Black, USA (for item 2); Col. Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence informed the Council that the situation in Egypt had lately taken a critical turn. Since Naguib had announced the break-up of the conversations with the

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British in a highly inflammatory speech, [1] Mr. Dulles feared that the situation might get out of hand before Secretary Dulles could get back from his trip and a decision be reached as to what the United States could do. The essence of the difficulty was the pressure which the extremists were bringing to bear on Naguib, which forced him into positions which he might otherwise avoid. His difficulties were compounded by failure thus far to institute any significant land reforms and by the drop in world-wide cotton prices.

Mr. Dulles then informed the Council of the relative military capabilities of the British and of the Egyptians in the Suez area. It was made clear that, from a strictly military point of view, the British position was much stronger. Their problem was how to protect some 20,000 of their nationals in Egypt in the event of guerrilla warfare and mob action. To make matters worse, the Soviets were assuring the Egyptian Government of all possible support against the "Anglo-American imperialists". The Ambassador of India in Cairo, Pannikar, was adding to the Russian mischief. The British position in a nutshell, concluded Mr. Dulles, was that their forces in the Suez area constituted the last stronghold of the Western powers in the Middle East. Accordingly, it must be held at all costs. There seemed slight possibility that the British would recede from their position or that Naguib could recede from his. An explosion could therefore occur at any time.

Mr. Dulles also noted that, by court decree of recent date, the Tudeh Party in Iran had become a legal political party. This development indicated further deterioration for the interests of the free world in Iran. [2]

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' briefing, the President inquired whether any members of the Council had any idea or inkling of what could be done to save the situation in Egypt.

Secretary Smith replied that at the State Department was preparing an alternative approach which might at least delay an explosion and violence in Egypt. [3] It was another package deal involving further concessions to Egypt with respect to the evacuation of British forces. Secretary Smith was far from optimistic that either the British or the Egyptians would buy this new alternative. Indeed, the British were at the moment blaming the United States for failure to join with them at the beginning in negotiations with

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[1] See telegram 5966 from London, Document 1154, and telegram 2156 to Cairo, Document 1155. Materials regarding these events are in Department of State files 641.74 and 774.00.

[2] Documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the situation in Iran and American interest in the settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute is scheduled for publication in volume x.

[3] See telegram 1665, May 23, *infra*.

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the Egyptians on evacuation. They contended, although falsely, that had we joined with them the Egyptians would have been compelled to accept their terms.

The President then inquired whether any plans had been worked out by this Government with regard to what would happen after the British withdrew from Egypt if indeed they did withdraw. Do we expect the Russians to take over? Would the Russians supply the Egyptians with arms? Would we blockade Egyptian ports to prevent these arms from reaching Egypt?

To this and other questions Secretary Smith replied that at the present time the United States had no option but to support the British vis-à-vis the Egyptians. Indeed, our relations with the British Government were at the moment worse than at any time since Pearl Harbor. . . . Moreover, Secretary Smith agreed that the 70,000 British troops in the Suez base and zone represented the only effective fighting force for the free world in the Middle East. Accordingly, we would have to play along with the British for the time being, and take the beating which would inevitably result through our association with an ally whom the Egyptians and other Arab states hated as imperialists.

Reverting to the difficulties this Government was encountering with Mr. Churchill and the serious decline in Anglo-American relations, Secretary Smith stated his belief that Mr. Churchill had had some kind of contact with Moscow, and that as a result of these initiatives in Moscow we might well be confronted in the next few weeks with a Soviet invitation for high-level talks including the French as well as the British and ourselves.

In this contingency, the President replied, it would perhaps be best for us to extend the first invitation and schedule a meeting in Iceland or Greenland. The temperatures there would moderate the heat of the meeting.

The National Security Council:

Discussed the situation in Egypt in the light of an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, which also incuded reference to the legalizing of the Tudeh party in Iran.

[Here follow discussion of the volunteer Freedom Corps, an analysis of possible courses of action in Korea, and a report on negotiations with Spain.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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No. 1170

641.74/5-2353: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 23, 1953—2:52 p. m.

1665. For Secretary. Number 7. Noforn. In compliance Secretary's instructions [2] Department attempting formulate recommendations on Egyptian problem for consideration Secretary on his return. Following tentative approach now under working level consideration here. While we fully appreciate opposition this approach might arouse from different viewpoints both London and Cairo, as Secretary has pointed out dangers in present situation call for exploration of new measures to break deadlock and reverse continuing deterioration.

Agreement on basis "package proposals" seems unobtainable. [3] Maximum Egypt appears willing accept is base arrangement equivalent to little more than Case C. [4] At same time Western security requirements would not be met by evacuation of base in accordance with Case C trusting in vague assurances hitherto given by RCC that it will subsequently conclude agreements required by defense needs of West. Essential smoke out intentions RCC. Request for RCC assurances willingness undertake defense planning with US at this time might be used for this purpose.

In face above following moves suggested:

1) Prior discussion with UK to obtain its approval procedure outline below.

2) Approach to Egypt by Caffery requesting explicit written commitment to negotiate and conclude with UK and US, *after* evacuation British troops agreed to and has started, agreement on following lines:

a) Full Egyptian cooperation with West in event of war.

b) Immediate reactivation Suez Canal base in case of war and right of forces of Western powers make full use of base.

c) Maintenance in peacetime by Western personnel facilities considered essential by JCS and British General Staff for immediate use at outbreak of war.

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[1] Repeated to Istanbul as telegram 1304, to London as telegram 7550, and to Cairo as telegram 2251. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan.

[2] In telegram 4189 from New Delhi, May 20, not printed, the Secretary of State instructed the Department to try to formulate recommendations on the Egyptian problem for his consideration upon his return. (641.74/5-2053)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 1082.

[4] See Document 1061.

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d) Facilities and Western personnel involved to be kept to minimum and every effort made train Egyptian personnel. Western personnel to be assigned in guise of training missions.

e) Commitment to be secret but provide that formal agreement be concluded on above lines before evacuation of British troops.

3) Resumption and conclusion UK-Egyptian talks on evacuation and future of base in accordance Secretary's formula (being sent separate telegram to London).[5] Start of evacuation UK combat troops.

4) Conclusion of open agreement covering points listed under 2 but ostensibly unconnected to evacuation. This sequence will provide RCC major political victory and meet its slogan of "unconditional evacuation".

5) US economic and military aid to Egypt dependent on conclusion both agreements, and of course on Congressional authorization.

6) Deferment efforts obtain multilateral Middle East Defense Organization.

Cairo and London comments requested.

SMITH

[5] Secretary of State Dulles' formula transmitted to London in telegram 7551, May 23, not printed (641.74/5–2353) was the same proposal that he had advanced in telegram 2422 from Cairo, Document 1162.

No. 1171

641.74/5–2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Jordan (Green) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT AMMAN, May 25, 1953—1 p. m.

999. Following from Caffery. In working up tentative recommendations on Egyptian problem (Deptel 2251 to Cairo)[2] Department appears not to have taken sufficient account of following considerations:

1. Although Western stock is at a low ebb in the Middle East considerable hope now prevails (at least in Egypt) that as result of Secretary's visit United States will adopt a new role of leadership in this area.

2. The first and in many ways the crucial test of the incipient renaissance of faith in United States leadership will come in Egypt where the attainment of United States foreign policy objectives is

[1] Also sent to Istanbul for the Secretary of State as telegram 1, and repeated to London as telegram 61 and to Cairo as telegram 131.

[2] Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, *supra*.

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greatly complicated by the exacerbated state of Egypt's long-standing dispute with our principal ally.

3. It is axiomatic that unless UK and US are prepared to contemplate indefinite retention British base facilities by force, Western security requirements can be met only by agreement based on restoration of confidence. Although Egyptians retain some confidence and considerable hope in United States, they have none in Britain. We therefore have double task of confidence-building.

Although I fully agree that Western defense needs cannot be met by "vague assurances" of RCC intentions, it is equally certain that RCC will not and can not give at this juncture written commitment of nature envisaged in Deptel. Approaching them on basis suggested would utterly destroy their existing confidence in the United States the immediate result would be repudiation by the RCC of thier present offer to assure the continued functioning and instant availability of the base. They would then insist on literally unconditional evacuation.

I believe the only productive course will be to proceed with effort to persuade British accept principles contained in Secretary's original formula with a view to getting Anglo-Egyptian discussions restarted. Any attempt to get written Egyptian commitment on details of defense arrangements before some improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations would merely prejudice hopes for development of satisfactory arrangement in course of future discussions (repeat in course of future discussions).

In other words, I agree fully with Department's objectives but the only possible way of achieving them is to restart negotiations on basis of Secretary's original formula, endeavor to recreate measure of confidence between Britain and Egyptians and then at opportune moment work into practical means of arriving kind of arrangements we require.

GREEN

No. 1172

641.74/5-2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 26, 1953—noon.

6245. Following are my comments on Deptel 7550, May 23: [2]

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 332 and priority to Athens for the Secretary of State as telegram 161.

[2] Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.

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1. Department's revised formula appears contain essentials of all elements to which British attach importance in any settlement. (Assume, in this connection, paragraph 2a would cover point of air defense.) This fact, plus prospect close US association with contemplated arrangements would, I believe, mitigate with British in favor of plan.

2. On other hand, plan, as presently drawn up, would undoubtedly raise Parliamentary and public opinion difficulties here. While difficult gauge extent this problem, I believe it sufficiently far-reaching to make it impossible for Churchill to defend initial agreement which publicly concedes evacuation without any assurance regarding future availability of the base and area defnse cooperation unless he were able at some time to give indication that latter questions had been or would be covered in second agreement. This might be done by Churchill taking selected back-benchers and opposition leaders into his confidence re secret commitments outlined paragraph 2 Department reference telegram, appealing to them not to rock boat. However, spreading knowledge of secret commitments this widely is risky procedure in situation where leak might enable Egyptians to maintain that agreement had been vitiated by violation of secrecy. Moreover this procedure could not be applied to press, nor could position probably be held very long in Parliament.

3. Problem might be taken care of here if Naguib could find it possible to make public announcement immediately on conclusion evacuation agreement that now Egypt's national aspirations have been achieved, he has taken initiative in inviting US and UK (and perhaps others) to discuss area defense arrangements, including training and equipping Egyptian armed forces so that they can play their maximum effective role in common effort. Ambassador Caffery will know whether such a statement is possible, but it seems to me comparable in statesmanship to stand Naguib took on Sudan and to be minimum which would be required to cope with thorny problem here. Against background statement of this kind, I believe Churchill might be able hold off criticism. He, however, is only competent judge of this and I cannot speak with complete conviction on this point.

4. I think suggested terms of reference for base committee (Deptel 7551 May 23), [3] could probably be sold with difficulty to British, except for E. *Query*: Are we convinced that Egypt would not accept arrangement whereby British instructions would be sent directly to senior British technician with copy simultaneously to base commander and perhaps provision for diplomatic consultation in event of disagreement?

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[3] See footnote 5, Document 1170.

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5. I have further suggestion on problem of technicians which I throw out without knowledge its possible acceptability to British. Idea would be for Egypt and British Governments to agree to designate and give responsibility to some well-known British engineering firm to undertake care and maintenance certain specified facilities and stores subject right of inspection both parties. Arrangement this kind might, it seems to me, have following advantages:

a. From standpoint Egyptian sensibilities re sovereignty, it might be less onerous have private firm undertake work than UK Government employees.

b. War Office could informally let its requirements be known to London office of firm which could issue necessary directives to technicians on base, thereby obviating British Government formally instructing UK Government employees on Egyptian soil.

c. Eygpt could defend arrangement as being on essentially same basis as any other private firm doing business in Egypt.

d. From UK point of view, arrangement would permit more organized direction and management within base area than would be case with lot of individual government technicians.

6. Major factor in British attitude towards any plan which we may evolve will be extent to which we are prepared to continue to stand firmly with them.

ALDRICH

No. 1173

641.74/5-2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, May 26, 1953—6 p. m.

6261. Embtel 6245 today was drafted prior receipt Amman's 999 to Department containing Ambassador Caffery's views on Department's proposed plan of action on Egyptian problem. I entirely agree with his remarks re importance restoration of confidence between UK and Egypt, which is matter of fundamental importance here in view prevalence deep-seated doubts and suspicions of Egyptian intentions engendered by or inferred from public statements, liberation battalions, Canal Zone incidents, positions in negotiations et cetera. Whether rightly or wrongly, British not psychologically adjusted in these circumstances to act on trust alone, to make significant concessions without reciprocal gestures of good faith.

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 333 and priority to Athens for the Secretary of State as telegram 162.

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There is one point in Ambassador Caffery's telegram on which I would appreciate clarification. I am not clear what Egyptians mean by their offer to assure "instant availability of the base", to which I have also noted Naguib and Fawzi agreed in their conversation with Secretary reported Cairo's 2417, May 12. It has been my understanding that, in course discussions with British, Egyptians were not prepared recognize any right of re-access (see Embtel 5875 and Cairo's 2379) [2] and I have therefore assumed that they mean "instant availability" to Egyptian forces. If, however, they mean phrase to apply to British or Western forces, this appears to me to constitute significant new development which, if specified in Secretary's draft terms of reference contained Deptel 7551, [3] would have salutary effect here.

ALDRICH

[2] Not printed.
[3] See footnote 5, Document 1170.

No. 1174

641.74/5-2853: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 28, 1953—7:19 p. m.

2278. Request clarification certain points Amman's 999, May 25 from Caffery:

1. Does procedure suggested last two paragraphs reftel contemplate that attempt to get written Egyptian commitment on defense arrangements will have to await conclusion of negotiations re British evacuation and base maintenance, or do you think it possible restore necessary minimum of confidence and trust during course of negotiations and prior to conclusion firm agreement?

2. Would appreciate elaboration of statement that US request for written commitment at this stage would "utterly destroy" existing Egyptian confidence in US and cause repudiation by RCC of present offer to assure continued functioning and instant availability of base.

3. Do you believe a commitment phrased in more general language than was suggested Deptel 2251 [2] but clearly making base available to West in wartime or imminent threat of war would have chance of Egyptian acceptance or are Egyptians allergic to written commitment of any kind at this time?

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 7639. Drafted and approved by Jernegan.
[2] Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.

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In light of recent informal consultation with JCS representatives, Department is coming to believe that question of base availability to West in wartime or threat of war is both more important and more difficult than that of arranging for adequate maintenance in peace time, at least from strictly US point of view. We are also coming to the view that this problem could and perhaps must be solved without reference to creation of MEDO. This, however, merely brings up crucial question, which is: What are RCC real intentions and how far are they willing to go in giving US and UK minimum assurances upon which we can rely? It also raises question as to how far British could go in relinquishing their present control of base before insisting upon concrete guarantees of its future availability.

We have carefully examined files to determine nature of assurances given up to now. Most statements on record here are ambiguous and susceptible wide variety interpretations. Naguib's note November 10 read: "Immediately upon conclusion of such agreement (evacuation) Egyptian Government will be prepared to give assurances that one of ultimate objectives of its policy is participation with US, UK and other free world powers in planning for common defense of area within framework of charter of UN." Since that date most statements by Government leaders have been increasingly vague as witnessed by Naguib's noncommittal reply to President's letter. Cairo's tel 2423 reported Egyptian formula that in event of attack upon any Arab State access and use of base would be given to Arab partners and any Nation allied with any of them. This has been restated informally by Egyptian Ambassador here, who says it would cover use of base by US as well as UK. This formula is most specific yet offered but is probably still insufficient to meet minimum needs of West, which would want to have use of base in event of general war regardless of whether Arab States were under direct attack. It is also to be noted that Egyptians have not offered to put it in writing. (Ambassador dodged direct question on this point. He explicitly stated formula could not be extended to cover attack on Turkey or Iran.)

We are therefore unable to find any clear recognition by Egypt of need to assure functioning and availability of base in sense we understand those terms. In fact perusal of complete British minutes covering discussions ending May 6 gives contrary picture RCC intentions. Minutes show RCC aim was secure departure all British personnel taking with them if necessary all British stores. Egyptian delegation studiously avoided any intimation it prepared consider base in context of free world defense or for any purpose other than defense of Egypt itself. While we gather Secretary's visit had

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salutary effect on Egyptian attitudes, we are still gravely concerned.

As stated Deptel 678, September 30, 1952, "We must make certain as we proceed that precision and detail take place of vagueness and generality . . . ." Essential thing is to obtain undertaking of such definite nature that we could act upon its authority in time of war and that this undertaking be obtained before British withdrawal has passed point of no return.

Department would appreciate Embassy's further views on how this might be accomplished.

SMITH

No. 1175

Editorial Note

At the 147th meeting of the National Security Council on June 1, Secretary Dulles discussed the situation in the Near East and South Asia, including Egypt. For text of the memorandum of discussion at the meeting, see Document 137.

No. 1176

641.74/6-153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, June 1, 1953—6 p. m.

2512. Following refers to questions raised Deptel 2278.

1. (a) While it is possible that formal Egyptian commitment on defense arrangements may be obtainable in course of negotiations it will depend on whether US–UK tactics are successful in instilling confidence in Egyptians and creating atmosphere which will enable RCC to cooperate publicly with West powers. We must, however, face the fact that any "package deal" [2] is out of the question. Evacuation must not be made to appear conditional on area defense commitments from Egypt.

(b) I have every confidence that if problem is approached in this way the RCC will prove reasonable particularly as they will be anxious to qualify for military and economic assistance. The other contingency could in any case be provided for, e.g., British could

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 809.
[2] See footnote 3, Document 1082.

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begin withdrawal of combat forces as soon as agreement reached on evacuation and base maintenance but could halt withdrawal short of point of no return if Egyptians proved intransigent. Assuming evacuation phased over some months there would be substantial period in which safely to test RCC intentions and capabilities.

2. (a) Statement in my telegram 999 from Amman was that approaching RCC on bases suggested Deptel 2251 [3] would utterly destroy existing confidence in US with resultant repudiation their present offer regarding the base.

(b) In elaboration on this statement I should like to remind Department that in eyes of RCC and virtually every Egyptian, continued presence of British Forces on Egyptian soil constitutes illegal aggression (Egyptians consider that 1936 treaty has been repeatedly violated by UK). Russia seems remote and until an Anglo-Egyptian settlement based upon realization of British evacuation is reached British will continue to be enemy number one. In the light of this and other Arab grievances toward the West Egyptians do not feel moral or ideological compulsion to insure Western security requirements nor can they be bought by promises of financial assistance. They are at present interested only in the realization of "national sovereignty." Those not for them are against them; hence proposed move by US would be seen as US taking sides against them.

(c) US and UK can only win Egyptian cooperation by a combination of adroit psychology and political and (less importantly) material inducements. Since proposal outlined in Deptel 2251 in effect would ask Egypt to concede in advance all the Western desiderata in return for a vague offer of economic and military aid it would simply have convinced the RCC that US and UK speak with one mouth and are not prepared to offer anything like the minimum political and material inducements required.

(d) The RCC has made it clear that extended delay or continued intransigence on part of UK would require them to withdraw their offer for base maintenance and availability as outlined before and during Secretary's visit and to stand on demand for literally unconditional evacuation. It is my estimate that an approach by me along the lines suggested would destroy the RCC's hopes for a settlement on terms acceptable to Egyptian Nationalist opinion and have the result predicted in my telegram 999 from Amman.

3. The Egyptians are allergic to any written commitment of any kind at this time. The objective would be to create the political conditions under which the RCC could and would enter into formal

[3] Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.

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commitments with the West. For the US to attempt to push them into written commitments at this juncture would drive the RCC rapidly to a neutralist position.

On the other hand, the officials point out that by agreeing to maintain the base they are effectively putting Egypt on the side of the West. They reiterate their offer to initiate joint staff planning with the US and UK and have said that many practical questions could be settled at that level with avoidance of publicity.

CAFFERY

No. 1177

641.74/6–153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, June 1, 1953—7 p. m.

2513. Further to my telegram 2512 I should like to add by way of general observation that the hour is far later for the West in the ME than would seem to be realized. The sentiment of the people in this area is more especially anti-Western and more prepared to be sympathetic to the enemies of the West than we like to believe. The officials of the RCC are Egyptian Nationalists of middle class background brought up during a generation of continuous anti-British agitation. They are closely attuned to, and themselves largely reflect, the attitudes of the Egyptian people. They are, at the same time sincerely anti-Communist and desirous of leading Egypt into a firm association with the West. Being honest men and realistic as regards their own internal capabilities, they have consistently rejected and will continue to reject proposals which do not take into sufficient account the complexes created by three-quarters of a century of British occupation.

We have an opportunity to do business with a group of men who will not easily give commitments because they believe in keeping their word. If we are going to do business with them, we shall have to take this into account and we shall have to move quickly. Admittedly such a course of action will involve a considerable gamble and a large measure of trust. Nothing breeds confidence like a display of confidence, however, and the vicious circle of Anglo-Egyptian recrimination and distrust must be broken. (Churchill's gratuitous pro-Zionist remarks, for example, unquestionably set back the prospects of any Arab-Israel settlement.)

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 810.

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It must also be borne in mind that if agreement is not reached with the present regime, the UK will have no alternative but to maintain its position by force. Although the Egyptians have not the capability of expelling the British, they can tie up 80,000 of the best British troops indefinitely and can make life difficult for any Britisher or even any Westerner in Egypt. If matters drag on as at present, no Egyptian leader will dare raise his voice in favor of cooperation with the West. The probable impact of such a development on the Western position in the other Arab states can be surmised.

In short, we are playing for big stakes in Egypt. By playing too cautious a game we are sure to lose. The problem is not only to convince the British of that but to help them find a graceful way out of the impasse.

CAFFERY

No. 1178

641.74/6-553: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 5, 1953—6 p. m.

6419. While appreciating aspects of situation in Egypt which prompted Cairo's thoughtful telegrams 2512 and 2513, I see no prospect that suggested procedure would be acceptable here. Whatever confidence we may have in RCC's good intentions, British do not share it to an extent which would lead them to concede unconditional evacuation, depending on an improvement in atmosphere to secure wider Western defense requirements. Nor are they likely to be impressed by argument that they are protected by phased evacuation, which they could halt if Egyptians proved intransigent. They are almost certain feel that such action would in circumstances place them in impossible moral and legal position.

In reviewing this problem, I feel I should reaffirm certain observations from this vantage point:

1. Psychologically, British are not adjusted under present circumstances to act on trust alone (Embtel 6261).
2. Practically, minimum program British likely find acceptable is that outlined Department telegram 7550. [2]

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 335.
[2] Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.

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3. From parliamentary and public opinion points of view, even this program would require some modification, perhaps along lines paragraph 3, Embassy telegram 6245.

4. From point of view of prudence, British would heartily concur with statement reiterated penultimate paragraph Department telegram 7639 [3] re assuring that as we proceed, "precision and details take place of vagueness and generality".

I realize that in situation such as that which at present confronts us in Egypt and Near East generally, certan risks are necessary. In this case, however, it seems to me that Western security stakes in canal base are so high that we must exert every possible effort to minimize such risks. Cairo's 2512 makes point that "Egyptians do not feel moral or ideological compulsion to insure Western security requirements, nor can they be bought by promises of financial assistance". Is it likely this situation will change in flushed and emotional atmosphere of ostensibly unconditional British evacuation? Will uncommitted RCC then be willing set about forcefully to lead public opinion to realization of Egypt's wider security responsibilities in sufficient time to permit conclusion effective Western arrangements for defense of area involving use of base?

I agree we should make every effort facilitate to extent possible RCC's public opinion problem, and secret assurances seem to me safest device which has thus far been developed for accomplishing this end.

ALDRICH

[3] Printed as telegram 2278 to Cairo, Document 1174.

No. 1179

641.74/6–1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 10, 1953—1:50 p. m.

7841. Please deliver following message from President to Churchill:

"From my discussions with Foster about the findings of his recent trip, I am particularly concerned about Egypt. While I will wish to talk to you personally about this matter in Bermuda, [2]

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2338 eyes only for Ambassador Caffery. (641.74/6–1053) Drafted by Byroade and approved by Secretary of State Dulles.

[2] Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower planned to meet in late June at Bermuda. The conference, however, was postponed due to illness of both the *Continued*

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there seems to be a real danger that the situation there will not hold that long without further action.

I was happy to hear that you agreed with Foster's statement of our position on May 12, 1953 at Cairo. [3] He reaffirmed that position in his radio report to the American public on June 1. [4] I fully concur in his views.

From Foster's personal observation and from all other reports which reach us, I have come to the conclusion that some step should be made soon to reconcile our minimum defense needs with the very strong nationalist sentiments of the Egyptian Government and people. It appears that it is not possible to conclude a settlement on the basis of Case A [5] in its entirety, despite its desirability from a military point of view. As we had agreed when it was thought we might negotiate side by side, there may have to be some concessions which will permit a quick start on withdrawal of UK troops and produce an adequate if not ideal arrangement for maintenance of the Base. Dept of State is sending to Amembassy London a formula which illustrates what we have in mind and which your staff can examine if you so desire. To assist further with this problem, if you desired and if it proved helpful with Egyptians, I would be prepared to assign US technicians to participate in the maintenance of the Base.

In addition to the question of maintenance there is, of course, the problem of assuring availability of the Base in time of need. Pending more formal arrangements, a private undertaking by Egypt that the Base would be made available in case of general war to the Arab States and to the Allies of Arab States might serve the purpose. You could invoke your treaties with Jordan and Iraq and we might also be able to utilize our special relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Eden. The conference was finally held in early December with the French also present. For documentation regarding the Bermuda Conference, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

[3] Presumably President Eisenhower was referring to Secretary of State Dulles' public statement which he made at Cairo on May 11. The key paragraph reads as follows:

"The defence and well-being of this important part of the world are inevitably of great concern to the United States Government. We came to the conclusion that there should be a solution consistent with full Egyptian sovereignty, with a phased withdrawal of foreign troops—all to be arranged however so that the important base in the canal area, with its depots of supplies and systems of technical supervison, should remain in good working order and be available for immediate use on behalf of the free world in the event of future hostilities." (Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 342)

[4] See Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1953, p. 831.

[5] See Document 1061.

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Also, on the conclusion of agreement on evacuation and the future maintenance of the Base, Naguib might publicly invite the United Kingdom and the United States to help develop the defense of Egypt, including training and equipping of the Egyptian forces. In response to this initiative, we could jointly negotiate the necessary formal defense requirements of the West, as well as assistance to Egypt. The results of these negotiations could be made public. Meanwhile, as I think you know, Foster, at your request, is presently deferring any arms aid to Egypt.

Once agreements of the nature described were reached with the Egyptians, we would be prepared to insist uncompromisingly on their being carried out in good faith. This determination could be made unequivocably clear to the Egyptians.

I am sorry to bother you with this before we can talk together at Bermuda but the possible danger from the situation to us all is so much on my mind that I intrude these ideas at this time in accordance with the spirit which has animated our full and frank exchanges of views."

DULLES

No. 1180

641.74/6–1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 10, 1953—7:03 p. m.

7865. Given below is amplification Department's thinking re message from President to Churchill contained Deptel 7841. Information is for use by Holmes (in Aldrich's absence) to extent he may feel advisable in explanations to British. (FYI. Regret not possible consult Aldrich re this series telegrams. End FYI)

General consideration behind message is that while basic US–UK objectives remain unchanged, attainment concurrently or immediately of five items included in "package proposals" [2] impossible. Political conditions Egypt necessitate adjustment to long-range effort, accepting calculated risks involved for immediate future. Emphasis to be placed on eliminating factors causing friction between Western powers and Egypt, and creation essential confidence. Although forcible measures would permit retention present position for period, such course would destroy remnants of good will in area

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2337. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 1082.

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toward West. Approach involves deferment efforts create regional defense organization.

Since both sides apparently awaiting US initiative before resuming talks, first step would be to urge UK and Egypt (after British approval of entire procedure obtained) to recommence talks on basis formula quoted following telegram. Use of formula, which is intended to constitute terms of reference for "Base Committee" only, should result in base arrangement substantially better than Case C. [3] Embassy should furnish Foreign Office copy now.

Department convinced Egyptians will prove adamant (para 4, London's 6245) in demanding instructions to technicians flow through Egyptian base commander.

Only committee which would be required at this stage in addition to Base Committee" would be "Evacuation Committee".

To minimize insofar as possible difficulties foreseen by Caffery (Amman's 999 and Cairo's 2512) timing of different moves would be altered from that specified Deptel 7550. [4] US would be willing approach Naguib in endeavor to obtain "private undertaking". In Department's view, this might take form of specific written secret commitment of such a nature as to provide basis for action upon its authority if necessary. Approach would take place after progress in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations has resulted in reestablishment measure of trust and confidence with the exact time dependent upon course negotiations. US ability obtain commitment would depend largely on success British efforts to create propitious atmosphere.

Suggestion para 3 London's 6245 incorporated in effort to ease Churchill's public relations problem. During negotiation of formal defense requirements, air defense of Egypt and military and economic aid items of original "package proposals" could be considered. This step, even though presented to Egyptian public as taken on Naguib's initiative, would require considerable political courage on his part. As in case secret commitment, willingness Naguib to undertake move and his success in carrrying Egyptian public with him will depend mainly on manner in which negotiations conducted by British. Conceivably Naguib might wish to broaden his invitation to include other states. While US would welcome such decision, question should be left to Naguib's judgment and no effort made by US or UK to force him into multilateral defense arrangements at this time.

DULLES

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[3] See Document 1061.

[4] Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.

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No. 1181

641.74/6-1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 10, 1953—7:03 p. m.

7866. Formula referred to Deptel 7841 follows:

Verbatim text. In order to clarify certain points of misunderstanding that have arisen in recent discussions between Egypt and the United Kingdom the following memorandum of understanding is hereby agreed and constitutes the terms of reference for the "Base Committee":

To draw up plans for the transfer of the present military base in the Canal Zone to Egyptian control and for keeping it in working order and use so that it may strengthen the area by continuing to supply forces outside Egypt and be available for immediate use in the event of hostilities endangering peace and security of area.

Recommendations will be made regarding the installations and the equipment within the base area and the equipment in the base under the following considerations:

(a) That the Egyptian Government in exercise of its sovereignty over base will undertake by the agreement to insure the security of British property therein.

(b) That the present level of depot stocks may be maintained but not increased except by consent of the Egyptian Government.

(c) That the British experts needed shall be limited to the absolute minimum numbers required for the efficient operation of the installation and the maintenance and current withdrawals and additions of British equipment left in the base.

(d) That arrangements will be proposed for the training of Egyptian personnel to replace British personnel utilized for the above purposes within a minimum period to be agreed upon between the two delegations. At the end of this period British personnel will no longer be stationed within the base area except as may be agreed to at that time by Egyptian Government. It is understood that at the end of the above time period British inspectors may be attached to the staff of the UK Ambassador to Egypt and will be allowed to inspect Egyptian maintenance of British-owned supplies in the base and examine the measures taken by the Egyptian base commander to carry out British directions regarding the maintenance and disposition of such supplies, equipment and facilities.

(e) It is understood that channels from London effecting the above matters will be to the United Kingdom Military Attaché attached to the United Kingdom Embassy in Egypt. These instructions will be forwarded to the Egyptian base commander through

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2339 Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade after being cleared in draft by the Secretary of State.

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such channels as the Egyptian Government may prescribe, it being realized that efficiency and speed of communication is of the utmost importance in matters of this nature.

(f) That any arrangements proposed above shall not be inconsistent with Egyptian sovereignty nor with British ownership and use of the property concerned.

(g) That the Egyptian Government is conscious of the responsibility placed upon it as custodian of the base area, the purpose of which is to deter aggression against Middle East, as a whole, to supply forces beyond Egypt's borders and to increase the defenses of Egypt itself including the Suez Canal waterway. The Egyptian Government recognizes and has no intention of interference with the right of the British Government to direct the shipment of its equipment and supplies in the base to areas and forces outside Egypt.

(h) That the Committee will not concern itself with the duration in time of the arrangements which it proposes. This will be determined by the two delegations. *End verbatim text.*

DULLES

No. 1182

641.74/6-1153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 11, 1953—4:28 p. m.

2346. Egyptian Ambassador orally informed Department June 10 his Government, after long deliberations Cairo, has taken decisions listed below. Action is result questions informally put to Ambassador previously by Department.

1. Assure US RCC will maintain quiet at least until after Bermuda conference. This done in awareness importance allowing US exert its influence for Canal Zone settlement under best possible conditions.

2. Give unqualified guarantee to British re shipment British supplies from Suez Base anywhere, anytime at British discretion. Form of guarantee would pose no problem to Egyptians.

3. Undertake in writing that Base will be available to "Egypt's Allies and to Allies of Egypt's Allies in case of land attack on frontiers of any Arab nation." Although not specific, Ambassador gave impression Egypt would prefer open agreement.

4. Once agreement reached on Base, to invite publicly US and UK military and economic technicians to discuss informally military and economic plans with Egyptian Government. Ambassador added "politicians" would be excluded.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 7879. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

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Department considers above represents considerable advance by Egypt towards resolving Canal Zone problem. Large area agreement now appears exist between Egyptian position and US suggestions to UK. Accordingly US in stronger position to urge favorable British consideration US proposals. Egyptian decisions should in no way be made known to British at present.

Broader agreement on availability of Base still required. Embassy Cairo requested stress on appropriate occasions US conviction any general war will embrace Middle East regardless where starts. From military viewpoint essential use all facilities from beginning instead of leaving initiative to aggressor and delaying protective measures (full reactivation of Base) until area actually attacked. Officers of RCC should understand military logic this argument.[2]

DULLES

[2] Ambassador Caffery in telegram 2562, June 12, not printed, indicated his agreement with the contents of this final paragraph of Department telegram 2346 and added that the Embassy would continue to stress this view in the future. (641.74/6–1253)

No. 1183

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

SECRET LONDON, June 15, 1953.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I look forward to a good talk about Egypt when we meet in Bermuda. Meanwhile, I think I must send you at once my first reactions to the new formula suggested in the message which I have just had from you. [1]

In the hope of reaching agreement with you and your predecessor we went over all this ground before and agreed to make a number of concessions to the Egyptian point of view. Our object in these discussions was not to obtain military or financial aid from the United States, but only their moral support in what we hoped would be a joint approach to the Egyptian dictatorship. However, you decided to defer to Egyptian objections to your representatives, including General Hull, taking part in the discussions. Since then we have been disappointed not to receive more support particularly in Cairo from your Government in spite of the numerous far-reaching concessions which we made in our joint discussions with you.

[1] Transmitted in telegram 7841 to London, Document 1179.

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We went forward alone, having made clear to you that we did not seek United States mediation or arbitration. The Egyptian dictatorship presently "washed their hands" of the discussions, timing it no doubt to fit in with Mr. Foster Dulles' visit. We are quite ready to resume the talks if they should intimate a wish to do so. This could be no humiliation to them as the meeting place is under their roof. Nothing however has happened: the campaign of threats and abuse of the most violent character to which we have been for many months subjected has not been followed up by any action except a few murders. Latterly there has been a decline in the campaign of threats and abuse, and this no doubt is due to the fact that the Egyptian people have lost faith in its sincerity and considered it all bluff for political purposes, or are hoping for some help from the United States. We propose to await developments with patience and composure. If a futher approach is made to us to resume discussions, we shall comply without, however, any change in principle in the terms on which we had decided and to which we understood you had in the main agreed. I should have no objection to your advising the Egyptians to resume the talks, provided of course they were not led to believe that you were whittling us down or prepared to intervene in a matter in which the whole burden, not nineteen-twentieths but repeat the whole burden, falls on us, and about which I thought we were agreed. After all there are other bases conceded for mutual security in other countries not even established by formal Treaty, for instance yours in the United Kingdom.

If at the present time the United States indicated divergence from us in spite of the measure of agreement we had reached after making so many concessions, we should not think we had been treated fairly by our great ally, with whom we are working in so many parts of the globe for the causes which we both espouse. If as the result of American encouragement at this juncture or a promise or delivery or arms, Dictator Naguib is emboldened to translate his threats into action, bloodshed on a scale difficult to measure beforehand might well result, and for this we should feel no responsibility, having acted throughout in a sincere spirit for the defence not of British but of inter-allied interests of a high order.

As I have said I look forward to talking these matters over with you in Bermuda. Meanwhile, I watch the progress of events with the closest attention.

I asked General Robertson, who with our Ambassador has been conducting the negotiation and is now in London, for his opinion. I

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send it* to you although it was not drafted for your eye, and I wrote my own message before seeing it.

Kindest regards,

WINSTON

* See Annex. [Footnote in the source text; annex not printed here.]

No. 1184

641.74/6–1753: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, June 17, 1953—noon.

6606. Eyes only Secretary. At meeting with Churchill yesterday I told him I felt President was concerned over tone of Churchill's message to President concerning Egypt.[1] Churchill obviously regretful and said that he would "soften that up". I did not understand this to mean that he intended to alter his position but simply to express himself less belligerently in future. He urged very strongly the necessity of not disclosing in any manner to Egyptians the development of new formula referred to in Deptel 7866, June 10. With this I am sure we all agree.

ALDRICH

[1] Ambassador Aldrich was in Washington when President Eisenhower received Prime Minister Churchill's letter of June 15.

No. 1185

641.74/6–1753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953—2:08 p. m.

2369. Eyes only Ambassador. FYI. Churchill has sent long negative reply to President's message of June 10, sent Cairo as 2338.[2] Attached to his reply was memorandum written by Robertson[3] giving Robertson's views on President's message and Secretary's formula contained in Deptel 2339.[4]

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 7991.
[2] Printed as telegram 7841 to London, Document 1179.
[3] Not printed.
[4] Printed as telegram 7866 to London, Document 1181.

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From our point of view only constructive note was that Churchill would not object to US advising Egyptians to resume talks. Robertson's memorandum put forward thesis that Secretary's formula very little better than what Egyptians had already offered and very little better than Case C. Memorandum stated Robertson had already given Churchill his views as to why he considered British should reject Case B [5] and therefore formula "unacceptable." Memorandum contained, however, following statement: "I may be too optimistic, but I believe that we could get an agreement which retains the essentials of Case A provided that resumption of discussions is not too long delayed, and that you can accept certain concessions of form to pander to Egyptian conceit."

I consider it most important that specifics contained Deptels 2337, 2338 and 2339 to Cairo, [6] as well as Churchill's message described herein, remain unknown to Egyptians at this time. President's reply to Churchill and further instructions to London will be sent shortly. Pending their receipt, matter should not be discussed further with British.

DULLES

[5] Regarding "Cases C and B", see Document 1061.
[6] Printed as telegrams 7865, 7841, and 7866 to London, Documents 1180, 1179 and 1181, respectively.

No. 1186

611.74/6-1753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953—6:31 p. m.

8010. For the Ambassador. In connection with the President's reply [1] to Churchill's June 15 message and instructions on Egypt being cabled to you [2] Department is airpouching (1) Churchill's message (2) General Robertson's memo which was appended [3] (3) Under Secretary's memo of March 10 [3] setting out his understanding of US–UK agreement on negotiating flexibility between Cases A and B.[4] This agreement is referred to in today's instructions. If Items (1) and (2) above not available through Foreign Office and required urgently, they will be cabled on request.

[1] Transmitted in telegram 8011, *infra*.
[2] See telegram 8013 to London, Document 1188.
[3] Not printed.
[4] See Document 1061.

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Re Item (3): During March talks Eden received a very strong telegram from Churchill objecting to any compromise with Case A. This discussed at length between Under Secretary and Eden and Churchill finally assented. Following is substantive portion of Item (3):

"We had rather long talk during which I pointed out that British apprehension with regard to second alternative (B) was largely matter of interpretation of most desirable result; i.e. base in continuous operation immediately available on D-Day, and less desirable but acceptable alternative of base which could be put in effective operation within 60 days. I left quite certain British would agree to this since I was sure views expressed in Prime Minister's cable were his alone and not as he indicated those of Slim and Alexander. Monday morning, a few minutes before our meeting with the President, the Prime Minister agreed to this arrangement which was accepted by the President as a negotiable basis. The President indicated that our military representatives should arrange to ensure 'proper technical supervision and inspection' of communications and other heavy installations at the base."

DULLES

No. 1187

641.74/6-1753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953—6:31 p. m.

8011. Message from President to Churchill mentioned immediately preceding telegram follows:

Verbatim text.

"Dear Winston: Thank you very much for your prompt response to my recent message on Egypt. There are certain passages in your reply which I fail to understand, but I believe it more profitable to leave these for the personal talks we anticipate in Bermuda.

"I was interested to note that Robertson feels that agreement might be reached which would retain the essentials of Case A, [2] providing there is reasonably prompt resumption of deiscussions and that some adjustments are made to meet Egyptian sensibilities.

"As you know, I personally believe that the best interests of all of us will be served if friendly discussions are promptly resumed in Cairo. Obviously, however, it would be worse than futile to resume those talks unless you and I are absolutely clear as to the mini-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2371. Drafted by Burdett and approved by the Secretary of State.

[2] See Document 1061.

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mum objectives we hope to attain, and have some reason to believe that these would not be rejected out of hand by the Egyptians. Perhaps our March agreement on the type of base arrangement to be sought, which you mention, would serve the purpose. If my memory serves me correctly, the negotiators were to have flexibility between arrangements which would insure a working Base in peace which would be immediately operable in event of war, and one which would require 60 days for reactivation.

"Won't you please dismiss any thought of us, here, seeming to desert any agreed position or exhibiting weakness. Foster's statements [3] in Cairo and his notification to the Egyptians that they cannot get arms as long as you and they are disagreed should reassure you on this.

"With warm personal regard, Ike."

DULLES

[3] See footnote 3, Document 1179.

No. 1188

641.74/6-1753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 17, 1953—7:28 p. m.

8013. From the Secretary to the Ambassador. Recently President sent Prime Minister message concerning situation in Egypt, and received reply, copy of which you saw in Washington. President believes conversations with Prime Minister will be more effective than continuation of cabled correspondence and following is given to you as background to assist in reaching understandings.

President is sending to you as Deptel 8011 reply for Prime Minister, and it is expected that you will carry on conversations in amplification of that message, and keep us informed as to results.

We believe best interests of all will be served if British-Egyptian discussions are promptly resumed in Cairo. Clearly Prime Minister does not feel as strongly on this point as we do. This difference probably arises from fact our official reports regarding Egyptian attitudes do not agree with London estimate of situation. Whereas Prime Minister apparently believes Egyptians are weakening, we consider they are merely marking time to see whether there is any hope of resuming negotiations before they attempt guerrilla campaign.

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2372. Drafted by Burdett and approved by the Secretary of State.

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Prime Minister's latest message to President remarked that he had no objection to our advising Egyptians to take initiative in resuming discussions. While we believe these discussions should be resumed, and are willing to be helpful in making them possible, we feel that it would be futile to do so if British stand firmly on Case A [2] with only "certain concessions of form". Assurance that British negotiators would be accorded flexibility mentioned below would give us a reason to make appropriate proposals to Egyptians even though we would seek to avoid giving to Egyptians any impression that British position had changed.

Prime Minister's message frequently refers to "Agreement" between his Government and ours. As stated Deptel 5989, Mar 9, [3] purpose of agreement is "to divert attention from technical points listed under alternatives in London papers and to focus attention upon implication of various cases as described in that paper. In brief, implications of Case A as listed in paper would be that working base would be immediately operable in event of war and in Case B [2] it would take sixty days to reach same operating conditions". Although we continue regard Case A as optimum objective, recent Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and reports from Cairo indicate Case A completely unacceptable to Egyptians. In accordance with agreement we should therefore fall back towards Case B striving for any improvements which might be obtainable. As stated in Deptel 5989 negotiations might usefully concentrate on obtaining base maintenance arrangements which would permit reactiviation in shortest possbile time (maximum 60 days), instead of adhering strictly to technical arrangements listed under various cases in London papers. Department was informed by Eden Mar 9 of Prime Minister's agreement to procedure described above. If this is agreement to which Prime Minister now refers in his message to President, and if his negotiators have even limited degree of flexibility indicated above, then we would gladly urge Egyptians to resume talks.

We note in Sir Brian's memorandum apparent misunderstanding of President's message. "Private undertaking" by Egypt on availability of Base, which President mentioned in paragraph 4 of his message, was to serve as interim guarantee pending conclusion of formal agreements which would be made public. These formal agreements would be concluded as result of discussions which he visualized in his paragraph 5 and which would be held as soon as feasible. We felt that agreement with Egypt alone was more practi-

[2] See Document 1061.
[3] Printed as telegram 1785 to Cairo, Document 1117.

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cable than broader agreement on M.E.D.O., which we think we cannot obtain in near future. We agree with Sir Brian on disadvantages of private undertaking of any duration.

DULLES

No. 1189

Editorial Note

Representatives of the United States and Egyptian Governments signed and thereby brought into force two Technical Cooperation Agreements on June 18, 1953. One of them was designed to create an education program and the other was to establish a public health program. For the texts, see TIAS No. 2841, printed in 4 UST (pt. 2) 1733 and TIAS No. 2852, printed in 4 UST (pt. 2) 1928.

No. 1190

641.74/6-1953: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 19, 1953—2 p. m.

6665. Eyes only Secretary. Re Deptel 8010. Churchill's message and General Robertson's memo given us by Churchill yesterday. Saw Churchill this morning and delivered President's message Deptel 8011. Churchill stated he wished to reply personally to President's message and would draft reply this afternoon and furnish me with copy. [1] Presumably reply will be received Washington tomorrow.

I reminded him of and explained in detail limits of flexibility provided in March agreement re base arrangement referred to in third paragraph President's message. In reply, he said that British were still trying to obtain basis of case A, [2] and that Robertson felt this goal obtainable. I asked him on what Robertson's optimism was based and he said he was not familiar with details. I said our

[1] The Prime Minister wrote his reply that day, saying with regard to Egypt that: "I look forward to a good talk with you about the problem at Bermuda. Thank you especially for your final paragraph. I did not mean to suggest anything to the contrary in my cable, as I have absolute confidence in American goodwill and fair play." (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower, February 1953 thru March 1955")

[2] See Document 1061.

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reports indicated that Egyptians were not prepared to agree to case A. I pointed out that President had always been ready to proceed on basis agreement reached in Washington and called his attention specifically to last paragraph of President's message in Deptel 8011. I also said it was perfectly clear from messages received from Caffery that no indication had been given Egyptians of any hope of change of position by British. I said that if there was necessry flexibility in British position, US would urge on Egyptians reopening of negotiations. His reply was that British were still hoping to obtain case A and that they were not asking us to suggest to Egyptians they reopen negotiations although they would have no objections to our doing so. I found it difficult to get Churchill to concentrate on details of Egypt problem, I believe because of the fact that he expects to discuss the Egypt situation fully with the President when they meet. [3]

ALDRICH

[3] Secretary Dulles sent a copy of this telegram to the President on June 20. In his covering memorandum, the Secretary said since Ambassador Aldrich had made no progress with the Prime Minister, he did "not think we are warranted in asking the Egyptians to reopen the discussions". (641.74/6–2053)

No. 1191

774.00/6–1953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, June 19, 1953—4 p. m.

2603. Following preliminary Embassy comments re proclamation Republic (Embtel 2595): [2]

1. Plan carried into effect by last night's decision was worked out by RCC a month ago but shelved because of press leaks (Embdes 2535, May 23). [3] In intervening period RCC had cooled toward idea and was exploring possibility of increased civilian participation in government. This led to friction between RCC and Naguib, who had heart set on presidency.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 834 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Ankara, Tripoli, and the Arab capitals.

[2] Not printed; Ambassador Caffery reported in this cable on June 18 that the military leadership was announcing that Egypt was being established as a republic with Naguib as President and Premier; with Nasser as Vice Premier and Minister of the Interior; with Salah Salem as Minister of National Guidance and Minister of State for Sudan Affairs; with Bagdadi as Minister of War and Marine; and with Major General Hakim Amer as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. (774.00/6–1853)

[3] Not printed.

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2. Yesterday's action fulfilled Naguib's ambition but placed actual control even more firmly in hands of Nasir and his RCC colleagues. Naguib has been separated from direct contact with army and moved upstairs. Nasir himself besides being Deputy Prime Minister has strategic post of Interior. Hakim Amir, Nasir's most trusted lieutenant, [is] Major General in command armed forces. Salah Salim, besides retaining his interest in Sudan is Minister of National Guidance, another influential post. Baghdadi, fourth member of Egyptian team in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, becomes Minister of War and Marines.

3. Amir's elevation to post of Commander-in-Chief is most spectacular move and will be closely watched for possible adverse repercussions within armed forces. Amir had, however, actually been fulfilling functions of post and is popular with army officers. Nasir says furthermore, he had carefully sounded army opinion on move and accepted. His judgment may be borne out by fact that Amir was greeted this morning on arrival at general headquarters by generals who carried him on their shoulders amid cheers and congratulations.

4. It seems certain that monarchs of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq will not welcome change. This could affect degree of support of these countries for Egypt in Anglo-Egyptian dispute both inside and outside Arab League.

5. Move will be generally popular wth Egyptian masses. Wealthier landowners who have already been disturbed by drift towards military dictatorship will see in this step confirmation of their fears of RCC.

For my part, I think that timing was bad and decision taken somewhat capriciously. On the other hand, I doubt this step will affect fundamentally the Government's internal and external objectives. In Egypt it means little more than a reshuffle of jobs. If the RCC leaders keep their heads, change could help them in dealing effectively with their enormous administrative problems unresolved by previous all-civilian Cabinet. On other hand, officers will have firmer grip on internal situation but will bear full public responsibility for actions of government which in past they could at least partially lay at doors of others. A secondary contributing factor to yesterday's change, is fact that there has been recently increasing friction between some of civilian Cabinet ministers and RCC members. A more forceful set of ministers might have secured redress for their grievances but this group, when matters really came to a head last night, apparently ran for cover. In other words the RCC cut this Gordian knot by openly assuming control.

CAFFERY

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No. 1192

774.00/6-2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, June 22, 1953—3 p. m.

2618. As indicated in my telegram 2603, Egypt's new governmental set-up is more accurate and candid reflection of actual power position in the country. Naguib, who is popular idol and the symbol, worldwide, of new Egypt has enhanced prestige and popularity as head of state—a role to which he is eminently suited.

On the other hand, Nasir, who has always been brains and sparkplug of movement, will as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior have increased formal facilities for coordination of national policy and control of public administration. Nasir's assumption of Interior portfolio is reassuring from security viewpoint. In conversation with Embassy officer on Saturday he expressed full realization of importance of protecting foreign residents under any and all circumstances. (In this connection a well-informed Egyptian journalist recently remarked that Muslim Brotherhood would long since have caused trouble in zone if it had not been for Nasir's personal control of situation.)

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 840 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Ankara, Tripoli, and the Arab capitals.

No. 1193

774.56/6-2953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

SECRET CAIRO, June 29, 1953—3 p. m.

2651. Abd Al Nasir and Hakim Amir on Saturday said Egyptian Government now desires complete interim arms purchase (Deptel 2138, May 5 and previous). When Embassy Officer pointed out that Secretary had taken position with Naguib that "US cannot equip Egyptians to fight British" (Cairo telegram 2417, May 12, paragraph 14) Nasir and Amir registered great disappointment and said Prime Minister had not mentioned Secretary's statement to them. (Naguib was probably not conversant with details of interim arms program and may have failed grasp full import of Secretary's remark.)

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In ensuing discussion Embassy Officer reviewed background of Secretary's position (breaking-off of negotiations, mounting of tension, British concern, et cetera).

Egyptians replied they are not asking for small arms of which they have "plenty" but are interested in tanks and armored cars and ancillary equipment. They said "we are ready to give full assurance that any arms received from you will never be used against the British. In any case we are not fools enough to try to use tanks and armored cars against the British".

Nasir said frankly their current interest is in some showy items to boost army morale and strengthen Amir's position as newly appointed Commander in Chief. He pointed out that if US position remains unchanged he will have no alternative but to explain to army officers that US and other western countries are withholding arms under pressure from British.

Nasir added this was last thing he wished do as he is anxious build pro-American sentiment in army in preparation for future cooperation. For this reason he particularly desired that first arms should come from US. He reiterated his interest in proposed US tour for staff college graduates as another means of working in desired direction (Embdesp 2355, June 23 and letter to Hart of June 26). [1]

In view of (1) GOE's demonstrated good faith and ability to maintain calm in response to Secretary's request; (2) Churchill's negative reaction to President's message; and (3) indefinite postponement of Bermuda conference, [2] I make recommendation that US now reconsider decision to withhold major items on interim arms list (which as Department will recall has been under intermittent discussion for more than six months).

Prompt action on Egyptian request at this juncture would have highly desirable effect of (a) strengthening regime internally in most vital area (Army), (b) encouraging pro-American and thus pro-western orientation of Egypt and (c) avoiding disillusionment at moment when lingering hope of American intervention is virtually only factor forestalling an even more adamant Egyptian stand on issue of British evacuation of Suez base (see my next following telegram).

CAFFERY

[1] Neither printed.
[2] See footnote 2, Document 1179.

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No. 1194

641.74/6–2953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, June 29, 1953—4 p. m.

2652. In course of lengthy conversation Saturday night between Embassy official and Abd al Nasir, Saah Salim and Hakim Amir question arose of effect of postponement of Bermuda conference on Anglo-Egyptian question. [2] Embassy official made point that US-UK discussion of question would probably be delayed by development and expressed hope that Egyptians would continue show admirable restraint and control which has prevailed since Secretary's visit.

Egyptians replied that although they must continue preparation for any eventuality they will do everything possible keep things quiet until US Government has had time take matter up with British.

Nasir said that position vis-à-vis Britain on Suez issue has not changed but remarked that if after US–UK discussions British attitude remained unchanged situation would enter new phase. In response to request for elucidation of this statement Nasir divulged that plan in event of British failure accept Egyptian offer on base maintenance is to withdraw that offer and publicly take position that no British installations of any kind can be retained in Egypt and no assurance of future availability of base can be given.

Department will note that British view that policy of "firmness" is responsible for present period of calm and that Egyptians will eventually "come around" appears be dangerously at variance with above statements.

I emphasize that an important reason why the RCC have promised us to keep things quiet until our government has had time take up matter with British is that they have confidence in us.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 852 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Unger, to Ankara, to the Arab capitals, and to Frankfurt for Satterthwaite.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 1179.

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No. 1195

774.56/6-2953: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 2, 1953—11:05 a. m.

5. Despite force arguments (Embtel 2651) we believe reopening question supply arms to Egypt inadvisable this juncture. President's message to Churchill (Deptel 2371) reaffirmed our assurances to British [2] we would not furnish arms until status Anglo-Egyptian problem clarified. As stated Deptel 2440 [3] we plan discuss Suez Base issue with Salisbury, thus preventing indefinite delay. Any change in our position on arms would prejudice prospects obtaining modification British stand on Base issue.

We giving urgent consideration (Embtel 2656) [4] possibility visit fifty-five Egyptian officers US military installations. Difficulties posed by shortage of time and heavy expense involved. [5]

SMITH

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 35.

[2] Printed as telegram 8011 to London, Document 1187.

[3] The Department in telegram 2440 to Cairo, June 30, not printed, informed Ambassador Caffery that since the Bermuda Conference had been postponed, the alternate plan was for Lord Salisbury to participate in talks at the Foreign Minister level in Washington, beginning about July 10. This event would allow an opportunity to discuss Egypt with the British, and the Department planned to proceed on the same basis as planned for Bermuda. (396.1 WA/6-3053)

[4] Not printed.

[5] The Department in telegram 57 to Cairo, July 14, not printed, told Caffery that owing to lack of funds, the Department was unable to arrange the transportation to the United States or a tour of American military installations for 55 Egyptian officers. (711.55374/7-1453)

No. 1196

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL LONDON, July 3, 1953.

(MY DEAR IKE) . . . . [1] I am sure you and Foster will like Salisbury. He holds all my views on Egypt and the Sudan very strongly and I think his idea of bringing General Robertson with him next

[1] According to an attached memorandum from the White House addressed to Under Secretary Smith, not printed, the copy of the Prime Minister's letter transmitted to the Department of State lacked the first paragraph because it was addressed eyes only to the President.

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week is a very good one. [2] I still hope that he and Hull and our two Ambassadors may jointly meet the Egyptian Dictator and that agreement may be reached on the general basis of Case A. [3] If we could say that you are satisified with the arrangements for the security of the Base and with the discharge of our international duty, it would make a solution easier and better looking. I wish I could have talked to you about all this and could convince you that we are only doing our duty. However I have great confidence that Salisbury, whom I have known for so many years and admired ever since he resigned from Chamberlain's Government with Anthony Eden, will put our case to you in firm but agreeable terms.

[Here follows discussion of the possibility of holding a Four-Power meeting later in the year; thoughts about Senator Alexander Wiley's remarks about the Soviets; and announcements that he, the Prime Minister, was sending some papers regarding the Duke of Windsor and several chapters of the last volume of his wartime memoirs.]

Your sincere friend,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

[2] See footnote 3, *supra*. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France met in Washington, July 10–14, 1953, at which time the U.S. and U.K. Foreign Ministers discussed the situation in Egypt. For specific documentation presented in this volume regarding Egypt and the Washington Conference, see telegram 203 to London, Document 1203, telegram 252 to London, Document 1204, and telegram 66 to Cairo, Document 1205. For documentation regarding the conference as a whole, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

[3] See Document 1061.

No. 1197

641.74/7-453: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 4, 1953—1:47 p. m.

17. Noforn. In continuing effort devise means secure early resumption Anglo-Egyptian discussions re Suez Base on basis offering chance of agreement and to prepare for Foreign Minister talks, formula given below in abbreviated form developed at working level. Formula endeavors establish framework for each of main points of disagreement apparent from Anglo-Egyptian discussions within which parties would seek reach understanding. Embassy comments requested soonest.

[1] Also sent priority to London as telegram 99.

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I. Technical Management of Base

Egyptian Base Commander.

British officer on staff as Technical Adviser and as officer in charge British technicians.

Messages from British War Office sent to Base communications center from where action copies routed Technical Adviser and information copies Base Commander.

Disagreements between Technical Adviser and Base Commander over action taken by Technical Adviser on messages from War Office settled by diplomatic means or other established procedure.

II. Movement Matériel from Base

UK accorded full right move British matériel in or out of Base any time anywhere at its discretion. No major increase in level supplies without Egyptian consent.

III. Number Technicians

Limited absolute minimum required for efficient operation installations.

Original number reduced progressively in accordance fixed schedule as Egyptian personnel trained replace British.

Within X years all British except top echelon supervisors replaced by Egyptians.

Specific numbers determined by committee experts.

IV. Duration Agreement

Need for arrangements created depend upon world conditions outside control either party.

Review agreement in X years to determine whether continued, altered or abrogated. If parties unable agree, it continues with following exception:

If parties disagree re retention supervisors referred to Number III Para 3 they shall be withdrawn. In such case British inspectors attached to staff British Embassy with right inspect Egyptian maintenance British-owned matériel at Base.

V. Future Availability Base

(We discussing acceptable language with Defense.)

VI. Military and Economic Consultations

On conclusion agreement re Base Egypt to invite US, UK, and if she desires other, military and economic experts to discuss defense plans and economic problems including measures strengthen Egypt militarily and economically.

SMITH

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No. 1198

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill"

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET AND PERSONAL WASHINGTON, July 6, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON: While I have met Lord Salisbury only once or twice—and then very briefly—I am quite sure that I shall come to share your high opinon of him. Everything I have ever heard about him leads me to such a conclusion. Foster knows him and has the highest regard for him.

In the Egyptian affair we, of course, always have wanted to obtain a solution that would conform as nearly as possible to Case A. [1] However, we have recognized the probability that some concessions would have to be made to Egyptian pride and spirit of nationalism. And so, in our thinking we established Case B [1] as representative of a minimum position, and have hoped for an agreement that would be somewhere in between these two cases—as near, of course, to Case A as possible.

We shall certainly be ready to talk to Lord Salisbury about the matter. In laying out a program looking toward a settlement, we earnestly believe it would be a grave error to ignore the intensity of Egyptian popular feeling. Dictators can never afford to cease striving for popularity; I think that the methods by which they normally come to power inspire them with a feeling of great personal insecurity. In Egypt, if Naguib thought that the population wanted him to be conservative and reasonable, we would have no trouble whatsoever. As it is, I think he feels he is sitting on a lid that covers a seething desire to throw out every foreigner in the country. In other words, he believes that any formula found for the solution of this problem must have appealing features for the Egyptian population—otherwise he will find himself happy indeed to join another Egyptian exile, now in Italy.

It is possible that whatever difference there may be in our respective approaches to this whole Egyptian affair springs out of our differing estimates of the flexibility that Naguib feels is available to him in negotiation. We believe that he is very definitely a prisoner of local circumstances of which the most important is Egyptian nationalism, and consequently he will act and react in accordance with them.

[Here follows discussion of the possibility of holding a Four-Power meeting later in the year; the prospects of the French Par-

[1] See Document 1061.

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liament ratifying EDC and the repercussions in the United States if the French refused; the President's comments on Senator Wiley's remarks regarding the Soviet Union; and statement of his hopes that the Windsor papers would be taken care of in an equitable fashion.]

As ever,

IKE

No. 1199

641.74/7-753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 7, 1953—7:34 p. m.

24. Limit distribution. For Caffery from the Secretary. Our bilateral talks with Salisbury on Egypt begin July 11. [2] General climate surrounding these talks is not one which leaves me hopeful.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Salisbury will present Churchill's stand on this problem. It appears that he and Robertson will advance their adherence to Case A [3] as a duty which Britain owes Western world. It is probable that Robertson, as indicated by a recent memo he sent Churchill, [4] will state his belief that Case A can be obtained with some slight modifications in form. We will thus not only be faced with Churchill argument but with an estimate that their position can in fact be obtained. When we refute British position that Case A cannot in fact be obtained we shall probably conclude with different estimates of situation and thus end in impasse.

On other hand Egyptians are sitting back waiting for US to produce a miracle. They broke off discussions in Cairo and have since that date had no suggestions of their own. A review of British minutes Cairo talks indicates Egyptians were most unreasonable on several points. In my conversations in Cairo and in informal contacts since that time their position has seemed more reasonable but hardly in form that we can use to advantage with British.

In light above it is difficult see how matters can be greatly advanced in Washington talks. If we strive for agreement with British on a specific formula we run risk that agreement would be pos-

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[1] Drafted and approved by Byroade after being cleared in draft with the Secretary of State.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 1196.

[3] See Document 1061.

[4] Not printed.

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sible only on formula which Egyptians would not accept and that we would be locked with British henceforth on that position. If on other hand we choose general discussions we shall probably get into discussion of Case A versus Case B etc. It seems to us that continuation of classification of Cases A, B or C is in itself unproductive. [5] The implications of Cases A, B and C as given in London papers was that Base could be made available for full wartime use either immediately, or in 60 or 90 days respectively. This mechanical formula becomes unrealistic in that it ignores the degree of Egyptian cooperation that might be expected. Case A for instance might never produce a workable Base in wartime if there were a total lack of Egyptian cooperation. Case C might even give a Base fully usable prior to 60 days with full Egyptian cooperation. We therefore conclude it better address ourselves to main points disagreement between UK and Egypt and ignore as much as possible use of these arbitrary classifications.

I hope Egyptians realize extent of desire of President and myself to see their problem solved with British. I also hope they realize difficulties of US producing an agreement in above situation. I fear if some new element is not added that I shall have little chance of obtaining agreement here next week that can solve their problem. It occurs to me that such an element might be provided by a specific proposal from Naguib prior to my talks with British. If Naguib were to send message to me just prior to our talks we would have something on which to work. Message should not be made public. Such a proposal should cover key points disagreement, i.e. number and duration of technicians, channels to technicians, and availability of Base. Formula transmitted Deptel 17 to Cairo might be of use to them in forming their proposals. I personally feel that any agreement should avoid possibility future disagreements and I would suggest that Egyptians agree to arbitrary number British technicians for a fixed period of years. As a suggestion, agreement might last 5 years and number technicians be limited to 4,000. As regards availability Base, I would be willing try obtain acceptance formula which I think is close to their position, i.e. that Base should be available to Egypt's allies and allies of Egypt's allies in event of attack or threat of attack upon any Arab State.

Use your own judgment in approaching Egyptians on this message. If you feel they can be induced to provide a formula upon which US can agree, I believe it would aid us greatly in discussions here. If on other hand you believe Egyptians would misunderstand our motives or your approach I should not wish you discuss matter with them.

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[5] See Document 1061.

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This message not being rptd London.

DULLES

No. 1200

641.74/7-1053: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, July 10, 1953--11 a. m.

35. For the Secretary. The following is verbatim text of Egyptian proposal for Base Agreement. Proposal must be considered in context covering message from Naguib to President which will follow shortly.

Begin Verbatim.

Egypt and the United Kingdom hereby accept the following understandings with respect to certain of the points pertaining to their discussions:

I. Technical Management Over the Base

a. An Egyptian officer shall assume command over the Base.

b. A British officer (footnote: Technical Adviser and technicians shall be in civilian clothes) shall be appointed to the staff of the Egyptian Base Commander as Technical Adviser. He shall be responsible to the Base Commander for the training of Egyptian personnel in the functions performed by the British technicians remaining in the Base. He shall also be in charge of British technicians.

c. Messages from the British War Office pertaining to technical matters shall be sent directly to the Base Communications Center.

d. The Communications Center shall route action copies of such messages to the Technical Adviser and information copies to the Base Commander.

e. Disagreements between the Base Commander and the Technical Adviser over action that is taken by the Technical Adviser on messages from the British War Office shall be referred for settlement to diplomatic channels or other established procedures.

II. Movement of Material to and From the Base.

a. The United Kingdom shall be accorded full rights to move any British material in or out of the Base to any point and at any time at its discretion. There shall be no major increase above the level of supplies existing at the time this Agreement is signed without Egypt's consent.

III. Number of Technicians

a. The number of British technicians to remain after withdrawal of British troops shall be fixed at 4,000 which is the absolute minimum required for the efficient operation of the installations.

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b. This number of technicians shall remain for the duration of the Agreement, that is for 3 years.

c. At the end of 3 years the parties shall review the desirability of retaining the same or other numbers of British technicians. Should they fail to reach agreement the technicians shall be withdrawn. In this case British inspectors attached to the staff of the United Kingdom Ambassador to Egypt shall be allowed to inspect Egyptian maintenance of British-owned supplies and installations remaining in the Base under the terms of this Agreement.

IV. Duration of Agreement

a. This Agreement shall last for 3 years.

b. The need for the arrangements created under this Agreement from the point of view of both parties will depend upon fluctuating world conditions outside the control of either. Because this factor the parties shall review the Agreement prior to its expiration to determine whether they wish it to continue in its present or altered form. If the parties are unable to agree on this question the Agreement shall terminate with the following exceptions:

c. The British Government shall withdraw or otherwise dispose of remaining British-owned stores and installations within a period to be agreed upon.

d. The understanding with respect to the future availability of the Base mentioned below shall not be affected by the termination of this Agreement.

V. Future Availability of the Base

a. The Base shall be made available immediately to Egypt's allies and allies of Egypt's allies in case of attack upon any Arab Nation. In case of a threat of attack on any Arab Nation there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the parties mentioned above. The provision regarding availability of the Base shall apply provided Egypt agrees that a threat of attack in fact exists.

b. This provision shall be made public at the time the Agreement is signed.

VI. Military and Economic Consultations

a. Upon the conclusion of an agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding the Suez Canal Base, Egypt shall invite military and economic experts from the United Kingdom, United States and from such other countries as she may wish to confer regarding plans for defense of the area and regarding economic problems of mutual interest. The discussions shall include measures to strengthen Egypt militarily and economically.

End Verbatim Text.

CAFFERY

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No. 1201

641.74/7-053: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, July 10, 1953—9 p. m.

43. For the Secretary. I offer following comments in connection with developments subsequent receipt your telegram 24.

1. Abd Al Nasir managed to secure RCC approval for proposals contained my telegram 35 by bare majority only. Major General Amir, new Commander-in-Chief, remarked that if this effort fails to secure agreement from British, then "other party" in the RCC who believes that British will never leave unless driven out "will obviously have things their way". He added that Egyptians will never again sit down to formal negotiations with British except to put seal on an agreement which had been worked out informally, as this, in advance and that in any event, they would never go beyond this. Thus, if British continue to make mistake of thinking they can secure better agreement later by standing fast, there will almost certainly be serious attempts at sabotage in the Canal Zone, although I am convinced that RCC will exert every effort to prevent violence against British civilians in rest of Egypt.

2. Egyptians appreciate our efforts to assist in bringing about Anglo-Egyptian settlement. In entering into active mediation, however, we have, in their eyes, assumed legal obligation not to let them down. Although Egyptians realize we cannot dictate settlement to the British, they will expect United States to make vigorous attempt to persuade British to settle for the terms offered. In this connection, they assert they have adopted Department's formula with minimum of changes. (Insistence on three-year period stems from RCC's unwillingness to have arrangements for direct British technical control extend beyond end of the transitional period of nonconstitutional rule.)

CAFFERY

No. 1202

641.74/7-1153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, July 11, 1953—3 a. m.

44. Following is Naguib's letter to President referred to my telegram 35:

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"My Dear Friend: In view of the desire expressed on several occasions by yourself and by your Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, to be of assistance in bringing about Anglo-Egyptian settlement, consultations have taken place between our diplomatic representatives. I trust that His Excellency, Mr. Jefferson Caffery, is keeping you informed as to the basis on which the Egyptian Government would be prepared to conclude an agreement with the British Government concerning the Suez Canal base.

I wish to point out that in making these suggestions Egypt is motivated by a sincere desire to reach a peaceful settlement on the issues now standing between her and Great Britain in order that new foundation may be laid for cooperation with the peace-loving powers in an effective defense Egypt and her Arab allies. I can assure you that if a satisfactory settlement can be reached, Egypt will cooperate loyally with her friends and allies to this end and, with their assistance, will be prepared to do her full part in building the military strength and economic and social stability which is indispensable to the achievment of security in the Middle East.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding in the future and so that you may not think me unreasonable, I must point out that the Egyptian Government's willingness to conclude an agreement concerning the Suez Canal base in conditional upon simultaneous agreement on the other questions as set out below.

First, there must be a satisfactory agreement with the British Government on the immediate evacuation of all British personnel in the Canal Zone, with the exception of the minimum required number of technicians whose presence during a limited period we accept.

Secondly, while we are prepared to agree to consultations for the building up of Egypt's economic and military strength, we cannot ask my people to accept the presence of British technicians and a commitment as regards the availability of the base with nothing to show for it in return except a vague assurance that the United States and Great Britain will confer on 'measures to strengthen Egypt militarily and economically'.

It is essential, therefore, that simultaneously with the signing of agreements on evacuation and the future of the base, there be firm undertakings and specific commitments to forthwith furnish Egypt with such military equipment and other assistance as may concommitantly be agreed. It should be understood that this will constitute a first step in the re-equipment of the Egyptian Army, and establishment of military industries which shall be carried out, in accordance with terms to be agreed upon.

In closing I must say that we are greatly relying upon your frequently-expressed sentiments of friendship and support for Egypt's right to be a fully free and independent state. You will recognize that the position I have outlined marks a great effort on Egypt's part to reach an agreement which would be satisfactory by all.

Such an agreement can be acceptable to the Egyptian people only if reciprocal good will of equivalent magnitude is shown. These proposals do not represent a bargaining position and any attempt to treat them as such will only convince us that Egypt's ear-

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nest desire for a prompt, honorable and peaceful settlement is not reciprocated.

Please believe me to be ever, your friend, Mohammed Naguib." [1]

CAFFERY

[1] The Department in telegram 45 to Cairo on July 11, not printed, instructed Ambassador Caffery to inform Naguib that the President had received his letter, and that he would reply in due course. (641.74/7–1153)

No. 1203

641.74/7–1253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 12, 1953—3:27 p. m.

203. Limit distribution.

1. At meeting July 11, [2] British presented outline of Suez Base plan as follows:

"*Evacuation.* Withdrawal within 18 months. Not yet discussed with Egyptians, but we think they may accept it in spite their statements about shorter period. We cannot accept less.

Base. For practical reasons we cannot accept an agreement which does not retain essential features of what was described as Case 'A', [3] namely, that technical control of main installations in Base should remain in British hands. As to how that is done, there is room for certain variety of treatment, but effective result is matter on which we feel certain that we cannot compromise.

Connected question very great importance is that of our right to get back into our Base and reactivate it when we need it. This has not yet been discussed formally with Egyptians, but is certain that they will make difficulties about giving us a sufficiently categoric and wide assurance. They will ask us to have confidence in their good intentions, but that is not good enough. It is no use to us to preserve our Middle East base in being unless we can have full access to it when we want it. We cannot accept vague verbal assurances from present rulers of Egypt as adequate guarantees of Egyptian behavior in future on such a critical matter. Formula which we propose to put forward to cover this point is as follows:

'In the event of a major war, or aggression or threat of aggression against Egypt by an outside power, the base area shall be at the full disposal of both the contracting parties. An aggression, or threat of aggression, by an outside power against Turkey, Persia,

[1] Also sent to Cairo as telegram 47. Drafted by Thomas Beale, Officer in Charge, United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, and approved by Douglas MacArthur II, the Counselor of the Department.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 1195.

[3] See Document 1061.

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or any Arab state shall be regarded as a threat of aggression against Egypt for this purpose'.

Air Defence. Proposals upon which we agreed originally stipulated that agreement should provide for an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation, including stationing of British squadrons in Egypt. This was feature of both Case A and Case B. [4] It was eminently sensible requirement; but in view of very clear Egyptian resistance to it we have decided to drop it; we shall offer Egyptians such help in air defence as they wish to accept. We think that they will be glad to have some technical advisers and to coordinate their air defence arrangements with ours in our parts of the Middle East. They will agree to British squadrons coming to Egypt occasionally to take part in joint training. We shall not press them to accept anything more.

Military Aid. Ideas previously discussed between us still hold good. There have been suggestions made recently that we try buy Egyptian agreement by offering give them large quantities of material free of charge. We do not consider such action justifiable or even wise.

MEDO. This formed the fifth article of package deal. We agree with view expressed by Mr. Dulles that there is no hope of getting the Egyptians to agree at this time to join either MEDO or any variation thereof. Yet it is very important that such an organization should come into existence at early date, and Egypt's accession to it is essential. We feel that there will be lot of reasonable criticism among NATO countries, including our own, if we conclude an agreement with Egypt which, by withdrawal of our forces, leaves vacuum in defence of this important area without anything being proposed to fill it. With this in mind we have taken up suggestion voiced by Mr. Dulles when in Cairo [5] that this Anglo-Egyptian agreement should be regarded as stage on road towards establishment of joint defence agreement. Question of period of duration of our new agreement with Egypt is obviously most important one. It was only discussed superficially at Cairo talks. It has assumed all more importance from fact that we have insisted that duration of stay our technicians shall be same as duration of agreement. We now propose to offer Egptians following formula:

'The Agreement to remain in force until the countries' members of the Arab Security Pact are organised (with the assistance and participation of other friendly powers) in manner to ensure their effective defence against external aggression. It shall in any case remain in force for an initial period of five years after which date either party shall be entitled to request discussion of its revision on grounds that the condition of principle referred to above has been fulfilled.' "

2. Following British presentation above plan, Secretary Dulles gave British copies text Naguib's letter President (Cairo 44 repeated London as Depts 200) and Eygptian proposal (Cairo 35 repeated London as Depts 201).

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[4] See Document 1061.

[5] See footnote 3, Document 1179.

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3. Salisbury stated did not feel empowered to go further than proposals first made but prepared study Egyptian proposals. Agreed that further discussion would be held after study proposals.

4. Above not to be discussed with British or Egyptian officials without specific instruction.

DULLES

No. 1204

641.74/7-1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953—3:20 p. m.

252. July 14 UK bilateral devoted primarily inconclusive discussion Suez Base although some progress made.

Re Egyptian proposal (Cairo 35, rptd London Deptel 201) British indicated generally satisfactory re treatment technicians except for question civilian clothes which, however, they indicated belief need not become major issue. British, however, felt Egyptian proposals re availability and duration deficient. As to availability British indicated extreme importance to them getting back quickly in event of hostilities to a base which would be in condition to be worth something. On question duration expressed view could not consider proposal limited to duration old treaty under which their rights would be substantially less. Also indicated three years too short a period to permit adequate military planning for area. Stated that should a fixed termination date be necessary ten years would be correct figure.

Secretary pointed out deficiencies British proposals these two subjects. On their provision re availability expressed view reference to threat of aggression could be interpreted very broadly. Therefore, likely to be unacceptable Egyptians. Expressed view provision re duration would appear to Egyptians to open way for an agreement in perpetuity. Secretary indicated our concern re British indication previous meeting their formula as far as they can go. Salisbury reaffirmed as far as he presently had authority to go but that he would be willing seek flexibility in wording under the limitation of the two principles involved. Salisbury indicated not expecting US to support every word but asked for US blessing and support on question of principles. Expressed hope UK could play its own hand this matter with, if possible, our general blessing in order avoid sit-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 63. Drafted by Raynor and approved by Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

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uation of approaches from both our governments which would result Egyptians being in position play one off against other.

Nature US reply Naguib letter discussed. Salisbury expressed hope US would not comment in detail on plan which would place US in role mediator. Hoped reply would be limited to thanks, to notification that plan had been transmitted to UK, that it represented substantial progress in some directions but that we avoid giving Egyptians impression UK should accept Egyptian proposals or that they should serve as basis further discussions. Expressed hope that under conditions outlined above we could suggest that Egyptians "make contact with Robertson". UK fully in accord informal contact should precede any further formal negotiations.

US side indicated general agreement re principles but expressed doubts as to possibility obtaining in form proposed by UK. Also US reiterated concern re continuing absence sufficient flexibility UK position. Undertook to take into account points raised this discussion in preparation our reply to Naguib.

DULLES

No. 1205

641.74/7–1553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953—5:30 p. m.

66. For Caffery from Secretary for information only. Text of President's reply to Naguib being transmitted separate cable.

While discussions somewhat inconclusive believe considerable progress made. Our impression is that discussions left only three points of Egyptian formula which British resist strongly. These are questions of uniforms for technicians, conditions for availability of Base and duration. We do not believe question of uniforms would alone become breaking point. As to availability and duration our Defense people fully share desirability of British formula, particularly regarding "threat" and also no possibility of equivocation that Base available to UK and US. As regards duration we fully agree three years too short. We have feeling Robertson formulated text which he erroneously thought would appeal to us as containing idea of MEDO. As he personally thinks little of MEDO concept, believe he will try to get new formula prior to talking to Egyptians. They may try for straight ten-year agreement in place of compli-

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 262. Drafted by the Secretary of State and Byroade and approved by Byroade.

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cated formula. We would prefer this although recognize ten years may be difficult.

Procedure is complicated by the fact that Egyptians do not accept us as co-negotiatiors with UK and UK unwilling recognize us as mediators. Therefore next step must be resumption presumably on informal basis of contacts at Cairo between Robertson and Egyptian representatives. Also situation complicated by political factors which are strong influence London as well as Cairo.

Egyptian initiative in approaching us has been valuable as it enabled us to have frank talks with Salisbury and Robertson which we believe will be reflected in greater flexibility unless London political factors prevent. However, Egyptians will have to show patience and flexibility also. Believe Robertson personally shares our view that what is to be done must now be done quickly. He also shares your concern of split within RCC and fears elements favoring no agreement will grow in strength.

You will be advised later as things develop, and as appropriations become firm, action to be taken by you in connection with President's mention of your role in economic and military assistance discussions.

DULLES

No. 1206

641.74/7-1553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953—9:20 p. m.

69. There follows text of President's reply to Naguib's letter of July 11 for delivery by you.

Begin text.

"Dear Friend: I was happy to recieve through Ambassador Caffery your letter of July 11 together with the suggestions contained in the new formula of your Government regarding the Suez Canal Base. The assurances which you convey of Egypt's readiness to play her full part in furthering the military strength and economic and social stability of the Middle East are particularly welcome.

The proposals advanced by your Government constitute a significant step forward although in some respects they leave certain difficulties unsolved. I believe I must state to you in all candor that I find certain points adversely affecting the security interests of my

[1] Repeated to London for the Ambassador as telegram 274. Drafted and approved by Byroade after being cleared by the President.

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own country. These points deal with the future availability of the Base and the duration of any agreement between you and the United Kingdom. I have no doubt that both of these questions present to you certain political problems. Nevertheless, I am sure you would like to know that it is my own view that the security of Egypt itself could not help but be affected should there be an unfortunate recurrence of global warfare or of enemy attack on areas other than those lying inside the Arab States. I would hope you could take this factor into account. I also feel that the limitation of three years leaves insufficient time on which to base sound strategic planning in this troubled world.

Lord Salisbury, the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for Great Britain has been here for discussions on a number of problems including the one to which your letter refers. I thought it advisable to make him aware of your proposals and our views thereon which include the above points. My assessment of this situation is that your views and those of the British Government are not now so far apart.

It is my belief that the next step should now be taken through a resumption of contact between your Government and the British representatives in Egypt. Sir Brian Robertson, who attended the talks here, should be returning to Cairo shortly and, so we are informed, will be available to discuss the situation.

As part of an overall solution, I am prepared to see firm commitments entered into between our Governments to assist you in your plans for Egypt's economic development and in the strengthening of your armed forces to discharge their increased responsibilities. I have been assured that the United Kingdom is also willing to help. I am prepared to authorize Ambassador Caffery to enter into discussions on these matters. I would hope we could arrive at an understanding which would be simultaneous with the signature of the Base agreements between yourself and the United Kingdom. The details could be worked out later at the conference mentioned in your proposals.

I look forward to news of progress in Cairo. I shall maintain my keen interest in the achievement of a solution which corresponds to the enduring interests of the three countries. This message brings to you personally my very best wishes as well as my high hopes that we can move forward together in closer association for the best interests of both our peoples. *End text.*

DULLES

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No. 1207

641.74/7–1853: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, July 18, 1953—3 p. m.

291. Allen, head African Department Foreign Office today informed us Robertson will arrive Cairo tomorrow evening. He will be available for informal exploratory conversations with Egyptians, but is under instructions take no initiative in resuming contact. In response Embassy official's expression of hope that opportunity for resumption of contact will not become bogged down in question of who assumes initiative, Allen explained Cabinet has strong views against giving my [*any*?] impression that UK is running after Egyptians. We gathered, however, that Allen hopeful Ambassador Caffery will find means of stimulating Egyptians to take initiative in getting in touch with Robertson but without in any way suggesting approach if British inspired.

Pending Salisbury's return and Cabinet discussion on July 21 of points raised during Washington conversations, Robertson will be generally guided by memo contained Deptel 203, July 12. Within this general framework, however, he will have wide flexibility to explore British and Egyptian ideas. He will not put forward any "plan" or "proposals." We gather both from Allen and from Robertson himself that latter is conscious of need for flexibility and for keeping conversations going.

Allen said government feels it is risking rebuff in sending Robertson back under foregoing circumstances and that, if Egyptians should fail to establish contact, government will feel compelled to bring him back home again. Further factor bearing on situation is Commons Foreign Affairs debate scheduled for July 21, in which some reference will have be made to Robertson's departure. Allen hoped government statement can be so worded that it will not run risk of prejudicing any Egyptian initiative in resuming contact. Biggest risk arises from uncontrollable statements and questions of Conservative backbenchers and opposition. Ideal development would therefore be for contact to be made before debate opens, in which event Allen thought it would be possible for government avoid any reference to fact it came about on Egyptian initiative.

Embassy official expressed strong hope that public reference can be avoided altogether to question of initiative, particularly further

[1] Repeated niact to Cairo as telegram 9.

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reiterations of such statements as those contained Embtel 254, July 16. [2] Foreign Office seemed receptive this point of view.

Comment: In light foregoing, Embassy suggests Department and Ambassador Caffery may wish consider stimulating Egyptians to resume contact. Embassy suggests any such US efforts might be tied to statement in President's letter that Robertson returned to Cairo and "will be available to discuss the situation." [3]

ALDRICH

[2] Not printed.

[3] In telegram 83 to Cairo on July 18, not printed, the Department asked Caffery if he believed it a good idea to ask either the British or the Egyptians to act in order to resume negotiations per the contents of telegram 291 from London. (641.74/7-1853) Caffery reported in telegram 103 on July 19, not printed, that the British Embassy in Cairo thought the suggestion that contact be made with the Egyptians before the debate in the House of Commons was unrealistic. (641.74/7-1953)

No. 1208

641.74/7-2253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 22, 1953—3:57 p. m.

96. Confidential for Caffery from Secretary. Your 112. [2]

Robertson's statement reflects wishful thinking. We are not "backing" either Britain or Egypt. We are anxious to get the result which I specified in my public statement made in Cairo. [3] In certain respects we share the British position. In other respects we share the Egyptian position and in many respects we strongly backed Egyptian viewpoint in our talks here with British.

With reference to Department's 66 it perhaps does not sufficiently make clear that while we are concerned as to "availability" or "duration" this does not mean that we support the British formulae. On the contrary I emphasized to Salisbury that while we felt that the Egyptian formulae were too restrictive we doubted that a Brit formula should be insisted on and we assume Robertson now has some flexibility on this point. If Egyptians feel we have "let them down" remember British also disappointed we are not fully

[1] Drafted and approved by the Secretary of State.

[2] Ambassador Caffery in telegram 112, July 21, not printed, reported that General Robertson had told him the previous evening that the British felt that, as a result of the Washington talks, the United States was supporting the United Kingdom. Robertson said, "British point of view is that as Great Britain stands behind United States in Korea, United States stands behind Great Britain in Egypt." (641.74/7-2153)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 1179.

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backing them. Difference is British conceal their disappointment and pretend greater degree of agreement than in fact exists.

DULLES

No. 1209

641.74/8-253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 2, 1953—2 p. m.

160. Noforn. In lengthy conversation with Embassy officer Abdal Nasir confirmed that initial contact with British (mytels 152 and 159) [2] hardly touched on substantive matters but said that atmosphere of meeting was not bad.

Nasir in course of conversation frankly expressed his current views on Anglo-Egyptian question. He said resort to violence is Egypt's last resource and will be used only if all else fails in persuading British to evacuate. Nasir made clear his awareness of Egypt's need for constructive settlement as indispensable prelude to serious assault on Egypt's basic problem, i.e. expanding agricultural production through new Nile development.

He indicated his awareness that patience, persistence and restraint on part of Egyptians during forthcoming informal discussions are tactic most likely to promote agreement. Nasir expressed some concern lest British make mistake of thinking that Egyptians are bluffing and that they will make further substantial concessions in face of "tough" British stand. He agreed, however, that it is important that public atmosphere remain good and press speculation be held to minimum.

Nasir asked what role United States would play in matter. Embassy officer replied United States had repeatedly made clear its desire to see peaceful settlement which would fully respect Egypt's sovereignty while at same time maintaining canal base in good working order ready for immediate use by Egypt and her allies in case of future need.

It was pointed out that it is now squarely up to Egyptians and British to try to narrow differences between them. Reference was made to points in President's letter to Naguib, including assurances that United States, as part of over-all solution, would be pre-

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 50.

[2] Neither printed; the initial Anglo-Egyptian meeting occurred over dinner on July 30.

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pared assist in Egypt's economic development plans and in strengthening Egyptian Armed Forces.

Comment: Although conversation did not bring to light any significant changing Egyptian position, Embassy officer was highly encouraged by Nasir's general attitude and frame of mind which showed greater degree of political realism and maturity than ever before.

CAFFERY

No. 1210

641.74/8-753: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 7, 1953—7:52 p. m.

155. Egyptian Ambassador stated following based on telephone conversation with Cairo re Anglo-Egyptian discussions August 6:

1. British adopted extreme bargaining position.
2. UK suggested Base agreement should last ten years and technicians should remain throughout period. Ambassador described this as utterly unacceptable.
3. British proposed Base should be available in case of general war or aggression against Egypt, any Arab State, Turkey or Iran. Ambassador said this unacceptable. Asserted Egypt must retain right determine when threat exists, otherwise UK could conjure up threat at any time.
4. Next meeting scheduled August 11.

SMITH

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 683.

No. 1211

641.74/8-853: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 8, 1953—3 p. m.

187. British Embassy expanded as follows today regarding Anglo-Egyptian talk August 6 (Embassy's 177, August 7): [2]

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed. Telegram 177 conveyed "preliminary information" regarding the Anglo-Egyptian talks on Aug. 6. (641.74/8-753)

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(1) Egyptians requested British ideas regarding Egyptian proposals in Naguib–Eisenhower correspondence. Therefore, Robertson set forth general British attitude towards these. Egyptians listened, but did not comment.

(2) Reorganization base United Kingdom accepted idea Egyptian commander assisted by British technical adviser. Neither side was sure what title latter should have. (Fawzi told me Egyptians prefer "technical assistant") both sides agreed that his functions would have to be defined with care.

(3) United Kingdom expressed view that base would require communications center of some kind and that some messages would have to be in code. (Egyptians agreed that this was problem to be worked out along with that of communication channel.)

(4) British, without obtaining any Egyptian reactions, outlined reasons why British technicians in base should wear uniforms. (Fawzi told me Egyptians might give in on this.)

(5) Egyptians asked British views regarding length of time technicians would remain; British replied that this was question related to duration of agreement itself.

(6) Regarding duration agreement, Egyptians stated 10 years far too long; British replied three years impossibly short. British consider this question left open. (Fawzi told me Egyptians might go to five.)

(7) Regarding availability United Kingdom advanced formula discussed Washington and directed attention to the aspects to which President Eisenhower attached particular importance. Egyptians plainly did not like this formula, but reserved their position. British believe this question was left for further consideration and discussion.

CAFFERY

No. 1212

641.74/8-1453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 14, 1953—7:01 p. m.

784. Noforn. We attach utmost importance continuation present informal Anglo-Egyptian talks on Suez Base. Recent incidents Port Said serve reinforce our conviction necessity settlement. We encouraged by apparent earnest desire both sides eliminate differences and by progress in narrowing area disagreement. Despite favorable trend, danger always exists incident or other factor will precipitate sudden break and public disclosure this fact with far-reaching consequences. For this reason Caffery given advance au-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 183. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Matthews.

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thority take at his discretion steps outlined below as last resort measure to prevent definitive break.

Call on appropriate Egyptian officials and stress importance we attach to continuation talks and our conviction necessity agreements. He should state we believe parties close together on substantive points and remaining differences capable adjustment. He should add that he has been instructed to request delay in break in order permit US Government determine whether it able make any useful suggestions.

Immediately after call on Egyptians Caffery should inform Hankey [2] and advise him Embassy London approaching Foreign Office in same manner. Embassy London should act upon notification by Caffery of his call on Egyptians.

FYI Although we believe US should inject itself in talks only in extreme circumstances, our present thinking is we should be prepared to submit compromise formula in effort prevent breakdown talks.

DULLES

[2] Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy in Cairo.

No. 1213

641.74/8-2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 25, 1953—3 p. m.

253. British Embassy today supplied following re British-Egyptian talks yesterday (Embassy's 250). [2]

1. For Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, Nasir and Hakim Amir; for UK Hankey, Robertson and Brig Dove. After unsuccessful attempt get Egyptians to express their views Robertson advanced substance new British formula London's 745 [3] without giving text

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 84.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Ambassador Aldrich reported in telegram 745, Aug. 21, not printed, that the British Foreign Office had just given him a revised Canal Zone base reactivation formula, which was to be put to the Egyptians at the next meeting in Cairo:

"In the event of United Nations action to resist an act of aggression, or in the event of an attack on any Arab country by an outside power, the base area shall be at the full disposal of the UK. An attack on Turkey shall be regarded as an attack on an Arab country for the purposes of this agreement. In the event of an attack on Persia, or in the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above-mentioned countries, there shall be immediate consultation between the UK and Egypt." (741.56374/8-2153)

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to Egyptians. Egyptians rejected inclusion Turkey and Iran stating flatly that on political grounds they could not go beyond "members Arab League Collective Security Pact": Egypt would be willing to "consult" if Turkey attacked and would accept reactivation of base in case UN decision calling for armed action. According British Embassy Robertson believes "we are not far off on availability" provided London does not insist on inclusion of Turkey.

2. Robertson now considers most serious question to be dealt with is that of duration of agreement together with numbers and duration of stay of technicians. UK for first time advanced their ideas on these matters in detail. UK asked for 10 years agreement with technicians to stay concurrently. Egyptians refused this. UK then proposed 10 year agreement with 4000 technicians for 5 years, this number to be tapered off thereafter. Egyptians suggested 5 year agreement with technicians for 3 years. Robertson replied this impossible if base is to have real military value and urged Egyptians to be forthcoming.

3. Egyptians were "filled with gloom" when British advanced idea that all agreement times must start after British evacuation completed. UK said it was practical impossibility to work out technician pattern while British forces still there. Robertson estimated evacuation would require two years although he hinted this time might be slightly shortened. (British Embassy states 18 months now considered absolute minimum.) Egyptians stated that they had always assumed agreement would run from date of signature and that 6 months adequate period for evacuation. Both sides agreed meet August 27.

CAFFERY

No. 1214

641.74/8-2853: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 28, 1953—7:17 p. m.

239. On instructions from Abdel Nasir, Egyptian Ambassador informed Department August 28 following re Anglo-Egyptian meeting August 27.

(1) British abandoned proposal that agreement time should start from date evacuation troops completed.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 1063. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

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(2) Substantial accord reached on "availability" in line with British formula quoted London's 745. [2] Only remaining difference concerns inclusion "attack on Turkey". Nasir insists this unacceptable and believes British prepared yield.

(3) British still maintained evacuation troops will take two years. Nasir believes this not firm position and thinks agreement possible. (Department notes Embtel 263 [3] mentions 18 months).

(4) "Duration" major difficulty. UK demanding ten year agreement while maximum RCC able offer is 5 years with technicians remaining for three years.

Next meeting scheduled September 3 after which Robertson departing for ten days consultation London. Nasir believes this meeting will decide success or failure talks. He requested assistance Department in inducing British modify stand on duration. Nasir emphasized growth neutralist sentiment and asserted RCC would be unable make as favorable offer two months hence.

For Caffery—Except as noted does this report coincide with your information?

Egyptian Ambassador here excited state of mind and greatly concerned prospects of failure of next meeting. Also transmitted personal plea Nasir to Byroade for our support with British at this stage. Do you believe US should intervene this juncture beyond efforts we know you are making locally in Cairo?

DULLES

[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.
[3] Not printed.

No. 1215

641.74/8-3153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, August 31, 1953—2 p. m.

273. British Embassy denies abandoning proposal on agreement time (numbered paragraph 1 Department's 239 repeated London 1063). Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 coincide my information that Egyptian request next meeting moved up to September 1 (mytel 267). [2] Nasir only partially confirms Egyptian Ambassador's statements as reported reference telegram. He says he told Ambassador that he expects next meeting will be last of informal contacts if British po-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 93.
[2] Not printed.

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sition on "duration" remains unchanged and asked that his views be transmitted to Byroade.

When asked whether Egyptians could not make some further concessions as regards "duration" and/or technicians, Nasir and Amir recalled with some bitterness that at our inducement Egypt had made substantial concessions for Washington conference. In their view, British have simply taken Egyptian concessions on points which suited them and started bargaining from new ground on other issues.

Nasir again voiced his conviction that RCC have gone as far as they can go and still hope to win battle for public acceptance of agreement (mytel 263). [3] He pointed out that in accepting five-year base agreement, 4,000 British technicians for three years and liberal "availability" formula, this government will be putting Egypt squarely in western camp. Nasir said, "I asked General Robertson if British really think it is wise to undermine this regime by trying to extract concessions beyond our powers to give. I could sign ten-year agreement tomorrow but it would not be honored by the nation, especially after evacuation of British troops". He concluded by expressing hope that British would be far sighted enough to give concessions which government can publicly point to in justification for substantial concessions it has made to British.

Embassy officer urged that discussions not be broken off when basis of agreement seemed so near and received indication from Nasir that if impasse is reached at next meeting no public announcement of breakoff would be made without prior notice to me.

We have further urged that in event of no progress, time be allowed for Robertson's scheduled visit to London before any final decision is taken by GOE. I have reason to believe this suggestion will receive favorable consideration.

In light of foregoing I believe intervention with British not yet advisable. I shall of course, inform Department immediately if developments warrant change in this judgment.

CAFFERY

[3] Not printed.

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No. 1216

641.74/9–553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, September 5, 1953—4 p. m.

292. Noforn. Under my harassment Minister Foreign Affairs admitted to me today that Egyptians would be prepared eventually [to extend] agreements they are offering British for duration. As their absolute last word they might agree to allow British one year for evacuation with verbal understanding that Egypt would not object if evacuation took a little longer. The five year duration for the agreement would begin at the end of the one year period.

I said "why can't you let the technicians stay for the whole period?" He replied "we probably could let them stay for all 6 years but the latter part of their stay would have to be by way of or in disguise of 'inspectors' ".

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 103 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Maffitt, to Moscow, Ankara, and to Tel Aviv.

No. 1217

641.74/9–653: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, September 6, 1953—1 p. m.

293. Re Embtel 292 to Department. Nasir told me last night that he would accept terms discussed yesterday with the Minister Foreign Affairs; but that, that is his last word. Furthermore Egyptians would not propose those terms but they would agree to them if "Washington does something about them with the British." He said "if we propose them, British will take them as that much gained and then start bargaining for more from there."

He talked at some length about the rising opposition within the country to the negotiations that are now going on with the British and of the opposition that the government will have to meet forcefully if an agreement is reached with the British. Also, if an agree-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 104 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Maffitt, to Moscow, Ankara, and to Tel Aviv.

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ment is to be reached it is important to reach it before the reopening of the universities in early October.

CAFFERY

No. 1218

641.74/9-953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, September 9, 1953—3 p. m.

302. 1. It now appears that possibility Anglo-Egyptian settlement near future largely depends upon reconciliation of differences between what two groups of politicians (British and Egyptian) consider they "can get away with" vis-à-vis their public opinions on duration question.

2. I am not in a position to comment re what British Government can accept politically: As Egyptians know it, UK suggestion is agreement for 10 years and technicians for 5 years (with tapering off of technicians after fifth year), agreement to start from completion British evacuation. In effect, making allowance for 2-year evacuation period, British formula is 12–7 years.

3. Egyptians have offered UK as "maximum Egyptian public opinion will accept" agreement for 5 years from date of signature with techicians for 3 years. Adding important Egyptian concessions I obtained and reported in my 292, Egyptians, "in order achieve quick settlement", are now prepared to go to formula which amounts in effect to 6 years for agreement and evacuation (1 year) combined-technicians in some guise for entire period.

4. Considering past and present difficulties, I am surprised RCC has felt able to go as far as it has to meet UK re duration. Nasir, himself, has said that while he could sign agreement for 10 years this would not mean anything because it would be violently and effectively rejected by Egyptian public. Important element in RCC decision as to maximum it can "get away with" is widely held idea that under treaty British will have to get out anyway in 1956. This idea clearly militates against acceptance British suggestion that RCC should sign up until 1963. As it is, RCC is taking big political risk in offering agreement running to 1959. Aside from Wafd, Moslem Brothers and Communists even the Pashas would come into the open against RCC if 10 years accepted. It is just too long for any class of Egyptian to accept.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 105 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Maffitt, to Moscow, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and the Arab capitals.

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5. I regret duration looms so large at this juncture because it seems to me that any terminal date is likely mean very little in practice.

6. Prerequisite for enhancing security this part of world is Anglo-Egyptian settlement which will open door to permanent good will and "equal to equal" collaboration with Egyptian area defense. Short range, evacuation British forces from Suez base represents security risk but this risk will be same under Egyptian 6-year offer as under British 10-year suggestion. We should all know well before end 5 years whether our hopes for fruitful collaboration with Egypt are realizable. If they are, well before that time we will wish to replace Anglo-Egyptian settlement with a broader-based and more satisfactory arrangement.

7. After due reflection I conclude that RCC offer (as amended to me by Foreign Minister (Embtel 292)) is so close to being maximum politically feasible that it should be accepted as just that. I believe also that unless agreement is reached in principle between now and early October (when universities open) it is doubtful RCC will be able to maintain its offer amounting to 6 years. While British Government may be attached to idea poker game in which Egyptians likely raise their bid again (Embassy's 291) [2] I think this concept may be dangerous over-simplification which does not take into account extent opposition which Egyptian Government will have to face as result of making any agreement with UK.

8. Having in mind my telegram 293 September 6, I suggest that Department bring these latest suggestions to attention of British and counsel British to accept them.

CAFFERY

[2] Not printed.

No. 1219

641.74/9–1153: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 11, 1953—6 p. m.

1067. Egyptian understanding of British position on duration issue (paragraph 2, Cairo's 302, September 9) differs somewhat from British explanation of their position. Foreign Office informs us 10 year period should commence on ratification of agreement

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 32.

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(not from completion evacuation as suggested reference telegram) and would comprise following phases:

1. Year and half evacuation period (Foreign Office states 2 years more satisfactory but in last analysis would accept minimum of 18 months).
2. Three year period with 4,000 British technicians.
3. Two year period during which technicians would progressively decrease to 3,000.
4. Three and half year period during which base would be maintained under some formula developed by a Joint Anglo-Egyptian body reporting to two governments.

Training of Egyptians would commence at beginning of agreement. UK would also like provision permitting review of agreement at end 10 year period.

Embassy understands from Foreign Office that above formula never explained in detail to Egyptians because latter rejected conception 10 year agreement and refused listen to detailed elaboration of formula.

Difficult to say what would be minimum period politically acceptable in UK but three years for technicians would certainly not be as government considers it would be impossible explain satisfactorily to Parliament why UK accepted agreement terminating roughly same time as existing Anglo-Egyptian treaty and whose terms were greatly inferior. We also doubt that UK would accept six year period mentioned Cairo's 293, September 6 on basis conversations with Foreign Office and reports of recent Cabinet meeting (Embassy telegram 1023, September 9) [2] consider it probable that should Egypt suggest six year period UK would agree to 18 months, three years and three years respectively for first three phases above and drop phase four, thus making total duration of seven and one-half years from ratification.

ALDRICH

[2] Not printed.

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No. 1220

641.74/9-553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 12, 1953—1:39 p. m.

1354. In general and informal conversation with British Ambassador, Under Secretary took opportunity express Department's views re Egypt. He stated that neither the Secretary nor he wished to be in position of attempting to "quarterback" negotiations which British were conducting. He stated however we had certain information from Egyptians we felt should be passed to British and wished at same time make certain observations. Substance of Cairo's 292, 293 and 302 given Makins.

Smith stated it was our own view that "poker game" was just about played out, and that we had feeling present Egyptian concessions on duration given Caffery were very close to all that could be obtained. He also pointed out from military point of view we felt present Egyptian position was satisfactory.

Makins reporting above conversation along with substance above-mentioned cables to London.

DULLES

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 289. Drafted and approved by Byroade after being cleared in draft with the Under Secretary of State.

No. 1221

641.74/9-1953: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 19, 1953—2:33 p. m.

324. Selwyn Lloyd in New York and British Ambassador here have presented latest British position on Egypt to the Secretary and Department. They state this to be their final position as worked out by the Cabinet after extensive deliberations. They request our full support, indicating their belief that with our support their offer would be accepted. Their position as follows:

Duration to be total of 7 years after conclusion of agreement (British Ambassador uncertain whether this means signature or

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 1481 and priority to the Secretary of State in New York as telegram 132. Drafted and approved by Byroade after the substance of the last paragraph had been cleared with Under Secretary Smith.

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ratification). British time table as follows: 1.5 years for evacuation; 3 years with 4,000 technicians; 2.5 years for reduced number of combined technicians-inspectors.

Formulae for availability as follows:

"In the event of United Nations action to resist an act of aggression or an attack by an outside power on Egypt; or An attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact; Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the base on a war footing and to operate it efficiently for the benefit of Her Majesty's forces and other friendly forces. These facilities will include the use of Egyptian ports by Her Majesty's Naval forces and merchant shipping.

2. In the event of an attack on Turkey or Persia or in the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above mentioned countries there shall be immediate consultation between the U.K. and Egypt."

British also insist upon clause in the preamble of the agreement regarding freedom of transit of the Suez Canal. Text to be as follows:

"Recognizing the economic, commercial and strategic importance of the Suez Canal as an international waterway and being agreed on the necessity of preserving and upholding the principles of freedom of navigation set forth in the international convention at present governing the use of the Canal."

British also want article of the agreement itself to cover the above point on Suez Canal. British Ambassador did not know nature of article, apparently to be left for later drafting stage, but assumed it would go no further than the above preamble clause. He was reminded that in recent Suez Canal talks here British had wished phraseology which would in effect give to UK enforcement rights in connection with freedom of transit. Makins stated he believed that position had been changed and that article could be along general lines of preamble clause.

General Smith expressed keen disappointment British desire interject new problem of Suez Canal in Base negotiations at this late stage. Also disappointment British prepared stand on 7 year duration as our information indicated 6 years was as high as Egyptians would go. Makins said London believed 7 years obtainable. Apparently Nuri Said gave them this impression. Smith replied that we would of course be delighted if Egyptians would in fact accept 7 years and Suez Canal addition as well. We did not disagree with desirability of either. This purely question of tactics as to what in fact was obtainable and question of whether, now that agreement so close, talks should be allowed to fail.

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Believe pressure from us will not cause British make substantial change their latest proposals. Desire you do utmost assist them unless you perceive part of package which you convinced not obtainable even with your support, and which will inevitably lead to break. Impossible judge here extent of Egyptian reaction Suez Canal clause which in itself fairly logical and innocuous. Request your earliest views including recommendations as to how Suez Canal issue might be handled. [2]

SMITH

[2] The Department informed the Embassy in Cairo in telegram 328 on Sept. 21, not printed, that Lord Salisbury wished to clarify two points that arose during the Smith-Makins talks reported in telegram 324. The first was that the article in the Base Agreement itself regarding freedom of transit of the Suez Canal was not really a sticking point, and that General Robertson was to try to obtain agreement for the article, but if he could not, he could accept merely the clause in the preamble. The second point was that General Robertson had considerable latitude in his handling of the rest of the base negotiations. (641.74/9-2153)

No. 1222

641.74/9-2253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 22, 1953—6:44 p. m.

336. On instructions from Col Nasir, Egyptian Ambassador called Sept 22 to request Department urge British accept six-year duration clause including twelve months for evacuation. He discussed only duration aspects problem (Cairo's 353). [2]

We replied that in our opinion additional concessions from British on major points not obtainable. We stated US made maximum effort induce British reduce duration period down to seven years; that question considered in detail by Cabinet; and that in our opinion this minimum British position. Amb told our advice as friends was to accept present offer. After consultation top level in Dept Ambassador informed we believed further approach to British by US would be fruitless. He was also told it was our hope that negotiations on the base problem could come to early and successful conclusion so that we could begin discussions more constructive matters such as assisting Egypt play her new role.

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 1532. Drafted by Burdett and Byroade.
[2] Not printed.

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Caffery should take similar position in discussions with Egyptians emphasizing our conviction that seven years duration is best obtainable and should be accepted.

SMITH

No. 1223

641.74/9-2353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, September 23, 1953—2 p. m.

357. Nasir said last night (mytel 354) [2] he had difficult time in RCC meeting as all RCC members except Salah Salim were most unhappy over British proposals. (He remarked he was "losing his prestige" in RCC because he was accused of leading them into dangerous position through repeated concessions to British.)

Nasir made observation that he was not so concerned about details as about "general shape" of agreement in eyes of public and that British position on "duration" particularly unfortunate in this respect. We repeated our conviction that UK could not be budged from stand on seven years duration but suggested Egyptians explore with British possible ways of improving "look" of agreement. Nasir said most important in this regard that evacuation period be set at one year. He reiterated (mytels 292 and 293, September 6) that there could be "gentlemen's agreement" to cover small residue of "clean-up troops" for some additional months.

Only other point raised by Nasir was Suez Canal preamble. Although he still suspicious of British motives in raising this issue we did our best to allay his concern and explain importance of reassuring western public opinion and maritime nations about future of canal.

My over-all impression is that if British will try to be helpful on details there is fair chance agreement can be reached which will meet UK requirements on essentials.

(It is significant that press today announced postponement of University opening from October 3 to 24.)

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 125.

[2] Not printed.

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No. 1224

641.74/9-2453: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, September 24, 1953—noon.

360. Egyptians told us last night that they walked out of yesterday's meeting with Hankey and Robertson without setting date for another session.

According to Egyptians Nasir offered 18 months evacuation period to be followed by five year agreement, i.e. total of six and a half years.

Following some discussion of duration issue, Robertson raised question of uniforms for technicians (apparently he had not made point clearly in first meeting). When Egyptians turned down idea, Robertson protested he had understood Egyptians would accept uniforms and had so told London. Nasir, who has said all along that technicians must be in civilian attire, replied to that effect. When British persisted he lost his temper and stalked out of meeting.

Comment: It appears there is genuine misunderstanding involved as British had indicated to us previously they thought Egypt would accept uniforms and Fawzi had also suggested this possibility.

Nasir, on other hand, feels all important concessions have been made by Egypt and evidently became angry at what he considered British failure to reciprocate when relatively minor point involved. He was particularly incensed because he has recently extended facilities on number of supply matters to British in zone as gesture of good will and completed payment of indemnities for January 26 deaths.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 128.

No. 1225

641.74/9-2453: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, September 24, 1953—1 p. m.

361. Robertson and Hankey came to see me this morning to let me know yesterday's meeting with Egyptians was most unsatisfac-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 129.

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tory. Robertson brought up question of uniforms and a first class row ensued. There was disagreement also on various other secondary points.

I read Robertson and Hankey the first sentence of second paragraph of Deptel 63 July 15 [2] to effect that British representatives at Washington conference indicated re uniforms "belief need not become major issue". Robertson said that there was apparently a misunderstanding because British had not meant to convey any such impression. Uniforms is a sticking point. He said also Fawzi had indicated that "uniforms" need not be sticking point and he had so reported to London.

He said, furthermore, "I will lay my cards on table. We do not want a break on duration. If we break, we want to break on a point like uniforms or some other similar matter."

He indicated furthermore, that he believes it more important at this juncture to obtain agreement to questions like uniforms than it is to obtain agreement to seven-year duration.

As meeting broke up with both sides in a huff, Egyptians left with no discussion of a future meeting date.

CAFFERY

[2] Printed as telegram 252 to London, Document 1204.

No. 1226

641.74/10-353: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, October 3, 1953—3 p. m.

396. Reference mytel 388 October 1. [2] On "availability" Egyptians proposed to British at this morning's meeting that they place following phrase at beginning of formula: "Having in mind charter of UN". They refused British version of reference to UN (London's telegram 745 August 21) [3] as involving sweeping rights of re-entry.

They agreed, however, to "extend system of consultation to danger of global war".

Re Suez, Egyptians agreed to modify their proposed formula in direction desired by British.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 146 and unnumbered to Ankara, Paris for Reinhardt, and to Rome for Maffitt.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 1213.

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They clashed again on uniforms, British insisting on British uniforms with slight tab variations; Egyptians insisting technicians could not be in British uniforms or uniforms looking like British uniforms, but they would accept some other uniform.

In view evident strain meeting lasted only 40 minutes. They are to meet together, however, on Wednesday next.

In another conversation with Embassy officer, Nasir repeated what Fawzi told me and added that Egyptians made it clear to British that they would only grant automatic right of re-entry of base in case of attack on one of Arab States. Egyptians declined further discussion on this point and on use of British-type uniforms for technicians. Since they suggested that British produce their word these subjects at next meeting. Nasir alleges there may be early breakdown. I will of course endeavor to prevent this.

CAFFERY

No. 1227

641.74/10-653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 6, 1953—7:33 p. m.

1800. Personal for Aldrich from the Secretary. We have refrained since talks here with Salisbury from attempting to act in any way as intermediary in the Suez negotiations. We adopted British thesis that if we would avoid this role and support British, that would produce desired results. Therefore, we have frequently urged Egyptians to modify their position to meet UK position. Last month British asked our support on three specific items which we gave fully because we were led to assume that these issues of "reference to Suez transit", "availability" and "duration" were the only major matters that stood in the way of agreement. Our information is that Egyptians are prepared to meet substantially the British position on those three items. Now we learn somewhat to our dismay that the negotiations may collapse on the issue of what kind of uniform the technicians should wear, namely, whether they should be military uniforms or non-military uniforms.

It is still not our intention to intervene in negotiations. We hope that the information we have received is inaccurate and that an agreement will in fact be reached. We hope that not only because of its bearing on this particular situation but because of the fact

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 393. Drafted and approved by the Secretary of State.

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that success in this instance will help greatly to make it possible for us together to achieve other successes.

Please present this personal viewpoint to Eden. [2]

DULLES

[2] Ambassador Aldrich reported in telegram 1474, Oct. 7, not printed, that he presented the contents of this telegram to Foreign Secretary Eden, who said that the United Kingdom was not in agreement with Egypt on the question of availability. The British wanted to have the base available in case of action by the United Nations in the same manner as in the case of an attack on any member of the Arab League. Eden believed this was the most important point of difference dividing the two sides. Regarding uniforms, Eden said that the technicians were part of the British Army, and that some sort of uniforms had to be worn on the base. (641.74/10–753)

No. 1228

641.74/10–753: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 7, 1953—7 p. m.

1490. At Eden's instructions Foreign Office this afternoon gave Embassy following summary present UK position on Suez negotiations (Embtel 1474 October 7): [2]

1. Availability. This is most important outstanding issue and for domestic political as well as strategic reasons British can not accept base as being automatically available to them only in event attack on members Arab League collective security pact. British feel very strongly on this point and seem have impression Egyptians have retracted from original position of accepting in principle British formula re UN action to resist aggression. In this connection see paragraph 2 Deptel 1063 August 28. [3]

2. Duration. 18 months period for evacuation agreed, but Egyptians want evacuation commence as soon as agreement on principles of base agreement reached. Although UK not disposed give undertaking begin evacuation on such basis, UK might consider evacuation some troops when agreement reached.

3. Uniforms. British military feel strongly British soldiers must be able wear conventional British uniforms, i.e., UK unwilling make agreement eliminating uniforms. Re actual fact, however, British would probably agree soldiers when not on duty would be

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 39.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] Printed as telegram 239 to Cairo, Document 1214.

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in mufti and even when on duty would probably be dressed in dungarees, or the like. British currently considering their position on this point and Foreign Office hopeful compromise may be reached.

4. Air staging post. UK needs air staging post both for (a) facilities for serving base, and (b) normal transit facilities. Foreign Office states UK most insist on such staging post, and that this and availability most crucial points.

5. Freedom of transit canal. Cabinet most insistent agreement either in preamble or body contain wording by which Egypt recognizes principle of freedom transit Suez Canal. UK wants legal peg on which hang case in event Egyptian violation. Also some such wording necessary if agreement to pass Parliament.

6. Inspectors. Details for final 2½ year period of agreement's duration during which 4000 technicians would be reduced to small number inspectors now being worked out.

7. British assistant to base commander. UK feels British technical assistant must be able give orders to British base technicians. Feels it of utmost importance that relationship between commander and British assistant be clearly understood by both parties.

Foreign Office expects today's meeting in Cairo will cover only minor issues.

ALDRICH

No. 1229

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 165

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 17, 1953—3 p. m.

Secto 20. Bilateral Foreign Ministers meeting morning October 17 discussed following:

1. Egypt:

Eden showed Secretary in greatest confidence latest draft on availability as approved by Cabinet, providing base would be made available in event (a) attack on Egypt (b) attack on any member ALCSP or (c) recommendation by UN that base should be made available in view aggression or threat aggression. Eden said this wording would be given Egyptians at Monday's meeting.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 43.

The Secretary was in London primarily for the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings in October and November 1953. Regarding the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings in London, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1709.

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Secretary said our information was Egyptians would agree to refer their responsibilities under both Charter and 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution [2] and suggested wording of latter ("in event of threat to peace, breach of peace or aggression") be substituted under (c) above. British agreed consider this.

Eden continued UK were prepared to agree to (a) 15-month period for withdrawal of troops, which was "major concession", (b) 7-year duration and (c) time schedule providing for 4,000 technicians for a year and a half, then 2,500 for 3 years and finally 1,000 in last year. Did not anticipate any great difficulty on either air facilities or base organization. On uniforms, however, there had been a long Cabinet discussion as result which finally agreed uniforms would never be worn outside base while inside they would not normally be worn but this would not be incorporated in formal agreement as UK unwilling give up right wear uniforms and carry weapons inside base. In actual practice uniforms would only be worn inside base on ceremonial occasions such as church parade, etc. Selwyn Lloyd added British hoped get Egyptians agree that inside base shirts, shorts, badges of rank and caps could be worn.

During considerable discussion which followed, Secretary expressed hope talks would not break down on uniform question. This he said, would be serious and have a bad effect on American public opinion. He wondered whether argument was not over words rather than substance. Eden replied question was important since if Naguib Government should be replaced by less friendly one, British might wish put its soldiers in uniform. Secretary concurred but added that if it was intended technicians would ordinarily not wear uniforms, he thought this should be made very clear, not simply stated orally.

Ambassador suggested there misunderstanding as to whether men in question were soldiers or technicians. Eden replied that they would be mainly engineers and actually soldiers. He hoped Egyptians might agree to British position, in view especially British concessions on initial evacuation and staging of technicians. Cabinet, however, was absolutely firm on uniforms and public opinion would not allow further concessions.

Eden said he thought latest UK proposals were "pretty good" and expressed hope that even if Egyptians did not accept them wholly Monday they would not break off talks. He hoped we would do our best prevent any break. Secretary assured Eden we would do all we could to help.

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[2] For documentation on the Uniting for Peace Resolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303 ff.

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[Here follows discussion of the situation in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Kuwait.]

DULLES

No. 1230

110.11 DU/10–1753: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 17, 1953—3:23 p. m.

Tedul 5. Hope you will be able give your personal attention to Cairo's 182 to London [2] re British insistence on military uniforms. We consider British position most unfortunate and unnecessary. Feel it important British be under no illusions that we can give them further support on this issue.

Generally, we think Egyptians have gone far to meet British and it will be difficult for us, in our own interest, to continue to back British in event agreement now fails. [3]

SMITH

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 437.

[2] In telegram 182 from Cairo to London, sent as telegram 464 to the Department, Oct. 17, not printed, Caffery reported that the British had instructions from London to insist on British military uniforms for the technicians. (741.56374/10–1753)

[3] In telegram Dulte 2 from London, Oct. 18, not printed, the Secretary of State said he had shown Eden a copy of Cairo's 182 to London and a copy of telegram Tedul 5, and had expressed the American misgivings about the British position. (110.11 DU/10–1853)

No. 1231

774.5 MSP/10–1753: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 17, 1953—3:30 p. m.

439. Joint FOA–State Message. Ref: Department's CA 1862. [2] As result discussions State, FOA, Defense, we now plan authorize Embassy approach Egyptians along lines outlined below when Suez Base negotiations reach appropriate stage. This proposal intended implement commitment contained President's letter to Naguib re-

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 2092.

[2] Not printed.

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garding provision US military and economic assistance. Manner presentation to Egyptians to be left to Embassy's discretion although, as indicated, we desire omit specific figures. Information is for Embassy USOM use only and not for discussion with Egyptians at present.

(1) Military aid up to $25 million in end items. Specific elements to be determined by military survey team which would take into account Egypt's present availabilities and desirability Egypt's continuing procure from normal sources of supply. Subject to Congressional action, further limited contributions would be possible in future years. We prefer describe offer as "substantial amount of military end items". If Caffery considers it absolutely necessary to cite specific figure, he should later request authority from Washington.

(2) Military procurement assistance under Section 408(e) based either on list previously submitted by Egypt or new requests.

(3) Special economic aid up to $20 million subject agreement on sound projects. Additional five million might be available provided additional sound projects could be developed. We prefer avoid citing specific figures, but Caffery authorized do so if in his judgment this required. Furnishing of aid also subject to execution satisfactory single overall economic aid agreement or individual project agreements. Texts will be forwarded for your comments shortly.

(4) Technical assistance funds in amount as yet undetermined from FY 54 appropriation in addition to $10,934,000 carried over from FY 53.

SMITH

No. 1232

641.74/10-1953: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 19, 1953—6 p. m.

1686. Foreign Office stated today Secretary's suggestion re wording proposed text on availability (Secto 20 October 17) has been concurred in by Robertson and will be put to Egyptians when talks resume Wednesday.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 45.

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Commenting on bilateral talk between Secretary and Eden, Foreign Office official said confidentially he was "very glad" Secretary had put case re uniforms so strongly since Secretary's views corresponded exactly with those of Foreign Office. When Embassy officer expressed fear Egyptians might not accept proposals on uniforms outlined by Eden to Secretary, Foreign Office official stated "that event we should probably have another look at it", adding that in re-examining matter, British would want be very sure what Egyptian intentions actually were. He indicated CIGS taking very strong line on uniform question but Foreign Office still hopeful talks will not break on this point.

ALDRICH

No. 1233

641.74/10-2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, October 22, 1953—2 p. m.

488. Following British Embassy account Anglo-Egyptian meeting yesterday.

1. In carefully worded opening statement Robertson outlined British position as follows and tabled four formulae on key points.

a. Suez. As part general settlement UK accepts reference in preamble already discussed with Egyptians. (Formula: "Egypt and UK recognize Suez maritime canal is integral part of Egypt and a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance; and being determined to uphold the 1888 convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation of canal").

b. Duration. Seven years.

c. Withdrawal. As "new concession" 15 months from day agreement comes into force. Robertson informed Egyptians that as soon as agreement on principles reached UK planned on own initiative start important withdrawals.

d. Number technicians: 4000 for 4½ years (Phase one); prepared discuss members [*numbers*] Phase 2.

e. Uniforms. Robertson said this problem has received exaggerated public attention; it was obviously one susceptible solution by application common sense. UK prepared have technicians off duty wear normal civilian clothes; on duty wear working dress similar to that civilian firms. However, because British public would not understand UK could not accept formal denial right British soldiers wear British uniform. Robertson pointed out problem does not arise until after British forces withdraw by which time Egyptians had said popular attitude toward British would have materi-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 197.

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ally altered. Common sense would obviously be applied in deciding when uniforms should be worn. (British formula: "Outside base area and when off duty within it British personnel will wear civilian clothes. When on duty in base in installations or in transit between them they will normally wear working dress. However, Egyptian Government accepts in principle that they may wear service uniform and that they will do so when so directed. They may carry a weapon for their personal protection".) See paragraph 2*e* below. *Note:* Egyptians asked "directed by whom?" Reply was "by responsible British officer".

f. Consultation. UK wished agreement to contain clause covering what will happen at end agreement. (British formula: "Parties will consult together at end of period specified for duration of agreement to decide what agreements are necessary to provide for continued maintenance of base thereafter".)

g. Availability. Egyptians had already received UK's final concession on this point. (British formula: "(1) In the event of (a) an attack by an outside power on Egypt; or (b) an attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab mutual security pact; (c) a recommendation by the UN that the base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace or breach of peace or an act of aggression; Egypt will afford to the UK all such facilities as may be necessary to place base on war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes of Egyptian ports by British forces.

"(2) In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the members of the Arab mutual security pact Iran or Turkey there shall be immediate consultation between the UK and Egypt".)

h. Air facilities. UK agreed to text as discussed October 10.

i. Organization base. Prepared settle this issue at once in light Egyptian comments.

2. After 1½hour recess Egyptians returned and stated their position as follows:

a. Agreed Suez formula.

b. Agreed 7 year duration provided "7 years means 7 years only".

c. Agreed 15 month withdrawal.

d. Technicians. Agreed 4000 technicians 4½years; suggested 1000 technicians one year and 500 technicians final 1½years.

e. Uniforms. Principle contained third sentence British formula (paragraph 1e above) entirely unacceptable: Offered following new wording "on duty at installations and in transit between them they will wear a unified civilian dress to be agreed upon". Egyptians explained "unified civilian dress" (on which they agreed badges of rank could be worn) as being something like cork helmets, overalls or shorts and shirts (not khaki).

f. Consultation. Egyptians proposed consultation two years before end of agreement; if no agreement reached British to spend remaining period of agreement "withdrawing or otherwise disposing of remaining British owned property".

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Note: According British Embassy this proposal in effect limits agreement to 5 years since maintenance effective base impossible while in liquidation.

g. Availability. Agreed British formula with exception [(1)(c)] but offered no substitute (see Embtel 486 paragraph 7). [2]

h. Air facilities. Assured UK MFN treatment and "satisfaction" but avoided mention October 10 formula.

3. Robertson said Egypt response major British effort meet their requirements extremely disappointing: Main issues remained availability and uniforms. On former, UK thought its offer so good Egyptians could not refuse it. In any case this offer UK's final word as was UK offer re uniforms. Formal denial right wear uniforms would not be understood in UK. UK prepared discuss number technicians Phase 2 but Egypt figures "too low".

4. Foreign Minister Fawzi said, stage obviously reached when both sides must report: Said Egypt had nothing more offer re availability.

5. When publicity discussed, Salah Salim wanted statement saying only no agreement reached. "His colleagues suppressed him firmly and Egyptian delegation accepted text suggested by UK including reference to another meeting".

6. Robertson reported to London that throughout meeting Egyptians "showed no disposition to precipitate a break". British Embassy representative describes atmosphere meeting as friendly "and almost genial". British Embassy representative was left with impression that Egyptians genuinely want agreement that they "have no present intention of turning loose the commandos".

Comment: We urged RCC Tuesday night to be "friendly" with British during next days meeting and to avoid break.

CAFFERY

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[2] Paragraph 7 of telegram 486 from London, Oct. 21, not printed, reads as follows:

"7. Agreement was not reached on availability. Egyptians agreed to make base available in event attack on Egypt or attack on any member ALCSP and consultation in event of threat of attack on Turkey and Iran. Furthermore, they are willing to include a provision which sets out that Egypt "fully recognizes" her responsibilities under UN Charter and uniting for peace resolution." (641.74/10–2153)

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No. 1234

641.74/10-2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, October 22, 1953—3 p. m.

489. It appears from Egyptian and British accounts of yesterday's meeting (mytels 486 [2] and 488) that agreement on most issues is possible but it is clear that all attempts to compromise or gloss over underlying differences of principle on "uniforms" and "availability" have been unsuccessful. It is possible, therefore, unless concessions of principle are made, next meeting will see breakdown of talks.

(1) It strikes me that despite apparent reasonableness of latest British offer on uniforms British are in weak position in insisting on right of technicians to wear uniforms "when ordered" (British technical advisor would have right to order).

(a) Egyptians have never been willing to concede principle that technicians could publicly have other than civilian status. To do so would in Egyptian eyes be tantamount to accepting continuation of "occupation"—a thing which no Egyptian Government could do.

(b) British Government through Stevenson made proposal on April 11, 1951 [3] which included "progressive civilianization of the base. . .essential British civilian personnel being introduced as military personnel are withdrawn."

(c) From Egyptian viewpoint British position on uniforms shows no significant changes so long as right to wear military uniforms is insisted on. Therefore Egyptians feel British have not come through on Robertson's implied offer to trade concessions on uniforms and availability in return for Egyptian acceptance British views on base organization (mytel 462).[2]

(2) On "availability" stand Egyptians are on less firm ground. Despite Nasir's repeated insistence that automatic availability cannot be extended beyond case of attack on Arab State and that consultation adequately covers other situations, I believe there is slight remaining hope Egyptians could be persuaded go along with something very close to present British formula if British will abandon their position on uniforms.

It seems to me that what we want is an available base and that we are not very much interested in haberdashery.

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 198.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 356 ff.

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Our coin with Egyptians is pretty well exhausted, however, as a result of our repeatedly pushing them into concessions.

CAFFERY

No. 1235

641.74/10-2253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 23, 1953—7:15 p. m.

2202. After consideration all factors bearing on Anglo-Egyptian meeting October 21 we concur with Cairo's 489 that Egypt unlikely yield on substance two issues "availability" and "uniforms".

Re Availability. We believe little practical difference exists in effect of British wording on UN clause (Paragraph g Cairo's 488) and Egyptian offer to include specific reference to Egypt's responsibilities under UN Charter and Uniting for Peace Resolution (Cairo's 486). [2] In fact, Egyptian suggestion offers certain advantages to Western Powers over British wording: (1) Proposed re-affirmation of Egyptian responsibilities would have practical results comparable to those achieved by including in treaty clause suggested by British. (2) Under Egyptian proposal, Egypt would be under pressure make base available in event of UN recommendation either under Chapter VII or under Uniting for Peace Resolution while under British formula similar pressure would exist only in unlikely event UN specifically requested base.

Re Uniforms. Last meeting serves reinforce US view on uniforms as expressed to Eden by Secretary (London's Secto 20 and Dulte 2). [3] Our attitude remains as stated Tedul 5.

Embassy London requested bring foregoing to attention Foreign Office.

Egyptian UN Delegation today raised question implication consultation clause (paragraph f, Cairo's 488) and expressed fear this implied agreement would continue in perpetuity. Request clarification from UK and report from Cairo on whether matter raised there.

DULLES

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[1] Also sent to Cairo as telegram 472.
[2] See footnote 2, Document 1233.
[3] See footnote 3, Document 1230.

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No. 1236

641.74/10-2353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 23, 1953—6 p. m.

1780. Foreign Office version of Wednesday's Suez base meeting is that after Robertson stated British position and Egyptians rejected British proposals on availability and uniforms, (making no counterproposal in availability but suggesting "unified civilian dress") Robertson assumed very grave manner and told Egyptians he very disappointed their reply. He told them he did not see anything in their reply which would warrant his referring it to London. Robertson stressed UK position these two outstanding points was clear. According Robertson's report to Foreign Office, Egyptians manner then changed completely leading him conclude they had been trying see how far they could push him. He further thinks they were not in any event fully empowered to make agreement or break off talks then and there without referring to higher authority. In other words, British do not believe, in spite of Egyptians having characterized Wednesday's meeting as crucial that Egyptians really meant this. Foreign Office considers this impression confirmed by cordial atmosphere of meeting.

Robertson informed Egyptians their formula re "unified civilian dress" wholly unacceptable. As Egyptians had not made any suggestion re availability, there was no further discussion this point, although Foreign Office states Robertson left Egyptians in no doubt UK would consider counterproposal.

Cabinet yesterday approved reply to Robertson confirming position he took at Wednesday's meeting and next move is therefore up to Egyptians. No further proposals have been sent to Robertson.

When Embassy officer commented according our information Egyptians not prepared give in on British military uniforms, Foreign Office official pointed out Egyptian proposal of cork helmets, overalls or shorts and shirts (not khaki) with badges of rank (although according to Foreign Office "nonmilitary") were "out of question" adding Egyptians had been informed of this previously. On availability, however, Foreign Office hopeful some formula could be found that would be acceptable to Egyptians while retaining British wording re UN recommendation. Official added impossi-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 46.

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ble be more precise without knowing what Egyptians now have in mind on this point.

When I saw Eden this afternoon he confirmed above and said he did not think delay which would give Egyptians time to think matters over would do any harm at this time. Neither Foreign Office or Eden seem worried about possible effects early opening of universities referred to in Cairo's 357, September 23.

ALDRICH

No. 1237

641.74/10-2453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 24, 1953—11 p. m.

1789. Foreign Office commented as follows re views expressed Deptel 2202 October 23 on issues availability, uniforms and consultation in Suez negotiations.

1. Foreign Office does not see advantage suggested second paragraph reference telegram as regards Egyptian proposal re availability (which Foreign Office insists never given UK by Egyptians). Egypt would, in Foreign Office view, be under pressure in any event make base available under Chapter VII of Charter as preamble of draft agreement refers to both parties obligations under Charter. From UK point of view, precise definition of Egyptian obligation in event of "threat to peace et cetera" is very important in defending agreement against Parliamentary and other domestic criticism. Furthermore Foreign Office considers such precision necessary insure NATO members fully aware exact conditions under which base available to West.

2. Re uniforms, Foreign Office considers UK offer reasonable. UK has told Egyptians, and new formula (paragraph e Cairo's 488 October 22) makes clear in writing, that technicians except on very special occasions would not be in uniform. Foreign Office shares our view negotiations ought not to be allowed break on this point.

3. UK position these two issues remains as stated Embtel 1780 October 23. Foreign Office hopes United States will support UK on these issues and considers such support would be decisive as it ["] was in case of 7 years duration".

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 47.

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Embassy officer promised forward Foreign Office request but, of course made no commitment be [*re*] United States support. Reiterated our position as set forth Deptel 2202.

4. Re consultation, Robertson's instructions are "to try obtain arrangements by which parties would consult together at end period of agreement to decide what arrangements necessary provide for continued maintenance base." According Foreign Office, should Egyptians, after consultation, desire end arrangements with UK latter would have no legal basis perpetrate agreement.

Foreign Office, however, would hope more amicable relations resulting from evacuation et cetera might make Egyptians want continue agreement.

ALDRICH

No. 1238

641.74/10-2553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, October 25, 1953—2 p. m.

502. I feel it necessary make following observations re London's 1789.

1. Complacency of London Foreign Office disturbs me.

2. Paragraph 3 of London's 1789 impels me to remark that concessions made up to date by Egyptians have been obtained 90 odd percent by me. Also as has been said before even in Egypt it is impossible to continue indefinitely making bricks without straw.

3. Egyptians did not say they gave counterproposals on availability to British. Fawzi produced proposal as final Egyptian offer under pressure from me.

4. There is no point in engaging in debate with UK over desirability of "precise definition of Egyptian obligation" or "reasonableness" of UK offer re uniforms as there is no prospect of Egyptians accepting British position these two issues.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 204.

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No. 1239

641.74/10-2853: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, October 28, 1953—noon.

1830. After further discussion with Foreign Office, Embassy considers, because of domestic political considerations, it extremely doubtful UK will make further substantive concession on availability in Suez negotiations (Embtel 1780 October 23 and 1789 October 24). As Department is aware large segment Conservative Party opposes evacuation on grounds it would weaken defense link with Commonwealth countries and, like Abadan, constitute blow British prestige and consequently British power position throughout world. This viewpoint eloquently and vigorously presented at recent Conservative Conference by Julian Amery, brilliant young right wing MP (Embassy Despatch 1478 October 19) [2]. Amery's speech wildly acclaimed and there were many private expressions agreement. One responsible conservative MP (not of Amery group) told Foreign Office official government could fall on issue. Although Embassy doubts this government is certainly going to have considerable difficulty with own party both in and out of Parliament even if agreement secured on basis present British position. To minimize these difficulties, Government feels it must have some specific provision in agreement which makes base available in circumstances more consistent with Western defense requirements than merely attack on members ALSCP.

Embassy therefore believes government will consider that any formula which does not specifically provide for base being made available upon UN recommendation could not be defended within its own party and consequently unacceptable. Changes in wording would probably be considered provided UN recommendation retained.

ALDRICH

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 48.
[2] Not printed.

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No. 1240

874.00 TA/11-653: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 6, 1953—5:49 p. m.

519. Dept restudying on staff level question economic aid to Egypt. Point at issue is whether it would be best to launch program publicly at earliest possible moment or to follow our previous plans of awaiting UK-Egyptian agreement.

Factors seem to be these:

(a) *US–UK Relations.* Subject involves US–UK relations and would have to be discussed with UK. Over past year British have stressed that we make our assistance in economic rather than military field if time came when we felt we must in our own interests assist Egypt. We have over that period of time become increasingly committed to British against provision of military assistance prior to agreement on Suez Base. Record is less specific on economic assistance. We have at times felt that introducing such aid on our part might at right time prevent collapse negotiations. It was at time of exchange of letters between Naguib and President that our course of waiting for agreement seemed to become fixed. Naguib asked whether US could make definite commitments in both economic and military fields "simultaneously with the signing of the agreements." We responded affirmatively. We were all of course hopeful at that time that agreement would soon be reached. Query: Would British react strongly if US economic assistance preceded agreement on the Suez Base?

(b) *Status of Negotiations.* Negotiations deadlocked and chances successful conclusion far from certain. We cannot discard possibility that British for domestic political reasons are coming to conclusion they cannot afford agreement with Egypt at this time. Whether this is case or not, failure negotiations on question of uniforms would be on an issue which neither we nor world opinion could consider significant from viewpoint either US or UK security. On remaining question on availability we also see no real security, as distinct from domestic political, significance as in operative sense even British formula appears meaningless. If negotiations fail we consider it to be in interests both US and UK that we retain as much influence in Egypt as is possible under circumstances. As seen from here it would be most difficult and perhaps impossible retain any position at all. Conditions might be such that we could not extend even economic assistance. On other hand if it could be used profitably and help retain US position we would wish to proceed. Query: Is holding back of US economic assistance, upon which Egyptians feel we are administratively able to proceed, an adverse or beneficial factor upon remaining negotiations? Query: Is it more

[1] Also sent to London as telegram 2473. Drafted by Byroade and approved by Jernegan.

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difficult from viewpoint of US–UK relations to start economic assistance while negotiations still in process or immediately after a break in negotiations?

(c) *US Position in the Middle East.* Developments in Israeli-Arab matters have seriously affected US position in many of Arab states. Strong measures of US in temporarily withholding assistance to Israel and in taking Qibya aggression before Security Council [2] have not offset reaction against US by acts of what they look upon as US-sponsored state of Israel. We have now announced resumption aid to Israel and would like follow quickly with some assistance on Arab side. Assistance to Arab states takes form of developing projects which are difficult to start. We are therefore some stage away from conclusion of any negotiations and agreements will be of type which do not normally lend themselves to announcement of any specific magnitude of assistance. Query: Is our situation in Arab world as seen from Cairo such that we should adopt different procedure with Egypt, leader of these Arab states, and plan for early announcement of economic assistance to Egypt working out details later?

Request comments Cairo and London without discussion Foreign Offices including appraisal by London real intentions British at this stage re Egypt.

SMITH

[2] For documentation regarding the Qibya aggression, see Documents 947 ff.

No. 1241

874.00 TA/11-953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, November 9, 1953—10 p. m.

543. In reply Deptel 519 I have following comments to make:

(1) British will probably (as they did in case of military aid last year) make every effort to prevent US economic assistance to Egypt at this point.

(2) Up to time of Byroade-Badawi conversation [2] Egyptians had been led to understand that all aid was conditional on Anglo-Egyp-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 211.

[2] Assistant Secretary of State Byroade and Dr. Bahgat Badawi, the Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry, had a conversation on Oct. 20. Byroade asked Badawi if the granting of economic aid previous to the settlement of the Suez base issue would be more advantageous to Naguib than would an announcement, after the settlement, of a single larger package of military and economic aid. The Egyptian answer was that such a step was preferable, and Byroade said he would look into this possibility. (774.5 MSP/10–2053)

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tian agreement. Thus RCC's decision to stand fast on availability and uniforms was taken in expectation that it meant no aid.

(3) In light of above it is most unlikely that continuing to hold back economic assistance will induce change in Egyptian position. On other hand if we fail to do anything positive at this juncture (particularly since possibility of early economic aid has been mentioned to Badawi and Egyptian Ambassador) we will be a long time convincing Egyptians that US foreign policy is not "made in Downing Street".

(4) It is my impression that both sides are content to let present situation continue until outcome of Sudan elections are known. Furthermore, Stevenson has let me know he is returning end of the month. Stevenson is more realistic than Robertson and Hankey who probably will be leaving. Hankey is ill and Robertson goes to his new job. There will probably, therefore, be few more quiet weeks in which to try to lay ground work for possible resumption of talks. I believe announcement of US economic assistance during this period would be much less difficult from viewpoint US–UK relations than afterwards. I also believe it would have maximum beneficial effect on both Egyptians and British (assuming base agreement remains our goal).

(5) Prompt announcement of significant economic assistance to Egypt while it might not necessarily please other Arab League States might help to counteract adverse effect of recent $26 million release to Israel. It would also set hopeful example for Arab countries and increase Egyptian disposition to be helpful with them on Jordan Valley scheme. [3]

CAFFERY

[3] For documentation regarding the Jordan Valley project, see Documents 381 ff.

No. 1242

874.00 TA/11-1053: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Penfield) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 10, 1953—noon.

2030. We believe British would regard it as gross breach of faith if we went ahead with economic aid Egypt (Deptel 2473) [2] without prior consultation UK. Our thinking based on specific statements

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 50.
[2] Printed as telegram 519 to Cairo, Document 1240.

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by Foreign Office officials as well as attitude consistently maintained by British throughout course of Suez talks to effect that although we not actual participants, they regard us as enjoying very special relationship within framework talks.

Therefore, if, as would appear, US is considering extending economic aid to Egypt at this time, it would, in our view, be essential for UK to be consulted in advance. Nature of British reaction (paragraph a, Department's reference telegram) would undoubtedly depend on timing of proposed extension aid although we would not expect British to oppose aid in principle unless it appeared we were trying use it to encourage Naguib resist some given British proposal. We believe foregoing to considerable extent answers queries contained paragraph b, Department's reference telegram. We are inclined minimize effect on negotiations one way or the other of our withholding aid, always provided UK consulted first and no evidence we seeking apply pressure. British reaction in event breakdown negotiations more difficult to assess but not necessarily adverse provided it clear we not attempting reward Naguib for causing breakdown.

Our view of UK's real intentions re Egypt at this stage (last paragraph Department's reference telegram) is that British most desirous of reaching agreement with Egypt in spite of domestic political pressure (Embassy's telegram 1830, October 28) [3] which will undoubtedly continue to play important role in determining extent to which British can make concessions re two main outstanding issues of uniforms and availability.

PENFIELD

[3] Not printed.

No. 1243

874.00 TA/11–1253

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 12, 1953.

Subject: Economic Aid to Egypt

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Burdett.

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Discussion:

Attached are three messages on the above subject which should be read in order listed:

1. Deptel 2473 [2] posing the problem on timing of economic aid to Egypt and requesting views of Caffery and Aldrich. (Tab A)
2. Embassy Cairo's 543 recommending that such aid be extended. (Tab B)
3. Embassy London's 2030 expressing no definite opinion on extension of aid, but urging discussion with the UK in advance. (Tab C)

Recommendations:

1. That you or the Under Secretary call in the British Ambassador and make the following points:

a. We plan to initiate discussions with Egypt in the immediate future on economic aid.
b. This action is needed to strengthen the U.S. position (and thereby the British) in Cairo. It will enable us to assist more effectively in overcoming the remaining obstacles to a base agreement. It is also necessary to offset the effect in the Near East of the release of $26 million to Israel.
c. The amount involved has not been finally determined but will range from $20 to $27.5 million.
d. We plan to make a public announcement at an appropriate time.
e. There has been no change in our intention to withhold military aid pending the outcome of negotiations.
f. There is no change in our views on the issues still outstanding in the Suez Base talks.
g. We will be glad to consider any comments the UK may wish to make, but would appreciate receiving them as soon as possible since we feel this matter is very urgent.

2. That you authorize me to seek agreement from FOA to allot $27.5 million for Egypt. This is the amount recommended by Ambassador Caffery. To counter in the Arab states the release to Israel, the amount allotted to Egypt should be greater than $26 million. Previously tentative agreement was reached between State and FOA that Egypt should receive $20 million from FY '54 special economic aid funds, with the possibility that an additional $5 million would be available provided suitable projects can be developed.

3. That at the appropriate time we work out with the Egyptians a public announcement to be released simultaneously here and in Cairo. In accordance with our desire to relate economic aid to specific projects we would endeavor to use such phraseology as "substantial amount" to describe the amount of aid planned, but if

[2] Printed as telegram 519 to Cairo, Document 1240.

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pressed by the Egyptians would mention a figure of up to $27.5 million dependent upon the presentation of satisfactory projects.

Concurrences:

EUR feels strongly that the British should be consulted about the matter rather than merely informed that we have taken the decision to proceed forthwith. (Memorandum from Mr. Merchant attached hereto.) (Tab D) [3]

[3] *Infra.*

No. 1244

874.00 TA/11-1253

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 12, 1953.

Subject: Economic Aid to Egypt.

Discussion:

Reference Mr. Byroade's memorandum to you of today's date in which he recommends that you or General Smith call in the British Ambassador and inform him that we plan to initiate discussions with Egypt in the immediate future with a view to granting $27.5 million in economic assistance. It is evidently proposed to tell the Ambassador that although we will consider any comments the U.K. may wish to make, we have taken our decision and feel obliged to move forward immediately.

EUR feels strongly that, as the Embassy at London reported in its telegram No. 2030 of November 10, "the British would regard it as gross breach of faith if we went ahead with economic aid to Egypt without prior consultation with the U.K." We do not expect, nor does the Embassy, that the British will oppose aid in principle unless it appeared that we were trying to use it to encourage Naguib to resist some given British proposal. The Embassy says, and this is also our judgment, that the nature of the British reaction will undoubtedly depend on the timing rather than on the substance of our program.

We fully appreciate the value of the program of economic aid to Egypt and we raise no question whatever in this regard. We do seriously question, however, NEA's recommendations that the Brit-

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Andrew B. Foster, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

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ish should be told in effect that we have taken our decision and intend to proceed immediately without regard to their views. It has not seemed to us that the situation in Egypt has reached the point which would justify us in risking what the Embassy describes as a "gross breach of faith" in failing to consult, in the true sense of that word, with the United Kingdom. We have in mind among other things our present efforts to persuade the British to modify their position with regard to availability and uniforms, as well as their considerable sensitivity on the Egyptian problem by reason of the domestic political situation in the U.K.

Recommendation:

The U.K. should be consulted, rather than merely informed, about our plans to grant economic assistance to Egypt.

No. 1245

641.74/11-1253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 12, 1953—4:56 p. m.

2570. Following is possible language re Suez Base on "availability" and "uniforms" which conforms to Secretary's suggestions to UK Ambassador (Deptel 2521). [2]

Availability—UN clause to read "In the event of a recommendation by the UN that the base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace or breach of the peace or an act of aggression by an outside power, and recognizing her responsibilities under the UN Charter and the Uniting-for-Peace resolution; Egypt will afford etc." (Cairo's 488). This retains UN action as criterion for availability and should dissipate possible Egyptian fear clause would be invoked in dispute between Arab States and Israel. Citing responsibilities under UN Charter and Uniting-for-Peace resolution as basis for clause might make it more palatable to Egyptians.

Uniforms—"Outside base area and when off duty within it British personnel will wear civilian clothes. When on duty in base in-

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 538.

[2] In telegram 2521 to London, Nov. 9, not printed, the Embassy was informed that on Nov. 3, the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador discussed the Suez Base negotiations. The Ambassador stated that availability was still the great obstacle, saying that the Egyptians had rejected language from the Uniting for Peace Resolution because they suspected it might be invoked in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Secretary of State suggested that some formula under which United Nations action could still be used should be found with the qualification that the Arab-Israel conflict should be excluded. (641.74/11-953)

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stallations or in transit between them they will normally wear distinctive civilian working dress. They may wear service uniforms when so directed by the Base Commander. The Base Commander shall so direct on appropriate occasions." This is in accord our view UK should meet Egyptian position on uniforms. Problem does not arise until after British forces withdraw by which time popular feeling towards British should have materially altered. By this time probable Egyptians willing authorize use service uniform on ceremonial occasions when desired by British.

London requested discuss with Foreign Office. At same time Embassy should inquire when British plan make next approach to Egypt. Our understanding of last meeting is that British told Egyptians they would consider situation and communicate with Egyptians.

DULLES

No. 1246

641.74/11-1353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 13, 1953—7 p. m.

2095. Deptel 2570 re Suez base discussed today with Foreign Office official who undertook furnish comment soonest on our proposed wording re availability and uniforms. Foreign Office has sent instructions to British Ambassador Washington to inform Department that Foreign Office does not believe Egyptians oppose British availability formula on grounds possible invocation in an Arab-Israel conflict. Foreign Office believes Egyptian opposition more likely based on reluctance, admittedly understandable, make base automatically available under certain conditions without prior consultation.

Re wording Department reference telegram, preliminary Foreign Office reaction is that addition of specific recognition of responsibilities under UN Charter and Uniting for Peace resolution would probably not be objected to by British if this wording satisfactory to Egyptians. Foreign Office inclined to doubt latter would be case in view its interpretations, given above, of Egyptian opposition to availability formula but obvious unable speak for Egypt on this score.

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 51.

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Re uniforms, Foreign Office, while entirely agreeing with Department that problem will not arise until after British forces withdrawn by which time popular feeling toward British should have materially altered, believes British will have to continue insisting on formula presented to Egyptians at last meeting. Foreign Office still hopeful, however, talks will not break down on this point and thinks if agreement can be reached on availability Egyptians will give in on uniforms.

Asked when British planning make next approach to Egypt, official stated no such intention since British position remains (Embtel 1780, October 23 and 1857, October 29) [2] that next move is up to Egyptians. Department's understanding this connection therefore appears erroneous. Official added that although UK still desires agreement and believes Egyptians do too, both sides now seem to be coming around to belief it might be best await outcome Sudan elections. [3]

ALDRICH

[2] Not printed.

[3] The Embassy in London in telegram 2112, Nov. 16, not printed, reported that Eden had examined the proposed wording regarding availability and uniforms as transmitted by the Department in telegram 2570, *supra*, and had approved the preliminary line taken by the Foreign Office as reported in this telegram. The British attitude on both points was still that they had made their position plain to the Egyptians, and that it was up to Egypt to propose new language. (641.74/11-1653)

No. 1247

874.00 TA/11-1353: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 13, 1953—7:32 p. m.

2603. For Eden from Secretary. We have reached point in Israeli-Arab relations where it is of utmost importance to announce allotment economic aid to Arabs to counter recent announcement economic aid allotment to Israel. The only place where we would be in shape promptly to make an economic allotment of substantial size is Egypt. We have been holding up all assistance to Egypt in effort help settlement Suez matter. However this settlement has dragged out to a point where we cannot continue much longer without very grave effect upon our Arab relationships. If you felt that it was likely there would soon be new moves in Suez matter which might

[1] Drafted and approved by the Secretary of State.

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produce agreement, we could still hold up briefly but our time is fast running out.

Before making final decision would appreciate your reactions.

DULLES

No. 1248

874.00 TA/11-1853: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 18, 1953—11 a. m.

2135. For the Secretary. At his request I saw Eden late yesterday. He handed me following reply to message contained Deptel 2603, November 13:

"I must most urgently ask you to postpone a decision on proposed economic aid to Egypt at least until we have had a chance of discussing it at Bermuda. [2]

In my view an allotment to Egypt at this juncture could not fail to give publicity to a major divergence of British and American policies, and thus to have a serious effect on Anglo-American relations. It would have the appearance of encouraging the Egyptians to stand out in their demands against us and it would remove an important inducement to them to reach an agreement with us".

Report on conversation in following telegram. [3]

ALDRICH

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 562.

[2] The Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, which had been postponed in June 1953, was rescheduled and held Dec. 4–8. Both Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden were present for the meetings. Regarding the conference, see telegram 638 to Cairo, Dec. 9, *infra*, and telegram 649 to Cairo, Document 1250. For additional documentation, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

[3] Not printed.

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No. 1249

641.74/12-953: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 9, 1953—1:50 p. m.

638. For Caffery. Egyptian problem discussed informally with Eden as opportunities presented themselves at Bermuda. Time required for scheduled tripartite items did not allow formal bipartite meetings. Matter was raised only briefly in formal Tripartite Heads of Govt conference with inconclusive results. Minutes that meeting will be air pouched.

Eden informed Secy they could not politically make any further concessions. This all the more binding in view of results Sudanese elections. He had assumed whichever side won out in elections could afford to move a bit farther on Suez problem. Reaction Parliament to elections would now make it difficult even go thru with their present positions. Nevertheless they would do so if Egyptians could agree. Problem complicated in London by success Zionists with Labor Party, who now demand guarantees for Israel, and revolt within Conservative Party. Eden felt some slight flexibility on availability formula might be possible but could do nothing on uniforms.

Secy informed Eden we could not stall much longer on extension of economic aid to Egypt. He used date of Jan 1 as date by which we would have to act. Eden felt this extremely serious as regards US–UK relations and hoped we could support their positions with such vigor that agreement could be obtained prior to extension of US aid. Robertson felt agreement possible with our help. Regretted our reporting led us to different conclusion. Eden stated if Conservatives fell on this issue this could not benefit Egyptians as under those conditions Egypt could only be offered less by new government. He personally knew Sudan agreement had been right and present British position base talks have not conceded more than British should to get agreement but large body of opinion in Parliament was of opposite view. Secy stated we would do what we could but were pessimistic re outcome and repeated his view on extension economic aid.

In conversation subsequent Secy departure Byroade asked Eden could we agree on (1) concession on availability formula (2) public UK support extension economic aid and (3) we inform Egyptians question of uniforms political fact of life which would prevent

[1] Repeated priority to London for Ambassador Aldrich as telegram 3041. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

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agreement unless they accepted. Eden said could never publicly support US aid prior to agreement. When asked if they could support aid as part of agreement (rather than subsequent to agreement) he was cautious but stated would think it over. He was then given following availability formula as suggestion with stipulation we didn't know how Egyptians would react:

"Egypt and the UK fully recognize their obligations under the United Nations Charter and the Uniting-for-Peace Resolution of the General Assembly regarding collective security measures, and their application to the use of the base in the event of a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace or an act of aggression by an outside power."

Eden said they would study carefully and let us have their reaction.

Secy seeing Egyptian Amb here tomorrow. Caffery should await report of line to be taken by Secy with him prior to discussions in Cairo.

DULLES

No. 1250

641.74/12–1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 10, 1953—8:11 p. m.

649. For Caffery. Secy saw Egyptian Ambassador today re Bermuda. Secy said he personally convinced after long discussions with Brit that they could not, from domestic political point of view, make further concessions of substance. He explained situation in London, including Zionist impact upon Labor Party, revolt in Conservative Party, effect of Sudanese elections, etc., as outlined in Deptel 638 to Cairo, repeated London 3041. Secy felt that Eden had accurately portrayed situation in London which was confirmed by our own independent reporting.

Secy stated he felt it impossible for us to accomplish anything by further urging Britain to make further concessions under above conditions. He felt it now up to Egypt to weigh seriously facts of the situation. He urged strongly that Egypt consider advantages of seeking agreement along lines now apparently possible as contrasted with grave effects of non-agreement. Choice of these two alternatives now revolved about two specific issues of relative non-im-

[1] Repeated priority to London for Ambassador Aldrich as telegram 3095. Drafted and approved by Byroade after being cleared in draft with the Secretary of State.

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portance from a practical point of view. He hoped Naguib, particularly after being strengthened by Sudanese elections, would take statesmanlike view of situation and make best of it by accepting early agreement with the British. If this could be done Secy felt Egypt and US could move together into more constructive planning and development for the future.

Egyptian Ambassador given no hint of new availability formula we had urged upon Eden or that Eden had indicated some slight flexibility might be forthcoming on this point.

Do not believe Ambassador grasped full import of Secy's remarks and fear he may not objectively report conversation or situation as we see it.

Caffery should do utmost under these difficult conditions persuade Egyptians carefully weigh alternatives prior to their final decision. Our own estimate of situation is that British prepared to make agreement if Egyptians act promptly but this may not be the case for long in view of British political problems.

DULLES

No. 1251

641.74/12-1153: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 11, 1953—6 p. m.

2559. With concurrence Eden, who met at Foreign Office with advisers regarding Egypt on returning today, British Embassy Washington is being instructed inform Department that availability formula suggested to Eden at Bermuda (Department telegram 638, repeated London 3041) does not appear adequate, at least in present form. British feel that merely referring to "application" of Charter and Uniting for Peace resolution would not ensure that the base would be made immediately available. Moreover, they have recently received indications from Cairo that Egyptians may be coming round to accepting earlier British formula in which specific reference to "global war" was made and which would fully meet British requirements.

British are "delighted" and "heartened" by Secretary's conversation with Egyptian Ambassador (Department telegram 649 to Cairo

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 61.

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repeated London 3095) of which they learned from British Embassy Washington.

Stevenson, who left yesterday for Egypt, is not carrying any new proposals regarding Suez talks, but was instructed to sound Egyptians out of an early date along lines proposals put forward by British at October 21 meeting.

Eden is meeting this afternoon with Conservative back-benchers (Embassy telegram 2534) [2] in effort allay their fears.

ALDRICH

[2] Not printed.

No. 1252

641.74/12-1253: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 12, 1953—11:09 a. m.

656. Following Secretary's talk Egyptian Ambassador, reported Department's telegram 649 to Cairo, repeated 3095 London, Ambassador discussed situation by telephone with Nasir. Apparently decision reached Ambassador return Cairo for consultation shortly after December 15. Ambassador states Nasir said no decision would be reached prior Ambassador's discussion in Cairo.

Hussein tells us he will make determined try Cairo but very pessimistic chances of success. He believes Egyptian Government will take view that British do not really want agreement and that if they make concessions on two remaining outstanding points British will thereafter raise other obstacles (believe Hussein personally holds this view).

Hussein feels he might have chance convincing Government to accept British position, or something similar thereto, on two outstanding points if he were in position state United States would guarantee total agreement would then be possible.

We believe point raised by Hussein represents honest concern of Egyptians and does not seem unreasonable. Nor does it seem improper, in return for strong support we giving British, for United States to have assurances along same lines. This particularly true as in past British have asked for and received our support on points they classified as all-important and final only to raise additional points for our support subsequently.

[1] Also sent priority to London as telegram 3133.

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We would like to ask British for such assurances if we can work out procedures from practical point of view and avoid commitment to support Egypt on all other minor points still unsettled. If so-called "agreement on principles" was already drafted in agreed text except for question of uniforms and availability perhaps British commitment could be obtained to sign document without further alteration or addition if Egyptians meet them on these points.

Caffery and Aldrich requested inform status of drafting and whether it is planned that preliminary agreement on principles would be signed or merely final detailed agreement. Would it be possible for British prepare "agreement on principles" which they think would be acceptable to Egyptians with exception of uniforms and availability sections?

From our own point of view best procedure would seem to be that United Kingdom: 1. Prepare "agreement on principles" acceptable to Egyptians except for uniforms and availability sections. 2. Provide us assurances they prepared sign such "agreement on principles" provided Egyptians accept their formula on availability and uniforms. 3. Defer until later working out final detailed agreement covering such factors as jurisdiction etc. We would then be in position to tell Egyptians we have United Kingdom assurance such document will be signed if Egyptians accept British position on availability and uniforms. "Agreement on principles" could be played publicly as settlement Base question between United Kingdom and Egypt following which British troops would begin to evacuate. Simultaneously with such an agreement United States economic and military assistance could publicly commence. If United Kingdom and Egypt get into trouble later on details, at least a certain momentum would have been started.

Request Caffery's and Aldrich's comments on feasibility this procedure. Also any ideas they may have as to form of assurance to be obtained from United Kingdom and manner to avoid getting United States in box where Egyptians would be led to believe we would support their position on all minor points to be covered by final detailed agreement. [2]

SMITH

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[2] The contents of this telegram were transmitted by the Department to the Secretary of State in Paris in telegram Tedul 2, Dec. 13, not printed. (110.11 DU/12–1353) Secretary Dulles was in Paris at this time attending the North Atlantic Council meetings. For documentation regarding these meetings, see vol.v, Part 1, pp. 549 ff.

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No. 1253

641.74/12-1453: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, December 14, 1953—8 p. m.

675. As I reported in my telegram 666, December 12 [2] on Saturday last I endeavored to influence Egyptians to accept British proposals on availability and uniforms. As yet Egyptians have made no direct comment. Indirectly their reactions are not encouraging. (My telegram 664, December 12). [3]

Following are my comments as requested on Deptel 656.

1. No draft agreement on principles (even with exception availability and uniforms) exists. Embtel 488, October 22 sets out extent verbal agreement reached at last Anglo-Egypt meeting. Egyptians have always hesitated commit themselves to drafts in absence agreement on "important" matters of principle.

2. Only extensive written proposal which Egyptians have made is one they have under heavy pressure from US prior to Washington talks (Embtels 35, July 10 and 44, July 11). Egyptians have since made important concessions under pressure from us (e.g. 7 years duration). On my urging they also agreed to substance British paper on base training which Robertson and Hankey said might "go far to alter British cabinet attitude re availability and uniforms". (My telegrams 437, October 11 and 462, October 17). [4]

3. In absence any substantial British concessions on these points Egyptians have maintained that large measure of agreement apparently reached is conditional upon satisfactory resolution remaining issues of principle. Also as Department points out in Deptel 656 Egyptians frequently assert that "British do not really want agreement and if they make concessions on two remaining outstanding points British will thereafter raise other obstacles. Suggestion Deptel 656 thus appears have little prospect of acceptance by Egypt although there is possibility its acceptance if British prepared make even slight concession on availability and compromise on uniform question.

4. Egyptians have always argued for prompt agreement on principles and subsequent working out of details but British have heretofore declined accept this.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 238 and niact to Paris as telegram 36 for the Secretary of State.

[2] In telegram 666 from Cairo, Dec. 12, not printed, Caffery reported that he conveyed the substance of telegram 649 to Cairo, Document 1250, to Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister. Caffery reported that Fawzi did not commit himself to the American proposals. (641.74/12-1253)

[3] Not printed.

[4] Neither printed.

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No. 1254

641.74/12-1453: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 14, 1953—4 p. m.

2603. Deptel 3133 December 12 [2] and Embtel 2585. [3] Embassy officers discussed Suez negotiations with R. Allen today in attempt elicit as much information as possible without specifically mentioning plan outlined Department reference telegram. Following is substance Allen's comments.

British envisage present talks as concluding in agreed written heads of agreement which would immediately be made public and would be followed promptly by formal negotiations on definitive agreement. Sole important subjects, in addition to those covered in heads of agreement, that would be included in definitive agreement are status of forces and financial arrangements. British have no intention introducing these topics into present heads of agreement discussions as they fully realize negotiations on definitive agreement for them would be extended and difficult. Allen, however, volunteered comment that it would be easy for UK to raise status of forces or some such other question if it should decide not to attempt reach immediate agreement. He was disturbed over Bevan's articles in Egyptian paper which he said were stimulating renewed labor agitation to "stay in Egypt". Allen appeared to be concerned that Churchill might suddenly decide to reverse government policy and side with Tory rebels.

Allen said following heads of agreement topics not fully agreed, in addition to availability and uniforms: (1) British have offered troop withdrawal within 15 months from signature definitive agreement, Egyptians are asking that 15 month period start with signature heads of agreement; (2) run down schedule for technicians not fully agreed; (3) definitive agreement to be of seven year

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 66 and to Paris as telegram 390 for the Secretary of State.

[2] Printed as telegram 656 to Cairo, Document 1252.

[3] In telegram 2585 from London, Dec. 13, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich reported that the British position was that the negotiations had not reached an impasse, and that they hoped the United States would not give aid to the Egyptians until they had another opportunity to come to a final agreement with the Egyptians. Moreover, Aldrich expressed doubt about the feasibility of the procedure outlined in telegram 656 to Cairo, Document 1252, but suggested that it could be explored further by the Secretary of State with Eden in Paris. Aldrich hoped, however, that no definite action would be taken until he had an opportunity to discuss the question with Byroade and the Secretary of State. (641.74/12-1353)

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duration with provision for consultation on future arrangements at some period, which Allen said would be one year, before expiration; Egyptians have made counter-proposal; (4) terms of RAF staging facilities still to be determined.

Re withdrawal, Allen said British willing give oral assurances to Egyptians that they would start withdrawing troops as soon as heads of agreement signed provided situation in Canal Zone at that time should permit this. Allen declared, however, present situation would not so permit as Egyptians would have to cooperate in suppression incidents such as have been recently occurring and in general "improve atmosphere".

Allen states that points (1) and (4) above are essential to British: (4) because of need for facilities and (1) because if British committed to evacuation 15 months from signature heads of agreement, Egyptians would be free to stall on definitive agreement and thus obligate British troop evacuation without signing definitive agreement. British also attach considerable importance to points (2) and (3) but anticipate they could be agreed with Egyptians without too much difficulty.

Allen regards above four numbered points in different category from availability and uniforms, as Egyptians have definitely said no on latter but have refused to say either yes or no on former. British could draft heads of agreement document they would be willing to sign but have not done so because of Egyptian unwillingness to discuss above four numbered topics on which British feel Egyptians are holding out for bargaining purposes, before agreement reached on availability and uniforms (Cairo's 516, October 28). [4]

BUTTERWORTH

[4] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 516 from Cairo, Oct. 28, not printed, that the British in Cairo had received instructions to stand fast on their bargaining position with the Egyptians. (641.74/10-2853)

No. 1255

641.74/12-1653: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 16, 1953—4 p. m.

2311. Secretary in private luncheon conversation with Eden December 15 initiated discussion Egypt by stressing:

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 557 and to Cairo as telegram 2[illegible].

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(1) Agreements reached between UK and Egypt on all major items of principle other than availability and uniform should be reduced to writing.

(2) British should make clear they would raise no additional demands on Egyptians after agreement reached on major points already covered and on availability and uniforms. Eden insisted agreement clearly reached but not put in writing because Egypt did not desire agreed documentation. Conversation indicated British:

(1) Relying on own minutes to support assumption certain points already firmly agreed;

(2) Fear reduction agreements to writing would prompt Egyptians reopen points British regard as already agreed;

(3) Prepared negotiate written document from now on, even in treaty form, if Egyptians desire;

(4) Now awaiting Egyptian response re availability and uniform provisions which were submitted in precise language to Egypt;

(5) Unable concede anything further to Egypt because of rebellion in Conservative Party;

(6) Would face still more vehement opposition in Parliament to any agreement on Suez if Naguib visits Sudan as planned.

Secretary reemphasized need for written summary of British understanding of agreement already reached, both for US and Egyptian use. US needs understand position of British in negotiations which US has undertaken to support. Secretary further pointed out any agreement not reducible to writing was tenuous at best.

Secretary inquired what other points required to be negotiated and as example mentioned status of forces. Eden replied British felt that when British-Egyptian agreement reached on "principles of agreement" improvement in general climate would follow and thereby facilitate negotiation of any other points. He said British have in mind agreement along line UK-Libyan agreement on status of forces. No mention made by Eden of need for financial agreement referred to in London's 2603 to Department repeated Paris 390 (which Secretary saw only after reported conversation with Eden). Furthermore, Eden gave no indication that four points listed reference telegram remained imprecise or unagreed.

Eden showed considerable annoyance at pressure applied during conversation and stated there was limit to which he could carry government position. He promised, however, to take look *ab initio*, on return to London, entire situation including points Secretary had raised.

ACHILLES

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No. 1256

641.74/12-1653: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 16, 1953—11 p. m.

2320. Merchant spoke Dixon further December 16 concerning points made by Secretary in his talk with Eden on December 15. Former pointed out that our understanding (based on London's 2603 to Department of December 14) was that in fact there was ambiguity or non-agreement on four specific subjects already considered agreed according to Eden between British and Egyptians. Merchant also pointed out that status of forces agreement particularly if comparable to what one would assume British had obtained from the King of Libya, would in all probability prove extremely thorny subject. He added that financial arrangements apparently have not been raised as yet and that this subject could contain difficulties.

Merchant went on to say that speaking in all frankness, there was a considerable body of American opinion which believes that present British Government had in fact no intention of negotiating any agreement on Suez with Egypt; and that failure to reduce reported points agreed to precision in writing, plus existence at least two difficult subjects as yet untouched, gave color to contention that even if Egyptians accepted British position on availability and uniforms, the British would be unwilling to initial agreement but would introduce further demands. Merchant added that we had over long period desired to be helpful and in our judgment, in large part through Caffery's efforts, had brought Egyptians long way down road to agreement, but that it was virtually impossible to support them when we did not know in fact what true British position was and hence what we were supporting.

Dixon acknowledged real risk of misunderstanding and said that all this was helpful in their understanding of our suggestion that agreed points reached to date be reduced to writing. He said he would discuss it further with Eden on their return to London.

Dixon then went on to say that revolt within Conservative party on Suez issue was extremely serious and that, whereas there is no doubt as to Eden's desire and intention to reach an agreement with Egyptians, he was in for serious fight in which he naturally was heavily involved.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 562 and to Cairo as telegram 28.

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Finally, Merchant told Dixon that the Secretary was deadly serious when he had told Mr. Eden earlier that he did not see how he could hold off on economic aid to Egypt beyond January first.

ACHILLES

No. 1257

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

TOP SECRET LONDON, December 19, 1953.

MY DEAR FRIEND: I am very much worried at the idea of the grant of American economic aid to Egypt at a time when our differences with them are so acute. It would, I am sure, have a grave effect in this country on Anglo-American relations. The Socialist opposition would use it to urge us to press for the inclusion of Red China in U.N.O. and might class it with trade to that country upon which subject McCarthy's unjust charges are already much resented. The frontier of the Suez Canal zone shows very much the same conditions of unrest and potential warfare as does the frontier in Korea. So much for the opposition. On our Conservative side too we have a disturbed and increasingly angered section who could at any time cancel our modest majority. They would not, I think, do that, but the fact ought not to be ignored.

Whether in your policies and immense responsibilities you would get much help from a Socialist Government, I shall not attempt to predict, and it would not be my business anyhow. What I fear, however, is that the offended Conservatives might add their voices to that section of the Socialist Party who criticize the United States. In fact I think there would be a considerable out-pouring which of course would be used in America by all who are hostile to the unity of action of the English-speaking world. This would make more difficult the solving of those large problems which occupy your mind and in which I do all I can to help. I ask you to think over this particular proposal about Egypt with due regard to its setting in the general picture, which may be out of proportion to your interest or ours. We have not the slightest intention of making any more concessions to Egypt after all we have done in these long negotiations, and fighting might easily occur at any moment.

[Here follows discussion of the European Defense Community concept.]

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Kindest regards,

WINSTON

No. 1258

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill"

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1953.

MY DEAR WINSTON: You are so well aware of my convictions as to the necessity for sound and friendly Anglo-American relations that you must keenly realize the concern I feel over the somber tone of your cabled message. [1]

Because it is a personal communication, I am answering in the same fashion, without waiting to call together the State Department staffs which will be, of course, deeply interested in what you have to say. I shall hope to get this cable off to you the first thing Monday morning so that I may have your further observations on certain delicate phases of this matter.

In considering our common interests in various areas, I am, of course, anxious to take into consideration your particular political problems and to adjust our activities so as best to accommodate your position so long as this leads toward a satisfactory solution. We likewise have our political problems. For example, our aid program for the Mid-East was drawn up and was approved by the Congress on the basis that there would be a reasonable division of aid between Israel and Arab countries.

Since we have already made allocations to Israel, we have little excuse to avoid moving in the case of the Arab countries, but as you know, at your request we have not only withheld military aid from Egypt, but have likewise postponed several times the initiation of economic aid.

You state that the Socialist Opposition would be bitterly resentful of American economic aid to Egypt because of the American objection to trade with Communist China. It has been my understanding that Britain has continued to carry on trade in economic non-strategic items with Red China, and we do not now propose more with respect to Egypt than beginning to help develop its economy. Consequently, I am at a loss to understand the basis on which the Socialists could make a logical attack. You likewise mention that the Opposition would resent any economic aid to Egypt so bit-

[1] Presumably the reference here is to Churchill's message of Dec. 19, *supra*.

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terly that they would urge you to press for inclusion of Red China in the UN. By implication this would seem to mean that if we do not extend economic aid to Egypt, you are prepared to stand firm with us in opposing the inclusion of the bloody Chinese aggressor into the councils of peaceful nations, at least until Red China withdraws her invading armies, ceases supporting the Indo-China war and begin to act like a civilized government. Could you confirm this to me?

I assume, of course, that you are genuinely anxious to arrange a truce with Egypt and that the only remaining obstacles are the two points you mentioned to me at Bermuda, namely availability and uniforms. Now if we continue to press Egypt to accept your conditions on these two points, can we do so with the assurance that they can count on a settlement if they accept your position? You can well understand my anxiety to avoid asking our people to do everything in their power to bring about a settlement of this situation, including another postponement of economic aid, and then discover that we have been operating on a complete misunderstanding.

As I told you at Bermuda, I am most deeply sympathetic with your whole problem in the area, even though at times I have believed that different methods might have been more effective. I repeat that in our actual dealings with Egypt, we have gone to great lengths to meet your convictions and opinions. We certainly want to continue to do so. We think we proved that in Persia, and I hope we shall together make that effort seem worthwhile.

I know that you realize that there are in this country many people who believe that the United States has treated the Arab countries shabbily and, because parts of the Arab holdings are vital to the Western world, this segment of our citizenry asserts that we should work to improve our relationships with the Arab countries. But this government has always refused to do this at the cost of anything we believe detrimental to Anglo-American best interests. In spite of outrageous and irresponsible criticism of each other on both sides of the Atlantic, American governmental policy and popular sentiment recognize the great value to the free world of keeping Anglo-American relationships coordinated with respect to the rest of the world and friendly as between themselves.

[Here follows discussion of the European Defense Community concept.]

I hope that you can find it possible to answer this personal cable promptly so that I can assemble the necessary staffs and go over this whole matter in detail. I assure you that I am prepared to meet locally any political difficulty in carrying out whatever ar-

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rangements we may make between ourselves for the common good of our two countries.

I realize that this is a long and possibly a tedious cablegram. But it is quite necessary that there be the clearest kind of understanding between us if we are at one and the same time to operate together in some of these critical situations abroad and still be able to withstand any kind of political problem and criticism that can arise in our respective countries.

I shall look forward to early receipt of your comments.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

IKE

No. 1259

641.74/12-2153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 21, 1953—2 p. m.

702. Stevenson told me this morning that when he saw Fawzi December 19 (Embtel 697) [2] the latter affirmed that Egyptian policy, like that announced by Eden, is to continue efforts to reach an agreement. They agreed also that two most important outstanding points are availability and uniforms about which they might at a later date talk on a strictly personal basis.

Stevenson asked Fawzi to explain his "dark hint" to Hankey just before Hankey's departure to effect that "storm blowing up in Egypt". Fawzi replied that he had nothing specific in mind. In Egypt, as in UK, there is public opinion problem. He thought that if no agreement achieved, Egypt might very well feel it necessary to realign its policy in direction of neutralism.

RCC negotiators met yesterday with Egyptian Ambassadors from UK and US and another meeting planned December 24. My general impression, which is shared by British Embassy, is that it may take some days for RCC to study outcome parliamentary debate and oral reports of Ahmed Hussein and Haki and that in consequence Egyptians may withhold major moves until after holidays.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 243.

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 697, Dec. 19, not printed, that Stevenson had returned from consultations in London, and that he was seeing the Egyptian Foreign Minister later that day to try to ascertain what Egypt's intentions were with regard to resuming the negotiations. (641.74/12-1953)

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Stevenson will dine informally with Egyptian negotiators in near future. [3]

CAFFERY

[3] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 703, Dec. 22, not printed, that the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him the previous evening that he was still hopeful of making an agreement with the British; Caffery gave encouragement and in particular urged Fawzi to find an adequate availability formula; and the Ambassador repeated his belief that the British were sincere when they spoke of their parliamentary difficulties. (641.74/12-2253)

No. 1260

641.74/12-2253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) and the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 22, 1953.

Participants: The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Merchant—EUR

The British Ambassador called on the Secretary this afternoon at his own request. He opened the conversation by stating that he wanted to discuss the subject of the Egyptian negotiations in light of his own impressions of the situation in Great Britain based on his visit and also under instruction from Mr. Eden with whom he had discussed the subject at length.

First he said that he was convinced that Egypt was the most explosive current topic both in British domestic politics and potentially in the realm of US–UK relations. He went on then to transmit to the Secretary Mr. Eden's personal assurance to the effect that the British government does in fact want an agreement. The Ambassador went on to say that he felt there was some real reason to believe that an agreement might be secured from the Egyptians in the next few weeks and that he hoped we would assist in giving the matter one final heave to put it over the top. In this connection he emphasized the importance from the British point of view of the US continuing to withhold economic aid.

The Secretary replied that on successive occasions we have held up at British request the granting of economic aid and that we could not hold off indefinitely, particularly in view of the fact that Congress would be reconvening in two or three weeks. Congress, he pointed out, had appropriated these funds and they would be asking a great many questions. The Secretary went on to say that he was not inclined to share the view that by granting economic

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aid in advance of an agreement between the UK and the Egyptians, the climate would be so improved as to accelerate the arrival at agreement. For his part the Secretary said that he inclined to view that it was desirable to hold the use of economic aid as ammunition with which Naguib might sell the agreement with the British to the Egyptian public. But there was a time limit which was rapidly expiring.

The Secretary then went after the Ambassador hard on the request he himself had made of Mr. Eden that the British put down on a piece of paper a draft heads of agreement which would include all the items which the British considered agreed with the Egyptians (At this point the Secretary noted his doubt as to whether in fact any precise meeting of minds between the Egyptians and the British had been reached on these points.) and also the British draft proposals on the two open items of availability and uniforms. The Secretary said we would then be prepared to back this up with the Egyptians if the British could assure us that these in fact represented the full extent of their requirements. When the Ambassador expressed some doubt as to whether the Egyptians would be willing to return to the conference table, the Secretary responded that he felt we would succeed in getting them back to the table.

There followed some discussion on the absence of a status of forces agreement and the Ambassador obviously was not aware of the Secretary's conversation on this point in Paris with Mr. Eden, in which conversation it became clear that what Mr. Eden had in mind would not be satisfied by the NATO status of forces treaty, but a Libya formula.

The Secretary re-emphasized the importance of the British producing the memorandum as described and stated that if with our support the two parties were then prepared to initial such a document the US could start its economic aid and the UK resume normal relations with Egypt and begin withdrawal even though not required to do so until a treaty was concluded. The Secretary concluded the discussion of this topic by pointing out that if the negotiations broke down we should then consider whether it would not be in the common interest to use US economic aid to keep the situation in bounds. That, he said, was something that we could talk about with the British when the time comes. [1]

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[1] On Dec. 23, 1953, Secretary Dulles informed President Eisenhower, in a telephone conversation, of Ambassador Makins' visit, saying that Makins had a telegram from Eden, the contents of which attempted to set matters straight and to make clear Eden's unhappinesss that "things have been messed up". Dulles went on to inform the President that he, Dulles, had told Makins that the United States "would be glad to support their [the British] position, but we had to know what that position is—we wanted it in black and white". (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Telephone Conversations")

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The Ambassador closed with an expression of his belief that they were very close to an agreement with the Egyptians.

No. 1261

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

LONDON, December 22, 1953.

MY DEAR FRIEND: Thank you for all the thought you have given to my message. [1] It is always difficult to explain the internal politics of one to another and I have not succeeded this time. I did not say or mean the Socialists would be bitterly resentful of American economic aid to Egypt at this juncture. Indeed given the narrow issue they might be more favourably inclined to your proposal than we are. They would however be able to press their strong views and feelings about China in an atmosphere much less favourable to the United States than now exists. If the Egyptians accept our present terms we shall certainly abide by them. But we do not think you ought to give them moral and material support while they threaten and assault our troops and conduct a campaign of hatred against us. No doubt the Egyptian issue seems petty to you in comparison to other great questions, including China, confronting us both. It is nevertheless one which might well cause a deep and serious setback to relations between America and Great Britain. That would certainly be a disaster for all.

Whether you take sides against us in Egypt or not will not affect the support which we have thought it right to give you over China. It will however make it more difficult for Anthony and me to help you in the Far East if we have to do it in face, not only of Socialist opinion, but of general feelings of indignation throughout the country. I earnestly hope that the United States Government will not so act as to let it be said that their intervention has wrecked any chances of agreement in Egypt and possibly has even caused bloodshed.

There are however few things we cannot do together. 50,000 British graves lie in Egypt and its approaches. We were virtually agreed together on detailed proposals about bases and had we put them jointly to Naguib, all might well have been settled six months ago. Our being on opposite sides in the Mediterranean will gird on every enemy we have in common throughout the world.

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[1] For Churchill's message of Dec. 19 and Eisenhower's reply of Dec. 20, see Documents 1257 and 1258.

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I feel I should not be doing my duty if I did not let you know what I believe to be the truth of the matter. [2]

[Here follow additional remarks about the European Defense Community.]

Kindest regards,

WINSTON

[2] According to a memorandum of telephone conversation which Secretary Dulles had with President Eisenhower on Dec. 23, 1953, the President "asked whether the Secretary had a copy of the latest one? [Telegram from Churchill.] He got it late last night and was very annoyed. He read portions of it—said he would have to acknowledge it but he was getting tired, we would have to get this back in diplomatic channels." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "Telephone Conversations")

No. 1262

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill"

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 23, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON: I have your reply to my message. [1] We shall study it and you will hear further from us, probably through the State Department. Foster knows that I am anxious to find a way for us to conform as far as possible to your views on Egypt. Of course you know of our conviction that if we can together reach a prompt and completely successful arrangement with Iran, this will immeasurably strengthen our hands here at home against any opponent seeking to weaken our support of the efforts you are making to reaching a proper arrangement in Egypt.

Merry Christmas to you and yours.

As ever,

IKE

[1] *Supra.*

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No. 1263

641.74/12-2853: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 28, 1953—3 p. m.

716. Following is Stevenson's account of informal get-together December 26 (Embassy's 710, December 23) [2] at which Egyptians represented by Nasir, Salah Salim and Amir; British by Stevenson, Creswell and General Benson.

1. Meeting lasted for four hours in course which, while it was possible to remove a number of "misapprehensions", Egyptians were "even firmer than on December 22" regarding availability and uniforms. Egyptians stated base could only be automatically available in event of attack on Arab States. Re uniforms, Egyptians said that they must emphasize publicly "civilian character" of technicians. For this reason they objected to British "Deputy Commander" and preferred title "Director of Technicians". (Stevenson commented that there may be trouble ahead on this point because if UK considers base military and Egypt considers base as civilian, a conflict of interpretations comparable to that which wrecked Bevin–Sidky agreement could arise.)

2. Only advance from British point of view was Egyptian acceptance of "working base" for seven years from ratification of detailed agreement. Egyptians complained they could never accept an "open-end" agreement comparable to that of 1936. British said they understood this and suggested that after seven years as "working base" removal of stores and equipment could be accomplished by civilian contractors. They promised Egyptians to seek a rough estimate as to how long this might take.

3. If meeting of minds can be achieved, procedure contemplated is that both sides would initial heads of agreement. As soon as possible thereafter, detailed agreement would be worked out and signed. After being tabled in Commons for 21 days, British Government would be ready to exchange ratifications with Egyptian Government. Times specified in agreement would date from ratification exchange.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 248.

[2] Ambassador Caffery informed the Department in telegram 710, Dec. 23, not printed, that Stevenson had lunched with Nasir and Saleh Salem the previous day; that the atmosphere was cordial; that availability and uniforms were not discussed; that the Egyptians brought up the old charge that the British were continuing to raise new issues and asked for a promise that this procedure would end; and that Stevenson assured them that nothing new would be added for future discussion. (641.74/12-2353)

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4. Stevenson said that as result meeting he is "even gloomier than before". Same group will get together again tomorrow. No word of Saturday get-together has appeared in press. Both sides have agreed, if pressed, to say that they are "in continuing contact".

5. Stevenson said that only result American economic aid at this juncture would be to encourage Egyptians to "dig in their toes" in negotiations—particularly on point of availability "in which US is so interested". At present he can foresee no circumstance in which negotiations would be advanced by US aid.

JONES

No. 1264

641.74/12-2953: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 29, 1953—7 p. m.

2792. Foreign Office today gave us statement of HMG's understanding of points agreed and not agreed in Suez talks (Department telegrams 3133, 3167, and 3178; Paris telegrams 2311 and 2320; and Embassy telegram 2687). [2] Document, which is quite detailed, being transmitted by air pouch. [3] It covers following nine points on which British delegate attempted secure agreement on principles (or "heads of agreement") at October 21 meeting: (1) duration, (2) consultation, (3) withdrawal troops, (4) number technicians, (5) availability, (6) uniforms, (7) air matters, (8) organization base, and (9) navigation Suez Canal. These are same nine topics covered Cairo's 488, October 22, and we believe substantially all points made in document already familiar to Department and Embassy Cairo. In general, document takes position consistent with that outlined in Embassy telegram 2603, i.e. there evidently are a number of issues in addition to availability and uniforms on which agreement has not been reached.

Document concludes by pointing out that after announcement of agreement on principles, two sides would start discussing a definite

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 72.

[2] Telegram 3133 is printed as telegram 656 to Cairo, Document 1252. None of the other reference telegrams is printed.

[3] Not printed; this statement of points agreed and not agreed in the Suez talks as of Oct. 21, 1953, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 2275 from London, Dec. 29. (641.74/12-2953)

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text. Questions of finance and status of technicians would be included in this latter discussion.

Commenting on foregoing, Foreign Office official stated categorically UK has no intention raising any other matters in current talks, besides nine listed above.

In circumstances we do not believe document could usefully serve in promoting action which Department originally had in mind (Department telegram 3133). However, it occurs to us that document might serve as basis for US approach to Egypt along following lines: (1) We convinced British seriously want agreement; (2) we do not believe British will raise any other points, in addition to nine above, in present talks, and (3) since it will probably prove easier to reach agreement on other points than availability and uniforms, Egyptians should try come to agreement with British on other points in effort narrow area disagreement. (We have not, of course, discussed this suggestion with Foreign Office.)

In this connection, reaction of working level of Foreign Office to December 26 meeting (Cairo's 716) is one of encouragement at willingness Egyptians discuss some of the other issues in addition to uniforms and availability, and at indications considerable agreement still exists on these other matters. British had been fearful that on resumption talks, Egyptians would change their position on some of them.

As regards title of assistant base commander, Foreign Office points out Egyptian delegate prefaced remarks by stating that they accepted idea that technicians were actually soldiers, but that considerations of public opinion made it desirable for technicians to appear to have civilian character to greatest extent possible. Foreign Office, therefore, regards this as essentially question of what title to give assistant base commander and does not anticipate any particular difficulty on this score.

Foreign Office stresses current talks being kept highly secret.

Summarizing present position, official expressed great appreciation for American support. He hoped that with our help Egyptians can be brought to agree to British position on availability. Official remarked UK and Egypt "not very far apart" uniforms and, therefore, he hopeful on this point also.

Embassy believes, however, that undue importance should not be attached to this renewed hint, at Foreign Office working level, that British might possibly make some concession on uniforms if Egyptians meet British position on availability, since Alexander in recent conversation with Embassy Officer indicated he regarded uniforms as more important issue of the two.

BUTTERWORTH

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No. 1265

641.74/12-3053: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, December 30, 1953—3 p. m.

720. Stevenson today gave Embassy following account informal get-together December 29 (Embtel 716 December 28) at which Egypt side was augmented by Boghdadi; British represented as before:

1. Principal achievement was that both sides were able to "fix some points of detail". British offered some comments in writing re Egypt comments on base organization paper including title principal Britisher in base and uniforms (Embtel 452 October 17). [2] Egyptians insisted on their need to emphasize civilian character technicians. Stevenson pointed out that technicians in base would be referred to in British Parliament as military and stressed danger conflicting interpretations. Egyptians said that they were prepared to admit publicly that British in base were British military, but that their work is strictly civilian; therefore, they must dress as civilians and have civilian titles. Stevenson said that while Egyptians yielded nothing re uniforms he was relieved by Egyptian assertion that they would not attempt to disguise fact personal status technicians would be that of members Britain Armed Forces.

2. British gave Egyptians a "compromised draft" re air arrangements which Egyptians promised study. Stevenson does not think Egyptians will accept this in its entirety, but discussion showed that primary fear of Egyptians is of being accused of granting UK permanent "air base". Egyptians said that staging and terminal facilities on most-favored-nation basis would be available and that RAF technicians could be employed. They would prefer air arrangements not be given prominence but incorporated in agreement annex. Stevenson indicated what Egyptians seem prepared to offer on this score is substantially what UK is seeking.

3. Discussion then ensued re availability. Egyptians reiterated neutralist public opinion very strong and government already taking big risk in extending automatic availability to attack ALCSP states. Nasir said candidly that "not even India can be neutral in global war and certainly neutrality is not possible for Egypt". He did not see why UK could not accept "consultation". Stevenson said that in order to be acceptable to UK there must be automatic availability on broader basis than Arab states; since

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 251.
[2] Not printed.

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Nasir privately admitted an attack on Turkey or Iran would make immediate base activation desirable, he suggested that Egyptians consider extending their formula to something like "an attack on Turkey or Iran which threatens security ALCSP states". Stevenson said that this idea appeared to make some impression. Although he is not hopeful, he said he got impression that Egyptians might not be "irreducible" re this point.

4. Neither side suggested another meeting. Egyptians promised study British ideas. Stevenson feels that he has got as far as possible with this Egyptian group: "I plan to tackle Fawzi tomorrow re availability".

JONES

No. 1266

874.00 TA/12-3153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 31, 1953—2:20 p. m.

713. *New York Times* Dec 30 carried London story British Government circles concerned at possibility US military or economic aid to Egypt and on December 31 carried Hanson Baldwin article criticizing US failure support UK more strongly. FYI only Dept has informed British Ambassador its displeasure at first story.

AP Washington story Dec 30 cited "authoritative sources" saying US reported to have informed UK it intends give Egypt military and economic aid.

In response queries prompted by first *NY Times,* Department replied that question of economic aid to Egypt still under consideration. Dept continues take this line in response further press inquiries. Re military aid we will say we have no present plans.

In response Egyptian Embassy, Dept making following points:

1. US doubts extension economic aid during present delicate stage Base negotiations would be conducive chances of settlement. Announcing aid now might evoke such violent reaction London that talks would be doomed. It will be recalled that it was Egyptian public criticisms which first gave wide publicity to connection between Base negotiations and US aid.

2. Recent official Egyptian advocacy of neutralism jeopardizes immediate extension economic aid. Even if deterrent mentioned preceding para not operative, US could not appear to be granting aid in direct response this type of Egyptian pressure, not only because of adverse domestic (especially Congressional) reaction, but

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 3436.

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also because of very adverse effect in other Middle Eastern countries, where such action would undercut moderate elements and embolden extremists to demand their governments exert similar pressures.

3. US continuing efforts promote workable Anglo-Egyptian accord, Egyptian Government may be assured such efforts have included frequent instances in which we have pressed important points in discussions with UK, despite strains in US–UK relations. There has been no "deal" at expense Egypt. US has pressed UK as hard as it has pressed Egypt, even harder.

Embassy at its discretion may use foregoing in conversations with Egyptian Government. Embassy comments on probable effectiveness above points requested.

Department considering recommending Presidential letter to Naguib asking that Egypt exercise moderation, especially in view of considerable progress already made in negotiations and the delicate balance between success and failure as the goal is near. Letter could make points set out numbered paras above in confidential friendly tone. Embassy views requested.

Department of course encouraged by Fawzi's belief RCC members will refrain from tendentious statements (Embtel 703 Dec 22), [2] and believes present press flurry provides opportunity reinforce Fawzi's efforts induce moderation.

DULLES

[2] Not printed.

No. 1267

874.00 TA/1-654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, January 6, 1954—3 p. m.

749. From our point of view points set out in Department telegram 713 are sound. However, points one and three will not be convincing to Egyptians. I have taken frequent occasions recently to insist with Egyptians that we will not and cannot extend aid in the face of neutralism. Ahmed Hussein understands this and is helping me in effort to make RCC and Fawzi understand. Fawzi said to me this morning "in that case what about press notices this morning about additional 25 million dollar payment to India?"

Neutralism is a menace here. Press and public are of that mind and if British negotiations definitely fail and it becomes clear that

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 254.

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we are not coming up with economic aid soon Egyptians will put into effect at least some of previously set out programs including recognition Commie China, East Germany, etc.

I am still actively endeavoring to persuade Egyptians to find an acceptable availability formula. Fawzi told me this morning that Egyptians might be able to do something about availability formula and even accept part of British viewpoint about uniforms if they were assured British would not bring up new subjects. He said that last night Stevenson pointedly brought up a new subject and a dangerous one, that is, he referred to the future status of the base in such fashion as to make clear that British have in mind merely reducing the garrison of a military base from 10,000 men allowed by the treaty to 4,000 in the guise of technicians. "That" he said "is entirely unacceptable to the Egyptians" (British garrison is over 80,000).

Stevenson told me later Fawzi's remarks are misleading.

As reported before, RCC is now merely killing time until their plan of action for actively harassing British in Egypt is ripe.

Paradoxically as it may seem RCC leaders by exception are definitely not neutralist minded and they would very much like to find some way out of the present impasse.

I do not recommend letter from President to General Naguib at this time.

CAFFERY

No. 1268

874.00 TA/1-754

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 7, 1954.

Subject: Economic Aid to Egypt

The suggestion of Ambassador Stevenson (Cairo's 732) [2] was discussed by BNA with Ambassador Aldrich. The Ambassador sug-

[1] The following appears beside Jernegan's name on the source text: "O. K."

[2] In telegram 732 from Cairo, Jan. 2, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that Stevenson had seen him and said that he and Fawzi several days earlier had agreed that they should try to improve the atmosphere; therefore, Stevenson had recommended to London that 15 million pounds in blocked sterling balances should be released on Jan. 1. London, however, would agree to release only 5 million. Caffery thought this was unfortunate and recommended that the Department consider taking up the idea with the Foreign Office. (641.74/1-254)

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gested no further approaches to the British for the time being. He felt that Stevenson should bring the idea to the attention of the Foreign Office himself. In view of the strong pressure recently applied to the British on the subject of Egypt, I am inclined to concur that further approaches at this time would not be productive.

With respect to the extension of aid by the US, I believe that economic aid should not be extended at this moment. The principal reasons for this are:

1. Ambassador Caffery has not made a case that economic aid would affect favorably the base negotiations.
2. The neutralist campaign in Egypt. Extension of aid at this time would make it appear that the US was acting under threat and would tend to encourage extremists and neutralist tendencies in other countries of the area. I am particularly concerned over the possible reaction in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria to the extension of large blocks of aid to Egypt unless it is simultaneously quite clear that the "neutralist campaign" was a tactical maneuver which has been dropped.

Once we have reached the conclusion that there is no longer any hope of an agreement at present, we might consider extending some aid in a final effort to retain Western influence in Egypt.

No. 1269

874.211/1-954: Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, January 9, 1954.

No. 1604

Ref: CERP 10-13-52 D-15; Embdesps. 1496, Dec. 21; 1319 Nov. 29; 1274, Nov. 23 and 1247, Nov. 20, 1953. [1]

Subject: Discussions by IBRD Representative, Mr. Dorsey Stevens, with Egyptian Officials Regarding the High Aswan Dam and the Proposed Fertilizer Plant.

Scope and Purpose of Mr. Stevens' Visit

Mr. Dorsey Stevens, Middle East representative of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, arrived in Cairo from Beirut Saturday, January 2, to ascertain informally from Egyptian officials the status of the High Aswan Dam project. The proposal for a fertilizer plant at the present Aswan Dam was also discussed in this connection. He visited officials of the National Production Council (including Dr. Mohamed Selim, Secretary, and

[1] None printed.

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Mr. Hussein Fahmy, President), of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (including Dr. Abdel Guelil el Emari, Minister, and Dr. Ali el Geritli, Deputy Minister) and of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (including Dr. Hilmy Baghat Badawi, Minister). Also, he discussed his visit with members of the Embassy and the United States Operations Mission for Egypt, including the Ambassador, Admiral Stevens, Mr. Perry Ellis, and the reporting officer. He left Cairo early Friday, January 8.

Nile Valley Study

Mr. Dorsey Stevens called on the reporting officer on Monday, January 4, just after having seen Dr. Selim, and stated that, although his reception had been friendly, he had been somewhat taken by surprise at the highly critical attitude of Egyptian officials toward the IBRD. This attitude and the reasons given therefor were very much the same as reported in the Embassy's despatches cited above. It is believed, however, that as a result of Mr. Stevens' interviews with the Egyptian officials their resentment toward the Bank has been considerably relieved and that they have a better understanding of the Bank's organization, purposes and functions.

He sought to make it clear that the Bank is not an instrument of the United States Government. The Egyptian officials were particularly incensed at the condition attached to an IBRD engineering survey of the High Dam, namely, that it should be accompanied by a study of the development of water resources of the whole Nile Valley. Although there is a great amount of information regarding the Nile Valley, little exists on the part lying in Ethiopia and a number of years might be required to obtain information in this regard. Assuming that IBRD financial assistance for the High Dam would depend on the outcome of the Nile Valley study, Egyptian officials suspected that the condition attached to an IBRD engineering survey reflected merely an effort to obstruct construction of the High Aswan Dam and, presumably, also suspected that the United States, in offering to finance an IBRD survey on the condition of a Nile Valley study, was merely promoting British objectives. IBRD's recent refusal to consider a loan to Egypt for a fertilizer plant at the present Aswan Dam pending receipt of a request from Egypt for an engineering survey for the High Aswan Dam (accompanied by a Nile Valley study) did not allay Egyptian fears in this regard.

There is no prospect now of Egypt's asking the IBRD for the engineering survey in question. This is indicated in the Embassy's despatches cited above and confirmed by Mr. Stevens' visit. The prospects are, however, that Egypt will still require IBRD financial assistance in construction of the High Dam and Mr. Stevens be-

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lieves that, if a Nile Valley study is not made a condition of such assistance, that the Egyptian Government might possibly agree to having such a study made.

Status of Work on the High Aswan Dam

On arrival here, Mr. Stevens was aware of course that a preliminary engineering survey for the High Dam had been undertaken in 1952 by West German engineering firms engaged by the Egyptian Government, that the results had been submitted in the Spring of 1953 to an international panel of engineering advisers to the Egyptian Government, which had decided that further preliminary work needed to be done. He was under the impression that the German engineers were now completing their job. However, he was advised by Dr. Selim that the Germans have been engaged to undertake the second phase of the work, a detailed and final engineering survey (which the IBRD had expected to sponsor), and also the third phase, the drawing up of designs for the dam, that the second phase would be completed in March, that the final designs would be completed in June, that the results would be submitted to another international panel of engineers, and, if approved, that a call for bids would be made in July of this year. According to Dr. Emari, the decision to proceed without IBRD assistance on the engineering survey was due to suspicions aroused by IBRD's requirement of a Nile Valley study in connection with sponsorship of such a survey and was made while he was in Washington last September discussing the matter with IBRD officials. It appears therefore that, when in response to an inquiry Dr. Emari told the reporting officer on November 12, 1953 that a request for an IBRD survey had been sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for transmittal, he knew that no such request would be sent.

There appears to be some question as to whether the second phase of the engineering work, the detailed and final survey, is actually being done by a German engineering firm or whether it is being done by the Egyptians themselves. During Mr. Stevens' visit, the reporting officer called on Mr. von Schulman, First Secretary for Commercial Affairs, of the German Embassy. Mr. von Schulman said that he had been to the High Aswan Dam site a week or so before and had seen the Egyptians drilling, but that he was not aware that there was any German engineering firm presently engaged at the dam site. The names of the German firms which had been engaged to do the "rough work" (preliminary) were, he said, Gute Hoffrungshuetti of Dusseldorf and Dortmunder Union of Dortmund, there being many other firms associated or affiliated with them. (However, subsequent to Mr. Stevens' departure, Dr. Selim again confirmed to the Director of USOME that the second

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phase of the work was being done by German engineers and that there were now 16 such engineers at Aswan.)

Mr. Stevens thought it would be desirable for an IBRD engineer to come to Egypt to ascertain exactly what engineering work is being done at the High Dam site and whether or not it is likely to be adequate for IBRD purposes in view of the prospect that the Bank's financial assistance will later be required. He made a suggestion along these lines to Dr. Emari and Dr. Selim, who concurred.

Dr. Selim has several times told the Director of USOME that the Revolutionary Command Council has definitely decided on proceeding with the construction of the High Aswan Dam, it being politically necessary to do so.

Mr. Dorsey Stevens was given by the Egyptian authorities a chart showing the time schedule of work on the High Aswan Dam from the reconnaissance survey up to the call for bids. A copy is presented herewith as Enclosure No. 1. Accompanying explanatory notes comprise Enclosure No. 2. [2]

Financing of the High Aswan Dam

In his discussions with Mr. Stevens, the reporting officer pointed out that there had recently been a delegation of West German bankers in Cairo to investigate the possibilities of German financing of the High Aswan Dam project and inquired as to prospects in this regard.

Mr. Stevens estimated that the High Dam project might cost around $500 million and that Egypt might over a period of years be able to finance half of it from its own resources, leaving $250 million to be financed from foreign sources. Egypt's international credit position was not strong enough, Mr. Stevens thought, to support financing of all of this balance of $250 million on a bankable basis, but the IBRD would probably be prepared to finance as much of it as was bankable, say $125 million, leaving $125 million to be financed on a grant basis. He stressed several times the point that IBRD financing would depend on U.S. grant aid and also he thought that loans for the High Dam project should be made on a 20 or 25 year basis.

If this was the situation in the case of the IBRD, Mr. Stevens did not see how the Germans could possibly undertake the foreign financing of the Dam without substantial help from other sources, especially since the Germans were not in a position to make loans for longer periods than 5 or 10 years. It is, of course, of great importance to the Germans to obtain substantial contracts in connec-

[2] None of the enclosures is printed.

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tion with the High Dam project, but they have been informed, according to Mr. Stevens, that IBRD would be prepared to provide part of its financing in German marks.

Mr. von Schulman confirmed this to the reporting officer, but pointed out that IBRD's German mark financing would be against Germany's subscription to the Bank and he questioned whether his Government would agree to this since it would restrict Germany's financial activities in other fields. He admitted, however, that Germany was not in a position to make loans for periods of more than 10 years and could not undertake the financing of the High Dam project except in connection with an international consortium, but he gave no hint as to what other countries might participate in such a consortium. He also said that Dr Geritli, Deputy Minister of Finance, was thinking of High Dam financing on a 10 year basis, with Egypt undertaking half of it. The total cost figure mentioned by Dr. Geritli was L.E. 180 million.

With reference to Germany's interest in the High Aswan Dam, Mr. von Schulman pointed out that it was a development resulting from German reparation payments to Israel, from which arose a threat of an Arab boycott against German trade. Egypt claimed that reparations to Israel were inimical to Egyptian interests and insisted that, by way of compensation, Germany undertake to build and finance the High Aswan Dam. Germany had indicated that it might be prepared to do so but only if, after investigation, a sound basis were found for such an undertaking.

The Fertilizer Plant

Regarding the proposed fertilizer plant at the present Aswan Dam and Egypt's request of the IBRD for $45 million loan to meet the foreign exchange costs thereof, Mr. Stevens said that he did not understand why the IBRD had refused the request pending receipt of a request from Egypt for an engineering survey for the High Aswan Dam, conditioned on its being accompanied by a Nile Valley study. He readily conceded that the High Dam would reduce the costs of the plant, but pointed out that the Egyptians had earlier been told that, when they had gathered together a group of private investors interested in the plant, IBRD would be prepared to discuss the matter. The High Aswan Dam had not been involved as a condition of such discussion. The Egyptian Government had not yet, of course, gathered together a group of interested investors, but Government officials pointed out to Mr. Stevens during his visit here that such a group could not be gotten together until it was known whether the IBRD would lend the foreign exchange required, but that if the IBRD would agree to do so, there would be no difficulty in finding interested private investors, since the

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project is highly attractive. The attractive aspects of the project were indicated in a memorandum given Mr. Stevens, a copy of which is presented herewith as Enclosure No. 3. In any case, if the public did not take up all the shares in the fertilizer plant which were offered to it, the residual would be taken up by the National Production Council with a view to disposing of them to private persons over a period of time

Mr. Stevens thought that an expert from the IBRD should come to Cairo to discuss also the fertilizer plant with the Egyptian authorities. He might be the same person as sent to investigate the status of the work on the High Aswan Dam.

Since last seeing Mr. Stevens, the reporting officer met Dr. Selim briefly at a social function. Touching on a number of the points presented above, Dr. Selim was in an optimistic mood and stated that Mr. Stevens' visit had helped to clarify matters, that he should have come sooner, and that Egypt might after all be able to do business with the IBRD.

For the Ambassador:
ROBERT M. CARR
Counselor for Economic Affairs

No. 1270

741.56374/1-1454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 14, 1954—1:49 p. m.

765. Given below is text "Heads of Agreement" British prepared sign. They desire our comments prior determining how use document. Your views requested soonest on both substance and best use of paper.

Verbatim Text. It is agreed between the Egyptian and British Delegations that with a view to establishing Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship, and taking account of their obligations under the United Nations Charter and of their common concern for the security of the Middle East, an agreement regarding the future of the Suez Canal Zone Base should now be drafted on the following lines.

2. The Agreement will last for 7 years from the date of its entry into force.

3. The Canal Zone Base and its contents will be maintained in efficient working order as a Working Base to supply and maintain in peace the forces supported by Her Majesty's Government in the

[1] Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

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Middle East and to be capable of immediate use in accordance with the following paragraph.

4. In the event of—

(a) an attack by an outside Power on Egypt; or

(b) an attack by an outside Power on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact; or

(c) a recommendation by the United Nations that the Base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or act of aggression;

Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the Base on a war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes of the Egyptian Ports by British forces.

In the event of a threat of an attack on any members of the Arab Mutual Security Pact, Iran or Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

5. The organisation of the Base will be in accordance with Annex I attached.

6. The United Kingdom will be accorded full rights to move any British material in or out of the Base to any point and at any time at its discretion. There will be no major increase above the level of supplies existing at the time the Agreement is signed without the consent of the Egyptian Government.

7. Subject to the above arrangements, Her Majesty's forces will be withdrawn from Egyptian territory within a period of 15 months from the entry of this Agreement into force.

8. After the period of 15 months mentioned in paragraph 7 above, there will be 4,000 British technicians for the remainder of the first 4 and a half years of the Agreement for the maintenance and running of the Base.

9. During the next 18 months the number of technicians shall gradually be reduced to 2,500. Thereafter their numbers should not fall below one thousand during the period covered by the Agreement.

10. Outside the Base area and when off duty within it, British personnel will wear civilian clothes. When on duty in the Base installations or in transit between them, they will normally wear working dress. However, the Egyptian Government accepts in principle that they may wear service uniform and that they will do so when directed. They may carry a weapon for their personal protection.

11. The parties will consult together at the end of the period specified for the duration of the Agreement to decide what arrangements are necessary to provide for the continued maintenance of Base thereafter.

12. The Agreement will recognise that the Suez Maritime Canal is an integral part of Egypt and a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance and will ex-

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press the determination of both parties to uphold the 1888 Convention [2] guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal.

13. Air matters are dealt with in Annex II attached.

14. There will be many questions of detail to be covered in the drafting of the Agreement, including the defence of the Base, the storage of oil, the financial arrangements necessary, the status of the British personnel and their dependents, and other detailed matters of importance to both sides. These will be settled by friendly Agreement in negotiations which will begin forthwith. *End Verbatim Text.*

Annex I— Consists of first four paragraphs of Section VIII "Organisation of the Base" of enclosure to London's Despatch 2275 Dec 29 [3] rptd Cairo (Paragraphs 5 through 10 omitted) with following added:

Verbatim Text.

(a) After consultation with the Assistant Base Commander, the Base Commander may request the replacement of any British technicians for indiscipline.

(b) The Base Commander will be responsible for ensuring that after the completion of the withdrawal of British Forces the level of equipment in the Base will not be appreciably increased nor the installations appreciably extended without the consent of the Egyptian Government. *End Verbatim Text.*

Annex II—Substantially same as Section VII "Air Matters" of enclosure to London's Despatch 2275. [4]

DULLES

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[2] The reference is to the Convention between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal signed at Constantinople, Oct. 29, 1888; Great Britain, *British and Foreign State Papers* (London, HMSO, n.d.), vol. 79 (1887–1888), pp. 18–22 (French text).

[3] For text of Section VIII of the enclosure to despatch 2275, see the editorial note, *infra*.

[4] For text of Section VII of the enclosure to despatch 2275, see the editorial note, *infra*.

No. 1271

Editorial Note

Annexes I and II of the Heads of Agreement consist of Sections VIII and VII, respectively, of the enclosure to despatch 2275 from London, December 29, 1953. (641.74/12–2953) See footnotes 3 and 4, *supra*. The texts of those sections follow:

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"*VIII Organisation of the Base*

The British Delegation have put forward a text on the lines of the first four paragraphs of the following; the full text is a revised draft which we shall shortly be discussing with the Egyptians.

'*Duties of the Base Commander and Assistant Base Commander*

(1) Upon the completion of the withdrawal of Her Majesty's forces the Egyptian Government shall appoint a senior Egyptian officer as Base Commander. He will administer the Base and ensure the efficiency and smooth running in accordance with the provision of this Agreement. To assist him the United Kingdom Government shall appoint an Assistant Base Commander with the duties set out in paragraph 4 below.

(2) *The Base Commander*

(a) The Base Commander will be responsible on behalf of the Egyptian Government for the discharge of its undertakings for:

(i) The Security of the Base, of the installations and of equipment contained therein, or in transit, and of all the personnel needed to run it.

(ii) The running of the public utilities and telecommunications required for use within the Base in peace and the upkeep of those and of such roads, railways, bridges, pipelines and wharves as may be required for the Base in war including where necessary, any new construction and the observance of the conditions attached to the installations listed in Appendix II.

(iii) The recruitment, administration and reliability of all labour employed in the Base (other than the British technicians and domestic labour hired under private arrangements). It will be the duty of the Base Commander with the assistance of the Egyptian administration generally to ensure that the members of the labour force are of the necessary competence to the standard required by the Assistant Base Commander.

(iv) The provision and efficient upkeep of motor transport required in the Base.

(v) The provision and allocation of rail and water transportation and port facilities where required.

(vi) The provision and maintenance of buildings and works.

(vii) The hygiene of the Base.

(b) In execution of his responsibilities the Base Commander will give full support to his Assistant Base Commander in ensuring that the facilities which the latter requires (as defined in paragraph 4 below) are promptly furnished and that the administrative needs up to normal British standards of his Assistant Base Commander and the personnel in his charge are met.

(c) As part of the Base Headquarters there will be a joint Base Communication Centre. Its organisation will be governed by the following considerations:

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(i) There will be a signal link operated by British and Egyptian personnel to the appropriate British radio communications network.

(ii) All messages received by the signal link mentioned in sub-paragraph 3(c) (i) above will be passed when decoded to a joint message distribution centre, which will transmit them promptly to the Assistant Base Commander with a copy to the Base Commander. Outward messages will be similarly handled.

(3) *The Assistant Base Commander*

(a) The Assistant Base Commander will:

(i) be responsible through the Base Commander in each case for the control of the installations etc. listed in Appendix I. He will be in full and effective charge of all British owned equipment stored or used in these installations;

(ii) pass on all instructions received through the Base Communications Centre from British authorities and initiate all other instructions necessary under sub-paragraph 4 (a) (i) above;

(iii) apply to the Base Commander for transport, labour and other facilities required for the efficient operation of these installations. He will indicate the standard of competence required of such labour and will arrange for its engagement and payment. He may discharge any man for incompetence, indiscipline or unreliability and may refuse to re-employ him;

(iv) control and distribution of all personnel, both technical and unskilled, employed in these installations.

(b) He will be the adviser to the Base Commander on all technical matters and in this capacity will be responsible for advising him on the efficiency and maintenance of installations and facilities other than those listed in Appendix I. For this purpose he and his staff will inspect such installations as often as they may consider necessary and will render reports to the Base Commander and to Her Majesty's Government.

(c) He will be in full military command of the British technicians in the Base. He will be responsible for their personal administration, including their pay, discipline, welfare, rationing, clothing, terms of service, medical attention and all similar matters affecting them as individuals. He will apply to the Base Commander for, and will be entitled to receive from him, whatever assistance may be needed for their maintenance.

(d) He will be responsible for training Egyptian personnel in technical functions in the Base.

(4) (a) The Base Commander shall discuss any matters of detail not covered by the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 above with the Assistant Base Commander in order to reach a satisfactory working arrangement directed towards achieving the efficient running of the Base.

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(b) Should matters of any nature arise at any time on which the Base Commander and the Assistant Base Commander cannot come to an understanding, they will be free to refer the issue to the Egyptian Government and Her Majesty's Ambassador respectively. To lessen the possibility of any misunderstanding such reference shall be in the form of a joint memorandum setting out both points of view.' "

"*VII Air Matters*

Verbal agreement was reached on an understanding of the position and a text was prepared on the technical level by the British delegation and handed to the Egyptians, who neither accepted the draft nor put forward amendments to it. The draft is as follows:—

'Having regard to the need for:—

(a) facilities for handling Royal Air Force aircraft connected with the movement of personnel and equipment required in the maintenance of the Base;

(b) facilities for handling Royal Air Force aircraft in transit through Egypt;

Provision will be made for the use of a designated Egyptian air force airfield in the Canal Zone at which Royal Air Force technicians will be employed for the handling and servicing of British aircraft and for the movement and control of personnel and freight. This includes provisions for flying boats.

The airfield will be under the command of an Egyptian air force officer and would not necessarily be used exclusively by Royal Air Force aircraft. Egyptian airport authorities for immigration, health and customs will be provided in accordance with international customs. British technicians would come under the command of the senior Royal Air Force officer in accordance with the general principle governing the command and discipline of the British technicians within the whole of the Base.

All Royal Air Force aircraft movements will require clearance in accordance with procedures which shall be agreed from time to time.

Overflying rights will be accorded to Royal Air Force aircraft subject to notifications in accordance with procedures which shall be agreed from time to time.' "

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No. 1272

741.56374/1-1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, January 18, 1954—3 p. m.

808. Noforn. Re my telegram 792. [2] After careful review with British Embassy of text draft heads of agreement (Deptel 765 and annexes I and II), it is our understanding that these generally agreed to subject to following exceptions:

1. Paragraphs 4-c (unavailability clause) and 10 (uniforms) are British positions which have been rejected by Egyptians.
2. No firm agreement has been reached on timetable for reducing technicians (paragraph 9) but serious difficulty on this score is not expected.
3. Present wording of paragraph 11 unacceptable to Egyptians. British have orally insisted they are not seeking "open-end" agreement (Embassy 716 December 28) and mutually acceptable redraft should therefore be achievable if London backs up categoric oral statement to this effect made by Stevenson to Egyptians.

It is not clear what is meant by including "defense of the base" among questions, enumerated in paragraph 14, on which detailed agreement remains to be reached (according British Embassy, which not informed on this point, phrase originated with British military).

Re annex I, [3] Egyptians reject title "assistant base commander" because of its military implications and have suggested something like "chief British technician". Egyptians also asked right to approve British appointee. Present reference to mutual consultation is counterproposal of British. Egyptians also refuse accord British right to inspect installations maintained by Egyptians (paragraph 3-b) (British say inspection necessary to assure power stations and filtration plants adequately run).

Although Egyptians have never said anything contrary substance annex II, [4] (aid) they deny any need for such an annex, or even any

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 276.

[2] In telegram 792 from Cairo, Jan. 16, 1954, not printed, Caffery reported that British Embassy officials in Cairo were unhappy with the draft Heads of Agreement because it did not take into account the evolution of substantive issues since Oct. 21, 1953; that the British Cabinet seemingly had decided to reaffirm its position of the previous October; and Caffery believed that as long as London was insisting on standing pat on its October position, there was little the United States could do. (741.56374/1-1654)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 1270.

[4] See footnote 4, *ibid.*

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reference to air facilities in heads of agreement on grounds that British requirements will be met by most favored nation rights. To sign anything on this score, Egyptians say, would be to raise spectre of "British air base".

Department will note that while considerable area agreement achieved, points set out above which not agreed are of such substance that more than form of words involved. Both sides will have to yield some substance if an agreement is to be achieved.

All of the points listed above on which Egyptians are holding out have their roots in Eygptian pre-occupation regarding infringements of their national sovereignty. It is this attitude (and not neutralism) which accounts for their refusal to extend commitment on automatic availability beyond case of attack on Arab states, in other cases they insist on sovereign Egypt being consulted in existing circumstances. Same holds true for refusals formally accord British rights to inspect Egyptian-run base installations or accord UK what would appear to Egyptians as "special treatment" in matter of air rights.

A particularly difficult aspect of this problem is question of status of technicians (including of course both question of uniforms and title of "assistant base commander"). British insist technicians must be recognized as British military personnel.

To this Egyptians reply in effect:

"We agree that you may assign British military personnel as technicians, that for purposes of identification and control they may wear a uniform type of dress, that they may carry pistols for their personal protection, and that as regards administration and discipline they will be under British control. We are willing to accord to the technicians and their families personal status comparable to that enjoyed by foreign diplomats. We cannot agree that these men shall have the status in Egypt of British military personnel".

If it is adequate protection of their personnel which concerns British, I do not think problem is too difficult. I do not however, believe Egyptians will give way on principle involved. To them it entails crucial issue of "complete military evacuation".

It is plain that any attempt on our part to sell the Egyptians current British draft based on October 21 position would seriously damage our position and future usefulness. It is therefore, my recommendation that Department counsel British to prepare more realistic draft. If new British draft looked good enough to stand a chance, I might then, without emphasizing its origin, take it to the Egyptians as our own considered view of maximum they could hope to obtain from UK. As Egyptians sincerely desire agreement they might feel that new element introduced into stalemate under US

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aegis offered them honorable basis for resumption serious negotiations.

If however, London persists in standing pat on present position, playing the very remote possibility that Egyptians will eventually be forced to come around to accepting British terms, US should take a new look.

CAFFERY

No. 1273

741.56374/1-2154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 21, 1954—7:20 p. m.

816. As you know UK draft "Heads of Agreement" prepared in response our prodding. Purpose was assure ourselves and Egyptians UK wanted agreement and would not raise additional "matters of principle". We did not anticipate any change of substance UK positions "availability" and "uniforms". Egyptian Ambassador already informed this assessment (Deptel 649). We think chance agreement depends on recognition by RCC draft in principle best obtainable by Egypt present time. This does not preclude minor changes substance and presentation.

We wish avoid another "joint approach" or being placed in position supporting British language on matters detail.

Following comments given British Embassy Jan 20:

1. We consider draft constructive forward step but had hoped would reflect advance over British position Oct 21 as result informal talks Cairo.
2. Besides "availability" and "uniforms", Para 14 likely prove most troublesome. Suggest introduction sentence affirming no further "matters of principle" will be introduced.
3. At appropriate time we ready urge on Egypt again acceptance provisions regarding "availability" and "uniforms". We also now in position assert to Egyptians we have assurances UK will not raise further "matters of principle".
4. Draft served useful purpose clarify in our minds British position and permit us give assurances indicated to Egyptians. We do not consider document "joint draft" and have no thoughts at moment regarding tactical use.

UK representative then given following informal comments:

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 3785 and by air pouch to Berlin to the U.S. High Commissioner for the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Power Conference at Berlin. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

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Verbatim Text. The United Kingdom may wish to consider the following suggestions:

1. Numbered Paragraph 3 might be made more attractive to the Egyptians by "window dressing," emphasizing the benefits they will derive. This could be done by specifying that the working base would be used for the defense of Egypt, as well as the other purposes mentioned.

2. With respect to numbered Paragraph 9, we assume the United Kingdom will wish to consider adjustments in the numbers of technicians if this proves necessary during the negotiations.

3. We understand that the British intend by numbered Paragraph 11 to provide for consultations to determine whether or not arrangements with respect to the Base should be continued. The Egyptians appear concerned that the British wording could be interpreted as continuing the agreement in perpetuity. If our understanding of the purpose of the paragraph is correct, substitute wording might be found to eliminate the Egyptian apprehensions.

4. We are concerned lest the Egyptians interpret numbered Paragraph 14 as confirmation of their fears that numerous additional "matters of principle" will be introduced. To meet this, the paragraph might be opened with a sentence specifying that the British and Egyptian delegations agree that the "Heads of Agreement" sets forth all the "matters of principle" which will be incorporated in the final agreement. This would give the Egyptians assurance against the injection of additional "matters of principal" while at the same time not barring discussion of other "questions of detail." We recognize that as a matter of practical necessity such questions as those mentioned in the paragraph must be included in the final agreement.

5. We believe that during the course of negotiations modifications will be necessary in the annexes to meet Egyptian views on such matters as the title of the "Assistant Base Commander," and his right to inspect installations turned over to the Egyptians. *End Verbatim Text.*

British representative expressed appreciation for promise renewed support "availability" and "uniforms". Stated believed UK would endeavor meet suggestions with possible exception number two. Felt Eden probably would wish discuss matter with Secretary Berlin before determining use draft.

SMITH

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No. 1274

741.56374/1-2254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 22, 1954—4:29 p. m.

820. In your talk with Nasir Jan 25 suggest in your discretion you take position given below. This based on our conviction that: A. Agreement depends on Egyptian acceptance substance British "Heads of Agreement"; B. British reaction to US extension economic aid at present time would preclude UK signature of agreement.

1. As explained to RCC over past year, we believe Suez Base issue should be disposed of soonest to unblock road to economic and social development of Egypt desired by RCC. This would permit full and enthusiastic assistance from Egypt's friends including US and UK.

2. As result recent exchanges at highest level with UK we are convinced without least doubt UK wants agreement, will sign agreement and will carry it out faithfully. This is despite bitter and personal attacks Eden will face. This situation may not continue for long.

3. Agreement in principle along lines British proposals Oct 21 best obtainable by Egypt this time. Minor changes of substance and language can be expected. Our advice to RCC is to accept this agreement and carry it out in cooperative spirit.

4. Resulting evacuation British troops will give RCC tremendous political victory. By contrast failure to reach agreement could set in motion disastrous chain of events and frustrate hopes Egyptian people for social and economic improvements.

5. Particularly with victory in Sudan and suppression of Moslem Brotherhood RCC now at peak strength. We believe it fully able withstand any attacks by dissident groups endeavoring present false picture of agreement to people. Delay will only weaken position RCC.

6. We gave RCC unwelcomed advice re Sudan agreement. This advice accepted and regime obtained outstanding political success. Same will happen re Base.

7. We ready extend economic aid immediately upon signature "Heads of Agreement". Aid will flow before final detailed agreement negotiated. Despite our continuing desire to aid Egypt at earliest possible date, we forced to reluctant conclusion that extension

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 3805 and by air pouch to Berlin to the U.S. High Commissioner for the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Power Conference at Berlin. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Hart.

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aid prior to agreement in principle would cause such reaction in UK as to destroy present willingness HMG sign agreement. We arrived this conclusion after most careful assessment political situation London.

8. Delay will make it more difficult for US to extend economic and later military aid on scale we would wish. We unable to hold inactive available funds much longer in face of strong demands for their use elsewhere.

9. If you believe it useful you should add US technical aid since advent RCC has amounted to significant figure $16,000,000. Also Egypt offered last Mar agreement for grant military aid for training which RCC failed accept.

SMITH

No. 1275

741.56374/1-2654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, January 26,1954—1 p. m.

836. I showed Nasir yesterday evening a close paraphrase of Department's 820 (repeated London 3805, Berlin unnumbered). It did not make him happy. He rehearsed usual charges that when he satisfies British on one point they always bring up another, lack of confidence, bad faith, et cetera. However, after considerable conversation he said that if US sets such store by availability he would recommend to RCC (with good prospect of RCC acceptance) that formula be extended to permit immediate availability of base in event of an attack on Arab States or Turkey. (Hitherto Egyptians have firmly refused to include Turkey). He said he could not accept formula on uniforms as drafted by British; people would say he had agreed to British simply reducing their garrison from 10,000 troops allowed by treaty to 4,000 troops.

Nasir's views reported above refer to availability and uniforms only. Egyptians have not seen draft heads of agreement paper and consequently there was no discussion thereon.

I am convinced that if UK sincerely desires achieve an agreement step in this direction would be the preparation of new and more realistic draft (taking into account recent developments including above important Egyptian concession on availability) with

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 282 and unnumbered to Berlin.

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view to showing this to Egyptians. Also it is all the more important to go ahead with joint estimate without delay. [2]

CAFFERY

[2] See telegram 871 from Cairo, Document 1277.

No. 1276

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BERLIN, February 3, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 79. Following Bidault's departure from tripartite meeting, Eden said to Secretary that joint appraisal from United States-United Kingdom-Embassy Cairo due tomorrow [2] and he would then see what could be done.

Secretary said we are still holding up economic aid to Egypt and cannot do so much longer. Planes which United Kingdom recently planned for Israel have not helped matters with respect to economic aid for Egypt. Eden replied he was under impression planes were Mosquitoes and not very important, but perhaps they were meteor jets. He would let me know. He then said United Kingdom was sending 6 night fighters to Syria and had offered to hold up delivery if United States held up delivery military items to Saudi Arabia. [3] Secretary expressed personal view it desirable work out some kind of system between United States and United Kingdom, which would result in better coordination of deliveries of military equipment to Middle East. Referring back to Saudi Arabia, Eden said he hoped to have some new proposals regarding terms of arbitration for Saudis "in the next week or so". [4]

DULLES

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 119, to Jidda as telegram 1, and to Cairo as telegram 1. The Secretary of State was in Berlin as the head of the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Power Conference. Documentation regarding this conference is scheduled for publication in volume VII.

[2] See telegram 871 from Cairo, Feb. 4, *infra*.

[3] For documentation regarding U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, see Documents 1432 ff.

[4] For documentation concerning U.S. interest in the Buraimi Oasis dispute between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, see Documents 1466 ff.

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No. 1277

741.56374/2-454. Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, February 4, 1954—9 p. m.

871. Joint estimate completed today following outline Department's 817 January 21 [2] except for transposition paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section II. Following summary of answers is being telegraphed by both Embassies (verbatim text) in view of urgency indicated Berlin's Secto 79 February 3.

Begin Verbatim:

I. Internal Stability and Capabilities RCC:

(a) Prospects maintaining power:

Very good at present provided key members not assassinated and there is no grave deterioration in economic situation.

(b) Main sources support and opposition and their effectiveness:

Main sources of support are armed forces, national guard and liberation rally. Peasantry and urban proletariat generally in sympathy. Opposition comes mainly from old political parties, upper classes, some dissatisfied elements in army, police and civil servants, some business and labor organizations and Communists. RCC forces are sufficient at present to keep opposition elements in check.

(c) Trends toward authoritarian or representative government:

Regime is at present authoritarian but majority of RCC genuinely believe in some form of democracy and the trend appears to be towards a form of representative government possibly one based on trade and occupation "corporation".

(d) Capabilities achieving announced goals in economic and social fields:

RCC is sincere in aiming at economic and social improvements in Egypt.

Achievement will depend on whether RCC can inspire sufficient confidence to attract foreign aid and investment which will also encourage internal investment and make best use of both local and foreign technical talent. Though more determined than any of their predecessors Egyptian characteristic lack of perseverance will probably prove a handicap.

(e) Evidences of long-range planning and guiding doctrines as opposed to improvisation:

RCC realizes necessity for long-range planning and has established authoritative bodies for this purpose. Plans are, however, handicapped by lack of assured finance. Consequently immediate problems have at present to be dealt with by improvisation.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 293 and to Berlin for the Secretary of State as telegram 4.

[2] Not printed.

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II. Foreign Policy Intentions:

(a) Basic readiness to sign Suez Base Agreement recognizing special UK position:

The main object of RCC is to achieve what they call full sovereignty by putting an end to what they regard as British military occupation of Egypt. They are at present ready to sign an agreement according UK a special position in the base for the period of that agreement but this attitude is unlikely to persist much longer.

(b) Acceptability of principles incorporated in heads of agreement:

(This reply long and impossible to summarize. British Embassy air pouching text tonight; we are pouching tomorrow). [3]

(c) If agreement signed prospects genuine cooperative effort carry it out as opposed to renewal agitation:

So long as position of RCC is as good as at present, it is likely to cooperate in the execution of an agreement. To support them, however, they will need positive and prompt moral and material aid from UK and USA.

(d) In event of agreement extent of eventual cooperation with West on:

(1) East-West matters;
(2) Area problems.

(1) RCC professes with apparent sincerity that their natural attraction is towards the West rather than the East, and that one of their reasons for wanting an agreement is to make it possible for them to adopt a more overtly pro-Western policy. This would require a reversal of the whole propaganda trend of years but it can probably be done if encouraged by a generous and sympathetic attitude on the part of Western Powers.

(2) Although Egyptian attitude to Israel is less intransigent than that of some Arab States, Egypt would probably be reluctant to abandon her pretensions to hegemony in Arab League by making a separate settlement with Israel.

Re treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Libya, while after an agreement the causes for Egyptian hostility towards these treaties will have largely disappeared, force of habit may continue to be strong. A change of Egyptian attitude is likely to depend principally on the degree to which genuine cooperation can be developed both between Egypt and the West over general issues and among Arab countries themselves on defense matters.

Egyptian attitude of "anti-colonialism" towards British interests in Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and Africa is unlikely to be greatly changed but they may be less vocal about it.

(e) Practical measures Egypt likely to adopt in event definite break in negotiations:

Though several other courses are open to them they are most likely to start by increasing all forms of pressure on the British forces in the Canal Zone and on British subjects in the Delta while

[3] This joint estimate was air pouched to the Department on Feb. 5 as despatch 1870 from Cairo, not printed. (741.56374/2-554)

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maintaining a facade correct relations. The measures taken are likely to be progressively increased in severity. Whatever other course they may adopt, RCC would almost certainly launch an anti-British political propaganda campaign through the UNO and Arab League States.

End Verbatim Text.

Full text joint estimate will be pouched Washington, London, Berlin tomorrow.

CAFFERY

No. 1278

641.74/2-954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 9, 1954—noon.

Dulte 55. Limit distribution. For President, copy for Acting Secretary. From Secretary. Eden giving considerable concern here to Egyptian problem. Says question of whether to try to settle with Egyptians will be dealt with Wednesday Cabinet meeting. He is strongly urging that conditions are ripe now for settlement, and he hopes Cabinet will go along, although he admits Winston very difficult.

DULLES

No. 1279

741.56374/2-954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, February 9, 1954—3 p. m.

891. Nasir last night asked Embassy Officer what British position was regarding his offer to me to extend availability formula to include case of attack on Turkey (mytel 836, January 26). He said he had not yet taken matter up in RCC and saw no point in doing so unless British reaction favorable.

Embassy Officer referred to Eden's absence from London and said British have not yet taken position on matter. (Nasir, incidentally, remarked that at time of Robertson's visit to London in July, British were insisting on inclusion of Turkey and Iran in availability formula but subsequently dropped Iran. He also alleged that

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 295.

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UN formula was brought up when Egyptians turned down Turkey and therefore considers his current offer to be in lieu of reference to UN.)

Nasir pointed out that Egyptian public is expecting decision as to government's "new foreign policy" and that he had to know very soon "whether there is going to be agreement or not." (In this connection he also reiterated that Egypt could never accept British position on uniforms.)

Nasir said he has been delaying foreign policy consultations to prevent situation from "jelling" pending an indication of British reaction to his concession on availability but that situation cannot be allowed to drift much longer. Embassy Officer urged that Egyptians continue to wait a while longer. Importance of avoiding any new crisis was particularly stressed. He appeared to take latter point and remarked that government has internal security situation well in hand.

CAFFERY

No. 1280

641.74/2-1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 10, 1954—6 p. m.

3438. Our telegram 3389, [2] gives present situation here regarding Anglo-Egyptian problem.

It obvious Eden facing difficult decision in light of joint estimate by two Embassies Cairo, that Egyptians will not accept current British position on availability and uniforms. There is already considerable opposition in Conservative Party to the British position, so Eden can anticipate even greater trouble if he decides offer concessions to Egypt for sake reaching agreement. In my opinion, this problem is so serious it may take sometime before decision is reached especially as Eden away.

I am sure Eden is anxious to go through with a settlement, in spite of opposition he will continue to face within his own party. His Parliamentary position, however, is complicated by fact that

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 88 and to Berlin as telegram 97.

[2] In telegram 3389 from London, Feb. 8, not printed, Aldrich reported that the Foreign Office thought the joint estimate was excellent and was using it as the basis for a review of the Egyptian situation in order that the Cabinet could determine the next move. Aldrich also reported that the British Government continued to face considerable domestic difficulties regarding Egypt. (641.74/2-854)

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leaders of Labor Party and probably bulk of that Party favor agreement with Egypt along general lines he has been pursuing. This of course, does not help Eden with his own Party, especially with opposition losing no opportunity criticize government on issue and point up dissension among Conservatives. Moreover, Eden does not appear to be getting full support from Cabinet, especially Churchill and Alexander.

Although Secretary will undoubtedly be discussing foregoing in Berlin with Eden, latter is unlikely to be willing modify British position, particularly regarding uniforms, before he returns here and confers with Cabinet colleagues. It might therefore, possibly be helpful, in event that Secretary is unable to persuade Eden to do this, for me to have talk with Churchill following Secretary's final conversation on subject with Eden in Berlin and just prior to Eden's return here. If this suggestion commends itself, I should appreciate receiving appropriate instructions. [3]

ALDRICH

[3] In connection with this telegram, Aldrich reported in telegram 3462, Feb. 12, not printed, that Prime Minister Churchill the previous evening had said with great emphasis that he was not prepared to make any further concessions either on uniforms or availability; that Selwyn Lloyd said that the Cabinet would not consider Egypt until Eden had returned from Berlin; and that he, Aldrich, recommended that his suggestion in telegram 3438 be withdrawn. (641.74/2–1254)

No. 1281

741.56374/2–1254: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, February 12, 1954—11 a. m.

901. I told Stevenson about my 891, February 9. Naṣir still stands on what he told me as quoted by you in your 87, February 10. [2] He says, however, that it would jeopardize his influence for him to argue RCC into accepting Turkish concession and then be confronted by London turndown. He has done some preliminary soundings, and while he is reasonably confident he can put idea across (I am

[1] Sent priority to London as telegram 297 and repeated to the Department.

[2] In telegram 87 from London to Cairo sent to the Department as telegram 3429, Feb. 10, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich reported that the Embassy was perplexed to note in telegram 891 from Cairo, Document 1279, that Nasir had not yet referred to the RCC his offer to include Turkey in the immediate availability formula. It was the Embassy's understanding, on the basis of telegram 836 from Cairo, Document 1275, that Nasir had done this. Aldrich also asked if Stevenson had been informed of the conversation reported in telegram 891 from Cairo, as the Embassy in London had not discussed the matter with the Foreign Office. (741.56374/2–1054)

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confident he can) in context UK accepting Egyptian position on uniforms, he is reluctant to have agreement opponents in RCC say "we told you so" if and when UK rejects the deal he has proposed. His prestige would undoubtedly suffer.

In final analysis Nasir must decide how his RCC colleagues can best be handled.

On his side Nasir has repeatedly asked if I had received a reply to his offer from London. I counseled patience on his part.

He would put "Turkey" proposal to RCC if London would give some indication of approval in principle.

Furthermore, Nasir has very much in mind what took place before and after "Washington conference". Before the conference I extracted vast concessions from Nasir on his assumption that we would obtain concessions from British in return. He alleges British accepted his concessions but made no significant moves on their part.

CAFFERY

No. 1282

661.74/2-1254: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, February 12, 1954—2 p. m.

902. Reliable Egyptian source yesterday told Embasy officer in strictest confidence that Soviet Minister of Trade had made attractive offer to Egyptian economic mission recently in Moscow [2] for Soviet assistance to Egypt in construction of High Aswan Dam. Source declined reveal details but stated Russians had cleverly made offer "subject to Colonel Abdal Nasir's personal approval". Two members of Egyptian mission returned Cairo to transmit proposals to Nasir while remainder of group waited in Moscow.

Source, who was present when two members reported to Nasir, said latter listened attentively to enthusiastic account of Russian proposals. After hearing delegates out, Nasir's comment was: "That is all very fascinating, but I should put both of you under arrest because you have come back Communists". Nasir then reportedly gave orders that the two envoys should remain in Cairo and remainder of mission should return with fullest information on Rus-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 298, to Berlin as telegram 6, and to Moscow as telegram 2.

[2] According to telegram 867 from Moscow, Jan. 18, not printed, the Egyptian economic delegation had arrived in Moscow on Jan. 16. (461.7431/1-1854)

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sian proposals, which would be given "careful consideration" (press reports mission leader, Brigadier Hasan Ragab, arrived Cairo February 10).

Source, who is personally opposed to any Soviet activity in Egypt, states GOE suspicious of Russian intentions and "leary" of traps. He is concerned however because Russian offer "appears very attractive".

Comment: Whatever Russian intentions are, USSR is already reaping propaganda dividends. Salah Salim told press February 10 that GOE in contact with Russia re economic assistance and that there was "great possibility" Russia would undertake some of Egyptian development schemes "if definite agreement reached on details".

CAFFERY

No. 1283

661.74/2-1354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, February 13, 1954—3 p. m.

909. News of Egyptian-Russian contacts re economic assistance (Deptel 922) [2] was revealed by Salah Salim in reply to question at press conference (mytel 902). Salim had previously given lengthy, rather moderate statement dealing with political and economic affairs in which no specific reference to USSR was made. (Embdesp 1930, February 12). [3] GOE's failure to "ballyhoo" news of Soviet offer bears out report (myreftel) that Egyptians suspicious and looking for "hooks". . . .

While there are many factors mitigating against Egyptian acceptance of Soviet aid, GOE decision will depend on whole complex of considerations. Acceptance under certain conditions of serious Soviet offer cannot be ruled out as possibility, although RCC would undoubtedly prefer to deal with the West.

Naguib regime is committed to High Aswan Dam or equivalent Nile development scheme and if Western sources of aid remain closed to Egypt, RCC's need to show results could overcome present reluctance to get involved with USSR. Fact that Egyptians will

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 300, to Berlin as telegram 7, and to Moscow as telegram 3.

[2] The Department in telegram 922, Feb. 12, not printed, requested the Embassy to evaluate the significance of the Egyptian announcement of negotiations with the Soviets for large-scale economic assistance. (661.74/2-1254)

[3] Not printed.

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probably try to use Russian offer as bargaining weapon vis-à-vis US and UK is, moreover, no grounds for assuming they will do nothing more if such tactics fail to produce results they desire.

It would appear unwise for us to give any public hint of concern over reports of Soviet offer. Only effective counter-action open to US is to convince London that prompt settlement of Anglo-Egyptian dispute is imperative. If domestic British political considerations continue to make settlement impossible, US should move with unilateral aid before situation develops to point where such action on our part appears to be direct result of Soviet "competition". [4]

CAFFERY

[4] In telegram 3507 from London, Feb. 15, not printed, the Embassy in London reported that the Foreign Office had no particular comment regarding the Egyptian-Russian negotiations except that the British thought it to be a maneuver designed to get the United States to put pressure on the United Kingdom with regard to the Suez base talks. (461.7431/2-1554)

No. 1284

741.56374/2-1554: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Berlin [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1954—7:36 p. m.

Tedul 52. Assume Secretary has had opportunity see copy joint estimate Egyptian situation by US and UK Embassies Cairo which we understand pouched to arrive Berlin Feb 10. Realize efforts he has been making with Eden, but believe he may wish consider usefulness one further approach along following lines:

1. Refer to joint estimate and indicate our assumption Eden and British Cabinet would be as reluctant as we are to go against judgment men on spot.

2. Express hope therefore that this will strengthen HMG against internal political opposition and make possible development of amended proposals which in judgment our two Embassies could be sold to Egyptians.

3. Indicate that if HMG unable seize present opportunity reach full agreement we would conclude UK believed price too high. We

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 934 and to London as telegram 4209. Drafted by Burdett and Raynor and approved by Robert D. Murphy, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, after being cleared with Byroade and Bonbright.

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are deeply apprehensive deterioration Egyptian situation which would ensue in this eventuality.

4. Under such circumstances would be necessary US revise tactics and concentrate on long term efforts to induce RCC accept British terms and in meantime refrain from precipitate action against British.

5. This would be most difficult and our effectiveness distinctly limited. If effort to have chance we would need to proceed with extension economic aid which Eden requested us withhold temporarily while UK made further effort to determine if agreement possible at this time.

SMITH

No. 1285

661.74/2-1654: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (O'Shaughnessy) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL Moscow, February 16, 1954—7 p. m.

1002. Deptel 522. [2] Last mention Moscow press Egyptian economic delegation was reception Egyptian Legation February 12 attended by usual trade brass at such affairs including Mikoyan and Kabanov. Also mention visit Leningrad February 4–8 where saw factory making generators for Kuibyshev hydroelectric power station. Member Egyptian Legation states group also visited steel mill and tractor plant Stalingrad and Stalin auto works, Moscow, had planned to leave for Cairo via Bucharest and Rome February 17, but may still make visit to Kiev. This source says that trip has been exploratory and that no agreements will be considered until return Cairo. Less official attention than given British or Argentine delegations and as yet no Soviet announcements on results of visit or prospects of large scale assistance.

Seems likely that Egyptian announcement premature and designed to force western hands, and that any Soviet propositions still in preliminary stage. Is possible that Soviets are incorporating technical assistance features in desirous trade agreement similar to India. While USSR capable of building specific factories, ability or desire to assist in large development projects more dubious.

O'SHAUGHNESSY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 137 and to Cairo as telegram 2.

[2] Telegram 522 to Moscow, Feb. 12, not printed, was sent to Cairo as telegram 922. See footnote 2, Document 1283.

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No. 1286

741.56374/2-1254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 16, 1954—5:40 p. m.

938. We do not anticipate any UK Cabinet decision on Egypt for at least ten days and see only slim prospects for significant modification in "Heads of Agreement".

Cairo's 901 and previous describe Nasir as waiting for UK reply to his suggestion re Turkey. British show no inclination to reply especially in absence direct approach to them and RCC endorsement.

We believe pressure should be maintained on RCC and especially Nasir to consider exhaustively consequences rejection present UK offer. As long as Nasir continues hope his suggestion re Turkey will produce important changes UK position, he unlikely face up to actual situation.

Accordingly Embassy requested at its discretion remind Nasir US views (Deptel 820) and suggest he consider advisability approaching UK directly re Turkey.

SMITH

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 4223. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

No. 1287

641.74/2-1754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, February 17, 1954—2 p. m.

926. Embassy is naturally losing no opportunity to impress upon RCC advantages of Anglo-Egyptian settlement and to make clear US view that British unlikely make further important concessions (Deptel 938).

On other hand I must emphasize conclusions reached in joint estimate (B II) in connection with availability and uniforms. Nothing has happened since that time to make either me or British Ambassador or our staffs change our minds in their regard.

Also I must point out again Egyptian impression as set out in second paragraph mytel 891 that British were striving all along to include Turkey and Iran in availability formula, primarily Turkey,

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 302.

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and Iran if possible; and that UN formula was brought in as second best when Egyptians refused to agree to inclusion of Turkey. My British colleague is of opinion that maximum availability formula obtainable would be inclusion of Turkey and Iran and next best Turkey alone without Iran. British community here are back of British Embassy in believing that London would be lucky to obtain the inclusion of Turkey.

Stevenson told me the other day there were some indications London might be getting ready to move on this. Writer G. F. Eliot, who has been supporting British stand, told me few days ago that he understood that what British were after regarding availability was inclusion of Turkey and Iran.

Nasir is out of town for few days but upon his return I shall take first available opportunity to suggest that he talk directly to Stevenson about Turkey.

CAFFERY

No. 1288

741.56374/2-1854: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 18, 1954—6:47 p. m.

955. Following is report of Secretary's conversation with Eden Feb 17 Berlin:

Egypt. Eden indicated that if Iran could be included with Turkey, he personally would be satisfied and ready to make concession on uniforms.

However, he said Churchill was very difficult on this subject, and he could not be confident of result until he saw situation after return to London. He said that if no new agreement could be reached they would have to get along as best they could under the present treaty, and I said I thought we would then have to give economic aid to Egypt, particularly having regard to Soviet proposal regarding upper dam. Eden seemed acquiescent.

SMITH

No. 1289

Editorial Note

Representatives of the United States and Egypt on February 23 and February 24 signed a Technical Cooperation Agreement which

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entered into force on February 24, 1954. For the text, see TIAS No. 2986, 5 UST (pt. 1) 1029.

No. 1290

774.11/2-2554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT CAIRO, February 25, 1954—2 p. m.

954. Re urtel 953. [2] News of acceptance Naguib's resignation comes as surprise and shock here as it will abroad. Even those aware of periodic disputes between Naguib and RCC did not anticipate open rupture at this time. (As of 11 o'clock last night Nasir himself expected differences would be smoothed over as on previous occasions.)

Naguib's going will unquestionably be serious loss to regime (even more from international point of view than from domestic one). There is no one in sight to replace him in role of genial, winsome "father of the country". Development will also be widely interpreted as weakening present government and will lead to speculation over possibility further schisms in RCC.

On other hand, it has long been evident that Naguib was little more than figurehead while Nasir was real brains and spark-plug of revolutionary movement. Actual power structure remains unchanged, whereas accession to Naguib's demand for extraordinary powers including veto over RCC decisions would have placed government at mercy of man who actually not qualified exercise such powers.

Background to blow-up was increasing insistence of Naguib (spurred on, I am told, by his wife, presidential legal advisor Suliman Hafiz and officers of his bodyguard) that he be given real presidential powers. It appears Naguib sometime ago demanded same authority as United States President but was told present regime temporary and definition presidential powers must await decision on new constitution. Naguib then proposed immediate plebiscite on question presidency alone. When this refused and situation aggra-

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 311, as 19 to Rome, as 40 to Paris, as 62 to Amman, as 67 to Beirut, as 35 to Baghdad, as 24 to Damascus, as 21 to Jidda, and as 45 to Tel Aviv.

[2] In telegram 953 from Cairo, Feb. 25, not printed, Caffery reported that the RCC had issued a communiqué that said that three days earlier, Naguib had resigned from all posts that he occupied; that the RCC, under Nasir's leadership, would continue to govern the country; and that Nasir was appointed President of Council of Ministers. (774.11/2-2554)

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vated by several petty disagreements, Naguib submitted resignation three days ago but continued exercise functions. RCC made repeated efforts mollify him but offered no major concessions.

Naguib seems to have deliberately chosen most inopportune moment to face RCC with demands (just before inauguration Sudanese Parliament and at delicate stage Anglo-Egyptian talks) apparently in belief RCC would not dare accept his resignation. It is typical of RCC officers that they unanimously decided to do so, in full awareness of inevitable world-wide repercussions, rather than bow to pressure on what they consider vital question of principle. Decision was approved by Cabinet and by entire group of "free officers". Trouble therefore not expected from Armed Forces, nor is it likely there will be difficulties at this juncture from organized populace despite Naguib's personal popularity.

CAFFERY

No. 1291

774.00/2-2654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, February 26, 1954—2 p. m.

963. Line taken in Department's helpful statement (Deptel 988) [2] borne out by Salah Salim at press conference last night. Salim specifically made points:

(1) No change in foreign policy as result Naguib departure.
(2) Policy made by RCC and not determined by any one man.

Tone of his remarks suggested RCC more anxious than ever settle Suez issue and concerned lest British seize on dispute with Naguib as reason for further delay. Salim added that once Suez question settled "transition period" could rapidly be brought to close and parliamentary life restored.

In piecing together accumulated evidence, I believe following conclusions are justified:

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 315 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, the Arab capitals, Tripoli, and Khartoum.

[2] In telegram 988, Feb. 25, not printed, the Department informed the Embassy that it had issued a statement saying that the events in Egypt were unrelated to Egypt's international policies, and that the question of the Suez negotiations was not involved in those domestic developments surrounding the fall of Naguib. (641.74/2-2554)

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1. Naguib essentially good, honest, patriotic, loyal, lovable, sincere man but weak. He revelled in acclaim and at times privately disavowed responsibility for unpopular decisions of RCC.

2. RCC was well aware of Naguib's popularity and importance as symbol of new regime and successfully concealed to large degree growing difficulties with President.

3. Decision dispense with Naguib taken with reluctance and full appreciation its potential consequences. Although showdown over locus of power probably inevitable, RCC hoped postpone crisis at least until after Anglo-Egyptian settlement.

4. Naguib forced showdown in belief he could win out. From his point of view situation had probably also become intolerable as his injured vanity was played on by people around him. (His wife reportedly told him on one occasion: "You are nothing but a Fawzi Selo".)

5. RCC now in extremely delicate position because of necessity justify action against Naguib whom they had formerly built up as leader of revolution. Neither Egyptian public nor world at large aware of extent to which Nasir has from beginning planned and guided movement. He lacks Naguib's popular appeal and it will be extremely difficult under the circumstances to convince public of what is obvious to anyone meeting him more intimate circumstances; i.e., that at 36 Nasir is already head and shoulders above Naguib in ability and strength of character (London's 3663, February 25). [3]

CAFFERY

[3] Ambassador Aldrich had reported in telegram 3663, Feb. 25, not printed, that the Foreign Office considered Naguib to be a man of greater stature and depth than Nasir. (641.74/2-2554)

No. 1292

774.00/2-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, February 27, 1954—7 p. m.

986. Following is best information so far available regarding events last night:

Around 10 last night, representative of group young cavalry officers went to Nasir to demand reinstatement Naguib. Nasir replied RCC would respect desire free officers from whom RCC derived its powers. Following meeting, Nasir passed word that there was dissatisfaction among cavalry, whereupon free officers took it upon themselves to surround cavalry, barracks and informed officers

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 320 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, and the Arab capitals.

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there that RCC had their full backing. RCC then sought to get in touch with RCC member Khaled Muhieddin for background on action of cavalry officers. When they reached him, he announced he was taking over the government, and was going to enlist Naguib's support. Muhieddin then alerted cavalry tank units. At about 1 a. m., Muhieddin saw Naguib and it was quickly agreed that Naguib would resume Presidency and Muhieddin would be Prime Minister, with program to restore Constitutional government.

When Muhieddin returned to cavalry barracks, he and 41 cavalry officers were arrested by free officers, who also took Naguib to artillery mess, Abassia barracks.

Artillery, air force and infantry reported to have fully supported RCC at this stage.

Subsequently, Nasir reported to have talked with cavalry officers and reached some agreement.

Situation still extremely confused, but reports continue persistently that Naguib is coming back. Rumors to this effect current in the streets have produced evidence of popular election at prospect. Embassy reliably informed, however, RCC meeting has just been suspended for a few hours and that no decision has been reached regarding Naguib.

At 6 p. m., security measures markedly reduced from high level of this morning.

CAFFERY

No. 1293

774.00/2–2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, February 28, 1954—8 p. m.

1002. Following roundup my preliminary impressions re events past 48 hours.

1. RCC appears to have badly underestimated Naguib's nationwide popularity and overestimated extent their own supporters not only among general public but also within army. RCC belief that it had full control of latter through free officers has not been justified by events and it seems clear that at this moment there are factions not only among free officers but also among RCC members whose

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 327, as 37 to Baghdad, as 71 to Beirut, as 28 to Damascus, as 66 to Amman, as 24 to Jidda, as 49 to Tel Aviv, and unnumbered to Paris and Rome.

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monolithic front is no longer intact. Plain fact is reaction in army and general public forced RCC to restore Naguib.

2. Naguib comes back as President of "parliamentary Republic of Egypt" with Nasir in role of Prime Minister. Naguib is man of the hour who has just received national acclaim in the nature of an overwhelming plebiscite. He is obviously in a stronger position vis-à-vis RCC.

3. Some changes soon in RCC seem almost certain: The pro-Naguib crowds shouted against some RCC members by name and it is doubtful Naguib can long work in real harmony with Salah Salim who voiced RCC grievances against him. Spotlight is currently on leftist RCC member Khaled Muhieddin who enjoys support junior cavalry officers (Embassy's 986). Naguib's gratitude for efforts his behalf of this group places it in strategic position which could be exploited by leftist elements.

4. Many leading Egyptians, civilian and army, see in cavalry officers move plot by Communists and/or Ikhwan to break power of RCC which indeed has been weakened. Evidence cited for this is that:

(a) Salah Ashmawi and another prominent Ikhwan leader appeared on balcony with Naguib this morning;
(b) Among student demonstrators number of Ikhwani and Communist organizers were seen (Embtel 1001). [2] Only hard fact is that until new situation settled into firmer pattern both Ikhwani and Communists will do their best to make headway and both will try to persuade Naguib (consciously or unconsciously) to advance their ideas.

5. Naguib's ostentatious display of solidarity with Nasir and Salah Salim and order banning further demonstrations indicate situation returning normal. Even if recently aired differences are composed publicly, it is possible that subsurface rifts will persist for some time.

6. Promise of immediate steps toward restoration parliamentary regime is only solid new political development and one which may have hopeful potentialities.

CAFFERY

[2] Not printed.

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No. 1294

774.11/3-854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, March 9, 1954—noon.

1069. As intimated my telegram 1062 [2] RCC was faced with extensive demands from Naguib (details will follow). Return to *status quo ante* was probably best compromise which could be worked out under circumstances.

Naguib returns much stronger than he left. It is not to be expected, therefore, that he will be willing to sit back and let Nasir run government as Deputy Prime Minister to extent he formerly did. While this is potential source of friction, Nasir will probably try to avoid further flare-ups during period remaining before election Constituent Assembly.

Another possible cause of trouble is Naguib's partiality to "presidential", as opposed to "parliamentary" republic and his desire for direct plebiscite on this issue and on choice of him as President. RCC's preference for parliamentary republic is supported by Ali Maher, Sanhuri and apparently majority of constitution drafting commission.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 352 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, the Arab capitals, and Khartoum.

[2] In telegram 1062 from Cairo, Mar. 8, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported serious disagreements existed between the RCC and Naguib over the definition of the President's authority and his relationship to the RCC and Cabinet. Caffery predicted that if compromise could not be reached, Egypt might soon be faced with renewed crises. (774.11/3-854)

No. 1295

641.74/3-1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, March 10, 1954—2 p. m.

1075. Ambassador Ahmed Hussein told me last night that Nasir still desires settle Anglo-Egyptian question as quickly as possible. He said Nasir reaffirmed yesterday his willingness extend availability to include Turkey if British will give up uniforms.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 354 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Ankara, and the Arab capitals.

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Hussein made point (which coincides Embassy's own analysis) that unless Anglo-Egyptian agreement concluded before start electoral campaign for constituent assembly, there will be no Anglo-Egyptian settlement in foreseeable future. Once speech-making starts, "British imperialism" will again become number one political issue in Egypt and politicians will again strive to out do each other in uncompromising insistence on Egypt's full "national rights".

British may be inclined view this prospect with some complacency in belief they can successfully resume pre-revolution tactics of playing off Egyptian politicians against each other. (Commonwealth representative said last night that British Embassy officer last night told him file on Anglo-Egyptian negotiations has been "closed up and locked away".) I cannot believe, however, that Eden will fail to appreciate essential short-sightedness of any "wait-and-see" policy. Despite mistakes and weaknesses, this regime has brought new and positive approach to Egypt's problems.

If British attempt to remain by force at Suez base after expiration treaty in 1956, they will unleash forces which may devour our Middle Eastern interests as well as theirs. [2]

CAFFERY

[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 1081, Mar. 11, not printed, that he had provided Stevenson with the contents of this conversation, and Stevenson had said that he would telegraph London immediately for authorization for meetings. (641.74/3-1154)

No. 1296

774.11/3-1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, March 10, 1954—3 p. m.

1078. Following account events leading to return of Naguib as Prime Minister (my telegram 1069) given to Embassy officer by reliable source in close touch RCC: On March 7 Naguib sent RCC list of demands which included all his original demands prior his resignation (Embtel 953) [2] in addition to insistence on direct plebiscite

[1] This telegram was repeated to London as telegram 356 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, the Arab capitals, and Khartoum.

[2] In telegram 953 from Cairo, Feb. 25, not printed, Caffery reported that Naguib had demanded the right to veto any decision of the RCC, the power to appoint and dismiss Ministers, and to pass on promotions, dismissals, and transfers of officers. (774.11/2-2554)

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on issue of "Presidential" versus "Parliamentary" Republic. He also demanded "yes" or "no" ballot on choice of himself as President, to precede elections for constituent assembly. When, at one point, formation of sort of Supreme Court to referee disputes between president and RCC was proposed, Naguib insisted any such body should have only advisory powers and should include ex-Wafdist Speaker Abd Al Salamguma and three ex-Wafdists, ex-Sadist leader, Hamid Guda and three former Sadists plus Husain Haykal, former President liberal constitutionalists and three members of this party.

According to source, RCC had made full preparations fact possibility renewed obstinacy on Naguib's part in particular had very carefully assured itself of full army support in event of renewed crisis with Naguib. When Naguib failed to appear at joint Congress meeting Monday night, Major General Amir, CINC Armed Forces, was sent to convey to Naguib unanimous decision of RCC and Cabinet to refuse his demands. Source states Amir was armed with "documentary evidence" to convince Naguib that persistence in his demands would be met with firmest measures on part of RCC and Armed Forces.

Naguib thereupon accompanied Amir to meeting where he protested to Nasir that his position had been misrepresented and insisted he wished to cooperate with RCC but that he found himself in humiliating position vis-à-vis public because of his loss of premiership and presidency of RCC. He begged Nasir to make him Prime Minister again "just for a month". Source states that Nasir thereupon offered to restore to Naguib all his lost titles and return situation to *status quo ante*. Source insisted Naguib has no more powers than before his resignation and that Nasir remains in effective control of RCC which continues to operate by majority decision.

CAFFERY

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No. 1297

641.74/3-1054: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 12, 1954—7:30 p. m.

4699. We concur views expressed by Caffery (Cairo's 1075) and endorsed by Foreign Office (London's 3917) [2] re importance concluding Suez Base agreement soonest.

Aldrich requested urge on Eden resumption negotiations taking advantage meeting proposed by Nasir and on basis acceptance by Egypt of availability formula including Turkey (and possibly Iran) in return for abandonment by UK of insistence on uniforms. Aldrich should stress: (1) Unless agreement concluded quickly we doubt settlement possible foreseeable future because of inevitable injection question in elections campaign; (2) Desirability capitalizing on present straits RCC which may permit UK obtain better terms than in future; (3) Despite present weakness RCC offers best hope for long run constructive approach to Egypt's problems and cooperation with West.

SMITH

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1081. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

[2] In telegram 3917, Mar. 11, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich reported that he had discussed Nasir's suggestion brought forth in telegram 1075 from Cairo, Document 1295, and the Foreign Office promised to inform the Embassy as soon as a decision had been reached. (641.74/3-1154)

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No. 1298

641.74/3–1754: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, March 17, 1954—1 p. m.

3991. Re Deptel 4699 and Embtel 3956. [2] At Eden's request, I called late last evening and he handed me an *aide-mémoire* on Egypt summarized below (text pouched today). [3]

Begin Summary. Negotiations now held up by two main issues, availability and uniforms. On first, Egyptians had indicated they would be prepared make base available in event of attack on Turkey though not Iran. This "to a great extent" would meet British requirements on availability but divergence on uniforms still unreconciled. Whole issue largely one of confidence. Behavior of Egyptian Government over Sudan, violent attacks in speeches Egyptian Ministers and continuance terrorist activities make it impossible for HMG have any confidence that Egyptian Government would adhere to agreement on Canal Zone if one were made. In particular, to leave 4,000 British soldiers in Canal Zone whether in uniform or not would be "offering hostages to fortune". At same time HMG anxious reach agreement and believe Egyptians are too and that if Anglo–Egyptian relations are ever to be placed on better footing, present may be right moment seek agreement.

HMG, therefore, considering whether it would be possible abandon idea of keeping British soldiers in Egypt to maintain base after withdrawal British forces and substitute concept maintaining installations with civilian contract labor. At same time, HMG would expect to secure right re-enter base in case real emergency and would expect that Egypt in return for total evacuation British troops would be prepared grant this right over considerably longer period than seven years contemplated.

Main outlines of new plan under consideration are:

(a) British troops would redeploy elsewhere than in Egypt.

(b) UK would obtain right re-enter base in case of attack on Egypt, and Arab state or Turkey, and immediate consultations in case of threatened attack on these or Iran. "A 20-year life for this arrangement" should be sought.

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[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 107.

[2] In telegram 3956 from London, Mar. 15, not printed, the Department was informed that Aldrich on Mar. 9 had spoken to Eden along the lines of telegram 4699, Mar. 12, *supra*, and that upon receipt of that instruction, the Chargé, Butterworth, reiterated Aldrich's remarks to Eden. Butterworth also believed it likely that the Cabinet would authorize Eden to resume the negotiations along the lines suggested by Nasir. (641.74/3–1554)

[3] Not printed; the *aide-mémoire* was transmitted in despatch 3136 from London, Mar. 17. (641.74/3–1754)

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(c) Certain key installations, such as airfields, would be maintained by civil contractors under arrangements with Egyptian Government which would be responsible for their security. No British soldiers would remain in base as technicians. Egypt would engage herself to maintain these installations.

(d) Agreement would contain preamble covering free navigation Suez Canal, making it clear this replaced 1936 treaty.

(e) Considerable quantities of equipment which could not be maintained by civil contractors would need to be removed and therefore HMG would have to insist on more time, "probably two years", within which the last troops would be withdrawn although substantial withdrawals would be made at an earlier date.

Egyptian Government would be informed this plan could only be put forward if Egypt prepared satisfy HMG "they would take necessary steps restore confidence", e.g., undertake observe terms and spirit of Sudan agreement and contribute to orderly transfer of power by insuring that balance in Governor General's commission is not upset. Official Egyptian spokesman must also refrain from unbridled attacks on Britain and on British public servants in Sudan.

Given present state Anglo-Egyptian relations, HMG feel such arrangement unlikely be effective if made on purely Anglo-Egyptian basis and consequently believe US Government should be associated with it. HMG hope USG would be prepared accept invitation by Egypt to use base on same terms as it would be available to HMG and "work out with HMG and in due course with Egypt arrangements under which base would be maintained until such time as Egyptian resources capable doing work efficiently". *Aide-mémoire* concludes:

"HMG would ask USG give most earnest consideration these proposals and let them have as soon as possible their comments on question civil contracts by American firms, in addition to British, and arrangements under which these could be entered into".

End Summary.

Eden explained plan summarized above was approved after long discussion in Cabinet afternoon March 15. He said it was sincere attempt not only meet Egyptians on question of uniforms but go further and remove all military personnel in order contribute to an amicable durable settlement. He particularly hoped we could associate ourselves with this endeavor which would make the plan feasible for the British Government from a parliamentary point of view and would contribute importantly to durability of settlement.

In this connection, he explained that idea of British Government was that Egyptians would invite US to use base and would agree that base would be maintained by Egyptian Government through civilian contractors who would be acceptable to both US and British Governments. He hoped that US private contractors would be interested in joining British contractors in doing this. He said it

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was not contemplated that the US Government would incur any expense in connection with this phase of plans, and if no US private contractors were available, he felt sure British contractors would be available who could do the work on satisfactory basis.

In response to questions, Eden made the following explanations and comments regarding details new plan.

Re (b) above: He said that he would not insist on 20-year life for arrangement, but he pointed out that Egyptians had always maintained that their main objection to existing situation was presence British troops and that if British troops were removed, Egypt should have no objections to making base available over long period. I said that present proposed arrangement provide for availability of base for only seven-year period and that I doubted very much whether Egyptians would agree period as long as 20 years. I believe from discussion which ensued that Eden would be satisfied with something like 10 years. However, mention was made of disadvantageous precedent a short period would create as far as Iraq is concerned.

Re (c): Eden explained that plan contemplated civilian contractors being employed and paid by Egyptian Government and British Government (and American Government, if latter should become associated with plan) would have right to periodic inspection to insure installations being properly maintained.

Re (e): Eden explained that Defense Ministry believes that if base were to be maintained by civilian contractors it would have to be reduced in size and additional time would be required for removals. He emphasized strongly, however, that this would not affect withdrawal of combat troops.

Eden stated that no action with respect to the above plan would be taken by HMG vis-à-vis Egypt until reply had been received from US.

In Embassy's opinion, reference in paragraph 1 of summary to effect it impossible for HMG "have any confidence that Egyptian Government would adhere to agreement" should be read in connection with subsequent statement that Egypt would be informed plan could be put forward only if Egypt takes necessary steps restore confidence.

ALDRICH

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No. 1299

641.74/3-1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, March 18, 1954—noon.

4008. Eyes only Secretary. Just before dinner last night Eden called me on phone and asked if I would come to see him. I met him at his house at 11 p. m. and was with him alone for about an hour.

He began by asking me whether I had yet received any reply to Embtel 3991. I replied that I did not think any answer could be forthcoming for a considerable time. He said Churchill and he were extremely concerned with present political situation here regarding Canal base, that conferences had been going on all day yesterday between himself, members of Cabinet and Churchill regarding this situation, and that matter had been discussed by Committee of 23 which he said constituted executive of Conservative Party. He said Churchill and insurgent back benchers were extremely reluctant to go along with him in withdrawing all military personnel from Canal base. He then said that if the United States Government would be willing to associate itself with future operations of base in manner described in reference telegram or in any other manner which might be satisfactory to yourself and the President, he felt certain that settlement with Egyptians could be completed within a month and redeployment of British forces commenced. Eden said he needed this association to carry Churchill with him and that if it were not possible he was convinced "old man" would insist on maintenance large British forces at Suez base indefinitely. He stated categorically that association of United States Government on any basis would satisfy Churchill and whole Conservative Party in giving in on having British military technicians on base and thereby eliminating question of uniforms.

I asked Eden whether he felt at all sure that Egyptian Government would invite United States Government to use base on same terms as it would be available to Her Majesty's Government and pointed out to him fact that Eygptian Government had not been willing to invite United States Government to participate in negotiations regarding base. Eden said situation had changed completely since then and that he felt sure Egyptian Government would now extend such an invitation.

I have never seen Eden show such concern about anything as he did last night about Egyptian negotiations. In my opinion he is not

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exaggerating political difficulties he faces with Churchill and back benchers.

I assume that if you and President should be favorably inclined towards Eden's proposal you might consider action by NSC necessary and that this would involve delay. If you could give me your preliminary reaction in meantime I am sure it would be greatly appreciated by both Eden and Churchill.

ALDRICH

No. 1300

741.56374/3-1954

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 19, 1954.

Subject: British Proposal on Suez.

Attached is a summary of today's State–JCS meeting regarding the recent British proposal on Suez which I believe you may find useful preparatory to your meeting with Admiral Radford on this subject tomorrow morning. [2]

[Attachment]

SUMMARY OF STATE–JCS MEETING—MARCH 19, 1954

Subject: British Proposal on Suez (London's 3991)

After introductory remarks by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jernegan outlined the British proposal, emphasizing that any feasible arrangement with respect to Suez on a purely Anglo-Egyptian basis would probably be unacceptable to the British; but that if the U.S. agreed to the British proposition, it would certainly be acceptable to the British, and probably to the Egyptians. It was pointed out that more intransigence on the part of the British and a series of incidents might be expected if some new step of this kind were not taken. Special reference was made to the importance the British attach to the Egyptians creating an atmosphere of "mutual confidence". The basic questions are:

1. How long can Eden hold the Conservatives in line?

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[1] Drafted by John Goodyear, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files.

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2. How long can the Egyptian situation be controlled pending an arrangement to make an agreement?

United States involvement under the British proposal was listed by Mr. Jernegan as:

1. A willingness, though not a commitment, to be included in such an arrangement.
2. A commitment of a sort (a) to consult in the event of an attack upon Egypt, the Arab countries and Turkey; and (b) to consult in the event of a "threat" to these countries or Iran.
3. Agreement to assist in arranging to make an American contribution. (It was pointed out that this had come up before, and had been approved in principle by the U.S. Government.)

Mr. Jernegan believed that the Egyptians would look favorably on this proposal because:

1. It eliminates the "uniforms" question.
2. It meets the "availability" formula which is acceptable to both sides.
3. It associates the United States with the effort.

Mr. Murphy emphasized that a question of British domestic politics is involved, and that the element of United States association would clinch the matter with Churchill and with the Conservative back benchers. Mr. Murphy suggested that it was likely that the Egyptians would agree to invite us (although we had not yet explored this point with Ambassador Caffery), and referred to Ambassador Caffery's close association with the negotiations so far.

Mr. MacArthur reviewed the Secretary's discussion with Eden on this subject at Berlin. It was stressed then, he said, that if the present situation dragged on it would result in a hardening and a deterioration of the position on both the British and Egyptian side.

Admiral Carney interjected that more than Egypt was involved; that even if we accepted, difficult negotiations on details might ensue and that long-standing friction not only between Britain and Egypt but also between Britain and all the Near East might be transferred to us; and that there were also cost considerations which had to be studied.

Mr. Jernegan replied that we are likely to suffer from these disabilities whether or not we accepted this present proposal. Mr. MacArthur echoed this, and stressed that the acceptability of the proposal to the Egyptians was a *sine qua non* of our participation.

Admiral Radford suggested that if we should take this on, we should demand that the British accept a reasonable Iranian oil settlement.

. . . . . .

Further discussion involved exactly what the proposal committed us to. Admiral Carney pointed out that we would be involved very

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heavily in the Middle East in any tension which involved the British.

Exploring the availability conditions, Admiral Radford pointed out that they are very limited if Iran was not included; and that the USSR could initiate a militay operation in the Middle East (in Iran, for example) without violating Turkey.

The Air Force representative did not believe that the proposed "availability" arrangement would mean as much to us as it would if it involved NATO, and that it would assist the British position in the Near East far more than it would our own in a global war.

One JCS suggestion was that we should agree to the proposal on condition that the United States present it to Egypt and that, if acceptable, the British accede to it. Mr. MacArthur stated that if we let the British propose it we would still get the credit . . . ; and that an easing of UK-Egyptian tensions might also result—which would not be the case if the U.S. presented it.

Mr. Jernegan stressed the importance of time. He said that this was a desperate and last ditch effort by Eden to get a settlement and that it put the Foreign Secretary very much out on a limb.

Discussion took place concerning the possibility of having an answer from the JCS by Saturday. The JCS felt that this was not nearly enough time.

Consideration was given to the suggestion that the United States Government should take a long hard look at this proposal and should not be stampeded into making a hasty decision. The JCS felt a short but reasonable study should be made of the implications of the British proposal.

No. 1301

741.56474/3–1954

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 19, 1954.

Subject: New British Proposals on Suez Base

Eden has submitted for our comments new proposals on the Suez Base involving: (1) Withdrawal of all British troops; (2) Maintenance of essential facilities by civilian contractors; and (3) Retention of reentry rights for twenty years. The plan is conditioned

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Burdett.

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upon: (1) US participation and (2) Steps by Egypt to restore confidence. Eden has stated that without US association he is convinced that Churchill will insist on maintaining large British forces at the Suez Base indefinitely. (Tab A) [2]

The proposals resemble, but offer advantages over, "Case C," [3] which the US Government decided early last year to accept as a minimum if this were necessary to obtain a Base agreement. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Department of State, approved "Case C" in February 1953. The proposals involve considerably less in the way of a US commitment than the offer of the President to Churchill in June 1953 to provide US technicians to participate in the maintenance of the Base.

The effects of US association with the proposals would include: (1) Ensure that the British would in fact advance this new proposal to the Egyptians; (2) Increase the attractiveness of the proposals to Egypt and enhance the prospects of Egypt's carrying them out in good faith; (3) Redound to the credit of the US in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. A paper commenting on the proposals in detail is attached. (Tab B) [4]

A meeting was held with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 19 at which no decision was asked or given. The reaction of the Chiefs was generally favorable, but they had certain secondary reservations and in particular wished to study the implications at greater length. Admiral Radford will be present at your meeting with the President on March 20. [5]

Attached is a memorandum to the President which you may wish to present to him at the start of your discussion. (Tab C)

Recommendation:

That you urge approval of US association with the proposals at your meeting with the President on March 20, stressing the importance of an immediate decision.

[Tab C]

[DRAFT] MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: New British Proposals on Suez Base

The British have requested our comments on a new plan for solution of the Suez Base question with Egypt involving evacuation of

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[2] Tab A consisted of telegrams 3991 and 4008 from London, Documents 1298 and 1299.

[3] See Document 1061.

[4] Not printed.

[5] See footnote 2, *supra*.

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all British troops, retention of certain reentry rights and maintenance of key installations by civilian contractors. The pertinent telegrams from London are attached. [6] The British state the proposals are conditioned on steps by Egypt to "restore confidence." The United States is asked to associate itself with the arrangement in the following respects: (1) Accept an invitation by Egypt to use the Base on the same terms as it would be available to the United Kingdom and (2) Work out maintenance arrangements with the United Kingdom and Egypt, including civil contracts by American firms if we so desire.

Eden has requested an immediate indication of our preliminary reaction. He has emphasized to Ambassador Aldrich his concern over the Suez Base problem and the seriousness of his difficulties with Churchill and Conservative Party backbenchers. Eden stated that without United States association he is convinced that Churchill would insist on maintaining large British forces at the Suez Base indefinitely.

The effects of United States association with the proposals would include: (1) Ensure that the British would in fact advance this new proposal to the Egyptians; (2) Increase the attractiveness of the proposals to Egypt and enhance the prospects of Egypt's carrying them out in good faith; (3) Redound to the credit of the United States in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world.

The proposals were discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a meeting on March 19 at which no decision was requested or made.

I recommend that you approve United States association with and support of the British proposals. I consider a decision urgent because of the domestic difficulties faced by both the British and Egyptian Governments and the current deterioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[6] The telegrams under reference are telegrams 3991 and 4008 from London, Documents 1298 and 1299.

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No. 1302

641.74/3-1754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, March 20, 1954—1:04 p. m.

4863. Limit distribution. For Ambassador from Secretary. Urtel 3991 please tell Eden we are in principle prepared to cooperate in working out Suez Base solution along lines he suggests. I believe HMG has adopted farseeing and constructive attitude in this plan, which should hold good hopes for settlement unless Egyptian political situation has deteriorated too far.

We assume of course that our association would not involve us in any new military commitment and that any participation by us in negotiations with Egyptians would be subject to Egyptian invitation.

We would want prompt consultation with HMG re details of plan and tactics for presenting it to Egyptians. However we would first want to have Caffery's suggestions re tactics. Would be glad to have now whatever ideas this subject British have worked out so far. We are especially anxious avoid situation such as developed last Spring when Egyptians rejected proposal that US be associated in negotiations.

We do not see any present objection in principle to use American civil contractors if that seems desirable element in package but believe many technical and other aspects should be considered before attempting final decision. [2]

DULLES

[1] Repeated niact to Cairo as telegram 1126. Drafted and approved by Jernegan after being cleared with the Secretary of State, Merchant, MacArthur, and Murphy.

[2] Ambassador Aldrich reported in telegram 4056, Mar. 20, not printed, that he had conveyed the contents of telegram 4863 to Eden, who wished to thank Secretary Dulles for his support. Eden wished also to say that this matter would be given top precedence in the following week in London. (641.74/3-2054)

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No. 1303

741.56374/3-2054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, March 20, 1954—8 p. m.

1137. Reference Department telegram 1115, [2] following are my comments London's 3991:

Overall, Eden's proposal seems offer hopeful possibilities. In particular, concept total withdrawal British military personnel and use civilian contract labor in certain installations suggests possible way out of present impasse over "uniforms". On other hand, Egyptians are likely take exception to number of arguments and propositions put forth by Eden, particularly if British offer is put up as completely "new deal". In such case, Egyptians will probably claim United Kingdom really just serving up "warmed-over hash" with a lot of new demands thrown in. Large measure of agreement already reached might be completely undone.

Egyptian reaction might be quite different, however, if United Kingdom made new proposal within framework previous bilateral discussions. It would then be proposed as series of inter-related amendments to previous positions on specific points, such as "duration" (ten years), "availability" (formula including attack on Turkey), "period for withdrawal" (two years) and "base maintenance" (civilian contractors, instead of military technicians).

As regards details Eden's proposal in present form, I anticipate Egyptians may raise objections along following lines:

1. Complete evacuation is Egypt's "national right". In compromising to extent of accepting British "technicians", Egyptians have always insisted these could not have status in Egypt of British military (hence dispute over "uniforms"). Therefore, shift to genuine civilian "technicians" will not, from Egyptian viewpoint, entail such important victory in principle as to warrant great additional concessions by Egypt on other points. Government of Egypt will also be acutely aware that within two years in which British propose evacuate, 1936 Treaty will run out.

2. In line with foregoing, I anticipate Egyptians: (a) will reject any suggestion of 20 year agreement, although they might consider 10 year, and (b) will resent and reject any attempt inject commitment regarding Sudan Governor General's commission into Suez base question and insist on dealing with Sudan question in sepa-

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 375.

[2] The Department in telegram 1115 to Cairo, Mar. 19, not printed, requested that the Embassy comment as soon as possible on telegram 3991 from London, Document 1298. (641.74/3-1754)

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rate context. This does not preclude "gentlemen's agreement" to keep "hands off".

3. Government of Egypt will probably decline involve itself in any extensive or long-term contract commitments with foreign firms. British have in past insisted on principle of British technical control of War Department stores and equipment. With abandonment this principle and removal "considerable quantities of equipment" by British, Egyptians may be expected adopt attitude that need for foreign maintenance must be demonstrated in any particular instance. Since Egyptians already operate both military and civilian international air fields, doubt they would be impressed by Eden's example (paragraph C, London's 3991) of type of "key installations" to be maintained by foreign civil contractors. I also doubt Government of Egypt will readily agree to foreign government inspection of installations.

In summary, I find Eden's initiative in seeking agreement at this time highly encouraging. I believe his proposal constitutes constructive approach toward attempting resolve present impasse. I think psychologically now is time to move in order to turn presently deteriorating situation into new channels equally desired by Egypt on one hand, and by United States and United Kingdom on other. It is evident that the obverse of Egyptian concern at prospect of Iraqi adherence to Turkish-Pakistan pact is desire not to "miss the boat" themselves.

I believe, therefore, that Eden's proposal, with modifications, could lead to Egypt-Western cooperation in Middle East defense arrangements. I do not, however, think United States should again attempt to get directly involved in negotiations prior to agreement in principle between United Kingdom and Egypt. I should certainly recommend that United States be prepared accept Egyptian invitation to use base on any reasonable terms (these presumably would entail United States and United Kingdom aid to Egypt-Pakistan). I urge, however, exercise of greatest caution concerning United States involvement in proposed arrangements for civilian contract base maintenance. It appears to me that this idea has not been fully thought out and in its presently-proposed form may be quite unacceptable to Government of Egypt (see paragraph three above).

CAFFERY

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No. 1304

774.00/3-2354: Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET
No. 2262

CAIRO, March 23, 1954.

Subject: Conversation Between Lt. Col. Gamal Abd Al Nasir and Mr. Parker T. Hart

On Sunday March 21 Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, accompanied by Mr. William Lakeland of this Embassy, called upon Lt. Col. Gamal Abd Al Nasir at his home. The principal points covered in more than two hours conversation are reviewed below.

The most important aspect of Nasir's remarks was the impression which he gave that the RCC has no intention of yielding tamely to its opponents. He strongly implied that General Naguib is the RCC's most difficult problem and gave the impression that a definitive show-down with Naguib at some future date is probably inevitable. Nasir also made it clear that he did not intend to sit by and allow opposition elements to undo what the present regime has accomplished.

The conversation opened with some discussion of the Sudan situation in which Mr. Hart gave a brief account of his impressions gained during a quick visit to Khartoum. Colonel Nasir indicated his agreement with the proposition that measures which might lead to increased tension in the Sudan should be avoided. He commented that the Sudanese Prime Minister is an "intelligent man" and implied that he did not believe the Sudanese Government would try to disturb the balance in the Governor-General's Commission.

Turning to the Egyptian situation, Nasir embarked upon a rather confused and intemperate dissertation, the principal theses of which were:

1) that the Wafdists, Communists and Muslim Brothers are attempting to exploit the current situation and are making a common cause in vociferously espousing "freedom and democracy" in the hope of displacing the revolutionary regime,

2) that communism is making great headway in Egypt through the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda activity and the ineptitude of American policy in the Near East. He asserted that he himself did not know what the United States policy in this area really was but that the United States was losing out because it "always sides with Britain".

[1] Copies of this despatch were sent to London and Khartoum.

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Mr. Hart in reply said that he could assure Nasir that Mr. Byroade had devoted a great deal of his time and effort to the Egyptian question and that the Secretary himself had taken a personal interest in the matter. He said that he was convinced that the United States Government had done everything that it could short of openly breaking with the United Kingdom in trying to bring about an Anglo-Egyptian settlement and that it would continue its efforts in this regard. Mr. Hart pointed out the world-wide basis for the US-UK alliance and the obvious interest of the Soviet Union in an Anglo-American split. He questioned whether the growth of pro-Communist and anti-Western feeling described by Nasir was not actually contrary to the interests of Egypt as well as those of the United States.

In the face of Mr. Hart's rebuttal, Col. Nasir rather changed his tack and asserted that he not only recognized the sound basis for Anglo-American solidarity but realized that a split in the Western alliance would, in fact, be contrary to the real interests of Egypt as he sees them. He made no secret, however, of his regret that Egypt's hopes for more effective American support had not materialized and, particularly, that the United States had not seen fit to express by any overt act of assistance its professed feelings of friendship for Egypt.

When questioned about his attitude toward an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, Nasir confirmed that he still desired an agreement with the British but said that opposition elements would violently attack any agreement signed now. When reference was made to a recent press statement by General Naguib rejecting the idea of extending the "availability" formula to include the case of an attack on Turkey, Nasir made a wry face and commented that Naguib was trying by all means to increase his popularity and was quite capable of using this, or any other issue, for that purpose. Nasir added that Naguib was in touch with "certain elements" opposed to the RCC. He implied that present tactics are to allow Naguib plenty of leeway in the hope that he will work himself out on the end of a limb.

In discussion regarding current thinking about plans for the Constituent Assembly and/or Parliament, Nasir dwelled upon the difficulties and dangers involved in any attempt to restore free political life at this time. He said that it was obviously impossible in less than two years to stamp out the widespread corruption of the old regime and create a new basis for political life. He asserted, however, that the country needed a lesson and gave the impression that he plans to allow the situation to go on deteriorating for a month or so in order to demonstrate to the people what would be in store for the country if party elections were carried out now. Without

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saying that there will be no elections, Nasir was certainly trying to give the impression that he anticipated the development of a situation which would permit the Revolution to reassert itself in a strong fashion and resume its program of purification and reform. He asserted that "in a month or so", after there had been a "pulling up of the reins", an immediate settlement involving evacuation of British forces from Egypt would be very desirable. It was clear, however, that he felt that a clarification of the internal situation must precede any final settlement with the British.

Comment:

It was clear that Nasir is heavily pre-occupied with the domestic political battle which he faces and is not clear in his own mind as to just what course of action to adopt. His remarks contained even more than the usual number of inconsistencies encountered in Egyptian thinking. His transparent tactic in raising the communist bug-bear during the early part of the conversation was obviously mistakenly designed to impress the visitor from Washington but must also to some extent be explained by Nasir's deep personal sense of disillusionment at the failure of the United States to extend to Egypt the aid which he believes Egypt was given every reason to expect.

Nasir was also probably trying to impress Mr. Hart with the strength of his own position in his preview of future internal developments. It must not be forgotten, however, that Nasir is a man of boldness and cunning and not one to be easily discouraged by a setback. He is at present devoting most of his attention to tightening his control on the Armed Forces and has always been a strong believer in the importance of the element of surprise.

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

No. 1305

774.00/3-2554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CAIRO, March 25, 1954.

1167. Following lengthy meeting with Naguib presiding, RCC announced today following decisions:

1. Political parties will be permitted organize immediately.
2. RCC will not form political party.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 386 and unnumbered to the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Khartoum.

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3. No one will be deprived of political rights.

4. Constituent Assembly will be freely elected (no appointees).

5. RCC will turn over all powers to Constituent Assembly on July 24 and consider revolution ended. President of Republic will be elected by Assembly when it meets.

CAFFERY

No. 1306

774.00/3-2654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, March 26, 1954—noon.

1168. Re Embtel 1167. Decisions announced by RCC were taken to avert internal crisis and possible internal strife. While RCC believed to feel early elections not really in best interests of country, their hand was forced by political maneuvering of Naguib. RCC was faced with decision whether to eliminate Naguib and his backers and assume tight dictatorial control or go along with return of parties and holding of elections.

Reasoning behind RCC decision possibly influenced by following considerations:

1. Naguib has demonstrated that apparently he is willing to play along with worst elements in country, including Wafdists, Muslim Brotherhood, and Communists to stay in power and any other decision risked possible immediate clash with this unholy alliance.
2. Continuation of split with Naguib could only maintain and increase unrest in general.
3. Settlement with UK impossible while unrest continued.
4. Seeming RCC capitulation on issue of parties and election would create atmosphere in which settlement might be possible prior elections.
5. RCC prestige would be restored and even enhanced by settlement to point where they could maintain an important role, direct or indirect, in future government of country.

Present move constitutes calculated risk in face of alternatives which could have spelled civil war at worst or continuation grave unrest at best with eventual collapse of regime in sight in either case.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 387 and unnumbered to the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Khartoum, Alexandria, Paris for Reinhardt, Bonn for Satterthwaite, Rome for Maffitt, and Valletta for Paddock.

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No. 1307

774.00/3–2654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, March 26, 1954—4 p. m.

1178. Re Embtel 1168. Source close to Nasir says RCC concluded that continuation of ambiguous situation could only redound to their disadvantage and consequently faced Naguib yesterday with choice of sincere collaboration in firm course of action or grant of full freedom for expression of public will. Naguib reportedly offered counterplan for immediate plebiscite on his position as president, RCC to remain as advisors to president under title of "Republican Council".

When Nasir rejected this and insisted on program as subsequently announced Naguib asked: "What are you trying to do, throw me to the lions?" In face of Nasir's threat to make facts public, Naguib finally agreed. Proposal was then carried by vote of 8 to 4 with Gamal Salim, Baghdadi, Hasan Ibrahim and Kamaled Din Husain reportedly voting against. (These favor strong action against Naguib.)

Comment: RCC officers apparently committed for present to "wait and see" policy but hopeful forthcoming political melee, from which they will stand aloof, may sully Naguib and party groups and lead to resurgence public sympathy for "clean" revolution leaders. It is not unlikely that RCC prepared seize any favorable opportunity which may present itself for reversal of present trend if it appears important segment of public would approve of such a move.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 789 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, Rome for Maffitt, Bonn for Satterthwaite, the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Khartoum, Alexandria, and Valletta for Paddock.

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No. 1308

774.00/3-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT CAIRO, March 27, 1954—midnight.

1187. Good natured crowds started pro RCC demonstrations this evening downtown Cairo thence to RCC headquarters and dispersed. Press sources say other groups, mostly Wafd, meanwhile demonstrated pro Naguib.

ESB announced transport, textile, merchant, agricultural workers, and printing press syndicates various areas have come out against civilian government. Other sources say syndicates oganizing sit down and hunger strikes against restoration political parties.

Few hours ago Major Amin Shaker called press conference and issued statement "in name RCC" denouncing Naguib as playing into hands of subversive elements. Shaker queried by well known Egyptian newsman later said he issued statement own authority not on behalf RCC and is withdrawing it. Meanwhile, wire services have sent stories.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London priority as telegram 394.

No. 1309

774.00/3-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, March 28, 1954—noon.

1188. Re Embtel 1187, RCC subsequently denied Shaker statement.

On return from visit to Alexandria last night King Saud and Naguib held midnight meeting which Nasir and Sanhouri were shortly after invited to join. This morning's press announces meeting broke up 2:30 a. m. and will reconvene again this morning. Also announces Saud has postponed departure 24 hours presumably to mediate Naguib–RCC dispute.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 395, to Amman as telegram 76, to Beirut as telegram 87, to Baghdad as telegram 50, to Damascus as telegram 40, to Jidda as telegram 32, and unnumbered to Paris, Bonn, Rome, and Valletta.

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Transport workers strike in favor RCC spreading. Now includes railway, tram and bus workers in Cairo. Press says group trade union leaders have issued statement demanding following:

1. No political parties.
2. Maintenance RCC until evacuation achieved.
3. Creation body representing syndicates, trade unions and all forms of organizations to act as national assembly to which all RCC decisions must be submitted.
4. No electoral campaign until evacuation achieved.

According press civilian ministers withdrew their resignations and expressed support RCC.

Increasingly large crowds including students gathering this morning in Abdin Square. Some pro-Naguib, more pro-RCC. Being kept apart by security forces. Other smaller groups marching in peaceful demonstrations about town. Security forces appear to have situation under control.

CAFFERY

No. 1310

774.00/3-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, March 28, 1954—1 p. m.

1189. Reliable Egyptian source close to RCC states that Air Force officers held meeting three days ago under chairmanship Sidqi, Air Force Chief of Staff (non-free officers) at which decision taken to reject decisions reported Embtel 1167 and insist on RCC remaining. All Air Force units reportedly contacted and decisions supported by all officers. Navy subsequently followed suit. Beginning with infantry, all branches of Army yesterday adopted same decisions (five pro-Khaled Muheiddin cavalry officers reportedly abstained on decision and have been ordered by fellow cavalry officers to remain at home).

Deputations of officers representing all branches armed forces last night presented decisions to Nasir and to Naguib on his return from Alexandria. In face of these decisions by armed forces and mounting demonstrations of support for RCC, Naguib went about midnight to King Saud to seek his protection and, if necessary, refuge in Saudi Arabia.

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 396, to Amman as telegram 77, to Baghdad as telegram 51, to Beirut as telegram 88, to Damascus as telegram 41, to Jidda as telegram 33, and unnumbered to Paris, Bonn, Rome, and Valletta.

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As reported mytel 1188, King Saud called in Nasir with view to mediating dispute. Nasir reviewed in detail history Naguib–RCC relationship and Naguib reportedly stated he was willing to do whatever RCC desired.

RCC has been meeting at GHQ this morning and will meet with Naguib shortly. No indication yet what decision will be taken in Naguib's regard.

Al Misri today openly advocates Wafd–Communist–Ikhwan front. Ikhwan leader Hodeibi spent several hours with Nasir last night and called on Naguib this morning.

CAFFERY

No. 1311

774.00/3–2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, March 28, 1954—midnight.

1195. Regarding Embassy telegram 1189. Morning RCC meeting merged into joint session with Cabinet which continued until 10:30 p. m.

Large demonstrations broke up into smaller groups largely pro-RCC which continued peaceful demonstrations throughout day and evening. One group about one thousand stoned building Wafd daily newspaper *Al Mizri*. Army police protection provided papers request. No casualties.

Continuing build-up popular support for RCC, ESB has throughout factually and unemotionally announced support of varied elements. Students Ibrahim and Cairo universities announced to have supported stand taken by labor syndicate leaders (see reference telegram). Police officers decided take orders only from RCC. Such announcements interspersed with reports of thousands of telegrams insisting RCC remain. Early afternoon Nasir and Saleh Salem made radio appeals for calm.

At one point Foreign Military Attaché Liaison Officer said, RCC would remain until its aims realized and that meeting discussed type constituent assembly (elective or appointive).

At 7:30 p. m. Saleh Salem requested crowds go home quietly assuring them satisfactory decisions would be taken tonight and RCC would not abandon people.

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 397, to Amman as telegram 78, to Baghdad as telegram 52, to Beirut as telegram 89, to Damascus as telegram 42, to Jidda as telegram 34, and unnumbered to Paris, Bonn, Rome, and Valletta.

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At 8:30 p. m. Shakir, RCC spokesman held briefing for correspondents at which he said "last night I told you Naguib was the tool of subversive elements. Today you have seen proof of that therefore, the people have demanded removal of Naguib, thousands of telegrams attest to this fact and Naguib's fate is what Cabinet meeting is discussing now".

Before briefing broke up Shakir received telephone call after which he told correspondents they could not use anything he had just said. Correspondents say Naguib present joint meeting except 90 minutes "while his fate discussed".

At close of meeting ESB announced no agreement reached and further meeting 9 a. m. Monday. [2] Naguib and Nasir reported to have left together to call on King Saud. On leaving Naguib reported saying "some decisions in principle made tonight but details will be announced tomorrow".

CAFFERY

[2] According to telegram 1207 from Cairo, Mar. 29, not printed, this meeting did not begin until noon on Mar. 29 and lasted until 7 p. m. (774.00/3–2954)

No. 1312

774.00/3–2954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

PRIORITY CAIRO, March 29, 1954.

1208. Following is ESB communiqué issued 7 p. m. by Saleh Salem:

"The army undertook the July 23 revolution with deep belief that it represented unanimous wish of the nation to attain its goals which are the evacuation of the imperialists from Egypt and the Sudan, saving the people from the old corruption and having a perfect parliamentary democratic rule.

"When the leaders of the revolution thought that it was the peoples wish to return to parliamentary life, they did not hesitate to take the necessary steps immediately. They decided to end the transitional period, leaving their posts gladly.

"The RCC then saw the attitude of the people within the past few days. It was clear that the people, with all organizations represented, were determined to have the revolution continue until the

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 400, to Amman as telegram 81, to Baghdad as telegram 55, to Beirut as telegram 92, to Damascus as telegram 45, to Jidda as telegram 37, to Tel Aviv as telegram 59, and unnumbered to Bonn, Paris, Valletta, and Alexandria.

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country achieved its goals. Consequently the RCC has decided to carry on its responsibilities in full. It has taken the following decisions:

"1. Suspension of the decisions taken on March 5 and 25 until transitional period has ended.

"2. Establishment immediately of a national advisory council in which all organizations and different districts will be represented and whose establishment and jurisdiction will be defined by law."

CAFFERY

No. 1313

774.00/3-3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CAIRO, March 30, 1954.

1209. Re Embtel 1208. Decisions March 5 and 25 which RCC decided yesterday to suspend until end transition period were following:

March 5

(1) formation elected Constituent Assembly to meet July 23 to study and proclaim new constitution and exercise sovereign functions of Parliament pending election new Parliament.

(2) Martial law to be lifted before elections.

(3) Immediate abolition censorship.

March 25

(1) formation political parties authorized.

(2) RCC not to form political party.

(3) No deprivation individual political rights.

(4) Direct election Constituent Assembly with no appointive members as sovereign Parliament.

(5) RCC to be dissolved July 24 when revolution to be considered ended. (Embtel 1053 and Embdesp 2117 March 6. [2])

(6) Assembly to elect President. (See Embtel 1167 March 25, Embdsp 2301 March 26. [3])

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 401 and unnumbered to the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Bonn, Paris, Rome, Valletta, and Alexandria.

[2] Neither printed.

[3] Not printed.

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No. 1314

774.00/3–3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, March 30, 1954—6 p. m.

1213. Following observations may be of use to Department in attempting to assay events of last few days culminating in decisions announced last night (Embtels 1208 and 1209).

1. Organized labor has been deliberately and effectively used for political purposes on nation-wide scale for first time in Egyptian history and must henceforth be expected to make its voice increasingly heard. Coordination and control of labor movement by RCC through liberation rally surprised observers and had definite "Peronist" overtones.

2. Armed forces have made it clear they stand solidly with RCC in showdown with Naguib.

3. RCC, probably wisely, chose to make return of old political parties the public issue and not their dispute with Naguib. RCC appear to realize they have thus received public mandate only in negative sense—i.e., against return of former political corruption and party strife.

4. Naguib has been weakened in his own eyes and eyes of elements who were seeking to work through him. His reputation has been damaged, particularly among literate classes, by evidence of his flirting with Wafdi politicos. At same time, he undoubtedly retains great deal of personal sympathy among rural masses and "disinterested" elements of general public.

5. Although main opposition elements (that is, Wafdi, Muslim Brotherhood and Communists) remain, they will not have opportunity for open attempts to exploit general discontent and sway "uncommitted" public opinion. Government remains under pressure to produce results, but good deal of accumulated steam has been let off.

If situation takes no unforeseen turns for worse, government should be able to look forward to period of calm in which to turn its attention once again to substantive problems of domestic and foreign policy.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 403 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Bonn, the Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Khartoum.

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No. 1315

774.00/3-3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY CAIRO, March 30, 1954—8 p. m.

1215. Re my telegram 1213. In conversation with Hart and Embassy officer on March 21 (see Embassy despatch 2262) Nasir gave hint as to his plans, which in view then-existing circumstances, appeared have no great chance of success.

Nasir deliberately allowed political situation to deteriorate in order to inspire counter-reaction in armed forces. He was then able to point to impressive demonstration of army solidarity (my telegram 1189) without having seemingly sought it.

At same time he arranged to use organized labor under liberation rally direction for "activist" phase of his plans and avoided use of army except to insure law and order. It appears, moreover, that he envisages alliance with labor and professional syndicates as permanent and looks upon projected national advisory council as instrument for developing this relationship. This is designed also to keep labor out of Communist hands.

In carrying decision to retain Naguib (despite insistence of Gamal Salim and Baghdadi that he should go) Nasir was convinced that adverse reaction here and abroad to renewed break with President would be more dangerous than chastened Naguib in hands of RCC. Nasir, furthermore, is well aware that Naguib, when cooperative, is definite asset to regime. It is to be hoped that both men now realize extent to which their own and Egypt's interest requires that they work together.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 404, to Beirut as telegram 93, to Baghdad as telegram 56, to Damascus as telegram 46, to Jidda as telegram 38, to Amman as telegram 82, and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, Valletta, and Bonn.

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No. 1316

741.56374/4–254: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, April 2, 1954—7 p. m.

4342. Foreign Office handed us today two memoranda (summarized below, text being pouched) [2] outlining tentative interdepartmental thinking here re new proposals on Suez base negotiations. British would like US reaction as soon as possible and would welcome any suggestions.

In discussing matter with Foreign Office we inquired how soon Stevenson could speak to Nasir (Deptel 5106). [3] We mentioned renewed informal approach from Nasir and stressed urgency which US attaches to matters outlined Department's reference telegram. In conversation with Selwyn Lloyd earlier in day I had made same point.

We were assured Department's inquiry would receive urgent top level consideration and reply would be furnished soonest. Working level declined further comment but seemed impressed by suggestion Stevenson might at least give Nasir some preliminary indication in immediate future that new proposals under consideration. Official commented this might have beneficial effect as regards incidents in zone.

Foreign Office current thinking re timing is that as soon as US and UK have completed consideration of documents handed Embassy today, proposals be put to Egyptians, assuming both US and UK agree do so. Foreign Office would welcome Department's views as to whether proposals should be jointly presented to Egyptian Government or by parallel representations. Foreign Office hopes that by time both governments ready make this approach it will be clear Nasir in sufficiently strong position insure necessary stability.

Documents are (1) suggested arrangements between US-UK-Egypt re withdrawal British troops, liquidation of 1936 treaty, availability and maintenance of base; and (2) suggested arrange-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 116.

[2] The two memoranda were transmitted to the Department in despatch 3321 from London, Apr. 2, not printed. (641.74/4–254)

[3] The Department in telegram 5106, Apr. 1, not printed, instructed Aldrich to inform the Foreign Office that an approach about the Suez base should be made to Nasir within a week, since Nasir seemed so receptive to having negotiations renewed. (741.56374/4–154)

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ments for operating and maintaining base under civilian contracts. First memorandum follows:

"1. Arrangements for withdrawal British troops, liquidation 1936 treaty and maintenance base would have to be confirmed by inter-governmental agreement.

"2. It would be possible deal with all these matters in one comprehensive agreement, and if this formula were adopted application relevant provisions of agreement to US could perhaps form subject of exchange of notes between Egypt and US.

"3. It might be simpler, however, have two agreements:—

"(a) One between UK and Egypt providing for liquidation 1936 treaty, withdrawal British troops and future availability of base to UK. Provision for use of base by US could be made in exchange of notes between Egypt and US referring to this agreement.

"(b) An agreement providing for detailed arrangements for operation and maintenance of base; this might perhaps be tripartite."

Second memorandum, which contains four detailed technical appendices, begins by stating some controlling authority will be needed to place contracts, pay contractors and exercise administration. As full Egyptian cooperation essential it proposed this controlling authority should be Egyptian Government. As operation of base essentially military in character, most suitable authority to run it under Egyptian Government would be Egyptian Army. Egypt military "base commander" would be responsible for guarding and policing the base and exercising general supervision over its activities. He would let a main contract for operation of base and there would be sub-contracts covering specific activities.

Main contractor could be either (a) existing contracting firm, or (b) preferably a special commercial company with British, American and Egyptian participation. (Foreign Office explains this company if set up would be subject to Egyptian law. Its composition and powers would be specified in the inter-governmental agreement mentioned above.)

HMG would contribute toward cost of main contract in respect facilities maintained primarily for benefit HMG and would expect Egypt bear some part of cost, since base would be Egyptian. (Foreign Office explains relative participation in cost would be on pro rata basis, depending on items in which UK and Egypt respectively would be primarily interested. US would not be expected pay anything.)

Some form of inspectorate, under control of a senior British representative who would presumably be a liaison officer to the base commander, would be necessary to make sure work was done properly. (Foreign Office explains American inspectors would be included if American contractors used.)

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Memorandum then lists RAF and British Army requirements and points out these set forth in detail in appendices. Total of European supervisory personnel estimated at 3,000 and of inspectors at 300 but Foreign Office states both very rough estimates and if main contractor were reliable commercial corporation number of inspectors could be much smaller.

UK would have right to approve any contractor. Some American contractors could be employed if US agreed. Number of civilian contracts might be progressively reduced by training Egyptians. Egyptian military authorities would be responsible for security of stores, installations, et cetera in base. *End summary.*

Would appreciate Department's comments soonest.

ALDRICH

No. 1317

741.56374/4–354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, April 3, 1954—3 p. m.

1243. As its outlines become clearer I am increasingly persuaded that British are now on right track in Suez base negotiations. Following are my comments regarding London's 4342, April 2 to Department:

1. We must avoid at all costs, resurrecting in minds of Egyptians fear of United States-United Kingdom "gang-up". I think joint presentation would have exactly this effect; same would be true of formal parallel representation. As I have said before, Nasir is only one with enough will and guts to make and defend a settlement. I suggest best tactic would be for me to make first move with Nasir privately. I would tell him more or less: "United States and United Kingdom have been working hard to find a compromise which meets our needs and your needs. We have found a formula which United States strongly advises you to accept. Stevenson will give you the details. I will be constantly available in background." Next move would be for Stevenson to tell Nasir about proposals and work out with him most effective manner of presentation to Egyptian negotiating team. (On this, only Nasir in position to advise.)

2. I prefer idea of starting with bilateral Anglo-Egyptian agreement. After Anglo-Egyptian agreement well along in negotiations with United States helping behind the scenes, we will be in better

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 410.

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position to decide best manner of identifying United States more openly and formally with agreement. On one hand, we may find that Egyptians want United States to appear soon in picture openly, as guarantor of honest British execution; on other hand, RCC may find it easier to deal with their opponents if United States moves gradually into the picture by succession of steps, i.e., economic aid followed by military aid.

3. Regarding civilian contractors, I can only reiterate (my telegram 1137, March 20) that while Egyptians in practice are fairly reasonable about employment foreign technicians (e.g. Aswan electrification) they are highly sensitive about policy acknowledging need for foreigners. This makes useful idea Egyptian company coupled with program of personnel reduction as Egyptians trained.

CAFFERY

No. 1318

741.56374/4-254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 3, 1954—1:41 p. m.

5163. We agree in general with UK proposals on basis information submitted London's 4342 and in con ext of principles set forth Deptel 4863. Embassy should inform Foreign Office stressing again importance we attach to making initial approach to Egyptians soonest.

We believe proposals could be presented most effectively by parallel representations. We wish to have Caffery's suggestions on tactics soonest.

Regarding document 1—separate exchange of notes between Egyptians and US making base available to US appears preferable.

Although unable comment fully in absence details we regard favorably British plan for future maintenance and operations. Particularly encouraging is emphasis on need for Egyptian cooperation and willingness place control authority clearly under Egyptian Government. We have some doubts regarding suggested numbers foreign supervisory personnel and inspectors.

We hope it will not be necessary to wait until technical details are ironed out before making initial approach to Egyptians. In first instance Egyptians could be given outline British proposals. Main-

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1224. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

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tenance and operations provisions could be covered by general statement outlining main characteristics control authority.

We would like to work out as soon as possible with the UK details especially technical arrangements for operation and maintenance. Perhaps this could be accomplished most expeditiously by discussions here or in London. Request British views. [2]

We may wish to submit additional comments after further study.

DULLES

[2] Ambassador Aldrich in telegram 4365, Apr. 5, not printed, reported that the Foreign Office had been informed of American approval in general of the tentative British proposals regarding the Suez base negotiations. Foreign Office officials were gratified at the Department's reply and promised to inform the Embassy as soon as a decision was reached regarding the preliminary approach to the Egyptians. (741.56374/4–554)

No. 1319

774.00/4–554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, April 5, 1954—6 p. m.

1258. At the urgent suggestion of the British Ambassador, he and I have reviewed our joint appreciation of February 4, [2] in the light of subsequent events and are agreed on the following conclusions:

Begin Verbatim.

1. Events of March severely shook the RCC. Nevertheless, the regime's immediate prospects appear to be fairly good. Although situation has not yet returned to normal and university students have still to be brought to heel, chances are that RCC, with army behind it, will be able to bring situation under control, possibly in matter of days, provided there is not an outbreak of assassinations or terrorist activities.

2. The outlook in the longer term also is not unpromising. Internal unity both of RCC and of armed forces as a whole is likely to be maintained at least for some time and RCC may be able to reach some *modus vivendi* with Muslim Brotherhood. RCC continuation in power, however, will depend very largely on prospects of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. If negotiations are reopened, confidence will gradually return and the regime will be strengthened. If, on other hand, negotiations are not resumed within a reasonable time, the regime's position will again become precarious. In that case, with every month that passes, the risk of further dissension within RCC and in army increases, as does possibility of Naguib refusing to accept role of figurehead. There is also risk that in attempt to

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 417.

[2] See telegram 871 from Cairo, Document 1277.

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achieve popularity the regime might embark on violently anti-British and anti-Western courses.

3. In long term there is good chance that provided an Anglo-Egyptian agreement is reached and material and moral support is forthcoming from the West, the regime will survive in some form, possibly until end of "transition period" in January 1956, and also that it will be more zealous than any other Egyptian Government in prospect in carrying out its obligations. The regime has, however, proved itself to be one beset by recurrent crises, and, although an Anglo-Egyptian agreement would represent a major contribution to its stability, crises of one sort of another will almost certainly arise. Anti-British and anti-Western agitation will inevitably continue to some extent but with the removal of main irritant—the presence of British troops in Canal Zone—its intensity is likely to be far less.

4. Philosophy of RCC has not been altered by events. It is still anti-Communist and relatively pro-Western. RCC appears to be as anxious as ever to reach an agreement with UK provided it is compatible with its idea of Egyptian sovereignty.

5. There is no alternative government in sight which would be as satisfactory from point of view of the West.

6. As long as RCC (or any successor government created by it) is in power, it can be expected to carry out any commitments it has freely undertaken at least as faithfully as any government now in sight.

7. Skillful handling of public opinion during last stages of crisis suggests that RCC will be able to deal successfully with danger period immediately following announcement of an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. The strike weapon is double edged but RCC appears to be confident that it can exercise requisite control.

CAFFERY

No. 1320

741.56374/4-1254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1954—7:28 p. m.

5367. After examination documents attached London's Despatch 3321 [2] we suggest following procedure and tactics in advancing new Suez Base proposals.

Preferable procedure appears to be Anglo-Egyptian agreement soonest on general plan, with establishment of technical committee

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1265. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 2, Document 1316.

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to develop details on future maintenance and operations. Language from draft "Heads of Agreement" could be used in part and arrangements for operations and maintenance could be described in broad terms along lines first paragraph of second enclosure to reference despatch. UK-Egyptian agreement could be followed promptly by public announcement and first withdrawals British troops. US and Egypt could then exchange notes extending availability rights to US.

If desired by both parties US might be represented on technical committee charged with working out future maintenance and operations. We interpret proposal as not requiring any commitment from us that US firms will participate. However interested US commercial companies might bid on specific contracts at appropriate time. Such participation requires no specific government authorization.

Tactically we agree with Caffery that approach should be made through Nasir leaving to Nasir's judgment best manner bringing proposals formally to attention RCC. Stevenson might make first move simply informing Nasir British have new proposals they would like discuss with him. Before discussions start Caffery could advise Nasir that US aware of proposals, believes they will be welcomed by Egyptians and strongly advises acceptance. Stevenson could then initiate actual discussions in manner suggested by Nasir. We would not participate in negotiations unless invited by Egyptians.

We agree with Caffery on necessity avoiding joint *démarche* or appearance of "ganging up". However, believe it important that Stevenson make first approach. This would help avoid accusations from British public that US forcing British evacuate base and also would give British maximum credit in Egyptian eyes which would facilitate working out details. Follow up by Caffery would serve place our full influence behind proposals.

London requested discuss with Foreign Office soonest. [3]

SMITH

[3] Ambassador Aldrich informed the Department in telegram 4529, Apr. 13, not printed, that the substance of telegram 5367 had been conveyed to the Foreign Office, which confirmed that the next move regarding Egypt would be for several British contracting firms to be consulted on a highly confidential basis. Then the Foreign Office hoped to be in a position to obtain Cabinet approval to make a preliminary approach to the Egyptians. (741.56374/4-1354)

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No. 1321

741.56374/4-1354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, April 13, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 8. For Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Egypt was discussed at morning meeting April 12 between Eden and myself. Kirkpatrick, Roger Allen and Shuckburgh as well as Ambassador Aldrich, Butterworth and Merchant were present. After Eden confirmed to me that base proposal communicated to us several weeks ago had been approved by Cabinet, I asked what plans British had for re-establishing contact with the Egyptians. Eden emphasized British intention to push ahead rapidly. He said next requirement was to communicate with industry group or groups in England, to work out details which he planned to arrange promptly. If these conversations reveal no practical difficulties, plan is to immediately thereafter drop hint to Egyptians of willingness reopen talks.

I noted that when they had their plans for base maintenance worked out, we would like to discuss with them certain details. I referred to the fact that the President had approved proposal in general principle though some quarters in our government were not too enthusiastic. Eden expressed appreciation for our cooperation and for rapidity with which we gave our reply to British proposal.

Eden mentioned that Stevenson is not enthusiastic over plan. He believed that margin of superiority over old formula is slight.

Incidentally, Eden mentioned with enthusiasm happy experience of joint construction Aden Refinery by British and American private firms which may have been genesis of British proposal for Suez Base. Eden gave every impression of desiring to push ahead rapidly in negotiations.

Eden brought up, however, political difficulties which he faces in House and fact that if Nasser lost control at conclusion or when in midst of negotiations, he would face difficult political situation in London.

I said that our latest estimate indicated army group likely keep control with which Eden concurred but mentioned that on this point Stevenson somewhat less confident than Caffery. Kirkpatrick said he had recently talked with Picot, Managing Director Suez

[1] Repeated to Cairo for the Ambassador as telegram 119. Secretary Dulles was in London and Paris from Apr. 11 to Apr. 15, for a series of meetings at the Foreign Minister level preparatory to the North Atlantic Council meetings which took place in Paris on Apr. 23. For documentation, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 508 ff.

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Canal Company, who is generally gloomy believing present regime has no roots and that performance of civil service is steadily deteriorating in absence of ministers capable of administering.

Finally Eden said that Cabinet will study this week timing of move of headquarters to Cyprus. This might permit some modest reduction of troops at Suez Base which could be helpful influence on negotiations. [2]

ALDRICH

[2] According to a memorandum of a dinner conversation with Prime Minister Churchill also on Apr. 12, which was drafted by Secretary Dulles, not printed, the Secretary congratulated the Prime Minister on the new approach to the Egyptian problem, but "Mr. Churchill merely grimaced to show his distaste for the proposal". (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238)

No. 1322

741.56374/4-1354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, April 13, 1954—3 p. m.

1300. After reviewing Foreign Office memoranda (London despatch 3321, April 2) [2] and in light of London's Secto 8 repeated Cairo 119 I have following comments to offer re new British Suez proposals.

1. I assume that UK Government has done some re-thinking of politico-military strategy. I also assume that civilian contract idea is largely designed to help British Government over domestic political difficulties by avoiding appearance of outright scuttle in Egypt. (This is only justification of idea I can see since it is obviously inconsistent with previous UK insistence on necessity for British military technical control.)

2. I think implied UK decision to withdraw troops from Egypt is wise one (although it is late) and I approve civilian contract principle on assumption it will help British Government implement that decision. British military in base, incidentally, appear enthusiastic over prospect of getting out.

3. I agree with Stevenson that idea offers but slight margin of superiority over old formula (its principal merit being total withdrawal of British troops). I am furthermore concerned lest proposal be put up to Egypt in such form as to nullify large measure of

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 428 for the Secretary of State.
[2] Not printed; see footnote 2, Document 1316.

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agreement already reached and to provoke serious objections and renewed suspicions on part of Egyptians. (My telegram 1137)

In light of foregoing I would strongly urge that every effort be made to avoid presenting Egyptians with elaborate, detailed proposal for foreign civilian contract maintenance on terms which GOE would be likely to reject. Particularly objectionable from Egyptian viewpoint would be British military inspectorate (mixed inspectorate might be less so). Also suggested numbers of foreign technicians appear exorbitant in view of proposed installation reductions although this might be offset somewhat by proposal to train Egyptian replacements.

Presentation of basic idea in somewhat general form is much more likely to evoke favourable Egyptian response. Details of operation, nature of firm to be employed, question of US participation, etc could be worked out quietly over negotiating table with US helping "behind the scenes" as usual.

CAFFERY

No. 1323

Editorial Note

On April 17, 1954, General Muhammad Naguib resigned as Prime Minister of Egypt and was replaced by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasir, who retained his chairmanship of the Revolutionary Command Council. General Naguib remained President of Egypt until November 15, 1954.

No. 1324

874.00/4-2254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, April 22, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 4. After lunch April 22, I mentioned to Eden our desire to move on economic aid to Egypt which I recalled we had deferred for months at his request. Apart from technical consideration of approaching end of our fiscal year and hence availability funds, I said I believed such action by US, if publicly supported by UK and

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 957 and to Cairo as telegram 39. For an explanation of Secretary Dulles' presence in Paris, see footnote 1, Document 1321.

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timed with reopening UK-Egyptian negotiations on Suez, should have favorable effect on negotiations.

Eden was non-committal but did not argue against my thesis. He said Egyptians had recently arrested an Egyptian in Canal Zone involved in recent incident and that this was encouraging. He had just authorized Stevenson to tell Egyptian Foreign Minister that touchstone for renewal of Suez talks was evidence of Egyptian willingness to act firmly to protect British troops against incidents of type they had been subjected to. In any event, Eden said that it was next to impossible to progress on Egyptian problem while he was at Geneva. He indicated matters would have to wait until he returned to London and could take them in hand personally.

I explained I did not expect an immediate answer. Eden agreed to reflect and intimated that he would give me his more considered reaction within a few days.

DULLES

No. 1325

741.56374/4-2254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 22, 1954—5:21 p. m.

5580. We would prefer bilateral UK-Egyptian agreement for operation (Embtel 4640) [2] and maintenance of Base. Should both Egypt and UK desire USG become party to tripartite agreement, we prepared consider specific suggestions.

Single comprehensive Anglo-Egyptian agreement with technical annex detailing arrangements for maintenance and operation appears to offer certain advantages. (Drafting of comprehensive agreement and negotiation of technical annex would follow agreement in principle and subsequent moves mentioned second para Deptel 5367.) RCC might prefer presenting to Egyptian people one agreement in which "achievement of Egyptian's national aspirations" could be emphasized and future arrangements played down. Separate agreement on future operations would have to stand on

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1306. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan.

[2] In telegram 4640 from London, Apr. 22, not printed, the Embassy informed the Department that the Foreign Office would appreciate receiving the Department's views regarding the proposal for a tripartite agreement which would have detailed arrangements for the operation and maintenance of the Suez Base. (641.74/4-2254)

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its own feet and might prove more difficult for RCC to defend. Also might be more susceptible to attack in future.

As stated Deptel 5367, we prepared participate on technical committee working out arrangements for maintenance and operation if desired both by Egypt and UK. We have no objection US firms participating on commercial basis but unable make commitment they will wish to do so. [3]

SMITH

[3] The Embassy in London reported in telegram 4694, Apr. 23, not printed, that the substance of telegram 5580 had been conveyed to the Foreign Office, and officials did not understand how the United States could be associated with the proposals for the maintenance of the base if these were covered only in a technical annex to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. Since close American association was an essential feature of the accord, the Foreign Office thought a tripartite agreement along the lines it had suggested was preferable and asked that the Department reconsider this matter. (741.56374/4-2354)

No. 1326

741.56374/4-2354: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 23, 1954—10:50 a. m.

1310. Noforn. Ambassador Hussein conveyed to Department through third party following comments from Nasir on new British Suez Base proposals:

1. Iran should not be mentioned in section providing for consultation in case of threat of attack. Some general geographic expression could be used instead.
2. US should not be mentioned in describing consultations to be held in case of threat of attack. Clause could state simply consultations will be held without specifying between whom.
3. Participation of US firms in future operation and maintenance of Base should not be mentioned.

We have not provided Hussein with any information on British proposals, but he appears quite well informed as to their nature.

Believe we should leave it to Egyptians to make above points to British when they begin discussions.

SMITH

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No. 1327

741.56374/4-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, April 27, 1954—2 p. m.

1357. Re Department telegram 1321. [2] I agree with position outlined Department's 5580 to London. It is self-evident that nature and extent of any US participation in Suez base arrangements must depend on Egyptian as well as UK desires.

1. It would seem most inadvisable for US to become involved in British military housekeeping operations, although there would be no objection to participation US commercial firms.

2. As stated my telegram 1243 it is essential avoid giving Egyptians impression of renewed Anglo-American "gang-up". (My views this regard reinforced by comments reported Department telegram 1310). Presenting GOE with proposal for tripartite agreement at outset would be best way I know of insuring failure of renewed effort for Suez base settlement.

Important thing is to get two sides talking again. Attempt to work out detailed proposals without benefit of Egyptian reaction is unrealistic and time consuming.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 441.

[2] The Department in telegram 1321, Apr. 23, not printed, asked for the Embassy's views on the advisability of the United States becoming a party to a tripartite agreement on the future maintenance and operation of the Suez base, and the Department wanted the Embassy's assessment of the probable Egyptian attitude toward a tripartite accord. The Department said it needed this information before it replied to telegram 4694 from London (see footnote 3, Document 1325). (741.56374/4-2354)

No. 1328

741.56374/4-2354: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 29, 1954—5:41 p. m.

5751. Re London's 4694. [2] We prepared become party to tripartite agreement for future maintenance and operation base if this would

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1336.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 1325.

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assist in obtaining settlement. Unless Egypt well as UK desires our participation attempt to push tripartite agreement would have opposite effect. Our decision associate ourselves with new British proposals did not imply commitment become party to agreement regardless circumstances. Our intention was to throw our full influence with Egyptians behind proposals and assist best our ability and to extent desired by UK in presenting them to Egyptians.

We concur Cairo's 1357 that presentation to Egyptians agreed US–UK proposal for tripartite agreement during first phase discussions would jeopardize chances success. However UK-Egyptian "agreement in principle" could include same statement that if both desire, availability may be extended to third party, and if both desire, third party may participate in future operation and maintenance Base. If after conclusion "agreement in principle" Egypt concurs in US becoming party to tripartite agreement for operation and maintenance we prepared to do so. Otherwise technical annex covering maintenance and operation appears best way meet this problem.

Since Eden requested quick action on March 17 we have endeavored advance suggestions on tactics and procedure on urgent basis. Our concentration on speed based on conviction prospects for agreement and our ability to assist steadily waning with passage time.

Embassy requested discuss with Foreign Office along above lines.

FYI only: We would like avoid letting situation drag along undeterminable time until end Geneva Conference and Eden's return London. Request Embassy's views whether HMG still desires carry through with new proposals.

Because of resulting complications we prefer avoid tripartite agreement but provided Egypt agrees are prepared participate if necessary to induce UK proceed with proposals. Does Embassy believe our participation in agreement essential?

End FYI.

SMITH

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No. 1329

741.56374/4–3054: Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassies in Egypt and the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 30, 1954.

CA–6247. Subject: New British Proposals on Suez Base.

To assist in clarifying our thinking with respect to the new British proposals on the Suez Base, the attached draft of a possible "Memorandum of Understanding" has been developed in the Department. The draft is also intended to coordinate the thinking of the Department and the Embassies at Cairo and London.

The document is modeled upon and includes certain language from the British "Heads of Agreement" of January 13, 1954. [2] The British proposals of March 17, 1954 and current Egyptian views, as far as they are known, have been taken into account. The language, particularly in Section 6, was purposely kept vague in the belief that it would be easier to work out details at a later stage in the negotiations. The references to "third parties" in Sections 7 and 8 are intended to permit the association of the United States.

As we envisage the negotiations, the British and Egyptians would first reach an "agreement in principle," perhaps along the lines of the attached document. Up to this point, United States association would consist of assistance behind the scenes. During the discussions, however, it would be indicated to the Egyptians that if they so desire, the United States is prepared to become a party to the final settlement to the extent provided for in Sections 7 and 8. Once the "agreement in principle" is reached, we would expect a much-publicized initial withdrawal of British troops, extension of United States economic aid, and, perhaps, the dispatch of a survey team as a first step in the extension of military assistance. These moves should enhance the position of the West in Egypt and facilitate the final phase of the negotiations. Only after the "agreement in principle" is signed would we make a definite decision regarding how openly and firmly the United States would associate itself with the final arrangements. We could become a party to a tripartite agreement and exchange notes with Egypt accepting availability rights.

The Embassies at Cairo and London are requested to advise the Department if the attached document reflects their understanding of the current Egyptian and British positions and whether or not

[1] Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.
[2] See telegram 765 to Cairo, Document 1270.

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they believe an arrangement along its lines would prove acceptable to the parties. The document should not be shown to either the British or the Egyptians.

Enclosure

POSSIBLE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

It is agreed between the Egyptian and British Delegations that with a view to establishing Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship, and taking account of their obligations under the United Nations Charter and of their common concern for the security of the Middle East, an agreement regarding the future of the Suez Canal Zone Base should now be drafted on the following lines.

1. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 shall be null and void on the entry of this Agreement into force.

2. The Agreement will recognize that the Suez Maritime Canal is an integral part of Egypt and a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance and will express the determination of both parties to uphold the 1888 Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal.

3. The Agreement will last 10 years from the date of its entry into force.

4. All of Her Majesty's forces will be withdrawn from Egyptian territory within a period of 24 months from the entry of this Agreement into force.

5. In the event of:

(a) an attack by an outside Power on Egypt; or
(b) an attack by an outside Power on any country which is a party to the Arab Collective Security Pact or on Turkey;

Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the Base on a war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes of the Egyptian Ports by British forces.

6. In the event of:

(a) a threat of an attack on any member of the Arab Collective Security Pact or an independent Moslem nation bordering on a member of the Arab Collective Security Pact; or
(b) the outbreak of a global war;

immediate consultation shall take place which shall include the United Kingdom and Egypt.

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7. With the concurrence of both Egypt and the United Kingdom, agreements may be reached with third parties placing the facilities mentioned in Section 5 at their disposal under the conditions specified in Sections 5 and 6.

8. (a) Following the withdrawal of British troops, the Egyptian Government shall assume responsibility for the security of the Base. A civilian entity acceptable to both governments shall be entrusted with the operation and maintenance of certain specified facilities within the Base area. The civilian entity shall be under the authority of the Egyptian Government, and the United Kingdom shall have the right to inspect the work performed by this entity.

(b) A technical committee shall be established to work out the details of the future operation and maintenance of the Base, including, among other matters, financial aspects and the exact composition and functioning of the civilian entity.

(c) At the invitation of both Egypt and the United Kingdom, third parties may be asked to participate in the work of the technical committee and to associate themselves with the arrangements pertaining to the proposed civilian entity.

9. The United Kingdom shall be accorded full rights to move any British matériel out of the Base to any point at any time at its discretion. Following the withdrawal of British troops, the Egyptian Government will permit movement into the Base of replacement and spare parts for the maintenance of the specified facilities.

10. Aircraft under Royal Air Force control shall be accorded most favored nation treatment, including overflying rights and use of designated airfields, in accordance with procedures which shall be agreed to from time to time. Certain of the specified facilities to be maintained and operated by the civilian entity may be used by aircraft under Royal Air Force control.

11. The parties will consult together at the end of the period specified for the duration of the Agreement to decide whether they wish to continue the existing arrangements for the maintenance and operation of the Base or to effect other arrangements. In the event that the parties fail to agree, the Agreement shall terminate as specified in Section 3.

12. Although there will be additional questions of detail to be covered in drafting of the Agreement, the Egyptian and British Delegations agree that this document sets forth all the matters of principle which will be incorporated in the final agreement.

SMITH

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No. 1330

741.56374/4-3054: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, April 30, 1954—3 p. m.

4841. First three paragraphs Deptel 5751 conveyed today to Foreign Office which will let Embassy have its reaction soonest. Official commented it essential tell Egyptians early in proceedings that some form tripartite arrangements for maintenance base contemplated (assuming Eygpt's invitation US participate), otherwise Egyptians might claim, as they have in past, that British holding out on basic matter of principle. He added participation of US in arrangements for maintenance appeared to be a necessary consequence of extension of availability to US. He undertook, however, explore possibilities finding some way of associating US in maintenance arrangements without definitive tripartite agreement.

Embassy believes HMG still sincerely anxious carry through new proposals. We have no reason believe British intend postpone decision until end Geneva conference, [2] but simply until Eden's return to London, which anticipated within two or three weeks from start of conference. Consultations with contractors still continuing.

We do not believe US participation in tripartite agreement for maintenance would be absolutely essential but suggest Department await further views of Foreign Office on subject (paragraph 1 above).

BUTTERWORTH

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 129.

[2] For documentation regarding the Geneva Conference, see volume XVI.

No. 1331

741.56374/5-1054: Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET CAIRO, May 10, 1954.

No. 2658

Ref: Department's CA-6247, April 30, 1954

Subject: New British Proposals on Suez Base

[1] A copy of this despatch was sent to London.

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The draft of a possible "Memorandum of Understanding" enclosed with the Department's Instruction under reference corresponds substantially with my understanding of the latest British position, insofar as that position has been spelled out to date.

The document cannot be said to reflect the current Egyptian position, which officially remains as stated in October 1953, but actually has been modified by Abd Al Nasir's offer made to me in January to extend "availability" to include the case of an attack on Turkey, provided the British would give up their insistence on military uniforms for "technicians". Whether or not an arrangement along the lines suggested would prove acceptable to Egypt is, however, another question. While the answer cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty, it is my opinion that an approach to the Egyptian Government on such a basis would be favorably received and would hold considerable promise of leading to an agreement.

The Department's attitude on the question of United States association is the only realistic one which can be adopted. Any attempt to go farther in this regard would almost certainly provoke a strongly adverse Egyptian reaction. The draft memorandum *in toto* constitutes a much needed and eminently successful attempt to coordinate recent thinking regarding the Suez Base issue. I strongly recommend that the Department seek United Kingdom agreement to a statement along these lines as a basis for an early approach to Egypt.

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

No. 1332

741.56374/5-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, May 28, 1954—7 p. m.

5415. Re Deptel 6391. [2] In showing memorandum to Foreign Office today, Foreign Office official told Embassy officer that entire matter of Suez negotiations being presented to Eden at Geneva. However, Foreign Office uncertain whether he will deal with this problem there.

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[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 134.

[2] The Department in telegram 6391 to London, May 27, not printed, instructed the Embassy, in light of despatch 3807 from London, May 21, not printed, to discuss the American draft memorandum of understanding and the suggested procedures with the Foreign Office. (741.56374/5-2154)

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Foreign Office wishes study memorandum before commenting.

ALDRICH

No. 1333

641.74/6-1154

Memorandum for the Files, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 11, 1954.

Ambassador Aldrich told me that yesterday after lunch Anthony Head, [1] who I believe is Secretary of the Army, had told him that after two months' effort he had secured the Prime Minister's agreement to reopen the Suez negotiations. He said he had an appointment with Sir Winston that same afternoon to discuss timing and tactics. This piece of information developed apparently from a discussion between the Ambassador and Mr. Head on the bearing on Southeast Asian policy of the absence of any British strategic reserve.

LTM

[1] The British Secretary of State for War.

No. 1334

741.56374/6-1254: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 12, 1954.

CA-7323. Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations. Reference is made to Embassy Despatch No. 3966 of June 4, 1954. [2] The Department is deeply impressed with the need for moving quickly on the Suez Base negotiations. It finds disturbing the indication that, following cabinet approval of the "new" (March 17) proposals, the Foreign Office contemplates engaging in further discussion with this Government "regarding the manner in which the proposals should be put to the Egyptians".

The Department has indicated its views on this subject (Deptels 5163 of April 3 and 5367 of April 12). Without commenting in detail, a Foreign Office official indicated on April 13 that these

[1] Repeated to Cairo; approved by Byroade.
[2] Not printed.

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views were "very much in line" with those of the Foreign Office (Embtel 4529, April 13). [3]

The Department believes that if the Foreign Office considers it essential to have further discussions concerning the manner in which the proposals are to be put to the Egyptians, such discussions should be initiated immediately, in order to avoid delay on this matter in addition to the considerable delay now ensuing because of Mr. Eden's absence at Geneva.

For the Embassy's information only, insistence on a further period of discussion of the subject of tactics, to begin only after cabinet approval of the proposals, would raise anew in the Department the question of whether the British still wish to carry out the "new" proposals, and will call for re-examination of the policy of withholding economic assistance to Egypt.

The Department is puzzled by the suggestion of the Foreign Office that it will be appropriate to discuss the question of a tripartite agreement for the maintenance of the base prior to giving the Egyptians an opportunity to express their views on this question. The Department is willing to consider such an arrangement only if United States participation is requested by both Egypt and the United Kingdom. This position has been consistently expressed to the Foreign Office since the new proposals were advanced (Deptels 4863 of March 20, 5580 of April 22 and 5751 of April 29). The Department is not prepared to go beyond its position as stated in numbered paragraph 7 of the Draft Memorandum of Understanding enclosed with Instruction CA-6247. The Department believes that there will be adequate opportunity to discuss this problem following the initial presentation of the British proposals to Egypt and receipt of official indication of the Egyptian position on this aspect of the proposal.

The Embassy is requested, at its discretion, to inform the Foreign Office of the Department's views as given above, with the exception of the paragraph "for the Embassy's information only".

DULLES

[3] Not printed; see footnote 3, Document 1320.

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No. 1335

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 21, 1954.

MY DEAR FRIEND:

[Here follows discussion of the Indochina situation and the possibility of creating a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.]

Now is the time the Middle East front should be considered together by the United States and Britain. I had hoped more than a year ago that the United States would act jointly with us in negotiating an agreement with the Egyptian military dictatorship in accordance with the terms already agreed between the British and American staffs. It was, however, felt at Washington that America could not go unless invited. The negotiations therefore broke down. Since then there has been a deadlock though the area of dispute is limited.

As time has passed, the strategic aspect of the Canal Zone and base has been continually and fundamentally altered by thermonuclear developments and by a Tito–Greek–Turco front coming into being and giving its hand to Iraq and by America carrying N.A.T.O.'s finger-tips to Pakistan. I like all this improvement in which you and the power and resources of the United States have played so vital a part.

These events greatly diminish the strategic importance of the Canal Zone and base, and what is left of it no longer justifies the expense and diversion of our troops, discharging since the war, not British but international purposes. As far as Egypt is concerned, we shall not ask you for a dollar or a marine. I am greatly obliged by the way you have so far withheld arms and money from the Egyptian dictatorship.

The general theme of completing and perfecting in a coherent structure the world front against Communist aggression, which I suppose might in current practice be described as N.A.T.O., M.E.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O., is of course one, but only one of the topics I am looking forward to talking over with you.

[Here follows discussion of the chances for better sharing of information and resources in the nuclear sphere and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if the European Defense Community concept failed.]

I would not have tried to put all this on paper but for your direct request. So if there is anything in it which you do not like, let it

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wait till we are together for our weekend meeting, [1] to which I am so keenly looking forward.

With kindest regards,

WINSTON

[1] Prime Minister Churchill was referring to his impending trip to the United States. He and Foreign Secretary Eden were in Washington from June 25 to June 29 for a series of meetings with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. For information regarding their discussion of the Egyptian situation, see telegrams 1601 and 1602 to Cairo, *infra* and Document 1337. Documentation regarding the conference as a whole is scheduled for publication in volume VI, Part 1.

No. 1336

641.74/6-2854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 28, 1954—6:38 p. m.

1601. For Ambassador. Considerable time devoted Eygpt in weekend talks here with British. [2] Sending in immediately following message Agreed Secret Minute on Eygpt approved by Mr. Eden.

It obvious in opening discussions that British had decided reopen negotiations and push for early agreement. Churchill has decided defend such a course primarily in view desire HMG move their forces in Egypt elsewhere.

As regards timing, Eden explained he felt they could not start talks prior to his and Churchill's return London. It is their present intention to move within couple days after return.

Proposals they will present essentially those we have known for some time. One exception is they have decided greatly reduce Base area to be maintained. This will necessitate greater effort in disposition supplies and equipment which will take longer than originally anticipated. They feel, therefore, minimum of 24 months required for evacuation.

As regards duration British feel new approach which calls for evacuation all armed forces should entitle them longer agreement. Secretary stressed political difficulty going beyond 7 years as this already public figure. He suggested two methods of approach. One was as British now in position surrender large portion Base in two years, Egyptians might in turn extend rights to smaller portion retained for longer period. Other was that parts of Agreement other

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 7144. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

[2] See footnote 1, *supra*.

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than availability might be for 7 years and availability portions for a longer period. British agreed consider both. Eden mentioned figure of 10 to 12 years but explained he would wish leave up to Stevenson initial figure that should be presented in order obtain such results. Secretary stressed undesirability starting with excessive figure for purposes bargaining.

Separate instructions will be sent regarding para 2 of agreement. As regards Paragraph 3 Agreed Minute, one method accomplishment expressed by Secretary is that US in its aid agreements would make reference fact Egypt is providing bases for defense of area. We will continue study this problem and would welcome your thoughts.

It was agreed on highest levels that secrecy would be maintained re discussions here on Egypt so as not prejudice British negotiations. Believe we should inform Egyptians only that discussions were held on this subject, we are aware proposal which will be presented Egyptians and that we are generally optimistic that quick agreement should be reached. We could also add we expect new developments very quickly after return British London.

Convinced press articles so far from Washington based upon speculation rather than leak from conference.

DULLES

No. 1337

641.74/6-2854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 28, 1954—6:38 p. m.

1602. For Caffery. Herewith Agreed Minute on Egypt, referred to in immediately preceding Deptel.

Verbatim Text.

"The British stated their intention to place their new proposals as discussed in the Washington talks before the Egyptians in the immediate future. The US agreed to follow up the British approach, stressing their support for the British proposals. After the approach has been made, the British plan to make public announcement that they have taken the initiative in resuming discussions, unless it develops in their talks that greater progress can be made on a secret basis. If the British make such an announcement, the U.S. would make a statement welcoming the resumption of ne-

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 7145. Drafted and approved by Byroade.

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gotiations and emphasizing the importance from the US point of view of early agreement.

"If the Suez Base talks start satisfactorily the US would begin negotiating with Egypt the necessary cover agreements required before US assistance can be extended. It is understood that these agreements would not be signed prior to signature of the Heads of Agreement between the British and the Egyptians on the Suez Base. Should protracted delays result due to unforeseen circumstances further consultations might be required regarding the extension of US assistance.

"The US agreed that, while there should be no legal connection between the Suez Base agreement and the US assistance agreements, a way would be found to indicate to the Egyptians that US assistance would be conditioned upon Egyptian fulfillment of the Base Agreement. This should be accomplished in a manner which would not indicate to the Egyptians an advance distrust that they would in fact not live up to the agreement.

"The US also agreed to support publicly the principle of freedom of transit through the Suez Canal to be reaffirmed by the British and Egyptians."

DULLES

No. 1338

741.56374/7-954: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 9, 1954 —1 p. m.

143. Limit distribution. Foreign Office informed Embassy today in strict confidence that Stevenson putting new British proposals on Suez base to Egyptians tomorrow. [2] No announcement will be made and British hope for absolute secrecy for next few days. Churchill is meeting with group of Conservatives July 13 to explain proposals. It expected Butler and Head (Minister of War) will participate in this discussion but not Eden, in order stress proposals have full Cabinet support rather than being merely Foreign Office inspired. Next day some sort of announcement will probably be made in House Commons.

In effort improve atmosphere for resumption of talks British decided release pounds 10 million Egyptian sterling balances and Stevenson has so informed Egyptians. According to report just re-

[1] Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 3.

[2] Ambassador Aldrich reported in telegram 12, July 1, not printed, that the Foreign Office was sending instructions to Stevenson to be prepared to approach the Egyptians after Eden's return, which was expected on July 6. (641.74/7-154)

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ceived from him this has had extremely favorable reaction. Foreign Office tells us some consideration was given to making release conditional on relaxation Egyptian trade restrictions but it finally decided not make this absolute condition, although Stevenson was instructed to ask for, and received, oral assurances on this score.

ALDRICH

No. 1339

641.74/7-1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, July 11, 1954—2 p. m.

40. 1. Stevenson has just given me a full account of his meeting with Nasir last night. Somewhat to British surprise (Stevenson had his full team on hand) Nasir came alone directly from Alexandria. Stevenson led off by expressing hope that the arrangements which UK now prepared to offer Egypt would presage a new era of Egyptian alignment with the free world. Stevenson then gave Nasir draft heads of agreement (approximately 480 words) and draft "organization of the base" annex (240 words). After reading these, and listening to supplementary oral explanation Nasir remarked that "with amendments" the drafts "might be basis for agreement." Only point of substance discussed at length was duration. British draft leaves figure blank; Nasir commented "I agreed to seven years; why change?"

2. Nasir remarked also "I did not agree to Persia."

3. Stevenson told me he has authority if Egyptians raise the question to go beyond present paragraph 8 re termination.

4. There will be another meeting tonight at Benson's house. This time Nasir plans bring Fawzi, Amir, Salah Salim and Baghdadi.

5. I shall recommend at once to Egyptians favorable consideration of the British proposals.

6. I am not telegraphing texts as Stevenson says British Embassy Washington has copies.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 6.

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No. 1340

641.74/7-1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, July 11, 1954—9 p. m.

43. I saw Fawzi a few minutes ago and told him that we highly recommended the British proposals to the Egyptian Government. I remarked (as Stevenson asked me to do) that the proposals were not a rock bottom ultimatum and that I was sure that Stevenson would listen with interest to any observations they would have to make.

Fawzi said that there are three points to which Egyptians would take exception.

First they take high exception to suggestion of a 20 to 30 year availability program. He said they were not prepared to go beyond 7. I urged him to go beyond that. He finally said that in no event could they go beyond the expiration of Arab Collective Security Pact in 1962 in view of Article 4 (I) of draft heads of agreement. I urged him to reconsider that.

Second he said they must stand on the 15 month evacuation period. I said that as the British are going to move more material than they originally planned to move, they would need a longer time. He admitted that that argument had merit.

Third they were willing to include Iran for consultation but not for automatic availability. (Stevenson told me this morning that if necessary he could accept that.)

Fawzi took occasion to express high appreciation and much gratitude to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles for our part in this. He remarked, "I admit that it has taken courage on the part of the British to go this far but on our side we have our own public to consider too." He said finally that Egyptians were prepared to work hard for agreement which he admits they badly need.

In course of conversation with Fawzi, I gave him to understand clearly that only if Anglo-Egyptian talks proceed satisfactorily will we be prepared to initiate conversations regarding cover agreements for military and economic aid (Department's telegram 1602).

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 9.

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No. 1341

641.74/7-1254

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 12, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the course of the recent visit of Prime Minister Churchill the United States Government was informed that the United Kingdom will shortly present new proposals to Egypt which, it is hoped, will result in Anglo-Egyptian agreement concerning the Suez Base. During the conversations between the President and Prime Minister Churchill it was agreed that if the Suez Base talks start satisfactorily the United States would begin negotiating the economic and military assistance agreements which are required before grant United States aid can be extended. It was understood that these agreements providing for the extension of United States aid would not be signed prior to the signature of the Heads of Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

United States policy contemplating grant military assistance to Egypt is reflected in NSC 155/1 [2] and in the letter of July 15, 1953 from President Eisenhower to Naguib. You may recall that on March 14, 1953, President Eisenhower made a determination that Egypt meets the criteria of Section 202(a) of the Mutual Security Act for the purposes of military assistance limited to training.

It is highly important that the United States Government take at this time the preliminary measures which will enable it to extend full military assistance to Egypt promptly under the circumstances contemplated above.

It is therefore requested that the Department of Defense concur in a recommendation to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration that:

(a) the President be requested to make a determination that:

(1) the strategic location of Egypt makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area,

(2) military assistance to Egypt is of critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and

(3) the immediately increased ability of Egypt to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the area and to the security of the United States;

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[1] This letter was drafted by Norbert L. Anschuetz, Politico-Military Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

[2] For text, see Document 145.

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(b) the President be requested in light of the foregoing determination to authorize the furnishing of grant training and end item military assistance to Egypt under the terms of the Mutual Security legislation. [3]

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[3] Secretary of Defense Wilson replied on July 30 and concurred with all of the recommendations advanced in paragraphs (a) and (b). (744.5 MSP/7-3054)

No. 1342

641.74/7-1354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, July 13, 1954.

57. The Prime Minister asked to see me this evening. He indicated that the British proposals in general are acceptable except for three points: Availability period, evacuation period and inclusion of Iran. He reminded me of our conversation last January when he agreed to the inclusion of Turkey against, he said, the unanimous opinion of his fellow officials. He said also that it was on my insistence that he had agreed to extend the availability period from five to seven years. He said he explained this to the "free officers" who reluctantly at the time backed him up. "Although I have considerable influence with them," he remarked, "I have taken soundings and they will not back me up to extend the availability period beyond seven years".

I asked him if it were possible to do something in a round-about way to extend the 15-month evacuation period. He first said he was committed to that period also with the officers, but later on my insistence admitted that he might do something about it if combat troops were withdrawn within 15 months.

I said, "What about Iran?" He said, "You know our people do not like Turkey. I made them swallow Turkey, but I cannot make them swallow Iran also".

Needless to say, I warmly recommended the British proposals and asked him to do his best to have them accepted, but he kept repeating what I have reported above. Aside from these three points, he did not seem to believe there would be any real obstacles.

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 13 and to Paris as telegram 1.

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No. 1343

774.5 MSP/7-1554

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 15, 1954.

Subject: Request for authority to initiate grant economic and military assistance agreement with Egypt.

Discussion:

In accordance with the understanding reached during Churchill's visit we are making arrangements to initiate negotiations for military and economic assistance agreements with Egypt. Tentative drafts have been transmitted to Embassy Cairo pending instructions. [2] Anglo-Egyptian conversations were resumed July 10.

The draft-military assistance agreement (Tab A) [3] is substantially along the lines of the Pakistan Agreement. In addition, it includes language incorporated in the Iraq Agreement at your suggestion, i.e. "Such assistance . . . will be related in character, timing and amount to international developments in the area" (Article I, par. 1). The draft is predicated on the assumption that military assistance will be provided not only to maintain internal security and legitimate self-defense, but also to assist Egypt to discharge obligations under the terms of a Base settlement. Language relating, in general terms, United States military assistance to Egypt's obligations will be inserted in the draft following receipt of Caffery's recommendations on this point. Twenty-one million dollars of MDAP funds are available for Egypt.

The draft economic agreement (Tab B) [4] is generally similar to the agreements recently signed with Jordan and Lebanon. We have in mind a United States contribution during fiscal 1955 of the order of $25 million.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Anschuetz. According to the source text, Secretary Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendations appearing at the end of the memorandum.

[2] Neither printed; the draft agreement for provision of American military assistance to Egypt was sent to the Embassy in Cairo as airgram 6, July 2. (774.5 MSP/7-254) The draft accord for provision of U.S. economic aid to Egypt was sent to the Embassy in Cairo as airgram 3, July 2. (874.00 TA/7-254)

[3] Not printed; Tab A was not attached to the source text. Presumably, however, it was the same draft military assistance agreement referred to in footnote 2, above.

[4] Not printed; Tab B was also not attached to the source text. Presumably, it, too, was the same draft economic agreement referred to in footnote 2, above.

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Since these agreements will be made pursuant to the Mutual Security legislation, it is believed that they may be entered into as Executive Agreements.

Recommendation:

That you authorize, as prescribed by Department Circular 25, May 15, 1953, [5] the negotiation of Executive Agreements for grant economic and military assistance to Egypt along the lines of the attached drafts, timing to be determined by progress of the Base talks.

[5] Not printed.

No. 1344

641.74/7–1554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, July 15, 1954—9 p. m.

71. 1. Today's three-hour meeting between British and Egyptian teams resulted, according British Embassy, in "considerable progress on number points of substance, but not on duration period, withdrawal period, nor Iran".

2. Egyptians conceded:

a. Movement material into and out of base.
b. Operation base for current British requirements.
c. British views regarding consultation clause.
d. "Much improved" air clause (Egyptians agreed to clear flights operationally without recourse to diplomatic channels).
e. Satisfactory formula regarding visits of inspection.

3. In same category, Egyptians would not withdraw their opposition to phrase "common concern for defense", nor agree to enlargement of contractor's clause to permit use of contractors from other Arab States.

4. British Embassy commented on skillful and serious manner in which Nasir presented Egyptian case regarding three unagreed major points. Concessions by Egyptians listed above intended by him as evidence Egyptian goodwill and willingness to make settlement.

(a) Iran. This was impossible for reasons stated my 57 (Britains say they could leave out Iran, but Iraq has recently made it clear to United Kingdom that it will resent this omission).

[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 71.

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(b) Withdrawal period. This question "major political importance" for RCC which wants no British troops in country when elections to which RCC committed are held in January 1956. (Britains believe Nasir disposed to help them on this if he can find a way to do so. Present calculation is that at end 15 months, Britains will have 9,000 pioneers and 5,000 working troops and about 3,000 guards.)

(c) Duration period. Nasir reiterated previous arguments that he is irrevocably committed to seven years and then pointed out following reasons why United Kingdom should accept this offer:

1. Egypt is conceding to United Kingdom for first time a base in Egypt; 1936 Treaty provided no base rights.
2. By proposed agreement, Egypt is "irrevocably tying herself up with the West"; he will have considerable difficulties on this score and to go beyond seven years would make greater difficulties.
3. Last summer United Kingdom agreed to seven years as fulfilling British interests; he failed to see how civilianization of base could change this period.

5. British Embassy hopeful that London's instructions will be received in time for another meeting Saturday, but no date fixed. [2]

CAFFERY

[2] In telegram 297 from London, July 16, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich reported that the Foreign Office had given the Embassy no indication that the British would agree to a 7-year duration; that the British apparently would not insist on the inclusion of Iran in the availability formula in view of the Egyptians' objections; that with regard to the attitude of Iraq, the Foreign Office did not attach much importance to the Iraqi position; and that owing to Eden's absence, it would not be possible to get instructions to Stevenson to enable him to meet again when he had hoped to with the Egyptians. (641.74/7-1654)

No. 1345

641.74/7-2054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, July 20, 1954—10 a. m.

86. British Embassy this morning gave us following account last night's meeting which lasted from 10-12:15:

Except for clearing up certain minor points Stevenson was only authorized probe Egyptian position on duration and withdrawal. "He got nowhere" with Egyptians sticking to 15 months and 7 years. Since British not authorized commit themselves they tried hard put ideas in heads of Egyptians. Stevenson made it plain he

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 21.

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was exploring situation and asked Egyptians to show him some daylight to report to London.

Egyptians put up many arguments, "some of them quite good some not so good". They made big play over Turkey which they said was causing them great deal of trouble. Also pointed out they are conceding a base and thus making selves target for atomic attack. They repeated that 7 years had been agreed to last October so they saw no reason to change now particularly as they did not regard British proposal to civilian ideas anything new or startling but rather as something put forward to suit UK convenience.

Egyptians made point that short agreement which works is better than long one which would be open to attack from many angles.

On Iran Stevenson hinted he might be able persuade HMG to drop it. Egyptians replied, not entirely accurately, this was agreed to last year so concession did not amount to much.

Through Salah Salim Egyptians dropped veiled threat they might resort to rabble-rousing if there should be no agreement.

British have sent factual report and are now considering what recommendations to make. They have indicated Stevenson will probably wish discuss situation with me today after his thoughts clarified.

It was agreed tell press simply that meeting had been held with no mention further meeting which now dependent response from London. [2]

British mentioned in passing that Iraqi Ambassador called yesterday to emphasize point made by Jamali in London that Iraq would be unhappy if Iran not included in agreement.

CAFFERY

[2] Caffery reported in telegram 89, July 20, not printed, that Stevenson had advised London that he thought the Egyptians would break on any extension of the 7-year duration period, but that if they were assured of 7 years, they would probably find a way to extend the evacuation period beyond 15 months. Caffery also informed the Department that the British Embassy thought that the final decisions would probably require Cabinet determination, and the Embassy hoped to get a response from London in time to inform the Egyptians before July 23 that they were ready for another meeting after the celebrations marking the anniversary of the Revolution. (641.74/7-2054)

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No. 1346

641.74/7-2154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 21, 1954—7:36 p. m.

94. We informed British Embassy July 19 Secretary believes Egypt will not accept duration beyond seven years and suggested UK consider proposal advanced by Secretary to Churchill and Eden during recent visit. See memorandum conversation Churchill Talks CEV MC 5 Page 2. [2]

British Embassy today expressed hope our view did not mean we intended relax support for Britain in negotiations. Department said Caffery is continuing strong efforts although making no progress. We added latest reports confirmed our belief Egyptians would stick on duration. [3]

DULLES

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 434.

[2] Not printed; presumably the Secretary's proposal under reference as stated in CEV MC-5, June 28, 1954, which reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles stated he thought another approach might prove politically acceptable. Now that the British have decided to greatly reduce the extent of the Base area, they could point out to the Egyptians that a part of the Base would be handed over to them within a relatively short period, say two years. In return for this the Egyptians might accept longer term arrangements on the remaining portion to be maintained by civilian contractors. Mr. Eden thought this a valuable new suggestion." (CFM files, lot M 88, "Churchill-Eden Visit Washington June 25-29, 1954 Memos of Conversation")

[3] According to telegram 112 from Cairo, July 26, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that the British Secretary of State for War, Anthony Head, had been given full authorization by London to conclude a Suez agreement including, if necessary, the acceptance of a 7-year duration period. Moreover, Head would probably ask for some extension of the 15-month evacuation period in return. (641.74/7-2654)

No. 1347

641.74/7-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT CAIRO, July 27, 1954—10 a. m.

113. British Secretary for War tells me that at meeting last night with Egyptians he told them after due consideration British Government prepared to accept 7-year duration period, to omit Persia, but must have 20-months evacuation period. After consultation

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 28.

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among themselves Egyptians indicated they would accept these terms.

There was considerable bargaining on minor points about which agreement was reached.

British and Egyptians will be meeting together in few minutes when Hood hopes that terms of agreement will be initialed. [2]

CAFFERY

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[2] Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 115, July 27, not printed, that the "Heads of Agreement" document was to be initialed at 9 p. m. that evening in Cairo, and that the text of the agreement was available at the British Embassy in Washington. (641.74/7–2754)

No. 1348

Editorial Note

On July 27, 1954, British and Egyptian negotiators initialed the "Heads of Agreement" document, which established a set of agreements in principle to govern future British use of the Suez Canal base in time of war and to guide the representatives of the two governments in their continuing efforts to negotiate a definitive accord. The Heads of Agreement was to last for 7 years without provision for extension; it provided for the British withdrawal of troops from the canal zone within months of its signature; 1,200 civilian technicians were to maintain the base, of whom 800 could be from outside Egypt; and the British could unilaterally remilitarize the base only if there was a direct attack upon Egypt. In the event of an emergency or a threatened attack, Egypt's obligation was confined merely to consultation with the United Kingdom. Additionally, the field of aggression, direct or threatened, was restricted in the Middle East to Egypt or any other Arab state and to Turkey. Iran and Israel were excluded. The accord also recognized the Suez Canal as an integral part of Egypt; the United Kingdom was to have the same status as other users of the waterway; and Egypt pledged its adherence to the principles of the 1888 Convention of Constantinople concerning the free use of the Suez Canal by all nations. For the text, see British Cmd. 9230, Egypt No. 1 (1954).

Negotiations continued on the definitive agreement, and on October 19, 1954, representatives of Egypt and the United Kingdom signed a final agreement which abrogated and replaced the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The instruments of ratification of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement were exchanged in Cairo on December 6, 1954. Materials describing the complex problems and complicated progress of these final negotiations are in Department of State

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file 641.74. For the text of the October agreement, see British Cmd. 9298, Egypt No. 2 (1954).

No. 1349

774.5 MSP/7-2854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 28, 1954—7:43 p. m.

144. Caffery authorized inform GOE: 1) US prepared at this time to enter into discussions re extension economic and military assistance in fulfillment commitment President's letter to Naguib July 15, 1953; 2) He is ready provide GOE with draft texts agreements whenever Egypt desires; 3) US aid will be for purpose assisting Egypt in implementing her plans for economic development and in strengthening her armed forces in order discharge increased responsibilities Egypt assuming under Suez Base Agreement; 4) Character, timing and amount US assistance will necessarily be related developments in and including among other factors Egypt's fulfillment Suez Base Agreement; 5) President will be asked determine Egypt eligible for military assistance on grounds among other factors Suez Base Agreement constitutes arrangement which requires Egypt take important part area defense.

Accordance recommendations Embtel 96 [2] we eliminating clauses tying agreements specifically to Egypt's provision of bases. We agree language Article I Para 2 military assistance agreement [3] adequate meet requirements US–UK Agreed Minute.

Following telegrams [2] give changes in texts military and economic agreements which should be made prior presenting them Egyptians and recite problems involved in pending legislative developments particularly with regard economic agreement. Because Congressional action on legislation not yet completed you should make clear Egyptians additional changes texts agreements may become necessary.

We wish avoid difficulties which would arise from citing specific amounts aid. Re economic aid Caffery should state amount will depend on subsequent agreement on specific projects such as those discussed November 1954 (Joint Embassy-USOM Despatch 1359).[2]

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[1] Repeated priority to London as telegram 584. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; see footnote 2, Document 1343.

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FYI telegram follows re magnitude economic aid. Re military aid Caffery should state amount will depend findings military survey group which will be sent Egypt promptly after signature agreements. FOA assumes Stevens can assist in discussion economic aid.

View extensive press speculation and statements in Cairo we feel unless GOE has objections it may be advisable issue press release announcing initiation negotiations and containing appropriate references to safeguards against misuse arms for aggressive purposes. Request your views.

DULLES

No. 1350

774.5 MSP/7-3154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, July 31, 1954—2 p. m.

140. Aid program of scope envisaged Deptel 163 [2] will be greeted here with dismay. Expectations built up during two years since GOE first requested United States military and economic assistance and given encouragement by President's letter to Naguib, have soared with conclusion Suez agreement.

Regime furthermore will need tangible evidence of substantial proportions to justify to Egypt public the reorientation of foreign policy of which Prime Minister today spoke with me (my telegram 136). [3] Although GOE will be inclined cooperate in keeping public emphasis on specific items and projects there will inevitably be press tendency to dwell on figures. Any airing of amounts mentioned Deptel 163, especially when translated into LE equivalents, could have adverse effect on our position here. Accordingly, I urge that Department make every effort, within limits final statutory authorization, to maximize allocations Egyptian program. (In this

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 38.

[2] The Department in telegram 163 to Cairo, July 30, not printed, reported that a final determination of Mutual Security funds available for Egypt could not be provided until Congress had completed action on the funding for the impending fiscal year. However, the tentative allocation for fiscal year 1955 for military assistance for Egypt was approximately $20 million. For developmental assistance, apart from technical aid, the approximate figure was calculated to be $20 million as well. (774.5 MSP/7-2854)

[3] Not printed.

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connection, I await also information on Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act 1954.) [4]

CAFFERY

[4] The Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act was signed into law on July 10, 1954, as Public Law 480. (68 Stat. 454)

No. 1351

774.5 MSP/7-3054

The Secretary of State to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 2, 1954.

DEAR MR. STASSEN: United States policy as set forth in NSC 155/1 [1] contemplates the granting of military assistance to Egypt when developments in the Suez Base problem merit it.

The President on March 14, 1953, determined that Egypt met the criterion set out in Section 202(a) of the Mutual Security Act for the purposes of military assistance in the form of training only. On July 15, 1953, in a letter to the President of Egypt the President promised to provide military assistance upon the conclusion of a Suez Base agreement. It is now recommended that the President make a determination that Egypt is eligible for both grant end-items and training military assistance. The Secretary of Defense concurs in this recommendation. [2] During the course of the recent visit of the British Prime Minister this Government agreed to initiate negotiation of economic or military assistance agreements only after the then new British proposals regarding the Suez Base had been presented to the Egyptians and the Egyptian Government had reacted favorably. Now that a British-Egyptian agreement has been concluded this Government is beginning negotiations with the Egyptian Government.

In order to meet legislative requirements it is requested that you seek Presidential determination that:

1. the strategic location of Egypt makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area,
2. the plans and arrangements agreed to between Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding the Suez Base are important to the defense of the Near East area and require Egypt to take an important part therein,

[1] For text, see Document 145.
[2] See footnote 3, Document 1341.

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3. military assistance to Egypt is of critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and

4. the immediately increased ability of Egypt to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the area and to the security of the United States.

It is also requested that in light of the foregoing determination you seek Presidential authorization to furnish grant training and end-items military assistance to Egypt subject to the negotiation of an agreement meeting the requirements of Mutual Security legislation, including a firm commitment that such aid will not be used to undertake any act of aggression against any other nation.

It is further recommended that you request the President that he keep his determination secret until an appropriate time for its disclosure is reached in discussions with Egypt.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

No. 1352

774.5 MSP/8–254: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 2, 1954—2 p. m.

144. I handed Egyptian Minister Foreign Affairs this morning drafts re economic and military aid. [2] He said he would study them at once and get in touch with me again very soon.

I emphasized following points:

1. United States aid will be for purpose assisting Egypt in implementing her plans for economic development and in strengthening her armed forces in order discharge increased responsibilities Egypt assuming under Suez base agreement;

2. Character timing and amount US assistance will necessarily be related developments in area including among other factors Egypt's fulfillment Suez base agreement;

3. President will be asked determine Egypt eligible for military assistance on grounds among other factors Suez base agreement constitutes arrangement which requires Egypt take important part area defense;

4. Because Congressional action on legislation not yet completed additional changes texts agreements may become necessary;

5. Re economic aid amount will depend on subsequent agreement on specific projects such as those discussed November 1953;

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 39.

[2] Not printed.

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6. Re military aid amount will depend findings military survey group which will be sent Egypt promptly after signature agreements.

Military assistance which will be provided during fiscal year 1955 following conclusion agreement represents initial increment in program which United States Government expects will enhance ability Egypt participate defense its area, but subsequent increments contingent Congressional authorization additional funds on annual basis.

Provisions and procedures reflected proposed MDAP agreements are standard, applying with few variations to similar agreements with approximately thirty other countries.

CAFFERY

No. 1353

874.00/8-454: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, August 4, 1954—4 p. m.

609. Re Cairo's 145 August 2 [2] to Department, Foreign Office says Egyptians have raised in very off hand matter with Stevenson (possibly via Ambassador Caffery) questions of UK economic aid to Egypt and lifting arms embargo and referred to establishment joint committee to study UK economic and military aid.

While Her Majesty's Government has been unable give much thought in past weeks to these questions they now being studied by Foreign Office, Treasury and War Office. Working level of Foreign Office unable predict what final outcome will be but thinks UK should for political reasons offer some economic aid.

Re military aid Shuckburgh this morning confidentially and personally informed Embassy Office that he hopes for governmental decision by end of week at latest. He personally favors reclassifying arms into two categories, one including only tanks and other heavy combat equipment and the other, all other arms and military supplies. He feels it would be undesirable from viewpoint over-all NE policy to lift arms embargo publicly and ostentatiously but is in

[1] Repeated to Cairo as telegram 12.

[2] In telegram 145 from Cairo, Aug. 2, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that the Egyptian Foreign Minister inquired if the United States knew what the British intentions were with regard to providing Egypt with economic and military aid. (874.00/8-254)

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favor quietly dropping embargo on broad second category mentioned above, reserving first category for consideration after signature agreement. Release first category items would of course not be made definitely conditional on signature. He also favors some prompt British gesture, such as immediate resumption deliveries on long-standing Egyptian order for [Meteors]. He assumes British will definitely wish to be considered as traditional supplier of certain equipment and states Belgians have also asserted claim as traditional suppliers some items.

Shuckburgh agrees with comments contained Cairo's 154 August 3 [3] to Department and believes Her Majesty's Government will be effectively helpful and forthcoming vis-à-vis Egyptians. [4]

ALDRICH

[3] Not printed.

[4] In telegram 860 from London, Aug. 19, not printed, the Embassy informed the Department that the British were having a great deal of difficulty developing a firm policy on giving arms to Egypt, and that the matter was at that time before Prime Minister Churchill. (874.00/8–1954) The Embassy reported further on Aug. 30 in despatch 631, not printed, that the British Government had given very little consideration to the matter of granting Egypt economic aid as well, the reason being that the British were waiting until the financial aspects of the Suez base agreement had been settled and the agreement had been signed. (874.00/8–3054)

No. 1354

774.5 MSP/8–554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET CAIRO, August 5, 1954—6 p. m.

167. Although we have in no way encouraged Egyptians to expect huge aid either economic or military they very definitely do expect considerable aid. They have particularly in mind following statement in President Eisenhower's letter to Naguib: [1]

"As part of an over-all solution, I am prepared to see firm commitments entered into between our governments to assist you in your plans for Egypt's economic development and in the strengthening of your armed forces to discharge their increased responsibilities."

Fawzi took occasion to emphasize to me yesterday that whereas they would welcome any aid British might care to give, they wanted it definitely understood that it is our aid they are counting

[1] The President's letter was transmitted in telegram 69 to Cairo, Document 1206.

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on, and that they assume that any aid British might give would be in addition to our substantial aid.

CAFFERY

No. 1355

774.5 MSP/8-654

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 6, 1954.

Subject: Economic and Military Aid to Egypt

I understand that you have inquired regarding the amounts of economic and military aid which we plan to extend to Egypt. The tentative planning figures are $20 million for development assistance and $20 million for grant military assistance. Ambassador Caffery has been advised of these figures and has been authorized to initiate negotiation of the necessary agreements.

Last fall we discussed with Egypt informally economic development projects in the magnitude of $25 million in the fields of irrigation, railroad equipment replacement and highway construction. At the time, the Embassy reported that a study of Egypt's fiscal needs and capacity to proceed with well-planned projects indicated an additional $8.6 million could usefully be obligated. Because of the previous discussions of larger figures and the exaggerated expectations which are usually aroused in the Near East over prospects of United States aid, Ambassador Caffery is apprehensive that Egypt will be disappointed at the present planning figures. Final determination of the funds available for Egypt must necessarily await the completion of action by Congress.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Burdett.

No. 1356

774.5 MSP/8-1354

The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 18, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is transmitted herewith, in accordance with the instructions of the President, a copy of his Memoran-

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dum of Determination with respect to grant military assistance to Egypt.

For your information, there are also attached copies of the following additional documents pertaining to this transaction:

1. My memorandum of recommendation to the President. [1]
2. My letters to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees of the House of Representatives. [2]

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD E. STASSEN

[Enclosure]

AUGUST 12, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION [3]

Subject: Grant Military Assistance to Egypt

In accordance with the recommendation contained in your memorandum of August 12, 1954, [4] and in order to authorize the furnishing of additional forms of military assistance to Egypt, I hereby remove the limitation contained in the second paragraph of my memorandum to you dated March 14, 1953, [5] in which I found Egypt eligible for limited military assistance, and I further find that plans and arrangements agreed to between Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding the Suez Base are important to the defense of the Near East and require Egypt to take an important part therein. The furnishing of such additional forms of military assistance shall be subject to the conclusion of the agreement required by law with Egypt, which shall include a firm commitment that no military assistance furnished by the United States shall be used to undertake any act of aggression against any nation.

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[1] Not printed; this memorandum is attached, however, to the record copy of this letter.

[2] None printed; a copy of these letters was also attached to the record copy of this letter.

[3] The course of action presented to the President in this memorandum had the support of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and of the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and the Foreign Operations Administration.

[4] Not printed; see footnote 1, above.

[5] See the attachment to Stassen's letter of Mar. 14, 1953, to the Secretary of State, Document 1120.

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This determination shall remain secret until an appropriate time for its disclosure is reached in discussions with the Egyptian Government.

The Secretaries of State and Defense and Director of the Bureau of the Budget are to be notified by you of this determination. You will also notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

No. 1357

774.5 MSP/8-2954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, August 29, 1954—3 p. m.

268. Minister Foreign Affairs told me last night that after careful consideration Egyptian Government has decided not to ask military aid from US at this time. He said Egyptians realize US legislative requirements would necessitate MSA agreement along lines of draft which now in their hands but fear adverse public reaction to such agreement. Although full implications for the future difficult to assess, Fawzi insisted this decision does not affect GOE's policy of working toward closer alignment with west but is based solely on internal political considerations which require government to move slowly. He strongly urged that, in view of decision not to request military aid, US raise amount of economic aid for Egypt. He asserted substantial economic aid (a) would have very beneficial effect on public attitude toward US and (b) would permit Egypt make modest start on building up its strength by purchasing arms out of its own budgetary resources.

Fawzi then asked me to meet with him Tuesday evening to begin negotiation of economic aid agreement. I agreed.

Comment. This development not surprising in view GOE's domestic political problems. Furthermore it relieves US of commitment to extend arms aid to Egypt. In terms of US relations with Egypt, this decision (a) removes prospect that necessarily limited arms aid program would have provoked adverse reaction, and (b) it does not alter excellent opportunity to improve US position while strength-

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 68, to Paris as telegram 6 for Reinhardt, and unnumbered to Bonn for Satterthwaite, and to Rome, Ankara, Karachi, the Arab capitals, and Tel Aviv.

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ening forward-looking regime through substantial grant economic assistance on development projects.

CAFFERY

No. 1358

774.5 MSP/8–3054

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 30, 1954.

Subject: Effects of Egyptian Decision Not to Request US Grant Military Aid

Caffery reports (Tab A) [2] that the Egyptians have decided not to request US grant military aid at this time because of the anticipated adverse public reaction to the type of agreement required by MSA legislation. The Foreign Minister asserted that the decision does not indicate a change in Egypt's intention to work towards closer alignment with the West and he requested an increase in economic aid in substitute for the military aid.

The British Cabinet has decided to lift the embargo on commercial exports of arms to Egypt.[3] Shipments will continue to be subject to the NEACC procedures and will be in accordance with the Tripartite Declaration.

Recommendations:

In your conversation with the Secretary at noon today, it is recommended that you make the following points:

1. We share Caffery's belief that it is still possible to work towards improving the US position in Egypt. The decision on military aid emphasizes the need to move slowly.
2. We should make every effort to increase the amount of economic aid to Egypt.
3. Israel pressure should be considerably alleviated. Israel has objected strenuously to arms aid to Egypt, not only on the grounds that it would increase Egypt's military strength but because of the psychological effect.
4. We might be able to postpone the special assurances requested by Israel. If it is decided to proceed with such assurances, they

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Burdett.

[2] According to the record copy of this memorandum, Tab A was telegram 268 from Cairo, Aug. 29, *supra*.

[3] Department of State officials had been given this information earlier that same day in a conversation with R. W. Bailey, First Secretary of the British Embassy. (Memorandum of Conversation, not printed; 474.418/8–3054)

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could be given in undramatic fashion and could be considerably less forceful than might have been necessary if we had extended arms aid to Egypt. (I plan to submit to the Secretary today the text of a possible statement to Israel.)

No. 1359

774.5 MSP/8-3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, August 30, 1954—2 p. m.

271. In light Egyptian rejection military assistance and limitations imposed by Section 503 (b) (1) Mutual Security Act 1954, [1] I consider utmost importance US attitude re economic assistance be framed produce maximum political impact here as well as maintain and accelerate latent pro-West orientation present Egyptian Government.

Department doubtless appreciates that rejection military aid will inevitably be interpreted in Egypt in manner unfavorable to US. Furthermore, continued US efforts to encourage Iraqi participation area defense arrangements outside Arab League framework will be interpreted as challenge to Egyptian leadership in area. [2] Grant of substantial development assistance would, however, appreciably mitigate these adverse reactions.

Consequently, I request authority inform Egyptian Government in course forthcoming economic negotiations US prepared provide up to 40 million dollars during FY 55 provided adequately justified projects submitted.

CAFFERY

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[1] The Mutual Security Act of 1954 was signed into law as Public Law 665 on Aug. 26, 1954. (68 Stat. 832)

[2] For documentation regarding U.S. efforts to encourage Iraq's participation in area defense arrangements, see Documents 1376 ff.

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No. 1360

774.5 MSP/8–3154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 31, 1954—3:40 p. m.

354. We informed by Egyptian Ambassador on basis telephone conversation Nasir and by another source that contrary statement by Fawzi (Embtels 268 and 271) Nasir has not made firm decision re request for grant US military aid. Nasir wishes hold matter abeyance pending resolution his current internal difficulties and may request grant assistance later. Ambassador added Saleh Salem has made public statement to effect question still under consideration. We agreed Department would volunteer no statement re military aid and if queried would reply matter still under consideration. If release subsequently decided upon we will coordinate with Egyptians (Embtel 275). [2]

Advise urgently whether your information indicates Nasir now wishes only postpone decision and may present request later. [3]

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan.

[2] In telegram 275 from Cairo, Aug. 31, not printed, Ambassador Caffery strongly recommended that before the news was released that Egypt was not going to receive grant military aid from the United States, the Department should come to an accord with the Egyptians as to the manner and timing of such an announcement. Otherwise, Caffery feared that the effect in Egypt could be disastrous to American interests. (774.5 MSP/8–3154)

[3] Ambassador Caffery replied in telegram 281, Sept. 1, not printed, that the Egyptian Government had come to the conclusion that it could not sign an agreement at that time, and that therefore Egypt has given up the idea of obtaining grant military aid at that time from the United States. Moreover, Caffery reported that Nasir had not come to any definite conclusion as to whether or not he would be able to present a military aid request later. (774.5 MSP/9–154)

No. 1361

774.5 MSP/8–3054: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 4, 1954—2:57 p. m.

382. Joint State–FOA Message. Re Embtels 268 and 271. Magnitude of Egyptian program considered September 2 with Stassen, who is prepared authorize program $20 million now and likewise prepared consider up to further $20 million for economic assistance, but for this purpose needs persuasive documentation in terms

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uses MSP and Public Law 480—Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act [1]— funds and justification of anticipated obligations and expenditures of proposed projects in form discussed Usfoto 100. [2] Submit telegraphic summary.

Regret cannot yet authorize disclosure possibility $40 million figure to GOE at this time, but you should encourage presentation project material up to this limit.

Need for justification requested above intensified by reduction by Congress funds requested for Development Assistance, major cuts elsewhere in MSP Program and urgent claims unforeseen when budget presented—examples Greece and Pakistan.

Embassy USOM should inter alia appraise total agricultural surplus products that might move to Egypt from MSP funds, pursuant Section 402 of Act, whose local currency sales proceeds could be made available by US provide project local currency requirements. Such use should be consistent with Section 104 of MSP Appropriation Act [3] which requires that local currency be used for same purposes as dollars where from granted. Congressional presentation MSP included explanation that $12 million of $20 million requested for Egypt would be in form Surplus Agricultural Commodities. Whatever aid can come from Public Law 480 resources may have to take form of agricultural goods in excess $12 million financed by MSP funds.

Embassy USOM should also consider and comment on effect loan requirements in MSP legislation. USG hopes to have loan provisions worked out at early date in form which will not impair capacity borrow from IBRD and other institutions. [4]

SMITH

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[1] See footnote 4, Document 1350.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See footnote 1, Document 1359.

[4] Ambassador Caffery responded to this final paragraph of telegram 382 on Sept. 9 in telegram 318, not printed. Caffery stressed that Egypt needed aid in the form of grants, not loans, and concluded with the thought that American loan assistance would not be regarded as real aid by the Egyptians. (774.5 MSP/9-954)

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No. 1362

774.5 MSP/9-854

Memorandum by Louis E. Frechtling to the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs (Nolting) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1954.

Subject: Extension of Military Assistance to Egypt

I discussed with William Burdett (NE) the present attitude of NEA on the extension of military assistance to Egypt. It is NEA's view that the Egyptian Government did not categorically refuse military assistance last week. Subsequent information from our Ambassador and from the Egyptian Ambassador here leads to the conclusion that Nasser intended only that there be a period of a month or two after the signature of the Suez base agreement during which time the RCC could establish a favorable atmosphere for the announcement of an Egyptian-American agreement on military assistance.

NEA believes that, if during the next several months the Egyptians indicate that they are willing to discuss a military agreement, the United States should be prepared to acknowledge military assistance is justified in view of:

1. The President's commitment to Egypt of military assistance upon signature of the Suez agreement.
2. Our present policy of encouraging the strengthening of forces in the Near East against possible Soviet aggression.
3. The impact of military assistance on the Near Eastern States leading toward their self-confidence and willingness to discuss long range settlements of the Palestine question.

William Burdett admits that the initial reaction on the 5th floor was to welcome the Egyptian rejection in view of recent Israeli protests. He says that NEA does not consider that the Secretary's approval of the extension of assistance to Egypt has been withdrawn.

Frankly I do not see that we have much room to maneuver, particularly in view of the President's commitment. The most that we might do is to make sure that on the United States side we do not give the Egyptians the impression that we are overly anxious to extend assistance. They should be given an opportunity to review their situation and approach us when they have made up their minds.

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[1] Frechtling was a member of Nolting's staff.

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No. 1363

774.5 MSP/9-954 Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY CAIRO, September 9, 1954—2 p. m.

317. Re Deptel 382 September 4 fourth paragraph.

1. Although we have been doing our best, with some success, to convince the Egyptians of the utility of agricultural surpluses in the economic aid program now under formulation, it is now crystal clear that we will not be able to achieve the 60 percent target indicated reference telegram. To press them beyond what is feasible will not only be contra-productive but will jeopardize our long range objectives here.

2. Extent to which US agricultural surpluses might be used to generate local currency for development projects discussed September 8 with new Minister Finance, El Kaisouni, also member Egyptian US aid negotiation team. His reaction was as follows:

a. At this stage economic development Egypt does not desire to increase consumer goods imports above present level.

b. Would welcome on grant-aid basis for purposes local currency generation hard currency imports including crude oil imports from Bahrein for which LE 5 million equivalent in foreign exchange must presently be found.

c. Previously, wheat imports in this connection would have been desired but no need therefore this year, in fact, lack of storage facilities would alone prevent it.

d. Imports of most other agricultural commodities of which US has surplus now obtained from soft currency areas. If these replaced by imports from US, would mean either loss foreign markets for Egyptian cotton or increased restriction on imports of US non-agricultural commodities to force their purchase from soft currency areas.

3. We repeatedly stressed fact law requires specified amount of US aid in form surplus commodities. El Kaisouni finally agreed to have prepared list on most generous basis possible agricultural commodities in US surplus category, together with quantities thereof, which might be imported for purpose local currency generation, but will add also other commodities which might be used for this purpose and indicated such list could do little more than reflect 1953 imports. Will discuss further on his return Sunday from Alexandria.

4. Department will recall that promise of US aid was held out as inducement to Egypt to come to settlement of Suez base question and that all aid was withheld for more than a year in absence such settlement. In view of this background, and especially since they

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are not seeking arms aid at present, Egyptians have in mind much more substantial economic assistance that $50 million figure mentioned Embtel 271 August 30. It is therefore, not my present intention that this figure be quoted GOE in early stage negotiations. I had in mind, however, that as specific projects qualifying for US aid were worked up and Egyptian interest therein grew, GOE might come to accept $40 million figure.

5. If it turns out that even this minimal amount is to be circumscribed by insistence that GOE take large percentage in form US surpluses, for which there appears to be limited requirement, there may be repercussions adversely effecting our position in whole Middle East. [1]

CAFFERY

[1] Ambasador Caffery reported in telegram 324, Sept. 10, not printed, that the Egyptians had expected $50 million in military aid and an additional $50 million in economic assistance, and since they were no longer intent on getting military aid, they expected to receive $100 million in economic assistance. (774.5 MSP/9-1054)

No. 1364

OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "Egypt"

Memorandum by the Operations Coordinator (Radius) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1954.

Subject: Status Report Item 7(b)—Military Assistance to Egypt

Attached (Tab A) is the briefing memorandum from Mr. Jernegan recommending that you concur in the proposals of the *ad hoc* working group.

Mr. Nolting does not concur in this proposal on the grounds that it will not remain secret and he does not approve the precedent.

Also attached (Tab B) is a memorandum for the OCB from Mr. Staats summarizing the discussions and suggestions of the working group. These coincide closely with Mr. Jernegan's recommendations. The question of source of funds may be subject to further discussion. It should also be noted that the $10,000,000 figure is an upper limit.

Mr. Jernegan and Mr. Nolting will participate in the briefing session to enable you to reach a decision as to the position to be taken at the OCB meeting.

[1] The Operations Coordinator was located in the Office of the Under Secretary of State.

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[Tab A]

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Acting Secretary of State [2]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1954.

Subject: Military Assistance to Egypt.

The *Ad Hoc* OCB Working Group (State, Defense, CIA and FOA) met yesterday evening and agreed to submit the following to their respective principals:

(1) We shall proceed, as at present, to attempt to work out a bona fide economic development program for Egypt in the magnitude of $40 million.

(2) . . . , we should advise Prime Minister Nasir that we cannot undertake a full scale military aid program unless and until he is able to conclude a normal military assistance agreement. However, in view of our special friendship and our desire to assist his regime to maintain and consolidate itself, we are willing to make available a modest additional amount of economic aid in such a way that it will release dollars for the purchase by Egypt of American military equipment. This would be kept strictly secret. It would apply only to the present fiscal year and Nasir would be told very clearly that any future assistance could be obtained only in the usual way.

(3) If Nasir agrees, a sum of not to exceed $10 million would be earmarked by Defense for transfer to FOA economic aid funds, to be added to the $40 million proposed for genuine economic aid.

(4) The actual decision on items to be sold to Egypt and the placing of the necessary orders, etc., would be carried on overtly in the normal way as if the funds involved had originated solely from Egyptian resources.

I concurred in this proposal because the magnitude of military purchases involved (not over $10 million) is small enough to prevent other states from assuming that the US has shown special favoritism to Egypt. Even without any assistance from us, Egypt might well scrape together $10 million to buy equipment. A year or two ago she was prepared to spend $11 million in this country, at a time when she was receiving no aid of any kind from any one.

I also think that a grand total of $50 million in economic aid to Egypt will not seem out of line, in view of the size of the country and its obvious needs for economic development.

Finally, I believe there is some merit in the CIA argument that Nasir genuinely believes we are committed to give him some mili-

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[2] This memorandum was drafted by Jernegan. The following handwritten remarks by Frederick E. Nolting appear on the record copy: "I think it's unlikely that this deal will remain secret, and I don't like the precedent it sets. My vote is *negative*. FEN".

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tary help. I also believe he can be very useful to us in the Near Eastern picture if properly supported and cultivated. Therefore, I think a special gesture of this kind is worth trying.

However, if Nasir should reject this arrangement as inadequate or as otherwise unacceptable, I would recommend reverting to our original position that he gets no military assistance in any form until he is ready to sign the usual agreement.

I anticipate that this subject will be raised in the OCB meeting September 29th. [3]

[Tab B]

Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (Staats) to the Operations Coordinating Board

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 28, 1954.

There was convened at the offices of the OCB a special meeting of representatives of State, Defense, FOA and CIA on September 27 to consider the problem of military assistance to Egypt. The following persons were present:

State
Mr. John D. Jernegan
Mr. Louis Frechtling
Mr. William Burdett

Defense
Mr. William Godel

CIA
Mr. Richard Bissell
Mr. Kermit Roosevelt

FOA
Mr. Norman Paul

OCB
Mr. Elmer B. Staats
Mr. Max W. Bishop

Mr. Jernegan chaired the meeting and opened the discussion by stating that the United States had a commitment to Egypt to give both military and economic aid; that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had indicated to Ambassador Caffery that because of existing conditions, Egypt did not wish to conclude a military assistance agreement at this time; that the U.S. commitment to give military

[3] According to the minutes of this meeting, there was no mention made of military assistance to Egypt. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "OCB Minutes, II")

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assistance to Egypt did not include any unusual circumstances and assistance was to be given only in accordance with normal procedures; that in view of Egypt's expressed unwillingness to take military aid at this time, it was felt undesirable to raise the issue in an effort to convince the Egyptians that they should accept a military assistance agreement; but that, in view of the recent discussions of this matter at the OCB, if a convenient device could be found to give not more than $10 million worth of military assistance to Egypt under . . . some arrangement such as economic aid, Mr. Jernegan thought such arrangement would be politically acceptable and would not cause us embarrassment.

Mr. Staats and Mr. Godel reviewed briefly the discussion which had taken place at the last OCB meeting on Wednesday, September 22.[4] Mr. Godel went on to say that Defense had earmarked a little over $20 million for military assistance to Egypt and that a part of this might be transferred to FOA providing the OCB found it necessary and desirable to do so. Mr. Godel emphasized at the same time that there were other demands on this money . . . .

Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bissell described briefly the situation in Egypt . . . .

. . . . . .

There was considerable discussion of the type of materials which the Egyptians want at this time. It was agreed that it would be highly desirable to send American military officiers to Egypt to advise the Egyptians on the matériel which they should obtain and to see to it, insofar as possible, that United States wishes were met.

Mr. Paul stated that FOA could within a short time develop programs of economic aid for $40 million and a . . . plan for $10 million which the Egyptians could use to purchase military supplies from the United States.

It was agreed that the group would suggest to the OCB at its meeting of September 29[5] the following program of action:

1. . . . get in touch with Colonel Nasir and . . . inform the latter that while grant military aid can be given only under a military assistance agreement, it might be possible to make available to him, . . . , up to $10 million which he could use to purchase military supplies from the United States, that this aid is *all* that he can expect in this fiscal year, and that if such a program is desired by Colonel Nasir, he should have his Foreign Minister approach the American Embassy and request assistance and advice to purchase some $10 million worth of military supplies in the United

[4] According to the record, there was no mention made of military assistance to Egypt. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "OCB Minutes, II")

[5] See footnote 3, above.

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States, and that no information would be given the Egyptian Government of the total program of economic aid contemplated until Colonel Nasir has indicated his concurrence or non-concurrence with the proposal.

2. That the Defense Department would then in response to an open request from the Egyptians send a military survey team to Egypt in civilian clothes to advise the Egyptians on the type of matériel which they should purchase in order to get maximum benefit from their expenditures.

3. That FOA should devise programs for $40 million economic aid to Egypt from FOA funds and up to $10 million economic aid . . . for Egyptian military purchases in the U.S. from Department of Defense funds which would be transferred to FOA.

ELMER B. STAATS

No. 1365

874.10/10-2054: Despatch

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CAIRO, October 20, 1954.

No. 752

Ref: CERP June 24, 1954; D–5. [2]

Subject: Transmitting Copy of Memorandum of Conversations Between IBRD Officials and Members of the Egyptian Economic and Financial Missions to the United States.

There is enclosed a copy of the memorandum of conversations which were held on September 25, 1954 in Washington between IBRD officials and members of the Egyptian Economic and Financial Missions which have just visited the United States.

For the Ambassador:
PERRY ELLIS
First Secretary of Embassy

[Enclosure]

Conversations held with representatives of Egypt in Mr. Black's office, September 25, 1954

There were present:

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[1] A copy of the enclosed memorandum of conversations was sent to the U.S. Treasury representative in Beirut.

[2] Not printed.

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Bank—
Mr. Eugene R. Black
Mr. F. E. Gregh
Mr. Joseph Rucinski
Mr. Dorsey Stephens
Mr. F. G. Bochenski

Egypt—
Mr. Amin Fikry
Mr. Hussein Fahmy
Mr. El Emary
Dr. Zaki Saad
Dr. Aly Gritly

1. Mr. Black opened the conversation by saying that he had received the day before the answer of the Egyptian Government to the Bank's *aide-mémoire* of June. If this should be agreeable to the Egyptian Government, the next steps which the Bank could take would be a) to send a couple of experts to look into the Fertilizer Project and b) to send another small group of experts to study all the information available in Egypt on the Nile River and on the High Aswan Project. These two groups would then return to Washington and report to the Bank. Mr. Black then referred to the international panel which, according to his information, was to come to Egypt around the middle of November in order to investigate the German study on the High Aswan Project. He thought that the Bank also should have somebody in Egypt at that time. Mr. Black then asked whether the Egyptian representatives had any suggestions.

2. Mr. El Emary asked what the Bank's ideas were about the financing and whether the Bank would be willing to take over the foreign financing of the whole scheme.

3. Mr. Black emphasized that the High Aswan Scheme, if found feasible and economically sound, will be the biggest single project ever financed by the Bank. The Bank would want to be absolutely sure that this is the right solution to the problem of a full utilization of the Nile waters. If the project is found feasible from the engineering and economic points of view, the Bank would be willing to undertake to organize the financing of the foreign exchange costs of the scheme and to participate in such financing. It is premature to discuss this question now as, at present, it is not known how much the project would cost.

4. Mr. El Emary said that Egypt does not want to try to tap other sources for financial assistance if that can be avoided; she would prefer to regard the Bank as the only channel.

5. Mr. Black approved of this attitude and emphasized that Egypt and the Bank have the same interests in approaching the Scheme.

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Neither Egypt nor the Bank would want to embark on this project unless it was found to be feasible and sound. Both Egypt and the Bank have got to be absolutely sure that they were doing the right thing, and would have to know all the factors important for the evaluation of the project. Mr. Black remarked that since the time of his visit to Egypt he was convinced that the High Aswan Scheme was the most intriguing and exciting project he ever came across. If Egypt so desires, the Bank is ready "to get busy" on the Scheme right away.

6. With reference to an inquiry from one of the Egyptian delegates, Mr. Stephens asked at what stage would private financial groups be brought into the Scheme.

7. Mr. Black answered that this would be in one of the later stages "after we set things up." Two types of such participations have been tried in the past: in Japan, two suppliers took early maturities of the Bank loans, which means that as the loan is paid off, the suppliers are paid first. A different approach was followed for the Sui Gas project in Pakistan, where Mr. Black had talked with British banks in London before the loan was made. Six of these banks, who have branches in Pakistan, took LE 600,000 out of a total of a LE 5 million loan. Another solution considered in certain cases is that investment bankers may sell a part of the loan to the public. The Bank cannot try to interest others in the financing of a project while its study is still in the early stages; before doing so, the Bank must know that the project is good and sound. If the Bank invited private financiers to take a part of the loan, the Bank itself would take the bigger risks because it would take the longer maturities. Private groups would have to participate without the Bank's guarantee. If the Bank is to guarantee the whole loan itself it can also take the whole loan. The Bank covers the ependiture involved in the investigation of the project. Cooperation of the Bank with private lenders in the financing of specific projects is a comparatively new development.

8. To Dr. Saad's question whether private lenders in these cases would charge higher rates of interest, Mr. Black replied that, on the contrary, he thought their rates would be lower because, with regard to the participation of private lenders the Bank would try "to knock off" the 1% statutory commission charge which the Bank has to make for its reserve during the first 10 years of its operations. For the amounts taken up by investors without recourse to the Bank, the Bank would not apply the 1% charge.

9. Dr. Gritly asked what would be the effects of higher interest rates prevailing in the countries of the suppliers or in those of the private banks participating in the financing of the project.

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10. Mr. Black admitted that this was a problem and mentioned as an example the case of France where private banks might wish to participate in the financing of the Scheme but the high rates of interest prevailing in France might present a certain difficulty. If such difficulties should be found unsurmountable the Bank would then make a bigger loan itself.

11. Dr. Gritly asked what would happen if the Bank would not be willing to lend the total amount of foreign exchange involved but, for instance, would decide to lend, say, LE 60 million out of LE 100 million; would the rest then be borrowed from private banks?

12. Mr. Black replied that the IBRD cannot compete, according to its Statutes, with private lenders if the latter are ready to make loans on reasonable terms. He illustrated this principle with the case of Norway: the Bank was ready to lend to Norway at its current interest rate but discussed the matter with New York bankers who offered to take a part of the loan and sell it to the public at higher rates. As Norway refused to borrow on these terms, the IBRD alone financed the whole project.

13. Mr. El Emary brought up the following point: assuming that the High Aswan Project was found feasible but very costly, was it understood that the IBRD would supply all the foreign exchange needed, regardless of what the amount might be?

14. Mr. Black replied that he would first have to know the cost of the project and the foreign exchange component of this cost but he could not now say that the Bank would lend "regardless of what the amount would be" since this also depends on Egypt's debt repaying capacity. He said that the Bank would lend Egypt as much as it thought the country can repay. When he offered to help Egypt in obtaining funds to cover the remaining cost, he had in mind that any remaining difference could perhaps be partly made up by grants or equity participation.

15. A general discussion followed during which the existing cost estimates of the entire High Aswan Scheme were briefly referred to. It was emphasized that the Fertilizer Project is regarded as a part of th High Aswan Scheme and enters into the total cost estimates of the Scheme.

16. Mr. El Emary emphasized the urgency of the Fertilizer Project in view of the necessity to utilize the power which will be available fairly soon from the existing Aswan Dam power station. Egypt would need foreign exchange for this project very soon. A brief general discussion followed on the prospects of obtaining foreign private participation in the Fertilizer Project.

17. Before the end of the meeting, Mr. Black encouraged the Egyptian Delegates to have further conversations and exhange of views and information with the members of the Bank's staff.

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No. 1366

774.5 MSP/10-2754

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 27, 1954.

Subject: Military Assistance to Egypt

I. Sequence of Events:

(a) *December 9, 1952*—Signature of reimbursable military assistance agreement under Section 408(e).

(b) *July 15, 1953*—Letter from President Eisenhower to General Naguib, stating that we would enter into firm commitments to provide Egypt with military and economic assistance simultaneously with the signature of an agreement in principle on the Suez Base.

(c) *July 27, 1954*—Signature of "Heads of Agreement" between the UK and Egypt on the Suez Base.

(d) *August 2, 1954*—Draft of military assistance agreement given to Egypt by Caffery.

(e) *August 29, 1954*—Egyptian Foreign Minister informed Caffery Egyptian Government had decided not to request military aid from the US at this time because of internal political considerations which required the Government to move slowly towards closer association with the West.

(f) *August 30, 1954*—Egyptian Ambassador informed the Department that Colonel Nasir did not wish to be understood as rejecting US military aid in principle. Because of internal opposition he wished to postpone a decision for the time being.

(g) During this period Colonel Nasir sent several messages . . . emphasizing that he was not rejecting US military aid but merely postponing negotiations.

(h) *October 19, 1954*—Signature of final Suez Base Agreement.

(i) *October 22, 1954*—Egyptian Ambassador informed the Department that because of the good reception given the final Suez Base Agreement and the generally improved internal political situation, Colonel Nasir wished to resume negotiations on military aid.

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Burdett.

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II. Procedures Planned: (The procedures outlined are based on OCB decisions of September 29 and October 6, 1954.) [2]

(a) . . . inform Nasir that the US is prepared to resume military aid negotiations and to send immediately a military survey team in civilian clothes to discuss with Nasir the factors involved in a military aid agreement and, ostensibly, Egyptian purchases of arms in the US. Should a grant military aid agreement be concluded, the team also would determine the items which might be furnished under the agreement.

(b) . . . provide Egypt . . . approximately $3 million to be used by Egypt to purchase military equipment in the US, principally morale building items.

(c) Resumption of negotiations by the Embassy at Cairo on the basis of an agreement modeled on the Iraq Agreement and including specifically assurances against aggression and the statement that the character, timing and amount of our aid will be related to developments in the area.

(d) Grant aid to be in the magnitude of $20 million.

[2] No record of these decisions has been found in the OCB files in the Department of State. Minutes of the Sept. 29 meeting are in OCB files, lot 62 D 430, "OCB Minutes, II".

No. 1367

Editorial Note

Representatives of the United States and Egyptian Governments signed and thereby brought into force an agreement to exempt relief supplies and equipment from Egyptian importation duties and from internal taxation on October 30, 1954. For the text, see TIAS No. 3119, 5 UST (pt. 3) 2551.

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No. 1368

774.5 MSP/11-654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, November 6, 1954—1 p. m.

620. Atmosphere of exchange of notes re economic aid was almost gala; it is plain Egyptians are very pleased and plan to stress aid as evidence US confidence Egypt's future.

I saw Fawzi privately afterwards. He again reiterated his thanks to all those concerned in Washington and Cairo; he said GOE fully appreciate the many problems which had to be surmounted in connection with economic aid. Fawzi went on to say that a committee headed by Finance Minister Kaissuny had been established to implement agreement. He thought there would be no foot dragging.

Fawzi also told me that he had great hopes for increased collaboration between private American and Egyptian firms. He mentioned minerals as being field in which there are great opportunities for American and Egyptian businessmen to work together. He said, "for our part we will give every facility". [2]

CAFFERY

[1] Repeated to London as telegram 134 and unnumbered to Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, and the Arab capitals.

[2] According to telegram 619 from Cairo, Nov. 6, not printed, the amount of economic development assistance extended by the United States to Egypt totaled $40 million. (774.5 MSP/11-654) For the text of this economic development agreement, which was signed and thereby brought into force on Nov. 6, see TIAS No. 3156, 5 UST (pt. 3) 2985.

No. 1369

Editorial Note

The document presented in this and subsequent editorial notes in this compilation is located in Department of State file 774.5 MSP. This document and those that follow were not ribbon copies. They were typed on plain sheets of paper. They appear to be communications exchanged between American officials in Washington and American officials in Cairo. They provide useful information concerning the issue of extending grant military assistance to Egypt.

The date of the first document is November 15, 1954, and it reads as follows:

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"On 13 November a long conversation was held between Norman Paul, . . . , Abdul Nasar, and aides. The following is a summary of the conversation:

"a. The 5,000,000 proposal as approved by OCB was presented to Nasr who reacted negatively. He pointed out that 40,000,000 aid for *economic* development had been announced to the people and the govt had already presented to the U.S. Govt projects which would more than utilize the funds authorized. He felt strongly that any diversion now was out of the question.

"b. Re possible MDAP agreement, Nasr stated categorically *not* possible for him to sign any such formal undertakings now or probably in the near future. He repeated same line taken the last several months re uphill battle to win popular support after Suez agreement and felt additional agreement now with us, however worthwhile its motives, would be interpreted by enemies within and outside govt in such manner as to seriously interfere with mutual interests of U.S. and Egypt.

"c. As conversation went on, it became clear that it was not MDAP undertakings in themselves that troubled Nasr, but that his main aversion was to the idea of 'MDAP agreement' as some formally executed document, whether secret or not, and idea of MDAP survey group or MAAG detailed to Egypt, particularly latter.

"The foregoing seems to suggest the following courses of action:

"a. Abandon idea of using device of 5,000,000 out of 40,000,000 now authorized along lines OCB paper. Irrespective of reasons why, fact remains that it is now politically impossible, and in our view undesirable even if it could be done, to divert funds from economic development projects and resort to device which in minds of Egyptians can only appear to be loss of 5,000,000 already promised and desperately needed by economy.

"b. Nasr would, we believe, be prepared to revert to substitution technique if additional funds were made available for 'economic development' but this would involve additional allotment from overstrained U.S. funds . . . . Do not minimize delicacy this problem and might not be possible (he maintains categorically this time he willing sign no type of agreement), but if document could be simple exchange letters or memo understanding believe major objection could be overcome. Re content, the basic thing that troubles Nasr is idea of acceptance MAAG. Suggest this problem might be overcome if agreement avoided reference to MAAG and informal arrangements made requirements Dept of Defense. Suggest possibility be explored of Presidential determination under Section 401 which would permit waiver certain formal undertakings which Nasr cannot now agree to, with instruction to negotiators that they will exact in writing as many of statutory MDAP undertakings as are possible under circumstances. Suggest content Naguib letter to President should be re-examined to see degree to which it satisfies statutory requirements. Nasr seemed to think that it did.

"In view impending arrival Gerhardt, urge prompt action on policy decisions involved in next U.S. Govt move. Believe any further approaches Nasr by Wash reps without authority discuss specific courses of action would be embarrassing and unconstructive.

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"Above discussed with Caffery who concurs.
"Paul requests Stassen be informed of above."

No. 1370

774.11/11–1554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, November 15, 1954—3 p. m.

663. Embassy has received Foreign Office note stating that RCC decide remove Naguib from all his functions, post of President to remain vacant for present.

Action removing Naguib, as noted my telegram 653, [2] was based on RCC conviction Naguib had been conniving with Muslim Brotherhood extremists in plans overthrow regime.

Interesting angle today's press reporting is *Al Ahram* story that captured Brotherhood documents included plans for forcing government into real battle in Palestine or with British in Canal Zone to enable Muslim Brothers effect coup in Cairo.

Naguib had made no great secret of his opposition to Suez agreement and if given chance would have prevented its ratification for sake of personal political advantage.

Naguib and family now "guests of Government" at [garble] short distance from Cairo. RCC future plans for Naguib not certain and it is likely they will watch public reaction and testimony current Muslim Brotherhood trials before deciding his ultimate disposition. Reactions so far appear mixed. Cairo outwardly calm.

CAFFERY

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[1] Repeated to London as telegram 142, to Paris as telegram 20, to Rome as telegram 11, to Ankara as telegram 10, to Amman as 17, to Baghdad as 20, to Beirut as 25, to Damascus as 9, to Jidda as 19, and to Khartoum as 4.

[2] In telegram 653 from Cairo, Nov. 23, not printed, Ambassador Caffery informed the Department that the Egyptian Government planned to announce on Nov. 15 that General Naguib had been removed from the Presidency of the Republic of Egypt. The alleged reasons for his removal were that he had had prior knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood assassination attempt against Nasir and that he had opposed the Suez agreement in an effort to secure personal political advantage. (774.11/11–1354)

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No. 1371

774.5 MSP/11-1654: Telegram

The Ambassador Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

SECRET CAIRO, November 16, 1954—3 p. m.

673. Egyptian Minister Foreign Affairs approached military aid this morning from another angle (mytel 642, November 11) [1]. He asked if it were not possible to find some means of their obtaining military aid without having to sign an agreement. I told there was no way to avoid carrying out provisions of pertinent law.

If Department has any suggestions I should be glad to receive them.

CAFFERY

[1] In telegram 642 from Cairo, Nov. 11, not printed, Ambassador Caffery reported that Foreign Minister Fawzi had revived the question of military aid, indicating that in view of the much improved domestic atmosphere the Egyptian Government would like to make a new study of the projected military assistance agreement and would like to find out if it were possible to make certain changes in it. (774.5 MSP/11-1154)

No. 1372

Editorial Note

The document in this editorial note is located in Department of State file 774.5 MSP. It is not a ribbon copy. It was typed on a plain sheet of paper and contains no data which permits agency identification. Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade apparently was the drafting officer. The document's date is November 16, 1954, and it reads as follows:

"Believe following points should be made to Nasir.

"1. We surprised turn of events his conversation with Norman Paul November 13th. Had understood he favored use of $5 million from economic aid for purchase military equipment. On this assumption officers had departed Washington and now waiting in Beirut.

"2. Additional economic aid funds to add to $40 million for this purpose not available. US world-wide programs and present budgetary situation strained to limit for Egypt to come up with figure of $40 million with relatively low loan component. US in fact now without funds previously planned elsewhere in Middle East.

"3. We understand Nasir's position and respect his judgment of his own internal problems. Difficulties here rule out possibility of using Section 401.

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"4. Our officers en route will be unable discuss alternatives to $5 million arrangements. If Nasir would like conversation with them for purpose of understanding US procedures and general discussion of politico-military character, we will have them proceed. This entirely at his discretion and we await his answer."

No. 1373

Editorial Note

The document in this editorial note is located in Department of State file 774.5 MSP. It is not a ribbon copy. It was typed on a plain sheet of paper and was sent to Assistant Secretary of State Byroade from Colonel Harrison A. Gerhardt, USA, in Cairo. The document's date is November 17, 1954, and it reads as follows:

"1. Have seen Paul's message recounting discussion with Nasr. With regard to 3,000,000 dollar deal, understand that Nasr has not settled down on amount which he would release for discussion of items, prices, etc. This may be resolved in the next few days with a little pressure from people here, in which case we can go ahead on this one.

"2. Paul's message indicates that $5,000,000 of economic aid would not be available unless other funds are tapped. Until this is resolved in Washington, no basis for approach this subject to Nasr or Egyptian military. Assume we will get prompt answer on this one from you.

"3. There remains question of further exploration possibility of MDAP and general discussions Nasr's views on regional defense arrangements. As to first, although unfeasibility of MDAP at present time seems clear, a clear negative answer with some estimate by Nasr of timetable for overcoming present internal obstacles might be helpful. If Presidential determination waiving formal agreement requirements under 401 is obtained, as suggested by Paul, explanatory discussions, with Nasr might be helpful in paving way to later negotiations. I understand defense position, and my instructions so state, is to speak of MDAP only in terms of open formal arguments. Difficulties which secret agreement presents, in terms of U.S. and Egyptian explaining sharp increase in flow of arms into Egypt without formal basis is obvious. To go further than explanatory discussions on MDAP agreement provisions, without Washington instructions not possible. Final point of discussion re Nasr's views regional defense arrangements remain as a profitable area of exploration. However would be preferable to have clarification on other subjects mentioned above if possible. In view OCB meeting on 17 Nov and possibility consideration and clarification as result thereof have decided to remain Beirut additional day to receive any instructions you may have.

"4. If no clarification on $5,000,000 and MDAP possible in terms available suggest that discussions be limited to general points we discussed, MDAP explanatory talks, emphasizing no U.S. pressure,

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to get clear negative and exploration Nasr's views regional defense."

No. 1374

Editorial Note

The document in this editorial note is located in Department of State file 774.5 MSP. It is not a ribbon copy. It was typed on a plain sheet of paper. Colonel Gerhardt in Cairo sent this document on November 29, 1954, to Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, USN, who was Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense. It reads as follows:

"1. On 23 November, Gerhardt, Eveland . . . met with Abdul Nasr, Amer, and a member of the Prime Minister's personal secretariat in a four hour night session, which followed a previous rundown with a member of the personal secretariat of the night before. Atmosphere was cordial and relaxed. General discussion of regional defense arrangement problem provoked expression by Nasr of two major considerations:

> "a. People of Egypt are not conditioned to think in strategic terms and this remains a major problem for Nasr and the RCC to overcome in the future.
>
> "b. He recognizes and admits the inadequacies of the Arab League Security Pact as a vehicle for regional defense. However, Nasr nevertheless believes that with a revision of the present Security Pact an adequate basis for RDA can be obtained although he has not worked out the details of such a revision.

"2. One point on which he laid emphasis was command structure from which it could be inferred that the basis for the defense arrangement must be indigenous and the commander from the area. (Later exploration of this showed clearly that they have not thought the problem through in terms of personnel or organization.)

"3. He left the impression that the RCC considered that during the period in which they were building up internal strength they would develop the revisions to the Pact required to strengthen it. He felt that the U.S. could help this program by using its influence with the Arab Nations at the appropriate time that they support a revised Arab Security Pact.

"4. Nasr displays a keen understanding of the strategic importance of the area and the critical role which Egypt plays in it. He also is keenly aware of the vacuum that exists between the northern tier of defense and the Egyptian base. In a brief strategic estimate he considered that the Soviets would strike first at the oilfields and as a second priority the Egyptian base crossroads. (He promised to submit a more detailed estimate before the departure

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of the group.) He said that there were neutralist elements in Egypt who felt that with a strong national army the frontiers could be defended and the Soviets would bypass Egypt. He did not accept this view since he did not see within Egypt the capability of developing a sufficiently strong force to deter a Soviet attack on Egypt. Hence the vacuum between the northern tier and Egypt must be filled. He referred several times to his conversations with Mr. Dulles of two years ago and to the principle that the defense arrangement for the Middle East must be based upon indigenous factors. A MEDO with a superimposed command structure is out as far as he is concerned.

"5. On the question of an MDAP agreement with Egypt for grant military assistance, he pointed out that the words 'mutual,' 'Agreement', 'Assistance' are all unacceptable at the moment in view of the internal situation in Egypt. Though he stated that he could sign an agreement that night, nothing would happen in Egypt the next day or during the period when the RCC maintain full control, still he was looking to the years ahead, when a constitution had been adopted, elections held and a parliament established. At that time the opponents of the regime would have free play to attack the government and he did not feel he could take on the fight that would inevitably come over the Suez Base Agreement and a military pact with the U.S. at the same time and have the right forces win.

"6. In a detailed discussion on the points which might be objectionable, aside from the major obstacle of the Pact itself, he agreed that a small survey team in civilian clothes would be acceptable. As to the MAAG he drew the parallel to the old British Military Mission and felt that though he could understand the functions of the MAAG, within the army the operations of the officers assigned to the MAAG would create more resentment and lose more good feeling for the U.S. Hakim Amer during this entire discussion was very negative and probably is the major opponent of any type survey mission or MAAG. His main concern seemed to be maintaining control of the contact between his group and the American officers of the MAAG group. This may stem from lack of confidence in the complete loyalty of all officer personnel until present programs now in process detect and eliminate any disloyal elements.

"7. After long discussion and argument, Nasr came around to an estimate of the time period before he felt he would be in a position to sign a grant agreement. He felt that if he could convince the people that the Government had signed an agreement with the British which really provided for their evacuation, he would have overcome one of his major obstacles. At the time when the last British soldier left Egypt we could say that this agreement had been carried out and that the government had been correct in signing the agreement. He mentioned the time of 18 months which is the period remaining before completion of the British evacuation. At the conclusion of this period he would be in a position to undertake a military assistance agreement with the U.S. During the interim period he felt he must concentrate on the internal problems of Egypt. He recognized the real necessity for sustaining the morale of the army which meant providing newer equipment and

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other morale building items. It is clear he is not thinking of uniforms, sidearms, etc. as morale building items. The equipment he has in mind is clearly of a major item category which the troops can see operate and take as an indication of a fulfilled promise to get them better equipment. He wants a strong loyal army which is capable of backing the regime when a parliamentary government takes over. He mentioned several times the fact that for a year he had expected U.S. military equipment and his officers have not seen it forthcoming. However, if he had to sign a pact to get it he would elect not to sign the pact, to forego grant assistance and to get what equipment he could by purchase. When asked where the money would come from he referred back to the economic aid agreement but was clearly told that there was no money available to increase the present funds utilized in that agreement.

"8. As to the current amount which was being held for a grant aid program, it was explained to Nasr that unless there was an agreement this money would inevitably by reallocated to other more urgent needs and that the military authorities in the U.S. could not in all conscience recommend a diversion of this money to economic aid to Egypt to increase their capability for reimbursable aid in view of the large demands on these funds for what would have to be considered, from the military point of view, as more critical requirements.

"9. Nasr did not raise the question of any residual amount from the three million dollar fund. At the suggestion from our side Nasr agreed to have reps from Hakim Amer's staff meet with Gerhardt and Eveland the following night for discussion of pricing and requirements should he have any funds of his own available. This was purely to be eploratory and on an exchange of information basis.

"10. It is possible that the position taken by Nasr was dictated by the feeling that he could still get additional funds from the U.S. to support a reimbursable aid program. Aside from the psychological difficulties of the words "mutual", "military" and "assistance", Nasr kept harping on the fact that his enemies, no matter what kind of an agreement be signed or even if he signed would attack him, in the event that military aid of a grant nature came into the country, with the claim that he had sold out Egypt to the Americans. The difficulties of making exceptions for Egypt and the effect upon other MDAP agreements and the MDAP program as a whole, were repeated to him several times. Unless after further reflection on the discussion he indicates a changed position, it would seem that the proper course of action would be to drop any further negotiations for MDAP agreement and on the face accept his timing of approx 18 months. This has been his decision based upon his estimate of what he can get away with and would relieve the U.S. of its commitment at least insofar as grant aid program is concerned. His estimates on the strengthening of the RCC and the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood, Communists, Dissident Groups, etc., indicated a completion date of approx two months, at which time, if from his ever-increasing strength position, he succeeds, he will have consolidated the position of the RCC for the reasonable future. There is a possibility that at that time, if he is continuously

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worked upon to reevaluate his strength, he may be willing to negotiate on the timing of an MDAP agreement. It is the general concensus that he does not fully understand the details of MDAP, MAAG, etc. despite the fact he says he does, and that considerable education is still required.

"11. In view of the nonavailability of any additional funds to be worked through the economic agreement for reimbursable aid from the U.S. and the timing factors mentioned by Nasr, there seems little point in holding the MDAP funds in the present fiscal year appropriation for Egypt.

"12. The possibility exists of developing a program of support for the Egyptian forces in their new responsibilities in the protection of the Suez Base. Nasr and Amer were asked if they had developed a program to take care of this situation. They replied that they had and felt that they could meet their requirements. That this is probably more wishful thinking than anything else was borne out in subsequent meetings with Nasr's reps. The decision as to whether this thin lead would stand up as a basis for a program would have to be made in Washington by State, Defense, JCS and FOA.

"13. Several meetings were held on 24 and 25 November with Nasr's reps which will report on arrival in Washington."

No. 1375

774.5 MSP/12-3154

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 31, 1954.

Subject: Message to Prime Minister Nasir on Military Aid to Egypt

We have received two messages . . . from Prime Minister Nasir in which he states that "the need for military aid is desperate" because of the present state of Army morale. Nasir explains that the RCC is exploring means of raising funds for purchases, but again requests that some way be found to provide grant military assistance without an MDAP agreement. He inquires specifically whether a personal letter to the President covering all the points required by legislation could be substituted for an agreement.

The attached draft reply (Tab B) [2] has been cleared . . . and Defense on the working levels and makes three points: (1) the funds tentatively allocated for grant assistance to Egypt have been re-

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Burdett and Jernegan and had the concurrence of Murphy and Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Under Secretary of State. According to the record copy, Secretary Dulles approved the recommended course of action.

[2] Not printed; Tab B is attached to the record copy.

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leased to meet other urgent needs. Consequently, aid depends on new Congressional appropriations which, in turn, will be affected by public and Congressional attitudes in the United States towards Egyptian policies, especially with regard to Israel; (2) in any event, Egypt would be required to sign a regular MDAP agreement; (3) we are prepared to consider requests for purchases under the existing reimbursable aid agreement and to explore means of expediting delivery.

As you know, our plans for making progress toward a solution of the Arab–Israel problem count heavily on Egypt as the potential leader in a settlement with Israel. To induce Nasir to accept this role, we must (1) help to strengthen his position at home and (2) show him that such a policy will pay dividends. By the proposed message we would hold out to him the carrot of possible military assistance (which he wants more than anything else) while at the same time making it clear that he must earn this by an improved attitude toward Israel.

This whole matter was discussed on December 30 by Mr. Hoover, Mr. Murphy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, and Mr. Allen Dulles. I believe the draft message represents the consensus of that meeting.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached message for transmittal . . . . (Tab B)

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IRAN

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN; THE QUESTION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN; INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL DISPUTE [1]

[1] For documentation on Iran, see volume x.

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IRAQ

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ [1]

No. 1376

741.56387/2-2752: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State [2]

SECRET BAGHDAD, February 27, 1952—6 p. m.

682. Re Dept 498 Feb 26 [3] Embtel 646, Feb 20. [4] UK reps today gave Emb fol résumé Robertson [5] visit:

(1) UK Amb asked Robertson come Baghdad particularly to explain Nuri in mil terms importance proper maintenance Suez base in hopes this would dispel some of Nuri's "wilder ideas" about evac canal zone.

(2) Robertson also regretted not seing Nuri during latter's visit London in Dec–Jan; also wanted make inspection trip to air base at Shaiba.

(3) During course discussions Nuri raised question role contemplated for Iraq in MEC. [6] UK Amb who accompanied Robertson replied question premature until Egypt's role clarified.

(4) Nuri vaguely outlined his idea modify Arab collective security pact (ratification of which on agenda Parliament this session) to permit adherence by outside powers. Said pact could be divorced from Arab League but did not explain how. Also said pact could be framed as instrument of defense against aggressive threats external to ME rather than against Israel. UK Amb said he doubted collective security pact could be made an effective instrument for defense ME.

(5) Question arms supply discussed. Iraq is particularly desirous tank transporters and towing equipment.

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[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 545 ff.

[2] Repeated to London, Amman, Basra, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Paris, Ankara, and Moscow.

[3] Not printed; it requested any information the Embassy had on a recent visit by top British military personnel to Baghdad. (741.56387/2-2052)

[4] Not printed; the Embassy replied it did not know why British military personnel were visiting Baghdad and asked for any information the Department of State or the Embassy in London might have. (741.56387/2-2052)

[5] Gen. Sir Brian Robertson.

[6] For documentation on the Middle East Command, see Documents 55 ff.

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(6) UK rep said all talks in nature gen chats with no conclusive results.

(7) Re Habbaniyah and Shaiba UK counselor Beeley in separate conversation with Ireland said he did not believe subj discussed; described UK position as "letting sleeping dogs lie". On other hand, Tahsin Qadri, chief Royal Palace informally volunteered to asst army attaché that "There is some activity" with regard changing status those two bases.

(8) Beeley said visit Air Vice Marshal Baker routine leave-taking.

(9) Visit Sir Roger Makins, Under Secy FonOff largely concerned economic matters and is being summarized in separate tel. [7]

CROCKER

[7] Telegram 687 from Baghdad, Feb. 28, not printed. It reported that Makins' visit to Iraq was merely incidental to a trip he had made to the Persian Gulf area. He had, however, briefed Embassy representatives on Britain's economic crisis and had talked to the head of the National Bank and other Iraqis on the same topic. (741.56387/2-2852) Makins was appointed Ambassador to the United States in December 1952.

No. 1377

741.56387/3-652: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 6, 1952—4 p. m.

3866. Further to Embtel 3767, Feb. 29. [2] FonOff informs us that for some time HMG has been studying question courses it might take in event Nuri moves to revise Anglo-Iraqi treaty. [3] FonOff thinks Nuri himself wld be inclined let treaty live out its life but it recognizes that political pressures may be such that he will feel compelled call for revision.

In course informal conversations in past between Nuri and Troutbeck [4] former has indicated he personally wld feel that ar-

[1] Repeated to Baghdad.

[2] Not printed; it reported the Embassy believed General Robertson's visit was for the purpose of seeing how Iraq was progressing on the British plan for the expansion of the Iraqi Army. (741.56387/2-2952)

[3] Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq, signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, with annex and exchanges of notes of the same date. Texts are in British Cmd. 3797, Treaty Series No. 15 (1931) or League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXXXII, p. 363. An unofficial text is in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: Volume II, 1914–1956* (New York, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 178–181.

[4] Sir John Monro Troutbeck, British Ambassador in Iraq.

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rangement along treaty of Portsmouth [5] lines might meet situation. HMG has therefore been restudying that treaty from point of view considering how it might be made more acceptable. (For example, placing emphasis on UK use airfields on invitation Iraqi Govt and dropping any clause similar that permitting continued use as of right until conclusion peace treaties Germany.)

Recognizing foregoing may not meet situation, FonOff has also been exploring other alternatives such as possibility arrangements for use fields within MEC concept and even complete evacuation airfields if, in last analysis, this were necessary to assuring continuance alliance.

FonOff emphasizes highly confidential and purely precautionary nature foregoing study. UK has taken and will take no moves initiate discussion with Iraqis and is merely preparing itself move quickly if Iraqis precipitate matter which they have not done yet. FonOff repeats treaty not discussed during Robertson's visit and there are no conversctions formal or informal, taking place at present time.

Foregoing undoubtedly is explanation for hints dropped by Brit Emb Baghdad (Baghdad's 646 Feb 20 to Dept [6]) re Habaniya and Shaiba.

GIFFORD

[5] For documentation on U.S. interest in the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1948, a revision of the Treaty of 1930, which never went into effect, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, pp. 202 ff.

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 4, *supra*.

No. 1378

787.56/4-2152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, April 21, 1952—2 p.m.

901. Emb views re mil assistance to Iraq (Embtel 893, April 19 [2]) as follows:

1. Former basis on which we have parried Iraqi requests for arms, i.e. primary responsibility of UK under Anglo-Iraq Treaty, has become galling in the extreme to the Iraqis and is anachronis-

[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed; it reported the Embassy policy in the past had been to discourage Iraq from asking for arms and said it would submit its views in a separate telegram on whether it thought the United States should make an internal political decision to establish Iraq's eligibility to receive arms under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. (787.56/4-1952)

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tic in light MEC concept. Whereas Iraqis usually sensible enough realize UK must continue take most of mil assist burden here they resent bitterly any implication UK own exclusive sphere. Moreover, they dissatisfied with small quantity and at time inferior quality of Brit arms recently received.

2. Better basis on which to parry mil requests is on grounds Arabs cannot expect much mil help until it becomes clear they prepared cooperate with West in creating effective ME defense org along lines MEC or similar. Naturally Iraqis wld prefer that we simply give them arms without any *quid pro quo*, but Emb believes foregoing is argument they readily comprehend and respect.

3. MDA agreement with SA consistent with foregoing since we can make valid argument that our bid there "just reward" for Saudi cooperativeness, particularly on Dhahran airfield agreement.

4. In case Syria, however, argument breaks down. Whereas we may privately have compelling reasons to shoreup present Syrian Govt, we can hardly show on the record that Syria has been more coop or more clearly committed to pro-Western policy than Iraq.

5. Thus if Syrian mil assist agreement finalized, Emb believes we cannot then logically refrain from offering something similar to Iraq; Emb believes we shld do so soon enough to off-set unfortunate reaction when Iraqis learn of projected Syrian program.

6. Iraqis do not need grant aid. Ministry of Defense known currently to have about 5 million sterling at its disposal for arms purchases. Moreover, in order retain bargaining power on MEC, Emb wld recommend that we not at this time provide arms on a scale permitting Iraqis expand mil forces. Iraqis cld profit, however, by cash reimbursable or procurement assistance under Section 408e(1)(c) to make up shortages in motor transport, radar, standardized ammo, anti-tank mines, replacement parts, etc. for currently existing forces. (Army attaché submitting detailed estimate Iraqi requirements to Defense in BD–045 April 21.)

7. Emb assumes before MDA agreement cld be offered Iraq following steps wld be necessary:

a. Pres must find Iraq eligible under 408e(1)(c).

b. Agreement must be reached with UK re (1) principle involved; (2) procedures for coordinating mil assist; (3) UK Treas willingness convert sterling to dollars for purposes of agreement.

8. Dept guidance re foregoing requested.

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No. 1379

787.5 MSP/5-552

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Iraq [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, May 2, 1952.

Subject: Provision of Military Assistance to Iraq Under Section 408e of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as Amended

Participants: Brigadier Arthur Boyce, British Military Attaché
Mr. Tom Bromley, First Secretary and Acting Counselor of the British Embassy
Mr. Morgan Man, Oriental Counselor of the British Embassy [2]
Mr. John D. Jernegan, Visiting US Counsul General from Tunis shortly to return to a Departmental post
Mr. Phillip W. Ireland, Counselor of the US Embassy
Mr. John R. Barrow, Second Secretary of the US Embassy
Capt. Wilbur C. Eveland, Acting Army Attaché of the US Embassy

The meeting was held as a result of a suggestion made by the American Ambassador to the British Ambassador.

Mr. Ireland opened the meeting by observing that hitherto the US Government had turned back Iraqi requests for US military assistance on grounds that Iraq should seek aid from the UK under the provisions of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930.

It must be obvious to all, however, that times were changing and some thought had been given both in the Embassy and at the working level in the Department to the possible provision of limited US cash reimbursable and/or procurement assistance under the terms of Section 408e(1)(c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 as amended. Whereas we had been able to explain our military assistance to Saudi Arabia on grounds of our large interests there and Saudi cooperation on the Dhahran airbase, added impetus had been given considering a program in Iraq by the projected conclusion of 408e agreements with Syria and with Egypt which, if

[1] This memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to a letter by Ambassador Crocker to G. Lewis Jones, dated May 5. Crocker said he had come to agree with the concept of limited assistance to make up current Iraqi military deficiencies. (787.5 MSP/5-552)

[2] Man was appointed Head of the American Department of the British Foreign Office in May 1954.

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not accompanied by parallel action here, would be viewed most unfavorable by the Iraq Government.

We envisaged only cash reimbursable and procurement aid on a scale permitting Iraqis to make up deficiencies for currently existing forces in categories of supplies which the UK could not deliver within a reasonable period. We believed lavish aid unwise inasmuch as the supply of arms was our biggest bargaining lever to bring Iraq into the MEC. However, we felt giving the Iraqis some small earnest of what might be done would possibly bring them a step closer to eventual participation in the MEC.

We wished therefore to raise this question on an informal basis in the hope that we might find common ground of agreement with the UK Embassy which in turn would strengthen discussions at the Washington–London level where final decisions would be made. It was to be emphasized that all thinking thus far had developed at the working level only. The proposal did not have Departmental clearance nor were we speaking under Departmental instructions.

Brigadier Boyce noted that last year Brigadier Sir Heber-Percy had prepared a plan for build-up of the Iraqi Army, phase 1 of which called for making up deficiencies in the training and equipment of the 2½ Iraqi divisions currently in being. Phase 2 of the plan called for the gradual expansion of these forces. He did not believe phase 1 necessarily had to be completed "to the last button" before phase 2 began, because it would no doubt be advisable to negotiate contracts for phase 2 equipment some little while in advance. Still, phase 1 had a long way yet to go. At the earliest he estimated it would be nine months before phase 1 would have reached even a semblance of a satisfactory stage.

The greatest shortages preventing the completion of phase 1 were in motorized transport and artillery tractors which, as listed by Boyce, were all of British types. However, when he was read the list of items which the US Army Attaché thought were in short supply and which the US might provide, Brigadier Boyce voiced no objection.

It was generally agreed that there was much the US could profitably do to speed along phase 1 of Sir Heber-Percy's plan and that for political reasons it would be wise to limit US assistance to this phase without for the time being considering what might be done in phase 2. In any case this was a technical question to be worked out by whatever group was eventually set up to coordinate UK–US assistance to this country.

Mr. Ireland noted that our original ideas on 408e assistance had developed around the Iraqi request for tank transporters. We believed there was a possibility that ten transporters might be provided from US stocks, but wondered now if these were urgently re-

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quired particularly since Iraq had obtained 16 from British and Egyptian commercial sources at about ⅓ the price quoted for the new US transporters.

Brigadier Boyce said if they were in satisfactory operating condition (and the May 15 delivery would tell the tale on that) he thought the 16 were as many as the Iraqis could profitably use and maintain at this time. He had no doubt, however, that if offered the other ten the Iraqis would probably purchase them. It seemed to be generally agreed that the US should not offer additional tank transporters at this time but concentrate instead on other categories of equipment in short supply.

Financial arrangements were briefly discussed. Brigadier Boyce said that the 5,000,000 sterling Iraqi arms budget had for the most part already been earmarked against current contracts. Thus the Iraqis might not, at least initially, place large requests for US arms. In regard to convertibility, Mr. Bromley noted that advice received from the Foreign Office indicated that the F.O.'s agreement in principle to the idea of 408e assistance had been "subject to discussion with financial authorities". When he was queried as what was meant by "financial authorities", he said he thought conversations between British defense and Treasury officials were meant. Mr. Bromley did not believe, however, that any special reference to the 408e agreement would have to be inserted in the Anglo-Iraq hard currency agreement (to be renegotiated shortly) since it was probable the new agreement would be of an "open-end" nature similar to the present agreement.

Coordinating procedure was also touched upon. Mr. Bromley said he did not off-hand see any objection to coordination taking place by the tripartite arms coordinating agency in Washington except that it wasn't established yet. Mr. Man remarked that the idea of "limited" assistance was fine provided others on our team played the same game. He referred to French practices of transferring arms to Syria. Mr. Bromley said that perhaps giving the French information about our arms supply policy in Iraq would encourage the French to do likewise in Syria. It was generally agreed that the French would be unlikely to desire an active role in the Iraq arms supply picture.

In summing up the meeting, Mr. Bromley said that he wanted to give his Ambassador, who was away on a local trip, the benefit of the minutes of the meeting and seek his views, but speaking personally he agreed in principle with our proposals as outlined by Mr. Ireland and saw no reason why the recommendation made by the UK Embassy to the Foreign Office on this question should not

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be substantially the same as those made in paras 6 and 7 of the Embassy's telegram 901, April 21. [3]

[3] *Supra.*

No. 1380

787.5/5–1352

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, 5 May 1952.

Subject: Arms Aid to Iraq and Jordan.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum BRY 92 of 2 April 1952, concerning arms aid to Iraq and Jordan. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the information provided with regard to British plans for the development of the armed forces of Iraq and Jordan.

2. With regard to the possibility of United States arms aid to Iraq and Jordan, the British Chiefs of Staff will recognize that higher priority programs and the world-wide demands for modern equipment and military assistance funds have placed severe limits upon military aid programs for countries of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the British Chiefs of Staff can be assured that if requests for military aid are received from the interested countries, they will receive careful consideration in accordance with established United States Government procedures. In this connection it is to be noted that the procedures established by the United States Government for the administration of military aid programs require that proposals such as those contained in your above referenced memorandum be presented to the Department of State through diplomatic channels and, therefore, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff

[1] The source text was an enclosure to a letter from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, dated May 13, informing the Secretary of State of the exchange of information between the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff on arms aid to Iraq and Jordan. Also enclosed was a memorandum from the Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated April 2, with two annexes on arms aid to Iraq and Jordan and general plans for the development of air and ground forces of Iraq and Jordan. (787.5/5–1352)

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cannot furnish a definitive reply to the questions raised by the British Chiefs of Staff.

For the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. LALOR
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Secretary

No. 1381

787.5 MSP/8–1352

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [BAGHDAD,] August 12, 1952.

Participants: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister
Mr. Burton Y. Berry, American Ambassador

I called formally at 10 o'clock this morning upon Foreign Minister Jamali in accordance with protocol requirements for newly arrived Chiefs of Mission. After the exchange of the usual amenities the Minister said that he would like to express two hopes that regards our future relationship, (1) that we could swiftly pass over the official and formal phase and develop a personal and friendly approach to our work so that he would feel free to telephone me day or night, arrange for a meeting, and then talk out quite frankly what was on his mind, and that I can on my part deal with him in the same informal manner, and (2) that on those occasions when he would "blow his top" that I would bear with him recalling that underneath a sometimes turbulent exterior there is a warm heart and a desire to act justly. The Minister explained that he was not a career diplomat and therefore had not learned to control his feelings at all times, particularly on matters where he had worked hard and another party seemed to take an unreasonable position.

The Minister said that he hoped that the relations between Iraq and America would develop constructively and rapidly, particularly in two fields, that of defense and economic development. He said that he felt that in the past America had neglected Iraq and fa-

[1] The source text is an enclosure to a letter from Berry to Parker T. Hart, informing him that the conversation under reference here was Berry's first with Jamali. Berry informed Hart he hoped the United States would agree to make Iraq eligible for reimbursable military assistance if the Foreign Minister should request it. In an answer, dated Aug. 21, Hart informed Berry that Byroade wanted to attack the whole program of military aid to the Middle East states because he did not favor the piecemeal process of declaring eligibility for individual states. In the meantime, the Department of State had presented a strong recommendation to the Department of Defense requesting its support for reimbursable military aid for Iraq. (787.5 MSP/8–1352)

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vored other Near Eastern countries. Of course, there were explanations for such an attitude, but the fact remained that in Near Eastern matters America was inclined to think first of Lebanon or Iran or Saudi Arabia and only afterwards of Iraq. This was illustrated, for example, in the matter of schools. In Iraq before the war American interests had established a single small school for boys in Basra, a small school for boys in Baghdad, which subsequently had been closed, and a small school for girls in Baghdad. In view of the need of education in Iraq and the great educational effort America had made in neighboring countries this obviously demonstrated lack of American interest in Iraq. Similarly, he said, he felt it was a grave mistake to neglect Iraq in matters of defense as Iraq was an area of stability which could be developed into the focal center for the defense of the Near East. He recalled a map published by *Time* magazine showing how Russian armies, by moving down from Azerbijan into Iraq and then westward to the Mediterranean, could bypass Turkey and dominate the Near East. He said that if Iraq were developed from an area of weakness into an area of strength such a Russian maneuver would become impossible.

The Minister explained that there were elements in Iraq, such as the Communists and the die-hard British supporters who would resent America playing a more prominent role, but he personally felt that the times require America to play such a role, and that the opposition of such elements would be overcome inasmuch as they represented only the type of opposition that one met anywhere in the world where selfish interests oppose the national good. The Minister recalled that when he had last seen Secretary Acheson he had said, "I accuse America of neglecting Iraq, both in development and in defense", and when he had had conversations with Assistant Secretary McGhee [2] he had developed considerably this theme. He said that he felt very strongly that the time had come now when the United States should remove the validity of this accusation and that he would want to talk to me soon on a series of suggestions, the purpose of which would be to bring Iraq into closer cooperation with the United States.

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No. 1382

787.5 MSP/9-652

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 6 September 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In response to your letter of 20 June 1952, [1] concerning the Government of Iraq, the Department of Defense has considered your proposal in recommending a Presidential finding of Iraq's eligibility for reimbursable military assistance.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded, and I concur, that:

a. Iraq's ability to defend itself and to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, is important to the security of the United States. Accordingly, recommendation should be made to the Director for Mutual Security that Iraq be declared eligible for reimbursable aid under Section 408e of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

b. If Iraq is found eligible, at the time the Iraq Government is informed of this fact it should be provided information substantially as follows:

(1) The United States is prepared to assist the Government of Iraq, on a reimbursable basis, in obtaining needed military aid which cannot be furnished by the British Government within a reasonable length of time. The extent of such assistance will necessarily be limited due to previous commitments to other nations.

(2) It is probable that limited quantities of 2½-ton trucks, anti-tank mines, and 75mm tank ammunition could be made available during the first half of Fiscal Year 1954. These items are among those which the Iraqi could profitably utilize during the current calendar year. For your information, this is the opinion of the Military Attaché in Baghdad.

(3) Limited quantities of non-competitive (obsolete) items of military equipment could be made available within a period of three to twelve months, the estimated time required to recondition this equipment. For your information, these items are of the type that have been made available to Syria.

(4) Due to lack of specific information on Iraqi requirements and the various factors in the military aid program which are subject to change, it is undesirable to attempt, at this time, to

[1] Not printed; it informed Defense that the Department of State judged Iraq to clearly meet the standards of eligibility laid down in the Mutual Defense Act. Since Iraq had been outstanding in its willingness to cooperate with the West and had shown great interest in the proposed Middle East Command, finding Iraq eligible and providing a limited amount of equipment supplementary to the British supply program would demonstrate that U.S. military assistance was provided to Near East countries which cooperated with the West as well as those who did not. (787.5 MSP/6-1252)

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provide more definitive information on the types and quantities of military equipment that could be provided.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

No. 1383

787.00/9-852

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq (Barrow) [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, [undated.]

Participants: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Tom Bromley, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. John R. Barrow, Second Secretary, American Embassy
Mr. David Newsom, Second Secretary, American Embassy

On a social occasion spontaneous discussion was touched off among the above mentioned participants after Dr. Jamali had made reference to Ambassador Berry's press statement of August 27. [2] Dr. Jamali's specific reaction to the statement will be fully analyzed in an Embassy despatch, but the discussion developed into a wider range of topics. The highlights of the discussion are given below.

Dr. Jamali said that the statement was a good one in expressing the American point of view and in enabling persons like himself to understand American policy. He also said that the recent leak of a document prepared by Assistant Secretary Byroade, regarding his Middle Eastern tour, which had been forwarded to him by the Embassy in Washington and which was commented upon in the *Wash-*

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 197, Sept. 8. According to the despatch, the conversation had been a spontaneous discussion which had taken place at a recent social occasion. The Ambassador considered the most interesting feature of the conversation to be the fact that such forthright views were exchanged among representatives of Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all at the same time. (787.00/9–852)

[2] Despatch 176 from Baghdad, Sept. 2, transmitted a copy of a statement of United States Principles distributed by Ambassador Berry at a reception he held for the Baghdad press on Aug. 27. (987.61/9–252) Despatch 211 from Baghdad, Sept. 13, informed the Department of State of the reaction to Ambassador Berry's statement. (987.61/9–1352)

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ington Times Herald, had also helped him to understand American objectives.*

Dr. Jamali said, however, that neither of these documents was geared to Arab mentality.

He said that the question of Middle East defense, for example, should have been given "fifth priority", since Palestine, North Africa, Fertile Crescent and economic development were all more important from the Iraqi viewpoint. †

A discussion ensued regarding each of the foregoing topics, much of which followed familiar ground. Mr. Bromley and Mr. Barrow both asked if giving defense a fifth priority was consistent with the Soviet Union's probable timetable for aggression which they thought to be the decisive factor. Dr. Jamali said that he had listed his five priorities not from the standpoint of timing but from the standpoint of emphasis. He thought progress should be made on each of these questions simultaneously, but that emphasis should be in the order indicated.

Mr. Barrow said that a view held by some noted diplomatic historians was that states which intervened in situations in which they had no concrete interests more often than not committed blunders thereby. . . . Whereas appreciating that Iraq had emotional interests in Palestine, Mr. Barrow wondered whether Iraq's concrete interests were sufficient to justify Palestine being given a top priority as regards relations with the West, particularly since the Haifa pipeline had been sealed off. Dr. Jamali said he did not believe in the "materialistic philosophy" of the diplomatic historians which Mr. Barrow had cited. He said that Iraq had important concrete interests in the port of Haifa, but even if that were not the case it would make no difference. He noted that Iraq had no concrete interests whatsoever in North Africa, but, nevertheless, felt very strongly on the subject.

Mr. Bromley became the principal target of attack on the Fertile Cresent. Dr. Jamali said that whereas the British had once been favorably disposed toward the plan, provided it was in accord with the will of the peoples concerned, he thought they had now changed their attitude as a result of bargains with the French. He noted that Iraq had given Britain guarantees that its strategic position in Jordan would be preserved if it supported Iraqi aspirations.

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* The Embassy has not seen the document Dr. Jamali mentioned. [Footnote in the source text.]

† As in the Iraq Government's foreign policy plank, no mention was made of Egypt. [Footnote in the source text.]

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Mr. Bromley expressed ignorance of any bargains with the French on this question and said that as far as he knew the UK's official policy was the same as it always had been.

Dr. Jamali referred in slighting terms to Colonel Shishikly in Syria, noting that he had once foretold the downfall of Colonel Zaim and once again would warn the West against truckling with "dictators". He said that French arms, which were really American arms, and Saudi Arabian money, which was really American money, were all that were sustaining Shishikly.

Mr. Barrow asked how the Fertile Crescent scheme would affect Arab Collective Security. Would its implementation not, in effect, draw a horizontal line separating the Northern Arab States from the Southern? Dr. Jamali noted that some Arab States had tried to expel Jordan from the Arab League after it had annexed territory on the west bank of the Jordan, but had failed. He said that Egyptian and Saudi Arabian resentment to the Fertile Crescent plan would quickly subside expecially if the great powers would use their influence to this end.

Jamali said he conceived of three logical geo-political units in the Arab world, the first being the Fertile Crescent; the second being Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula; the third being Egypt, Libya and the Sudan. He felt that unified states or federations should be established in each of these three geo-political units and that the three units so formed should cooperate among themselves.

In regard to economic aid, Jamali castigated the United States for its bias toward Israel. Indulging in a *non-sequitur*, he said the British, for all their faults, would not oppose Iraq having direct elections or clean courts, but there was no excuse for what the Americans were doing in Israel.

Dr. Jamali said Iraq was very much concerned about the situation in Iran. He said people like Kamel Chaderchi, head of the Iraqi National Democratic Party, wanted the Tudeh Party to come to power in Iran and his hand in opposing viewpoints like Chaderchi's was weakened by the West's failure to act on Arab grievances.

The main theme that Dr. Jamali followed consistently throughout the discussion was that he fully understood and sympathized with Western efforts to oppose the spreading influence of the Soviet Union. He said, however, that the public at large in the Arab World did not understand these policies as he did, and could not be made to understand them unless the West redressed Arab grievances.

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No. 1384

787.5 MSP/10-1052

The Director for Mutual Security (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 10, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to a letter of October 1, 1952, [1] signed by Mr. Edwin Martin, with attachments, in which the Department of State forwarded a joint recommendation by the Departments of State and of Defense that Iraq be determined eligible for reimbursable military assistance under Section 408(e)(1)(c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

This recommendation is based on a joint conclusion by the Departments concerned that Iraq's ability to defend itself and to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, is important to the security of the United States. This conclusion, with which I concur, meets the statutory requirements for eligibility for reimbursable military assistance. Accordingly, I hereby find and determine, under the authority delegated to me by Executive Order No. 10300, dated November 1, 1951, [2] that Iraq is eligible to receive reimbursable military assistance under Section 408(e)(1)(c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. In making this determination, I note and agree with the conclusion by the Departments of State and of Defense that any military equipment furnished to Iraq should consist of noncompetitive items under existing priorities which do not interfere with current United States domestic or Mutual Defense Assistance programs.

I assume that the Department of State will obtain the necessary assurances from the Government of Iraq, [3] as provided for in Sec-

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted copies of the June 20 letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense and the Sept. 6 letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Document 1382. The letter noted that the Departments of State and Defense agreed that any military equipment furnished to Iraq should consist of noncompetitive items under existing priorities, which did not interfere with current U.S. or Mutual Defense Assistance programs. (787.5 MSP/9-652)

[2] Reference is to Executive Order 10300, Providing for the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Related Statutes, Nov. 1, 1951. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 19, 1951, pp. 826-827, or *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, pp. 3086-3088.

[3] Telegram 436 to Baghdad, Oct. 17, informed the Embassy of the decision by the Director for Mutual Security. It advised the Embassy to inform the Iraqis that there would be a time lag in delivery of the items involved; and in any case it would not be possible for Iraq to purchase large quantities of equipment, both because of the scarcity of material and the effect of such purchases on the stability of the Near East. (787.5 MSP/10-1732)

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tion 408(e) and will consult with the Office of the Director for Mutual Security in the process of formulating any documents which will be used for this purpose. I further request that this Office be advised sufficiently in advance of the actual shipment of any equipment to Iraq so that appropriate letters can go forward to interested Congressional Committees.

I am sending an identical letter to the Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

No. 1385

787.5 MSP/10-2252: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 24, 1952—5:55 p. m.

462. Embtel 521 Oct 22. [2]

1. Re para one reftel Dept notified Brit Emb rep Oct 21 and Secy told Jamali Oct 21 in long amiable conversation at UNGA. [3] Jamali of course professed ignorance declaration but was pleased with news.

2. Re para 2(b) Deptel 436 [4] Dept wishes avoid giving Iraqis any impression (a) that US is attempting supersede UK or (b) that competitive US–UK bidding will be order of day, therefore suggests some palatable presentation para 2(b) be made Iraqis, possibly along fol lines "US recognizes IG difficulties purchasing certain categories arms from UK within reasonable time to satisfy IG plans for phase reorganization Iraqi forces. Therefore as tangible evidence concerted Western intent strengthen indigenous NE de-

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[1] Drafted by Worcester and cleared by S/MSA, BNA, NE, and Defense. Repeated to London. Instruction No. 11 to the Embassy in Baghdad, also dated Oct. 24, transmitted the draft texts of notes which might be exchanged between the Embassy and the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs. Also enclosed was an illustrative list of military equipment which might be made available for purchase following the signing of the agreement. (787.5 MSP/10–2452) Telegram 617 from Baghdad, Nov. 14, informed the Department of State that Ambassador Berry had told the Acting Foreign Minister of Iraq's eligibility for aid and left him copies of the notes transmitted in Instruction No. 11. (787.5 MSP/11–1452)

[2] Not printed. The first paragraph informed the Department of State the Embassy believed that to obtain the maximum political advantage from reimbursable military aid to Iraq, notification should take place in Baghdad at a time to be agreed on between the Embassy and the Department. (787.5 MSP/10–2252)

[3] The conversation under reference here occurred in New York at the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

[4] See footnote 3, *supra*. Paragraph 2 informed the Embassy that U.S. aid to Iraq should be a substitute only for material that could not be furnished by the United Kingdom within a reasonable period of time.

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fenses, US offering IG opportunity augment arms sources and speed reorganization armed forces". Does Emb concur?

3. Coordinating machinery not yet established but assumed US supply authorities might consult Brit Mil Mission Wash after prelim coordination US–UK service atts Baghdad. Iraqi arms requests wld be submitted thru MA and Emb to State and Defense. Defense wld answer with price and delivery data if equipment available, and order wld be considered firm upon IG deposit of dollar check.

BRUCE

No. 1386

787.00/10-2452: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, October 24, 1952—noon.

530. Section two of two. [2] From ME affairs conversation turned to Iraqi affairs. He asked my impressions of Iraq and I told him I thought it was a country on threshold of great possibilities but to realize such required a govt in which people had confidence and wld assure them of the quiet and stability needed to realize planned developments. He agreed adding "we are just awaiting the Regent's return to solve these problems. I can bring into national govt honest men with technical capabilities who will give confidence to the people and assure stability." I said that from reading the Baghdad press I wondered if that wld be so easily accomplished as strong words daily were being printed expressing dissatisfaction. He dismissed Baghdad press lightly saying it had no importance. And when I suggested that students and lawyers generally were also very outspoken in their criticisms he said these groups cld easily be managed by a strong govt. As an illus he told of his experience with recent IPC agreement. [3] He said every one shouted

[1] Repeated to Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and London.

[2] Section one not printed; it reported the first part of a conversation the previous night between the Ambassador and Nuri Said. According to Nuri, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf had always been the two critical areas of the Middle East. He considered the Eastern Mediterranean a secure area because the United States had buttressed its nerve center, Turkey, with financial and military support since 1947. The withdrawal of Britain from the Indian subcontinent, however, had created a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf, which was directly responsible for the critical situation in the Middle East, with Iran the current focal center. (787.00/10-2452)

[3] For documentation on the IPC agreement, see Documents 242 ff.

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against it but when he, as PriMin, said clearly agreement was a good agreement for Iraq and that no nonsense was going to be tolerated from irresponsible elements who wished to use it as an excuse to challenge the authorities such elements immed quieted down, Parl approved the agreement and the people were unanimous in their praise. He added Iraq needed such strength in govt today and when it had that strength there wld be no fear for the stability of the country.

I then said we had heard four polit parties were on the point of agreeing upon a petition to Regent to modify the election law and if this were true it might make some difference in his calculations. He said there was and wld be no agreement among the four parties. One of the four was actually closer to his party than it wld ever be to the other three. Moreover, the three were only participating in the maneuver to try to gain more seats for themselves in new Parl.

I then inquired if the ME effervescence which in Egypt and Leb recently had coalesced into bringing about changes wld be a danger in Iraq. He said that he thought not as there was no dissatisfaction whatsoever in the Iraqi army, the tribes were generally quiet, and the police were strong and competent to deal promptly and effectively with any urban disturbance. He added that what wld have a great bearing on events in Iraq were Persian events. A Tudeh controlled Persia using the Kurds, unassimilated by either Persia or Iraq and occupying contiguous lands in each country, cld create grave difficulties for any Iraqi govt. Thus it was most urgent and vital that Persia be saved from Communism and this cld be accomplished most effectively by developing Pak into a ME power.

In closing Nuri said that he was sure I was aware Arab confidence in US had been shaken by events in North Africa and Palestine. I told him of US decision to vote for inclusion of Tunis and Morocco items on agenda of GA. [4] He said this was welcome move adding "the conditions in Tunis and Morocco are light scratches on the arm of the Arab body which will heal eventually because the French will be forced to give reforms, but the Pal trouble is at the heart of the Arab body and that will not be cured until Israel respects the UN decisions." He felt US had plans of making Israel respect these decisions through threatening to discontinue financial aid but because US did not use this threat the Arabs doubted US wld ever restrain Israel even shld Israel make an aggressive move against an Arab state and tripartite declaration be invoked. He added there cld be no hope of a stable ME until this Arab conviction was removed. I told him that the US had helped Israel and

[4] For documentation see vol. XI, Part 1, pp. 599 ff. and 665 ff.

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wld continue to help Israel, that Israel had recently made conciliatory moves toward Arabs and that we are genuinely concerned with Arab as well as Israeli problems. He then replied that the best way for US to help Israel is not through continuing financial subsidy for purpose of overcoming Arab econ boycott but to remove need of subsidy. This can be accomplished by urging Israel to give up some land taken by conquest after the UN resolutions were passed. If Israel did this a place wld thus be created to settle many Pal refugees and the Arabs wld be convinced that Israel was willing to be a law-abiding member of the community of ME nations. Once so convinced Israel wld be able to make her way economically in the Arab world without American subsidies.

BERRY

No. 1387

787.5MSP/11-752

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

AIDE MÉMOIRE

Her Majesty's Government thank the United States Government for informing them in confidence of the decision to declare Iraq eligible for cash re-imbursable military equipment under paragraph 408(e) of the Mutual Defence Act of 1949 (as subsequently amended). They have noted with satisfaction the two specific qualifications that aid should be a substitute for what cannot be furnished by the United Kingdom within a reasonable period of time, and that it would in fact be limited to modest quantities.

2. Her Majesty's Government feel it may be of advantage if they re-state their position for the information of the United States Government and would be grateful if the following considerations could be borne in mind:

(*a*) The United Kingdom is the traditional supplier of arms to Iraq. Her Majesty's Government are bound by the Anglo-Iraqi treaty to supply arms and Iraq is similarly bound to ensure that the armament of the Iraqi forces shall not differ in type from those of Her Majesty's Forces.

(*b*) It is in the common interest of the United Kingdom and Iraq that arms bought by Iraq should be for sterling. It is also indirectly a United States interest to avoid any additional drain of dollars from the sterling area.

(*c*) More equipment is becoming available for export from United Kingdom production than was looked for when this question was

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discussed early this year and Her Majesty's Government now expect to be able to supply the requirements of Iraq fairly completely with the exception of certain items of which there is a general shortage among North Atlantic Treaty Organization states and which it is therefore assumed the United States would hardly wish to supply.

3. The United States Government will understand that Her Majesty's Government is for these reasons most anxious that supplies provided under this act should be kept within very narrow limits.

4. Her Majesty's Government would accordingly welcome early information of any Iraqi applications and would appreciate the opportunity to express their view on these before a decision is taken, and if possible, before submission to the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee.

WASHINGTON, 7th November 1952.

No. 1388

780.5/3-2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, March 22, 1953—11 a. m.

1158. Foreign Minister Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi asked me to call this morning. He said that recent conversations with Turkish Chargé (mytels 1053, 1107 and 1118 [2]) had made Iraqis realize how very vulnerable their country was to a Soviet attack coming through Persia. Foreign Minister had discussed this situation with Cabinet with result Cabinet had decided to improve Iraqi defense as rapidly and completely as means permitted.

Currently Iraq had no external military responsibilities except those specified in Arab League treaty of mutual defense, the military clauses of which have not yet been implemented. Thus, until such time as these, and arrangements of mutual defense by Western powers, are completed Iraq is bound to supply its army with the means to meet situation. Therefore Iraq desired to commence forthwith in building up its army. Foreign Minister then outlined importance to Western world of Iraq both from viewpoint of resources and strategy and asked that US, with British, assess Iraqi needs to meet its obligations in defense of its own territory and Western world. Foreign Minister said that he would send Embassy

[1] Repeated to Ankara and Cairo.

[2] None printed. Telegrams 1053, Feb. 27; 1107, Mar. 10; and 1118, Mar. 12 are in Department of State file 780.5.

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written note expressing these thoughts. He said he planned similar approach to British Ambassador today.

I told Foreign Minister that I would report this conversation and forward to Department by air pouch his note when received. [3] I said that I understood that his intention in present conversation was to start us thinking upon matter. If that were correct I felt USG might inquire as to why Iraqis had not availed themselves of means suggested to them by my note November 12 [4] informing Foreign Minister that Iraq had been declared eligible to receive military equipment from USG under provisions of 408*e* of MDS act. As I had presented our note to acting Foreign Minister Baban I took occasion to repeat to Foreign Minister Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi remarks I made at time of presentation. Minister replied that Iraq Government expected to take advantage of this offer and that I could expect very soon an official reply from Iraq Government so stating.

I told him I was pleased with this information and also that Iraq Govt realized so thoroughly need to prepare against Commie aggression. I said it seemed to me appropriate that Iraq Government use its resources to meet needs since it did have considerable resources.

Foreign Minister commented that Iraq Government could maintain four complete divisions from its own resources but it would not arm and equip four divisions without jeopardizing its program for economic development. He added that if there were plenty of time he felt developing sound economy and building military strength could go forward together entirely with Iraqi means, but he doubted the wisdom in these times of slowing down building strong army to maintain planned economic development. Without economic development Communism would arise from within Iraq.

Foreign Minister confirmed to me Cabinet position on defense as reported in final paragraph mytel 1108. [5]

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[3] Despatch 693 from Baghdad, Mar. 25, transmitted a personal and confidential memorandum by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador Berry. The Memorandum stated that in order to defend its territories, Iraq required important quantities of arms, equipment, and supplies, which could only be obtained through aid from the United States and Great Britain. (780.5/3-2553)

[4] See footnote 1, Document 1385.

[5] Dated Mar. 10, not printed. The last paragraph reported the Iraqi Government had set up a special Cabinet committee to consider the general subject of defense. The committee, composed of Defense Minister Nuri Said, Foreign Minister Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi, Justice Minister Ahmad Baban, and Deputy Prime Minister Ali Jawdat, made the following recommendation to the Cabinet: 1) If Egypt agreed to a system of Middle East defense, Iraq would join; 2) If Egypt did not agree, Iraq would conclude an agreement with the United Kingdom and the United States, if they agreed, based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; or 3) Iraq and the United Kingdom would modify the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty through and exchange of notes worked out between the two governments. (780.5/3-1053)

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I am gratified that this government understands the Commie menace and is taking measures to meet it both at the present time internally and in the future at Iraqi frontiers. Furthermore, it begins to look as though this government is toying with the thought that participating in MEDO may be the approach to solution of their own defense problems.

BERRY

No. 1389

780.5/3-2653: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Ireland) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, March 26, 1953—6 p. m.

1180. British Ambassador has reviewed with me his recent talk with Nuri when he asked for additional information regarding defense plans as raised by Foreign Minister Suwaidi (Embtel 1158, March 22 [2]). Nuri said Iraq's defense plans based on establishing four divisions to be brought up to full strength immediately with new divisions to be created thereafter. Divisions to be stationed as follows: Mountain division in north; armoured division at Khanaqin; motorized division at Basra and one reserve division composed of mountain, armoured and motorized units. Fighter squadrons to be located at Basra, Kirkuk, Mosul and Baghdad.

Military experts would assess equipment and funds required, but a preliminary estimate was cost of 60 to 80 million dinars. Iraq would provide as much as possible but it could not do all without serious adverse affect on economic development. Iraq was, therefore, turning for assistance to UK and US, in accordance with Articles 51 and 52 of UN Charter. Nuri emphasized the precedent of arms and funds to Turkey and that such aid had been given prior to Turkey's participation in NATO. Nuri made it clear also that arms were not expected from United States but from United Kingdom. United States would, therefore, supply funds and UK equipment as had already been done with several NATO countries.

When asked how these plans fit in with MEDO, Nuri said while approach to Egypt was first requisite, Iraq could not wait indefinitely on Egypt. Iraq, in any case, should start building up its forces now which could be fit in with MEDO if it were set up.

In response to question how Iraqis understood word "self-defense" in requesting assistance, Nuri said word had been taken

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[1] Repeated to London, Cairo, and Ankara.

[2] *Supra.*

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from US note on 408(*e*) and that Iraqis interpreted it as used in that note (Department instruction 11, October 24, Embtel 617, November 14 [3]).

In regard to place of Anglo-Iraqi treaty in plans, Nuri said the treaty need not necessarily be abrogated but merely supplemented by arrangements growing out of application of Articles 51 and 52, which would provide rights for the British to store equipment, to transit and to training privileges. When Ambassador told Nuri that UK felt that right to station British air squadrons in Iraq very important, Nuri "shied off". He thought it necessary only to provide opportunities for return in time of war.

At no point in the discussions did Nuri mention Arab colleagues. As for future talks with Turks, Nuri said Turks had been told that before Iraq could talk further, Turkey must find out from Iranians what latter proposed and could do on behalf of their own self-defense. United Kingdon Ambassador says that Suwaidi in this connection had informed him that Turk Chargé had been told that Iraq envisaged its future relations with Turkey as being on a bilateral basis.

In his conversation Nuri expressed the hope for a speedy answer and particularly that a reply would come before the visit of Secretary Dulles. UK Ambassador reminded Nuri that questions as raised would take time and that discussions would be necessary both in London and in Washington.

British Ambassador, in reporting conversations to Foreign Office, will say that while Iraqis had obviously not thought through all aspects of their plans, he hoped Foreign Office would give serious consideration to proposals, particularly since Iraq was now proposing to do at small price what we had been long urging all free nations to do in behalf of thier own self-defense. Joint US-UK military assistance was being proposed for Egypt. Iraq, in view of its forward position, would seem to deserve no less consideration. This Embassy in thorough agreement with British Ambassador point of view.

He also will say that he presumes that decisions by United Kingdom and United States will be taken on principle whether assistance would be given and that a tripartite commission would then undertake to consider implementation of any responses given.

UK Ambassador said he would point out to his government that premature revelation Iraq's plans to Turks and French would certainly be most distasteful to Iraq. He did not propose to mention the proposals to Turks and French here unless so instructed.

IRELAND

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[3] See footnote 1, Document 1385.

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No. 1390

780.5/3-2853: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Ireland) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, March 28, 1953—5 p. m.

1182. Minister of Defense Nuri Said has given me review of Iraq defense plans along similar lines as to British Ambassador (Embtel 1180 [2]). He did not mention Anglo-Iraqi treaty, Arab secret pact nor Israel.

In re source of arms and equipment, his approach differed from that described by British Ambassador. Nuri emphasized to me his wish for best arms possible. If American tanks were better than British, he wanted them; similarly with planes, etc. Material should be placed in Middle East which would do job of "stopping the Russians".

Cost of expansion, over and above Iraq's contributions, had been estimated at least 60 million dinars over four years. Iraq expected put up cost barracks, airfields, clothing, locally procured equipment, starting with approximately 14 million in 1954 budget of about Iraqi dinars 40 million. Emphasized Iraq could not supply remainder without severely affecting its development program which, in view of our past encouragement, he felt sure we would not wish to see crippled.

Upon my suggestion that beginning might well be made on a reimbursable basis through 408(*e*) he professed inability to understand why this necessary. Grant had been given to Turkey as far back as 1947. We had built roads, etc., but Iraq did not ask for these. What we had done for Turkey in military aid we could surely do for Iraq. Iraq could be performing valuable services for the west. "Would not the resistance of Iraq on the Iranian frontier", he inquired, "be of direct service to American interests in the Persian Gulf?" The defense of Ruwanduz and Halabja in the north, Khanazin and Basra would do just that. Iraqis might not be able to do the whole job alone, but they would give time for Allied forces to arrive.

Apparent from conversation that one obstacle to signing 408(*e*) is belief by Ministers that it would bind Iraq to pay United States for equipment entire expansion program, a commitment not acceptable politically and because of impact on development program.

He proposed three steps looking toward United Kingdom–United States assistance in expansion of Iraq's defense forces:

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[1] Repeated to London, Ankara, and Cairo.

[2] *Supra.*

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1. Visit in near future of Anglo-American experts to assess Iraq's military needs and costs involved.
2. A subsequent visit by financial experts to assess what total cost Iraq could and should pay toward its defense.
3. Implementation of plan through assistance from United States-United Kingdom based on these reports.

IRELAND

No. 1391

Editorial Note

Despatch 820 from Baghdad, May 6, transmitted to the Department of State an account of the ceremonies held on the occasion of the accession to the Throne of Iraq of King Faisal II, May 2, 1953, on Faisal's coming of age. Despatch 817, May 5, transmitted an account of the activities of the visiting United States Delegation. (787.11/5-653)

No. 1392

787.5/6-1053: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 10, 1953.

A-242. With reference to the Embassy's despatch 693 of March 25, 1953, [2] the Department suggests that the personal and confidential memorandum from the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador be replied to along the following lines:

The United States Government welcomes the statement by the Government of Iraq of its intention to strengthen its defenses and, in keeping with the principles of Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, to unite with other countries of common interest in finding suitable means, including regional organizations for common defense, against external aggression.

The United States Government notes that the Iraq Government considers that only through assistance from the United States and Great Britain can the Iraq Government achieve its desired ends. The United States Government has noted with satisfaction the improvement which the Government of Iraq, in cooperation with

[1] Drafted by Funkhouser and Daspit and cleared by NEA and, in draft, by S/MSA.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 1388.

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Great Britain, has already effected in its defenses and hopes that this useful cooperation will continue. The United States Government on its part is prepared to assist the defense efforts of the Iraq Government as it had indicated by its note dated October 27, 1952 (408(*e*)).[3]

The United States Congress now has before it for consideration a proposal that Mutual Security legislation for the next fiscal year, which begins July 1, 1953, should include authority to provide grant military assistance to Greece, Turkey and Iran and to "other countries in the area of the Near East and Africa". As the Government of Iraq is no doubt aware, the Congress of the United States in authorizing Mutual Security Programs in the past has emphasized its purpose "to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world," and has sought to encourage the development of cooperative defense arrangements on the part of the nations of the free world.

The United States Government regrets that it is not possible at this time to give a definite reply to the request of the Government of Iraq for arms and training assistance for the purpose of strengthening the Iraqi defense forces. The Government of Iraq may be assured, however, that its request is receiving careful consideration and it is hoped that mutually satisfactory arrangements can be reached at an early date.

DULLES

[3] Not printed.

No. 1393

780.5/4-2253

The Department of State to the British Embassy [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 1, 1953.

The United States Government is in substantial agreement with the views set forth by the British Government in a note dated April 22, 1953, [2] relating to the desire of the Government of Iraq to strengthen its military forces for defense against aggression.

[1] This note was drafted by Funkhouser and Daspit between June 20 and June 25. It was cleared by NEA, S/MSA, BNA, G, and EUR.

[2] On Apr. 22, Beeley delivered the note under reference here to John D. Jernegan. The British note stated that Her Majesty's Government welcomed the Iraqi request for U.S. military aid insofar as it indicated an increased realization by Iraq of a need to strengthen its forces and increase its contribution to the defense of the

Continued

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The United States Government believes that until such time as the Government of Iraq may choose to concert in regional defense arrangements with Western powers the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty constitutes the most effective existing instrument for cooperative defense efforts in Iraq. The United States furthermore recognizes that the United Kingdom has been the principal supplier of equipment for the Iraqi armed forces and that these forces are based on British tables of organization and equipment. These factors will be taken into account by the United States Government in the development of any program of United States military assistance to Iraq.

The United States Government will not be able to state in definitive terms what assistance it may be able to give the Iraq Government until the Congress of the United States has acted on proposed Mutual Security legislation. As the British Government knows, the United States Government is only prepared at this time to assist the defensive efforts of the Iraq Government through cash reimbursable military aid under Mutual Security legislation.

The United States Government has assured the Government of Iraq that its request for further United States assistance is receiving careful consideration and hope is expressed that mutually satisfactory arrangements can be reached at an early date. The United States Government also informed the Government of Iraq that it had noted with satisfaction the improvement which the Government of Iraq, in cooperation with Great Britain, had already effected in its defenses and expressed hope for a continuation of this useful cooperation.

At such time as it may become possible for the United States Government to move ahead with a program of arms assistance to Iraq, the matter will be discussed further with representatives of the British Government, with a view to developing a mutually satisfactory arrangement for coordinating United States and United Kingdom actions in this field.

The United States Government would meanwhile welcome further informal discussion of the Iraq defense problem with United Kingdom representatives. Particularly desirable would be the British Government views regarding the effect of general trends in the area on the effectiveness of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and its pros-

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Middle East. The note went on to suggest that, since Iraq had not yet decided on the political framework in which the defense of the Middle East was to be organized, it would be in the interest of the United Kingdom and its allies for the present Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to remain in force. Since the terms of the treaty required Iraq to ensure that its military equipment not differ from those of British forces, the British considered it militarily undesirable to introduce new patterns of equipment into the Iraqi armed forces and suggested the United States use the services of British military experts who were already in Iraq to help plan the military aid program. (780.5/4-2253)

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pects for remaining in force until 1957. Similarly, the informal and confidential views of the representatives of the British Government would be welcomed on such subjects as the present and probable future political stability of the Iraq Government, incidence of Communism and extreme nationalism in Iraq, and any other basic problems in Iraq-Western relations which would have a direct bearing on the Western defensive position in Iraq in the event of emergency.

No. 1394

787.00/8-2453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Iraq (Ireland) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, August 20, 1953.

Participants: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, President of Chamber of Deputies
and
The Ambassador Philip W. Ireland

Dr. Jamali, when he came to call on me at the Embassy last night, was full of the news of the Royalist *coup d'état* in Iran. [2] He was greatly pleased at the train of events and optimistic as to the future.

He then said he had long wanted to have a serious talk with me concerning the situation in Iraq, which he believed was becoming increasingly critical. He had had long talks with HM the King and HRH the Crown Prince and he hoped they were aware of the situation.

He said internally Iraq had become stagnant. It had immense potentialities: land, resources, wealth, and people. None were being used as they should be. Iraq was a young country but its government was anything but youthful and vigorous. It was a government of old men, bound by the past, incapable of action and of leading Iraq into the future which its resources entitled it. Iraq could make no progress until such government was replaced by young, active and vigorous men whose objectives were progress and reform.

The second necessity facing Iraq was its relations with the West. Iraq should abandon the profitless concept of Arab collective secu-

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[1] Transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to a letter from Berry to Parker T. Hart. Stating that Jamali's analysis of Iraq's current problems was accurate, Berry wrote that he was one of the few Iraqis willing to speak out publicly in favor of a closer defense relationship between the Arabs and the Western world. (787.00/8-2453)

[2] For documentation on Iran, see volume X.

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rity and should come to working arrangements with Turkey and the West in common defense against Communism. He criticized Prime Minister Tawfiq al-Suwaidi for sponsoring Arab collective security. Arab security had no foundation without contact with the West, and therefore was meaningless. It was misleading to the people. Dr. Jamali said that he was advocating establishment of common defense measures with Turkey, even combined forces in some instances, and of obtaining help from the West on the same basis on which help had been given to Turkey.

The whole nation must also be aroused to its danger. The country must be put on a war basis, with one, two and three shifts in all the industries. There must be work and reform, reform, reform.

Dr. Jamali said in view of these two outstanding problems before Iraq, he wished to put the question frankly to me, "What assistance and help could be expected from the United States in meeting them?" He had spoken at length to Mr. George McGhee, when he was Assistant Secretary, concerning help from America but there had been little concrete evidence that America was interested in helping Iraq or the Arab countries.

I replied that I appreciated his statement. His analysis of Iraq's requirements in the fields mentioned was clear and forceful. We understood his concern for the internal political situation in Iraq and we hoped that the Iraqis would be able to work out something constructive. As for American aid and assistance in Iraq, particularly in defense matters, he would understand that a full and complete answer to his question could be given only by the Department. On the other hand, Mr. Dulles had pledged increasing interest by the US in the Middle East and while the development of this interest would require time, the trend was in the direction sought by Dr. Jamali. His talks with Mr. McGhee had been instrumental in getting things started in the Department.

I also pointed out to Dr. Jamali that if Iraq abandoned the Arab collective security concept and moved toward the West in a defense relationship, it would probably mean some sort of bilateral agreement, perhaps on a more specific basis than that with Great Britain. Dr. Jamali said that this particular relationship, based on the Anglo-Iraqi treaty would soon be over and that Iraq would not enter into any similar arrangement again. I replied that I felt that, nevertheless, some sort of an understanding would be necessary in regard to any large-scale military aid which might be furnished. Dr. Jamali thought that a proper relationship in regard to bases could be brought about by a system whereby the bases would be Iraqi controlled and managed by them with foreign technicians and experts. He was reminded that Americans were in Britain and Saudi Arabia with bases on which the Americans were in full

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charge and that NATO also had working arrangements in Turkey. No doubt similar arrangements would be desired in Iraq and in other countries. Dr. Jamali remained somewhat vague as to how such relationships could be established, but he said he thought something could be worked out. In regard to examples of how America could assist Iraq, he reiterated his belief that Americans should establish institutions of their own in Iraq and other Arab countries in order to demonstrate how such institutions might work.

When Dr. Jamali was asked what he considered the most important focal point of influence in bringing about internal change, he said Nuri first and then the Crown Prince. The Crown Prince was aware of the need for a change but he felt himself blocked by his associates. Dr. Jamali thought Nuri was becoming increasingly aware of the needs. In his talks with the King concerning these matters, he spoke as a teacher to a pupil. He said he was finding a very ready response on the part of the King to his ideas.

Dr. Jamali wandered in his conversation over a number of other points, including education in Iraq and internal politics. He criticized the educational system which did not prepare people for the best institutions in America and Britain. He said few, if any, Iraqis were in first-class institutions but in small colleges throughout the United States. He was particularly concerned since Iraq had produced no scholars of merit, no first-class scientists, no men of international renown. He had pointed out these facts to the Crown Prince and had urged that an attempt be made to create specialists by sending the most brilliant Iraqis to first-class institutions where they would be trained by experts. It was also necessary that this action be accompanied by a change of attitude by the Iraq Government since proper use was not being made of those who had been educated in America and England. Not only were their talents being wasted but they were being frustrated and were open to subversive influences.

He spoke briefly also concerning the possiblity of a *rapprochement* between Saleh Jabr and Nuri. He felt that much of the responsiblity lay with Nuri who would not accept Jabr as an equal in the government. He warned that unless proper position was assigned to Saleh, there would be trouble, serious trouble, in the forthcoming months.

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No. 1395

787.5/8-2453: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, August 24, 1953—10 a. m.

127. Iranian events have jolted many highly placed Iraqi officials out of their lethargy. At last they see the menace to them of international Communism. They feel the urgent need to put Iraq's house in order and particularly to strengthen its defenses. They speak of Iraq today as being the second line of defense against Communist aggression in Near East and of its becoming the first line of defense should Tudeh take over Iran.

The moment therefore is propitious for extension of American military aid to Iraq in order to get maximum political return for United States. The Iraqis asked us officially on March 21 for military grant aid. [2] We replied on July 2 that we were studying their request, but could give no definite answer as legislation was still in Congress. [3] Now we are in a position to answer and the time is ripe locally to answer affirmatively.

I recommend that what United States does be directed toward a distinctive objective. We will lose maximum impact if we furnish funds for British to give equipment or if we ourselves give equipment and it is absorbed in overall Iraqi program. Our greatest impact can only come from creating something new with full American equipment. The Iraqi military plans call for a mountain brigade. I think it should be ideal if we picked this up and offered to equip within the next year or two such a brigade. Such action would (1) strengthen Iraq's defenses where they are most needed; (2) be tangible evidence of United States support of Iraqi interest in its own defense; (3) constitute a recognition of Iraq's place in Near East defense; and (4) should not alarm Israel as such a brigade would be suited for use in mountainous terrain and hence no menace to Israel.

BERRY

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, and Ankara.

[2] See telegram 1158 from Baghdad, Document 1388.

[3] Presumably, this reference is to the suggested reply transmitted to the Embassy in airgram 242, Document 1392.

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No. 1396

787.5 MSP/9-953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq (Barrow) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, September 3, 1953

Participants: Mr. Daspit, Department of State
Col. Sievers, Department of Defense
Major Eveland, Department of Defense
Mr. Ireland, Chargé d'Affaires, American Embassy, Baghdad
Col. Hester, Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Baghdad
Lt. Col. Monroe, Army Attaché, American Embassy, Baghdad
Lt. Col. Hippenstiel, Asst. Air Attaché, American Embassy, Baghdad
Mr. Barrow, Political Officer, American Embassy, Baghdad

Mr. Daspit opened the discussion by outlining the background of legislation providing for U.S. military aid to the countries of the Near East. He noted that the State Department for a number of years has been urging that the United States take more initiative in furnishing military aid to the Near East primarily on the grounds of its political importance. In the Mutual Security Act of 1951 there was contained a permissive clause enabling the President to transfer 10% of the grant aid for Greece, Turkey and Iran to the countries of the Near East provided the situation warranted. However, until recently the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken the view that grant military aid to the Near East was not justified in the context of the world-wide politico-military situation. However, when Mr. Byroade became Assistant Secretary of State he thought it most important that the United States use military aid as a political tool to strengthen friendly regimes in the Near East and to increase their disposition to cooperate with the West.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were strong supporters of the MEDO concept, still held the view that there was scarcely any jus-

[1] Transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to a letter by Ireland to Parker T. Hart, dated Sept. 9. Ireland informed Hart that following the conversations that took place during the visit of Daspit and the two Department of Defense representatives to the Embassy, he took Daspit to call on the British Chargé. The Chargé read them excerpts from instructions received from London, which made it obvious to them that the British were very sensitive about anything the United States might do with regard to military aid to Iraq. (787.5 MSP/9-953)

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tification for military aid from the military-strategic point of view until there could be brought into existence an overall strategic plan for the defense of the area in which the Arab States would participate, but they had now taken cognizance of the political advantages of providing a limited amount of military aid to strengthen the internal security of friendly regimes. Recognizing that MEDO seemed for the moment unacceptable to the Arab States, they conceived of an action program on two phases, the first being bilateral military aid programs designed to strengthen regimes now willing to cooperate and to increase their desire to cooperate, this phase having primarily political significance. They would hope, however, that this would eventually create a political climate conducive to a second phase in which the participation of the Arab States in a regional planning organization could be achieved ultimately providing for the effective defense of the area.

The Executive Branch of the Government asked this year for one hundred million dollars for the Middle Eastern states. Congress had adopted legislation providing authority to develop military aid programs up to fifty million dollars, but actual appropriations had amounted to only thirty million dollars.

Originally set off against this sum were several contingencies. For example, Egypt had been given virtual promise of military assistance if it reached a settlement with the United Kingdom. Moreover, consideration had been given as to the practicability of extending assistance to Pakistan inasmuch as that country was considered of very high strategic importance by the Defense Department.

However, the recent trend of thought was that to hold out the 30 million dollars against such contingencies, which might not immediately develop, would unduly tie our hands. It was therefore now thought that the 30 million dollars could be used to best advantage in such countries as would immediately absorb these funds. This idea has been given impetus by Secretary Dulles' belief, after visiting the Middle East, that steps should be taken to strengthen the "northern tier" of Middle Eastern states against aggression. The "northern tier" concept had been written into the latest National Security Council paper on the area. [2]

At the August 28 RECNE meeting in Cairo [3] the most logical apportionment of the 30 million dollars was discussed and it was ten-

[2] For Secretary Dulles' view of the "northern tier" concept, see the memorandum of discussion at the 153d meeting of the NSC, Document 144, and NSC 155/1, Document 145.

[3] For information on the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference at Cairo, Aug. 28–29, 1953, see telegrams 271 and 272 from Cairo, Documents 149 and 150.

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tatively agreed that Syria and Iraq might well receive the major share, say 20 million dollars, with the other 10 million dollars being distributed among Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Thus Iraq might be eligible for say 8 to 12 million dollars of grant aid.

Colonel Sievers then undertook to outline the steps which would be necessary in order for the Iraq Government to obtain equipment under a grant military aid program; viz.:

(1) *Conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the United States in accordance with a standard form, as provided for in Mutual Security legislation.* Mr. Daspit noted that this agreement would also make Iraq automatically eligible for reimbursable military aid. Colonel Sievers emphasized the desirability of requiring Iraq to pay for as much U.S. equipment as possible from its own funds.

(2) *A U.S. military survey team to establish the program in terms of specific items of equipment.* Colonel Sievers said it would be preferable for this team to arrive after signature of the bilateral agreement in order that the team might have a firm basis on which to work. He said that in exceptional circumstances, it might come before the agreement was signed, but not unless the Iraqis had given a relatively firm indication that they intended to go ahead with the program.

(3) *The establishment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).* This group would be permanently stationed in Iraq to inspect equipment as it arrived and turn it over to the Iraq Government. It would also observe the end use of this equipment (as specified in the standard bilateral agreement) and give technical advice to the Iraqis on its use and maintenance. Colonel Sievers noted that it might be 12 to 14 months after conclusion of the agreement before substantial deliveries would be made, although some token shipment might be sent out shortly after the agreement had been concluded. He also noted that although all the equipment would be repaired, inspected and combat serviceable, it would not necessarily be new. He suggested that these considerations be brought to the attention of the Iraqis in order that undue expectations about the program would not be aroused.

Colonel Sievers also noted that in its terms of reference the Department of Defense would be largely confined to providing equipment for existing Iraqi forces and could not at this stage undertake an aid program designed for the expansion of such forces.

Embassy representatives noted that some aspects of the program, as outlined by Colonel Sievers, did not match with the request that the Iraqis had submitted simultaneously to both the United Kingdom and the United States. In the first place it had been indicated to us that the Iraqi Army would act as a British corps in the event of war, that its tables of organization and equipment were on British standards and that its supply "pipeline" in the event of war would originate from the British MELF. Consequently, it appears

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that the Iraq Government had thus far conceived of the program largely as the U.S. financing offshore procurement of army from Britain. It was also noted that the request had been in terms of an expansion of forces rather than in terms of meeting supply deficiencies of existing forces.

Colonel Sievers said with regard to the supply pipeline that it was the Defense Department's normal practice to provide a year's supply of spares and maintenance equipment and beyond that additional spares for an estimated three months of combat. With respect to offshore procurement he said that it was probable that some items, such as ammunition, might be obtained by offshore purchase but he believed the United States Government would wish to furnish many items directly, and in any case not be in the position of furnishing aid through the U.K. as an intermediary. He said that among other things there would be serious objections in Congress to the latter arrangement. Colonel Monroe noted that many of the U.S. equipment items likely to be in demand by the Iraqis would be similar to standard U.K. items.

With respect to the concept of furnishing arms for existing forces only, Colonel Sievers and Mr. Daspit thought that this point need not be raised with the Iraqis but could be worked out on a practical basis by the MAAG once established. It was the consensus that there was some merit to Ambassador Berry's suggestion that our equipment be directed toward a specific unit rather than scattered throughout the Iraq Army with its political effect thereby diminished.

Mr. Barrow said that if we still regard the U.K. as the principal supplier to Iraq, which he assumed we did, we would then ultimately be in the position of furnishing only such items as the U.K. told us they could not provide. This would, in a sense, conflict with an approach to Iraq's arms supply problems independent of the U.K.

It was generally agreed that some prior consultation with the United Kingdom on the foregoing points was essential.

Mr. Ireland further suggested that one possible approach to the problem might be the establishment of a joint US-UK planning team, or alternatively attaching UK liaison officers to the proposed military survey team, which would do the detailed work of establishing the program. Colonel Sievers said he thought it would be well if both the members of the military survey team and the members of MAAG would consult and work closely with appropriate British military counterparts in this country, but he believed it would be unwise to have the British participate directly in determining how our dollars and our equipment would be utilized.

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It was agreed that these points should be discussed between Washington and London prior to establishment of the program.

Colonel Sievers noted that the time element was most important inasmuch as if we were unable effectively to utilize the 30 million dollars currently appropriated by next June 30, there would be great difficulty in persuading Congress that more funds should be obligated in the future.

Mr. Daspit asked if we could not stimulate the Iraqis to more rapid action if we informed them of current discussions with Syria on military aid and leave them with the impression that their chances for obtaining desirable items in short supply would be enhanced by early signature of the agreement. The Embassy representatives said they saw no objections to trying such tactics but emphasized that Iraqis had not hitherto been noted for rapid action in such matters.

In a later discussion between Mr. Daspit and Mr. Barrow two further points were brought forward:

(1) Mr. Barrow noted that British Embassy representatives here often expressed the fear that our furnishing arms on a grant basis, while the U.K. required payment, would complicate their relationship with the Iraqis. Mr. Daspit said he believed the U.K. Government had considered this point and was reconciled to U.S. grant aid programs in the area.

(2) Mr. Daspit and Mr. Barrow discussed the possibility that Iraq, by diverting unused funds set aside for economic development, might be able to purchase military equipment on its own account. It was agreed that if we should decide to furnish grant aid we should make it clear that we were doing so in order that Iraq's own revenues could be saved for development purposes.

No. 1397

787.5/10-2753: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, October 27, 1953—10 a. m.

250. Prime Minister Jamali has once again raised question United States attitude toward Iraq request grant military aid submitted last March [2] indicating his government just as eager as the previous for favorable United States action. He told me he had instructed Foreign Minister Bakr to press question while in United States.

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[1] Repeated to London, Rome, Cairo, and Damascus.

[2] Regarding the Iraq request, see footnote 3, Document 1388.

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New Iraqi Chief of General Staff, General Arif, who is vigorous, able and impressive officer, expressed same hope in conversation with Military Attaché October 5 (see ARMA RN413N53, 8 October [3]). General Arif promised full cooperation in providing necessary information expedite a decision.

Embassy recalls that Daspit, when at August 28 Recne meeting Cairo and later in Baghdad, emphasized necessary implementing draft military aid programs promptly in order that funds currently appropriated be obligated before they expire next June 30. Also that at Recne meeting it was recommended Syria and Iraq received major share $30 million currently available.

Recently I discussed with Maffit from Naples importance I attached to plugging gap in free world defenses between Turkey and Persian Gulf. I suggest both CINCSOUTH [and] ourselves should be doing some thinking about means to close this gap.

Embassy believes establishment of grant military aid program here, with likely effect of generating spirit confidence and will to resist in Iraq Army, would be logical first step. I further believe it will materially strengthen political position of West, including both United States and United Kingdom, if we do something new and distinctively American for Iraq in such a way as to leave no doubt that what we are doing is for Iraqis and not for purpose of perpetuating monopolistic British influence here.

In view long period of time which has already elapsed since Iraq initially submitted request and in view shortness of time remaining in which to obligate funds, Embassy would appreciate earliest possible indication Department's views and, if favorable, test of draft bilateral agreement to present to Iraq Government.

BERRY

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

No. 1398

787.5 MSP/11-2553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 25, 1953—7:42 p. m.

302. Brit Emb informs that they shortly expect instructions from London to discuss with Dept general question of proposed US military assistance Iraq. Department now expects receive views of Defense on ME programs next week, and understands informally

[1] Drafted by Daspit and cleared by NE.

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funds for Iraq will be allotted. Department has stated view to Defense that prior discussions with Iraqi Government we should seek agreement with British on principles along following lines:

a) We recognize special Brit position Iraq, and importance this position for ME defense. Will endeavor avoid actions which might impair position.

b) In absence US plans for ME defense, we accept broad outlines UK plans for strengthening Iraq forces and agree fit our assistance programs to these plans.

c) US intends that equipment provided under its military assistance programs in area should consist principally of readily identifiable items of US manufacture, which should so far as possible in each country be concentrated in a particular unit or units. In case of Iraq, however, recognize that forces now organized on Brit TO&E. In programming equipment Iraq, therefore, prepared consider utilizing device off-shore procurement in UK to reasonable extent, and will take care that US equipment furnished of types which will not unduly complicate supply problem.

d) Problem one of identifying areas within which supply of equipment of US manufacture will both further program of modernization and improvement already agreed by Iraq and UK, and will stand out as a distinctly US contribution to programs.

e) In view of arrangements which Iraq already has with Brit, US will not seek place training mission in Iraq. However, this does not preclude acceptance some candidates for training in military school US.

Embassy comments requested on above. [2]

DULLES

[2] See telegram 315 from Baghdad, Nov. 28, *infra*.

No. 1399

787.5 MSP/11-2853: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State

SECRET BAGHDAD November 28, 1953—5 p. m.

315. After discussion with Embassy Military Attachés, following are comments on Department telegram 302, November 25: [1]

(*a*) No comment.

(*b*) No comment.

(*c*) Embassy concurs, but notes with respect to offshore procurement that United Kingdom has on occasion, been considerably criticized for having delivered unserviceable items, or for having unduly delayed deliveries. Believe appropriate safeguards should be

[1] *Supra*.

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established, so that blame will not be shifted to United States. Also believe that to realize maximum political benefit for United States, offshore procurement should be confined minimum consistent with logistical necessity.

(*d*) Believe for logistical reasons, United States equipment should, in so far as possible, be interchangeable with British types. Where not interchangeable in efficient ammunition, spare parts and replacements should be furnished to provide full logistical support.

(*e*) Agree United States training mission might unduly complicate British problems. Believe, however, establishment MAAG group to ensure United States equipment combat serviceable and to instruct Iraqis in use and maintenance of equipment essential. Fully agree Iraqi candidates should train in United States military schools and further believe provision should be made for periodic United States visits by high ranking officers of Iraq General Staff. Prime Minister has expressed considerable interest on latter, and has mentioned to me possibility early views by Iraq CGS.

Embassy assumes that before any public announcement of allocation military assistance is made, it will first have opportunity furnish Iraqi Government with full details and to present agreement.

BERRY

No. 1400

780.5/1-554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON January 5, 1954—7:29 p. m.

374. Department appreciates your concern lest Iraqis gain impression we stimulating development regional security arrangement in which we expect include them, but concerning which we are not consulting them (Embtel 386 [2]). On other hand, Department convinced US should stay as far in background of negotiations as possible, and that initiative should appear come from Pakistanis, as in fact it has in considerable measure, and Turks. Approach Turks (Deptel 361 [3]) was made in greatest confidence in effort develop appropriate context for extension military assistance

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[1] Drafted by Daspit and cleared by NE and S/MSA.

[2] Dated Jan. 3, not printed. The Ambassador requested permission to inform the Prime Minister of the negotiations between Pakistan and Turkey, making it clear that, although the United States had stimulated the negotiations, it hoped for an indigenous solution to Middle East defense problems and was taking no part in them. (787.5 MSP/1-354)

[3] Printed as telegram 686 to Ankara, Document 164.

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Pakistan. Success this effort depends in considerable measure on its being kept secret.

Taking account these considerations, Department of opinion problem you describe might best be approached via question military aid Iraq, which now formally approved by Defense. Although certain additional steps necessary finalize USG position, and undesirable that official information subject be released at this time, Department considers would be appropriate for you inform Jamali orally and in confidence that favorable reply Iraq request military assistance forthcoming near future. This would provide opportunity refer Section 202(*b*) of MSA which provides authority this offer, and which clearly indicates US interest in ME regional security arrangement. You could point out that although we no longer consider MEDO viable concept, we hope Middle East states themselves will come to appreciate fact that some regional security arrangement essential their interests.

If Jamali should then raise question possible four-power arrangement, you might tell him we informed that Pakistanis had held exploratory discussions subject with Turks and Iraqis and we had expressed our interest such development. You might then follow line para 2 reftel.

DULLES

No. 1401

780.5/1-854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET BAGHDAD, January 8, 1954—noon.

398. Prior departure for Beirut and Cairo today (January 7) Prime Minister Jamali requested urgent meeting with me. Subjects foremost in his mind were status Iraq's request for military aid and stories United States military aid program to Pakistan. [2] Jamali said that Indian Minister in Baghdad called recently and discussed at length reasons why United States arms aid to Pakistan should be opposed by Asian nations. Prime Minister replied Iraq could not ignore the question of its defense as Iraq has oil and occupies a key strategic position and is therefore liable to attack. Having refused advice offered by Indian Minister he proceeded to give him advice saying that India should pursue three courses: (1) settle its difference with Pakistan; (2) arm itself; and (3) cooperate with other

[1] Repeated to Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.
[2] For documentation on this topic, see vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1818 ff.

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sian nations to develop protection against external attack whether from east or west.

Fortunately Deptel 374 January 5 [3] reached me prior to meeting and Jamali was most appreciative of the remarks I was able to make to him in confidence on United States military assistance to Iraq and United States attitude toward Middle East regional security arrangements. He expressed especial approval of United States thinking that Middle East regional defense armies should spring from Middle East commenting that much difficulty could have been avoided had United States held such thinking several years ago.

Jamali said he wished to reiterate however that if United States expects success in Middle East we must not link cur relations with Arabs to Arab-Israel question. We must avoid stirring up Arab world by presenting plans, projects and proposals which ignore "what remains of Arab rights" as recognized in United Nations resolutions. He added that if we could not now produce "something equivalent" to United Nations resolutions, it would be best that we set Palestine to one side in our dealing with Arabs.

Jamali said that as this is first year of King Faisal's reign and as disturbances may take place in Iraq on anniversary of Portsmouth treaty (January 27), the projected royal visit to Pakistan is being postponed. However, as Prime Minister of Pakistan had extended a personal invitation to him independent of royal visit he might visit Pakistan alone sometime next month.

Following telegram contains Jamali comments re forthcoming Arab League meeting. [4]

BERRY

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Telegram 399 from Beirut, Jan. 8. Jamali told Berry that he intended to table a proposal at the conference calling for federation of all the Arab states. He did not expect early action on his proposal, but wanted Iraq to be recorded as favoring Arab unity through evolutionary, democratic means. Jamali also said he would try to enlist the support of President Chamoun to help blunt Egypt's drive for Arab neutrality. (780.5/1-854)

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No. 1402

787.5 MSP/1-1554

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 15, 1954.

MY DEAR MR. STASSEN: The Acting Secretary of State in a letter addressed to the Secretary of Defense September 21, 1953 [2] requested that the Department of Defense concur in a recommendation to the President that, in accordance with the procedures established by subsection 202(*b*) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 as amended, he determine that Iraq is "of direct importance to the defense of the area" and that its "increased ability to defend itself is important to the security of the United States", thereby making it possible to extend grant military assistance to that country.

In a letter to the Secretary of State dated January 4, 1954, [3] the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs reported the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he concurred, that a worthwhile military advantage could result if Iraq should be declared eligible for aid under the terms specified in subsection 202(*b*). The Department of Defense has suggested that approximately $10 million of Fiscal Year 1954 MDAP funds might be used for Iraq.

It will be remembered that in submitting to the Congress the request for the authority contained in sub-section 202(*b*), Executive Branch witnesses urged that in the absence of a regional defense arrangement, the United States should be in a position to undertake bi-lateral programs of military assistance with certain of the countries in the area. Iraq, which is strategically placed athwart the line of a possible Soviet thrust toward the Mediterranean and which has manifested a greater consciousness of the Soviet danger than other Arab states, was specifically mentioned as a probable candidate for such assistance. These views were formalized in NSC 155/1 [4] which provides in paragraph 16–d.:

"The United States should: Provide limited military assistance to promote United States security interests, to increase confidence in the United States, and to help in developing indigenous forces

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[1] Drafted by Daspit on Jan. 12 and cleared by NE, S/MSA, and BNA.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] Not printed. The JCS reported that it would prefer not to recommend specific apportionment of funds until after survey teams and military assistance advisory groups had determined country needs for the various countries to receive assistance. (780.5/1-454)

[4] Document 145.

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which can improve political stability, internal security, and the maintenance of pro-Western regimes, and ultimately contribute to area defense. We should select certain key states for this type of assistance, choosing those who are most keenly aware of the threat of Soviet Russia and who are geographically located to stand in the way of possible Soviet aggression. In this regard, special consideration should be given to Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Pakistan."

The provision of military assistance to Iraq may also have significance in relation to the development of a regional defense arrangement in the Middle East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently expressed an interest in the possible development of such an arrangement, to include Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The extension of military assistance to Iraq could be expected to contribute to the willingness of that country to participate in such an arrangement.

On the basis of the above considerations, I request that you seek from the President a determination that Iraq meets the standards prescribed in sub-section 202(*b*) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER B. SMITH

No. 1403

780.5/1-2954

Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 22, 1954.

Subject: Grant Military Assistance for Iraq

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[1] The source text was attached to a letter from Stassen to the Secretary of State, dated Jan. 29, notifying him that the President agreed Iraq should receive military assistance. Also attached to the letter was a copy of a memorandum by the President to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, dated Jan. 26. The memorandum informed Stassen that the President found Iraq of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area. Since the increased ability of Iraq to defend itself was important to the security of the United States, the President had found it essential for the purpose of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, that the Government of Iraq be provided with military assistance according to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. The Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget were to be notified by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration of the Presidential determination. (780.5/1-2954)

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Attachments: a. Letter from the Under Secretary of State to the Director of Foreign Operations Administration dated January 15, 1954, [2] and

b. Copy of letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to the Secretary of State dated January 4, 1954 [3]

The attached letters from the Departments of State and Defense recommend that the President make a determination that Iraq meets the requirements for grant military assistance which are prescribed by Section 202(*b*) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. Under this Section, the President may authorize the provision of military aid, if he finds it essential to the purposes of the Act, to any nation in the general area of the Near East and Africa which he determines to be of direct importance to the defense of the area and whose increased ability to defend itself is important to the security of the United States.

It is my belief that a grant aid program for Iraq would serve the purposes of the Mutual Security Act, both on an immediate bilateral basis and potentially with Iraq as a member of a Northern Tier defense arrangement, which might also include Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The strategic importance of Iraq has been recognized by the National Security Council in NSC 155/1 which advocates limited military assistance for these countries. The Department of Defense proposes an initial program of $10 million for Iraq, and this proposal is endorsed by the Department of State. A program of this amount would be funded from the $30 million provided specifically by the Congress for use in the Middle East under Section 202(*b*) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.

I concur in the recommendation that Iraq be granted military assistance and recommend that the President sign the attached determination. Since Section 202(*b*) requires that four Committees of the Congress be notified whenever such a determination is made, there is also attached for your signature suggested letters to these Committees giving the necessary notification. [4]

HAROLD E. STASSEN

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra.*

[4] Not printed.

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No. 1404

Editorial Note

Telegram 438 to Baghdad, February 18, transmitted the text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program Agreement to be submitted to the Government of Iraq. Telegram 440, February 18, contained the Department of State's comments on the text and the legal reasons behind the writing of some sections. Telegram 441, February 18, instructed the Ambassador on the method of presentation of the agreement. He was authorized to inform the Government of Iraq that the United States had discussed the matter with the Government of the United Kingdom. The United States considered its aid complementary to that of the United Kingdom, which would continue to be the prime supplier of arms and training assistance to Iraq. Documentation is in Department of State file 787.5 MSP.

No. 1405

787.5 MSP/2-2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State

SECRET BAGHDAD, February 23, 1954—10 a. m.

472. At five last evening I met Prime Minister quietly to discuss tactics of formal presentation of United States reply to Iraqi request for grant military aid. [1] At ten last evening I met with King, Crown Prince, and Prime Minister to continue discussions. I explained to them that as provisions in text of agreement related to statutory requirements or procedures which experience had shown to be essential to good administration, I saw no point in quibbling over the language in our reply to their request. After two hours of discussion they accepted this point of view.

In this connection Prime Minister today will consult legal advisor as whether Iraqi reply to our note must be presented Parliament. All hope it will not be necessary. Then he will consult principal political leaders privately so that they will be informed and he will have their support. Then he will advise me as when I should formally hand note to Foreign Minister. Please see next following telegrams. [2]

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[1] Regarding the Iraqi request for military aid, see footnote 3, Document 1388.

[2] Telegram 473, Feb. 23, transmitted a summary of the internal political situation in Iraq. (787.00/2-2354)

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In course of discussion all seemed relieved that our plan will be worked out in cooperation with British. Prime Minister asked why in view of contents of paragraph number one bis was necessary to include reference to tripartite declaration which will become subject local attack. [3] I said inclusion might make acceptance of agreement somewhat difficult for Iraqis but would make acceptance easier in other quarters. Crown Prince said he did not see any amount of aid mentioned or list of items we will contribute. I said neither could be talked about until survey team had completed its work. He pressed the point but I stood my ground on this, reassuring him to the extent that I anticipated that amount of aid would be substantial in relation to their own military budget.

King reading paragraph 3-A said that we might ask for some service that the Iraqis would be reluctant to give. He asked: "then what?" I replied if we regarded the service as essential we would present request to Iraqis in sufficiently convincing manner that they too would see that it was essential. However if the unlikely should occur, the key words in the paragraph were "as may be agreed upon". Prime Minister in reference to 5-D asked about size of team to come to Iraq. I said it would be small, initially probably not more than ten persons. He said to get public approval of agreement he might need to say that no American troops would be stationed in Iraq, that we asked no special privileges or base rights. I replied that if, after agreement was concluded, it was necessary for him to say such things, we would take an understanding attitude.

BERRY

[3] This reference is to the text of the agreement transmitted in telegram 438; see the editorial note, *supra*.

No. 1406

Editorial Note

As an attachment to a letter signed on September 30, 1953, and mailed on October 1, the Under Secretary of State transmitted to the Secretary of Defense a memorandum, dated September 24, entitled "Political Considerations Bearing on U.S. Military Assistance Programs to the Middle East in Fiscal 1954." The fifth section of the memorandum proposed principles for the United States to follow in coordinating possible military assistance to Iraq and Jordan with the British supply programs under way in those countries. In the letter, Smith informed Wilson that if the Department of Defense and the Foreign Operations Administration approved

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the principles proposed in Section 5 of the memorandum, the Department of State planned to cummunicate them to the British through diplomatic channels. Copies of the letter and memorandum were transmitted to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration as attachments to a letter, dated October 2, from the Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs. The letter to Stassen was mainly concerned with military aid to Egypt and informed him that a similar letter was being sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. (774.5 MSP/10-253)

After several discussions between Department of State officers and the British, on December 28 the British also presented a draft statement of principles on the same topic. Subsequent conversations between the Departments of State and Defense resulted in a revised draft tentative statement of principles which was transmitted to the British Embassy. No memoranda of conversation with the British have been found in Department of State files. The above information was taken from a memorandum by Byroade to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, dated January 5, 1954, and a letter by the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, dated January 11, asking for Defense comment on the final draft of the statement of principles. Documentation is in Department of State file 787.5 MSP/1-1154. For additional information, see footnote 1, *infra*.

No. 1407

787.5 MSP/3-454

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, Initialed at Washington, February 26, 1954 [1]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF MILITARY AID TO IRAQ BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Representatives of the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland met in

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[1] The source text, a copy of the original Memorandum of Understanding, was attached to a memorandum by Byroade to Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy, dated Mar. 4. The Byroade memorandum stated that on Feb. 26 Harold Beeley, on behalf of the United Kingdom, and Byroade for the United States, had initialed the Memorandum of Understanding. The memorandum informed Murphy that the

Continued

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Washington on February 26, 1954, to discuss the provision by the Government of the United States of military aid to Iraq. Having regard to the Provisions of paragraph 6 of the Annexure to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which state:

"In view of the desirability of identity in training and methods between the Iraq and British Armies, His Majesty the King of Iraq undertakes that, should he deem it necessary to have recourse to foreign military instructors, these shall be chosen from amongst British subjects.

"He further undertakes that any personnel of his forces that may be sent abroad for military training will be sent to military schools, colleges and training centres in the territories of His Britannic Majesty, provided that this shall not prevent him from sending to any other country such personnel as cannot be received in the said institutions and training centres.

"He further undertakes that the armament and essential equipment of his Forces shall not differ in type from those of the Forces of His Britannic Majesty."

They drew up the following statement setting out their common understanding of the principles to be followed by the two Governments.

1. The United States Government will as far as possible coordinate their military aid to Iraq with the plans already agreed between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq, pursuant to the above-mentioned Treaty, for the expansion and re-equipment of the Iraqi forces.

2. The United States Government will impress upon the Iraqi Government that any arms and training the United States Government may provide will be complementary to the arms and training supplied by the United Kingdom Government, and that the Iraqi Government should continue to look primarily to the United Kingdom Government for both types of assistance.

3. In formulating any program of arms assistance to Iraq, the United States Government will give due weight to the following considerations:

a. the desirability of avoiding dislocations in the existing reequipment and expansion plans of the Iraqi forces, and of minimizing logistic difficulties;

b. the possibility of furthering the above objective by means of off-shore purchases in the United Kingdom;

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memorandum printed here was substantially the same as the one transmitted to the Secretary of Defense on Jan. 11, and that Adm. A. C. Davis, USN, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, had informally agreed to it for the Department of Defense. Attached to the original Memorandum of Understanding was a letter to the Secretary of Defense, not found in Department of State files, transmitting a copy. (787.5 MSP/3454)

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c. the desirability that there should be a readily identifiable United States contribution to the expansion of the Iraqi forces.

4. In order to effect an appropriate application of the considerations stated in 3 above, the United States Government will confer with the United Kingdom.[2]

5. The United Kingdom Government will retain its responsibility for directing the training and organization of the Iraqi forces. With due consideration for this responsibility and after conferring with the United Kingdom Government, the United States Government may accept some Iraqi candidates for training in military schools in the United States.

6. The United States Government will station in Iraq a Military Assistance Advisory Group, which will be charged with carrying out United States responsibilities in accordance with applicable Mutual Security legislation and any Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement concluded with Iraq.

7. The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group and the appropriate British Military authority in Iraq will be instructed to maintain close liaison and to exchange all relevant information.

8. The United Kingdom Government will waive the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Annexure to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 to the extent required to give effect to the terms of this agreement.

HAB
United States Representative
HB
United Kingdom Representative

Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Provision of Military Aid to Iraq by the Government of the United States

Minute on United States Intentions With Respect to a Possible Air Force Program

Representatives of the United States Government provided representatives of the United Kingdom Government with the following information concerning United States plans for a military assistance program in Iraq.

An aid program for the Iraqi army and navy has been approved in principle and on this basis MDAP funds have been tentatively earmarked for use during the remainder of the fiscal year 1954 and fiscal year 1955. No funds have been earmarked for an air force program during this period and no program is contemplated. However, should it develop that the United Kingdom is not in a posi-

[2] Despatch 3207 from London, Mar. 24, 1954, transmitted the minutes of a follow-up meeting between representatives of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to discuss military aid to Iraq. (787.5 MSP/3-2454)

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tion to meet the requirements of the Iraqi Air Force for certain types of equipment or training, the Government of the United States would, after conferring with the Government of the United Kingdom, consider providing such equipment and training.

HAB
HB

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF MILITARY AID TO IRAQ BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Minute on Paragraph 5

Representatives of the United States Government informed representatives of the United Kingdom Government that it was not anticipated that any spaces could be made available for Iraqi candidates in United States training schools during the present fiscal year, ending June 30, 1954. In the succeeding fiscal year, ending June 30, 1955, it was possible that some spaces might be found. However, in view of the fact that present plans for 1955, which are already far advanced, include no provision for Iraq, the number of such spaces would be necessarily limited.

HAB
HB

No. 1408

787.5 MSP/3-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, March 27, 1954—noon.

569. Reference paragraph 1 Deptel 523 of March 25.[1] Embassy realizes its telegraphic reporting is not as complete as might be. We have . . . and one active code clerk, who, with some of the rest of us, work overtime seven days a week. With the need to report telegraphically our fight against Communism, cabinet crises, floods and other national disasters, as well as progress of our negotiations, we have to limit ourselves.

In connection with this problem, which is basically that of personnel, I call attention of Department to fact that shortly after

[1] Not printed. In the paragraph under reference here, the Department of State stated it was handicapped in arriving at a position that both the United States and Iraq could accept by a lack of detailed analysis from the Embassy as to the real motivation of the Iraqis on the contested points in the MDA Agreement. (787.5 MSP/3-2454)

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April 28 we will have but one stenographer in entire Embassy due to attrition and earned home leaves. This situation prevails in spite of our continuous efforts to prevent it. I hope Department will take necessary measures that my successor does not face in his work the same conditions under which I am laboring.

BERRY

No. 1409

787.5 MSP/4-854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 8, 1954—7:32 p. m.

566. We have become increasingly concerned at timorous attitude of Iraqi Government over proposed military aid agreement. This concern greatly accentuated by Arab League communiqué issued April 1 at Cairo, reading in part as follows:

"The first question examined by the Committee concerned the rumors recently circulated on the possible adherence of one of the Arab States to the Turko-Pakistan alliance and concerning the early conclusion of a Military Aid Agreement between certain Arab States on the one hand and the United States of America on the other.

"All the representatives of the Arab States on the Committee proclaimed these rumors are false and have no foundation in truth. As to the Turko-Pakistan alliance, the Iraqi representative affirmed in the name of his Government what the President of the Iraqi Council of Ministers had proclaimed, namely that Iraq has not been invited to join this alliance, that it has not considered joining and that everything which has been said concerning the connection of Iraq with this alliance is without foundation."

It seems to us that if the Iraqis are so unwilling to stand up and be counted on side of free world that at this late stage in negotiations they subscribe to statements such as foregoing, we should reflect very carefully before concluding agreement. If Iraqi leaders are justified in their fears of public reaction and repercussions in other Arab States, agreement may well cause difficulties out of proportion to benefits. We do not wish repetition of events that followed signing of Treaty of Portsmouth. If leaders apprehensions are unjustified would seem that Government lacks requisite cour-

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[1] Drafted by Jernegan and cleared by Byroade for the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Paris.

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age and self-confidence to carry forward proper defense program and follow policies essential to defense of area.

Area tensions which have become greater in recent weeks do not encourage us to inject another controversial step into the picture in absence of real enthusiasm on part of those whom we consider to be most interested party.

We believe we could meet remaining Iraqi points re administrative provisions of proposed agreement but in view of foregoing believe it preferable to leave whole matter in abeyance until Iraqis consider themselves in position to take firm stand on Pakistan model. Our whole policy regarding military assistance to Middle East is based on concept of collective security and while we have been willing to consider military aid to Iraq without insisting upon adherence to any regional defense pact or even so loose an arrangement as that just signed by Turkey and Pakistan (Deptels 406 and 441 [2]) we have been counting upon at least clear-cut public recognition by Iraq of her interest in regional defense against outside aggression and her willingness to cooperate with other states who also see the danger.

It now appears our expectations may have been mistaken. We therefore think it best to let the Iraqi Government consult with Turks and Pakistanis and determine whether or not it wishes to associate itself with those and any other like-minded states in some form of mutually satisfactory cooperative agreement before we attempt to move further in military understanding with Iraq.

Request you convey in manner you consider most appropriate substance of foregoing to Prime Minister and any other leaders you consider desirable. [3]

FYI If, after receiving this communication, Iraqis show real desire to proceed with negotiations and are willing to give firm private assurances of intention to join Turk-Pakistani pact in near future, we would be willing consider resumption discussion remaining difficulties in agreement provided at time of signature Iraqis

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[2] Telegram 406 to Baghdad, Document 186. Telegram 441, Feb. 18, is not printed, but see Document 1404.

[3] Telegram 611 from Baghdad, Apr. 11, informed the Department of State that the Ambassador appreciated the Department's concern that Iraqi leaders might accept U.S. military aid and then fail to work with Turkey and Pakistan, and indirectly with the United States, toward the development of an adequate regional defense system in the Middle East. But responsible Iraqi leaders had sincerely and enthusiastically approved the sequence of developments on the basis that the military aid program would pave the way for a regional defense program. He suggested that reversal of the sequence of developments at such a late date might cause alienation of the current friendly attitude in Iraqi Government circles. It would also place new and potent weapons in the hands of communists and would probably convince many undecided Iraqis that the United States had made military aid conditional from the beginning on joining the regional defense pact. (787.5 MSP/4-1154)

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would make some public statement at least endorsing pact in principle and indicating intention to use any military assistance received in interests of collective regional defense within that context.

It seems to us that endorsement of pact is if anything a less difficult step for Iraq Government than would be signature of military aid agreement. Since all principal Iraqi leaders have assured us they want to join pact in due course, we think they should be willing to show their good faith and good intentions publicly if only as evidence that they will not allow Arab League or other pressures to divert them from policies envisaged in our military aid programs.

We could not of course go along with Nuri's apparent desire to convert pact into outright military alliance made operable merely by an attack by one Near Eastern State on another. We assume this is only a bargaining position on his part. End FYI.

DULLES

No. 1410

787.5 MSP/4–1154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 15, 1954—2:45 p. m.

577. For Ambassador. Your tel 611 [2] is being given fullest consideration. Regret inform you, however, we believe it will be necessary postpone or stall on negotiations, thus leaving them at their present point, until matter has been considered by NSC. Under present conditions, this may take some time.

Deptel 566 [3] was drafted to give you best presentation we could conceive for sounding out Iraqi intentions without mentioning our most basic concern. Since time of Secretary's trip through area and NSC decision on policy of assisting militarily states such as Iraq, Arab-Israeli situation has grown increasingly more dangerous. If Iraq could see her way clear to join Turkey–Pakistan pact we would have good public case for providing her with military equipment. If on other hand she is publicly on record as opposing such a move, and we have no commitment whatsoever that she intends to make move, answer to critics in this country who see Iraq associated only with Arab states and their rash statements regarding use

[1] Drafted by Byroade and cleared in draft by Smith.
[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.
[3] *Supra*.

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of force against Israel is far less convincing. Also in Iraq's own interests it is important that best possible justification exist here for extending military assistance as this bound to affect in Congress our ability to follow through in worthwhile manner. We must try at all costs avoid situation where at each appropriation hearing the wisdom of our decision would be questioned with resultant doubt as to our ability to obtain funds or danger of having them extremely limited.

Believe, although your views on effect of delay appreciated, best tactic is for you, in your discretion, either to stall or to inform Iraqis you are under instructions to suspend negotiations temporarily. In either case, in response to their queries you might tell them you do not know the reasons for delay but that you assume Washington may be in the midst of fundamental review entire matter. You could then use some or all of points contained in Deptel 566 as your speculation of what might be under review. If Iraq is really serious about going ahead this procedure might evoke a response from her which would be helpful in NSC consideration.

Deeply regret our inability to meet your recommendations on this important matter near close of your many years of fine service. Our hope is that we will still succeed and in manner which will in long run be to mutual benefit of both Iraq and our own country. On other hand, we feel position you have established in Iraq will help you to obtain better setting for decision, if that is possible at all, and know you will do your utmost prior your departure.

SMITH

No. 1411

787.5 MSP/4-1654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY BAGHDAD, April 16, 1954—7 p. m.

621. For Byroade from Berry. With heavy heart I finished reading Deptel 577 of April 15. [1] Somehow the Embassy has failed to convince the Department how important the US–Iraq bilateral military aid agreement is for obtaining our national objectives in the ME.

As I see the picture the agreement is the foundation stone of a structure we are building in the ME that is capable of halting the advance of communism. By it Iraq becomes the first Arab state to

[1] *Supra.*

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thus win [*throw in*?] her lot openly with the west. Through it the Turk–Pakistan pact will come to have a real validity, and through it other Arab states may be led to similar cooperation. By means of our influence, exercised increasingly as Iraqis knit closer to us, we would bring Iraqi attention to focus more and more on the dangers of communism and the need to combat such danger through internal reforms. This approach, applied with skill and perseverence, can crack the hostile Arab ring around Israel and, with Israeli cooperation, can assure the peaceful survival of that country.

The Department's decision, which at this time is tantamount to a withdrawal of the US offer of military aid to Iraq, will be interpreted locally as giving the lie to the President's wise words on the strategic importance of the ME, to the belief in greater understanding of Arab views that bloomed after Secretary Dulles visit to the area, and to your own speeches. Today [*To say*?] even to ourselves that we will "leave the matter in abeyance" for the time being is as illusionary as was the statement that we would "wait for the dust to settle" after the tragic decision was taken concerning China. In Iraq today we have a great opportunity. We are losing it, and may never again have a similar one.

By the Department's action we set in motion in Iraq a whole series of events that seem to me to be inimicable to our objectives in Iraq and the ME. The news can only increase the frustration and disillusionment of Prime Minister Jamali who has from the first welcomed and accepted the agreement, asking only for changes in language to increase his ability to sell it to the public. I fear, therefore, he may resign shortly and we will, thereby, have lost the most outspoken of all Arab leaders against communism as well as the Iraqi official who is most convinced of the desirability of Arab cooperation with the west. He will probably be followed as Prime Minister by one of the "old gang". This will provide the opportunity for those who wish to change the order of things in Iraq through unlawful processes. The development of the pattern from there on is well known: The merging of the interests of the Nationalists and Communists into a common front, the beginning of government by mob action, denunciation of the British treaty, old nationalization, and fostering campaigns to rid the country of foreigners. I beg you to bend every effort in NSC review to see that the decision is taken in Washington that will halt this deteriorating process in Iraq; with its chain reaction throughout the ME.

In my reports I have honestly set forth the facts as I see them and tried to state clearly my opinions and recommendations with which the members of the Embassy working with me are in complete agreement. Now, as the Department has given its decision, I shall carry it out to the very best of my ability according to my

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instructions. I shall ask to see the Prime Minister tomorrow and early in the week, the King and Crown Prince. As my work here now is done, I shall plan to leave Baghdad by the end of next week. I trust the Department will make an appropriate announcement. I expect to say in making my farewell calls and to the press, when queried, that months ago I asked for retirement at the end of this assignment and the request has been granted. If you have objections to any of my final official actions in Iraq as proposed above please send me a niact message.

BERRY

No. 1412

787.5 MSP/4-1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, April 18, 1954—11 a. m.

624. Regarding Deptel 577, April 15. [2] This morning I called on Prime Minister Jamali who, in spite of illness, got out of bed to receive me. I informed him that I had received instructions to suspend temporarily negotiations on the military aid agreement. I said that I did not know the reasons for the delay but I assumed Washington might be in the midst of a fundamental review of the entire matter. I added that in exploring my mind for the reasons I speculated that the Arab League communiqué of April 1, [3] which I then read to him, had a bearing on the matter.

I commented that in the face of such a position the conclusion of our military aid agreement at this time might increase the difficulties of the Iraq Government. While it was true that the United States has been willing to consider military aid to Iraq without insisting upon its adherence to the Turkish-Pakistan pact, we were counting on the clear-cut recognition by Iraq of her interests in regional defense against outside aggression, and her willingness to cooperate with other states who also see the dangers.

The Cairo communiqué casts doubt upon this expectation. If the doubt is unfounded it should be removed. It would seem timely for Iraq to consult with Turkey and Pakistan and determine whether or not it wished to associate itself in some form of mutually satis-

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[1] Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, and London.

[2] Document 1410.

[3] The communiqué is quoted in telegram 566 to Baghdad, Document 1409.

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factory cooperative agreement before we attempt to move further in our military understanding with Iraq.

The Prime Minister said there was nothing he could say in reply except that "we are losing time". It was impossible for him to place himself more than he had at the service of the West. He wished to receive US military aid. He believed in the Turkish-Pakistan pact but Iraqi adherence had to come at the proper time. He made no comment on my suggestion that he seek talks with Turkey and Pakistan.

He said that in becoming Prime Minister he had developed three avenues for combatting Communism in Iraq: (1) development of political organization and stability; (2) development of the country; and (3) development of defense capabilities, with the international alignments necessary to this end. These alignments had to come step by step and with careful advance preparation of public opinion. He had now met reverses on all three approaches but he would continue to work for his objectives in and out of office.

He also commented that he was inclined to believe we were making too much of the Cairo statement. The Iraqi Ambassador there had not been authorized to make it and it had been badly translated. Nevertheless, he felt that the decision to suspend negotiations arose not from the statement or from Arab League action or local events but rather from "unfortunate trends" in Washington under Israeli pressures. [4]

BERRY

[4] Telegram 584 to Baghdad, Apr. 17, authorized the Ambassador to suspend the action ordered in telegram 577, pending further word from the Department of State concerning telegram 621, Apr. 16, *supra*. Telegram 625 from Baghdad, Apr. 18, informed the Department that upon receipt of telegram 584, the Ambassador telephoned the Prime Minister and asked him to consider the conversation described here as personal and confidential until the Ambassador could talk with him again. Documentation is in Department of State file 787.5 MSP.

No. 1413

787.5 MSP/4-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, April 19, 1954—6:06 p. m.

588. After further study, Department has decided authorize signature of MDAP agreement with Iraq on condition proviso can be attached indicating that US will take into account international

[1] Drafted by Jernegan and cleared by NE and U.

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position in area in determining amount, character and timing of aid. Believe this can be accomplished unobtrusively by amending introductory paragraph agreement (Deptel 438 [2]) as follows: In second sentence, put period after "Government of Iraq" and strike remainder of sentence. Insert new sentence as follows: "Such assistance will be provided subject to the provisions of applicable legislative authority and will be related in character, timing and amount to international developments in the area." Iraqis should understand that it may be necessary publicize agreement at time signing announced.

They should also understand that the agreement will be publicly criticized by various factions in this country and that the Secretary will have to justify the action in terms of defense against communist penetration and possible aggression. In response to attacks the Department will state its concern over the lack of defensive capabilities in the Middle East and its desire to see northern tier states strengthened against the possibilities of such dangers from the north. It would be stated that this and maintenance internal security are sole objectives of US assistance to the area. We would say that military aid is not given for any other purpose, and firm assurance has been obtained from Iraq, as from all other recipients of US military assistance, that her policy is one of legitimate self-defense. We would recall that in his statement of February 25 regarding US aid to Pakistan, the President re-examined the attitude of this Government regarding the misuse of US military aid for aggressive purposes. Should there be developments in the Near East showing that the policies of any government in that area receiving our military aid were no longer based on considerations of legitimate self-defense, the United States Government would immediately re-assess not only its aid program, but its basic policy towards the countries concerned.

This proposed new language in preamble could be put to Iraqis on ground that it designed to replace reference to Tripartite Agreement, eliminated at their request, and that it is minimum needed reassure US public opinion that program of arms assistance will not be permitted further inflame situation NE. Ambassador might point out Iraqis that we have moved considerable distance from usual pattern aid agreements in effort meet special problems of Iraqis and hope that they able go this far in meeting problem real concern to US.

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[2] Regarding telegram 438 to Baghdad, Feb. 18, see Document 1404.

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If Iraqis willing accept this language, Ambassador authorized propose concessions on details set forth in Deptel 586, [3] which we believe should meet remaining points outstanding.

DULLES

[3] Dated Apr. 19, not printed. (787.5 MSP/4-154)

No. 1414

780.5/4-2054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, April 20, 1954—5 p. m.

631. Yesterday I told Nuri Pasha that it was my understanding that the Turks sometime ago had issued a clear invitation for Iraq to associate itself with the Turkish-Pakistani pact and that it was now Iraq's move. As concerns his suggestions as made to me following his return from Pakistan, I told him that I had reported these to Washington and that it was the general feeling that such was a matter for the Iraqis to work out with Pakistanis and Turks. He replied that he would talk some more to Pakistanis and suggest that they inform our Ambassador of developments. He inquired if our Ambassador in Karachi would have the authority to "approve" what might be agreed upon between the Iraqis and Pakistanis. I told him that I felt that our Ambassador would be pleased to be informed of all developments, but, unless his intructions were very different from mine, his first action would be to report to Washington.

Nuri said that immediately after he had told me of his recent trip (mytel 590, April 5 [2]) he had written a report for the Prime Minister. A copy of this report he had sent to King Saud and he had just received a letter from King Saud commenting upon it. The second copy he had given the Turk Ambassador yesterday, and after translating Ambassador was sending it to Ankara. He said that he still hoped to go to Ankara but at the present time he had nothing to say beyond that said in his report as given to me, King Saud and the Turk Ambassador, and so was not planning a trip until sometime next month.

[1] Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, and Jidda.

[2] Document 202. Despatch 749 from Baghdad, Apr. 27, enclosed a translation of the formal report Nuri Said submitted to Prime Minister Jamali on his return from his trip to Pakistan and India. (780.5/4-2754)

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He informed me that he might go to Geneva for a few days early in May where he would meet many personalities. When I asked if the local political situation would permit him to be away in early May, he replied that only time would tell. He said he desired to let the present government carry on if it did its duty as it had good men in it, mentioning particularly Deputy Prime Minister Baban and Minister Interior Qazzaz, and that they were putting pressure at appropriate times on Dr. Jamali to exert leadership necessary to carry through the government's program. He then added that the army and police had been working so hard to save the city of Baghdad from drowning that they were incapable at the moment of handling serious demonstrations. Therefore, until the flood waters were no longer a threat and the army and police were in a position to handle demonstrations, Baban, Qazzaz and other like-minded cabinet members were not desirous of pressing the government into taking a position publicly on controversial matters. On the other hand, the elements of instability were trying to press the government into taking openly positions on controversial matters while the security forces were off balance. He commented that the next ten days would be interesting.

BERRY

No. 1415

Editorial Note

Telegram 637 from Baghdad, April 23, reported a meeting between Ambassador Berry and Prime Minister Jamali on April 20. At that time, they reached agreement on the final points to be covered in the note on military aid. The Ambassador told Jamali that in view of the special internal legal problem in Iraq, the United States would not insist on using the word "agreement" in the final paragraph of its note, but would use the word "understanding" instead. The United States did, however, consider the exchange of notes to constitute an international agreement and would eventually publish the notes and register them with the United Nations. The Prime Minister agreed.

On the morning of April 21, the Ambassador called at the Foreign Office and formally presented a fresh draft of the United States note on military aid for Iraq. Acting Foreign Minister Jamali read a translation of a draft reply he had already prepared, which the Ambassador considered acceptable. The Council of Ministers and the King approved the Iraqi reply later that same day,

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and Jamali officially presented the Iraqi note to Ambassador Berry that evening. (787.5 MSP/4–2354)

Despatch 755 from Baghdad, April 28, enclosed a certified copy of the Embassy's Note No. 677 of April 21, regarding United States arms assistance to Iraq; the signed original of the reply by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and a translation by the Embassy of the Iraqi note. (787.5 MSP/42854) For the text, see TIAS No. 3108, 5 UST (pt. 3), page 2497.

No. 1416

Editorial Note

On May 7, 1954, Brigadier General Harry F. Meyers, Chief of the Joint Military Survey Team to the Middle East, and the members of his team met with John D. Jernegan in Jernegan's office. The meeting was held to discuss arrangements to advise the Embassy in Baghdad on the types of assistance available under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. Members of the Survey Team requested that the information be transmitted to the Government of Iraq prior to the arrival of the Survey Team. After a discussion of the desired relationship between members of the Survey Team and the British military attaché to Iraq, the participants in the meeting decided the team would stress the fact-finding nature of its mission and indicate a final report could not be given until after their return to Washington. According to the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding of February 26 (Document 1407), the team was obliged to consult with the United Kingdom before recommending a definite program of assistance for Iraq. (Memorandum for the Record, prepared in the Department of Defense; NEA files, lot 57 D 177, "Iraq")

Telegram 639 to Baghdad, May 7, advised the Embassy in Baghdad that a five-man military Survey Team under General Meyers was scheduled to arrive in Baghdad on May 13. The Embassy was asked to inform the Government of Iraq that the team's terms of reference were restricted to requirements for military equipment and training, and did not include such matters as economic developmental assistance, defense support assistance, or nonmilitary technical assistance. The Department of State did not wish the Iraqi Government to be informed of the existence of the February 26 memorandum with the United Kingdom, but believed it should be informed of close consultations between the United States and the United Kingdom. (711.5887/5–754)

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No. 1417

711.5887/5-2454: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Ireland) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, May 24, 1954—2 p. m.

714. General Harry Meyers and survey team [2] departed Baghdad May 23 for Washington, ETA morning May 28. Visit, including contacts with Iraqis, visit to Army installations and field trip to Kurdistan Mountains, appears to have been highly satisfactory from point of view both parties. Friendly atmosphere on all sides. No incidents or disturbances. Iraqi political and military authorities cooperated fully, competently providing required information and [garble] review installations. Team impressed by Iraqi military organization, high quality officers and potentialities of defense.

Prior to departure General Meyers read prepared statement to Foreign Minister, Minister Defense Chief of Staff and selected group Iraqi officers. He reiterated nature teams mission, method of procedure, including that of decision on priorities of equipment. Explained need for possible offshore procurement. Emphasized his report would be prepared Washington and that implementation would require time. Stated in conclusion that he would recommend:

a. That a military aid program for Iraq be initiated with the least possible delay, and

b. That a military assistance advisory group be established in Iraq at the earliest possible date in order to coordinate the initial program and make plans for the receipt and transfer of the equipment.

In short reply, Foreign Minister expressed appreciation for team's visit which he regarded as second step in US-Iraqi cooperation, first being conclusion of understanding. Stated Iraq looked forward to further steps in developing commom interest between two countries.

Team subsequently received in audience by King.

General Meyers commented, prior to departure, Palestine question had not been raised by any Iraqi. Said it was his impression that military have little or no interest in Israel but are concentrating full attention on preparing defenses to east and northeast.

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[1] Repeated to London, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Ankara, and Paris.

[2] For additional information on the visit of the survey team, see the editorial note, *supra*.

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Text General Meyers statement and details by pouch. [3]

IRELAND

[3] Despatch 832 from Baghdad, June 1, transmitted an account of the visit of the survey team to Iraq from May 13 to May 23. (787.5 MSP/6–154)

No. 1418

611.87/7–2254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 22, 1954.

Subject: Conversation between Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq, and the Secretary at dinner on Saturday, July 17th.

Participants: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq
The Secretary
Mr. Henry A. Byroade, NEA

In a side conversation at the dinner by the Iraqi Ambassador on Saturday, July 17th, Jamali again raised with the Secretary the question of federation moves with Syria. The Secretary was most emphatic with Jamali that any moves in this direction prior to Iraq joining the Turkish-Pakistan Pact would be a great mistake as far as the United States is concerned. The Secretary explained to Jamali the difficulties he had encountered domestically in going through with the military aid agreement with Iraq. We had gone ahead with this project in the conviction that Iraq would move to tie herself more closely to Turkey and Pakistan and the so-called "northern tier" grouping. If now it proved that Iraq's next move was to the south, and towards Israel, this would place us in a most difficult position. The Secretary indicated he might have to re-examine our action under the US-Iraqi military aid agreement. Jamali seemed somewhat taken back by the Secretary's remarks and asked if such a move would be tolerable from the United States point of view *after* Iraq's joining with Turkey and Pakistan. The Secretary replied that in that case the move might be "tolerable" as far as we were concerned.

[1] A handwritten note in the margin indicates that the Secretary approved the memorandum of conversation.

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No. 1419

780.5/9-3054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 7, 1954—6:35 p. m.

430. Embtel 368. [2] Department continues support Northern Tier concept looking toward arrangements between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan preferably within framework Turk-Pakistan Pact as most realistic basis for development Middle East defense. Although complex political problems in Arab world virtually eliminate possibility substantial early progress we have no desire discourage efforts enlarge capabilities ALCSP to contribute to area defense. We believe Turk-Pakistan Pact and ALCSP should be regarded as complementary rather than mutually exclusive arrangements. We also aware elaboration ALCSP as basis Middle East defense organization presents certain attractions to UK which is faced with problem rationalizing Anglo-Iraqi relations at expiration present treaty.

Since US not prepared abandon or diminish support Northern Tier concept which represents best hope for realization real military collaboration and certain amount military strength we would be keenly disappointed if Iraq were defer steps looking toward close and effective military planning and collaboration with Turkey Iran and Pakistan. For this reason we are pleased at Nuri's reported intention approach Turkey, Pakistan, and possibley Iran. (London 1724 Dept rptd Ankara 32, Baghdad 12, Unnumbered Cairo, Karachi, Damascus, Tehran.)

Foregoing views may be communicated Turks accordance Prime Minister's request. On appropriate occasion we will make our position clear in direct conversation with Iraqis; however we would prefer these views not be attributed to US during Turk conversations with Nuri.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Anschuetz, and cleared by NE, GTI, and Defense-OMA. Repeated to London, Tehran, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, Baghdad, and Karachi.

[2] Dated Sept. 30, not printed. It reported that Nuri Said was expected to arrive in Turkey on Oct. 9 or 10, following a trip to Egypt and London. The Ambassador informed the Department of State the Turkish Prime Minister would welcome an indication of the U.S. position on the general subject of the association of Iraq with Pakistan and Turkey. (780.5/9-3054)

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No. 1420

611.87/10-1154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula–Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1954.

Participants: Dr. Moussa Al-Shabandar, Iraqi Ambassador
The Secretary
NE—Mr. Fritzlan

The Ambassador called to say good-bye to the Secretary before his departure on October 14 to take up his post as Iraqi Foreign Minister. He expressed his appreciation for the friendly reception he had received here and said we could count upon him to continue the Iraqi Government's policy of friendship for the United States and the West. Mr. Dulles expressed pleasure that the Ambassador was about to assume the post of Foreign Minister and said he looked forward to continuation of cordial relations.

The Secretary alluded to the "northern tier" regional defense arrangement and said we hoped Iraq would take steps in the near future to associate herself to the Turkish-Pakistan pact which we believed could develop into an effective defense arrangement. Dr. Shabandar said he personally strongly favored Iraqi adherence to the pact and believed the Government felt likewise. However, opposition had developed from other Arab states, especially Egypt, primarily on the question of timing. Nevertheless, he believed Iraq should and would proceed alone if necessary to join in efforts to achieve an effective "northern tier" defense plan. He stated, however, that it was often difficult to move as fast as the Government would like because of the question of Israel and our support for this state.

The Secretary said he was not asking Iraq to make public declarations of solidarity with the United States. The question of Iraq's foreign policy was a matter for Iraq itself to decide. However, he should know that we had a great deal of confidence in the "northern tier" plan and felt Iraq's interests would be suited better by joining such an arrangement than by campaigning for federation among Arab states. He mentioned his conversation in July on this subject with Dr. Jamali and reiterated his feeling that Iraq should adhere to the Turkish-Pakistan pact before directing its attention toward federation with Syria or other Arab states. The Secretary added that our military assistance to Iraq was based largely upon the belief that Iraq would adhere to the pact.

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On the matter of Israel, the Secretary said he felt he should repeat what he had told Mr. Eban, i.e., that the United States had no intention of assuming an unfriendly attitude toward the Arab states in order to become ingratiated with Israel. Likewise, he said, the United States had no intention of being unfriendly toward Israel in order to please the Arab states. A policy of fair impartiality had been instituted when he became Secretary of State and it was our intention to continue this policy even at the expense of losing votes in political elections.

The Ambassador expressed satisfaction over the Secretary's remarks.

In conclusion Dr. Shabandar raised several questions regarding the military assistance program and asked that we do everything possible to expedite the initial shipments. This would strengthen the Government's hand in foreign policy matters as well as in dealing with internal subversive activities. He was informed that our MAAG had arrived in Baghdad approximately a month ago and the Department understood that sizeable shipments of equipment are expected to be made shortly and should arrive in Iraq before the end of the year.

No. 1421

780.5/11–254: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Ireland) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, November 2, 1954—11 a. m.

273. Although Embassy has had no opportunity to discuss in detail with Prime Minister current status GIs regional defense thinking, Department's attention is invited to summarized minutes of Ankara talks obtained from Nuri and reported in Embtel 276. [2] Nuri's reported approach to Menderes placing primary emphasis on alleged Israeli threat (Ankara telegram 441 [3]) need not be taken overly seriously for Prime Minister adept any tailoring his argument to fit listener on hand. In Embassy's view reported statement is out of keeping with what we know to be Nuri's actual thinking on this score. Although he has stated in past that 95 percent of Iraqi public see Israel as principal menace and only 9 percent understand true nature Soviet danger, we believe Nuri belongs to

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[1] Repeated to Ankara, Cairo, Karachi, Tehran, London, Paris, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] *Infra.*

[3] Document 233.

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latter group and his defense concepts conditioned by full appreciation of threat from north.

Sources close to Nuri confirm distinct impression given in already cited summarized minutes that he clearly better disposed towards Turks since his Ankara visit and add his earlier fears re possible Turkish irredentist intentions appear be considerably assuaged. They feel that if present mood persists initialling of Iraqi-Turk bilateral defense agreement is strong possibility during or shortly after forthcoming Menderes visit to Baghdad.

Embassy inclined to believe Nuri has not yet planned his precise course of action and British concur in our estimate. Iraqi approach to Pakistan, however, has been one of few invariables in Nuri's regional defense concept from very outset and doubtless remains so. Embassy has no indication of reported preference for Turkish rather than Iraqi approach to Syrians and summarized minutes would seem to suggest that either party free take up matter with Syrians. Current hesitation re early Iranian adherence is, in our view, temporary phenomena and results from recent revelations re extensive Communist infiltration into Iranian Army. Embassy convinced ultimate Iranian adherence remains one of Nuri's goals.

While we share hope of Menderes that regional defense concept through series of bilateral agreements in process of developing and that they may ultimately lead to stabilization Arab-Israeli issue, we believe latter contingency still somewhat remote. Doubtless, however, any Turkish effort induce Israelis forego unlimited immigration and agree to internationalization Jerusalem will be greatly appreciated here. Establishment Israeli-Arab boundaries along present cease-fire lines may well require considerably more persuasion.

In any event, Embassy believes present favorable trend toward development of indigenous regional defense structure, even though it be through series bilateral accords rather than direct adherence Turk-Pakistan pact, deserves our sympathetic encouragement. Our interest is in effectiveness of regional defense scheme rather than form.

IRELAND

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No. 1422

780.5/11-254: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Ireland) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, November 2, 1954—1 p. m.

276. Prime Minister has given Embassy copy of summarized minutes of recent discussions held with Menderes and staff in Ankara. [2] Although full translation being despatched, substance of report follows.

Nuri expressed his basic position by stating Iraqi security tied to that of Turkey and Iran. He had always emphasized to Arab League States necessity of cooperation with Turkey. Egyptian Government's acceptance of thesis that an attack on Turkey would be reason invoke reoccupation clauses of Anglo-Egyptian Suez agreement indicative that Egypt too desires closer ties with Turkey. He had personally made it clear to Egypt that great harm might be done to Iraq should any delay occur in realizing cooperation with Turkey, and believed Iran and Syria should likewise participate soonest. Such action would catalyze other Arab States to follow suit. Process of effecting such cooperation would be facilitated if Turkey seized every opportunity to demonstrate its sincere feelings towards Arabs.

Menderes reportedly expressed his satisfaction over Nuri's remarks and stated Turkey determined show its friendship for Arab States. Any past shortcomings on this score regrettable and caused only by its failure understand fully reaction which certain acts might produce in Arab States if he himself had responded at once to Jamal Abdul Nasser's recent "positive" statements re Turkey. Turkish objective is to insure defense of area comprising Turkey and Arab States and consolidate Turko-Arab cooperation, which is in accord with Turkish-Pakistan pact. Such cooperation, he opined, would enhance possibility US and UK aid to area.

After foregoing exchange of basic positions, Nuri and Menderes reached agreement on following:

1. Security of Turkey and Iraq hinges upon establishment of cooperation with their neighbors. Best means realize this is for Arab States join with Iran and Pakistan. Iraq and Turkey should consult on all attempts they may make to attain said objective and take all measures to this end jointly.

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[1] Repeated to Ankara, Cairo, Karachi, Tehran, London, Paris, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, and Amman.

[2] Despatch 191 from Baghdad, Nov. 2, transmitted the text of the summarized minutes under reference here. (780.5/11-254)

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2. Effort will be made in forthcoming Iraqi and Turkish discussions with Egypt to persuade latter joint proposed grouping, or at least enable latter adhere subsequently.

3. Turkey and Iraq will consult on any efforts they may make re Syria, Iran and Pakistan.

4. Nuri defined role of Iraq in defense of area in following terms: (*a*) safeguard Iraq's eastern boundary and passes against enemy land forces, (*b*) take defense measures re air or atomic attacks on its oil wells, (*c*) facilitate arrival of any assistance which may be despatched to Turkey via Iraq.

5. Nuri emphasized to Menderes that constant measures should be taken to check Communist and Zionist propaganda which opposes any *rapprochement* between Turkey and Arab States and asked Menderes "several times" that Turkey tangibly demonstrate its cordial feelings towards Arab States. Menderes reportedly replied he would be pleased take all measures in this sphere and expressed his satisfaction over action taken to date against Communists by Iraq and Egypt.

6. Two Prime Ministers agreed re necessity rendering mutual assistance in economic field and implementing provisions of economic and cultural agreements of 1946 which have thus far been dormant.

IRELAND

No. 1423

611.87/11-454

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1954.

Subject: Visit of Dr. Jamali to Secretary

Participants: Dr. Jamali, Head of Iraqi Delegation to U.N. General Assembly
Mr. Hashim Khalil, Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires
The Secretary
NEA—Mr. Byroade
NE—Mr. Fritzlan

Dr. Jamali called by pre-arrangement to discuss several subjects with the Secretary. At the outset he expressed his warm appreciation for the forthright stand the United States Government has taken in an effort to achieve and carry out a policy of impartiality as between Arabs and Israelis. He said he was well aware that the Secretary had been subjected to considerable pressures from Zionist groups in the United States, especially on the question of military assistance to Iraq.

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As regards such assistance, Dr. Jamali made a plea for early and impressive shipments which would strengthen the Prime Minister's hand in taking action on questions related to regional defense. In particular, Dr. Jamali, acting on instructions from his Government, asked that we make available quantities of tanks and training aircraft. The Secretary said he was not aware of the details of our military assistance program, and Mr. Byroade stated that he had just learned of the request for tanks. He said this was a matter which would require careful study in the light of a number of factors. It was our plan to build up to full strength the two divisions of the Iraqi army before considering the possible establishment of new units. Furthermore, it was our policy not to disturb the present arrangement under which Iraq obtains most of its military equipment from the United Kingdom. Dr. Jamali stated that he understood this but unfortunately the British were at this time unable to make available the equipment he mentioned.

The Secretary strongly supported the idea of Iraq strengthening its relations with Turkey and joining the Turkey-Pakistan pact, and said such action by the Iraqi Government would make it easier for the United States to justify provision of military equipment of the type Dr. Jamali had mentioned. Dr. Jamali agreed and said he believed the Prime Minister planned to take early action after the meeting of Parliament next month to associate Iraq in some manner with the pact.

Dr. Jamali then raised the question of Israel, reiterating the lack of aggressive intentions of the Arab states and particularly Iraq. He added, however, that it was out of the question for Iraq or any other Arab state to make peace with Israel except on the basis of United Nations General Assembly resolutions and he hoped we would fully realize this. He knew the Secretary was constantly being bombarded with Jewish propaganda regarding alleged aggressive designs of the Arab states and the desirability of the United States taking some action to bring about peace. The key to peace lay only in the hands of Israel, and the United States could perform a very useful service by using its influence to cause Israel to recognize Arab rights in Palestine as set forth by the United Nations and take measures which would make it possible to bring about a settlement and eventual peace. However, the fact that Arabs had no intention of making peace on Israeli terms was a different thing from saying that they had aggressive designs. For his part he would gladly repeat statements he had already made regarding lack of any aggressive intentions on the part of Iraq.

Mr. Byroade inquired if Dr. Jamali thought it would be feasible for the Arab states to make a declaration at the next Arab League meeting affirming their lack of aggressive intentions against Israel.

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Dr. Jamali said he doubted if certain states such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen would agree to do so but he felt on an individual basis a number of states would be willing. He felt certain the Iraqi Government would be favorably disposed.

Allusion was made to the status of Jerusalem and Dr. Jamali deplored the fact that Ambassador Lawson was expected to present his credentials to the Israeli President in Jerusalem. He feared this would be the prelude to further actions on our part which would amount to recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. The Secretary explained our view that our Ambassador should present his credentials to the President at his place of residence, which happened to be Jerusalem. No political significance should be attached to such a procedure, nor should it be expected that we planned in any way to modify our stand on Jerusalem. Our Embassy would continue to be situated in Tel Aviv.

Dr. Jamali brought up the subject of Tunisia and Morocco and complained bitterly over reports that the French were shooting large numbers of Tunisian nationals. He said this did not conform with their apparent policy of conciliation and reform. The Secretary said he had discussed this problem with Mendes-France recently in Paris, and Mr. Byroade stated that our Ambassador there had also raised the question with the Prime Minister. It was naturally hoped that developments in North Africa could take place in an atmosphere of calm and order.

Before departing Dr. Jamali mentioned briefly his pet project of an American technical educational institution in Baghdad. The Secretary and Mr. Byroade expressed their support for the idea of enlisting the aid of private foundations in the United States. Mr. Byroade said the matter had been explored to some extent but the results so far had not been very hopeful. It was generally agreed that efforts in this direction should continue.

No. 1424

611.87/11-654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1954.

Subject; Discussion with Dr. Jamali on U.S.-Iraqi Relations

Participants: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Head of Iraqi Delegation to U.N. General Assembly
NEA—Mr. Byroade
NE—Mr. Fritzlan

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Pursuing the question of military assistance for Iraq, which was raised with the Secretary on November 4, [1] Dr. Jamali reiterated to Mr. Byroade the importance of a few tanks and planes for training purposes. This equipment would be symbolic in nature and appear as a token of what might be expected in the years to come. Dr. Jamali said Iraq had definitely committed itself to cooperate with the United States in defense matters and would like to be considered a full partner with the United States in defense planning. If assistance was to be effective it would have to consist of considerably more than vehicles, signalling equipment, etc. Otherwise Iraqis would reluctantly conclude that Zionist pressures had been effective in restraining the Department and the Pentagon.

Mr. Byroade said that Iraq should definitley consider itself a partner with the United States in defense planning. He outlined the reasons for elaborating the present assistance program. He pointed out that in building up an army it was necessary first to bring to full strength existing units. It was our purpose to do this insofar as the two divisions of Iraqi army were concerned. This necessitated the supply of a number of items which had little "glamour" attached to them but were nevertheless indespensable. It would be inadvisable to ship items such as tanks which would necessitate the creation of whole new units and the construction of new facilities such as bridges, etc. Mr. Byroade then mentioned the shortage of money available to the United States Government for military assistance throughout the world, emphasizing the heavy demands for assistance in other quarters. He said this whole question would be carefully reviewed with the Secretary before a final decision was made. However, he could not be encouraging to Dr. Jamali as to the result.

The discussion then shifted to the general subject of U.S. relations with Israel and the Arab states. Mr. Byroade explained at length the difficult position in which the United States Government finds itself. He said that the great majority of the American people, quite apart from the Zionists, found it difficult to understand why we were giving military assistance to Iraq while denying such help to Israel. People could not understand why this was being done in view of the technical existence of a state of war between Israel and the Arab states and belligerent statements made from time to time against Israel by Arab leaders. Dr. Jamali reiterated the non-aggressive intentions of Iraq, and Mr. Byroade said he personally accepted such assurances and believed our policy was on

[1] Memorandum of conversation of Nov. 4, *supra*.

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sound ground. However, real problems arose in explaining such matters convincingly to the public and this question was not essentially a political one. We had good arguments and presented them but there was a need for the Arab states to help us in this matter.

Dr. Jamali repeated his well-known views about the Arab rights in Palestine and his position that it was up to Israel to take steps to reduce tension. He added that Palestine should be left aside in considering the United States military assistance program for Iraq. The Department was well aware of lack of Iraqi intentions to attack Israel. During the negotiations for military assistance the question of Iraq modifying its policy on the Palestine question had never arisen. It should not now therefore be considered that the assistance program should in any way be dependent upon Iraq modifying its position. Iraq could not change its attitude as long as Arab rights in Palestine were ignored. Iraq had a long standing anti-communist record both at home and in world affairs and the Iraqi record in the United Nations on important matters relating to world communism would bear a favorable comparison with that of Israel. He stated that if the present anti-communist measures of the Iraqi Government, undertaken by leaders who were completely pro-Western in sympathy, should fail it was highly likely leftist and neutralist groups would gain power. It was therefore important to do everything possible to uphold the position of these leaders.

Mr. Byroade expressed general agreement over this objective. Reverting to the question of Israel he said he thought it unrealistic of the Arabs to insist upon the implementation of the 1947 United Nations General Assembly resolution on Palestine. Enforcement of this resolution would radically change the territorial boundary of Israel and this could be accomplished only by force since no Israeli government could accede to changes of such a magnitude. He wished to assure Dr. Jamali that the United States could never contemplate using its forces to achieve this purpose.

As a possible means of alleviating the situation Mr. Byroade suggested that the United States might consider giving Israel some military assistance. Dr. Jamali's immediate reaction was that this might not be a bad idea, providing, of course, that such assistance were considered in a regional context and that Israel was not given an amount of aid equal to that received by all the Arab states. Subsequently, he said he would like to think over this matter more carefully before expressing his view as to its merits. He agreed to think over the whole problem and try to find some feasible way of reducing tension and thereby assist the Department in carrying out its program for the Near East.

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At the conclusion of his visit Dr. Jamali asked briefly about our relations with other Arab states. Mr. Byroade said matters in Saudi Arabia were proceeding in a happier atmosphere than had been the case several months ago. We believed we could be reasonably hopeful regarding future development in Egypt. As regards Syria, there had been little development in our relations on account of the absence in Syria of a government which could do business. There was no time left to discuss our relations with other Arab states and, having expressed pleasure over the opportunity to spend a full hour with Mr. Byroade, Dr. Jamali took his departure.

Subsequently, Dr. Jamali told Mr. Fritzlan he had meant to inform Mr. Byroade that, should the United States Government agree to provide military assistance to Egypt without conclusion of an agreement similar to that which Iraq had signed, the reaction in Iraq would be most unfortunate. He wished to emphasize this point. Mr. Fritzlan agreed to convey this message to Mr. Byroade.

No. 1425

780.5/12-754: Despatch

The Ambassador in Iraq (Gallman) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, December 7, 1954.

No. 261

Ref: Ankara's telegram no. 541 to Department, November 21, 1954 [2]

Subject: Forthcoming Visit of Turkish Prime Minister

Within the past week in the course of conversations I had with the Turkish Ambassador, Muzaffer Goksenin, the Egyptian Ambassador, Tawfik I. Katamish, and Prime Minister Nuri, the forthcoming visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes was touched on.

The Turkish Ambassador, Muzaffer Goksenin, is a new arrival. My talk with him, referred to above, took place on November 30 when I returned his initial call on me. The talk with Ambassador Katamish took place at the Embassy here on December 2 when Katamish, who only recently returned from leave in Cairo, made a return call on me. I had the talk with Prime Minister Nuri on December 3 when he was my guest at luncheon at the Embassy.

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[1] This despatch was repeated to Ankara, Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Tehran, Karachi, Damascus, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.

[2] Not printed.

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This is Ambassador Goksenin's first diplomatic post. He is, as the Department will recall, a retired army and air force officer. Since retiring from the army a little over a year ago, he has been Governor of the Province of Izmir. He admitted to me that he has not had any serious talk as yet with Nuri on the subject of a defense pact. I gather that as Prime Minister Menderes himself will soon be here he is prudently keeping in the background. He did say, though, that he was present at the October talks in Istanbul and feels fully informed about the preliminaries leading to Menderes' decision to visit Baghdad. He has volunteered to clear up for me any questions I might at any time have about the Istanbul talks. He tells me that, according to present plans, Menderes will come here before visiting Cairo. Ambassador Goksenin says he is happy that he and Nuri have in common, service in the Turkish Army, and that Nuri is so thoroughly conversant in Turkish. He anticipates later close collaboration with Nuri.

The Egyptian Ambassador, Tawfik I. Katamish, when I first met him on November 23, brought up the subject of the Menderes visit and the general problem of the defense of the Middle East. Two matters seemed to preoccupy him, whether Menderes would come here before Cairo, which he hoped he would not do, and whether Nuri had already given any definite commitment to sign a pact with either Turkey or Pakistan, or both. When he called on me on December 3 he talked on these subjects at quite some length.

He talked as though it had been definitely arranged for Menderes to go to Cairo first. It was good, he said, that Turkey was beginning to show a real interest in the Arab States. Egypt, for her part, now that an agreement had been reached with Britain on the Suez, was freer to give thought and to act on matters affecting the Arab world. Before Iraq commits herself in any way on the defense of the area, there should be an exchange in Cairo between the Turkish and Egyptian Governments. He was wondering whether Nuri had committed himself. He hoped not. For Nuri to bind Iraq to the northern and western countries, ignoring his Arab neighbors, would be a serious mistake to his way of thinking. Should it come to war with the Soviet Union and a breakthrough in the Middle East, the Western powers would be too preoccupied in defending the West. What Iraq needed was defense in depth and that could come only through the closest association with her Arab neighbors.

Ambassador Katamish is most genial and a glib talker. I got the impression from listening to him that he is primarily airing his own views and fishing for bits of information to fill in some pressing gaps.

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In my talk with Nuri, having in mind the possible signing of a pact with Turkey, I asked Nuri what the effect might be on Iraq's relations with the Arab States of the signing of a bilateral pact with a non-Arab country. He promptly replied that he would have no hesitancy in signing such a pact and that there could be no ill effect of consequence on relations with other Arab States, because these states, notably Jordan and Saudi Arabia, already have such bilateral pacts of their own. When I said he must find the Turks very satisfactory to deal with, he said he certainly did, and then with an apparent show of impartiality, added immediately: "But that applies to working with the Pakistanis, too." Menderes, he said, was definitely coming here first before Cairo. He was happy about that, but he very much wanted to see the visit here followed up by a visit by Menderes to Cairo. "The Egyptians," he said, "need a push." Menderes could give them one, and then he hoped to see that visit followed up by a visit by King Faisal to Egypt. "That," he said, "would be the second push."

During our conversation Nuri made one general observation of interest on the defense problem. His Government, while wanting to see the Iraqi Army equipped with the best matériel available, wanted it understood that its force was not, however, big enough for Iraq to take on commitments to fight beyond its frontiers.

I was very much interested in reading in the memorandum of conversation of November 4 between the Secretary and Dr. Jamali, the Secretary's statement that Iraq's joining the Turkish-Pakistan pact would make it easier for the United States to provide Iraq with the type of military equipment Dr. Jamali had mentioned. It will be recalled that, as reported in my telegram no. 332 [3] of November 18, Nuri emphasized that it was essential to assure a steady, uniform supply of armament with assured maintenance and replacement throughout the area extending from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. In view of what passed between the Secretary and Dr. Jamali and this comment of Nuri, I would like at some time before too long to follow up the Secretary's statement to Jamali with a statement to Nuri that the way best to assure Iraq arms and replacements in keeping with the Turkish-Pakistan pattern would be for Iraq to adhere to the Turkish-Pakistan pact. To make such a statement to him prior to the Menderes visit might not be desirable as it might interfere with present plans for consummating a Turkish-Iraq agreement as a first step. The best time to make such a statement to Nuri would probably be immediately

[3] Not printed; it reported on a meeting the Ambassador and a military attaché had had that morning with Prime Minister Nuri Said. (787.5 MSP/11-1854)

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after the Menderes visit, whether or not a bilateral pact has been signed.

The Department's observations on the timing and feasibility of my making such a statement to Nuri would be appreciated.

W. J. GALLMAN

No. 1426

780.5/12-2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Gallman) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BAGHDAD, December 21, 1954—4 p.m.

381. I saw Prime Minister Nuri this morning at my request. I asked him whether the time of the visit of Prime Minister Menderes had now been definitely fixed; what the prospects were of signing a defense agreement during the visit; and what the present attitude was of Egypt on Iraq's proceeding independently at this time with some form of defense agreement, bilateral or regional.

Nuri replied that Menderes had said that he would be in Baghdad on January 6. He was not prepared to sign any kind of defense agreement during the Menderes visit. He needed clarification on certain points before he could sign any agreement. He hoped to get clarification before February. Some time in the course of February when the legislative calendar will have been pretty well cleared, he wanted to make statement in Parliament on regional defense. Egypt, he said, had made her present position clear when she looked with disfavor on Iraq going ahead at this time independently on any defense arangement.

In elaborating his statement on needed clarification, Nuri said that what he ultimately would like to have was a regional security pact based on Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter. But before he could make a move toward any kind of regional pact he would have to know how far the US and UK were prepared to go beyond their NATO commitments. These commitments, he observed, did cover Turkey.

At this point I reminded Nuri of our interest in seeing the northern frontier concept of defense come into being either through a step by step program, or through a single collective act. What we were concerned about was the vacuum now existing on the northern frontier between Turkey and Pakistan. If some initiative were

[1] Repeated to Ankara, London, Cairo, Paris, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

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taken by Iraq, I was sure the broader clarification he spoke of would follow in due course. It was hard for him, Nuri then went on to say, in view of Egypt's stand for example, to sign an agreement with Turkey now unless joined by the US and UK. Until the internal situation in Egypt, and for that matter in Syria too, became more stable, it was difficult for him to deal with those countries. In Iran too, a more settled situation had first to evolve. Obviously Nuri, probably in the face of Egyptian pressure, is stalling in the hope of getting some more definite commitment from US and Britain. We had to break off our inconclusive talk as Nuri was due in Parliament and had already run thirty minutes beyond the time he was to appear there.

We agreed to have another talk on the question of defense immediately after the Menderes visit. Nuri said he would then go over in detail with me his exchanges with Menderes.

I would appreciate receiving from the Department before the close of those talks any observations the Department may feel might well be made by me on that occasion.

GALLMAN

No. 1427

780.5/12-3154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 31, 1954—5:32 p. m.

732. 1. Department approves views Embassy Baghdad presented in discussions with Nuri Baghdad's 381 [2] to Department. While not greatly encouraged by Nuri's remarks we desire move ahead with Northern Tier arrangement. Although we believe would be counterproductive now attempt press Nuri take action Embassy Baghdad should use every suitable opportunity discreetly encourage and foster earliest Iraqi association with Pact or conclusion bi-lateral arrangements with either party.

2. In connection Nuri-Menderes talks Embassy Baghdad may, if suitable opportunity offers, express Department's view that generally US found Middle Eastern governments unresponsive MEDO in which Western governments sought take lead in helping plan area defenses. Believe essential if area defenses are to be effective and

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NE, GTI, Defense, and paragraph 4 in substance by UNP. Sent as telegram 373 to Baghdad and 998 to Cairo; and repeated to London, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

[2] *Supra.*

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meaningful there should be genuine indigenous effort on part of Middle Eastern countries create basis for their defense. While Turkey-Pakistan Pact loose arrangement limited in nature its provisions for military arrangements to consult and plan against possibly unprovoked attack from outside, or similar provisions, would in fact create precisely kind of basis from which full fledged regional defense organization could grow. Pending such development unprepared consider US commitment to area. Believe most useful US role for present is continue examine defense problems with, and help increase military effectiveness of governments pursuing workable joint defense efforts.

3. It would be helpful to Department in considering this question to know more clearly what Nuri envisaged in inquiring how far US and UK individually or collectively prepared go beyond NATO commitments. Embassy Baghdad may have opportunity sound him out discreetly this point.

4. In further general discussions of regional pact Embassy may wish suggest UN Article 51 and general reference to charter more suitable basis. Reference Article 52 would seem inappropriate since it directed chiefly to pacific settlement local disputes and its use would also involve provisions chapter 8 as a whole possibly creating misimpression of responsibility to keep Security Council informed at all times of activities regional organization including defense planning.

5. Concur views expressed Baghdad's 395 [3] to Department. FYI Department has given substance Baghdad's 381 to Department to representative British Embassy. He said he not aware Nuri had raised subject with UK and believed failure do so doubtless due to existence UK guarantee under present treaty and Nuri's desire complete own domestic program before discussing treaty question in any detail. He added Nuri must be aware UK willingness continue guarantee beyond expiration of treaty in consideration for base facilities which would permit implementation. End FYI.

6. In Nuri's attributing his unwillingness take formal step at this time to possible adverse Arab reaction, particularly on part Egyptian government, there is apparent reversal from point of view re-

[3] Dated Dec. 29, not printed. The Ambassador reported he and the British Chargé had agreed that each of them should see Nuri separately before the Menderes visit, and both decided to avoid any appearance of a joint approach. The Ambassador wanted to dispel any thought Nuri might have about being able to maneuver between the United States and the United Kingdom and considered it important that this be done before the Menderes visit. He informed the Department of State that he would confine his remarks on defense to general terms, with no specific mention of the Turkish-Pakistan report. (787.5 MSP/12-2954)

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ported Cairo's 358 [4] and 397 [5] to Department. Fact that Egyptians previously had no objection and recent Arab League meeting indicated no objection to Iraqi arrangements for Western use of basis in case of attack on Iran (Beirut to Dept 599 [6]), actually seem reflect more broadminded and fluid attitude. Would therefore appreciate Embassy Cairo's comments as to whether Egyptian reaction would actually be of serious nature if Iraq acceded to Pact or undertook bilateral with either party.

7. Embassy Ankara may wish give substance of Baghdad's 381 to Department along with Department's views expressed in paras 1 and 2 above to Menderes or Foreign Office.

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[4] Document 229.
[5] Dated Sept. 23, not printed.
[6] Dated Dec. 23, not printed, but see footnote 6, Document 240.

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KUWAIT

UNITED STATES POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT [1]

No. 1428

Editorial Note

Despatch 39 from Kuwait, January 2, 1952, enclosed the English language text of a decree by Sheikh Abdulla Al Salim Al Subah, the Ruler of Kuwait, imposing an income tax implementing the Kuwait Oil Company's Agreement of 1951 with the Ruler of Kuwait for additional oil payments. (886D.112/1-252) For documentation on the negotiation of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume V, pages 315 ff.

[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 998 ff.

No. 1429

886D.2553/4-3052

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1952.

Subject: The Status of Kuwait.

Participants: DNA—Mr. Hamilton
L/NEA—Mr. Crowe
DRN—Mr. Liebesny
AV—Miss Colclaser [2]
Mr. Bogart
NEA—Mr. Thayer
NE—Mr. Awalt [3]
Mr. Sturgill

[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared by Sturgill, Crowe, and Liebesny.

[2] H. Alberta Colclaser, Chief, Air Transport Branch, Aviation Policy Staff.

[3] Fred H. Awalt, Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs.

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Summary:

The increasing importance of American interests in Kuwait and the Department's concern with the extent of UK jurisdiction over them motivated this discussion. Three separate but related problems brought to the Department's attention the fact that US and UK interests conflict to a certain degree in Kuwait. These were: (1) a UK complaint that US air operations between Kuwait and London were an interference with British cabotage, thus raising the question of the application of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, [4] (2) conditions for establishing the American Consulate in Kuwait, [5] and (3) Aminoil's concern, expressed in a letter to the Department, about the possible effect on that company's operations in Kuwait if it were subject to British judicial jurisdiction.

Mr. Crowe reviewed in brief the legal situation in connection with the political status of Kuwait, stating that, while from time to time the British Government has referred to the Sheikhdom of Kuwait as being under the protection of Great Britain, the basic legal documents do not indicate that it is a protectorate in the strict legal sense or even that it is technically under the protection of that country. Still less do these documents make clear the right of the British to exercise complete control over foreigners within the Sheikhdom. Mr. Crowe stated that the action taken by the British to increase their influence and authority in Kuwait, such as the various orders in council, have been primarily taken on a unilateral basis and that it might be possible, on a strict legal basis, to point out that there is no clear authority emanating from the Sheikh to expand the British authority over foreigners within the territory. He said that it might be possible to support American objections to such extension by these legal arguments, among others, to which Mr. Liebesny agreed, as well as with the thought that there should be political determination as to whether this Government wished in the future to resist an extension of British authority in this direction. Mr. Liebesny and Mr. Crowe agreed that it was difficult to pursue legal arguments further until this basic question was decided but that it was felt desirable to point out that the legal position of the British in this regard is not an insuperable obstacle.

It was the consensus of the group that the Department's position regarding the status of Kuwait is weakened in such respects by engagements already entered into. It was pointed out that with

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[4] For documentation regarding negotiations leading to the Chicago Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 355 ff.

[5] For documentation on this topic, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 998 ff.

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regard to the British complaint of cabotage, the US is a party to the Chicago Convention which defines the territories to which cabotage is applicable as those, *inter alia,* "under the protection of" the member states. Article 2 states: "For the purpose of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such a State." With regard to the establishment of the American Consulate at Kuwait, it was brought out that the US accepted the issuance of an exequatur by the British King and in so doing recognized a degree of British control of Kuwait foreign affairs. It was agreed that an attempt should be made to overcome the verbiage of Article 2 through an interpretation of the generally understood meaning of cabotage and also of British statements indicating their own view of the extent to which they controlled the internal affairs of Kuwait.

Mr. Thayer said the Department should decide what it *wants* in Kuwait and then decide *how to get it.* He said at present we want at least two things: (1) aircraft landing rights and (2) the right to protect American oil companies. Mr. Liebesny suggested the importance of arguing on the basis of the *degree* of British control in the Sheikhdom and of pointing out to the UK that the rather vague phraseology of the [Chicago] Agreement was not visualized as going so far as the British are presently interpreting it. The UK should be told that we think their interpretation is an undue extension of their authority, he said.

The group seconded this approach, and Mr. Awalt suggested use also could be made of the fact that the UK itself recognized the independence of Kuwait and the fact that the UK flag (a flag being a symbol of control) does *not* fly in Kuwait. Miss Colclaser cautioned that in questioning the phraseology of the Chicago Agreement, care should be taken not to argue in such a way as to imply that the Department does not want the Convention as such to apply to Kuwait; it *does* want it to apply. Mr. Liebesny agreed and said our approach in this regard should be from the standpoint of an interpretation of Articles 2 and 7 of the Convention.

It was agreed that Mr. Liebesny and Mr. Crowe would prepare (1) a Departmental position in draft form and (2) a draft telegram to London, in reply to the British objection to certain TWA advertising re Kuwait-UK services, based on the suggestions made during this discussion and that these would be submitted to the group later for its consideration.

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No. 1430

Editorial Note

Despatch 30 from Kuwait, July 30, 1953, transmitted to the Department of State an analysis of the question of succession to the Rulership of Kuwait and its relation to British policy and American interests in that country. (786D.11/7–3053) Department of State file 786D.11 contains documentation on the threatened abdication of the Shaikh of Kuwait in the spring of 1952 and American interest in that topic during the period of 1952–1954.

No. 1431

Editorial Note

Documentation on Department of State interest in a proposal of the American Independent Oil Company to transfer its United States Flag Tankers to Kuwait registry is in Department of State file 986D.537. For documentation on United States interest in the petroleum resources of Kuwait, see Documents 242 ff.

Documentation on relations between the United States Consulate and the British Political Agent in Kuwait is in Department of State file 611.41.

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SAUDI ARABIA

UNITED STATES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA [1]

No. 1432

711.5886A/1-2152

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1952. [2]

Subject: Briefing of Col. H. E. Liebe.

Participants: U.S. Army—Col. H. E. Liebe
Lt. Col. T. R. Davis, Mediterranean—ME Section G–3
NE—Mr. Awalt
Mr. Sturgill

Summary:

Col. Liebe said he had orders to depart for Saudi Arabia February 19 as part of the Advance Technical Group and would remain as Acting Chief in charge of the Army portion of the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia when that got started. [3] Col. Davis said the fourth member of the Advance Group would probably be an Air Force Major already in Saudi Arabia, although he had not been chosen yet. He also mentioned that it was contemplated that some enlisted personnel would be needed for administrative support of the Group, but that no one had been assigned.

Col. Davis' attention was called to the JCS decision to appoint a Major General Chief of the Mission and to the Department's understanding that General Day was to have been appointed Chief pro tem; and he was asked if orders to that effect had gone out.

Temporary utilization of the housing facilities at Taif, used by the British Military Training Team recently departed, was discussed. It was pointed out that the Department saw no objection to

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[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1017 ff.

[2] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Jan. 23.

[3] For previous documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1059 ff.; see in particular the editorial note, *ibid.*, p. 1064.

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such use of the facilities if found to be suitable, since that would advance the time for starting our military training operations which would otherwise have to await considerable new construction at El Kharj. It was explained that it was politically desirable to implement our training commitment to Saudi Arabia as soon as possible. It was stressed, however, that initiation of training operations at Taif should have prior Defense approval.

In response to a question from Col. Davis regarding progress on the MAAG agreement, it was stated that an exchange of notes has not yet been effected in Jidda, but that a draft had been sent, upon which the Embassy commented, raising some points. None were major, although the Department's reply has been held up pending final agreement with Defense on a termination clause desired by the latter.

Col. Liebe expressed his interest in the Mission and said he considered it a challenging assignment. He was somewhat apprehensive regarding language difficulties, but it was pointed out that there were probably available a number of English-speaking Arabs who had had airport management training at Dhahran and in the US, as well as some who had had military training in this country. It was recommended to him that he make use of Saudi Arabs whenever possible in the training program.

No. 1433

Editorial Note

In early February 1952, the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington requested the White House to send a medical mission to Saudi Arabia because of the illness of King Ibn Saud. Major General Wallace H. Graham, personal physician to President Truman, was in charge of the mission, which left Washington on February 15 and returned the end of February. Regarding previous medical missions to Saudi Arabia by General Graham, see telegram 203, April 8, 1950, and the memorandum by Frederick H. Awalt, April 30, 1950, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume V, pages 1157 and 1169; and the memorandum by Awalt, August 14, 1951, *ibid.*, 1951, volume V, page 1066. Documentation on the 1952 trip is in Department of State file 786A.11.

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No. 1434

786A.5 MSP/2-2752: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, February 27, 1952.

452. Am informed by Deputy FonMin Yassin that MinFin has been asked set up $43 million fund for financing cash reimbursable arms purchases and building training installation at Kharj. Yusuf Yassin then recalled confidential info given him during DAF negots last year re efforts being made obtain legislation make ME states, including SEA, eligible grant mil assistance and said now that SAG had done its share, wished ask if we prepared lend hand along line which I had indicated to him last May and which had also been confirmed at same time by Dept to Saudi Amb.

Replied understood legislative authority along lines contemplated had been written into present MSA but action hereunder dependent executive decision Pres which, as far as known, has not been exercised. [2] Wld therefore submit Yusuf Yassin's inquiry to Dept for consideration and reply.

I do not think necessary go into detailed discussion tax matter since facts so clear and carry own argument. Inescapable truth is that in order sweeten pill of cash reimbursable aid—only *quid pro quo* for agreement on DAF, we informed Saudis our hope being able furnish some grant aid and indicated SAG in special position in that regard. SAG kept its bargain and we went part way by obtaining necessary legislation. Question is now whether we follow through. As matters stand I submit, in absence advice to contrary, that we morally obligated take appropriate action in accordance legislative authority and fact that approach was oral rather than written makes obligation that much stronger. Aside from specific reasons for affirmative action, this also becomes question of maintaining our reputation for constancy and fair dealing. This important with reference not only DAF but our relations with SAG generally. (Embtel 344, Jan 2, 1952 [3])

HARE

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran for General Day.

[2] For documentation on grant military assistance, see vol. I, pp. 460 ff.

[3] Not printed; it reminded the Department of State that since the probability of grant aid had been mentioned as an inducement to Saudi Arabia when negotiations for Dhahran Airfield and cash reimbursable military assistance agreements were being carried on, the United States had at least an implied obligation to furnish some grant aid to Saudi Arabia. (711.56386A/1-252)

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No. 1435

711.56386A/3–1952

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 19, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you will recall, negotiations were successfully concluded with the Government of Saudi Arabia for military rights at Dhahran Airfield on 18 June 1951. [1] Since that time, however, requirements for certain additional rights in connection with the U.S. operations in Saudi Arabia have developed. I am enclosing a detailed statement of these requirements. [2]

It is requested that negotiations be initiated with the Government of Saudi Arabia with a view of securing these additional requirements under the general terms and conditions of the present Agreement. The exact form in which these supplementary requirements should be cast is a matter which can best be determined during the course of negotiations, but this Department would wish to review the proposed supplement prior to its signature.

As in the case of the previous negotiations, I will appoint Brigadier General E. M. Day, USAF, to represent the Department of Defense as a military advisor to Ambassador Hare to assist him during the course of these negotiations.

. . . . . .

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM C. FOSTER

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[1] For documentation on this topic, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1017 ff. See in particular telegram 698 from Jidda, May 31, 1951, *ibid.*, p. 1053.

[2] The statement, entitled "Table of Requirements for New Negotiations with Saudi Arabia for Additional Facilities at Dhahran Airfield," is not printed. It listed a number of communications and Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) requirements desired by the Department of Defense.

Instruction 1 to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, dated July 8, informed him the Department of Defense had requested the Department of State to initiate negotiations for supplementary requirements in Saudi Arabia, and General Day had been instructed to assist him. A letter by the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, dated July 19, transmitted a copy of the letter of instructions the Department of Defense had sent General Day. Because of the MAAG negotiations going on at the time, the negotiations under reference here were not begun at that time. The matter was brought up in the following year. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 711.56386A.

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No. 1436

786A.5 MSP/4-1652

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 16, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In Mr. Foster's letter of December 10, 1951, [2] the Department of Defense indicated its view that political considerations might prove an over-riding and valid reason for furnishing grant military aid in token amounts to some of the countries of the Near East on a selective basis. The Department of State believes that political considerations involving the good faith of this Government make it advisable to extend such aid to Saudi Arabia under Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. In accordance with my letter of January 2, 1952, [3] I would like to seek your further consideration of this matter with the hope that you can concur in this view.

You will recall that during the course of negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government for a new Dhahran Air Field agreement last year, and following discussion between representatives of our two Departments, the American Ambassador at Jidda was instructed to discuss the possibility, subject to favorable Congressional action, of some military grant aid to Saudi Arabia in order to assist toward a successful conclusion of the Dhahran Air Field negotiations. The subject was accordingly discussed with Saudi Arabian authorities who expressed satisfaction with the possibility of grant military aid and with the intent of the United States Government.

Grant military aid was, therefore, mentioned as an added inducement to the Saudi Arabian Government to extend United States rights at Dhahran Air Field. The principal inducement was, as you know, provision of military training and cash reimbursable military assistance for the purchase of arms, as projected under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The negotiations for both Dhahran Air Field and Mutual Defense Assistance Program were successfully concluded on June 18, 1951. [4] The Saudi Arabian Government has recently taken steps to implement the Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreed upon, and has undertaken to pro-

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[1] This letter was drafted by Awalt and Meloy between Mar. 21 and Apr. 15.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed. It informed the Secretary of Defense that the Department of State welcomed the Defense statement that political considerations might justify the provision of military assistance to certain Middle East countries. (780.5 MSP/12-1051)

[4] See telegram 698 from Jidda, May 31, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1053.

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vide a fund of forty-three million dollars from its own revenues. It has inquired whether the United States is now prepared to assist by extending grant military aid as discussed last May. It would be very difficult for that Government to understand why such assistance should be denied after the enabling legislation has been passed. Consequently, I urge that favorable reconsideration be given this matter by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I urge this the more strongly in view of Mr. Foster's letter of March 19, 1952, [5] describing certain supplementary requirements desired in connection with Dhahran Air Field. Since this request has been made following Saudi Arabia's inquiry regarding grant aid, it is believed that it would be very difficult for Ambassador Hare to negotiate such an arrangement without some rather positive indication of our intention to extend such aid. It is understood, of course, that such assistance would be supplementary to cash reimbursable military assistance which, the Saudi Arabian Government has been given to understand, must constitute the major basis of its military procurement program. It is also contemplated that any equipment obtained through utilization of grant aid credits would be part of, and not additional to, the items approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as indicated in the letter from Secretary of Defense Johnson dated August 11, 1950 [6] and the letter from Secretary of Defense Marshall dated August 4, 1951. [7]

In view of the above considerations, this Department invites the concurrence of the Department of Defense in recommending a Presidential finding of Saudi Arabia's eligibility for military grant aid under Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act. The Department of State hopes this matter may receive the earliest attention possible in order that our obligation to Saudi Arabia in this connection may be fulfilled and in order to avoid undue delay in initiating negotiations for the supplementary rights referred to above.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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[5] *Supra.*

[6] Not printed, but see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1184. Additional documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 786A.5.

[7] Presumably, this reference should read Apr. 4, 1951, rather than August. A letter from Secretary of Defense Marshall, dated Apr. 4, 1951, is printed *ibid.*, 1951, vol. v, p. 1049. It contains the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military equipment for Saudi Arabia.

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No. 1437

486A.1112/4-3052

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Kopper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (McFall)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, May 8, 1952. [1]

Subject: Discontinuance of Saudi Arabian Trade Discrimination Against US Jewish Firms.

You will recall that Senator Lehman [2] and Congressmen Javits [3] and Celler [4] have made inquiries of the Department on behalf of certain of their constituents [5] regarding the Saudi Arabian ban on imports from US firms under Jewish control or ownership. Efforts by the Department and the Embassy in Jidda have recently been successful in causing the Saudi Arabian Government to discontinue this discriminatory practice. Reference Jidda Embassy telegram no. 629 dated April 30 (Tab 1). [6]

It is suggested that you might wish to inform the Senator and Congressmen that such is the case and letters have accordingly been drafted to them for your signature (Tabs 2, 3 and 4). [7] . . .

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[1] This memorandum was prepared by Awalt between May 5 and 8.

[2] Senator Herbert Lehman of New York.

[3] Congressman Jacob Javits of New York.

[4] Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York.

[5] The letters under reference here, along with correspondence from other Congressmen and various business firms, are in Department of State files 486A.1112, 486A.1116, and 486A.1117.

[6] Not printed (486A.1112/4-3052)

[7] None printed.

No. 1438

786A.5 MSP/6-1352

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 13, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of April 16, 1952, [1] requesting the Department of Defense concurrence in a recommendation to the President that he find Saudi Arabia eligible for grant military assistance.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded, and I agree that:

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[1] Document 1436.

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a. From a military point of view, grant aid to Saudi Arabia and certain other Middle East countries is not justified.

b. Saudi Arabia, however, holds a unique position among the Arab States because of the existence of a United States air base in the Dhahran area, and oil resources which may be required in war.

c. Contingent upon a political determination that token grant military aid is necessary in order to assure the continuation of adequate military base rights in Saudi Arabia, no objection is interposed to the proposed action of the State Department.

In view of the above conclusions and of the cogent reasons cited in your letter of 16 April 1952, and contingent upon a political determination that token grant aid is necessary in order to assure the continuation of adequate military base rights in Saudi Arabia, I concur with your recommending a Presidential finding of Saudi Arabia's eligibility for military grant aid under Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. However, this recommendation of her eligibility for grant military aid should not be construed as implying a requirement to commit U.S. military forces to the defense of Saudi Arabia or the Middle East. In concurring in your recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire, and I agree, that such aid should be limited to token amounts. In this connection, your attention is invited to:

a. The desirability of adhering to the U.S. position already stated to the Saudi Arabian Government, that cash reimbursable military assistance must constitute the major portion of its military procurement program. Also, it should be made clear to the Saudi Arabians that any equipment furnished as military grant aid must be a part of, and not additional to, the military assistance program which has been established as a result of the agreement now in effect between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

b. The undesirability of permitting the exceptional case of Saudi Arabia to serve as a precedent leading to similar requests from other Middle East countries.

It should be further borne in mind that such concurrence is subject to availability of funds, that no funds in the current Mutual Security legislation presently before the Congress have been programmed for Saudi Arabia, and that funds to implement token grant aid would have to be made available by transfer from a program for another country.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM C. FOSTER

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No. 1439

711.3886A/7-2652: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, July 26, 1952—1 p. m.

50. In course week tortuous negots at Riyadh reminiscent DAF negots last year have concluded with assistance Gen Day first phase MAG [*MAAG*] discussions. Although everyone from King down very friendly and although obvious Saudis wanted agreement, negots were haggling match from beginning to end. . . .

Discussions opened with strong Saudi bid for scrapping proposed US draft and negotiating on basis our agreement with Turkey. When resisted this move, YY shifted tactics and, as in case DAF negots, produced draft of his own based on DAF agreement, our draft and some new wrinkles of his own. On basis this document we gradually hammered out revised draft which reasonably satis except for questions juris and period.

Re juris, Saudis were unwilling concede beyond immed places of residence and duty. We maintained shld apply any areas where member MAG [*MAAG*] residing, working or traveling under orders. Maintaining our proposal wld subject SAG to strong internal and external pressure, Saudi group remained adamant but repeatedly stressed that members MAG [*MAAG*] wld come as welcome guests and that any difficulties wld be handled so as minimize complications.

Re period, YY insisted US committee straining program for duration DAF agreement and, despite our explanations as authorized by Dept., refused accept termination right exercised by other than Saudis.

When it became apparent that we had exerted as much pressure as situation wld stand at time without backfiring, Gen Day and I agreed it was tactically advisable desist and review situation with Defense and State in order have strongest possible argumentation for renewed discussions. As matters stand, believe we have prospect obtaining reasonably satis agreement, but because of . . . Saudi sensitiveness on sovereignty question, negotiating process slow and trying.

Full account negots and draft documents being pouched. [2]

HARE

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran for General Day.

[2] Despatch 36 from Jidda, July 28, transmitted a summarized day-by-day record of the 12 discussions at Riyadh, from July 17 to July 24, on the MAAG Agreement to

Continued

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No. 1440

711.56386A/8-452: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, August 4, 1952—9 p. m.

83. During courtesy call on Prince Faisal on his return Jidda, I gave report MAAG negots and said unable understand adamant SAG position on jurisdiction which clearly less favorable than DAF agreement, which Saudi negotiators otherwise so insistent following. Faisal professed understand but said certain people in Riyadh, including Prince Mishaal himself, seemed feel that, having obtained DAF agreement, we were not very interested in training program. I replied nothing cld be further from truth and this borne out by facts. As far as agreement concerned we had submitted draft in March but due delay caused by SAG had only gotten down to negots in July. During negots we had done best meet Saudi viewpoints but Saudi negotiators had shown little disposition meet us part way. Furthermore, Gen Day was vigorously trying get training program under way but getting very inadequate cooperation. Expressed intentions of Saudi officials were good but what was needed was organization, decisions and action, which hitherto not forthcoming.

Faisal . . . . suggested I pursue matter with Crown Prince with same frankness I had with him. Added significantly that there was no longer any point in taking up such matters with King. I said both Gen Day and I had discussed matter with CP from time to time but I wld take it up again with him as suggested.

Re foregoing it is my opinion, based on certain intimations at Riyadh, that, . . . , there was hope on part of Saudis that MAAG negots wld afford occasion for offer grant aid and failure such materialize tended cloud negotiating atmosphere.

HARE

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supplement the Dhahran Airfield and Mutual Defense Agreements of June 18, 1952. (786A.5 MSP/7-2852)

Despatch 37 from Jidda, July 28, transmitted the drafts of the MAAG Agreement. There were three drafts: one presented by Ambassador Hare to Prince Faisal on Mar. 20; a counterdraft prepared by Deputy Foreign Minister Yusuf Yassin and Husni Bey, Egyptian Legal Adviser to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation, presented to the American negotiators at Riyadh on July 20; and a compromise draft worked out in the course of the negotiations. (786A.5 MSP/7-2852)

[1] Repeated to Dhahran for General Day.

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No. 1441

786A.5 MSP/8–1952

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 19, 1952. [1]

Subject: Grant Aid for Saudi Arabia

Participants: Raymond A. Hare—US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
S/MSA—Mr. Bryan
NEA—Mr. Daspit
NE—Mr. Sturgill

Summary:

Ambassador Hare [2] opened the conversation with a review of past and present considerations with regard to the problem of grant aid for Saudi Arabia. In alluding to his instructions to discuss grant aid with the SAG during the DAF negotiations May–June 1951, he said that no promise was made to the SAG but that it was made clear that the US Government was thinking strongly about such assistance for the general area and for Saudi Arabia in particular, and there was a clear implication of favorable action if legislatively possible. He said that reference during the negotiations to the possibility of grant aid was an important factor in obtaining the DAF agreement. At that time, he pointed out, the United States Air Force wanted DAF very badly. In answer to an inquiry from Mr. Bryan, the Ambassador added, however, that he could not say categorically whether the DAF agreement could have been obtained without mentioning grant aid to the Saudis.

Since conclusion of the 1951 negotiations, the Ambassador continued, the Saudis have mentioned grant aid to him several times, the most recent reference having come during the MAAG negotiations in July. However, Saudi allusions to grant aid were made only behind the scenes and not openly during the negotiations; but they were made in such a way as to leave no doubt that the SAG was expecting the USG to offer such assistance.

The Ambassador described the present situation somewhat as follows: Tactically, by use of proper timing, grant aid for Saudi Arabia could be tied to the present rather than the past. He said he had talked the problem over with General Day prior to coming to Washington and they had agreed that if authority could be ob-

[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared between Aug. 20 and Aug. 22.
[2] Ambassador Hare had returned to the United States for a series of consultations on Saudi Arabia.

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tained to raise the subject of grant aid, they would have another "ace" during the forthcoming additional rights negotiations. Such an "ace", he said, could be used to facilitate obtaining additional rights at DAF and to enhance the position of the MAAG chief, who could "guide" application of the assistance to a specially selected portion of the program. The Ambassador said, however, that he would rather not tie grant aid directly to the additional rights negotiations. He also pointed out that if any grant aid were given to the other Arab states or to Israel, Saudi Arabia must get it at the same time or sooner and in appropriately large quantitative terms.

In response to a question from Mr. Bryan, Ambassador Hare said there was no situation in any other country in the NE area comparable with that of the US Air Force in Saudi Arabia. He pointed out that the Saudi Arabian Government gave the use of DAF to the US Air Force and got nothing in return; while in Libya, which is the closest comparable situation, the US Air Force is paying a one million dollar annual rental fee for the use of a base there. He said that in obtaining these terms at DAF we reversed the current of everything that was being done in the area at the time. The Saudi Arabian Government wants the United States in Saudi Arabia, he said, but it should be remembered that we are still negotiating against the current: witness Iran and Egypt.

The Ambassador thought that ultimately the situation came down to an evaluation of what the United States wanted in Saudi Arabia and how badly it was wanted. Mr. Daspit remarked in this connection that Defense had never defined just what US strategic interests are in that area. However, within the last week the Department has sent a letter to Defense asking them to clarify their strategic interest and to tell State what really would be needed for defense of the area. [3] The Ambassador said that was something he would like to know. If the concept for the area is positive, he asked, what part does Saudi Arabia play therein; if the concept is negative, does Saudi Arabia still play some special role?

It was emphasized again by the Ambassador that the question of grant aid bears on three things: (1) Dhahran Air Field, (2) military assistance, including MAAG, and (3) the future of the United States in Saudi Arabia—in other words what do we want there? Mr. Bryan expressed the opinion that the Director of Mutual Security would want to know the type of equipment which would be purchased with grant aid funds. The Ambassador said he had told the SAG under instructions that grant aid would be supplementary to cash reimbursable assistance but that he had recently heard

[3] For the text of the letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, dated Aug. 15, see Document 83.

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contrary opinion expressed and, as far as he could see, there would be no objection to using grant aid to pay for some of the equipment already recommended by the JCS for purchase under MDAP. However, what the SAG really appeared to want help with, the Ambassador said, was construction of the military base at El Kharj; they did not want military equipment. Mr. Bryan replied that he was not sure the Mutual Security Act provided for the purchase of construction items. But he said that the Department, in arguing for grant aid for Saudi Arabia, might take the line that the US should free the Saudi Arabian foreign exchange for purchase of construction items by paying for small arms equipment. Mr. Daspit suggested that perhaps a solution to the whole grant aid problem would be the payment of a rental fee for DAF similar to the fee paid to Libya. Mr. Bryan thought this worthy of consideration and said that such a suggestion might serve as a vehicle to get Defense to give a stronger endorsement of grant aid for Saudi Arabia. Mr. Bryan thought, too, that the Department could go back to Defense and say that it would be a calculated risk to negotiate for the additional facilities without authority to offer grant aid, but that we would be willing to go ahead on this basis if Defense had nothing further to say on the matter. Mr. Bryan was emphatic in saying that NEA's current file, requesting a Presidential finding, would not be acceptable to the Director of Mutual Security. Not only would it be difficult to sell to DMS, he said, but also it would be difficult to sell to the White House.

No. 1442

Editorial Note

On August 19, Ambassador Hare met at the Pentagon with a group of Air Force officers concerned with additional rights the military desired in Saudi Arabia. Two copies of a long, presumably verbatim, transcript of the meeting, entitled "Meeting on Saudi Arabia," were transmitted to the Department of State by the Pentagon on August 27. (711.56386A/8-2752) A large part of the August 19 meeting consisted of an explanation by Ambassador Hare of the way negotiations had been carried on with the Saudi Arabian Government in the past, in particular when treaties had been signed establishing the United States position at Dhahran Airfield. There was also a general discussion on additional rights the military wanted in Saudi Arabia, but no conclusions were reached on that topic.

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Another meeting was held at the Pentagon on August 22, in connection with the proposed transfer of Dhahran Airfield from the command jurisdiction of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) to that of the United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). The meeting was attended by representatives of the Department of State, including Ambassador Hare, and representatives of the Air Force, including Lieutenant General Smith, Commander, MATS. The conclusion of the conference was that representatives of the Department of State concurred in the proposed change of jurisdiction, provided that there would be no outward signs of the change, and that the Air Force retain the principle of selectivity in assigning personnel. A memorandum of understanding of the meeting was prepared in the Department of State on August 29. (711.56386A/8-2852)

No. 1443

786A.5 MSP/9-1952

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 19, 1952.

Subject: Grant Aid for Saudi Arabia

Participants: Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
S/MSA—Mr. Martin
Mr. Bryan
NEA—Mr. Daspit
NE—Mr. Sturgill

Summary:

Mr. Martin referred to developments regarding the Air Force base in Libya as . . . . It seemed to him, he said, that SA had plenty of money of its own and there was no ME defense program, so what reason was there to give SA grant aid?

Ambassador Hare replied by describing briefly some of the history relating to the signing of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement on June 18, 1950 [*1951*]. The cash-reimbursable military assistance agreement signed on the same date had been offered as a *quid pro quo* for DAF. The US had given the SAG nothing else, except a limited training program under the DAF Agreement. However, with authorization from Defense and State, he and General Day had discussed with the SAG the special position of SA vis-à-vis the US and the possibility of some grant aid becoming available in the form of 10% of the funds earmarked for Greece and Turkey. For a

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long time following conclusion of the DAF negotiations, the SAG had remained silent, but then they began making inquiries about grant aid. The newest inquiry had come during the recent MAAG negotiations. The situation could be summarized as follows, said Ambassador Hare: The US has an "implied commitment" to give grant aid to SA. The SAG is now proceeding with implementation of the cash-reimbursable program. The Air Force now wants additional rights at DAF, and the success of negotiations for these rights is not foreseeable without grant aid. JCS documents indicate the special position of SA in US military planning. . . .

Expressing the view that he had always thought of grant aid as being a reward for participation in MEDO, Mr. Martin asked whether the US would lose Saudi participation, if SA were given grant aid in advance. The Ambassador said no, and Mr. Daspit remarked that SA, in making DAF available to the US, was far ahead other ME countries when it came to such lines of cooperation.

Mr. Martin asked what amount of grant aid for SA the Ambassador was thinking of in this discussion and what items it would be applied to. Originally, the Ambassador replied, he had been thinking in terms of about $10 million; but now he was thinking of about $5 million. As to which items the money would be applied to, he didn't know. This was something for discussion, and he asked whether grant aid funds could be used for purposes of construction. Mr. Martin didn't think they could be.

Mr. Bryan was curious to know whether SA could absorb this amount of equipment under present training conditions or whether giving SA grant aid would merely be a political gesture? The Ambassador replied that it was both; and Mr. Daspit referred to the US training mission already in SA and said SA, therefore, would be able to use the equipment later if not now. Mr. Martin inquired whether the grant aid would be used for the present Saudi military program and whether it would be spent on the ground or air portion? The Ambassador thought it would be used for both but probably for the air portion first. Was any jet air force envisioned? Mr. Martin asked. He remarked that SA was the only country he knew of which could afford jets. The Ambassador pointed out in response that Saudi Arabia's financial condition now was good but that the country really had nothing, relatively, by way of modern development, still having a long, long way to go to catch up with some of the other ME countries.

If fiscal 1953 funds were used for grant aid, how long would it take to develop a program for SA and what would we have to give next year if we gave $5 million this year? Mr. Martin asked. Mr. Daspit pointed out that grant aid was visualized as supplementing

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but not adding to what SA was already getting under the cash-reimbursable program. The Ambassador said he and General Day had talked to the SAG only in terms of existing legislation; however, it was well to note that under terms of the DAF Agreement the US was committed to provide training to SA for five years. Mr. Martin then inquired whether $5 million a year for five years would accomplish what the US wanted to accomplish, and the Ambassador said the US would have to keep looking over its shoulder at that one. Mr. Martin wanted to know whether that meant that the US would have to give more to SA than to other ME countries, if the others participated in MEDO? The Ambassador replied that the SA position would change, depending upon the quantity of participation of the other states.

Mr. Bryan described what he thought was a weak spot in the Defense letter endorsing grant aid for SA. [1] He said the Air Force appeared to be behind grant aid, but apparently they were unable to swing a positive Defense interpretation of their position. The Ambassador alluded to his recent discussions with Defense officials and said their oral interpretation was positive.

Pointing out the difficulties in other countries in obtaining a 511(a) agreement, Mr. Martin inquired whether there was any possibility of negotiating such an agreement with the SAG. The Ambassador replied there probably was a possibility; it would be difficult, but he was willing to undertake such negotiations. Mr. Martin asked whether the SAG thought the US was reneging on grant aid, even though an area program had not been started. (He was referring to discussions during negotiations for the DAF Agreement in May of 1951, when the Ambassador and General Day had talked to the Saudis to some extent of grant aid in terms of an area program.) The Ambassador replied that the emphasis during the discussions had been on the possibilities of Congress passing the necessary legislation, not on an area program.

The Defense letter, Mr. Martin then observed, had weaknesses. Mr. Daspit interrupted and asked whether Mr. Martin felt the Department should not go ahead with its intended request for a Presidential finding? Mr. Bryan added the thought that perhaps the Department should go back to Defense for a more favorable endorsement; and Mr. Daspit, expressing tentative agreement, said the movement within the JCS for a program for the NE had been more favorable during the past two months, and perhaps the Department should talk to Admiral Smith. Mr. Martin said the squeeze for money was very tight this year (fiscal 1953), and the Depart-

[1] This reference is to the letter from the Secretary of Defense, Document 1438.

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ment would have to have a very strong case to take to DMS; so it would be better to go back to Admiral Smith.

The Ambassador inquired whether it would be possible to push ahead anyway, even if it weren't possible to get a more positive endorsement from Defense? Mr. Martin said he thought so but that the Department should try first to get something further from Defense. Mr. Daspit and Mr. Bryan agreed to approach Admiral Smith on the matter.

No. 1444

Editorial Note

The second stage of negotiations for the Military Assistance Advisory Group Agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia were held in Riyadh from October 4 to October 13. Despatch 103 from Jidda, October 19, transmitted the record of the discussions, and suggested that a reading of the report was essential for an understanding of the redrafted text of the agreement. (786A.5 MSP/10-1952)

Despatch 104 from Jidda, October 20, transmitted the redrafted text and an analysis of the changes. The Ambassador advised the Department of State that he and General Grover considered the sections of the agreement in which they were able to gain their objectives much more important than those sections where they were not. They recommended approval of the text as it stood, considering it a workable agreement with which the United States could live. (786A.5 MSP/10-2052)

The agreement covered the conditions that would govern the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group to Saudi Arabia, in implementation of the agreement for assistance in procurement of military arms concluded between the United States and Saudi Arabia on June 18, 1951. The first five paragraphs dealt with administrative matters concerning the Advisory Group. Paragraph 6 covered tax exemptions granted by the Saudi Arabian Government to supplies and personal property of the military personnel of the Advisory Group and civilians attached to the group, provided that official bills of lading and manifests were submitted for personal effects; that the quantities would be within reasonable limits; and that appropriate authorities of the Saudi Arabian Government would be notified in cases where personal articles were sold, so that taxes could be collected.

Paragraph 7 stated that the Advisory Group and all United States civilians and personnel attached to the Group, together with

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their dependents, were responsible for complying with Saudi Arabian laws. An offense committed by any individual, excluding military personnel, would be subject to the local jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia.

Other paragraphs of the agreement stated that the Saudi Arabian Government would provide living accommodations and offices for the Advisory Group, while the United States would pay their salaries and transportation expenses to Saudi Arabia for members and their dependents. Military mail was to be exempt from customs duties, except that postal parcels would be governed by the provisions of paragraph 6. Members of the Advisory Group were required to possess valid passports or identification papers and Saudi Arabian visas, and the Advisory Group was required to expel or replace any member of the group considered undesirable by the Saudi Arabian Government. The agreement was to enter into force as soon as it was signed and would remain in force until one year after notice of termination by either party.

No. 1445

786A.5 MSP/11-2552: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, November 25, 1952—5 p. m.

406. While in Riyadh to present Adm Wright, Yusuf Yassin and Khalid Gargoni approached me in considerable perturbation re certain aspects mil asst program which they said had become subj criticism among King's councillors and which were putting them (Yusuf and Khalid) on spot as persons responsible for negots mil assist agrmt.

First problem was payment for students studying US where fees of $35,000 per year were being charged. Not only was this exorbitant but it was not in accord mil assist agrmt under which tuition shld be free.

Second problem was excessive prices being charged for US planes. It had been found for example Brit jets cld be purchased for 1/7 price US jets.

I replied did not have documentation available for ref but believed student training question had been fully discussed by head of MAAG with Prince Mishaal and that, as far as liability to pay in

[1] Repeated to Dhahran for General Grover.

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principle concerned, never had been any question in my mind but that wld be on reimbursable basis. Both Yusuf and Khalid challenged this vigorously and said they wld never have recommended signature of mil assist agrmt if they had understood training Saudi students in US wld be at cost of SAG. They said this was not matter for discussion by head MAAG and Prince Mishaal but for polit negots. They hoped question cld be settled without difficulty but cld foresee necessity renegots if such not case. Saudis had not asked for rent for DAF because they expected receive other benefits. If such benefits being withheld, whole picture changed.

I reiterated that no question my mind re principle payment but was unfamiliar with details re actual sending students to US. I wld endeavor clarify this.

Re cost of planes, this was frankly not matter for discussion, surely not for bargaining. Prices charged SAG were same as paid by USG and it was merely question if SAG wanted specific items at current prices or not. If SAG desired purchase cheaper equipment elsewhere, that was its privilege but one usually gets just about what one pays for, and there cld also be maintenance and training difficulties if SAG resorted to bargain hunting.

Yusuf and Khalid agreed price US equipment cld be left for Prince Mishaal discuss with Gen Grover but requested question cost trainees be reviewed subj further discussion.

Foregoing discussed with Gen Grover who found correspondence going back to Aug this year in which head of MAAG had made clear to Prince Mishaal that SAG liable payment for student training. However he agreed with me that there may have been misunderstanding this regard by Yusuf and Khalid who may have assumed that, in lack of specification to contrary, mil training under Art 5 of mil assist agrmt to be accorded same treatment as prescribed DAF trainees in annex to DAF agrmt. We also agreed matter wld probably not have been raised if it had not been for $35,000 tuition fee for pilot students which, with fees other students, brings amount SAG requested pay to $252,000, [2] rather staggering sum.

In circumstances, fol courses action possible:

(1) To furnish full clarification but hold our ground and face possible consequences.
(2) To expedite grant aid and include student training therein.
(3) To renegot Art 5 of mil assist agrmt to cover question costs.
(4) To return Saudi students without training and abandon idea future training in US.

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[2] The actual amount was $292,000. (Correction made in telegram 409 from Jidda, Nov. 26; 786A.5 MSP/11-2652)

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Of these I feel that (4) wld be disastrous to training program, that (3) shld be avoided if at all possible that (2) wld be satisfactory solution if at all possible but, if impossible, no recourse except adhere to (1) unless prepared consider possible compensation in form payment rent.

Before replying to Saudis, wld appreciate any thoughts Dept may have for our guidance since, although this may turn out be only tempest in teapot, there is also possibility of serious complications.

Gen Grover also advising Defense.

HARE

No. 1446

611.86A/11-2652: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 26, 1952—11:22 a. m.

339. Limited distribution. No distribution outside Dept of State. During past year Emb and Dept have made attempts soften SAG attitude discrimination toward Amer Jews. Dept believes these efforts instrumental issuance decree Apr 4 limiting discriminatory trade restrictions on Amer (and other) firms (Embtel 629 Apr 30 [2]). However there is evidence hardening rather than softening SAG attitude other instances.

Dept had hoped persuade SAG its attitude doing SA far more harm than good before it became public knowledge in US that SAG discriminating between Amer citizens. Dept seriously concerned this whole matter may break in US press soon with serious harm SA reputation and deterioration US–SA relations. Incidents involving SAG discrimination toward US citizens increasing. Although Dept well aware sensitivity SAG these matters situation has reached point where wld seem less harmful US–SA relations for US sound warning to SAG than sit by and watch chance constructive action disappear.

Therefore Dept suggests you approach SAG (possibly Crown Prince) along fol lines:

1. Religious discrimination between US citizens particularly abhorrent Americans.

2. Many Amer citizens who are Jewish are not only not Zionists, some vigorously anti-Zionist. Some are topflight people within USG or private life who are working to ease feelings between Arabs and

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[1] Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by NEA.

[2] Not printed. (486A.1112/4–3052)

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Jews. SAG attitude cannot but undermine this work and arouse deep resentment. . . .

3. Inevitably, continuance SAG attitude will undermine friendly relations US. Impossible for USG indefinitely to regard its own officials as belonging to two classes, one of which is regarded by SA as "undesirable" in total disregard ideology or feelings toward Arabs and based on false assumption religious affiliation in itself creates attitude of enmity toward Arabs or Islam.

4. Dept is not in position explain or defend SAG intransigence these matters to US public or even to other USG agencies. Accordingly Dept feels SAG shld be given advance opportunity carefully weigh its course.

As of possible usefulness to you fol are recent examples discrimination which cld still result in most unfavorable publicity.

1. Case Deptel 273.

2. Nov 20 NY travel agency requested aid Dept in obtaining SAG permission once granted then denied for chartered plane carrying 55 to fly over SA territory from Tel Aviv to Bahrein enroute India for social welfare conference in which Dept had strong interest. Because difficulties encountered case Deptel 273, Dept felt it useless intercede.

3. Early last week prominent official Fed Security Agency denied visa for direct transit Dhahran same conference India. Dept in no position intercede for same reasons. As result Dept, which paying cost official's transportation, having reroute him at great added expense.

If you consider it appropriate and more effective, ur approach cld be coordinated with Dept approach SA Amb.

BRUCE

No. 1447

611.86A/12-1052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET JIDDA, December 10, 1952—10 p. m.

445. No distribution outside State Dept. Crown Prince left Jidda prior receipt Deptel 339, Nov 26, [1] and, in absence here now of any sufficiently high-ranking official, will wait next trip to Riyadh to discuss. Re concluding para ref tel, believe preferable take up only here originally since subject very sensitive and reaction likely be unfavorable if we dig in both spurs at once.

Meanwhile following comment may not be amiss in appraisal problem:

[1] *Supra.*

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(1) Saudi attitude is not only result Pal troubles but goes back to time Prophet Mohammed, who was originally favorably disposed to Jews but, following trouble with Jews in vicinity Medina, was turned against them. As consequence, practically only Jews residing in Arabian Peninsula since that time were confined to former colonies in Yemen and Asir, and Jewish visitors were infrequent. Pal difficulties thus only served intensify previously existing attitude and, in this respect, problem here different than in other Arab states where Moslem-Jewish relationship did not follow same pattern.

(2) Attitude of Saudis re Jews is paralleled by practically identical policy toward Communists, both being regarded as potentially dangerous from standpoint security.

(3) Saudi feeling has religious and political background, not racial. Saudis have no more contempt of anti-Semitism as manifested in West than they have understanding of disabilities to which Saudi persons of color subjected when traveling in certain parts of US.

(4) . . . Prince Faisal was particularly bitter following his UN experience during Pal debate [2] but has gradually become less extreme in discussing matter. . . .

(5) There is no discrimination here against American Jews as such; Saudi restrictive measures apply to all Jews regardless of nationality and, to extent any distinction as between Jews, American Jews are relatively more favored. Thus American commercial firms with Jewish connections apparently treated more favorably than most others and restrictions air transit and over flight are of general application to planes all countries.

(6) Basic arguments mentioned in ref tel have been repeatedly advanced in connection with specific cases as they have arisen. Thus in approaching Saudis now we shall be battling over terrain already familiar to both sides.

(7) Saudis are not unaccustomed to criticism in US press but they wld probably be somewhat bewildered if furore shld be raised, as Dept suggests possible, re subject Deptel 273, [3] Nov 1, where Saudis acceded to our request, albeit reluctantly, and visit passed off smoothly.

Foregoing is presented not as apology for Saudi attitude but in attempt evaluate facts; to show that, although Pal still inflamed wound, Saudi attitude has roots going deeper than current situation; and to suggest that any sudden and radical change is difficult foresee regardless somberness of picture which we many paint of consequences if Saudis fail heed our admonitions. However, I fully appreciate seriousness of situation as disturbing element in Saudi-US relations and agree effort shld be made to do all we can to ame-

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[2] This refers to the General Assembly debates leading to the Assembly's resolution of Nov. 29, 1947, on the partition of Palestine; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 999 ff.

[3] Not printed.

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liorate. Consequently I shall take up frankly with Crown Prince soonest and report outcome.

HARE

No. 1448

786A.5 MSP/1-1653

The Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan) to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) [1]

TOP SECRET
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1953.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I find that one of the most pressing and difficult problems facing me at the moment is the question of grant military aid for Saudi Arabia. Although I am aware that you have been waiting some time for a response from the Department regarding developments over the past few months, it seems more practical to comment on the matter in this form rather than by telegram, for the situation has been and still is one of some complexity and sensitivity.

You will recall that in July NEA prepared documentation requesting a recommendation for a Presidential finding in favor of grant military aid for Saudi Arabia. [2] The case progressed as far as our people in S/MSA, where it ran into considerable opposition for a number of reasons, among which was the feeling that priority should be given the developing situation in Egypt. (See attached memorandum dated August 13, 1952 from Mr. Martin to Mr. Jernegan. [3]) My understanding of some of the background on the matter is that it was agreed in a talk with the S/MSA people that an effort should be made to get a more positive endorsement from either the MCS or Defense before presenting the case for Saudi Arabia to the Director for Mutual Security. Mr. Bryan of S/MSA and Mr. Daspit undertook an exploration of the possibility of obtaining a stronger endorsement, which resulted in a decision that the time was not opportune to request an endorsement. It was

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[1] This letter was drafted by Sturgill and cleared by NE and NEA.

[2] Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 786A.5 MSP.

[3] Not attached. The memorandum listed a number of reasons why it appeared difficult to justify grant aid for Saudi Arabia, the main one being the "seemingly half-hearted endorsement" of the Department of Defense. (786A.5 MSP/8-1352) The Defense position is stated in the letter of June 13, 1952, from the Acting Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Document 1438. On this topic, see also the memoranda of conversation by Sturgill, Documents 1441 and 1443.

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thought that a further delay might see development of such an opportunity.

Meanwhile, however, the situation in Egypt came rapidly to a head, and Saudi Arabia became at most a secondary consideration. The general opinion seemed to be that so long as the Egyptian problem was up in the air, there was no possibility of considering Saudi Arabia for grant military aid. The same situation prevails now and, it appears, will prevail for the foreseeable future.

Last week a strong concerted effort on the part of State and Defense to have Egypt found eligible for grant military aid failed. The President and Mr. Harriman reportedly took the view that a decision on such a matter should more properly and advantageously be made by the new Administration. An important added factor in the failure to secure grant military aid for Egypt was that the Government of Israel and Jewish groups in the United States protested strongly. The Israeli Government argued that Israel's security would be threatened and that if arms aid were given any Arab state, it should be given at the same time to Israel and in suitably proportional amounts.

Nevertheless, the Department intends to press for a favorable finding for Egypt as soon as possible after the change in Administration. If a favorable finding is not forthcoming, then it is Alec Daspit's opinion that there is no chance of securing a favorable finding for Saudi Arabia this fiscal year. If the finding for Egypt is favorable, then he believes it becomes an open question whether the Department should attempt to secure a finding for Saudi Arabia. He feels that if you could provide the Department with some more ammunition to give added weight to a case for Saudi Arabia, the prospects of securing grant military aid for Saudi Arabia would not be altogether unfavorable. Whatever the outcome on the matter of grant arms aid for Egypt, NEA feels that as strong a case as possible should be made for such aid for Saudi Arabia.

Prospects for Fiscal 1954 are considerably brighter. At this stage, Defense and State have a firm policy in so far as possible to initiate a grant military program for the Near East area and have jointly recommended that a significant sum be specifically authorized for this purpose in MSA legislation for Fiscal 1954. If Congress approves, there is no question in Alec Daspit's mind that Saudi Arabia will be a recipient, but not within the proportions you and General Day mentioned to Yusuf Yassin during the DAF negotiations in May 1951 and probably not in advance of receipt of aid by one or two of the other Arab states.

In summary it would appear that: (1) there is little if any chance of securing a favorable finding for Saudi Arabia in Fiscal 1953

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unless Egypt is found eligible; (2) there is considerable doubt regarding a favorable finding for Saudi Arabia in Fiscal 1953 even should Egypt be found eligible; and (3) there is good reason to believe that Saudi Arabia will be found eligible under Fiscal 1954 legislation but not for one-third of an area program and not in advance of all other countries in the Near East. Therefore, it would appear profitable to do some thinking regarding the effects of these situations on our relations with Saudi Arabia. The following questions come to my mind:

(1) What would seem to be the consequences of a further delay in obtaining grant military aid on (a) further implementation of cash-reimbursable program, including operation of the MAAG and student training, and (b) the possibility of securing the SAG's agreement to periodic training flights to be conducted by the Strategic Air Command, for which instructions are now in preparation?

(2) Is it reasonable to assume that there is no chance or, at most, small chance of success in negotiating for additional requirements without first giving the SAG some indication of our attitude regarding grant military aid? (The requirements described in the Department's Instruction No. 7 of July 8, 1952 [4] are still undergoing revision in the Department of the Air Force and, I understand, will now include a request for stationing a permanent fighter squadron at DAF.)

(3) Should grant aid not be made available to Saudi Arabia prior to the renewal date of the DAF Agreement (December 18, 1955), would the SAG be likely to agree to renewal?

(4) Can you conceive of other means besides grant military aid which would satisfy our implied commitment to the SAG and preserve or perhaps enhance our basic political relationship with Saudi Arabia and our preferential position there?

(5) How would you relate the matter of grant military aid to the question of Saudi participation in MEDO?

I have no doubt that these and other questions have been occupying your thoughts for some time. As you stated in one of your telegrams, they are of an importance which justify unrelaxed attention.

I suggest the desirability of making your comments a part of the Department's official records. [5]

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

A. DAVID FRITZLAN

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[4] The instruction under reference here is Instruction 1, dated July 8, 1952, not printed; for a brief summary, see footnote 2, Document 1435.

[5] For the Ambassador's answer, see telegram 621 from Jidda, *infra*. A letter by Hare to Fritzlan, dated Mar. 15, gave a more detailed answer to the questions in this letter. A handwritten notation by Daspit on the Mar. 15 letter, which is not printed, noted that the purpose of the letter had already been served. (786A.5 MSP/3-1553)

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No. 1449

786A.5 MSP/2-1453: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, February 14, 1953—9 a. m.

621. Following is recapitulation Embassy's views regarding grant aid in compliance Deptel 469, Feb. 12. [2]

(1) In course negotiation Dhahran airfield agreement we informed Saudis confidentially of efforts being made obtain congressional authority for grant aid to countries of near eastern area other than Greece, Turkey and Iran and intimated that, if such action were taken, Saudi Arabia might expect receive substantial share reflecting our strategic interest in this country. In other words, this was implied *quid pro quo* in lieu of rent or some such other consideration and there is no doubt it contributed very considerably to successful outcome of negotiations. When therefore requested authority was obtained but not used, we were placed in a position of having our good faith open to question.

(2) It was originally emphasized that any grant aid must supplement, not supplant, cash reimbursable assistance and fact that SAG was slow in implementing latter constituted at least partial argument for our going slow in grant aid but this is no longer case since orders being placed and training has begun both here and in US.

(3) Saudis have always felt that we have not adequately recognized their contribution in according rights at Dhahran airfield as compared with our treatment such countries as Turkey and Iran. They also point out resultant exposure of their position in respect of hostile Soviet intent and criticism both within and outside country to effect Saudi Arabia falling unduly under American domination and had sold itself short of concluding Dhahran airfield agreement. This sensitivity would of course be greatly accentuated in event any other Arab country or Israel given grant aid either before Saudi Arabia or in undue proportions.

(4) Although Saudi income has increased greatly in recent years, country began from scratch with virtually no communications, industry, urban development or other attributes of even semi-modernity. Same is true of military establishment where must begin entirely from beginning, financial requirements great and necessary compete with other important developmental projects, some of which being stimulated by TCA. Defense minister is consequently up against very real financial difficulties.

(5) Although Saudis were forewarned, they have been genuinely shocked by cost American military equipment and training, and

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[1] Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Dhahran for General Grover.

[2] Not printed; it urgently requested further Embassy views in answer to the letter of Jan. 16, *supra*, to furnish a strong brief in favor of grant aid for Saudi Arabia. (786A.5 MSP/12-2152)

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find it difficult reconcile with charges by other countries, even when acknowledging superiority of what we have to offer. Thus, misunderstanding regarding payment for and high cost of military training in US is currently causing widespread bitterness in government circles with resultant indirect and adverse affects on operations Dhahran.

Consequently, aside from considerations of good faith, there is practical need for grant aid supplemental to cash reimbursable assistance in order to facilitate military assistance program, to help maintain better atmosphere at Dhahran airfield and to check deterioration in our basically friendly relations with this country at stage where action can be on relatively modest scale as contrasted with what might later be case, i.e., proverbial stitch in time.

As regards fields in which grant aid would be most useful, I would invite comments General Grover, head of MAAG, with whom I have kept in constant touch in this regard and who shares my views regarding importance of grant aid in principle. In view however of fact that problem attains importance because of its general bearing on our relations with Saudi Arabia as well as situation at Dhahran airfield, I would personally suggest that due regard be given to activities in which Saudis are particularly interested, especially student training in US and building up modest air force, while at same time giving balancing consideration to actions which we may hold essential but of which Saudis find difficult understand importance.

HARE

No. 1450

786A.5 MSP/2-2053

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Director for Mutual Security (Stassen) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. STASSEN: Developments in Saudi Arabia within the past year lead to the inescapable conclusion that, if the United

[1] This letter was drafted by Sturgill and Fritzlan. An early version was drafted in July 1952, and it was redrafted several times in January and February 1953. It was cleared by NE and NEA, with S/MSA concurring.

Attached to the letter was a memorandum by Jernegan to the Secretary of State, dated Feb. 26. It recommended that the Secretary sign the letter, in order to preserve the U.S. preferential position in Saudi Arabia, and in particular the continued right to use and expand the facilities at Dhahran Airfield. (786A.5 MSP/2-2053) A handwritten note on the file copy indicates that the original was to be delivered by Jernegan to Stassen on the afternoon of Feb. 27.

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States is to continue to enjoy friendly relations with the Saudi Arabian authorities and to maintain its preferential position in the country, Saudi Arabia must be provided grant military assistance.

Several months prior to the conclusion of the Dhahran Airfield and Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements on June 18, 1951, it appeared very probable that the agreement for the use of this strategic airfield could not be concluded unless we gave the Saudi Arabian Government reason to believe we would extend grant military aid to supplement cash-reimbursable military assistance.

In view of this consideration and the urgent view taken by the Defense Department concerning the desirability of obtaining signature of the Airfield Agreement without any further delay, the Departments of State and Defense authorized the American Ambassador on May 2, 1951 to discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government the possibility of extending some military grant assistance, should the necessary legislation be approved. At the time the Ambassador did so, he pointed out that Saudi Arabia, among Near Eastern countries, was being given special consideration for such grant assistance, which would supplement, but not supplant, cash-reimbursable assistance.

The Department of State, sharing Ambassador Hare's belief that the United States Government was morally obligated to take appropriate action under legislation which by then had come into force, requested the Department of Defense on April 16, 1952 [2] to concur in recommending a Presidential finding of Saudi Arabia's eligibility for grant aid. The Department of Defense expressed concurrence in a letter dated June 13, 1952 [3] contingent upon a political determination that grant aid was necessary to assure the continuation of adequate military base rights in Saudi Arabia. In a further communication of February 20, 1953 [4] the Department of Defense informed the Department of State that funds for Saudi Arabian training requirements in the United States could be made available under the military assistance program for fiscal year 1953.

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[2] Document 1436.

[3] Document 1438.

[4] Not printed; the document under reference here is a memorandum by the Director, Office of Military Assistance, to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs. Referring to the last paragraph of the June 13, 1952, letter from the Department of Defense, which stated that Defense concurrence was subject to the availability of funds, the memorandum confirmed an informal statement previously made that the Department of Defense could make available from Fiscal Year 1953 funds the money to cover known requirements for training Saudi Arabian students in the United States for the remainder of the fiscal year. (786A.5 MSP/2-2053)

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It should be emphasized that the Dhahran Airfield Agreement runs for a period of ten years but is subject to cancellation or modification by either party after five years have elapsed. The Defense Department has already spent a considerable sum for development of the airfield and is now planning further expansion in the extent of installations and services in order to increase effectiveness of the base. It is expected that we shall shortly negotiate with the Saudi Arabian Government for permission to make such expansion. Such a request will undoubtedly give rise to renewed representations concerning our intentions as regards grant military aid.

It is now perfectly clear that the Saudi Arabs, even if they are not approached concerning expansion of base facilities, intend to persist in their request for grant military assistance. Inquiries regarding our willingness to extend such help have increased in recent months, and on December 1, 1952 the Commanding Officer of Dhahran Airfield was taken to task by the Saudi Defense Minister for the failure of the United States Government to take steps to provide grant aid. [5]

The financial obligations of the Saudi Arabian Government have greatly increased in recent years, and the present military assistance program can be carried out without outside aid only at the expense of other important development projects. This financial burden can be alleviated by a modest grant aid program in which emphasis might well be placed on student training in the United States and provision of military training equipment in token amounts. Such a program would clearly contribute directly to Saudi Arabian participation in any effective regional defense organization.

It is the view of the Department of State that United States base rights in Saudi Arabia may be adversely affected unless grant military aid is made available to Saudi Arabia. I therefore request that you recommend to the President that Saudi Arabia receive grant military assistance.

With specific reference to the purpose of Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, the Department of State is of the opinion that (1) the strategic position of Saudi Arabia makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area, (2) such assistance is critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and (3) the immediately increased ability of the recipient country to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the area and to the security of the United States.

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[5] Telegram 431 from Jidda, Dec. 4, reported the conversation under reference here to the Department of State. (786A.5 MSP/12-452)

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The Department of Defense has joined the Department of State in recommending grant military assistance to Saudi Arabia under the provisions of Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. In this connection, the assurances listed under Section 511(a) of the Act will be requested of the Saudi Arabian Government.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER B. SMITH

No. 1451

786A.5 MSP/3-1453

Memorandum by the President to the Director for Mutual Security (Stassen)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 14, 1953.

In accordance with the recommendation contained in your memorandum of March 2, 1953, [1] I hereby determine, pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 202 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, that it is essential for the purpose of that Act that the Government of Saudi Arabia be provided military assistance, pursuant to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. In making this determination, I find that (1) the strategic location of Saudi Arabia makes it of direct importance to the defense of the Near East area, (2) the assistance to be furnished is of critical importance to the defense of the free nations, and (3) the immediately increased ability of Saudi Arabia to defend itself is important to the preservation of the peace and security of the Near East area, and to the security of the United States.

The Secretaries of State and Defense are to be notified by you of this determination. [2]

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[1] Not printed. The memorandum under reference here transmitted the letter by the Under Secretary of State, *supra*, and concurred in the recommendation that Saudi Arabia be declared eligible for military assistance. (786A.5 MSP/3-253)

[2] A letter by the Director for Mutual Security to the Secretary of State, dated Mar. 14, transmitted a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State. Telegram 533 to Jidda, Mar. 16, informed the Ambassador of the decision on grant military aid to Saudi Arabia, and authorized him to so inform the Government of Saudi Arabia. Telegram 716 from Jidda, Mar. 20, reported that the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office had been informed on Mar. 17.

Instruction No. 5 to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, dated Apr. 3, transmitted a copy of this memorandum and a copy of a draft agreement to be concluded with Saudi Arabia, incorporating certain assurances required by law. The Ambassador was informed that consideration would be given to any modifications he might propose in the draft agreement, and that if he considered it inadvisable to proceed with

Continued

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No. 1452

786A.11/5-2353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 23, 1953. [1]

Subject: Call of Prince Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, on Secretary.

Participants: Prince Faisal
The Secretary
Sheikh Asad Al Faqih, Saudi Arabian Ambassador
Sheikh Ibrahim Suleiman, Prince Faisal's Chief of Cabinet
Sheikh Ali Alireza, Prince Faisal's Personal Assistant
Mr. A. David Fritzlan, NE

Prince Faisal called by prearrangement in order to say goodbye to the Secretary prior to his departure for Saudi Arabia and to leave some presents with him.

After appropriate complimentary remarks Prince Faisal informed the Secretary that a report of the conversation between General Smith and the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on March 16 [2] had been made to him and he had immediately informed his father King Ibn Saud concerning it. He had now received word from the King and had been instructed to inform the Secretary as follows concerning the King's reactions:

1. His Majesty was very grateful for the reaffirmation made of the policy stated in President Truman's letter to him of October 31, 1950. [3]

2. On the question of border disputes with the British, [4] the King was disappointed at our position and did not feel it to be consistent with the special status which the United States has in the past accorded to Saudi Arabia. He felt that the unusually close ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia called for active United States intervention in the Buraimi dispute in such a way as to protect and advance Saudi interests. Prince Faisal stated that, as was well known, his Government had only peaceful intentions toward

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negotiations at that time implementation of a training program involving no equipment could be based on a much shorter agreement, a draft of which was also enclosed. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 786A.5 MSP.

[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Mar. 24.

[2] For a memorandum of the conversation of Mar. 16, see Document 1506.

[3] For text of President Truman's letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1190.

[4] For documentation on U.S. interest in border disputes between the British and Saudi Arabians, in particular that of the Buraimi oasis, see Documents 1466 ff.

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its neighbors and had no aggressive designs whatsoever. However, his Government could not be expected to lose sight of its rights.

3. As had often been stated in the past, Prince Faisal remarked, the United States could count on Saudi Arabian support in the event of war. While King Ibn Saud was grateful for the news that grant military aid for training had been approved for Saudi Arabia he felt that this step went only a short way to satisfy the requirements of the situation and to meet expectations which had been raised. Prince Faisal especially wished to know the extent of the proposed grant aid program, and in this connection he complained concerning alleged high costs of material and training which had been obtained under the cash-reimbursable military assistance agreement signed June 18, 1951. He made the statement that in a number of cases equivalent material could have been obtained from European sources at approximately half the cost.

Finally, Prince Faisal stated that he did not feel he could return to his father without evidence of greater goodwill on our part and that he would be in Washington several days and would be available in case the Secretary wished to convey any further information concerning our attitudes on the questions he had raised.

The Secretary stated he would give the matter his prompt attention and would inform Prince Faisal in the next day or two. [5]

Before departing, Prince Faisal left with the Secretary on behalf of his father several presents as tokens of appreciation.

On leaving the Secretary's office Prince Faisal encountered two newspaper representatives who inquired concerning the nature of his visit. He stated that he had come to say goodbye to the Secretary, to express appreciation for the very friendly reception he had encountered during his visit in the United States, and to discuss certain matters of mutual interest. He refused to elucidate concerning these questions.

[5] The Under Secretary of State met with Prince Faisal and the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on Mar. 25. For an account of the meeting, see telegram 559 to Jidda, Document 1507.

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No. 1453

786A.5 MSP/3-2653

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister (Faisal) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1953.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Under Secretary of State refers to his meeting with His Royal Highness the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister on March 25 [2] and to the discussion which took place concerning the military grant aid program being prepared for Saudi Arabia.

During the discussion the Under Secretary confirmed to Prince Faisal that for some time consideration had been given to the possibility of undertaking a special program of grant military assistance for Saudi Arabia under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. The approval of military grant aid had been recommended to the President by the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security, and had been authorized by the President on March 12, 1953. The Ambassador of Saudi Arabia had been informed of the offer on March 16. [3]

This program of military grant assistance, which marks a new departure in the relations of the United States with the Arab Nations, is intended to provide for military training of members of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces outside of Saudi Arabia and under United States auspices. The Under Secretary elaborated from his own military experience on the necessity for sound basic training as a prerequisite to effective use of modern military equipment.

The Under Secretary stated further that steps could be taken to give the program definite shape after the conclusion of the usual agreement covering the subject of grant aid for training, pursuant to the Mutual Security Act. The draft text of this agreement is being sent to Ambassador Hare. [4] After conclusion of the agreement, the Under Secretary stated, it will be incumbent upon Ambassador Hare and General Grover to work out with the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense a grant aid training program suited to the

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[1] This *aide-mémoire* was drafted by Fritzlan and Hart, and cleared by S/MSA and NEA.

[2] See footnote 5, *supra*. For a discussion of the source text between the Under Secretary and the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, see part 2 of the memorandum of conversation of Apr. 1 by Fritzlan, Document 1510.

[3] For a memorandum of the conversation of Mar. 16, see Document 1506. For information on the approval of the program by the President, see the memorandum by the President to the Director for Mutual Security, Document 1451.

[4] See footnote 2, *ibid.*

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needs of Saudi Arabia. Naturally, such a program would have to come within the scope of United States legislation and Congressional appropriations. The Under Secretary stated that the extent of aid which might be available for Saudi Arabia could not be determined until Saudi requirements had been studied and until the availability of funds had been determined.

In clarification of a question raised by the Foreign Minister, the Under Secretary emphasized that the offer of grant military aid for training purposes had never been and was not now intended to be considered as applicable to, or limited by, the expenses of training those Saudi military students now in the United States and whose tuition had already been paid by the Saudi Arabian Government.

No. 1454

Editorial Note

Despatch 250 from Jidda, February 28, transmitted to the Department of State a summary of two discussions held at Riyadh on February 19 and 20, regarding the draft of the proposed Military Assistance Advisory Group Agreement. The only controversy had been over the subject of jurisdiction over military dependents and civilians, which was not settled at that time. Despatch 251 from Jidda, February 28, transmitted the revised draft of the Agreement which emerged from the discussions reported in despatch 250. (786A.5 MSP/2–2853)

The final agreement was signed on June 27, 1953. For the text, see TIAS 2812; 4 UST (pt. 2) 1482.

Despatch 21 from Jidda, July 8, transmitted the agreement to the Department of State. It consisted of three documents: A note by Ambassador Hare to Prince Mishaal, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation, setting forth the conditions to govern the status, duties, administration, and conduct of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group to Saudi Arabia in implementation of the Military Assistance Agreement of June 1951, dated June 27, 1953; the translation of a note by Mishaal, dated June 27, 1953, agreeing to the contents of Hare's letter; and the translation of a note by Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister, dated June 28, 1953, regarding treatment of Americans in Saudi Arabia. The note by Yassin stated that American civilians in Saudi Arabia, although they would be subject to Saudi law and jurisdiction, would receive justice and equality under the law. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 786A.5 MSP.

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No. 1455

Editorial Note

Despatch 3 from Jidda, July 4, enclosed the record of the discussions on the draft bilateral Grant Aid Agreement held in Riyadh from June 28 to July 2 between the Ambassador, the Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister, and the King's Councilor. The despatch reported that the Saudis were pleased at being presented with a draft agreement before any other Arab countries; but they were dismayed by the complexity of the draft and hesitated to commit themselves in writing.

Saudi complaints about the complexity of the agreement led the Department of State to revise the draft agreement and the instruction to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia. A memorandum by Fritzlan, dated August 19, transmitted a copy of the revised agreement to the Foreign Operations Administration for comment. A memorandum from the Foreign Operations Administration, dated August 31, informed the Department of State that a few changes should be made, but on the whole the revised instruction and draft agreement were satisfactory. Airgram A-20, September 16, transmitted a copy of the revised draft agreement to the Embassy in Jidda. It informed the Embassy that the modified draft represented a special type of agreement, as short and simple as possible, which had been drawn up in deference to the Saudis. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 786.5 MSP.

No. 1456

786A.5 MSP/10-1153

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET [JIDDA, October 6, 1953.]

Participants: Prince Feisal, Saudi Foreign Minister
J. Jefferson Jones, III, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
Clifford R. Nelson, Second Secretary
Mohammed Massoud, Embassy's Arab Consultant

[1] Despatch 140, Oct. 11, transmitted a copy of this memorandum to the Department of State. The Chargé pointed out that one of the main obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement would be the necessity for including provisions required by the legislation governing grant aid agreements. (786A.5 MSP/10-1153)

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Mr. Jones referred to the conversations in Riyadh between Saudi and U.S. officials regarding a draft military grant aid agreement between the two countries, during the course of which the Saudi officials had raised certain objections to the terms of the draft. [2] The Embassy had submitted the questions raised by the Saudi representatives to the Department of State and had now received clarification and elucidation of them. Consequently the Embassy was prepared to resume the discussions at the convenience of the Saudi Government. Mr. Jones stated that a note to the foregoing effect would be left with the Foreign Minister at the conclusion of the interview.

Prince Feisal suggested that the Embassy might wish to supply to the Saudi Government a revised draft of the agreement which would embody the modifications resulting from the State Department's consideration of the points raised by the Saudi officials at Riyadh. He thought that such a procedure might be advisable as it would provide an opportunity for the Royal Diwan to consider and reach an opinion on the revised draft prior to resumption of the discussions and would thus expedite the course of the negotiations.

Mr. Jones stated that, in his opinion, it would be desirable to furnish Saudi representatives with certain oral explanations at the time it handed over the revised draft. He believed that the oral explanations would be of value in the consideration by the Saudi Government of the revised draft. If the Saudi Government wished, however, a short meeting could be held in the immediate future in order to present the revised draft and the meeting could then be adjourned in order to permit consideration by His Majesty's advisers. Prince Feisal said that he was agreeable and that his original comment was a mere suggestion on his part.

Prince Feisal stated that he had recently read the reports prepared by the Saudi Government's representatives on the discussions of the draft military grant aid agreement with Ambassador Hare and other U.S. officials. He had been impressed by the frequency with which the U.S. representatives had replied to Saudi objections to the draft with the statement: "We are bound by the law". He believed that one of the great difficulties in achieving agreement between the two Governments was the lack of flexibility of the United States Government, which was in contrast to the complete flexibility of the Saudi Government's position on the question. He thought that the U.S. legislation governing military grant aid to countries as widely divergent as those of Europe and the Middle East should make it possible to take into account the

[2] Presumably this refers to the June 28–July 2 conversations at Riyadh, mentioned in the editorial note, *supra*.

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peculiar conditions existing in each country. To illustrate his point, Prince Feisal referred to Egypt, which did not want any foreign soldiers on Egyptian soil, and to Great Britain, which had no objection to the stationing of American troops in the country.

Mr. Jones replied that the U.S. legislation controlling military grant aid required that certain provisions of a general nature be included in grant aid agreements. Nevertheless, there was a large degree of flexibility, particularly with respect to the substance of individual grant aid programs, since the type of aid would be worked out between the U.S. and the countries concerned and thus would reflect the needs of each particular country. Moreover, he hoped and believed that the mandatory provisions of the draft agreement, as it was modified by the Department as the result of Saudi objections, would not be unacceptable to the Saudi Government.

Prince Feisal said that the note, together with the views expressed by Mr. Jones regarding the procedures to be followed for the resumption of discussions, would be sent to the Royal Diwan for study. He also said that he would attempt to have an answer within the next several days. [3]

[3] The Saudi Arabian decision was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 109 from Dhahran, Document 1461.

No. 1457

611.86A/10-1453: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, October 14, 1953—8 p. m.

149. Foreign Office note dated October 13 [2] refers my conversations with King's councillor, Khalid Gargoni during Taif visit October 6–8 [3] and sets forth position SAG with respect (1) Dhahran mail problem (Embassy telegram 141), [4] (2) *Time-Newsweek* ban (Embassy telegram 140), [3] and (3) three American prisoners.

[1] Repeated to Dhahran.

[2] An Embassy translation of the Oct. 13 note was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 149, Oct. 18. (611.86A/10-1853)

[3] Telegrams 128 from Jidda, Sept. 29 (786A.00/9-2953), and 136, Oct. 5 (611.86A/10-553), reported the Ambassador had an appointment to see Prince Faisal at Taif on Oct. 6 to discuss the matters under reference here. Telegram 140 from Jidda, Oct. 9, informed the Department that Prince Faisal had been ill and Gargoni had acted as his representative. It further stated that nothing definite had emerged from the conversations regarding the three American prisoners and the *Time-Newsweek* ban. (611.86A/10-853)

[4] Dated Oct. 8, not printed. It reported that the Ambassador had set forth the U.S. position that inspection of mail was contrary to the Dhahran Airfield Agreement,

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Highlights note, text of which being airmailed, as follows:

(1) Regarding Dhahran mail problem, Royal Decree of December 23, 1952 provides all packages entering country must be inspected. [5] Validity this decree in no way affected by fact it not immediately implemented. Military and civilian personnel DAF subject, under terms paragraph 13(a) DAF agreement, laws and regulations of Kingdom and SAG will apply all such laws unless specific exemption exists. Though agreement grants exemption customs duties, nowhere specifies freedom from inspection of packages.

On basis request Chargé d'Affaires and without prejudice its rights, SAG willing, however, "postpone application" of Royal Decree ordering inspection for period 1 month during which time two parties have opportunity agree on arrangements satisfactory both. If in this time no agreement reached, SAG will exercise its right and resume inspection. Instructions this effect issued appropriate Saudi authorities.

Comment: Though not specifically so stated in note, Embassy assumes parcels presently held will be released. Will inform. End comment.

(2) After determination *Time* and *Newsweek* have modified policy, SAG has decided lift ban on both magazines.

Comment: In view publication article derogatory Saudi Arabia in October 12 issue *Time*, probably ban that magazine will be reimposed. End comment.

(3) SAG wishes issue American prisoners had not been raised and strongly urges it not be taken up again. As custodian holy shrines Islam, SAG cannot open itself to charge that, bowing to pressure of friendly government, it neglected its duty. [6]

JONES

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and urged Gargoni to consider reestablishing the *status quo ante* pending a mutually satisfactory solution within the framework of the Agreement. He also informed Gargoni that under present instructions the Embassy could not agree to spot inspection or any other form of inspection of U.S. mail. (611.86A/10-853)

[5] An unnumbered telegram from Dhahran, Feb. 23, had first reported the decree to the Department of State. Telegram 196 to Dhahran, Feb. 24, advised General Grover and Ambassador Hare that the subject of mail inspection should not be handled on a local basis but should be discussed with government officials in Riyadh or Jidda. It also asked them to find out the reasons for the policy. Telegram 673 from Jidda, Mar. 4, informed the Department that the Ambassador considered the main point at issue in the mail inspection matter to be Saudi Arabian sovereignty, which had always been the main preoccupation with regard to Dhahran Airfield. Documentation is in Department of State file 711.56386A.

[6] The three Americans, employees of the Bechtel Corporation, had been arrested for entering the city of Mecca, a Moslem Holy Place which non-Moslems were not supposed to enter. Telegram 234 from Jidda, Nov. 17, reported that the new King had freed the Americans as part of an amnesty following the death of King Ibn Saud. (786A.11/11-1753)

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No. 1458

786A.11/11-1053: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT JIDDA, November 10, 1953—8 a. m.

218. Delivered President's message to King Saud [2] 1300 local time today (approximately 1000 GMT). Text message identical that contained Department's Instruction 12 June 23. [3] King expressed appreciation and indicated reply would be forthcoming soon.

King asked me inform US Government he was determined continue his father's policies including maintenance close friendship with US. After referring anxiety in past about possible unrest following King Ibn Saud's death, he said he has assured support Saudi people in whole kingdom and US need have no concern in this regard. He has allegiance of every Saudi, both high and low, "from man in street to Emir Feisal." To commemorate his accession he was pardoning all persons exiled from Saudi Arabia and permitting their return to country. He was also proclaiming amnesty for persons convicted offenses against state and paying their fines himself. People jailed for civil offenses against private rights would enjoy amnesty only if wronged persons agreed waive rights. (Embassy has discreetly initiated inquiry determine whether amnesty applicable to three Americans imprisoned for entering Mecca.) [4]

King had no objection publication President's message and said both message and his reply would be published Saudi newspapers. [5]

Taif quiet and most shops closed. Crown Prince Feisal and other members Royal Family returned Taif from Riyadh this afternoon. King expects return Jidda tomorrow and receive Diplomatic Corps at 1100 local time.

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran and Beirut.

[2] Telegram 212 from Jidda, Nov. 9, reported the death of King Ibn Saud, and the accession to the throne of Crown Prince Saud. Prince Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been designated the new Crown Prince. (786A.11/11-953)

[3] Not printed; it transmitted the text of a message from the President for the Ambassador to give the new King in case of the death of King Ibn Saud. The Ambassador was instructed, in the event of Ibn Saud's death, to proceed immediately to Riyadh with the message; and to leave no doubt about U.S. support and recognition of the new King. (786A.11/6-2353) This plan had been formulated in March 1952 by the Truman Administration and reviewed and approved by President Eisenhower in March 1953.

[4] See footnote 6, *supra*.

[5] Telegram 228 from Jidda, Nov. 13, transmitted the translation of King Saud's reply to the President's message. It reported that both notes had been broadcast over the Mecca radio and published in *Al Bilad Al Saudiya* on Nov. 12. (Lot 66 D 204, Presidential Correspondence, King Saud/Eisenhower)

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Requested see Crown Prince Feisal express condolences but was informed he ill and, in fact, had left his bed in order accompany father's remains to Riyadh. Consequently did not press for interview.

Embassy informed by Foreign Office chiefs several other diplomatic missions Jidda requested permission visit Taif express condolences to King but were refused.

JONES

No. 1459

711.56386A/12-1653: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, December 16, 1953—6 p. m.

275. Deptels 180, December 14 [2] and 182, December 15. [3] Discussed question inspection mail and cargo for base with Prince Feisal today. Shaikh Yusuf Yassin who recently returned Jidda from Europe present at conversation.

After expressing appreciation consideration given question Prince Feisal other high Saudi officials stated Gargoni formula [4] not acceptable giving as explanation various points contained Deptel 180. Also referred personal parcel post packages now impounded and asked these packages as well as official cargo shipments now impounded be released without inspection pending further discussion question after arrival Ambassador Wadsworth.

Prince Feisal replied SAG not willing renounce sovereign right of inspection but had no intention hindering operation base at Dhahran. He still thought simplest solution was have American official

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Ambassador that the failure of the Saudi Arabian Government to accept without question official documents describing the contents of official parcel post received at Dhahran Airfield could only be regarded as questioning the good faith of the U.S. Government. No such question had arisen in any other country, and the U.S. Government could not acquiesce. (711.56386A/12-1353)

[3] Not printed; it advised the Ambassador to inform Prince Faisal that if personal packages for Dhahran were still impounded a serious problem of morale would arise at Christmas time. (711.56386A/11-1953)

[4] The so-called Gargoni formula refers to a proposal by Khalid Bey Gargoni, reported to the Department of State in telegram 265 from Jidda, Dec. 7. Gargoni implied that the Saudis did not intend to inspect official parcel post mail for Dhahran Airfield, but reserved the right to do so. He said the Saudi Arabian Government intended to be tolerant and not make a general inspection, but would inspect any package about which there was any doubt. Before inspecting a package, the Government would inform American authorities to send an observer to be present during the inspection; but if the observer were delayed the Government would carry out the inspection by itself. (711.56386A/12-753)

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be present at opening of "few packages". After my negative reply this suggestion Prince Feisal said he would refer to King my request release imports now impounded pending discussion Ambassador Wadsworth with SAG authorities. He said Yusuf who planned leave Riyadh tomorrow would submit question to King.

According Dunlop, acting commander US forces Dhahran following is status various categories imports and mail for base:

1. Since release impounded mail October 13 Saudis have not as yet impounded nor attempted inspect official mail including packages.
2. All intransit mail including packages released for shipment without inspection.
3. Saudis have refused release official cargo received Dammam without inspection but at present official cargo received via MATS or bases own aircraft not impounded.
4. Personal parcel post still impounded.

With reference last point Feisal stated there is possibility securing release without inspection all impounded packages in next few days by action local customs official.

Embassy will inform Department soon as information received regarding King's reaction to request presently impounded imports be released pending discussions Ambassador Wadsworth.

JONES

No. 1460

711.56386A/12-2053: Telegram

The Consul at Dhahran (Hackler) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY DHAHRAN, December 20, 1953—4 p. m.

97. From Jones. Department's 98, December 18. [2] King informed me at Riyadh yesterday he had received Crown Prince Feisal's message transmitting Embassy's request all mail and imports now impounded be released pending arrival Ambassador Wadsworth (Embassy telegram 275, December 16). [3]

King wished tell me he had given personal attention to Embassy's request and had decided grant it. He had sent intructions Feisal mail should be released and handled "in same way as

[1] Repeated to Jidda.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Embassy that the Saudi Arabian Ambassador told the Department of State he had received a message from the King stating he had ordered the release of all impounded mail and restoration of the *status quo ante* pending the arrival of Ambassador Wadsworth. (711.56386A/11-1953)

[3] *Supra*.

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before". While formal notification his decision would be transmitted US by Foreign Office, he wished inform me personally at this time. I expressed appreciation his action and said felt certain he and Ambassador Wadsworth would be able reach mutually satisfactory solution this problem.

King then said he wished cooperate fully US and not place any hindrances in its way. At same time he was determined maintain Saudi sovereignty and while he fully realized US not imperialistic state, hoped US would always keep this attitude in mind its dealings SAG officials. I commented was certain US wished take no action which would infringe upon Saudi sovereignty.

King closed conversation with statement that if Embassy encountered difficulties in its negotiations various questions with Saudi officials it should not hesitate come to him direct.

HACKLER

No. 1461

786A.5 MSP/1–1854: Telegram

The Consul at Dhahran (Hackler) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL DHAHRAN, January 18, 1954—1 p. m.

109. From Ambassador Wadsworth. Regarding draft military grant aid agreement, [2] Acting Foreign Minister Yusuf Yassin, acting under King's instructions, informed me January 15, that after thoroughly studying draft, His Majesty decided he cannot accept it "because of new obligations Saudi Arabia would have to assume". These "could not be put on shoulders of new regime; they would reflect badly on Saudi Arabian standing in all Arab States". King had added, however, that Saudi Arabia would be grateful all aid and assistance possible within framework existing agreements.

According Shaikh Yusuf, King also said US would receive "every cooperation, every friendship, whether or not US helped Saudi Arabia" and "regretted necessity informing me his inability sign agreement".

As I had already in earlier discussion argued that all really important commitments in proposed agreement were already included in existing agreements and that it was furthest from our thoughts suggest any relationship infringing Saudi sovereignty, I asked Shaikh Yusuf explain real reason King did not wish sign. His answer was: "Because it would mean anything we have, both

[1] Repeated to Jidda.

[2] Regarding the grant aid agreement, see Documents 1455 and 1456.

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in economic and military fields, would be under US control and dictation; all country would be under control US".

My impression is that King, unfamiliar with practices Western States [garble] influenced by advice his strongly Arab nationalist councillors, sincerely believes acceptance agreement would entail assumption obligations infringing Saudi sovereignty and, not possessing prestige his late father, believes it wiser take no action this nature which would subject him strong criticism other Arab States. I suspect contributing consideration was that negotiations came to head at time when reports regarding formation pact Muslim States under aegis US appearing Arab press (Consulate General's 106, January 15). [3] Feel certain King eager develop his defense forces with our continuing help and truly regrets what he considers necessity rejecting assistance which would flow from agreement.

Full details by early airpouch. [4]

HACKLER

[3] Not printed; it reported the Deputy Foreign Minister had asked the Ambassador if there was any truth to reports from Washington of an early conclusion of military grant aid agreements with Iran and Pakistan, and a mutual defense pact between those two countries and Turkey. (780.5 MSP/1-1554)

[4] Despatches 285 and 286, Feb. 8, neither printed. (786A.5 MSP/2-854)

No. 1462

Editorial Note

Telegram 386 from Jidda, March 10, reported on King Saud's first major speech from the throne inaugurating the Council of Ministers in Riyadh on March 7. He announced, among other things, that the Ministry of Finance would become a ministry in the true meaning of the word. It would control expenditures within an authorized budget, parts of which would be submitted to the Council of Ministers. Telegram 395 from Jidda, March 17, reported that a Financial Committee of the Council had been established to make a preliminary study of various budgets. The King was reported to be actively participating in the Council proceedings. Documentation is in Department of State file 786A.00.

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No. 1463

611.86A/6-154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT JIDDA, June 1, 1954—9 p. m.

493. Had some four hours with Prince Faisal at Taif today. He was exquisitely courteous throughout except for brief lapse into softly put sarcasm near end.

As I had requested appointment I opened by saying I had looked forward to opportunity talk to him of highlights Istanbul Ambassadors conference; [2] I had too one highly secret matter of which I wished speak with him alone; and I hoped he would wish speak as frankly with me re Saudi-American relations as in his view they had developed since I had seen King and him in Riyadh just one month ago (mytel 167, May 3 from Dhahran). [3] I had I added been disturbed at what I had heard on my return of growing anti-American feeling at Riyadh (mytels 489, May 29 re Buraimi [4] and 492, June 1 re Point IV). [5]

Department should know I had carefully considered just what I should say. I was seriously apprehensive he would—as in substance he did after two hours exposition on my part—tell me not only that US had failed Saudi Arabia as a friend in Buraimi dispute but also that Saudi Arabia no longer felt need of Point IV. Consequently in my exposition of strategic, Palestine and aid policies recommended to Department by Istanbul conference I interpolated full anticipatory rebuttal of reported Saudi criticism our positions on military and economic aid and on our support of Turk-Pakistan pact and military aid to Iraq. My over-all frame was tremendous struggle between our western world and Communist Russia.

Faisal followed me carefully; his few questions were well taken and I then answered and I listened with few interruptions for next hour. His frame was philosophic i.e., that nations like individuals must act in accord dictates their national or self-interest. He stressed that he did not question necessity our world policy of coop-

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] For documentation on the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 11–14, see Documents 210–212 and 824.

[3] Not printed; it reported the King's complaint that the United States was following a policy of neglect toward Saudi Arabia, especially in the case of the Buraimi dispute. (780.022/5-354)

[4] Not printed. (780.022/5-2954)

[5] Not printed; it reported some Saudi Arabian disaffection with the size of the Point IV program. (786A.5 MSP/6-154)

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eration with Britain; two countries had highly important common interests; but as one result small though it was on world plane Saudi Arabia was loser.

Consequently—and here was his touch of sarcasm—Council of Ministers last night after considering USG reply (Deptel 337, May 29) [6] to Shaikh Yussef's last representations re Buraimi dispute (Mytel 489, May 29) had decided it would no longer trouble USG with its small problems but instead would henceforth handle them to best its ability itself.

Our ensuing discussion was brief but during its course Faisal made two further important statements. According my notes (only two of any importance I took during whole conversation) they were substantially as follows:

1. "As to Point IV the Councils decision was to dispense with their further services not because they have not been doing their work well. The decision has been sent to the King for signature". I asked: "Why then dispense with their services?" He answered: "Because of the new policy of Saudi Arabia not to bother the US Government".
2. "As to the military mission this matter has not come to Foreign Office. You should continue to handle it with Prince Mishaal." Substance of my reply was that if and when it did come to Foreign Office I hoped he would again discuss matters fully with me; I had not found discussion with Prince Mishaal helpful.

. . . . . .

WADSWORTH

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 1565.

No. 1464

611.86A/6-454: Telegram

Memorandum of Conversation, by Donald C. Bergus of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1954.

Subject: U.S.-Saudi Arabian Relations

Participants: The Secretary
Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
NE—Mr. Bergus

Sheikh Asad stated that he had just returned from Saudi Arabia and that he was the bearer of a message to the Secretary and the President from King Saud. When Sheikh Asad had left the United States for Saudi Arabia three months ago, he had been disturbed at the way in which relations between the United States and Saudi

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Arabia had deteriorated. He had done his best to improve them, and had had several discussions with King Saud on the subject.

King Saud wished to assure the Secretary that he wholeheartedly desires to maintain good relations between the two countries. However, since the King's accession there had been a number of difficulties. Among them was the negative United States response to the King's request for economic aid made at the time of the King's accession when the Saudi Treasury was empty and Saudi commitments for development projects were great. Another difficulty had been created by the U.S. requirement that Saudi Arabia accept a number of detailed conditions before receiving military aid. Saudi Arabia was not run by lawyers and the Saudis simply could not understand why such onerous conditions were required, particularly in view of Saudi Arabia's close collaboration with the United States in World War II when there was no written agreement between the two countries. Saudi Arabia appreciated U.S. help in the Buraimi affair but there were times when it had appeared that U.S. assistance could have been more effective. The King had been of the opinion that his Government's agreement with Onassis on oil tankers [1] had been within Saudi sovereignty and did not run counter to the Aramco concession. When the United States made its position known, however, the King undertook to have the matter examined, especially article IV of the Onassis agreement.

The King had been "obliged" to cancel the Point IV agreement with the United States because the matter came up at a time when he was in receipt of reports of statements of "high U.S. officials in the area" to the effect that the U.S. should concentrate its efforts on Prince Faisal in an attempt to play him off against the King. Sheikh Asad would give no further details on this statement, but he did make it clear that the King did not have Ambassador Wadsworth in mind as the author of the statements. The King had expressed to Sheikh Asad his great esteem for Ambassador Wadsworth.

King Saud appeals to the President and the Secretary to use their influence to maintain close relations between the two countries. There were other disturbing factors such as a recent article in the *Christian Science Monitor* (which had a certain appearance of being U.S. Government inspired) stating that a revolution could shortly be expected in Saudi Arabia due to the profligacy of the King. The trend in Saudi Arabia was for progress and the King would need the help of the Secretary and the President to maintain this trend.

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[1] For documentation on this topic, see Documents 242 ff.

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The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for his remarks which would be closely studied. There was only a desire on our part to have strong and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. We had been disturbed over strains and tensions which had appeared in recent months. Some of the things the Ambassador had mentioned had been new to the Secretary. The Secretary could assure the Ambassador that the alleged "remarks of a U.S. official" had no standing with the President or himself. The U.S. Government did not inspire press articles and it was probably best for all concerned if very little attention were paid to press speculation. The Secretary could understand the King's feelings as to the complicated nature of aid agreements with the United States. The Secretary had made efforts to get these agreements simplified, but it appeared that legislative requirements prevented such simplification.

The Secretary expressed the hope that this exchange of views with the Ambassador would mark a turning point in improved U.S.-Saudi Arab relations.

No. 1465

611.86A/10-154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

SECRET JIDDA, October 1, 1954—5 p. m.

138. 1. King Saud invited me for private audience yesterday prior to my presenting General O'Hara who is on MAAG inspection tour. Highlights follow:

I asked after his health; he had just returned from ten-day post-pilgrimage visit to Medina. He replied he was physically fatigued but spirtually refreshed and happy over royal welcome.

He said he wished speak secretly with me on two subjects. First was his apprehension lest Jewish or British influences endeavor undermine Saudi-American friendly relations. Second was Communist leaflet distributed in Hasa few weeks ago (see Dhahran ConGen despatch 12, August 25). [1] (I had earlier told him USG would be interested [garble] this subject.)

On first subject he said he wished only offer word of caution. It was obvious Israelis and their supporters in US were opposing SAG plans for strengthening its armed forces. They might even endeav-

[1] Not printed. (786A.00/8-2554)

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or influence MAAG officers. He would not elaborate; his own views on general subject had been forcefully expressed only recently.

To my reply that I had carefully reported those views to Department (mytel 125, September 20) [2] and did not believe Jewish pressures could influence US against carrying through MAAG program or in selection MAAG officers, he commented he only wished caution USG that anything of this sort could best be stopped in initial stage.

Then as though by way of liaison to second subject, he added he had received information that during last 12 months 40,000 Jews had emigrated from Russia to Israel. He had feared just this would happen when Israel was established and that country became major channel for Communist infiltration Middle East. [3]

2. On second subject he said he had already spent 400,000 liras tracing origin of Communist leaflets and had sent another 200,000 to his representative in Beirut. There could be no doubt leaflets were printed there, for printing press had been found with copy of leaflet in it. Person who had done job, an Iraqi of Nedji origin, had also been located and would be arrested and turned over to SAG. Finally, investigation had established the delivery route of pamphlets was via Iraq, Bahrain and Dhahran; and he was hopeful it would soon uncover those persons guilty of distribution in Hasa and their associates.

He added he wished USG know not only all facts uncovered this connection but also his unswerving opposition communism and all its [garble]. (*Note:* If Department has or can get us from other American sources any information on this matter, I would welcome authorization communicate to King such of it as may be deemed proper together with some expression Department's appreciation this message.)

3. He then spoke warmly of his satisfaction at settlement with Aramco (mytel 18, Department 23 from Dhahran) [4] and said he wished tell me "personally and not as King" that $70,000,000 payment would be used to pay Saudi share of cost reconditioning Hedjaz Railway to [garble] all SAG foreign and domestic debts after full check by Egyptian firm chartered accountants, and to strengthen position and potentiality Saudi monetary agency.

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[2] Not printed; it reported on a visit by U.S. Senator Ellender. (033.1100 EL/9-2054)

[3] Telegram 128 to Jidda, Oct. 6, informed the Embassy reports received by the Department of State indicated Jewish immigration to Israel from Russia was virtually nonexistent, and the Department was unaware of any Soviet decision to permit Jewish emigration. (611.86A/10-154)

[4] This reference is unclear; telegram 18 from Dhahran, Sept. 23, concerns Saudi military supplies, with no mention of Aramco. (786A.5 MSP/9-2354)

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In this connection he welcomed Davies return to Jidda September 29 with Aramco financial and legal experts to complete details settlement and expressed hope occasion could be utilized to reach settlement Onassis matter as well.

In latter connection he voiced full confidence in new Minister Finance and said he would be pleased were he to discuss any financial matters of common interest. (*Note:* I propose to state advantage this invitation to present Minister Finance copy National Research Council's report on "utilization of waste gases in Saudi Arabia", Usfoto 80, August 27. [5] Has Department other suggestions?)

He said too that Minister Finance would take up promptly matter of Saudi Arabia joining World Bank which I had raised last January. [Garble] policy decision had already been taken, and Pakistan [garble] president Shoaib would be invited visit Jidda for preliminary discussion. He would then be happy invite President Black make visit. He mentioned in passing his continuing interests construction Riyadh–Mecca railway.

In conclusion he spoke in appealingly intimate way of his hopes for new regime (mytel 83, August 31). [6] It had not been easy to lay its foundations, but already much had been achieved. Patience was needed, roughshod methods would be self-defeating, rather would he "pull the thread from the pudding, slowly".

4. To Generals O'Hara and Grover, who were then introduced, he stressed view that to strengthen Saudi armed forces was in effect to enhance American strength as well, because of Saudi Arabia's special relations with United States. He wished us meet with Defense Minister, which we later did. Both King and Defense Minister were particularly interested in early completion work of joint planning committees (mytel 97, September 4). [7]

(*Note:* As early cost estimates are important to Ministry budgeting, General O'Hara will consider sending costing experts from US. I should appreciate Department supporting this move and urging prompt transmittal letter of offer for equipment SAG has already requested.)

WADSWORTH

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[5] Not found in Department of State files.

[6] Not printed; it reported that Crown Prince Faisal's appointment as Prime Minister had been followed shortly by the resignation of Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman as Minister of Finance.

[7] Not printed; it reported on a meeting General Grover and the Ambassador had with the "High Commission," composed of Royal Councillors Khalid Gargoni and Jamal Husseini and Minister of Defense Prince Mishaal, that had been appointed by the King to establish and supervise an armed forces joint planning commission to plan for a stronger Saudi Arabian Army and Air Force. (786A.5/9–454)

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UNITED STATES INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SAUDI ARABIA REGARDING BOUNDARIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, IN PARTICULAR THE BOUNDARIES OF THE BURAIMI AREA

No. 1466

Editorial Note

A conference on boundary problems between Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, represented by the British, opened at Damman on January 28, 1952. Prince Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the head of the Saudi Arabian delegation; which also included Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister; Shaikh Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom; and Amir Saud ibn Jiluwi, Governor of Al-Hasa. Sir Rupert Hay, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was the head of the British delegation; which also included Major C. J. Pelly, British Political Agent at Kuwait; W. V. R. Evans, Assistant Legal Adviser in the Foreign Office; and Mr. Michael Weir. Shaikh Ali ibn Abdullah Al Thani of Qatar and Shaikh Shakhbut ibn Sultan of Abu Dhabi were present, but took little part in the conference, letting the British present their case. Because of the death of the British King, the conference adjourned on February 7 for a week; and when it reconvened on February 14 it was adjourned again for one month at the request of the British delegation. (Despatch 74 from Dhahran, February 20; 780.022/2-2052)

In telegram 431 from Jidda, February 14, Ambassador Hare reported King Ibn Saud had sent him a message expressing concern over the boundary negotiations. The King asked if, as an act of friendship, the Ambassador would meet Prince Faisal for a firsthand account of the negotiations, and then stop at Riyadh to see the King. (780.022/2-1452) Telegram 444 from Jidda, February 24, transmitted a summary of the conversations the Ambassador had with the King, Faisal, and Yassin concerning the boundary discussions with the British. They asked the Ambassador to request United States intervention with the British. Ambassador Hare advised the Department he believed the Saudi Arabian position was stronger than the British, as the British had been insufficiently prepared and for that reason had adjourned the conference. He suggested the matter be discussed fully with the British, and reported he believed the British should proceed more astutely in the future unless they were prepared to see the issue transformed into another "crisis" in their growing list of difficulties in the area. (780.022/2-2452) Despatch 294 from Jidda, March 31, transmitted a

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translation of the official Saudi Arabian account of the conversations with the British at Damman. (780.022/3-3152)

Previous negotiations on this topic had taken place in London in August 1951. Regarding the London Conference, see the memorandum of conversation of September 25, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume V, page 330.

No. 1467

641.86A/3-1052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, March 10, 1952—4 p. m.

474. Long talk yesterday with Prince Faisal who said sent here by King from Riyadh especially discuss with me King's apprehensions re Brit. King had originally considered sending Faisal Wash but decided more discreet handle here. For same reason had deemed preferable have Faisal come here ostensibly for medical treatment rather than asking me come Riyadh.

According Faisal King increasingly concerned by what he regards as Brit political maneuvers contrary interests SA. King's own intentions entirely pacific but he definitely will not submit to measures directed against him even by Brit. Back of it all, he convinced, is Brit irritation because increasingly close Saudi-American relations recent years, but for policy reasons Brit ire cannot be directed at US, and SA therefore made objection their own pleasure. . . . Although situation perhaps not such warrant basing case on any one point, indices taken together clearly show disturbing pattern Brit anti-Saudi policy. Situation cld easily get out of control by accident or design and King feels strongly Brit shld be curbed before critical point reached. Why can't Brit leave well enough alone? That is all King asks.

In past King had approached us this regard and we had used good offices in endeavor narrow area difficulty but this neutral policy had not been effective and King now desired make serious plea for our taking matter up with Brit very firmly and seeking clear cut assurances they wld forego political machinations to disturb present political balance. I replied most this familiar ground and correct we had consistently followed policy not taking sides but trying promote agreement between our Brit and Saudi friends.

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[1] Repeated to London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.

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Now Saudis asking us change and bear down on Brit. That wld be serious decision in any circumstances but especially difficult now since King desired keep approach to us secret while at same time there wld not seem to have been any outstanding recent developments in situation to serve as basis our approach Brit with degree seriousness King desired. Faisal confirmed unable authorize reference to this approach without resubmitting to King, which wld be difficult, and he suggested that as alternative we might take up as matter of our own observation of Saudi concern. Re facts they not so important as Brit motivating attitude and important to change this attitude before facts become major concern. King wants take time by forelock and prevent degeneration situation to detriment not only SA and Brit but area as whole. Faisal then renewed appeal for our intervention and said instructed remain here until cld return Riyadh with our reply.

I said wld of course consider King's request but felt matter as presented did not afford much to get one's teeth into. Faisal replied that exactly the point; what King wanted was arrest present ominous drift events before it became overt dispute. Indicated, however, that particularly troubling King at present is indications Brit seeking promote unification Kuwait with Iraq. This King cld not countenance.

Comment and recommendations in fol tel. [2] Request all offices to which rptd treat as confidential and that London not mention FonOff at this time.

HARE

[2] Presumably this reference is to telegram 477 from Jidda, Mar. 11. *infra*.

No. 1468

641.86A/3-1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, March 11, 1952—10 p. m.

477. King's message (Embtel 474, March 10 [2]) puts us difficult position. Hitherto we have firmly maintained Brit and Saudi's shld iron out differences and our role shld be confined acting honest broker. In consequence, aside reporting King's frequent representations this subject to Dept and London, I have always kept Brit Amb

[1] Repeated to London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.
[2] *Supra*.

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fully informed and discussed with him how best meet situation. But now King, in atmosphere increasing restiveness, holds our neutral assistance ineffective; that, if difficulty to be resolved peacefully, we must step in; and that King's approach shld be kept secret. Of course we cannot be placed in position having King dictate our policy but he does occupy fairly consequential place in our scheme of things and, despite his advancing years, his power political perception has been keen. Consequently, when he professes see signs Brit maneuvering behind certain area developments, believe inadvisable treat as mere distortions of dotage.

While by no means disposed accept King's allegations re Brit without considerable discount, must be admitted that Brit action and attitude do in fact give King certain ground for misgiving. . . .

How act effectively and fairly in such situation hard decide but fol suggested: As regards Brit, feel time ripe for frank exchange views of type found so profitable in past. Such discussion shld be both short term and long term.

Re short term, most essential is some gesture reassure Saudis, especially King. For example special message might be sent King by Churchill whom King holds in high regard and concerning whom I have often heard King make comment that Churchill had once called him "the man of the black nights" (i.e. one who stands firm in time of trouble) but now Brit no longer refer to him such terms; King repeats this story over and over as particular example Brit change attitude. Possible Brit reply re renewal boundary negots cld also be used as vehicle for message of assurance. [3]

Re long term, believe we cld properly bring up to date discussion with Brit re union movement in order make certain some development re Jordan, Syria or Kuwait does not catch us by surprise. Strongly recommend we shld also attempt obtain from Brit clarification their intentions re Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms. Realize solution this matter difficult in extreme and natural tendency shy away from it but from now on it is a problem which will develop with increasing seriousness and delay cld be dangerous.

Re Saudis, suggest we reply saying appreciate King's desire resolve difficulty with Brit before more serious and such attitude characteristic King's statesmanship. Furthermore, how make well

[3] Telegram 4030 from London, Mar. 14, advised the Department of State the Embassy was "somewhat disturbed" at the suggested reply to Ibn Saud. While the Embassy granted that the British attitude toward Saudi Arabia might not be all that it should be, it considered the Saudi Arabians unrealistic about British intentions. The Embassy questioned the desirability of full-fledged talks at the time. In view of the complicated nature of the boundary negotiations, it had asked the Foreign Office to prepare an informal memorandum setting forth the British side of the story, and wanted to delay any decision to talk to the British until there had been a chance to study the British version of the facts. (641.86A/3-1452)

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aware our interest his welfare and that his country and also knows past efforts made by us facilitate agreement between Brit and Saudis who both our friends. We wish continue do anything we appropriately can assist and to that end will seek occasion discuss matter frankly with Brit. However, must proceed not only with reasonableness and fairness but also with delicacy and we must ask HM leave to our discretion timing and manner of our approach. In meantime we hope HM and his reps will take advantage every opportunity talk constructively with Brit.

Doubt foregoing will go far toward satisfying King but submit for consideration in hope Dept will have other and better ideas. Much of course will depend on whether Brit prepared make real gesture.

Recall Prince Faisal remaining here in order take our reply to King and therefore hope action may be expedited to extent possible.

Request this tel like reftel be held confidential by addressee offices . . . .

HARE

No. 1469

641.86A/3-1052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 24, 1952—12:33 p. m.

4691. Dept disappointed results Damman conference and from knowledge SA affairs has concern that boundary problem fast becoming emotional *cause célèbre* injurious to UK (Jidda's Embtels 474 and 477, Mar 10 and 11 rptd London 61 and 62 [2]). Dept has wanted remain aloof this problem and has for four years met SAG importunities our intervention with counsel for moderation, patience and direct substantive talk UKG, which still advocated. US can not remain aloof however if non-solution problem might needlessly jeopardize Brit position to which we attach great importance NE area.

Dept believes, therefore, that interests both US and UK lie not in further delay (London Embtel 4030, Mar 14 [3]) but in prompt resumption UK–SAG talks along constructive lines and offers suggestions to fol. Dept hopes FonOff will not misconstrue purpose as sup-

[1] Repeated as 350 to Jidda. Drafted by Awalt and cleared by NEA, EUR, and BNA.

[2] Document 1467 and *supra*.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

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porting SAG position. Such not intention but Dept has genuine anxiety time is running out and unless determined effort made soon with maximum flexibility to solve problem, SA may be seriously alienated from UK.

Dept suggests:

1. Resume promptly with firm intention reach agreement Damman conversations now recessed over month.
2. Precede meeting with frank and friendly statement from Churchill to King along lines Jidda's Embtel 477 rptd London 62, Mar 11 expressing PriMin's warm personal sentiments towards King who is always receptive such approach and giving firm assurances Brit NE policy not inimical SA. Such overture cld go a long way toward creating good atmosphere for resumption talks.
3. Take advantage declaration Sheikh Qatar (Jidda Embtel 402, Feb 3 rptd London 52 [4]) which so gratifying SA sensibilities and desire direct negots yet places responsibility on King for making generous settlement he so often promised thus probably benefitting UK-Qatar position with maximum goodwill all around.
4. Give early evidence in meeting of willingness compromise:

   a. Concede principle SA opening on PG east of Qatar and negotiate extent.
   b. Concede or divide Manasir tribal area bearing in mind however that division delicate unless excellent atmosphere already created by 2, 3, and 4a above.

5. Seek prompt agreement in order to:

   a. Derive maximum goodwill benefit.
   b. Avoid arbitration if possible since it wld cause long delay in settlement and diminish goodwill impact of friendly negots. Failing latter, however, Dept strongly supports arbitration as best possible second course.
   c. Avoid reference problem by SAG to UN where Soviet wld utilize it as subj polit propaganda against UK and West generally.

. . . . . .

Of above suggestions we attach particular importance to para no. 2 which is emphasized by para no. 5 Jidda Embtel 493, Mar 18 rptd London 64. [5]

Timing of ur approach to FonOff is left to ur discretion, but should not be too long delayed.

ACHESON

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[4] Not printed; it reported that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was very subdued and only participated in the discussions through the British, but the Shaikh of Qatar began by making a speech on his own, saying that King Ibn Saud was his "father" and he would accept whatever the King said. (786A.022/2-352)

[5] Not printed; paragraph 5 suggested some sort of British gesture to conciliate the Saudis. It added that the basic problem of power positions in the Persian Gulf area should be clarified in the interest of U.S. cooperation with the British in the area. (641.86A/3-1852)

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No. 1470

641.86A/3-1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 24, 1952—12:34 p. m.

351. You may inform Feisal US is moved by earnestness of his and HM's attitude this problem (Embtels 474 and 477, Mar 10 and 11 [2]) and intends making serious approach to UK (Deptel 4691 to London Mar 24, rptd Jidda 350 [3]). Approach made out of sincere concern for relations between our two good friends despite delicacy always attendant when outsider becomes involved family quarrel. Must similarly enjoin SAG, however, to meet any Brit approach halfway. Compromise cannot be one-sided. Inflexible view . . . re . . . rights to land and people not conducive success . . . . This alone cld block progress. [4]

You might also assure Feisal we know of no Brit plan unite Iraq, Kuwait (Embtel 474), and feel sure there is none. If this suggested to SAG by recent visit Sheikh Kuwait to Iraq you might add we know this visit caught Brit by surprise and was initiated by IG. Wld also appear illegal for Brit support absorption Kuwait by Iraq and lose preferential position UK enjoys in Kuwait. Dept notes SA tendency be over-suspicious Brit which is destructive mutual confidence so necessary for conducting negots under best auspices.

ACHESON

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[1] Repeated as telegram 4692 to London and 593 to Baghdad. Drafted by Awalt and cleared by EUR, BNA, and NEA.

[2] Documents 1467 and 1468.

[3] *Supra*.

[4] Telegram 551 from Jidda, Apr. 8, reported the message in this telegram had been delivered to Faisal the previous evening. (641.86A/4-852)

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No. 1471

641.86A/4-452: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 4, 1952—7 p. m.

4449. We today discussed UK-Saudi relations along lines Deptel 4691 March 24 [2] and Jidda's 535 April 2. [3] FonOff reception our suggestions was coolly correct. FonOff reps were reassuring in general terms re their intentions towards SA, stressing their desire for improvement in relations. Greatest barrier, however, to such improvement was intransigence . . . , on boundary question. Insofar as UK aware, this is only major factor standing between good UK-Saudi relations.

We said we were afraid matter not this simple and that other indications which we had recd from Saudi sources led us to believe that Saudis no matter how unjustifiably, were convinced that Brit pursuing course action in NE inimical to SA interests. We stressed that we did not subscribe to this theory and that we had made strenuous efforts to try to dispel these misconceptions from Saudi minds. They appear, however, to be deep-seated and we unfortunately have not been successful. We were therefore suggesting that strenuous effort be made, including dramatic move such as Churchill's statement, in effort halt deterioration and bring about more cordial relations.

. . . . . .

FonOff reps expressed strong hope we wld continue use our influence dispel Saudi fears re UK intentions and encourage Saudis to be more forthcoming in solving these problems. We told FonOff they cld be reassured on this point and that we were informing King he must meet Brit half way, that his attitude toward his land and people not conducive successful negots and that we had detected tendency be over-suspicious Brit.

. . . . . .

[1] Repeated as 44 to Jidda.

[2] Document 1469.

[3] Not printed; it reported the Saudi Arabians had agreed to end the secrecy regarding their request to the United States to intervene with the British regarding the boundary dispute, providing the King's motivation was attributed to the general pattern of British activity in the area rather than to any single point. The Ambassador also saw no reason why, without attributing it to the King, the United States might not mention to the British the tribal incidents on the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border, Iraqi activity in the Persian Gulf, and the Buraimi affair, as well as the boundary negotiations. (780.022/4-252)

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We particularly stressed importance we attached to suggestion re Churchill msg. FonOff reps said they wld wish consider this and other suggestions we had made and talk to us again next week. They asked for *aide-mémoire* which we are furnishing and added that they had been considering possibility suggesting conf with us on SA in order discuss, among other things, Aramco's "marginal interests". We said we wld welcome frank exchange including any views which UK might have. Our only purpose was to try to bring about improvement relations in view importance we attach Brit position in NE.

GIFFORD

No. 1472

641.86A/5–1352: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, May 13, 1952—7 p. m.

5167. Yesterday we resumed discussions with FonOff on Saudi Arabian boundary problems and gen ques UK-Saudi relations (Embtel 5099 May 8 [2]). FonOff furnished us *aide-mémoire* which replied to points contained our *aide-mémoire* Apr 7 (Embtel 4449 Apr 4 [3]). Copy being pouched. [4]

1. On Anglo-Saudi relations FonOff stated Brit policy of close friendship with SAG and Ibn Saud remained unchanged. On specific points mentioned our *aide-mémoire* FonOff pointed out UK had no connection tribal incidents on Iraq-Saudi frontier or Iraq Govt's Fertile Crescent plans and UK had never acknowledged Saudi sovereignty or claim to Buraimi, part of which belonged to Abu Dhabi and part to Muscat. Explained had been natural improvement in relations between Iraq and Persian Gulf states resulting from expansion in wealth and development there but closer relations in no

[1] Repeated to Jidda.

[2] Not printed; it advised the Department of State that a message from Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was being presented to King Ibn Saud. The message was intended to reassure the King of friendly British feelings toward him and his government and emphasize the value of the United Kingdom placed on his friendship. (641.86A/5–852) A copy of Eden's message was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 3 to despatch 5481 from London, May 16, not printed. (641.86A/5–1652)

[3] *Supra.* A copy of this *aide-mémoire* was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 1 to despatch 5481. (641.86A/5–1652)

[4] A copy of the British *aide-mémoire* was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 2 to despatch 5481. (641.86A/5–1652)

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way damaging to Saudis. In this connection FonOff mentioned it had estab in Mar 1952 loose council of Trucial States to discuss mutual problems but that council without admin functions and FonOff was not contemplating federation of states. With above in mind, FonOff agreed that altho no justification for Saudis fears, mere fact the fears existed was important factor to be considered in improvement Anglo-Saudi relations. It was with this in mind that FonOff sent personal msg to Ibn Saud from Eden (Embtel 5099 May 8). FonOff promised us copy.

2. On boundary question FonOff agreed that settlement wld contribute greatly to improvement Anglo-Saudi relations and thought it wld be better henceforth to carry on negots thru diplomatic channels in Jidda where less public atmosphere might have salutary effect on course negots. They thought it would not be possible resume in any event before fall for reasons stated Embtel 4871 Apr 26. [5]

We pointed out possibility Saudis refusing talk thru dipl channels in view importance they attach to Sheikh's participation. FonOff emphasized UK responsible conduct of Trucial Sheikh's FonOff.

On possibility for compromise FonOff was pessimistic. They maintained that despite UK's offers of generous concessions in past, especially between 1935 and 1938, only result had been increased demands by Saudis with no evidence of reciprocal moderation or compromise. In answer to specific suggestions FonOff answered as fols:

(a) On possibility making separate settlement of Qatar boundary first as it provided least trouble, FonOff explained that as it maintained Abu Dhabi and Qatar borders were contiguous, wld be difficult settle Qatar frontier without prejudicing that of Abu Dhabi.

(b) On possibility of taking advantage declaration which Sheikh of Qatar made to Ibn Saud at beginning of the Amman [*Damman*] conf (Jidda's 402 Feb 3 [6]) FonOff thought such an act wld be recd by King not as gesture of friendship by equals but as admission of weakness . . . .

(c) On division of Manasir tribal area FonOff maintained same position as in Embtel 4449 Apr 4. [7]

. . . . . .

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[5] Telegram 4871 from London, Apr. 26, reported that officials of the Foreign Office saw little prospect of reconvening the boundary negotiations before October. Prince Faisal was going to be in Europe and the Foreign Office maintained that experience had shown dealing with lesser officials to be unsatisfactory. In addition, the summer heat could impede progress because of its effect on the tempers of the negotiators. (641.86A/4-2652)

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 4, Document 1469.

[7] *Supra.*

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(e) They doubted feasibility estab new neutral zones in disputed areas since this wld merely postpone solution of issues involved and lead same complications with respect oil co's as Kuwait now faces.

Of possible ways out of present impasse, FonOff thought joint factfinding comm was unsatis in that mere presence of Saudi members wld intimidate people from whom facts were gathered. A better system, tho still far from ideal, wld be for independent investigating comm but even that shld not be tried until further efforts made in negots. While arbitration not excluded, they agreed better to continue try settle by negots.

We gained impression from discussions that Brit sincerely anxious for settlement but were somewhat stumped re course of action to take in view of what they continue consider Saudis' intransigent attitude. Our effort thruout conv was to continue to try to stimulate FonOff to come up with some new ideas. Results were disappointingly meager on boundary problem but we feel there may be greater understanding necessity for paying greater attn over-all relations. As indication, we understand FonOff has invited Abdullah Reisal [*Faisal*] to visit UK as official guest HMG enroute US and that invitation accepted.

GIFFORD

No. 1473

780.022/5-1452: Despatch

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Abbey) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, May 14, 1952.

No. 333

Ref: Embtels 540 April 3, [2] 535 April 2 [3] and 532 April 2. [4]

Subj: Saudi-British Dispute Over Buraimi

On March 31, 1952, the Ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Office by Tahir Bey Ridwan, Acting Chief of that Ministry. For the Ambassador's information, Tahir Bey reported that he had that morning, acting on instructions from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahaikh Yusuf Yassin, called in the British Ambas-

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed; it reported a message from Prince Faisal to the effect that the King was eager for stability in the area and friendly cooperation with the British, but difficulty was being caused in Buraimi by the British political officer in Sharja. (780.022/4-352)

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 1471.

[4] Not printed. (780.022/4-252)

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sador to protest the presence of British officials in the oasis of Al Buraimi. This group of approximately ten towns or hamlets lies some ninety miles east of Abu Dhabi. Tahir Bey told the British Ambassador that the Saudi Government does not recognize the authority of the Shaikh of Muscat, the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi or of any other Trucial shaikh in Buraimi. The Saudi position is that the people of Buraimi have been independent but are under Saudi tutelage.

Reports from the Saudis as to what actually took place in Buraimi are vague but it appears that the Political Officer of Sharja, identified only as a Mr. Wilton, appeared in Buraimi late in March, either accompanying him or visiting Buraimi at about the same time, according to the Saudis, were members of the British Desert Locust Control Mission. The Saudi Foreign Office believes that the purpose of these visits was to bring the Amirs of Buraimi into the British orbit of the Trucial Shaikhdoms influencing in advance any decision as to ownership of the Buraimi area.

This incident or incidents prompted the Foreign Office to notify the British Ambassador that the Saudi Government was informing the Amirs of Buraimi who, according to the Saudis, recognize the sovereignty of King Ibn Saud, that His Majesty does not recognize the authority of any Trucial Shaikh in Buraimi. At the same time the British Government is requested to put an end to activity in Buraimi and to keep British officials out of the area. The Foreign Office reminded the British Ambassador of the agreement reached at London and confirmed at Dammam to avoid sending parties into the disputed areas and asked that this agreement continue until the delineation of the frontiers.

The British Ambassador replied in an *aide-mémoire* of April 23 refusing to acknowledge the allegiance of the Amirs of Buraimi to Saudi Arabia and strongly protesting the Saudi approach to them. It was pointed out that the London and Dammam agreement did not restrict British administrative officials in the execution of their duties.

When asked about Buraimi during recent conversations with the American Ambassador, Shaikh Yusuf said that inasmuch as Buraimi is under Saudi jurisdiction the matter is not an appropriate subject for discussion with the British Government. The Ambassador recalled that in 1949 when Shaikh Yusuf and David Scott Fox, Counselor of the British Embassy, had agreed to discuss all boundary questions, Buraimi had been included. The Ambassador asked how the status of Buraimi had changed since then. Shaikh Yusuf replied that the Saudi Government's position was that the people of Buraimi had the right to determine their allegiance but that since 1949 they had asked to be associated with Saudi Arabia and

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that they had therefore exercised that right and made their choice. It is true that there are no Saudi amirs in Buraimi but the Saudi Government considers Buraimi under Saudi tutelage.

The history of Buraimi as known to the Embassy is very complicated and can hardly provide anyone with a clear title. Shaikh Yusuf finally agreed that the matter merited further study before action could be taken.

GLENN A. ABBEY

No. 1474

786A.00/9-1252: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 12, 1952—6 p. m.

1458. FonOff informs us Saudi movements into Buraimi somewhat less extensive than first reports had indicated, approximately 80 armed Saudis being involved. [2] However FonOff has now decided protest to SAG on grounds:

(1) Saudis traversed territory subject standstill agreement in order reach their destination;
(2) Presence armed Saudis in Buraimi also violation agreement which merely permitted both sides undertake normal administrative actions in disputed areas; and
(3) Sultan Muscat has requested British protest his behalf as well.

FonOff also states that it has recently talked to Pelham and that it is now planned that he will indicate to King upon his return to Jidda in mid-October that UK prepared resume negotiations through him (Pelham). FonOff hopes negotiations will be conducted on Saudi side by Feisal and that they will get underway end of November.

Embassy off expressed doubts SAG would agree this procedure in view importance it has attached in past to participation Sheikhs. FonOff however, expressed confidence Saudis would be willing negotiation through diplomatic channels, ...

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[1] Repeated to Jidda.

[2] Telegram 1254 from London, Sept. 3, advised the Department of State the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi had sent a message to the British Foreign Office informing it that Saudi Arabian troops had occupied several villages at Buraimi claimed by the Sultan of Muscat. The Foreign Office feared the Saudis might intend to move into all of Buraimi. (786A.00/9-352)

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FonOff further indicates that it is re-studying its position with respect to various boundary problems prior to preparing instructions for Pelham. In particular FonOff will wish consider carefully findings of Buckmaster, assistant political officer Trucial coast, who has recently made trip through Liwa area. FonOff also indicates that among new ideas it has in mind is suggestion that any boundary delineations agreed to between UK and SAG should not affect allegiance of inhabitants. FonOff thinks this suggestion might have some appeal to Ibn Saud, who insists he is more interested in individuals who acknowledge him than in lands involved.

GIFFORD

No. 1475

641.86A/9-1852

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 18, 1952. [1]

Subject: UK Views Regarding Recent Events in Al-Buraimi.

Participants: Mr. Ronald Bailey, First Secretary, British Embassy
NE—Mr. Sturgill

Summary:

Mr. Bailey came in at his own request to deliver a message from the Foreign Office regarding the recent activities of the Saudi Arabian Government in the oasis of Al-Buraimi. Mr. Bailey said the Foreign Office had learned that the Saudis had sent 80 people, 50 of whom were armed, to occupy the village of Hamasa, which is claimed by the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The Foreign Office considered this to be a violation of the 1951 "standstill" agreement.

The British Embassy in Jidda, Mr. Bailey said, had sent a note to the Saudi Foreign Office requesting information as to why the Saudi movement into Al-Buraimi had taken place. The answer received was terse and unsatisfactory, he said, and the Foreign Office now had decided to protest to the Saudi Arabian Government on the grounds that the Saudis had violated the standstill agreement by traversing Abu Dhabi territory to get to Al-Buraimi, that the presence of armed Saudis in Al-Buraimi was also a violation of the agreement which permitted both sides to undertake only the usual administrative actions in disputed areas, and that the Sultan of Muscat had requested the British to protest on his behalf. It was

[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Sept. 24.

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the intention of the Foreign Office, Mr. Bailey, remarked, to have a plane fly over Hamasa and drop leaflets containing messages from the Sultan. And if the Saudi answer were not satisfactory, series of forts belonging to Abu Dhabi would be occupied to demonstrate to the Saudis that the British were not going to let the Saudi action go unopposed, he said. [2]

I told Mr. Bailey that in view of the fact that the Foreign Office believed Abu Dhabi and the Sultan have a claim in Al-Buraimi, I could understand their not wanting to let the Saudi occupation of Al-Buraimi go unnoticed but I wondered if the action contemplated would really help the situation. I expressed the view that the appearance of a British plane over Al-Buraimi would be regarded as an aggressive action, as would the occupation of the forts, and that it would not make any difference to the Saudis that messages from the Sultan were being dropped because the Saudis simply would not believe otherwise than that the whole scheme was purely a British undertaking and that the Sultan had no part in it. Mr. Bailey interposed, saying, "What would you have us do, take the whole thing lying down?" I replied that I hoped the UK would make every effort to do anything necessary to avoid precipitating a clash between the opposing forces in Al-Buraimi. He assured me the Foreign Office was keeping this very much in mind and had no intention of provoking a conflict. I asked Mr. Bailey whether or not in his opinion the Foreign Office would consider telling the SAG now, instead of in mid-October as they intended, of their willingness to resume the boundary conference broken off in February at Dammam. I expressed the view that the Saudis probably were of the opinion that the UK did not intend to resume the talks; and because of that and because of British activities in Al-Buraimi which they considered inimical to their interests in that area they had decided to send personnel into the area. I informed him that the Department had not known of events in Al-Buraimi until after they had occurred, that these events had been discussed orally with the SA Embassy, and that the Department had given the Saudis no aid or comfort in the matter. I again expressed the hope that the Foreign Office might see its way clear to inform the SAG *now* of its willingness to resume the boundary conference. Mr. Bailey thanked me for the information he had received and said he would pass the suggestion to the Foreign Office.

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[2] Telegram 1631 from London, Sept. 19, informed the Department of State that following a Saudi reply that Buraimi was not subject to the standstill agreement, the British had ordered Trucial levies to occupy positions in towns claimed by Abu Dhabi. (786A.00/9–1952)

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No. 1476

786A.00/9-1752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1952—11 p. m.

149. SA Amb informed Dept Sept 17 [2] receipt cable from King objecting UK activity in Buraimi and requesting US stand on President's Oct 1950 ltr [3] re "US interest preservation independence territorial integrity SA" and any "threat to Kingdom matter immed concern US." Amb asked US be ready aid SA in case UK took "necessary steps protect its position" (Embtel 156, rptd London 2 [4]). Amb also stated position King that people Buraimi independent and settlement their status shld be in accordance principle self-determination and SA considering taking matter to UN.

Amb informed Dept's serious concern re incidents Buraimi, belief that UN not best way settle matter, hope that SA wld avoid any impediments to amicable solution and wld attempt settle in friendly and statesmanlike manner. Amb left Dept having recd no aid or comfort.

UK Emb rep also discussed matter with Dept Sep 17 [*18*], [5] saying Fonoff intended send plane drop leaflets Hamasa behalf Sultan Muscat and if no satis ans recd from SAG re Brit protest (Embtel 156 rptd London 2) UK wld take action indicated London Embtel 1527 rptd Jidda 10. [6]

UK rep informed that Dept unaware Buraimi events until after had occurred, had then discussed orally with SA Emb and had

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[1] Repeated as 2031 to London and 142 to Dhahran. Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by NEA and BNA.

[2] The memorandum of conversation of Sept. 17 between the Saudi Arabian Ambassador and Assistant Secretary Byroade has not been found in Department of State files.

[3] For the letter from President Truman to the King, dated Oct. 31, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1190.

[4] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that a British note had been delivered to the Saudi Arabian Government at Riyadh expressing concern regarding Saudi Arabian actions in Buraimi, and ending with a request that the Saudi Arabian Government arrange the immediate withdrawal of Turki bin Ataishan and all his followers. After delivering the note, the British Chargé stated that unless an immediate reply was received the British Government would be obliged to take necessary steps to protect its position. (786A.00/9-1752)

[5] For the memorandum of the Sept. 18 conversation, see *supra*.

[6] Not printed; it indicated the "necessary action" involved the entry of Trucial levies to protect approximately 5 forts in the area controlled by Abu Dhabi. The Embassy informed the Department of State that the Foreign Office was not unduly disturbed by the situation, but felt it had to follow this course of action if the Saudis were to be kept in bounds. (786A.00/9-1652)

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given Saudis no aid or comfort, expressed hope UK wld avoid any action leading to conflict opposing forces Buraimi, suggested SAG action in moving people into Buraimi possibly based SAG concern UK activity there (final para London Embtel 1458 rptd Jidda 9 [7]) and SAG belief UK not intending resume boundary conf (para 5 London Embtel 1458). Dept expressed hope UK FonOff might see way clear inform SAG now its willingness resume conf as measure soften Saudi attitude.

ACHESON

[7] Document 1474.

No. 1477

786A.00/9-2050: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Abbey) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, September 20, 1952—5 p. m.

163. Brit Chargé spent several days in Riyadh discussing Brit Buraimi note of protest [2] with King and Yussuf Yassin. He reported discussions involved with SAG remaining firm. He has referred entire matter back to London.

Yesterday, Act FonMin asked me to call and he read paraphrase of long oral reply given by King to Chargé. [3] Main points were: SAG never considered Buraimi subj negotiations for reasons:

1. No Trucial Coast sheik has either actual or treaty jurisdiction in Buraimi, consequently HMG can not object to SAG action.
2. Documentation sent by Brit to King after treaty of Jidda [4] did not state any Buraimi sheik as bound to Brit by convenant or pact.
3. Traditional ties with Saud family.
4. Buraimi not mentioned at London discussions or Dammam Conf consequently Buraimi absolute concern of SAG.
5. In spite of foregoing, Brit sent Wilton to Buraimi and did not recognize SAG protests and consequently assumed a right which it

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] A copy of the British note was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 87 from Jidda, Sept. 22, not printed. (786A.00/9-2252)

[3] An English translation of the paraphrase of the King's oral reply was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 87. (786A.00/9-2252)

[4] For the text of the Treaty of Jidda between the United Kingdom and King Ibn Saud of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, May 20, 1927, see British Cmd. 2951, Treaty Series No. 25 (1927). Also for text and historical commentary and citations to treaties of renewal in 1936 and 1943, see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: Volume II, 1914–1956* (New York, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 149–150.

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had never claimed before and denied clear and explicit right of SAG.

7. [*sic*] SAG fears for first time in Brit note that Sultan of Muscat claims that part of Buraimi territory lies within his jurisdiction.

SAG regrets exceedingly the Brit attitude when SAG was and still is ready to solve boundary problems by friendly means. SAG also regrets Mr. Riches verbally requested an immed satis reply and that if Turki bin Ataishan is not withdrawn the Brit Govt will be obliged "to take steps which it deems essential to protect its position." Such statement is contrary to existing friendship with Brit and against the UN charter. SAG had never anticipated Brit wld make such a threat.

Copies of English version paraphrase and of Brit note being pouched. King instructed FonOff to inform Department that the wishes to express his great thanks for the attitude diplayed by the US and its concern in solving this problem, he hopes US attitude will continue and become even stronger in view of the Brit threat; and the King hopes for an early reply.

ABBEY

No. 1478

780.022/9-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, September 28, 1952—2 p. m.

179. In reply Deptel 153, Sept 25, [2] believe that we shld not refuse SAG request mediate. It wld be one thing for us to intervene gratuitously but quite another to turn down plea mediate and I feel

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed. It said the Department of State was considering accepting Saudi Arabia's request for mediation and asked for the Embassy's comments on its plan. The Department was also considering a proposal for a standstill arrangement and withdrawal of both parties from Buraimi, followed by a proposal for the resumption of the boundary conference. If these were not accepted the Department would consider proposing arbitration. (780.022/9-2552)

The reference telegram had also been sent as telegram 2175 to London. In its reply, telegram 1767, Sept. 26, the Embassy in London said it realized that vital U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia were in a sensitive status but, since our whole policy in the area had been based on cooperative efforts with the British, mediation between the United Kingdom and a country in the area would threaten the entire basis of our fundamental policy. It recommended discussing the matter with the British before coming to a decision. (780.022/9-2652)

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we cld not do so without risk prejudicing solution Buraimi problem as well as our own general position vis-à-vis SAG.

Furthermore, suggest wld be inadvisable sell SAG short on its Buraimi position. Despite conflicting claims, SAG wld appear have quite tenable position on basis historical association and tribal affiliations although latterly ties had tended lapse until recent Saudi *rapprochement* with certain Buraimi elements and assertion renewed direct interest. As consequence, wrangle in SC cld be embarrassing Brit and at same time exacerbate Saudi feelings if, as seems likely, nothing definite materialized. Surely there are sufficient such precedents not to relish creating another.

In circumstances I can see no line of action preferable to that outlined by Dept in ref tel and wld hope presentation cld be such that both sides wld appreciate our disinterested desire be helpful. Specifically, as far as Brit concerned, I find difficulty believe they wld feel justified in construing our mediation as act of non-cooperation, particularly when alternatives are so unattractive.

Fact is that Buraimi case is but one of a series of pieces unfinished business in Arabian peninsula and is inescapable that their resolution in this day and age must take indigenous feelings, forces and institutions into account and not depend solely for solution on fiat of an outside power. This makes, it is true, for somewhat awkward situation but it wld be act of political negligence not face facts. As I have repeatedly stated, I do not feel motives of either Brit or Saudis in these matters are beyond question and it is consequently our thankless task to act as honest broker in interest of parties concerned, of area stability and of our own position. [3]

Recommend reply, if necessary of interim nature, be made immed to Saudi Amb in order stay restiveness of Saudis, especially King.

HARE

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[3] Telegram 186 from Jidda, Sept. 30, advised the Department of State that, since the idea of a so-called standstill agreement would come up in any discussions with the Saudis and the British, the Department might want to know that the Embassy read the record as showing that both parties seemed to have interpreted the agreement as applicable and nonapplicable to Buraimi as it suited them at the moment. As far as the Embassy knew the disputed areas had not been clearly defined either at the London Conference in 1951 or the Damman Conference in 1952 and applications of a standstill agreement were subject to varying interpretations. (780.22/9-3052)

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No. 1479

641.86A/9-2952

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1952. [1]

Subject: The UK-SAG Dispute at Al-Buraimi.

Participants: Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
NEA—Mr. Byroade
NE—Mr. Hart
NE—Mr. Sturgill

Summary:

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador came in at his own request to discuss events which had taken place at Al-Buraimi since his visit to the Department on September 17. He said he had learned just a few minutes earlier that the King had sent another cablegram [2] to the Saudi Ambassador in London regarding the detention by the British of a Saudi car and its personnel, who had been sent from Al-Buraimi to Dubai for food. The cable, Sheikh Asad said, instructed the Saudi Ambassador in London to inform Mr. Eden that not only had the car been stopped outside Dubai and then taken to Sharja but also the people in the car had then been sent to Abu Dhabi and placed in jail there. The Ambassador was instructed to inform Mr. Eden that the SAG already had requested the release of its people and was awaiting a reply and that the SAG was willing to sit down and talk about the Al-Buraimi dispute.

Mr. Byroade said he was very glad to hear that the Saudis were willing to talk to the British about the dispute and had taken the matter to Mr. Eden.

He then asked Sheikh Asad to clarify for him whether the King had requested the US to mediate formally or whether the King wanted the US to work informally to bring about agreement between the UK and Saudi Arabia. He pointed out that formal mediation would be public and that if that was what the King wanted, the decision as to whether or not the USG could accept the request

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Oct. 1.

[2] The Saudi Arabian Embassy had received a cablegram from the King on Sept. 25 which stated that British forces had camped within 5 kilometers of Amir Turki's forces, and two British planes were flying at a low altitude in the area. The Embassy next received a copy of a Sept. 26 cablegram sent by the King to the Saudi Ambassador in London for transmittal to the Foreign Office. It told of an incident in which British armed vehicles stopped a Saudi car and took it to Sharja. (Memoranda of telephone conversations between Muhtasib and Sturgill, Sept. 25 and Sept. 27. (641.86A/9-2552 and 641.86A/9-2752, respectively)

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would have to be made at a higher level. Sheikh Asad replied that he would have to request instructions from his Government before he could make a positive reply but that he was almost certain the King wished tthe US to work quietly behind the scenes. He remarked that he and his Government realized that the best way to settle the dispute was to sit down and talk about it. He reiterated that the Saudi Ambassador in London was now awaiting an answer from Mr. Eden on this point, and added that he would appreciate being informed of that answer if the Department learned of it before he did.

Sheikh Asad referred again to the possibility that the Al-Buraimi dispute would be presented to the Security Council, if it could not be settled with the British. He said Prince Feisal would head Saudi Arabia's delegation to the UN, and that, depending upon the seriousness of the dispute, Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister, might come to the US to aid in presenting the case.

Mr. Byroade remarked that he hoped the case would not have to go to the UN. He emphasized to the Ambassador that the Department already had been talking to the British about the dispute and said we would talk to them again. Sheikh Asad thanked him and said he realized that the Department was sometimes in a difficult position to act on these matters but that he and his Government appreciated what was being done.

No. 1480

641.86A/9-2052

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1952.

Subject: Controversy between Saudi Arabia and the U.K. regarding Buraimi.

Participants: Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy.
Mr. R. W. Bailey, First Secretary, British Embassy.
Mr. Thomas Beale, BNA.
Mr. Parker T. Hart, NE.

Mr. Burrows came in at my request. I informed him of the conversation of September 29, 1952 between the Saudi Ambassador and Mr. Byroade [1] in which the Ambassador indicated that Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Ambassador to the U.K., had been instructed

[1] See the memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

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by King Abdul Aziz Al Saud to discuss with Foreign Minister Eden the question of Buraimi. Burrows had no knowledge of such a conversation. I also inquired whether Mr. Burrows had any further information regarding a recent conversation in Jidda between Riches, British Chargé d'Affaires, and Crown Prince Saud regarding Buraimi. Burrows had no information on that conversation to impart beyond that which had already been communicated to me: namely, that the Crown Prince had invited Riches to come in and talk about Buraimi and that a general and friendly discussion had ensued, but without reported result.

I told Burrows that I hoped these conversations indicated a willingness of both parties to pursue direct conversations regardless of the recent developments in Buraimi. I then stated that we had been given reason to believe that unless some relaxation of the present tension over Buraimi took place in the near future we would be approached formally by the King of Saudi Arabia to mediate in the dispute. We were very anxious not to get "in the middle" on this issue and to do what we could to avoid such a formal request which probably would become public and which would be most difficult to reject. While I had no way of knowing whether we would accept or reject such a Saudi request, I felt that the odds were that we might be forced to accept it, subject to British concurrence in our role as mediator. This would then place the burden of refusal on the British Government, an eventuality which would be undesirable from both the British and American point of view. I inquired whether a resumption of the Dammam Conference was contemplated by London.

Mr. Burrows proceeded to outline the British position in the Buraimi dispute. . . . Burrows did not believe that London would agree to a resumption of the Dammam Conference until the Saudi Arab contingent in Buraimi had been withdrawn. Otherwise, the Saudi Arabs would have won their point . . . .

I asked Burrows whether any suggestion had been made by either party for a mutual withdrawal from Buraimi without prejudice to future claims. Burrows replied that no such proposal had been made and that he felt that the U.K. would not accept such a proposal since it did not consider the Saudi encroachment to have any legitimate basis. While Wilton and his party of Trucial Levies had a right to be where they were under Treaty obligations, Amir Turki with his Saudi retainers had no legal basis for their present position, which violated the territory of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. I asked whether the U.K. felt as strongly about the Sultan's claim as it did regarding the alleged encroachment by the Saudi party in crossing territory claimed by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. Burrows replied that since the U.K. had been requested by the

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Sultan to represent it vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and had agreed to do so, it therefore felt as strongly about the Sultan's frontier position as it did regarding that of Abu Dhabi.

. . . . . .

Burrows stated that he hoped that before the Department made up its mind as to acceptance of a Saudi request for mediation it would await the results of a telegram which he proposed to immediately send to London reporting this conversation. I agreed.

No. 1481

780.022/10-652: Telegram

The Consul General at Dhahran (Bishop) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET
NIACT

DHAHRAN, October 6, 1952—11 a. m.

91. From Hare at Riyadh. Arrived here yesterday and received by King [2] who launched immediately into discussion Buraimi matter. He appeared deeply concerned by turn events taking there and mentioned number of British instigated incidents contributing tenseness situation (daily low flying flights over Saudi occupied Buraimi, stopping of food supplies to Saudi sector, preventing normal desert travel by demanding passports and visas, arresting of Saudi nationals and other restrictive and intimidating acts). He said tribes getting very restive and he could not control much longer. He had appealed to US for help and received no answer. British were committing acts aggression on his territory and now was time put President's letter to test.

I attempted put on brakes by observing we had already discussed informally with British and had heard of King's message to Eden proposing talks on Buraimi and other boundary questions. We also understood British Amb returning soon with new proposals. Why not follow through along that line?

King replied no answer from Eden. Furthermore, matters had gone too far and in any event he couldn't expect any really sincere proposals from Brit . . . . Only solution was for US intervene and

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[1] Repeated to London and Jidda.

[2] In telegram 196 from Jidda, Oct. 2, the Ambassador informed the Department of State the King had asked him to come to Riyadh immediately to discuss the Buraimi question, and he asked the Department to advise him as soon as possible. (780.022/10-252) In answer, telegram 166 to Jidda, Oct. 2, advised the Ambassador the Department of State believed the United States should try to hold off Saudi pressure for stronger intercession with the British, at the same time continuing to promote the idea of friendly direct Saudi-British discussion. (780.022/10-252)

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act as mediator in three power mission with British and Saudis, however, he wld not press further until I had opportunity discuss with his councilors, Yusuf Yassin and Khalid Gargoni.

Three subsequent conversations with councilors yielded little except more details and renewed emphasis on necessity our intervention as mediator on basis President's letter.

Then, unexpectedly, I was called to see King this afternoon (Oct 5). He said he was "ill" from thinking plight his people, about whom some new reports just in, and he just couldn't bear it any longer without doing something. Let detailed discussion wait. What he wanted now was relief for his people. It was a case of either our helping or his acting on his own. He was not threatening; he would remain friends with US whatever happened; but further delay was insupportable.

I replied I had no formal instructions from my govt but would personally propose following line action:

(1) I would recommend to my govt that it approach the British and suggest that an end be put to present restrictive and punitive measures in Buraimi on understanding Saudis would also desist from any provocative acts, normal life to be restored.
(2) Both sides would remain for time being in Buraimi and maintain their present positions.
(3) Direct discussions to be resumed between British and Saudis and we would do what we could to facilitate negots behind scenes as we had done before.

Somewhat to my surprise in light his previous insistence on formal mediation, King accepted these suggestions without objection. All he cared for now was relief his people and he would accept anything we proposed re long-term settlement but he must have our answer without delay.

I regard this as unexpectedly good break in a difficult and delicate situation and hope Dept will find possible put foregoing recommendations before British and so advise me immediately since King anxious receive reply before I return Jidda. In any event would appreciate as complete reply as possible by Oct 8 by which time I should have completed work here. Please reply to Dhahran repeating Jidda.

BISHOP

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No. 1482

641.86A/10-652

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1952.

Subject: Problem of Buraimi.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. David Bruce, Under Secretary, Dept. of State
Mr. James C. H. Bonbright, FJR
Mr. Parker T. Hart, NE

Reference was made by Mr. Bruce to the close relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and to President Truman's letter of 1950 to King Ibn Saud.

Mr. Bruce stated that an urgent message had been received from the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Hare, now in Riyadh.[1] Ambassador Hare had been summoned by the King to discuss Buraimi and found the King extremely agitated since no effective action had been taken, in his opinion, to remedy the situation. We were worried over what the King might be planning to do next. It seemed likely, that if something were not done to ease the tension shortly, the matter would be made the subject of a formal request for mediation, or would be introduced by the Saudi Arabian delegate to the United Nations as a matter for cognizance by the Security Council. Regardless of the merits of the case (which the U.S. Government was in no position and did not wish to discuss) it seemed clear that the King was particularly irritated by the flights of the RAF planes out of Sharja over Hamasa, Buraimi. The U.S. Government had no desire to become involved in this affair and, therefore, hoped that the personal suggestions which had been made by Ambassador Hare at Riyadh might be seriously considered, since the King had expressed his agreement with them. These were:

"a. Termination of the RAF over-flights and such other measures and practices which are regarded by the Saudis as aggressive and provocative. This would be on the understanding that the Saudis would likewise agree to desist from provocative acts.

"b. Further direct message from the British that they are prepared to resume direct discussions immediately with Saudi Arabia on the frontier question and Buraimi in particular; and

[1] See telegram 91 from Dhahran, Oct. 6, *supra*.

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"c. Both sides to remain in their present positions at Buraimi and elsewhere in the Eastern Frontier area."

Remarking that he had only just been briefed by Mr. Burrows on the Buraimi matter and was almost wholly ignorant of the boundary problems of eastern Saudi Arabia, Ambassador Franks stated that he would report our views to London. He understood, however, that notice had been sent to Saudi Arabia of British willingness to reopen direct talks. Mr. Burrows confirmed that by now the Saudi Arabian Government must have received the news. Asked by Ambassdor Franks when such discussions were to be resumed, Burrows replied: "October".

Mr. Bruce expressed his surpirse at this information. He not only was unaware that the Saudi Arabian Government had received such news; in fact, all the Department's information was to the contrary. Mr. Burrows offered as explanation the refusal of King Ibn Saud to permit the return to Riyadh of his Ambassador to the U.K., bearing the message from Mr. Eden indicating British willingness to resume these discussions. It seemed, however, that by this time a telegram should have been received.

Ambassador Franks stated that, if Mr. Bruce would agree, he would like to rearrange the Department's suggestions in the following manner for transmission to London:

"USG being unable ignore agitation King over present Buraimi situation hoped direct UK-SAG talks cld be immed resumed and suggested as means improving atmosphere these talks, each side refrain from actions Buraimi area which wld be regard by other as provocative and both remain present positions Buraimi and elsewhere Eastern frontier area. Main emphasis, therefore, on resumption talks."

Mr. Bruce agreed to this re-arrangement.

Ambassador Franks then asked whether one might not characterize the Buraimi situation as similar to that of a chess gambit in which a player moves a pawn forward to menace his opponent's Queen. Would the U.S. Government suggest that a counter-move is not in order? Mr. Bruce rejoined that both sides had now advanced their pawns.

Mr. Burrows then remarked that the British Government had received news from the Sultan at Muscat that the latter had been approached by the Imam of Oman requesting assistance against a Saudi advance into his territories. The Sultan had consented and was sending a fairly sizeable Arab force to the general area of Buraimi, but not into the oasis itself, to protect certain neighboring villages from a possible Saudi advance. The Sultan of Muscat had been requested by the British Government, and had agreed, to

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avoid actions which might result in an incident between his forces and the Saudi contingent at Buraimi. [2]

Note: This development represents a change in relations between the Imam at Nizwa and the Sultan at Muscat. The traditional government of Oman is that of an elected Imamate of the Ibadhi Sect. This theocratic ruler, chosen for life by the Shiekhs of the hinterlands, holds temporal and religious power, in theory, over all Oman (except the Trucial Coast). The Imamate, which was developed some 1300 years ago, lapsed for a while during the temporal rule of the Al Bu Said dynasty which installed itself on the coast two hundred years ago (finally locating at Muscat) and which for a time ruled also over the interior. This dynasty also had possessions during the last century at Zanzibar and elsewhere on the East African coast. It has enjoyed treaty relations with the U.S. since 1833. No Imam of Oman has ever had treaty relations with a Western power, so far as this writer knows. During the last quarter of the 19th century, the elected Imamate was revived, competing with the Al Bu Said at Muscat, but was able to exercise authority only over part of the mountainous interior of Oman and not over Muscat and the coast. An attack by the Imam's forces on Muscat during the early years of the 20th century was repulsed by the Sultan with British help. Since that time, the Sultan has been able to retain authority only on a narrow coastal strip of northeast Oman known as the Battinah coast lying to the northwest, and on the area around Sur to the southeast of Muscat. The Sultan has claimed but hardly has exercised sovereignty over that part of Buraimi (Hamasa) where the Saudi contingent is now in occupation, and over some of the mountainous area (Ruus al Jibal) east and north of the Trucial Sheikhdoms. In actual fact, the Sultan has not maintained even a *wali* [3] except on Battinah coast and at Sur. As for the Oman interior, his men have not been able to penetrate it, and a state of mutual non-recognition has existed between the Imam and the Sultan until very recently. The present Sultan has attempted to correspond with the Imam and has sent his emissaries to Nizwa on friendly missions.

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[2] Telegram 87 to Dhahran for the Ambassador, Oct. 6, repeated as 176 to Jidda and 2446 to London, reported the conversation with the British Ambassador. It said Hare might give the King the Department of State's assurance of British willingness to solve the frontier problems and, if he thought it useful, he might suggest the possibility of mutual simultaneous withdrawal from Buraimi. The Department advised him that it was anxious to prevent the presentation of the issue to the United Nations, where it might become a rallying issue for anti-Western sentiment. (780.022/10–652)

[3] This word normally appears in a religious context, and can have one of several meanings as appropriate, in this case perhaps "protector".

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The appeal by the Imam has two implications among others which may later be apparent:

1. Recognition of the Sultan by the Imam.
2. Opportunity for the Sultan to strengthen his prestige in the hinterland as a part of his believed policy of the re-asserting authority of the Al Bu Said throughout Oman (except the Trucial Coast).

No. 1483

780.022/10–852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Dhahran [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 8, 1952—7:28 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

90. For Amb. Brit Emb conveyed Dept Oct 8 [2] very disturbing unconfirmed report from Bahrain via Kuwait Saudis concentrating 80 vehicles 700 troops armed rifles machine guns at Al Kharj, and some have reached Ain Haradh. If confirmed and if force to be sent Buraimi, suggest you reiterate firmly King line contained Deptel 88, Jidda 181, Lon 2469.[3]

FYI Brit intend make aerial reconnaissance Al Kharj in attempt confirm report. This will be direct violation Saudi sovereignty. [4] End FYI.

Brit Emb also informed Dept FonOff instructed Riches tell King (1) Eden most concerned this difference opinion between old friends

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[1] Repeated as 182 to Jidda and 2500 to London. Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by BNA and NEA.

[2] No memorandum of an Oct. 8 conversation with the British has been found in Department of State files. But telegrams 2034, Oct. 7, and 2042 and 2057, Oct. 8, from London, reported the following information from the Foreign Office: the British were urging restraint on the Sultan of Muscat, who had assembled forces reportedly large enough to oust Turki; the British had stopped RAF flights in the area; the Saudis had reportedly landed oil supplies at Dubai for Turki at Hamasa; and Saudi vehicles and troops were concentrated at Al Kharj. Documentation is in Department of State file 780.022.

[3] Dated Oct. 7, not printed; it said the British Embassy had informed the Department of State of the reported arrival of the Saudi vehicles and guards. The Department suggested the Ambassador advise the Saudi Arabian Government that Saudi reinforcements could only aggravate the situation in Buraimi and make it more difficult, or even impossible, for the United States to carry on informal mediation. The Department continued to believe mutual withdrawal, to which the British said they would agree, would be the wisest course for Saudi Arabia and would not prejudice their territorial claims. (780.022/10–752)

[4] Telegram 2091 from London, Oct. 9, reported the RAF had been ordered not to make aerial reconnaissance flights because of the adverse effects the action would have on efforts to secure Saudi Arabian agreement to mutual withdrawal. (780.022/10–952)

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being recklessly enlarged, (2) RAF flights suspended, (3) Saudi "engineer" released, (4) Eden genuinely anxious settle dispute amicably and equitably and ready withdraw levies Buraimi simultaneously withdrawal Turki, (5) UK will propose reopening frontier discussions soon as possible but King must allow time for preparation, meantime King shld demonstrate sincerity by putting end to present incident. [5] Garbled story Buraimi today reached US press corres. Brit Emb asked by *Newsweek* in preparation article appearing Oct 9 whether US asked mediate Buraimi incident. Emb replied had no knowledge such request and played down affair. Source not yet known.

ACHESON

[5] Telegram 97 from Dhahran, Oct. 9, reported Yassin acknowledged that a supply expedition sent to Buraimi had passed through Abu Dhabi territory in error, but when the King heard of it he gave peremptory orders that there was to be no recurrence of such a violation of Abu Dhabi territory. When the Ambassador brought up the substance of the source text, however, Yassin and Gargoni immediately and categorically denied the entire report. (780.022/10-952)

No. 1484

780.022/10-1052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1952—7:35 p. m.

2565. Saudi Amb acting on instrs from King called on Bruce today. [2] Made fol pts: (1) Sit Buraimi now very precarious. Drastic Saudi reaction can be expected to Brit move to cut Saudi supply line between Buraimi and Al Hasa. (2) King's request for mediation is for formal mediation if US desires consider it that way; but if US believes sit better handled by informal mediation then King agreeable. In other words up to US to decide, but results are what is now important. (3) Plane flights have ceased over Saudi occupied areas Buraimi but now believed continuing over Brit occupied areas. (4) Brit forces now being replaced by Muscati forces. This illustration Brit not adhering promise not to take aggressive actions. (Amb was

[1] Drafted by Sturgill and repeated as telegram 197 to Jidda and 100 to Dhahran for the Ambassador.

[2] No memorandum of this conversation was found in Department of State files. The files do contain a memorandum by Sturgill to Hart, dated Oct. 10, on matters to be discussed by Hart at an oral briefing for Bruce prior to the meeting. (641.86A/10-1052)

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reminded of historical friendship US and Sultan and of US knowledge since 1949 of Sultan's claims to part of Buraimi.)

Bruce informed Amb there appeared to be fol alternatives for settlement (1) Direct negot (2) mediation (3) arbitration, all to be preceded by one of two prelim steps, either mutual simultaneous withdrawal or standstill, both without prejudice claims either side. Said in view info provided by Amb Dept wld consider and talk him again perhaps with an answer early next week.

Dept has stated fol to Brit: (1) US for all practical purposes has recd request for formal mediation. (2) Dept wld like avoid mediation if at all poss. (3) Dept also wld like avoid reference Buraimi dispute to SC. (4) Therefore Dept suggests UK may wish propose immed to SAG that dispute be submitted to arbitration. (5) Dept wld appreciate ans soonest. [3]

ACHESON

[3] Telegram 2130 from London, Oct. 11, reported the British Foreign office had instructed Riches to agree to a standstill at Buraimi, provided it would not prejudice the claims of either party. Neither side would provide reinforcements, although the British could only make guarantees for themselves and not for the Sultan of Muscat. The Foreign Office added that it would agree to resume negotiations with Saudi Arabia, and if the negotiations did not show agreement was possible, the British would suggest arbitration. (780.022/10-1152) Despatch 105 from Jidda, Oct. 20, transmitted copies of two British notes delivered by Riches to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Oct. 12, and a reply by the Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs which was understood to have been delivered the following day. (641.86A/10-2052)

No. 1485

780.022/10-1452: Telegram

The Consul General at Dhahran (Bishop) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET DHAHRAN, October 14, 1952—11 a. m.

101. From Amb at Dhahran. Left Riyadh last night and proceeding Jidda tomorrow.

On Oct 12 Saudis recd two messages from Riches. [2] First referred to Saudi proposals of Oct 10 which Brit summarized as "a complete standstill without prejudice to claims by any party" and stated Brit agreeable in principle. Added Eden understood this to mean no reinforcements to be sent to oasis by either party and added, whereas Eden able ensure Trucial levies would observe this, he could not

[1] Repeated to London and Jidda.

[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

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immediately give undertaking on behalf Sultan of Muscat but would do best to obtain Sultan's agreement to standstill and observance of it.

Second message gave assurance of Eden's "genuine anxiety to achieve an amicable and equitable settlement and hope that Saudi Govt will act at once as though the agreement were in force". Added, if anything in doubt, Brit Amb returning Jidda Oct 12 and would no doubt seek early opportunity to discuss.

Foregoing given me Oct 12 by Yusuf and Khalid who expressed gratification and hope would lead to sincere negots and not another run-around. They particularly expressed continuing worry re Muscat. [3] I stressed necessity at this point of putting acrimony and suspicion aside and fixing attention on constructive statesmanship. Brit had made very significant move and Saudi should reciprocate in same spirit. They expressed agreement.

In final audience with King yesterday he repeatedly expressed his appreciation for what we had done to assist. Said he had been friends with Brit for long time and only wished they could now give evidence of being as well disposed to him as did his new Amer friends. He repeated that he felt much of his trouble had resulted from befriending Americans but said he couldn't understand why his friendship with US was incompatible with friendship with Brit. King said always wanted deal with us frankly and wanted us always advise him honestly regardless of whether we agreed with him or not.

For moment, therefore, situation much improved here but would, of course, be erroneous assume yet out of the woods. But constructive step has been taken and now it is up to Brit and Saudis rise to occasion by putting standstill honestly into effect and then getting down to real negotiation instead of shadow-boxing.

BISHOP

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[3] Telegram 2214 from London, Oct. 15, reported the British Foreign Office was concerned about a telegram received from Riches reporting Saudi Arabia had asked the Sultan of Muscat to disband his forces near Sohar, an area beyond the Buraimi Oasis. The Foreign Office was concerned that Saudi Arabia was attempting to extend the standstill beyond Buraimi to other parts of the area claimed by the Sultan and, while it would try to persuade him to act responsibly, it did not feel it could advise him not to move his troops in territory he claimed outside Buraimi. (780.00/10-1552)

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No. 1486

Editorial Note

On October 13 the Second Secretary of the Saudi Arabian Embassy telephoned twice to give the Department of State the substance of five cables from King Ibn Saud to the Ambassador concerning the Buraimi dispute. One telegram was dated October 11 and four were dated October 13. (Memoranda of telephone conversations, October 13; 641.86A/10-1352) On October 15 the Second Secretary telephoned again to give the Department of State the substance of a cable dated October 14 from the King to the Ambassador, complaining that the British troops in the area were not keeping their promise to cease their operations and activities in the Buraimi area. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, October 15; 786A.022/10-1552)

No. 1487

780.022/10-1852: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 18, 1952—2:10 p. m.

2758. SA Amb Shaikh Asad called on UnSecy Bruce today at latter's request to receive Dept's promised report on results US informal efforts abate critical situation Buraimi. Shaikh Asad however began conversation by citing msg from King stating Brit by acts not indicating genuine acceptance standstill arrangement but delaying resumption talks and continuing their interference with Saudi subjects Buraimi area. (He was not specific re interference.) King had therefore proposed US arrange for a tripartite comm (US, UK and SAG members) to proceed Buraimi area to verify situation including status of allegiances. [2]

Bruce cool to this proposal on grounds: (1) arrangement for and despatch such comm if possible at all wld be very time consuming and (2) US felt by acceptance both UK and SAG of standstill pro-

[1] Drafted by Hart and cleared by NEA and BNA. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

[2] In telegram 252 from Jidda, Oct. 19, the Ambassador reported a meeting the previous day in which the Crown Prince transmitted a message from the King asking for a tripartite committee. Ambassador Hare said he would transmit the King's message to the Department of State but, since he had personally assumed responsibility for framing the three-point proposal being implemented, he suggested the parties concerned should emphasize making that plan work. (780.022/10-1952) For details of the plan, see telegram 91, Document 1481.

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posal and resumption talks main requirement now was calmness patience good faith and immed pursuance bilateral negots. Dept understood Amb Pelham had just returned Jidda and cld be expected to have instructions permitting quick prelim contact with SAG to prepare for resumption talks. In any case unwise change rules at this favorable stage of proceedings. US Govt believed SAG shld give direct talks a chance as US Govt convinced good faith UK. US Govt had been in constant touch with Brit here London and SA and had made abundantly clear to UK its serious concern Buraimi situation. It had also intended send AmConGen Dhahran to Muscat to express US concern to Sultan but had postponed orders on learning of strong UK representations to Sultan and visit Brit Consul Sohar. [3] (Shaikh Asad expressed hope US wld send emissary to Muscat as King pleased this idea.)

Shaikh Asad again voiced concern over Brit delay in resuming direct talks and asked where they wld be held noting Shaikh Yusuf Yassin due New York City about Nov one, Prince Faisal later. [4] Bruce replied we had no info yet as to UK ideas re locus talks but assumed Pelham might have instrs this regard.

Dept hopes UK will now hasten resumption direct talks with SAG in interest re-demonstrating its good faith. Suggest immed prelim contact Pelham with King to discuss time and place. [5] Thereafter shld direct early negots prove impossible to arrange or shld they demonstrate their own futility at early stage Dept wld be ready propose arbitration as own idea to SAG. To emphasize seriousness of US concern Dept obtained auth show to Brit Emb Secret Presidential ltr dated Oct 31, 1950 to King Ibn Saud. Emb officer took notes. Shaikh Asad not informed but Amb Hare herewith authorized inform SAG his discretion. King's reply not shown to Brit.

BRUCE

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[3] Telegram 101 to Dhahran, repeated as 203 to Jidda and 2587 to London, Oct. 12, not printed. (780.022/10–652)

[4] They were planning to attend the Seventh Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York.

[5] Telegram 2303 from London, Oct. 20, reported that details had been arranged with the Sultan of Muscat, and Pelham had gone to Riyadh with instructions to gain agreement on the remaining details of the standstill agreement. He was also to discuss with the Saudis the best way to resume direct conversations. (780.022/10–2052)

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No. 1488

780.022/10-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, October 28, 1952—noon.

286. Brit Amb returned yesterday from Riyadh where he had spent week discussing Buraimi. Said King in friendly mood and turned over discussions to Prince Faisal who, after first day, turned over to Yassin and Gargoni where discussions really began. Amb said details of standstill had been worked out after protracted argument, including agreement Saudis refrain further issuance nationality documents.

Re renewed dir negots, Saudis said resume regular boundary talks in accordance London agreement of 1951 (which Saudis indicated had not been followed in Dammam talks this year and in connection with which Brit Amb expects Saudis will stress necessity fact finding). Re Buraimi, Saudis insisted, not in same category as boundary negots and proposed Three Power Commission as reported Embtel 276 Oct 26. [2] This is contrary Brit thesis that all these problems should be considered together.

Amb seemed reasonably satisfied with results his trip but said doubtful re acceptability SAG proposals for further negots and felt would probably be desirable suggest arbitration soon.

Amb was somewhat more temperate than just before departure Riyadh when, in discussion with me, he had repeatedly branded Saudi action as "imperialism, that's what, imperialism". Last night, however, he expressed personal view that Saudis might have something on their side although he still felt they were pushing their pretentions too far.

HARE

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[1] Repeated to London, Dhahran, and the Arab capitals.

[2] Not printed; it reported receiving information from the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office that a letter had been delivered to the British Ambassador in Riyadh stating the King was willing to submit the problems of Buraimi and its neighbors to a tripartite commission. The commission, to consist of Saudi Arabia, Britain, and the United States, which was a friend of the other two parties, would proceed to the area and conduct a plebiscite to determine the boundary of Buraimi and its neighbors. (780.022/10-2552)

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No. 1489

780.022/10-2752 Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 1, 1952—1:36 p. m.

272. SA Emb informed Dept Oct 25 tripartite comm proposal made to Brit in ltr Oct 23 (Jidda tel Dept 276 Lon 14 [2] and Lon tel Dept 2452, Jidda 32, Dhahran 22 [3]) but did not request official reaction from USG. Dept officer receiving info made brief comment very similar para 3 Jidda 276. On Oct 28 SA Emb informed Dept King requesting US respond to proposal. Response not yet given.

Dept feels latest Saudi moves (Lon 2452) are attempt enhance possibility obtaining perhaps undeservedly favorable settlement Buraimi dispute and reveal Saudi intent utilize help USG to maximum advantage and in ways not compatible maintenance smooth relations with Brit.

Dept had hoped for immed resumption direct talks which wld incl Buraimi. Difficult rationalize King's anxiety for quick solution (Jidda 276) with new requests (Lon 2452) all which will delay resumption talks.

Dept believes standstill agreement (Dhahran tel Dept 91, Jidda 70, Lon 5 [4]) meant be applicable only Buraimi. Saudi desire extend neighboring area likely exacerbate situation, prolonging delay of solution and increasing rather than decreasing tension (Lon tels Dept 2214, Jidda 27, Dhahran 15, [5] 2236, Jidda 28, Dhahran 16, [6] and 2452).

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[1] Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by BNA and NE. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] Not printed; it reported the British representative had signed a standstill arrangement with the Saudis for the Buraimi oasis. The Saudis, however, had then made three further requests: A resumption of the Damman conference and dispatch of a fact-finding commission to the disputed areas, with the exception of Buraimi; the extension of the standstill agreement to cover other disputed areas in the Buraimi region; and the sending of a tripartite commission made up of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia to the Buraimi region to determine the allegiance of the inhabitants. The British Foreign Office was disturbed by the Saudi requests and was urgently considering suggesting arbitration of the whole boundary problem. If Eden agreed the matter should go to arbitration, the British Embassy in Washington would be instructed to consult with the Department of State to enlist support for the proposal. (780.022/10-2752)

[4] Document 1481.

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 1485.

[6] Dated Oct. 16, not printed. It reported the Foreign Office had instructed Pelham to try to finalize the standstill arrangement in Buraimi, but not to agree to Saudi requests restricting the Sultan of Muscat. (780.022/10-1652)

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Saudi proposal tripartite comm made in face already expressed US coolness idea (Deptel 219, Lon 2758, Dhahran 107 [7]) begins suggest calculated effort avoid direct negots re Buraimi.

Saudi suggestion fact-finding groups connection resumption Dammam talks may well mean talks will not begin till after groups have done work, which cld be months. Delay cld be used as ammunition by Saudis for arguing since talks Dammam cannot start only way settle Buraimi dispute and ease tension immed is by means tripartite comm to Buraimi. FYI Dept desires avoid participation any fact-finding or tripartite groups or for that matter any substantive involve settlement boundary disputes.

On Oct 30 Brit approached Dept [8] to solicit support proposal Buraimi dispute be submitted arbitration (Lon 2452). Dept to reply next few days. . . .

Dept favors arbitration Buraimi dispute if seems clear direct negots wld not be fruitful or not desired by Saudis. UK regards direct talks as useless. Dept inquiring ur views entire picture as outlined this tel replying to UK.

Emb Jidda authorized own discretion tell SAG Dept appreciates confidence shown in asking US participate tripartite comm but USG prefers not take part since still believes direct negots shld be given trial.

BRUCE

[7] Document 1487.

[8] Two members of the British Embassy called at the Department of State on Oct. 30 to ask the United States to support the idea of arbitration, since the idea of direct talks seemed to be useless. The Foreign Office considered the Saudis had used unfair means to establish their influence on Buraimi and areas the British felt belonged to Muscat, and suggested that a plebiscite conducted among people who had been bribed would be unfair. (Memorandum of conversation, Oct. 30; 641.86A/10-3052)

No. 1490

780.022/11-452: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, November 4, 1952—2 p. m.

338. Following is estimate Buraimi and boundary situs requested Deptel 272 Nov 1: [2]

[1] Transmitted in two sections; repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] *Supra.*

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Basic fact is that Buraimi and whole territorial problem from Qatar to Aden constitutes polit anomaly and both sides tend view with right or left eye depending on which prospect is more pleasing (on one hand Brit profess mere acting in behalf local chieftains whereas obviously interested in oil and also in maintaining prestige by extending protective coloration of Empire to large semi-independent and as yet undefined areas of Arabian Peninsula. On other hand, Saudis talk of historical tribal affiliation whereas also thinking in terms of oil and maximization of dominions.) Brit have certain legal grounds for their pretentions, but customs of desert and normal trends of polit development of peninsula favor Saudis . . . . Problem in some ways comparable status French and Portuguese settlement on periphery Indian subcontinent. Believe this is matter on which we shld do some hard thinking on our account since it is basic in gen sit of which Buraimi and Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms are only incidental and since sit is such that neither Brit nor Saudis are in position talk to us frankly, if, in fact, it is entirely clear to them.

In these circumstances and in light recent developments it is probable, as Dept suggests, that Saudis desire to solicit our support to disadvantage of Brit but it wld seem equally clear that any such effort had been directly largely to counteracting what Saudis regard as distortion of sit by exertion Brit pressure. Similarly, as long as Brit felt they had free hand in matter, they were rather stand-offish with us when we endeavored discuss in past years, but now, when going is getting bit rough, they talk of common front in resisting Saudis. Here again any assessment of blame wld have to be fairly even.

Re questioned compatibility of professed desire King reach early settlement with his requests which might delay resumption talks, it is possible he may have certain ulterior motives but Emb recalls Saudis have from beginning insisted on consulting will of people whereas Brit have consistently resisted idea in dealing with Saudis and disparaged it in talking with us. If Saudi contention is subj to criticism as delaying tactics, Brit position is also vulnerable as indicating unwillingness put their claims to practical test.

We agree standstill which we proposed applied only to Buraimi and have so told FonOff. Idea of mentioning adjoining areas sounds like some of Yassin's sharp bargaining.

We also dubious re Saudi motives in reviving three power commission in view our strong and consistent opposition but it should be noted that, in form now presented, US rep would not supposedly be called on to reach decision between conflicting Brit and Saudi claims but would be third party in group conducting plebiscite. We

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agree we should resist such role but there is nuance in Saudi suggestion which bears noting.

Re Brit proposal for arbitration, fact is, of course that this is procedure they have favored since before Amman [*Damman*] conf; in fact, this may have been one of reasons for holding of conference so quickly. Also recall Brit amb recently mentioned arbitration informally to FonOff here and it cannot therefore be advanced as new thought. Arbitration idea naturally has appealed to Brit since it could be expected to emphasize legal aspects of problem (where Brit position strongest) as contrasted with polit aspects (where normal trends of polit development favors Saudi). As regards Saudi view on arbitration, occasion has never arisen, as far as we know, for them to take position thereon but probability is they would express preference for fact finding. As regards ourselves, arbitration has obvious attractions, since it would get us off uncomfortable polit hook but we do not believe we should be identified with Brit proposal to that effect at this juncture. As record stands, we suggested standstill and early resumption direct negots. Both sides accepted in principle but with misgivings. Saudis then suggested separating Buraimi from direct negots pursuant Amman [*Damman*] conf. Brit are now apparently disposed to proceed immed with proposal for arbitration. In this sitn we believe our position should be that question still subject, as agreed in principle by parties, to direct negots in respect of substance and/or procedure. If they cannot agree on substantive implementation of direct negots then it is up to them, by direct negots, to discuss some other procedure, but we should maintain neutral attitude and freedom to support arbitration, direct negots or possibly some other procedure as sitn develops. At present we are in middle position and, despite its difficulties, that is where we should remain, at least for time being. At same time and in pursuance policy, Emb suggests that Dept reply to Saudi Amb in sense of concluding para of reftel since first para of same tel indicates that question of our participation in 3-power commission was actually put to Dept by Saudi Emb. We believe, in circumstances, direct reply by Dept would be procedurally preferable as well as carry more weight. Please advise if this suggestion approved and if any action taken.

Regret length this tel but Dept requested "views entire picture" and matter is so many-faceted that compressed treatment difficult.

HARE

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No. 1491

780.022/11-452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 11, 1952—4:05 p. m.

298. Byroade called in SA Amb Nov 8 [2] informing as follows (Embtel 338, Lon 20, Dhahran 114 [3] and Deptel 292, Lon 3234, Dhahran 122 [4]):

(1) King's proposal for tripartite comm to conduct plebiscite Buraimi and neighboring area put USG on spot. Due USG efforts behalf SAG, UK had indicated agreement in principle resume direct talks. Now King, who was first to accept Amb Hare personal suggestions for resumption direct talks, has subsequently attached conditions which appear to have resulted in preventing talks from beginning.

(2) Wld greatly ease problem for USG if SAG wld give direct talks trial. Realize both UK and SAG skeptical their success; but if unable agree substantive problems during such talks, they shld turn to procedural matters and discuss fact-finding, arbitration, and all possible approaches, excluding nothing. If talks fail wld seem arbitration might be logical sequence.

(3) Believe wld take considerable amt time organize tripartite comm with terms reference, transport it Buraimi, and allow it complete plebiscite, which wld be very difficult conduct under conditions existing area. In any case do not believe third party shld be brought into picture while others (UK and SAG) still trying settle and do not believe SAG shld try establish such comm and set up its terms reference prior having direct talks.

(4) USG in very uncomfortable position this whole matter. Since USG friend both SAG and UK and since both come to USG with different views and recommending different solutions, situation boils down to proposition wherein USG, having faith both sides, cannot help but alienate one side or other in choosing solution. In other words, one cannot be umpire between disputants if he is intimate friend both, as each will expect special appreciation his own position.

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[1] Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by NE. Repeated as telegram 3260 to London and 125 to Dhahran.

[2] Memorandum of conversation of Nov. 8, not printed. (641.86A/11-852)

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Dated Nov. 9, not printed; it advised the Embassy the Department of State concurred with the views in telegram 338 and would follow with a more detailed telegram. (780.022/11-452)

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(5) Feel you shld not ask USG make choice until you have talked things over with UK. However, if SAG and UK decide USG is to be culprit this matter, suppose we cannot avoid our responsibilities.

SA Amb made fol comments:

(1) When King learned what Brit Amb had to say at Riyadh (Oct 23), he proposed tripartite comm. Do not believe King will abandon comm now and return direct talks.

(2) King proposed comm because wanted do away with Brit pressure in Buraimi area. Situation critical and while talks underway something may happen. King very anxious for comm to conduct plebiscite Buraimi after which talks cld be started.

(3) Can understand Brit may not want US participate comm because they might believe US has special interest in doing so in view own oil interests.

(4) Heart whole matter is both UK and US have strategic and other vital relations NE area and believe USG shld do something insure peace since so concerned with it.

(5) As understand USG position, you feel direct talks best way. Will try explain further to King.

. . . . . .

BRUCE

No. 1492

780.022/12-152 Telegram

The Consul General at Dhahran (Bishop) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET DHAHRAN, December 1, 1952—4 p. m.

136. Re Jidda's 405 to Dept, rptd info London 26, Dhahran 144. [2] On Nov 8-9 Vice Consul Noel and I visited Ajman and Dubai and on Nov 23-24 Qatar. During these visits noted indications of restiveness on part local leaders, as yet difficult to define, which seems confirm Amb's point that boundaries only part of more basic problem eventual status Gulf Shaikhdoms and Brit position there.

Brit were most hospitable and went out of their way to be helpful. . . . The polit agents Sharja and Qatar accompanied on all official calls and made every effort control conversation, although at Ajman and Qatar they were not entirely successful. Rulers were all extremely friendly and unusually profuse in expressions friendship and respect for US . . . .

Through all visits there were frequent expressions friendship and personal regard for King Ibn Saud and Amir Saud Bin Jelewi

[1] Repeated to Jidda.
[2] Not printed. (780.022/11-2552)

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which most often took form of a feeling of kinship with them as brother Arabs, personal warmth without obvious polit overtones but which cld easily be turned to polit purposes. This, and the incidents related below, led us to impression that Trucial Arabs may be tending towards Saudi point of view on boundaries and that in the long run Saudis will be more successful in winning allegiance not only of tribes in disputed areas but perhaps in Trucial Shaikhdoms as well.

In Qatar, Shaikh Abdulla Bin Darwish, adviser to ruler and probably most powerful man in Qatar, told me he had recently been to Riyadh at invitation of King and stayed eight days during which he had a daily audience with King covering Persian Gulf problems in general and undoubtedly also boundary disputes. King has annually extended to ruler of Qatar and his father Abdulla, an old friend, an invitation to visit Riyadh. This year they have accepted and will shortly travel Riyadh stopping en route at Hofuf to visit Bin Jelewi. . . .

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BISHOP

No. 1493

S/A (Jessup) files, lot 53 D 65, "Foreign Ministers Meetings--New York, October–December, 1952"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Edwin Plitt, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, December 2, 1952. [1]

Subject: Secretary Acheson's Conversations With Foreign Ministers of the NEA Area Attending the Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations

Participants: H.R.H. Prince Faisal Al-Saud, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia [2]
Shaikh Ali A. Alireza, Saudi Arabian Delegation
The Secretary
Edwin A. Plitt, U.S. Delegation

In the course of a meeting with the Secretary this morning H.R.H. Prince Faisal set forth the views of his Government in regard to the existing controversy between Saudi Arabia and the UK on the subject of Al Buraimi and the neighboring areas.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was typed on Dec. 4.

[2] Prince Faisal arrived in New York on Nov. 19, 1952, to assume the leadership of the Saudi Arabian Delegation to the Seventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

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For the better understanding of the problem, His Royal Highness summarized the well known background of the situation within the area involved in the dispute and outlined to some extent the difficulties confronting the Saudi Arabian Government at this juncture, and solicited the Secretary's help in overcoming them. His Royal Highness recalled his meeting recently with Mr. Eden when the latter in lieu of a long delayed formal reply to the Saudi Arabian Government's note on the subject, informed His Royal Highness of the British Government's proposal to arbitrate the controversy which, His Royal Highness told the Secretary, is most unsatisfactory because the British Government includes in its proposal not only Al Buraimi but the entire territorial problem from Qatar to Aden as well as Kuwait and other sheikdoms. His Royal Highness pointed out that the Saudi Arabian objection is based principally on the fact that in the eyes of his Government there is no dispute in regard to Al Buraimi which has always been an integral part of Saudi Arabia dating far back to the King's ancestor's association of this area with Saudi Arabia. Any recognition of its now being in dispute would entail grave consequences for King Ibn Saud, Faisal explained. "It is more than a mere question of sovereignty over a small area of sandy desert" His Royal Highness added. The problem of religion enters most decisively into the picture. The inhabitants of Al Buraimi are of the Sunnite sect whereas in the contiguous areas other forms of Moslem worship are followed. Religious traditions accepted by them are rejected by the others and these disputes greatly influence political claims. The importance of this political and religious interrelationship in the area is such that it cannot be too strongly emphasized and must be fully taken into account in arriving at a solution of the problem.

Referring to the origin of the Al Buraimi difficulty, he ascribed it to British interference for the purpose of creating trouble to serve British policy. When this occurred last summer the inhabitants of the Al Buraimi area asked for Saudi Arabian help and, in response, the King sent a representative and some twenty assistants. His Royal Highness explained that this was the natural thing to do and in line with the customary procedure followed in any other part of the Kingdom where a serious situation demanded it. In so far as Al Buraimi is concerned, there exists no dispute whatever from the Saudi Arabian point of view and consequently His Royal Highness' Government cannot agree to any arbitration procedure which would be an acknowledgment of its dominion over that area being open to question. On the other hand, the Saudi Arabian Government does not object to a plebiscite. The Buraimi inhabitants could then make their own decision and could not blame the King for abandoning them as might be the case if he had agreed to abide

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by a decision left to arbitration procedure which might rule against him.

The Secretary asked for a further clarification of the problem and whether His Royal Highness maintained that arbitration referred only to the Al Buraimi area or to all of the sheikdoms involved. His Royal Highness responded to the effect that in some of the areas concerned special treaty relations exist and that some of the affairs of the Sheiks are handled by the British Government in agreement with them. As a result of developments beginning last August, considerable tension has developed over conflicting territorial claims in the settlement of which His Royal Highness said that the British Government had not been cooperative even though an agreement in principle had been on the verge of being reached looking toward a settlement through direct negotiations. These, unfortunately, did not develop because of disagreement over the method of procedure for the reopening of direct talks.

His Royal Highness referred again to his Government's preparedness to accept a plebiscite under the auspices of a commission to be composed of a representative from his country, one from the UK, and one from the United States, whose findings could form the basis of defining boundaries and reaching a settlement among all the parties concerned.

His Royal Highness offered his excuses for having taken so much of the Secretary's time to go into the details he had described. He said that his Government placed so much importance on the Secretary's being fully informed of this grave problem with which his Government is faced, particularly in view of the serious consequences which a deterioration of the situation might entail, that he not only felt it his duty to bring it to the Secretary's personal attention upon implicit instructions of His Majesty the King, but to solicit urgently the Secretary's help. He concluded by saying that an early response from the Secretary would be welcomed by His Majesty who had been pressing him to see the Secretary with as little delay as possible.

The Secretary thanked Prince Faisal for having called on him and asked to have a little time to consider what His Royal Highness had set forth to him in the course of this meeting. He added that he would profit from the opportunity of having His Royal Highness here to discuss the subject further with him just as soon as he could do so.

No other subject was alluded to during the meeting which lasted nearly an hour.

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No. 1494

S/A (Jessup) files, lot 53 D 65, "Arab-Asian Question, Miscellaneous File, UNGA 7th Session"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Edwin Plitt, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET NEW YORK, December 4, 1952.

Subject: Al Buraimi Controversy

Participants: H.R.H. Prince Faisal Al-Saud, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia
H.E. Shaikh Ali A. Alireza, Minister, Saudi Arabian Delegation
Mr. Edwin A. Plitt, U.S. Delegation

Following a telephone call from Shaikh Alireza yesterday afternoon, and a follow-up request from Prince Faisal conveyed to me by Alireza at the Syrian reception last evening to see His Royal Highness tonight, Alireza telephoned to me again this morning saying that his Foreign Minister wished to speak with me as soon as possible and preferably this morning. I accordingly called on him at his suite in the Hotel Waldorf. He seemed somewhat agitated which is unusual for an Arab, and more so for anyone of his background and in the high position he occupies. This was further demonstrated after he had invited me to sit next to him and he produced a package of cigarettes with the remark: "I never smoke in public and rarely in the presence of visitors, but I should like to consider you this morning as a member of my family circle and have you join me in smoking for which I feel the need."

Shaikh Alireza, interpreting, said that His Royal Highness had just received another instruction from His Majesty urging upon him to procure our help in reaching an immediate amelioration of the situation which has developed as a result of the Al Buraimi *dispute* (they avoid the use of that expression) with the UK and which, according to His Royal Highness, is becoming serious. He added: "H.R.H. wants to speak very frankly with you."

He referred to his call on the Secretary (See memo of conversation of December 2 [1]) several days ago and asked if the Secretary had come to any decision. When I pointed out in general the extent of the problems with which the Secretary had to cope and the great demands made upon his time, he expressed the hope that the Secretary would nevertheless be able to give his attention to the request His Royal Highness had made of him, and asked me to find an opportunity to remind him of the urgency with which His Maj-

[1] *Supra.*

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esty had instructed His Royal Highness to bring the subject of Al Buraimi to his attention. He added that he had just received another instruction to the effect that help from the United States Government was earnestly and urgently desired. In response to a question, he said that in its simplest form such help would consist of:

1. US good offices to stop British interference in the area so as to establish a calmer situation which is urgently needed to lead to a settlement of the controversy;
2. Help from the United States to protect the rights of Saudi Arabia.

Recalling his talk with the Secretary, Faisal once more recounted the history of events leading to the present impasse. He said that up until 1936 no one had manifested any particular interest in Saudi Arabian affairs, but that when the Americans discovered oil, every inch of Saudi Arabian soil was looked upon with covetous eyes. Offers made to the UK before that event had gone unheeded. The concessions granted American interests changed that attitude almost immediately. The present difficulties have their origin in this and disputes among local sheiks have been exploited by the British with a view to wedging into the oil-rich areas.

Prince Faisal explained how Al Buraimi had belonged to Saudi Arabia for over a hundred years, from the time of the King's grandfather, the Imam Faisal. There had been an agreement made between him and the British to allow the latter to defend the coastal areas for the protection of the British sea lane. This was reaffirmed when the British later on sent a letter to the uncle of the King who confirmed to the British previous arrangements made with the Imam. His Royal Highness emphasized time and again that these agreements referred only to the coastal areas and did not include any "protection" over any inland territory.

The discovery of oil unfortunately started an extension of British interests in the area. No mention, whatever, was made concerning Al Buraimi in the 1915 treaty with the Emir of [omission in the source text] nor in the later agreement of 1926. It was only after 1936 when disputes arose between "Qatar and Abu Dhahib [*Dhabi*]" (not sure of spelling) which "lie between Saudi Arabia and Muscat." Furthermore, no mention of Al Buraimi was ever made in conversations with His Royal Highness last year in London.

After the controversy developed last August, His Royal Highness proposed a meeting with the sheiks involved in the area of dispute. A meeting took place at Dhahran and His Royal Highness suggested the appointment of sub-committees to handle the problem but

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the British refused, saying that the method proposed would take too long and that the disputes should be settled forthwith.

Prince Faisal said that he was certain that all of this would be a matter of record in the Department as he had kept Ambassador Hare fully informed of all developments.

When I mentioned the arbitration proposal, His Royal Highness most emphatically said that his Government would not accept it for the reasons given to the Secretary (memo of conversation of December 2) and once again referred to the problem of religion involved. He added that the King had more than a political responsibility for the inhabitants of the region concerned, and that if he submitted to arbitration even the population of Riyadh, his own capital, would be likely to give him trouble. In reply to my question concerning arbitration for other than the Al Buraimi area, he hesitated for a moment and somewhat reluctantly replied to the effect that that would have to be given further consideration by his Government.

He then requested me to impress the Department with the need for acting quickly and asked me to bring this to Assistant Secretary Byroade's attention upon my return to Washington and do what I could to change American policy toward the Arab states and Saudi Arabia in particular. When, in answer to his question as to whether I would help to this end, I replied that I would transmit his request, he somewhat impatiently remarked that he had seen and spoken with many high officials of the Department of State and the President, himself, but that none had ever admitted categorically as having responsibility for the formulation of American policy, that he could not understand this and felt considerable concern over it. I took a few moments to explain to him the extensive coordination required in the development of policy which in our government is not a one-man operation. He listened carefully, then in terminating the meeting he said that we should not forget that in so far as the Middle East is concerned, especially the Arab states, time is running out fast on us; that their friendship for us remains but that they cannot keep on hoping for a better understanding of their situation and more effective support from us; that our attitude on the Palestine item and what he fears may be our attitude toward the North African issues in the UN will further undermine our prestige in the Arab world.

In conducting me to the door he said: "Don't place too much faith in what Arab leaders may tell you that Communism is incompatible with Islam. We are in desperate straits. A drowning man will grasp at a snake—even a poisonous one—if it is the only chance he has to prevent his going under for the last time!"

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No. 1495

780.022/12–1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 11, 1952—4 p. m.

3245. FonOff has for last several days been awaiting Pelham's full report on Saudi reply to UK proposal for arbitration and countered with earlier proposals for tripartite commission to conduct plebiscite in Buraimi area and fact finding commissions to demarcate boundaries in other disputed areas. Saudi reply makes quite clear that it regards Buraimi as separate from other boundary problems.

At same time, Saudis have also, according to FonOff, replied to recent UK protest regarding Turki's activities by stating that Buraimi is integral part of Saudi Arabia and that tribes in Oman owe allegiance to Ibn Saud. FonOff greatly concerned at what it regards as more categorical statement Saudi claims Buraimi and extension claims to Oman. It is currently deciding what action it shld take in circumstances. Possible line might be to suggest to Saudis that fact finding comm shld be sent to area and that any disputes which arise from fact finding comite's attitude shld be submitted to arbitration. FonOff regards it doubtful, however, that Saudis wld accept this compromise.

FonOff official told us there is growing feeling in FonOff that Saudis are banking on belief that UK will not use force to dislodge Turki. This belief also prevalent among tribes in area who have hitherto been loyal to local Sheikhs and Brit but who cannot understand why Brit have permitted Turki to maintain his present position. This factor, plus liberal use of money by Turki, has resulted in many of loyal inhabitants defecting to Saudis. Turki now pushing his activities further afield and FonOff official said there is some feeling in FonOff that only effective way to counteract this and to restore Brit position in area is by using force to dislodge Turki. Another possibility might be to make things uncomfortable for Turki by interfering with his food supplies, etc.

Emb off expressed strong opinion that force was not likely to be effective solution to problem. Saudi prestige deeply involved and not likely give up easily. Use of force wld inevitably mean problem being taken to UN and, in view similar problems which have come before that organization involving Asiatic and Western states,

[1] Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

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there is no telling what outcome might be. Finally, one cld not dismiss possibility that action of this kind might result in full scale war between SA and UK. All these factors shld be taken carefully into consideration before any decision taken re use of force. FonOff official expressed appreciation these factors, but felt UK record of willingness solve dispute by peaceful means was unimpeachable and reiterated that dislodging Turki by force wld have beneficial effect on UK position in area. He particularly stressed necessity some early action to solve problem, since longer Turki permitted extend his activities, weaker UK position becomes.

At several times during conversation, FonOff official expressed opinion, which he said was shared widely in FonOff, that Ibn Saud has banked heavily on US intervening his behalf at crucial time. FonOff official expressed strong wish that we cld have been more categorical in discouraging Saudis from tri comm idea and encouraging arbitration. He thought greater US support on both issues might well prove decisive with Saudis and expressed hope it wld still be forthcoming.

Comment: Emb inclined discount possibility HMG using force to dislodge Turki, but very fact that it arose in foregoing conv is measure of FonOff's frustration at how to deal with this thorny problem. One cannot ignore possibility, moreover, that idea has been advanced to persuade US support UK position more fully. [2]

Whatever motivation, Emb fears deterioration in sitn unless machinery can be established to deal with it swiftly and effectively. Emb continues firmly of opinion for reason set forward Embtel 2879 Nov 20 [3] that arbitration best meets requirements of situation and that we could advance sufficiently cogent reasons for support of that proposal omits [*on its*?] merits as to make it clear to Saudis that we were not supporting it merely because UK put it forward.

GIFFORD

[2] Telegram 3491 from London, Dec. 23, reported the British position seemed to be to strengthen the defenses in the sheikhdoms, possibly by stationing armored cars at Sharja. The Foreign Office had emphasized there was no intention at that time to try to dislodge Turki by force, and any deterrent action to counteract Saudi activities would be tailored to the provocation involved. The Embassy commented that it was very difficult to argue against the principle of British defense of the sheikhdoms, since they had a treaty obligation to defend the territory; but the Embassy was disturbed by the timing of the move, especially since efforts were being made to persuade Saudi Arabia to agree to arbitration. (780.022/12-2352)

[3] Not printed. (641.86A3/11-2052)

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No. 1496

780.022/12-1152: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1952—5:40 p. m.

377. Brit Emb officers visited Dept Dec 15 [2] to emphasize orally points made UK note handed Dept Dec 12. [3] Note made fol points:

(1) Full text SAG note Dec 6 [4] not yet read but clear SAG rejected arbitration.
(2) Pro-Saudi tribes Liwa oasis incited to attack Abu Dhabi representative there, Saudis probably intend plant official Liwa, repeating Turki's successful experiment.
(3) SAG now claims not only "undisputed sovereignty Buraimi area and vicinity" but also "allegiance all Oman tribes."
(4) Eden requests USG make unmistakable to SAG (a) arbitration proper way solve dispute and (b) USG will not participate tripartite comm.
(5) Eden feels US approach SAG wld be more effective if made to Prince Feisal in NY and Crown Prince in SA.

Brit Emb officer commented FonOff believed SAG rejected arbitration because Saudis believed UK wld not use force to dislodge Turki and US still might participate on tripartite plebiscite comm (Lon tel 3245 Jidda 46 Dhahran 35 [5]).

Dept made fol points to Brit:

(1) Already had expressed to SAG desire not participate tripartite comm.
(2) Our agreement support arbitration hinged on SAG asking our view, which not done. Only Saudi reaction so far received came from Prince Feisal during talk Dec 2 with Secy when Feisal expressed view SAG wld not accept arbitration.
(3) However, feel we can do what Eden asks but first prefer have full info re SAG note Dec 6 and comments Brit and Amer Ambs Jidda. Saudis in very querulous frame mind, especially Feisal, not only re Buraimi but also other matters re Arab–Western relations. Hesitant make *démarche* to Saudis without background.

Dept desires soonest any further significant points SAG note (Embtel 453 Lon 28 Dhahran 159), ur comments thereon, clarifica-

[1] Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by BNA and NE. Repeated as telegram 4075 to London, 150 to Dhahran, and 3452 to Paris.
[2] Memorandum of conversation, Dec. 15, not printed. (641.86A/12-1252)
[3] Not printed. (641.86A/12-1252)
[4] Telegram 453 from Jidda, Dec. 11, transmitted a summary of the Saudi Arabian note of Dec. 6. (780.022/12-1152) The full text of the Saudi Arabian note was transmitted in despatch 177 from Jidda, Dec. 20. (780.022/12-2052)
[5] Dated Dec. 11, *supra*.

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tion as to which boundary disputes covered in Brit arbitration proposal, and ur evaluation strength our position re support arbitration either in Wash or SA. Dept strongly inclined support arbitration.

BRUCE

No. 1497

780.022/12-1852: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, December 18, 1952—7 p. m.

476. Have now had full discussions with Brit Amb re Buraimi, etc, following his study recent Saudi communications (Embtel 453, Dec 11 rptd info London 28, Dhahran 159 [2]), of which he furnished copies being sent Dept by pouch.

Amb disturbed re developing situation which he interpets caused by Saudi impression Brit weak with result tribes' gravitation towards SAG. In circumstances, Amb, while admitting Saudis may have claim to part of Buraimi oasis, now feels Turki should have been ejected at outset, forcibly if necessary, but that, having failed to [do?] so, Brit should now stiffen position, even to extent of risking war, in order re-establish prestige. In retrospect Amb also feels USG holds a primary responsibility for situation since he suggests our "passivity" interpreted as tacit support by Saudis and has encouraged Saudi excesses. Therefore, if situation is to be prevented from deteriorating to degree he foresees, Amb maintains USG and Brit should make common front in insisting Saudis accept arbitration. He expressed hope I would make strong recommendation this effect in anticipation matter would be taken up forcefully in Washington and here. Amb apologized for frankness but said wished to be clear. I replied understood and no point in pulling punches between friends. However, I did not belive observation justified that what Brit regard as Saudi intransigence should be laid at our door. Quite to contrary I had always endeavored exert restraining influence. I might have added, but did not do so, that counter-argument might be advanced regarding alleged aspirations of Shaiks who in fact appear have little voice in framing claims espoused in their behalf by Brit.

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[1] Repeated to London, Dhahran, and the Arab capitals.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 4, *supra*.

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Our general views on this matter have been fully reported. Basic fact is that this is a case, fortunately still in miniature, having uncomfortably close resemblance to Iranian, Egyptian and Tunisian problems where past failures of others to be sufficiently foreseen have created difficult present situations for us wherein both sides presuming on our intervention on their part as measure of our understanding and friendship. It is our view Brit made first error in approaching this matter exclusively in role of protagonist of Shaiks and putting Saudis on defensive instead of trying bridge their asserted obligations to Shaiks and their professed friendship for Saudis. Latter then sought strike back to find, probably to their surprise, that their position was even stronger than they had thought because of attitude of tribes. Now both sides are making bellicose noises, partly in order to intimidate the other and partly in order stimulate our intervention. Neither is probably as serious as he pretends but situation is progressively more disturbing. Emb hence believes sincere direct negots would have been best hope for at least interim solution but, since neither side now apparently so disposed and since neither we nor Brit favor tripartite approach, Brit suggestion of arbitration wld seem logical next step and recommend we shld say this Saudis. In doing so, however, believe we shld still maintain role of honest broker and avoid seeming disposition coerce Saudis. But in following this line of action we must realize that arbitration, in order to succeed, will require degree of cooperation by both sides (in working out terms reference, etc.) which unfortunately now lacking and that it may not prove as swift or effective as we wld wish, if in fact it works at all.

Suggest foregoing shld be read together with London's 3245, Dec 11, to Dept rptd info Jidda 46 and Dhahran 35, [3] with which we generally agree.

Would appreciate receiving guidance and views of Dept.

HARE

[3] Document 1495.

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No. 1498

780.022/12-2052: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, December 20, 1952—5 p. m.

479. Deptel 377, December 17, [2] reached us immediately following sending Embtel 476, December 18, [3] which would seem to have anticipated and covered points raised by Department.

Meanwhile unexpected opportunity discuss matter with Saudi official most immediately concerned was offered when Deputy Foreign Minister Yusef Yassin passed through Jidda yesterday en route Cairo to attend meeting Political Committee Arab League. Yusef Yassin afforded opening by referring to dispute over visit British political officer to Buraimi which he maintained particularly important because of principle involved and re which British Ambassador had apparently shifted ground. Re arbitration, said Prince Faisal had discussed with Secretary Acheson and Assistant Secretary Byroade [4] following departure Eden and believed both American officials favorably impressed by Faisal's presentation.

I replied had been pondering matter constantly and particularly since being furnished copies recent SAG communication to British Ambassador, and, whereas I had originally felt direct talks would have been constructive, now appeared from my contact with both sides that neither so inclined. Re tripartite commission, recalled I had discouraged from outset and Assistant Secretary Byroade had fully explained our attitude to Saudi Ambassador in Washington. Basic fact was that closeness of our relations with both parties would make it extremely difficult for us to act as umpire. Now situation is British suggesting arbitration and I felt this was logical suggestion in circumstances which Saudis would do well consider seriously and not close door.

I realized that in situations of dispute one party is apt to regard suggestions of other as suspect but I saw no reason for such misgivings in which case since both parties would participate in drawing up terms reference. Furthermore, if my understanding was correct that Saudis only desired assert right which could be supported on

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Document 1496.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Prince Faisal was in New York in early December and spoke with Secretary Acheson on Dec. 2 and Edwin Plitt of the U.S. Delegation Advisory Staff on Dec. 4; see Documents 1493 and 1494. No record of the meeting with Byroade has been found.

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basis justice and equity (Yusef Yassin said this definitely the case) arbitration procedure would seem well designed meet situation.

Yusef Yassin replied SAG not closing door on arbitration but felt plebiscite should come first and he still hoped USG could help out in role of impartial observer. He recognized this might subject US certain embarrassment but SAG would wish to minimize by avoiding putting US in position of arbitrator if he could not bring me around to Saudi point of view in this regard, perhaps since Faisal could be more persuasive in Washington. Yusef Yassin also renewed argument for separating Buraimi question from boundaries of Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, which seemed to hinge on British recognition in principle at London conference of certain historic Saudi rights in latter area whereas no similar acknowledgement re Buraimi with result that plebiscite proposed in order establish.

Foregoing discussion was undertaken without actual request for our views re arbitration in accordance instructions but opportunity for our view seemed too good to lose since Yusef Yassin usually in more relaxed and reasonable mood when outside conspiratorial atmosphere of Riyadh. Also because gave opportunity get in plug for arbitration before Yusef Yassin discussed with British Ambassador.

HARE

No. 1499

780.022/12-2452

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Sturgill of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 26, 1952. [1]

Subject: The Al Buraimi Dispute

Participants: Mr. Ronald Bailey, First Secretary, British Embassy
NE—Mr. Hart
NE—Mr. Sturgill

Summary:

Mr. Bailey came in at his own request to discuss latest developments and to request an official answer to the note which he and Mr. Burrows had delivered on December 12 and had discussed with Mr. Jernegan on December 15. [2] He was pleased with the conversation between Ambassador Hare and Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, which

[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Dec. 29.

[2] Neither the British note nor the memorandum of conversation is printed, but see telegram 377 to Jidda, Document 1496.

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had taken place in Jidda on December 19, [3] and he expressed the appreciation of the Foreign Office for what Ambassador Hare had said in support of arbitration. The Foreign Office had communicated to him a message from Ambassador Pelham in Jidda indicating that Ambassador Hare's remarks seemed to have had somewhat of an immediate persuasive effect on the Saudis. Pelham had had a talk with Yassin on the 20th in which Yassin said the SAG was not closing the door on arbitration. Yassin had said arbitration was not the usual way for the Saudis to settle their problems, but it seemed the views of the UK and SAG were not too far apart. The SAG, Yassin said, was awaiting a reply from the UK to its communication (of December 6).

Mr. Hart recounted Ambassador Hare's report of his talk on December 19 with Yusuf Yassin (Jidda's telegram number 479 of December 20, which was not received in readable form until 10 p. m. on December 24). He emphasized the fact that Ambassador Hare, and the Department, had from the beginning discouraged the King's tripartite plebiscite commission proposal and that Ambassador Hare, in supporting arbitration, had done so quite firmly. He then imparted to Mr. Bailey the substance of London's telegram number 3491 of December 23 [4] and Jidda's telegram number 498 of December 24, [5] both of which expressed concern over the possible use or display of force by the British in the disputed areas of the southeastern Arabian Peninsula. Mr. Hart noted also the Department's concern, and said such action on the part of the UK would place the entire situation on a different plane. It definitely would put the US on the spot with regard to supporting the arbitration proposal, and he said that both the Department and Ambasador Hare felt that if forceful action were taken, the Al Buraimi dispute would be carried to the Security Council.

There followed a brief discussion covering a possible problem at Liwa oasis similar to the one at Buraimi. Mr. Bailey again alluded to the fear of the Foreign Office that the SAG might try to plant a Saudi official at Liwa and said this would be an action the Foreign Office could not countenance. Mr. Hart called attention to the fact that Liwa oasis is another of the many "fringe" areas in the southeastern Arabian Peninsula over which no one had exercised complete sovereignty. He remarked that it was the visit of a British political officer which had excited the Saudis in the case of Buraimi.

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[3] See telegram 479 from Jidda, Dec. 20, *supra*.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 1495.

[5] Not printed, it reported the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia was greatly perturbed by the idea that the British might use force in the area, since that type of action would certainly dash hopes for settlement by arbitration and result in having the matter brought before the Security Council. (780.022/12-2452)

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Mr. Bailey said it was routine for such an officer to visit Buraimi, that one had been doing so for years. Mr. Hart agreed, saying he had personal knowledge of such visits having been made in the past. He pointed out, however, that an incident at Liwa could have a deleterious effect on the present situation at Buraimi and expressed the hope that neither the UK nor the SAG would precipitate any unnecessary activities in the area. Mr. Bailey did not comment but left the impression, given previously, that the Foreign Office might take action if the SAG attempted to do anything in the area.

Mr. Bailey then asked explicitly for an answer to the UK request made by him and Mr. Burrows on December 15 that the US support arbitration in talks with the Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia and with Prince Feisal in New York. Mr. Hart said there would be some difficulty about getting in touch in the proper manner with Prince Feisal. He remarked that the Prince was coming to Washington on January 6 for a luncheon at Blair House and that this would present a better opportunity for a discussion. Mr. Bailey thought action should be taken sooner than this and expressed the hope that it would be. Mr. Hart said he would discuss it with Mr. Jernegan and get in touch Monday with Mr. Bailey. Mr. Bailey again expressed thanks for Ambassador Hare's action in Jidda and said all that remained to be done now was a sort of follow-up approach to Prince Feisal.

No. 1500

Editorial Note

Telegram 401 to Jidda, December 31, reported that Prince Faisal was coming to Washington from New York within the next few days and was scheduled to see the Secretary of State on January 6. At their meeting the Secretary was to give strong support to the principle of arbitration and give a firm rebuttal to the expected plea for United States participation in a tripartite commission. (780.022/12-2052) Telegram 408 to Jidda, January 5, reported the Saudi Arabian Embassy had cancelled Faisal's appointment with the Secretary the following day, without explanation. The telegram speculated that Faisal might have realized the Department of State intended to support arbitration and wanted to preclude a policy pronouncement by the outgoing Administration that might complicate an approach to the new Administration. It had been agreed in the Department of State that the Under Secretary would call in the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the next few days and make the

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same points the Secretary had planned to make to Faisal. (780.022/1-453)

No. 1501

780.022/1-1053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 10, 1953—4:10 p. m.

418. Bruce made the following points to Saudi Arabian Ambassador January 8:

(1) Remarks constituted reply to Faisal's request made to Secretary in New York December 2 for United States participation tripartite plebiscite commission. Ambassador requested pass message to Faisal since he unable call on Secretary (Department telegram to Jidda 408 London 4430 Dhahran 164 [2]).

(2) In previous talk with Ambassador (Department telegram to London 2758 Jidda 219 Dhahran 107 [3]) had expressed hope for settlement by direct negotiations but unfortunately such procedure had proved unacceptable United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.

(3) United States as intimate friend both, not forgetting its treaty relationship dating to 1834 [*1833*] with Sultanate Muscat and Oman, [4] most eager see dispute settled quickly and finally. By same token, intimate United States friendship for Saudi Arabia and United Kingdom dictates against direct United States involvement in settlement machinery which could require United States to attempt verify allegiances or otherwise exercise judgment.

(4) Accordingly, United States feels it should not participate on proposed plebiscite commission and strongly recommends Buraimi dispute be submitted arbitration in accordance time honored Arab as well as world practice. Arbitration should not be considered as court sitting in judgment at distance. Arbitrator or arbitrators should be given broad terms reference, should have complete freedom to travel in disputed area, should talk directly (not through anyone) with whomever wishes, using experts and interpreters, verifying all facts, studying all documentation and historic precedents and claims, and should seek and find lasting settlement based on first-hand knowledge. Person or persons chosen should include expert Arabist but should not include United States citizens; and arbitration more likely succeed if neither British nor Arab citizens chosen.

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[1] Drafted by Sturgill and cleared by NEA and BNA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed, but see the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] Document 1487.

[4] The text of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Muscat, Sept. 21, 1833, is in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: Volume I, 1535–1914* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 108–109.

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Reaction Saudi Ambassador during talk with Bruce noncommittal. However, in immediately following talk with Hart, Ambassador expressed concern regarding transmittal United States position to King because of King's strong objections to arbitration Buraimi dispute and because King would interpret United States refusal to participate on plebiscite commission as United States unwillingness to help Saudi Arabia.

. . . . . .

For your information, Department concerned to learn just recently that in talk with Faisal in New York in late November Eden spoke rather freely giving strong indication United States had agreed support arbitration. British have not volunteered any information on this meeting.

ACHESON

No. 1502

780.022/1-2053: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 22, 1953—6:57 p. m.

444. Embtel 559 rptd London 42 Dhahran 204. [2] Dept agrees that approach supporting arbitration might better be combined with discussion other pending matters and that representations should be made initially at least to Crown Prince, since Yassin already aware our position. However it would appear likely that opportunity would also arise to support arbitration in subsequent talk with King.

. . . . . .

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NE and BNA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Telegram 428 to Jidda, Jan. 15, informed the Embassy a British Embassy representative in Washington had suggested that the Department of State request the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia to urge the King to accept British proposals for arbitration of the Buraimi dispute, and asked the Ambassador's view on the best way to gain the King's acceptance. (780.022/1-1553)

Telegram 559 from Jidda, Jan. 20, agreed it was desirable to support arbitration and appreciated the reservations of the Department on the manner and method of U.S. support. Ambassador Hare saw a clear differentiation between the British concept of a "common front" against the Saudis and the U.S. concept of an "honest broker" between two friends. Although the King was well aware of the U.S. position, the Ambassador was willing to add some arguments in support of arbitration even though he did not agree his action would have the effect the British hoped for. He suggested it might be better for him to go to Dhahran, rather than Riyadh, and discuss arbitration with the Crown Prince rather than the King. He also considered it advisable to combine a discussion of arbitration with other subjects pending with the Saudi Arabian Government. (780.022/1-2053)

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Dept informed today by British Embassy that persistent rumors from Buraimi indicate Turki shortly to be joined by Bin Mahdi (possibly Abdul Aziz Bin Mahdi, relatively minor figure among Saudi officialdom) or other prominent Saudi. Embassy representative added Pelham has been instructed by Foreign Office to express to SAG hope these reports unfounded and to add that such move would appear to be breach of standstill agreement and could not fail to have serious effect on already delicate situation.

British Embassy expressed hope you would, after consultation with Pelham, speak cautionary word to SAG.

In accordance with suggestion last paragraph reftel you may wish consider proceeding at early date Dhahran "ostensibly on other business" but use opportunity support arbitration with Crown Prince [3] and at same time endeavor ascertain basis if any for information provided by British Embassy. Dept would appreciate Embassy evaluation importance Bin Mahdi visit if rumor substantiated. [4]

DULLES

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[3] Telegram 585 from Jidda, Feb. 3, reported on the Ambassador's visit to Riyadh, where he had had two lengthy talks with the Crown Prince. Hare explained that the United States did not support arbitration because it was sponsored by the British but because it seemed the most logical move in a situation where previous approaches had proved unsuccessful. He informed the Department of State it was obvious the Crown Prince felt strongly on the matter and there was no indication at the end of the talks that he was more favorably disposed to arbitration than he had been before. There seemed to be no doubt in Saudi eyes that the United States appeared to be joining forces with the British, and Hare considered the situation to be one which involved a heavy drain on the U.S. reserve of good will with little favorable return. (780.022/2-353)

[4] A memorandum delivered by the British Embassy to the Department of State on Jan. 22 said there were persistent reports from Buraimi that Turki would shortly be joined by another prominent Saudi, perhaps Bin Mahdi; and the Embassy requested the Department to instruct the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia to caution the Saudi Arabian Government against such action. (641.86A/1-2253) Telegram 577 from Jidda, Jan. 28, reported the Ambassador had raised the question of the rumored appointment of Bin Mahdi to Buraimi and had received a reply from Riyadh that there was no foundation to the story. (780.022/1-2853)

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No. 1503

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "Secretary's Memoranda of Converation, January–April 1953"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula–Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1953. [1]

Subject: Call of Prince Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, on Secretary.

Participants: Prince Faisal
The Secretary
Sheikh Asad Al Faqih, Saudi Arabian Ambassador
Sheikh Ibrahim Suleiman, Prince Faisal's Chief of Cabinet
Sheikh Ali Alireza, Prince Faisal's Personal Assistant
Mr. John F. Simmons, Chief of Protocol
Mr. A. David Fritzlan, NE

Prince Faisal called on the Secretary on March 2 in order to return the call he had made on him in New York last December. [2]

After complimentary exchanges regarding the Prince's health (he recently had a checkup at the Mayo Clinic), the Secretary expressed his great satisfaction over the fact that it had been arranged for the Prince to visit the President today, and that this visit was in keeping with the great interest the United States had in the Arab World and of our desire that the spirit of cordiality between ourselves and the Arab nations be restored.

The Prince expressed appreciation of these sentiments and stated that Saudi Arabia had always been friendly toward the United States and he hoped that this friendship would grow under the new administration. He emphasized Saudi Arabia's need for United States aid and protection.

The Secretary read a proposed White House press release which, subject to the agreement of Prince Faisal and the President, would be released after his call on the President. Prince Faisal expressed complete satisfaction with it.

Prince Faisal stated that he had a number of problems under three headings to discuss with the Secretary, or his associates, as opportunity might present. These were:

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Mar. 3.

[2] For the memorandum of conversation between Prince Faisal and Secretary Acheson, Dec. 2, 1952, see Document 1493.

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1) *The Security of Saudi Arabia.* Feeling itself threatened by possible aggressive designs of its neighbors and realizing its dependence in large measure upon the United States, the Saudi Arabian Government requested assurances from the United States concerning its own security. In response to this President Truman wrote a letter on October 31, 1950, to King Ibn Saud expressing United States interest in the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. [3] It was his hope that the new administration would reassert and emphasize the sentiments expressed by President Truman.

2) *Economic and Military Aid to Saudi Arabia.* Prince Faisal complained that, despite numerous promises in the past, no action had been taken by the United States to provide economic and military aid which was needed. It was surprising that the United States should act in such a manner toward one of its best friends.

3) *Boundary Disputes with the British* (acting on the behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and the Trucial Coast Sheikhs). He said that until recently the British were regarded as good friends of Saudi Arabia, but that now their feelings were hostile. In particular, since August 1952 the British had endeavored to displace the Saudis from Buraimi concerning which there had never previously been any dispute. He felt the United States should help Saudi Arabia in this matter.

On the above-mentioned points the Secretary stated that:

1) President Truman's letter to King Ibn Saud was not familiar to him, but he would look into the matter.

2) He would also inquire into the question of economic and military aid for Saudi Arabia.

3) Although he was not entirely familiar with the border disputes with the British, he had understood that the British had proposed international arbitration as a means of resolving this matter. This procedure had been resorted to by the United States in a number of its border disputes with Mexico and Canada, and was accepted by tradition as the best means of settling such matters. He inquired concerning Prince Faisal's attitude toward this.

Prince Faisal stated that it was true that the British had proposed this procedure after the Saudis had suggested a tripartite plebiscite commission composed of US, UK, and Saudi representatives. While the Saudi Government was generally speaking prepared to accept arbitration to settle the greater part of the boundary between Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf neighbors, it could not agree to apply such procedure to Buraimi which was indisputably Saudi territory.

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The Secretary promised to study the boundary question further and to express his own opinion concerning the procedure best suited to the solution of this problem. [4]

[4] Attached to the source text was a memorandum, dated Mar. 3, from Jernegan to the Secretary, with a brief summary of the three problems Faisal had brought up at the meeting. A three-page background paper on the Buraimi border dispute was attached to the memorandum, ending with the reasons for the U.S. decision to support arbitration.

No. 1504

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, January–April 1953"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula–Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1953.

Subject: Meeting between the President and Prince Faisal.

Participants: The President
Prince Faisal
The Secretary
Sheikh Asad Al Faqih
Sheikh Ibrahim Suleiman
Sheikh Ali Alireza
Mr. John F. Simmons
Mr. A. David Fritzlan

On March 2, 1953, Prince Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister and second son of King Ibn Saud, called on the President to pay his respects and convey his father's greetings.

At the outset, the President expressed his great personal feelings of friendship for the Arab nations and his interest in their welfare, economic development, etc. He stated that he was very pleased to be able to receive Prince Faisal and asked him to be good enough to convey his warmest personal greetings to his father the King. He was interested to learn that the Prince had spent several months in the United States and had visited the Mayo Clinic. He hoped they had found him in good health.

Prince Faisal indicated that he was indeed in good health generally and hoped that the President would be preserved in good health to serve his country and the world. He stated that he had especially prolonged his stay in the United States in order to pay a call on the new President, and added that in 1948 he had determined never to revisit the United States, but that after the Novem-

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ber 1952 elections which portended a change in administration, he had consented again to head the Saudi Arabian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. He hoped that the advent of the new administration meant a change for the better in United States-Arab relations.

The President stated that it would be the policy of his administration to do everything possible to seek a restoration of the spirit of confidence and trust which had characterized our relations with the Arab nations until the last few years. He expressed the hope that the countries of the Near East would make great efforts to resolve their differences and live in peace together. He added that he and his associates would struggle to the utmost to gain a full understanding and appreciation of the Arab point of view.

The Secretary of State alluded to the press statement which had been prepared for release after Prince Faisal's visit and found that it met the President's approval. Prince Faisal expressed his concurrence, but wondered, if queried by the press, what he should say in regard to "matters of mutual interest" which the statement alluded to as having been discussed.

In reply, the President said that certainly one of the most important matters was maintaining the stability of the area and achieving a greater degree of peace and understanding between the various Near Eastern states. He mentioned as a second question the matter of the intellectual defeat of communism. He said that it was in the interest of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states to take all possible steps to counter the spread of godless materialist forces of communism. Prince Faisal indicated his full agreement with the President's remarks.

The Secretary raised the question of quoting statements made by the President in a press interview, and stated that it would be contrary to precedent for Prince Faisal to go into details. He added that the Prince might wish to take refuge in established practice in this regard.

After further expressions of good will and friendship between the President and the Prince, the President presented to His Royal Highness an autographed photograph of himself which he asked the Prince to deliver to King Ibn Saud. After a series of photographs of the President, the Secretary, Prince Faisal, and his group were taken, the meeting was terminated.

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No. 1505

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, January–April 1953"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula–Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1953. [1]

Subject: Call of Prince Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, on the Under Secretary on March 3, 1953.

Participants: Prince Faisal
The Under Secretary
Sheikh Asad Al Faqih, Saudi Arabian Ambassador
Sheikh Ibrahim Suleiman, Prince Faisal's Chief of Cabinet
Sheikh Ali Alireza, Prince Faisal's Personal Assistant
Mr. A. David Fritzlan, NE

Prince Faisal called with his entourage on General Smith on March 3 ostensibly to become better acquainted with the Under Secretary. Actually his call lasted almost two hours and various items of business were raised.

After the usual complimentary exchanges, during which General Smith recalled his meeting with Prince Faisal in North Africa during World War II, the Prince referred to his reception by the President and his call on the Secretary the previous day. He requested General Smith's permission to go into details concerning certain of the matters discussed with the Secretary. Questions covered were:

1) *President Truman's letter to King Ibn Saud of October 31, 1950.* The Prince expressed the hope that the terms of this letter would be reaffirmed and, if possible, strengthened by the new administration.

2) *Economic and Military Aid to Saudi Arabia.* Such aid had been promised Saudi Arabia but had not yet materialized. It was hard for Saudi Arabia to understand such action from such a close friend as the United States.

3) *Border Disputes with the British in the Persian Gulf Area.* Prince Faisal went into the question of King Ibn Saud's relations with the Sultanate of Muscat and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms (the latter being under British protection) at great length. He mentioned that relations between the King and the Sultan and the Sheikhs had been very friendly and no disputes on boundaries had arisen until 1935 shortly after the discovery of oil in the area. Procedures had been put into effect to resolve these boundary differ-

[1] This memorandum of conversation was prepared on Mar. 4.

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ences and undoubtedly discussions which had taken place would have made progress had the Saudi Arabians been able to deal directly with the Sheikhs rather than through the British who harbored aggressive designs in the area. In this connection, the Prince made the extraordinary statement that at various times the Sheikhs had expressed their allegiance to King Ibn Saud. A problem of a different type arose over the oasis of Buraimi, situated in the eastern part of Arabia on the borders of the territory of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The Prince stated that the inhabitants of the oasis, owing allegiance to King Ibn Saud, had requested the King to send a Governor in order to settle certain matters in the area. This was done in August 1952 and the British, allegedly acting for the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat sent forces into the area with aggressive and threatening purposes. As a result of Ambassador Hare's efforts and King Ibn Saud's goodwill a standstill agreement was reached last October between the British and the Saudis. In an effort to settle the matter fairly and amicably the King had proposed a tripartite plebiscite commission (with Saudi, UK and US representation) to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of the oasis. Without rejecting this, the British had made a counter proposal of arbitration. Such a procedure was unacceptable to King Ibn Saud, and he had rejected it because he could not even admit that the area in question was in dispute. While he might agree to abritration in other disputed areas, the Buraimi question was an entirely different one.

Prince Faisal complained that the British had on numerous occasions violated the standstill agreement by arrests and punishment of certain local sheikhs who had cooperated with King Ibn Saud's representatives, by entry of British-led troops into the area, and by low-flying plane flights designed to intimidate the inhabitants. He hoped the United States as a friend of Saudi Arabia, however, would use its influence to get the British to adhere to the standstill agreement, in order to arrest present deterioration in the situation, and to accept King Ibn Saud's proposed plebiscite commission. Unless such action were taken soon, he felt the British, who had been mustering troops in Muscat, would march on Buraimi.

General Smith raised certain questions. He wondered how the Buraimi area would be disposed of if it were separated from Saudi Arabia. Prince Faisal replied that the British contended that the area belonged to Abu Dhabi and Muscat and Oman, and reiterated that the Buraimi oasis had always been regarded as Saudi territory and had never been in dispute until last August.

General Smith inquired concerning the alleged violations of the standstill agreement and was told by Mr. Fritzlan that the Department had on record the details of this matter indicating there had been charges and counter-charges on both sides. General Smith further inquired concerning the attitude we had previously taken in this matter, and was informed it had been our hope to play the role

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of honest broker between the parties, acting as friends of both sides. We felt that we could not do this while participating in the proposed plebiscite commission and had so stated. After much consideration, we inclined to the view that a dispute of this character could most readily be settled through arbitration and our Ambassador in Jidda had supported this principle in discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government and Under Secretary Bruce early in January had done likewise in a conversation with the Saudi Arabian Ambassador. General Smith alluded to arbitration as a device frequently resorted to in the United States to settle disputes, even on a husband-wife level, and he hoped that King Ibn Saud would not take a firm position in opposition to it. He felt that the term "arbitration" should be construed in as general a manner as possible in order to get agreement between the parties on some type of procedure to be followed.

Prince Faisal stated that his father had rejected arbitration and he was certain that his position was unchangeable. He had, however, indicated he would welcome a neutral investigatory group into the Buraimi area in order to assess the rights and wrongs as regards alleged violations of the standstill agreement. The British had not responded favorably to this.

General Smith promised to study the boundary question, and in particular the Buraimi problem, very carefully and sympathetically and to consider in what manner the United States could be of greatest possible assistance to its friends. He wondered whether Prince Faisal had thought of meeting with Mr. Eden during his presence in Washington this week. Prince Faisal said he had not, but would be glad to meet with Mr. Eden should Mr. Eden so indicate. General Smith stated that an opportunity might offer during Mr. Eden's visit for him or the Secretary to go into the Buraimi question informally. He would certainly take advantage of any opportunity to explore Mr. Eden's latest thoughts on the subject.

General Smith stated that the first two items mentioned by Prince Faisal were under active consideration and would be pursued by him.

With further expressions of goodwill, during which Prince Faisal indicated his entire satisfaction with the reception he had met during his visit in the United States, he and his group departed in the expectation that the Secretary or General Smith would discuss the problems raised by him at a later date.

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No. 1506

780.022/3-1653

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1953.

Subject: Meeting with the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on March 16.

Participants: The Under Secretary
The Saudi Arabian Ambassador
A. David Fritzlan, NE

General Smith stated that he had promised Prince Faisal on March 4 to make the Department's views known on certain questions the Prince had raised. He stated he had examined the Buraimi question and it was the Department's feeling that both sides should continue to adhere strictly to the standstill agreement. The Department had recently queried the British on this subject and had been informed that they still considered the agreement binding and effective. We had stated that we naturally expected them to make every effort to observe it scrupulously. General Smith had looked into the matter of solving the Buraimi problem and felt that impartial arbitration offered the best chances of a successful outcome.

General Smith went on to say that he was very pleased to inform the Ambassador that the President had approved grant military aid for Saudi Arabia; [1] and that it was also his pleasure to state that the President, the Secretary of State, and he wished emphatically to reiterate the statements in President Truman's letter to King Ibn Saud of October 31, 1950, concerning United States interest in the territorial integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia and the fact that any threat to it would be of immediate concern to this country. General Smith concluded his remarks by saying that while the news he had to offer was not all good from the Ambassador's standpoint, he felt that on the balance it was very satisfactory.

The Ambassador expressed his gratitude for the statements of the Under Secretary concerning grant aid and President Truman's letter and said he would convey them to Prince Faisal and his Government without delay. On the question of Buraimi he said that the King would not be pleased by the attitude we had taken, but he agreed with General Smith's further remarks that there seemed to be room for negotiation between the positions taken by the Saudis

[1] See footnote 2, Document 1451.

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and the British. He felt that if some kind of an impartial body could undertake investigation and make recommendations such a procedure might lead to a settlement. The Ambassador drew the Under Secretary's attention to recent alleged violations of the standstill agreement by the British, and General Smith indicated he was aware of these charges and also charges from the other side. The Ambassador expressed some satisfaction on being told that our information indicated that the British intended to continue to observe the agreement.

The Ambassador inquired if the United States would participate on an investigative body looking into the observance of the standstill agreement and related matters, and the Under Secretary stated that if both sides desired it we might possibly do so. General Smith reiterated his hope that the two sides could agree on a procedure, whether it was arbitration or otherwise, which would contribute to a settlement. He himself believed that such disputes were more readily solved through impartial arbitration which gave full consideration to claims of both parties. He felt that such a procedure would include consultation of the wishes of the inhabitants and could thus embrace to some extent the plebiscite idea.

At the conclusion of his remarks the Ambassador stated that Prince Faisal was planning to visit Washington for several days during the week beginning March 23 and he hoped General Smith would accept an invitation to luncheon from him. The Under Secretary expressed his pleasure at the prospect and the Ambassador stated he would communicate further on the subject.

Prior to taking leave of the Under Secretary the Ambassador stated that at the last monthly meeting of the Arab representatives in Washington considerable concern had been expressed at Senator Taft's recent pro-Israel public remarks which seemed to them a repetition of the sort of thing Vice President Barkley often engaged in. They hoped that efforts would be made to restrain persons from making statements of this character which went far to counteract the prevailing belief that the United States had embarked on a new policy for the Near East. He said that his colleagues had delegated him to convey these remarks to the Under Secretary.

General Smith took note of the Ambassador's remarks.

The Ambassador departed appearing generally pleased with the conversation.

After the foregoing conversation Mr. Fritzlan informed the Ambassador that grant military assistance, referred to by General Smith, had been approved for Saudi Arabia for student training purposes.

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No. 1507

780.022/3-2753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 27, 1953—7:32 p. m.

559. Under Secretary received Prince Faisal and Saudi Ambassador March 25 [2] in order expand on United States position Buraimi dispute and grant military aid for training. During meeting General Smith stated he was speaking on behalf Secretary with whom he had discussed problems. Following points made:

A. Boundary Problems

1. After careful consideration United States Government had concluded it should not change its previous stand in favor arbitration as best machinery for settling Buraimi and other boundary problems.

2. United States Government had no desire mediate or arbitrate in such disputes.

3. Arbitration procedure might well include principle of plebiscite since investigation would undoubtedly cover present allegiance of inhabitants.

4. Regarding allegations of aggression it was made clear this charge could cut both ways.

5. Prince Faisal stated in reply that he now understood clearly United States position and inquired concerning possible steps United States might take to stop British violations standstill agreement.

6. Under Secretary stated he had raised question with Eden and British Ambassador and both had categorically assured him United Kingdom would scrupulously observe agreement.

7. Under Secretary added he was willing however renew similar representations but wished state he had received firm Saudi assurances that they too would respect agreement. Faisal gave this assurance.

B. Grant Military Aid

1. Under Secretary emphasized necessity basic military training as prerequisite to effective use modern military equipment.

2. He clarified Saudi thinking on subject of grant training assistance which was based on belief such assistance limited to training costs those students now in United States.

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by S/S and NEA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Memorandum of conversation of Mar. 25, not printed. (786A.11/3-2553)

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3. Under Secretary emphasized training program unrelated to and broader than this and pointed out its scope could be determined only after conclusion agreement on subject as required by legislation, after submission of Saudi requirements, after consultation between Saudi Defense Minister, United States Ambassador, and Grover, and after availability funds established.

4. Faisal expressed regret for earlier misunderstanding scope grant aid which had led to his expression of disappointment to Secretary.

DULLES

No. 1508

780.022/3–2953: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, March 29, 1953—11 a. m.

746. While here en route Cairo (Embassy telegram 744, March 28 [2]) Yassin went over Buraimi matter at great length. Most of what he had to say was so repetitious as not to require recording but following of interest:

(1) Situation regarding observance standstill has deteriorated to point where Saudis will be unable continue maintenance present position. Unless British change policy Saudis will have no alternative but to meet augmented British force by force regardless of consequences, or of resorting some other device such as recourse to Security Council. Prince Faisal had been instructed on March 25 to so inform American Government either personally or through Saudi Ambassador Washington.

(2) Saudis will definitely not submit Buraimi to arbitration but reply to British to that effect still being withheld pending receipt final report from Prince Faisal regarding his discussions in US.

(3) Since American Government had unfortunately seen fit "to take sides with British" in supporting arbitration, Yassin had personally been thinking of asking some other country act as third party in observing plebiscite.

(4) In reply my inquiry whether he seeing British Ambassador while here, Yassin said felt useless do so on basis past experience but would see him if he so requested. In subsequent discussion which I had regarding foregoing with British Ambassador he took somewhat similar line, saying he had indicated indirectly to acting

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[1] Repeated to London, Dhahran, and the Arab capitals.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Yassin was attending the Arab League meeting personally because he expected Secretary of State Dulles' forthcoming trip to be a principal topic of discussion. (110.11 DU/3–2853)

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head Foreign Office he would be prepared see Yassin if latter desired but that he felt would be *infra dignitatem* to ask see him. Ambassador said only point in Yassin's observations to me with which he agreed was that matters definitely could not be allowed to continue in present state and that action was required—British action.

Discussion with Yassin and Ambassador brought out nothing particularly new except that both sides apparently suffering increasingly from frayed nerves.

HARE

No. 1509

780.022/3-3154: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, March 31, 1953—8 p. m.

5371. Strang asked me to call this afternoon re Saudi Arabian boundary problem. He said Eden had intended to discuss problem with me himself, but as he is indisposed he had asked Strang to speak on his behalf. Strang reviewed in some detail HMG's efforts obtain equitable settlement of dispute and its anxiety retain traditionally friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. UK had made determined effort get solution by bilateral negotiations in London in 1951 and at Amman [*Damman*] in 1952, but Saudis never showed readiness settle on any other basis than their most extreme demands which made progressive leaps forward from time to time. British experience during negotiations prompts them to believe Saudis not interested in settlement, but eventually to extend domination over whole Arabian peninsula at expense lesser Arab rulers and HMG's position. For their part, British ready for fair compromise and showed conciliatory spirit by agreeing Saudi request restrict activities under *status quo* agreement.

Strang went on to say British suspicions confirmed by subsequent events, including Saudi incursion into Buraimi Oasis last August, which was undoubtedly attempt advance claims still further. HMG in spirit conciliation and after Ambassador Hare's intervention, had agreed stand-still arrangement which placed further restrictions on HMG's legitimate movements and activities but which also held out some hope restoring it to normal. HMG then proposed arbitration as manifestly fair way solving dispute of

[1] Repeated to Jidda.

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this nature and US supported this means. However, SAG have shown little response and while no final rejection yet received, despatch of further Saudi party to Buraimi on March 12 (Embtel 5112 March 16 [2]) convinces HMG Saudis not prepared agree arbitration.

Strang said it has become clear during last six months that Saudis have not and do not intend carry out terms their agreements with UK. Turki's activities, of which British have informed us from time to time, are clear evidence of this. Buraimi had in effect become Saudi "election headquarters" from which they have canvassed support by proper and improper means while offering United Kingdom solution by plebiscite. Such solution would be mockery.

Strang then said that after much careful thought, HMG has concluded its only course now is to reserve freedom of action in disputed area. SAG will be informed of this decision probably on April 2. [3] At same time, Churchill will address personal message to Ibn Saud which, I gathered, would explain why HMG felt compelled take this action.

Strang said HMG anxious that US Government know, on confidential basis, of contemplated action before Saudis are told. He also wanted to explain to us, for our own information only, what decision will mean in practical terms. In practice, HMG will consider their actions no longer restricted by previous interim agreements (i.e. *status quo* and standstill) with Saudi and will move levies into certain key positions in disputed areas. This action in no way effects offer of arbitration which still stands, nor is there any intention take aggressive action against Saudis. HMG will do what it can by peaceful means to make position of Saudis in Buraimi untenable, although it cannot undertake not to use force if necessary. It plans, moreover, intercept Saudi food supplies bound for Buraimi.

. . . . . .

Strang concluded by saying that he hoped US would understand and be helpful in this situation, particularly by endeavoring moderate Saudi reactions and by continuing encourage reference dispute to arbitration.

When Strang had concluded, I asked him what assessment British had made re likely Saudi reaction to these moves. Did he think they would respond with force? Strang replied he did not know. Saudis might refer dispute to SC of [*or*] GA. HMG thought it must face this risk. HMG consider its proposed action is logical and rea-

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[2] Not printed: it reported Foreign Office concern with a report from Hay that four Saudi vehicles with 38 armed men, led by a tax official, were en route to Buraimi. (780.022/3–1653)

[3] See telegram 759 from Jidda, Document 1511.

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sonable answer to conduct. He understood UN has felt in past that arbitration is fair course and that UN should not be involved in dispute. US advice to Saudis on these lines would be most valuable. In response further question as to whether HMG contemplated augmenting present military strength in area of approximately 400 levies and 12 armored cars, Strang said he did not know what plans military might have.

I leave it Department's discretion whether repeat this message Dhahran.

ALDRICH

No. 1510

780.022/4-153

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1953.

Subject: Call of Saudi Arabian Ambassador on Under Secretary.

Participants: Under Secretary
Saudi Arabian Ambassador
Assistant Secretary Byroade
Mr. Fritzlan

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador called on April 1 at his request in order to deliver a message from Prince Faisal who is about to return to his country.

The message dealt with two subjects which had been discussed between the Under Secretary and Prince Faisal on March 25. [1]

1. Buraimi.

The Prince instructed the Ambassador to inform the Under Secretary that King Ibn Saud was greatly perturbed over three new developments reflecting aggressive British intentions:

a. The intent to establish a general blockade of the Buraimi area,
b. Interference in the collection by Saudis of the *zakat* tax which has been collected for some time, and
c. The establishment of a British post ten kilometers from Buraimi and the interference in communication between Buraimi and the coast and confiscation of food supplies.

It appears that these activities are causing Ibn Saud loss of sleep with detrimental effect upon his health. It is feared that if they

[1] For a summary of the meeting, see telegram 559 to Jidda, Document 1507.

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continue he will be forced to take "desperate action" and Prince Faisal wished the Department to be aware of this possibility.

2. Grant Military Aid for Saudi Arabia.

The Ambassador expressed on behalf of Prince Faisal appreciation for the elucidations contained in the Under Secretary's *aide-mémoire* of March 26 on this subject. [2] While grateful for this new assistance the Prince, reflecting the feelings of his father, could not conceal some disappointment that the program apparently did not include training in Saudi Arabia and the provision of necessary training equipment. It was hoped that as the program developed it would embrace these two aspects. The Prince was especially grateful that the grant aid program for Saudi Arabia was a special program for the country and marked a new departure in United States relations with the Arab States.

The Under Secretary stated in reply that he was grateful for the Prince's message and would give it all possible consideration. He touched briefly on the fact that it was too early yet to estimate the extent of the grant aid program and that such could be done only after Congress had appropriated money, the necessary agreement had been concluded, and our representatives in Saudi Arabia had joined with the Saudi authorities in elaborating a training program. He added that the United States Government sought as often as possible to give Saudi Arabia preferential treatment.

[2] For the text of the *aide-mémoire*, see Document 1453.

No. 1511

780.022/4-253: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, April 2, 1953—2 p. m.

759. British Ambassador advises he delivered note and message from Churchill regarding boundary question to acting head Foreign Office this morning.

Note was along lines adumbrated by Foreign Office London [2] consisting of lengthy development of subject and concluding with statement of reservation of freedom of action in respect of British and Sultan of Muscat. Churchill message to King was in character-

[1] Repeated to London, Dhahran, and the Arab capitals.

[2] Presumably this reference is to telegram 5371 from London, Document 1509.

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istic robust style which opened by saying sending separate note which he realized would displease King but felt could speak frankly to King as old companion in arms and hoped that any adverse effect on traditional friendship would only be temporary. British had responsibilities vis-à-vis sheikhdoms which must be discharged and could not abandon weak when faced by strong. He felt King would understand this point of view. Situation was that British were doing what they thought was right and King was doubtless doing likewise. So far neither had been able to convince the other but it should not be beyond scope of statesmanship to find just solution.

Ambassador said acting head Foreign Office asked what "reserving freedom of action" meant. Ambassador said he could not elaborate but thought meaning clear. Acting head Foreign Office then asked if this should be considered declaration of war. Ambassador said constituted nothing of the kind and he resented any such implication by acting head Foreign Office.

Would appreciate Embassy London's sending if available copy of Churchill's letter which British Ambassador tells me is not being released together with note but being kept confidential.

HARE

No. 1512

780.022/4-153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1953—4:06 p. m.

565. Dhahran for Ambassador. In view implications latest British action Buraimi Department giving consideration to likelihood Saudi representations regarding Truman letter October 31, 1950. [2] Current thinking in Department as follows:

Despatch Saudi force Buraimi August 1952 indicative expanding Saudi ambitions which in past have periodically come to fore in Arabian Peninsula. Truman letter was intended provide Ibn Saud some measure assurance against external threat his security and not to serve as cloak for Saudi expeditions into disputed territories on periphery his domain. However applicability Truman letter to Buraimi will depend upon circumstances as developed in this dis-

[1] Drafted by Fritzlan, and cleared by BNA and NE. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] For text of this letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1190.

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puted area. We feel most strongly that if Saudis intend rely upon us for advice and assistance in security matters they must take us into their counsels before embarking upon campaigns in disputed territories. Had they asked our advice before going into Buraimi we most certainly would have counselled against such action.

We believe it important to emphasize to Saudis disputed character Buraimi which Saudis have not occupied since 1869. Our own independent research indicates claims to area on part Abu Dhabi and Muscat and Saudis themselves have tacitly admitted that dispute existed by (a) agreeing in note of February 7, 1951, to British Embassy Jidda that investigations of frontiers by proposed mixed committee should include Buraimi area and (b) agreeing in standstill agreement that activities be avoided "prejudicial to final decision on sovereignty of area."

We have supported arbitration because we believed it procedure best adapted to making full and impartial investigation of area and sorting out and evaluating claims of all parties on equitable basis. In view Saudi occupation and activities in Buraimi we have taken view plebiscite not fair procedure and we declined participate in proposed plebiscite commission. We do not intend become associated with Saudi practice sending governors into disputed areas on basis alleged popular demand and having their position established by plebiscite which would undoubtedly be contested. Department strongly hopes Saudis will not make outright rejection of pending British arbitration proposal but will at least consider making alternative suggestions other than plebiscite (London telegram 5376 to Dept [3]).

You are authorized as opportunity may arise utilize foregoing material in discussions with Saudi authorities.[4]

DULLES

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[3] Dated Apr. 1, not printed. It reported that on Apr. 2 the Foreign Office would publish a note to be delivered to the Saudi Arabians, and Eden would make an explanatory statement in the House of Commons at the same time. The Foreign Office told the Embassy it would not agree to a plebiscite, but would consider, in addition to arbitration, any other reasonable and equitable means of settling the dispute. (780.022/4–153)

[4] In telegram 773 from Jidda, Apr. 7, Hare reported in part: "During my overnight visit Riyadh April 3–4 to present Eric Johnston [Buraimi] matter was not mentioned by King or other officials but Crown Prince communicated with me indirectly through his private secretary and Mohammed Effendi, Embassy Arab consultant, seeking my views. I replied through same channel that difficult comment specifically on recent British action but regarded it significant that British holding arbitration door open and we still felt arbitration which would include *inter alia* appropriate provision for ascertaining desires of people concerned, offered fair and practical solution. However, if Saudis had any other constructive ideas they would doubtless be welcomed. I added that, regarding President's letter October 31, 1950 it was intended apply in case clear threat to security, whereas present difficul-

Continued

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No. 1513

780.022/4-353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula–Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 3, 1953.

Subject: Saudi Arabian Boundary Disputes

Participants: Mr. John E. Jernegan, NEA
Mr. James Terry Duce, Aramco
Mr. Philip Kidd, Aramco
Mr. Richard Young, Legal Consultant to SAG
Mr. Stephen P. Dorsey, NE
Mr. A. David Fritzlan, NE

Mr. Duce opened the conversation by stating that at the request of King Ibn Saud Mr. Ohliger had gone to Riyadh to confer on Buraimi. The Saudis had asked for Aramco assistance in bringing into the country a number of United States newspaper men who could effectively present the Saudi case on Buraimi in the United States press. It was felt such action was necessary in view of the mounting British "propaganda and misrepresentations." Aramco did not think this a good idea but had suggested that the Saudis obtain the services of a competent publicity agent. Before submitting names, Aramco wanted to clear the matter with the State Department.

Mr. Jernegan stated that while the Department hoped anything which might blow up the dispute would be avoided, it could not object to such a proposal which might be in the interest of the Saudi Government. Similar action, Mr. Jernegan noted, had been taken by a number of other Near Eastern Governments.

The discussion then centered around the recent history of the Buraimi dispute, and Mr. Young indicated that he was returning to Riyadh in the near future in order to be of service to the King in a legal capacity. He recalled the highly emotional view taken by the King of Buraimi, ... He stated flatly that Aramco had no present intentions to seek oil in Buraimi, or any other disputed area, and that the company had informed King Ibn Saud that if at any time it would alleviate his boundary problems the company would renounce its concessionary rights in disputed territories. He

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ty had arisen out of unclear situation involving conflicting claims. In circumstances, wished advise most strongly that Saudis not assume or assert application presidential letter in respect Buraimi. Subsequently, reply was received from Crown Prince expressing general disappointment with attitude of American Government in this matter but saying reserving decision regarding British move until our reaction ascertained. Added that, in light my observations, would not now raise matter presidential letter." (780.022/4-753)

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wondered if the British would change their attitude on Buraimi if they were satisfied oil was not in the picture. Mr. Jernegan doubted this, saying that he thought the British would act as they have purely out of their own prestige considerations. Mr. Duce mentioned that he is planning soon to go to London to talk with American and British oil representatives. He did not disclose the exact purpose of the talks but indicated that IPC and probably the Foreign Office were interested.

Mr. Jernegan related in a general way our attitude on Buraimi and the support we had given in recent talks with Prince Faisal to the principle of arbitration. We had told the Saudis that we would not participate in a plebiscite commission. There are a number of reasons why we did not consider a plebiscite fair, the principal reason being that the Saudis have been in occupation of the disputed area for some months and have engaged in a good deal of political and proselytizing activity.

Mr. Duce felt that the situation in Buraimi was deteriorating and would continue to do so as the result of the recent British action. He and Mr. Young thought the matter might well be referred by the Saudis to the Security Council, although in the past Mr. Young had counseled against such action since neither side would probably get more than partial satisfaction of its demands. He thought the Saudis were now in a mood to take such drastic action and he thought it might be embarassing to us. Mr. Jernegan said he hoped such action might be avoided in view of the difficult position we would be put in. He thought, however, that if the matter were taken up in the United Nations a decision might be reached to establish a United Nations Commission to settle the whole of the disputed boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula. He personally thought this idea had a certain degree of merit, but recognized the possible drawbacks arising from the relatively low prestige of the United Nations in the Near East.

Mr. Duce expanded on the idea that the Saudis consider it their legitimate right to work for the unification of the whole Arabian Peninsula, excepting the Yemen. He excluded the Yemem because of religious differences. Mr. Fritzlan pointed out the fact that the Ibadhi sect of Oman had also traditionally been at odds with the Wahabi and all foreign influence, and would doubtless resist a compaign of unification.

Mr. Duce suggested that the United States continue to use its good offices for settlement of the Buraimi problem. He wondered if we would be willing to serve on an arbitration commission and thought that King Ibn Saud might conceivably agree to arbitration if the United States member presided over the body. Mr. Jernegan said we would be most reluctant to assume this role, and Mr. Duce

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replied that we might have to face taking a stand in the Security Council or acting on an arbitration body. Mr. Jernegan was inclined to accept the former if faced with a choice.

Mr. Young made a further plea for understanding the view of King Ibn Saud, which was based on highly emotional attachment to Buraimi. Mr. Fritzlan inquired why King Ibn Saud's attachment to Buraimi had become so highly emotional only in the last few months, in view of the fact that his family had not occupied or controlled the place since 1869. Mr. Young replied, jokingly, that Mr. Fritzlan had been reading British propaganda, but the latter stated that his statement was based on the scholarly work on Oman produced under the supervision of George Rentz (Aramco official).

In departing Messrs. Duce and Young stated they would confer with Department officials upon their return from London and Riyadh.

No. 1514

786A.022/4-2053

Memorandum of Conversations, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer) [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 16, 1953.

Subject: Boundaries between Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms

Participants: Mr. Terry Duce, Vice President, Aramco
Mr. Archibald Ross, Head, Eastern Department, Foreign Office
Mr. Paul Anderson—Jersey Director of IPC
Mr. A. Stebinger—Socony Director of IPC
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, First Secretary, American Embassy

Mr. Paul Anderson arranged a luncheon on April 16, at which the above-mentioned guests were present, for the purpose of enabling Mr. Terry Duce to reassure the British Foreign Office of Aramco's position in the Persian Gulf boundary dispute.

Mr. Duce introduced this phase of the conversation by stating that he would like to make clear to the British the position in which Aramco found itself. He said that Aramco had no particular interest in the disputed areas. The undisputed portions of its concession were already sufficiently large to provide for its require-

[1] This memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 4998, Apr. 20. (786A.022/4-2053)

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ments. . . . He particularly wanted to make it clear that Aramco was doing nothing whatsoever to stimulate the present difficulties. On the other hand, he felt it necessary to point out that the concessionary relationship between Aramco and the Saudi Government was such that, in the protection of Aramco's own interest, it could not in certain matters do otherwise than accede to Saudi wishes. This, for example, had been the case with respect to the markers which Aramco had erected on behalf of the Saudi Government on the disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. A further example was the retention of Mr. Manley Hudson; although Aramco had obtained Mr. Hudson's services for the Saudi Government, in response to a request by that Government, and although the Company paid his salary, it had no influence over him and was not responsible in any way for the advice which he gave the Saudi Government.

Mr. Duce went on to emphasize the need for an early solution to the border problem. He said quite frankly that he felt the Saudis . . . would continue to endeavor to exert and extend their authority in disputed territories. He was under the impression that the Saudis had no ambitions with respect to the Yemen, Aden Protectorate or much of Muscat, although there were areas in Dhofar, for example, where Saudi claims came very close to the sea. With these exceptions, however, he thought the Saudis hoped to extend their influence over the rest of the peninsula, although the King would probably be willing to leave considerable authority to the Sheikhs.

Mr. Duce thought the whole situation would continue to be fraught with danger until some means were found of settling the dispute. Meanwhile, petroleum exploration, etc. was being held up. The need for proper delineation of boundaries applied not only to the land areas, but to the territorial waters and the seabed as well. For example, Aramco had made a promising strike of off-shore oil south of the Kuwait Neutral Zone and one well had recently been drilled almost nine miles from the shore. The area currently being exploited is well within Saudi territorial waters, but it is possible that the field extends considerably north. The extent to which Aramco can move in this direction is dependent upon the delineation of the territorial waters at the southern boundary of the Kuwait Neutral Zone.

Mr. Duce recalled a conversation which he had had with Mr. Dennis Greenhill when the latter was assigned to the British Embassy in Washington. . . . He asked Mr. Ross whether he had any suggestions or any ideas as to how Aramco could be helpful with respect to this entire problem.

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Mr. Ross said that he greatly appreciated Mr. Duce's explanation of Aramco's difficulties and good intentions which he, of course, accepted from Mr. Duce. . . . He suggested the Saudis intended to reduce the Sheikh's domains to the coastal towns and emphasized that HMG could not abandon its responsibility towards the Rulers merely because they were weaker than the Saudis. HMG had made a very reasonable offer to submit this problem to arbitration. If the Saudis sincerely wanted a solution to the problem, this represented a fair way out of the difficulty. As for the question of what Aramco could do to help, Mr. Ross expressed the strong hope that the Company could use its influence on the Saudi Arabian Government to persuade it to accept arbitration. Arbitration might include some arrangement for some form of plebiscite, but HMG could not agree to the Saudi suggestion that the problem should be determined solely by a plebiscite which would be a mockery in the light of Turki's activities.

Mr. Anderson and Mr. Stebinger, both speaking as representatives of the American partners in IPC, emphasized their hope that an early solution could be found. . . .

Mr. Palmer asked whether Mr. Duce had any personal thoughts as to what might be done to facilitate a solution of this dispute. Mr. Duce replied that as a purely personal idea, he had given considerable thought to the possibility of a federation arrangement between Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms. He did not elaborate this thought, but gave the impression that he had in mind a federation in which the British would continue to exercise certain rights and privileges within the Sheikhdoms. He agreed with Mr. Palmer's observation that so far as Saudi intentions were concerned, the situation seemed to have close analogies with the unification of Italy in the last century; what seemed to be uncertain was the number of "San Marinos" which the Saudis were willing to concede.

In a subsequent conversation between Mr. Duce and Mr. Palmer, Mr. Duce expressed the opinion that the British should make some large and unique gesture in order to solve their problems with Saudi Arabia. . . .

Mr. Palmer explained at some length the British problem as seen from here. He thought there were three major reasons for the British attitude towards this problem: (1) The desire to retain controls of these sources of sterling oil; (2) a genuine feeling of responsibility towards the interests of the Sheikhs; and (3), and probably most important, prestige considerations. He pointed out that there is widespread concern in this country, particularly among the Conservatives, about the loss of British prestige as a result of events in Iran and Egypt. The Conservatives had come to power partly on a policy of criticism of the "scuttle" from Abadan. Now the Sudan

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agreement was being interpreted in some quarters as another "scuttle". As unfair as these characterizations might be, they were symptomatic of a frame of mind. Under these circmstances, he was extremely doubtful that the present government, in any event, would, in the foreseeable future, be willing or even find it possible to make large-scale concessions to the Saudis in the Persian Gulf.

No. 1515

780.022/4-153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1953—5:17 p. m.

595. Saudi Arabian Ambassador called on Byroade April 17 under instructions his Government (Embtel 794 [2]). Following subjects discussed:

1. Secretary's Near Eastern Tour [3]

Ambassador made strong plea for Secretary remain Riyadh at least until two p. m. May 19 thus making possible official luncheon his honor which Crown Prince might offer. Byroade stated Department will carefully consider this suggestion and if schedule as whole permits will try arrange accordingly.

2. Buraimi Problem

Ambassador expressed his Government's growing concern British blockade activities Buraimi which causing severe hardship to inhabitants. He stated such activities in contravention traditional right inhabitants of peninsula travel and trade where they pleased regardless of political boundaries. He indicated King very upset and that relaxation British activities would improve atmosphere for talks between King and British Ambassador.

Byroade expressed Department's great satisfaction over recent exchange cordial messages between Churchill and King and said we hoped nothing would be done prejudice success these talks. He stated we had said this to British and we felt same applied to Saudis. He referred in this connection to report received from

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NE. Repeated to Damascus, London, and Dhahran.

[2] Dated Apr. 14, not printed. It reported the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had been instructed to seek U.S. views on developments in Buraimi. (780.022/4-1453)

[3] For documentation on the trip of Secretary of State Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Stassen to the Near and Middle East in May 1953, see Documents 1 ff.

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Saudi Embassy regarding British interference with Saudi vehicle which recently left Buraimi for Ibri a point within Oman territory. Ambassador replied vehicle concerned was non-military and such travel customary, on other hand British activities involved movement military vehicles.

Byroade stated Department had given much thought to Buraimi and it was convinced that area was indeed disputed territory. He hoped both sides could reach agreement on steps to be taken to resolve dispute.

Ambassador speaking personally said he felt it would be most useful if both sides could agree establishment some type of investigative body which could enter area and investigate breaches of standstill agreement. If members such group succeeded in gaining complete confidence of King it was very likely he would ultimately agree their recommendations for procedures to resolve dispute. Byroade felt this approach had considerable merit and to be worth consideration.

3. B–25 or B–26 Aircraft for Saudi Arabia

Ambassador stated his Government unhappy because United States not supplying certain B–26 planes which had been "promised". He was informed no such commitments had been made; that question of B–25 or B–26 planes for Saudi Arabia under consideration by Defense Department and General Grover; that aircraft these categories exceedingly scarce and that in absence of trained pilots Saudis would be well advised not acquire them. Ambassador suggested however Department consider making at least one or two such planes available as demonstration pieces.

Please use foregoing material on Buraimi in replying to Foreign Office concerning United States attitude (Embtel 785 [4]) and at same time reiterate our belief in arbitration.

Damascus should be guided (Damascus telegram 650 [5]) by Embassy Jidda's recommendations in replying Amir Saud.

Department would appreciate receiving more precise information on "British military operations" in Buraimi area for possible use in future approaches to British. Department attracted by Embassy Jidda's suggestion (Embtel 785) that mutual withdrawal be proposed, presumably as second step after parties have agreed on procedure which would doubtless include provisions regarding relax-

[4] Dated Apr. 13, not printed. It reported on a briefing given to an Embassy official by the acting head of the Foreign Office. (780.022/4–1253)

[5] Dated Apr. 20, not printed. It told of a visit from the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince, who was on an official visit to Syria. He was leaving Syria on Apr. 23 and asked that further information on the U.S. position on Buraimi be given to him before he left. (780.022/4–1953)

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ation blockade. Does Embassy Jidda believe such withdrawal could be arranged without loss of Saudi prestige?

DULLES

No. 1516

Editorial Note

A letter from King Ibn Saud to President Eisenhower, dated May 19, was delivered to the President by the Secretary of State, after he returned from the Middle East on May 29. The letter said the King regarded Dulles' visit as a clear sign of the mutual friendship between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and he sent wishes for the President's happiness.

A memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, dated June 2, asked the Secretary's thoughts on a draft letter to the King. The draft letter was a personal greeting to the King. It also gave him the President's personal assurance that "several matters which have been a source of concern" to him would be taken care of as soon as possible. A memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, dated June 8, informed the President that the Secretary considered the serious charges of King Saud to the effect that the United States had not lived up to its obligations in supporting Saudi Arabia over the matter of Buraimi required a different approach from the one in the draft letter.

A letter to King Saud was prepared in the Department of State and a draft was transmitted in telegram 671, June 8, to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, urgently requesting the Ambassador to comment on it. Telegram 913 from Jidda, June 10, informed the Department that the Ambassador considered the basic concept of the letter sound, and suggested some changes in the wording.

A memorandum from Byroade to Dulles, dated June 11, informed him that the proposed message from the President to King Ibn Saud had been revised in light of Ambassador Hare's comments. A memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, dated June 12, recommended that the President sign the revised letter prepared in the Department of State. The above documents, none printed, are in Department of State file 611.86A.

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No. 1517

786A.11/6-1553

President Eisenhower to King Ibn Saud [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 15, 1953.

YOUR MAJESTY: I was very pleased to receive your cordial letter of May nineteenth [2] delivered by Mr. John Foster Dulles upon his return to this country. Mr. Dulles has reported to me on his visit to you, and I am glad that he had the opportunity for an exchange of views on the relations between our two countries.

Your Majesty has justifiably established a reputation for being a loyal friend in times of adversity as well as in days of happiness and well being. Our countries have stood together in time of war and we are now making common cause against the evil and godless forces of communism which threaten the world. I have looked upon our friendship as one solidly based upon mutual confidence and respect, and almost immediately upon taking office I had the good fortune to receive a visit from your son, His Royal Highness Prince Faisal. I took advantage of his courteous call to express publicly my determination that the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries should be improved and that I would strive toward that improvement. Furthermore, I confirmed the assurances made to Your Majesty by President Truman in his letter of October 31, 1950, [3] and you may be certain that the United States Government will continue to act in accordance with these assurances.

I was therefore greatly concerned to learn from Mr. Dulles that Your Majesty felt the United States Government had not adequately supported Saudi Arabia during the recent difficulties with the British Government over the matter of Buraimi. [4] I have in mind your statement to Mr. Dulles that, if Saudi Arabia and the United States are good friends, as they most certainly are, each should tell the other when he believes him to be wrong and each should support the other when he believes him to be right. I concur fully in this view.

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[1] The source text was attached to a June 12 memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, not printed; see the editorial note, *supra*. Telegram 681 to Jidda, June 18, not printed, transmitted a copy of the letter to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia for delivery to the King. (611.86A/6-1053)

[2] Not printed, but see the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] For the text of the letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1190.

[4] In telegram 231 from Dhahran, May 19, not printed. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156)

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Upon assuming office, it became my duty and that of the Secretary of State to review the whole Buraimi matter before formulating our policy. This was done with great care, and our independent research into the matter led us to the conviction that there were three honestly held claims to the Buraimi area: the claim of Your Majesty and those of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. Having in mind the fact that border disputes have been traditionally settled by arbitration in cases where the United States has been involved with its neighbors, my Government adopted the view that the Buraimi problem might properly be settled through impartial arbitration which would, of course, include all relevant fact-finding and investigation on the spot. This procedure was supported in complete good faith and in the firm belief that it would be acceptable to Your Majesty as an honorable and equitable method of solution. While making known to the Saudi Arabian Government our views on this matter, we have not failed to impress upon the British Government our strong feelings that a conciliatory and fair-minded approach is of paramount importance.

It is therefore gratifying for me to know that Your Majesty has agreed in principle with the British Government for settlement of the Buraimi issue through impartial arbitration and that you and Sir Winston Churchill are close to agreement on the terms of reference for the arbitral body.

I feel confident that, upon careful review of the facts, Your Majesty will conclude that the United States has not failed in its duties as a true friend of Saudi Arabia.

I am grateful that Your Majesty spoke frankly with Mr. Dulles concerning our relations and means whereby they may be strengthened. I am sure Your Majesty will likewise desire that I express my own views to you in the same spirit of frankness. You and I are both old soldiers, and I believe that we shall understand each other fully. Our personal relationship should be a close one so that when something troubles one of us he will write fully to the other in the knowledge that there can never be a problem between us which cannot be solved by prompt and friendly consultation.

I pray God that He may have Your Majesty in His safekeeping, and that you may be preserved many years for the welfare and happiness of your country.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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No. 1518

S/P-NSC files, lot 61 D 167, NE (NSC 155)

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Planning Board (Cutler) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 24, 1953.

Subject: Buraimi Dispute: Developments Since June 1.

The Saudi Arabian Government, having agreed to British proposals that this border dispute be submitted to impartial arbitration, has for some weeks past been negotiating with the British on the local situation in Buraimi and certain procedure matters. At the present time, the Saudis have a governor and about 40 armed men in the area and the British approximately 250 Trucial levies supported by a number of RAF armored vehicles and several jet fighters. Since April British forces have been used to restrict the movement of Turki and his men and certain supplies in this disputed area.

Following instructions from the Secretary, our Ambassador in London raised the Buraimi matter with Mr. Churchill on May 22 [2] in accordance with instructions that the British be urged to moderate their position on remaining points of disagreement and to meet the Saudis half way.

In the meantime, the British replied to King Ibn Saud regarding the principal unsolved point at issue, viz., the relative local position of the two parties in the area. The British proposed mutual withdrawal and immediate implementation of arbitration. On June 12 the Department expressed the view that this proposal appeared reasonable as a means of establishing equality and authorized our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia to express this view if approached by the Saudis concerning it. [3]

The Saudis rejected this proposal claiming that such withdrawal would jeopardize Saudi prestige and create a vacuum producing confusion and disorder. Their counterproposals included the following principal points:

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Fritzlan.

[2] Ambassador Aldrich reported on the meeting in telegram 6236 from London, May 22. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156)

[3] On June 11 a member of the British Embassy delivered to the Department of State a copy of a letter from Churchill to King Ibn Saud, delivered by Pelham on June 7, proposing mutual withdrawal. (780.022/6–1153) Telegram 674 to Jidda, June 12, transmitted the text of Churchill's letter and advised the Embassy that the Department considered the proposal reasonable, and authorized the Embassy to so inform the Saudis. (780.022/6–1253)

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1. The British should raise the "blockade" and restore to Turki and his men freedom of movement for themselves and their supplies.

2. Agreement by both sides that their forces in the area should be equal in number at the time the arbitration body assumes its duties.

3. All provocative actions, for example, low jet flights, should cease immediately and the arbitration body should be given authority to pass on the validity of alleged provocation or violations of agreement.

In a telegram of June 19 (copy attached) [4] to London and Jidda the Department stated that the second and third points seemed reasonable and while we understood British concern lest the Saudi governor resumed his suborning activities, we were inclined to believe that some compromise on the first point was possible.

A telegram received from London June 24 (copy attached) [5] indicates the preliminary view of the Foreign Office is unfavorable to several of the proposals, but that the matter is under study and further proposals will probably be made. The Embassy representative presented arguments in favor of taking action along the lines of the Saudi proposals.

[4] This reference is to telegram 686 to Jidda, June 19, not attached to the source text. (780.022/6–1653)

[5] This reference is to telegram 6747 from London, June 23, not attached to the source text. (780.022/6–2353)

No. 1519

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "King Saud/Eisenhower"

King Ibn Saud to President Eisenhower [1]

SECRET RIYADH, June 28, 1953.

I have received Your Excellency's communication dated June 15, 1953 [2] which was delivered to me by the American Ambassador, Mr. Raymond Hare. I am grateful for your interest and appreciate your sentiments and assurances. While I was preparing the reply to Your Excellency, I received this morning from my Amir in Bur-

[1] This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 249 from Dhahran, June 29. It was transmitted to the President on June 30, together with a memorandum by the Secretary of State, dated June 30, not printed. The Secretary's memorandum stated that the Department had asked the British Embassy and the Consul General in Dhahran for further information, and the Secretary would consult with the President when the information was received. (Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "Memorandum for the President, June–December 1953")

[2] Document 1517.

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aimi a report that on Saturday morning, June 27, 1953, seven British armored cars, accompanied by British bombers, attacked a station of the Beni Kab Tribe, who are our subjects. The planes bombed the people's homes with women and children inside the houses. The armored cars fired their machine guns, and this armed aggression continued for seven hours, during which a number of people were killed.

Afterwards, the commander of the British Forces sent to the chief of the tribe a warning that, if there was not a complete surrender in fifteen hours, the commander would burn all the houses with their people.

A series of British aggressive acts against our subjects have been made in that area. The United States has been informed of these through our Ambassador in Washington and through the American Ambassador in Jidda. One of the most horrible of the recent British acts of aggression was when they detained certain numbers of the people in the burning sun without water, humiliating them for committing no crime except having called on our Amir.

Such abominable crimes are committed by the British authorities at the time when they have agreed to solve the dispute through arbitration in accordance with the recommendation of the US Government, and after an agreement in principle for such arbitration had already been reached with the British Government. All that I ask is that we and Britain be on an equal footing in the disputed area until after the conclusion of the arbitration. But the only reply made by Mr. Churchill to my request for the establishment of such equality was nothing more than another series of aggressive actions by the British authorities, the last of which was this savage attack against our subjects. The only suggestion made by Sir Winston Churchill to reach equality was a proposal to withdraw our Amir in Buraimi with his employees who are all civilians and do not exceed forty.

Since all my peaceful efforts with the British Government have resulted in nothing more than these aggressive acts and, depending upon the assurances embodied in your letter and your adhering to your undertakings, I ask Your Excellency to mediate in order to stop this aggression by any way which you believe would be effective in preventing it. I am certain that Your Excellency, in your capacity as President of the United States, will not fail to find an effective means to fulfill your undertakings and to solve this problem peacefully.

With my regards to Your Excellency,[3]

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[3] No signature on the source text.

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No. 1520

780.022/6–2953: Telegram

The Consul General at Dhahran (Bishop) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT DHAHRAN, June 29, 1953—8 a. m.

250. From Hare at Riyadh. Arrived Riyadh yesterday and was received by King in afternoon. Presented President's letter. [2] Deputy Foreign Minister Yassin subsequently told me message very well received by King. Yassin commented especially on understanding approach and language of message and said appropriate reply would be prepared subsequently for transmission President.

This morning when we met discuss draft grant aid agreement we were handed text urgent message from King to President regarding reported British attack on village of Beni Kab Tribe (whose allegiance Saudis claim) which transmitted ConGentel 249. [3] Following is additional information regarding attack elicited by questioning Deputy Foreign Minister:

(1) Incident occurred on June 27 in Nuweiji village which Yassin was unable to locate exactly but said somewhere on track between Sharja and Buraimi. Eight persons killed as result attack.
(2) According Saudi officials, there was no Saudi provocation for attack or any warning such attack was forthcoming.
(3) Source of report was Shaikh of tribe; message transmitted by Turki.
(4) Saudis had not yet protested to British but intended doing so immediately and informing British their approach to President.

General Grover has received first-hand reports British are building up troop complement Sharja and have recently moved planes that station.

This is, of course, a report from one side only but it is most specific with respect nature alleged attack, which, if substantiated, marks new departure from past pattern in that previous air operations were confined to demonstrations only. Consequently it does not appear to be merely one more incident since it changes basic situation. We, therefore, recommend that it be taken up urgently with British, particularly since it is type operation which, judging by past experience, might well serve exacerbate situation beyond point susceptible harmonious settlement. Moreover, it has bearing on passage in President's letter that developments progressing to

[1] Repeated to London and Jidda.
[2] Document 1517.
[3] *Supra.*

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point where there is strong hope for reasonable solution Buraimi issue, and it could serve to initiate calming effect which letter was intended to have, and did have, prior receipt this report.

BISHOP

No. 1521

780.022/6–3053: Telegram

The Consul General at Dhahran (Bishop) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT DHAHRAN, June 30, 1953—10 p. m.

254. Re Deptel 272 repeated information Jidda 697, London 8253. [2] Have just returned from Bahrein where I saw LeQuesne, [3] First Secretary, Political Residency, who gave me following British version incident near Buraimi: Hay, who returned this morning from Kuwait, confirmed LeQuesne's remarks.

About nine months ago Shaikh Obaid Bin Jume of Beni Kab Tribe went to Turki and professed allegiance Saudi Arabia. He may also have gone Riyadh. At same time other leaders Beni Kab Tribe particularly Shaikh's nephew, Abdulla Bin Salim, resented Obaid's profession allegiance Saudi Arabia and went to British political agent at Sharja requesting protection. UK considers Beni Kab to be subjects of Sultan and territory where they lived to belong to Muscat. They informed Salim that he should obtain assistance from Sultan who later asked British provide protection for his "subjects". British, from time to time, subsequently sent Levies into Salim's village of Shirm at Sultan's request.

After "blockade" of Turki, all was quiet around Buraimi until about six weeks ago when Turki again became active and is believed to have instigated Obaid. On May 30 Obaid established "check point" at Mahadha and seized truck going to Buraimi. He announced at that time that all future supplies for [garble] Bin Sultan (who has remained loyal to Sultan of Muscat throughout dispute) and for Zaid Vin Khalifa (brother of ruler of Abu Dhabi and local governor at Buraimi) would be confiscated in reprisal for blockade of Amir Turki. About two and a half weeks ago vehicle belonging to Adenese Levies was shot at about dusk near this

[1] Repeated to Jidda and London.

[2] Dated June 29, not printed. It requested the Consul General to approach the British authorities in Bahrain regarding the report contained in telegram 250, *supra*, and telegram 249, which transmitted the letter of King Saud of June 28, Document 1519.

[3] Charles Martin LeQuesne, British First Secretary and Consul at Bahrain.

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check point. Arabs responsible apologized and said that mistake had been made. Few days later second vehicle was shot at and tire punctured. British believe that Obaid was paid large sum of money by Turki about June 20. On Friday, June 26, Buckmaster from British political agency at Sharja and British officer commanding Levies while returning from Buraimi to Sharja, were fired on (about ten shots) from hills behind check point and when they reached Mahadha they were told that they could proceed only at their own peril. As result they returned to Buraimi and reported to political agent at Sharja.

Meanwhile, Shaikh's nephew, Abdulla Bin Salim, again appealed to British for protection because he felt attack was imminent. On Saturday, June 27, British moved 60 or 70 Levies in jeeps and trucks to Shirm. Upon arrival they were fired on from neighboring village of Nuwai. They returned fire and killed some three tribesmen. There is no definite report how long fighting went on. Eventually, head man Ali Bin Ahmed of Nuwai village came over and asked for peace which was granted. There were no armored cars involved and no bombers. While the fighting between village of Nuwai and Shirm was going on British political agent at Sharja, who had been investigating report from Buckmaster, flew over Shirm and Nuwai in unarmed RAF Anson transport. Plane was fired on but was not hit.

On Saturday, June 27, ultimatum was given by Buckmaster to Obaid to effect that if latter did not give undertaking to remove check point within 24 hours British would take whatever steps they considered necessary and would themselves remove check point. Obaid rejected ultimatum and reinforced check point to 100 men. After expiration of time given, British on Monday morning, June 29, removed check point by force. Total number of casualties known to the British for both actions were three killed, four wounded. So far as British know none were killed at Mahadha during removal of check point and only four were wounded there. There were three known killed during fighting between two villages. All of these places located not far from Buraimi at edge of mountains on road between Buraimi and Sharja. According to report which came Residency while I was there Ali Bin Ahmed and Abdulla Bin Salim are now reported to have sworn mutual defense pact and together have guaranteed to keep road open.

In discussing this with me Hay emphasized that according to his reports Obaid had been obstructing road to Buraimi and had thus forced British to take action open road and remove forces stopping traffic.

With regard to alleged detention of certain numbers of people in burning sun, I was informed that so far as British here are now

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aware no one was detained out of doors but a group of 30 or 40 people coming from south of Buraimi were prohibited from entering Hamasa and visiting Amir Turki. This in keeping with blockade. They do allow people who live in village to go out and buy food but they are not allowing anyone visit Turki. British political agent at Sharja has, however, been requested comment on charge that Arabs were "detained in the sun". Saudis have protested incident to British Government and reply will be made as soon as political agent reports.

BISHOP

No. 1522

780.022/7-253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Dhahran [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1953—1:37 p. m.

2. For Ambassador at Riyadh. British Embassy July 2 gave Department summary of statement [2] regarding Nuwai incident which substantially agrees with report contained Consulate General's telegram 254. It was recalled by Embassy representative that Obaid bin Juma had previously caused trouble on Buraimi-Sharjah road by attempting take British control point on behalf of Saudis. Chronology of events as provided Department follows:

1. June 23 Obaid set up post near Mahadha and opened fire on Trucial Levy patrol proceeding El Ain. Fire not returned.
2. June 26 Obaid interfered further with movement on road and Buckmaster and Trucial Levy officer turned back after 10 shots fired at them. Obaid was informed British forces would take necessary action unless he ceased interference.
3. June 27 Levies sent to Shirm and were fired at from Nuwai. Fire exchanged for about one hour during which three killed and three wounded among Obaid's men. Obaid given 24 hour ultimatum and proceeded reinforce his check point to 100 men.
4. June 28 ultimatum expired.
5. June 29 operations undertaken at dawn and check point captured at 8:30. At no time were aircraft and armored cars employed. Head man of Nuwai and Abdullah Salim have sworn mutual pact and guaranteed keep road open. Levies now control check point and principal Mahadha wells and remainder withdrawn to Shirm.

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan on July 3 and cleared by EUR, BNA, and NEA. Repeated to London and Jidda.

[2] A paper, dated July 2, not printed, entitled "Incidents in the Mahadha Area," contains the information set forth in this telegram. Presumably it is the paper under reference here. (780.022/7-253)

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Sultan of Muscat's description his territories to Hart December 1949 would indicate whole area concerned this incident located within his domains as claimed by him (see Dhahran's despatch 154 December 21, 1949 [3]).

Department views this incident as factional strife within Beni Kaab which would seem clearly divided in sympathy and loyalty between Ibn Saud and Muscat. In view disagreement Saudi and British reports and absence impartial information Department unable assess rights and wrongs this situation. This development emphasizes importance earliest possible implementation arbitration and Department believes highly desirable that both sides consider sending neutral observer to spot to act as advance element arbitration body.

You should inform King that United States Government has taken full cognizance all available evidence concerning this incident and has formed opinion indicated above. [4]

Embassy London should also approach Foreign Office along lines indicated above. [5]

. . . . . .

SMITH

[3] Not printed.

[4] Telegram 1 to Dhahran, July 1, requested the Ambassador to deliver a message from the President to King Saud, in reply to the King's letter of June 28. The message stated that the President was concerned over the report of the bombing attack and the matter was taken up with the British Government. (780.022/6–2953)

[5] See telegram 82 from London, Document 1525.

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No. 1523

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "King Saud/Eisenhower"

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, July 4, 1953—11 a. m.

2. While in Riyadh I was handed text King's reply, dated July 2, to President's message June 15. [2] Text reply being transmitted despatch. [3] Following major points message:

(1) Expression deep appreciation for letter and tribute to President.

(2) Expression of gratification for visit Secretary Dulles as indication of American interest in Saudi Arabia and assurance by King of continuing policy of cooperation with United States in fair times and foul.

(3) Similar expression of gratification for President's having received Amir Faisal and for statement subsequently issued because of its implications with respect US relations not only with Saudi Arabia but all Arab countries.

(4) Reiteration of protest regarding reported bombing incident Nuwai, and refutation British claim tribesmen initiated aggression.

(5) Renewed endorsement arbitration provided it accompanied by arrangements place both parties on equal basis.

(6) Expression astonishment that British had flouted President Truman's letter 1950 by their acts, that they had abrogated standstill agreement which had resulted from American efforts and that British should have taken unprovoked action against Saudis.

(7) Belief he was justified in addressing plea to President and statement he is awaiting President's action.

(8) Cordial closing remarks.

Foregoing reply drafted before Saudis received President's message transmitted Deptel 1 to Dhahran, repeated Jidda 2. [4]

HARE

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] The text of the King's letter was transmitted to the White House on July 15, and attached to it was a memorandum of the same date by the Secretary of State, neither printed. The Secretary's memorandum informed the President that members of the Department of State had been discussing the Buraimi dispute with Lord Salisbury, and had put forward some compromise proposals which the British were considering. (Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "Memorandum for the President, June–December 1953")

[3] Despatch 2 from Jidda, July 4. (786A.11/7–453)

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 4, *supra*.

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No. 1524

780.022/7–553: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, July 5, 1953—2 p. m.

3. British Ambassador yesterday gave Saudi Foreign Office account of Nuwai incident which essentially same as given Consul General Bishop by British officials at Bahrein. Only new fact of significance was that two-inch mortars used (which, in conjunction with overflight by observation plane, might have given rise to reported aerial bombardment although Saudis remain adamant that bombs used). British also expressed surprise matter should have been taken up with third party before facts more accurately established.

In subsequent conversations with Ambassador, I explored possibility of compromise between British position of insisting on complete mutual withdrawal to be followed by arbitration and Saudi position of insisting on return to standstill accompanied by reduction of forces to parity and then initiation arbitration. Ambassador made clear he was discussing personally and without commitment but it was obvious that, although he felt Saudi appeal to President was unwarranted, he could see possibility it might afford an opportunity for us to put forward certain suggestions which might get matter off dead center.

At conclusion of discussions I made following personal and tentative suggestions:

(1) There should be continued and strong emphasis on arbitration. I told Ambassador I had been considerably encouraged by apparent recent change in Saudi attitude in this regard since, whereas Saudis had at first professed to regard arbitration as British device which they had only accepted under compulsion, they now seem to regard it as desirable means of settlement.

(2) New standstill would be reached where Turki would remain and blockade lifted but under strictures against suborning activities and British forces would remain but under conditions where their presence would not constitute intimidating influence on population (see Embtel 945 of June 24 [2]).

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed. The Embassy suggested that the British relax the blockade to permit Turki to remain in Buraimi, in return for his promise not to use his freedom of action to change the existing situation before the arrival of the arbitral body; and that the Saudis, in return, agree to allow British forces to remain for the time being, on the understanding they would not be used for intimidation. (780.022/6–2453)

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(3) Immediate setting up of watchdog commission composed of one Saudi, one British and one neutral member to be agreed between them which would proceed to Buraimi area and remain as long as situation requires.

Ambassador said he felt Foreign Office would be reluctant accept any plan which would permit Turki remain but that on other hand some such plan might have appeal if presented by third party.

At this writing I am unaware how Department's thinking on this matter may have developed but I would suggest that these ideas would merit consideration if we are prepared to go further than try to restimulate direct conversations. As seen from here I would recommend our proposing some such plan.

HARE

No. 1525

780.022/7-653: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, July 6, 1953—7 p. m.

82. In compliance Deptel 98, [2] Embassy today approached Foreign Office regarding Department's conclusions re recent incidents among Beni Kaab, importance earliest possible implementation arbitration and desirability both sides consider sending neutral observer as advanced element arbitration body.

Foreign Office official, while acknowledging dived loyalty Beni Kaab, nevertheless thought there would be no further incidents of this kind if Ibn Saud would show firm hand in keeping Turki in line. Official expressed opinion that any neutral officials sent to area should be within context general settlement, i.e., agreement on the arbitration, withdrawal, etc. For that reason, UK would not favor sending neutral observer Buraimi at this time.

Foreign Office official reiterated hope that President might find it possible to suggest to Saudis mutual withdrawal coupled with tripartite supervisory commission. He noted in this connection Ibn Saud's latest letter to President suggesting tripartite investigating commission with US, UK and Saudi participation. Official thought this suggestion tied in closely with suggestion Makins had been instructed make to Under Secretary and was good augury for Saudi agreement.

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[1] Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.
[2] Printed as telegram 2 to Dhahran, Document 1522.

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Comment: Embassy believes British reaction to alternative machinery which Department is presently considering in connection Buraimi dispute is likely be governed primarily by whether neutral observer and supervisory personnel would (1) be superimposed on present *status quo*, or (2) involve British withdrawal to point of equalizing their forces with Saudis. As reported previous telegrams, British feel strongly that onus for present situation lies with Turki because of his incursion into Hamasa. British therefore strongly oppose any solution which would result in Turki remaining Buraimi and British withdrawing even part of their forces. They maintain their agreement to such course of action would have highly unfavorable effect on Muscat, British protected Sheikhdoms and local tribes. Additionally, of course, they are concerned about Turki continuing his alleged suborning of local tribes.

While Department's suggested formula should serve to minimize Turki's activities, Embassy believes it doubtful that British would consider it met their concern re local reactions if coupled with equalization of forces. Embassy believes, however, British would consider formula if machinery were superimposed on maintenance *status quo*, although they will undoubtedly make further efforts to obtain our support for their preferred solution of mutual withdrawal to which they say they believe Saudis might agree.

Embassy unclear as to just how British would exercise supervision over Turki's activities and Saudis over British. In Embassy's opinion, there would be less prospect of friction and more prospect of constructive supervision if responsibility were vested in tripartite commission composed of UK, Saudi and neutral official.

ALDRICH

No. 1526

780.022/7-753

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 7, 1953.

Subject: Alleged British Attack Against Saudi Subjects

I refer to my memorandum of June 30 [2] transmitting a message from King Ibn Saud concerning an alleged attack by British bomb-

[1] This memorandum was drafted by Fritzlan; BNA, EUR, and S/S also concurred with NEA. A handwritten notation in the margin stated that it was delivered to the White House on July 7. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Byroade to the Secretary, dated July 6, not printed, recommending that he sign the memorandum for the President. (780.022/6–2953)

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, Document 1519.

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ers and armored cars against tribesmen in the Buraimi area who are stated to be Saudi subjects.

A report has now been received from the British and according to it the trouble started on June 23 when certain pro-Saudi elements of the Beni Kaab tribe fired on a patrol of British-controlled forces proceeding from Buraimi along the road to Sharjah (a Sheikhdom under British protection). On June 26 these pro-Saudi tribesmen established a road block to prevent movement of British forces. In the meantime pro-Muscat elements of the Beni Kaab tribe, fearing an attack by pro-Saudi members of the tribe, requested assistance and a group of British-controlled forces were sent into the area. Shots were exchanged between the hostile elements within the tribe and three pro-Saudi tribesmen were killed and four wounded. In the meantime the road block was forcibly removed and pro-Muscat tribal elements have undertaken to police the road. In the process one pro-Saudi tribesman was killed and one wounded. The British state that no aircraft or armored cars were used in this operation.

The demarcation line in the area is a vague one but we do know that, while certain elements of the Beni Kaab have a clear attachment to Ibn Saud, the Sultan of Muscat claims the whole of the territory within which the incidents took place.

This incident, involving factional strife within a tribe living in the neighborhood of the disputed area of Buraimi, emphasizes the importance of the British and Saudis proceeding with arbitration to which both sides are committed in principle, and I intend to press this view upon them.

The Department has communicated with our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, in order that he may convey our views to the King.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

No. 1527

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "King Saud/Eisenhower": Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, July 7, 1953—1 p. m.

6. There follows summary of another message from King delivered by Foreign Office with request it be transmitted to President. Complete text being pouched. [2]

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Despatch 23, July 11, not printed. (780.022/7-1153)

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(1) Expression appreciation President's message Deptel 2, July 1.[3]

(2) Statement that British have replied Saudi protest denying bombing but admitting "most of acts" attributed British officials and claiming they were taken in retaliation aggression against British forces.

(3) Request that President send representative who, together with Saudi and British representative, would go to Buraimi area to make investigation.

(4) Contradiction between British statement that it has instructed its forces Buraimi area maintain peace and report from Turki that British forces intensifying siege against Hamasah, Turki's headquarters.

(5) Claim that on July 3 British forces fired guns and rockets at Hamasah in order frighten people.

(6) Expression of hope President's mediation will end aggression and result in investigation incidents Buraimi area.

(7) Reiteration willingness accept arbitration provided there is equality of forces in area.

(8) Repetition of thanks for President's interest in question and reassurance Saudi desire settle dispute and have friendly relations with Britain.

In conversation with acting head Foreign Office after receipt foregoing, I remarked that question of sending American observer to Buraimi was, of course, an old story which had been thoroughly discussed in past and that Department had always taken position that American participation was not desirable. I said that while I was not in position reply in negative to King's suggestion, I thought negative reply was probable and it is my recommendation to Department that we do not change our position on this point.

HARE

[3] Not printed; it transmitted the President's answer to King Ibn Saud's message of June 28, transmitted in telegram 249 from Dhahran. It informed him that the President was concerned over the report of the bombing attack, and the matter was being taken up with the British Government. (780.022/6–2953)

No. 1528

780.022/7–1153

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 11, 1953.

Subject: Discussion of Buraimi Problem at Bilateral Talks with Lord Salisbury and his Group, at 4:00 p. m., July 11, 1953

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Participants: U.S. Representatives, including The Secretary, General Smith, Mr. Byroade.
British Representatives including Lord Salisbury, General Robertson, and the British Ambassador. [1]

The Secretary raised the problem of Buraimi, stating that we appeared to be allied to the opposing forces. He alluded to his recent visit to Riyadh and the strong feelings of King Ibn Saud on the subject. He took the position that Turki was in Buraimi as a matter of right. We were under great pressure from the King, who often referred to the Truman letter, to help him.

Lord Salisbury said the British were under similar pressure from the other side. The British had proposed arbitration and had concluded this could not be carried out as long as Turki remained in the area. His entry into it was entirely unwarranted. The British had therefore proposed that the President suggest to both sides mutual withdrawal coupled with supervision by UK, Saudi, and, preferably, US representatives.

Mr. Dulles asked if there couldn't be supervision without mutual withdrawal and stated that the degree of withdrawal would be disproportionate and cause serious loss of face to Turki. Mr. Byroade mentioned that Turki would have to go 500–600 miles to Riyadh or Dammam while the other side would withdraw only a short distance. Lord Salisbury said perhaps this pointed up the extent to which Turki had trespassed.

Mr. Byroade listed our compromise proposals for consideration as follows:

1. Both sides agree arbitration take place with present strength Saudi and British forces remaining in area on understanding blockade lifted and that Saudis engage in no further suborning activities.
2. Observation commission consisting one Saudi, one British and one neutral representative to be set up immediately to proceed to area to insure adherence to foregoing. Commission to remain as long as situation required and to have freedom of movement and right of access to Saudi, British and other authorities in region.
3. Both sides to conclude arrangements without delay for arbitration.

Mr. Byroade emphasized our view that Ibn Saud would never accept mutual withdrawal.

General Smith stated that he had detected a feeling on the part of his British friends that perhaps strong measures had forced Ibn Saud to accept arbitration. He did not wish to pass judgment on

[1] Lord Salisbury was in Washington to attend the tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings held July 10–14; for documentation on the meetings, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

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this conclusion but he would say that last winter the Saudis spent long hours in the Department and if they had had one word of encouragement for a plebiscite, as opposed to arbitration, they would not have agreed to arbitration.

Lord Salisbury stated he and his group would be glad to consider these proposals and give his views at a later meeting.

No. 1529

786A.00/7-1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1953—11:23 a. m.

283. At Saturday UK bilateral meeting [2] US put up following proposition to British on Buraimi:

(1) Both sides agree arbitration with present strength Saudi and British forces remaining area on understanding blockade be lifted and Saudi cease suborning activities.
(2) Observation Commission consisting one Saudi, one British, one neutral be established in area insure adherence above.
(3) Both sides conclude arbitration arrangements without delay.

At Tuesday bilateral [3] Salisbury indicated British unable accept pointing real difficulty being provision re non-withdrawal forces. Secretary asked British reconsider this decision pointing out great importance to us maintaining good relationship Saudis. Salisbury agreed to reconsider but pointed out British treaty relationships PG sheikdoms also important them.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Raynor and cleared by NE. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

[2] For a record of the meeting of July 11, see the memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

[3] For the record of the discussion of Buraimi at the Tuesday, July 14, meeting, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1686.

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No. 1530

780.022/7-2753

The Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (Salisbury) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, July 27, 1953.

MY DEAR FOSTER: I have been giving very careful thought to the views which President Eisenhower and you expressed to me in Washington on the subject of our frontier dispute with Saudi Arabia: and I have now had an opportunity of reporting your views personally to my Cabinet colleagues and of discussing them fully, with every desire to help.

In reaching our conclusions we have been influenced by the following considerations. In our view, Turki has no right to be in Hamasa; the village is one of those belonging to the Sultan of Muscat, who, with the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, objected most strongly to Turki's incursion into the Buraimi Oasis. Ibn Saud should not in the first place have made a forward move for which there is absolutely no legal justification. In view of the obligations which he now puts upon you by virtue of President Truman's letter of October 1950, I do not understand how he ever contemplated such a step without seeking your advice and support. I have little doubt in my own mind that he deliberately meant to face us both with a *fait accompli*. It was a carefully calculated bluff, to which we could not submit without the most serious repercussions on the local rulers, whose legitimate rights we are by treaty bound to support.

We had indeed every right to remove Turki many months ago. But as you know, in the interests of us all, we restrained the Sultan of Muscat from using force against him, and in the Buraimi Standstill Agreement we acquiesced in his remaining in the Oasis temporarily until, as we hoped, and agreement was reached in regard to arbitration. I can assure you that in both these actions we were to a large measure influenced by the wish to spare you embarrassment. As a result of these decisions and because of Turki's subsequent improper activities, we have allowed our own and our friends' interests to suffer in no small measure. For there can be no doubt that Turki is doing his best, not without success, to disrupt the pattern of tribal allegiance in this area, by the simple process of bribery: nor, I am afraid, would a neutral commission have any chance of checking this process. In these circumstances, we feel most strongly that to allow Turki to remain in Hamasa during the arbitration, with no check on his activities except the supervision of a neutral commission, will have a disastrous effect

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on our relations with our old and tried friends. The local people will miss the significance of an agreement to arbitrate, and seeing Turki unrestrained, they will feel that we have deserted them. I could not advise my colleagues to put themselves in this position. Moreover, it might easily result in the arbitration being unfairly influenced by a situation which has been only recently created, and improperly at that. I doubt very much whether, in these circumstances, we could persuade the Sultan of Muscat to swallow such a manifestly unfair process, supposing for a moment that we wished to ask him to do so.

In short, our view is that the presence of Turki in Hamasa is the crux of the whole problem and that any compromise in this respect which entails our accepting that he should remain there with no proper check on his activities, will seriously prejudice the issue. And it is not only our friends in the Trucial Coast and the Sultan of Muscat who will be affected. Throughout the Persian Gulf the same attitude may be adopted and our position in the more important Gulf States, on which large joint interests depend, may be fatally called in question. You will, I am sure, understand if I say that this is a risk which my colleagues and I do not feel able to take. Our position in the Persian Gulf States has been carefully built up, we are trusted there, and to weaken it now would be detrimental both to you and to us. It is quite certain that, should we lose our position there, there will be many claims for the reversion, and I hardly think that any of these would be as valuable to you, in peace or war, in this important area, as we ourselves.

I know how close your relations with Ibn Saud are, and I know too how strong a position you have with him. If you felt able to urge on him the plan for mutual withdrawal combined with neutral supervision which I have suggested to you, all my information is that your advice would be accepted. If however, after consideration of what I say you still feel that it is impossible for you to do this, I am afraid that the only alternative will be for the situation to be allowed to continue as it is for the time being. This is, I know, far from ideal from your, or indeed from our own, point of view, but I really do not see any other course we could pursue.

Yours ever

BOBBETY

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No. 1531

711.022/8-753: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 7, 1953—7:53 p. m.

682. After receiving British rejection our compromise proposals on Buraimi, Department has given further consideration to proposals which US might make to both parties in effort resolve present impasse.

It is Department's tentative view that Embassy London should make representations to Foreign Office along following lines:

"Department has carefully considered Salisbury's letter of July 27 [2] to Secretary on Buraimi. Having in mind British reaction to our compromise proposals, Saudi attitudes and desirable conditions for impartial arbitration Department has elaborated new proposals. If British take favorable view these proposals Department will recommend President make them formally to both sides. Proposals as follows:

1. Withdrawal as indicated below of all Saudi and British-controlled administrative and military personnel from Buraimi region and from nearby British-protected Sheikhdoms who have entered these areas since August 20, 1952; it being understood that such withdrawal would be to undisputed areas not less than 350 miles from Buraimi and that any Muscat administrative and military personnel now in Buraimi area would be removed at least to Batinah coast.

2. Immediate conclusion arbitration agreement including details concerning designation of arbitration body and its functions.

3. Implementation of withdrawal mentioned above upon arrival in region of arbitration body it being understood that forces of neither side would re-enter area until conclusion arbitration and then only in manner indicated by arbitration decision."

Department's records indicate normal size British force in Trucial Coast about 100 men under British officer and perhaps several planes and that since inception Buraimi dispute about 200 Aden levies, 12 armored cars and 6 Meteor jet planes have been brought to area. Withdrawal of forces as specified under paragraph one would require return Saudi forces at least to Hofuf region while

[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA and BNA. Repeated to Dhahran and as telegram 30 to Jidda.

[2] *Supra.*

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British-controlled forces might be withdrawn to Bahrein but to no point in Trucial Oman, Qatar or Muscat.

Without prior consultation with Governments concerned Embassies London and Jidda requested comment foregoing suggested proposals.

SMITH

No. 1532

780.022/8–1053: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, August 10, 1953—2 p. m.

45. Embassy believes proposals contained Deptel 30, August 7 [2] would not be acceptable to Saudis. As Department is aware, salient points Saudi position are as follows:

(1) That Turki remain Buraimi, presumably until arbitration proceedings concluded;
(2) That arbitration commission be appointed immediately with responsibility observe developments Buraimi area or, as alternative, immediate establishment neutral observation commission and of arbitration commission when terms of reference agreed by two parties;
(3) That equality forces Buraimi area be established before arbitration proceedings initiated.

Department's proposals Deptel 30 fail satisfy first two foregoing points, on both of which Saudis have clearly shown they feel strongly. While it is realized that Department's proposals regarding mutual withdrawal were drafted with intent overcoming previously expressed Saudi objections thereto, Embassy doubts that this aspect of proposal would be sufficient in Saudi opinion to provide equality of position they desire. It is likely that Saudis would consider that number of British and British controlled forces in Trucial coast area prior August 20, 1952, with their easier access Buraimi area, would have result of giving superior position to British.

Even if King saw no alternative but to accept proposals, which Embassy considers doubtful, there would still remain problems of substance. For example, who would make determination that withdrawal of British and Muscat personnel in accordance proposals has been carried out? Saudis would be unwilling accept unilateral assurance British this complicated question. Moreover, if Saudis

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.
[2] Printed as telegram 682 to London, *supra*.

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agreed Turki would be withdrawn upon arrival Iraq arbitration body, they would tend draw out negotiations for arbitration, including those regarding terms of reference arbitration body, in order delay evil day Turki's withdrawal. During this period, present unsatisfactory situation would continue whereby there is no neutral body to minimize friction leading to incidents between opposing groups.

While Embassy still believes its recommendations contained Embassy telegram 3, July 5 [3] and 7, July 7 [4] provide most effective approach towards solving question it will of course exert every effort obtain Saudi acceptance of proposals if Department decides proceed with them. We strongly recommend however Saudi views be ascertained before formal recommendations by President to both sides are made but, if Department wishes, after British views are obtained. Otherwise, use of high channel of message from President for presentation of proposals, which at very least are certain to be unpalatable to Saudis, would in Embassy's opinion adversely affect whole fabric US relations with Saudi Arabia, including military cooperation.

JONES

[3] Document 1524.

[4] Not printed. The Embassy reported it agreed with the Department of State that it would be futile to suggest the British plan of mutual withdrawal to Saudi Arabia, since the Deputy Foreign Minister claimed it would be impossible for the Saudis to ask Turki to withdraw and leave the area under British domination. (780.022/7-753)

No. 1533

780.022/8-1053: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, August 10, 1953—6 p. m.

577. Following are Embassy's comments Deptel 682: [2]

1. Embassy assumes paragraph 1 Department's new formula means only Aden levies would be withdrawn to Bahrein and that Trucial levies would return Trucial states. If this case, suggest clarification this paragraph since present wording appears capable interpretation that presence in Buraimi area of any Trucial levies at any time since August 20, 1952 necessitates 350 mile withdrawal.

[1] Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

[2] Document 1531.

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In this connection, Embassy strongly doubts British would agree any withdrawal Trucial levies to Bahrein.

2. Similar problem to foregoing would seem arise re administrative personnel. Is it, for instance, Department's intention that British political officer Sharja, who only recently arrived there and who has travelled in Buraimi area, should be withdrawn?

3. British will certainly welcome emphasis on withdrawal but may find difficulty in accepting provision which debars them so specifically from maintaining certain military forces (e.g. Aden levies) all mainland areas of their Persian Gulf territories. This, they may argue, is unfair, particularly given their views re responsibility for origin of dispute.

4. Embassy feels there is another contingency that should be taken into account in any formula, i.e. that after mutual withdrawal there might be trouble among tribes resulting breakdown law and order.

5. Formula also appears raise problems when applied to Muscat. Does "Buraimi area", for example, embrace Dhank, Ibri, etc., and, if so, would Muscati officials in those places have [to] be withdrawn to Batinah coast?

6. Embassy recognizes that Department's formula evolved in effort meet part way very valid Saudi point that mutual withdrawal would place British in preferable military position due close proximity their forces after withdrawal. Embassy wonders, however, whether Saudi fears this respect could not be overcome by formula along following lines:

a. Withdrawal to undisputed territory of all Saudi, British and Muscati controlled administrative and military personnel who have entered Buraimi and adjacent disputed areas since August 20, 1952. In case of disagreement as to what constitutes undisputed territory, views of commission, as provided for below, shall prevail. All parties to undertake not to redeploy these or any other forces of administrative personnel in disputed areas except as they may be called upon by commission for forces in circumstances outlined below.

b. Establishment commission in Buraimi composed of one Saudi, one British and one neutral to ensure compliance with this agreement, to undertake such investigations as may be required by arbitration body and to be responsible for good government and security Buraimi area until conclusion arbitration award.

c. In event of situation developing in Buraimi involving breakdown of law and order, or threat thereof, commission may call upon Saudi and British Governments to furnish forces, such forces to function under commission's instructions and to withdraw again when, in commission's judgment, situation permits.

d. All parties to refrain from propaganda and other means of influencing local inhabitants from date of signature this agreement.

e. Same as Department's 2.

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f. Implementation withdrawal mentioned above upon arrival in region of Buraimi commission.

7. If paragraph 6(a) above does not appear practical from standpoint Saudi acceptance, Embassy inclined think British might be more disposed accept formula which simply provides for mutual withdrawal to pre-August 20, 1952 dispositions than one which so obviously debars their forces from all their mainland territories, even though return of Aden levies to Aden Protectorate would be involved in first case. In other words, they could publicly present withdrawal to Aden as natural consequences liquidation of dispute. On other hand, maintaining levies Bahrein creates presumption their presence in area deemed necessary from military standpoint and, in such circumstances, British would appear hard put defend their agreement to stationing them on island 350 miles away.

ALDRICH

No. 1534

780.022/8-2853

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom (Salisbury) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 28, 1953.

DEAR BOBBETY: I have given most careful consideration to your frank exposition of your views regarding the problem of Buraimi in your letter of July 27. [2] To be equally frank, we are disappointed and concerned that you and your Cabinet could not accept the approach to this problem which we suggested last month.

As I see the present position, our respective estimates of the situation differ in certain important respects.

You state that any compromise which entails your accepting that Turki should remain in Hamasa with no proper check on his activities will seriously prejudice the issue. We, however, consider that our proposals would meet your difficulty by providing for a definite

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[1] This letter was drafted by Fritzlan and Reale, Aug. 17–25, and was cleared by NEA, EUR, S/S, G, and C.

Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Byroade to the Secretary, recommending that he sign the letter to Lord Salisbury. The memorandum advised the Secretary that, since Lord Salisbury's letter of July 27 revealed the British were persisting in their "tough" attitude, the Department of State should frankly register its disappointment and hope the British would give further consideration to the Department's previous suggestions. (780.022/8–2553)

Telegram 984 from London, Sept. 5, informed the Department of State the Embassy had delivered the letter to Lord Salisbury on that date. (780.022/9–553)

[2] Document 1530.

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restraint on Turki's possible . . . activities before and during the arbitration process.

You also state that all your information is that, if we urged on Ibn Saud your plan for mutual withdrawal combined with neutral supervision, our advice would be accepted. We, on the other hand, are convinced, on the basis of discussions Ambassador Hare has had with Ibn Saud in which the Ambassador unofficially and informally mentioned the possibility of withdrawal, that the Saudis would not accept such a proposal. My own conversations with the King last May have persuaded me that this must be accepted as a fact. During our talks last month I indicated our belief that the King could not be persuaded to move any further on the matter of withdrawal. In view of our understanding of the situation, we do not feel able to urge your plan upon King Ibn Saud.

You will recall that, after your Government proposed arbitration, we strongly supported the principle with Prince Faisal and the Saudi Government. I believe you will recognize that this support was largely responsible for Saudi acceptance of this procedure. Perhaps you were not aware, however, of the strain which our support imposed upon our friendly relationship with King Ibn Saud. I am sure you will agree that Saudi Arabia is assuming an increasingly important position in the pattern of our common defense. While recognizing the importance of your position in the Persian Gulf, I feel strongly that in the days ahead of us it will be of paramount importance to both of us to have the friendship and confidence of the ruler of Saudi Arabia.

I judge from your letter that we may not have made sufficiently clear, during our conversations in July, the seriousness with which we view the situation and the importance we attach to finding some means of settling the dispute which would have greater chance of being accepted by the Saudi Government than those you have put forward. I feel that the possible consequences of inaction are so serious that I again urge your reconsideration of our proposals in the light of our understanding of the situation as I have set it forth above. I would add that we feel an oligation to reply as soon as possible to a letter from King Ibn Saud to President Eisenhower which we will delay answering pending further word from you.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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No. 1535

780.022/10-1153

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET JIDDA, October 6, 1953.

Participants: Prince Feisal, Saudi Foreign Minister
J. Jefferson Jones, III, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
Clifford R. Nelson, Second Secretary
Mohammed Massoud, Embassy's Arab Consultant

Subject: Buraimi Dispute

In view of Prince Feisal's oblique reference to lack of support by Saudi Arabia's friends on the Buraimi issue, Mr. Jones attempted to reassure him with respect to the efforts of the United States to assist in bringing about a solution of the Buraimi dispute. Mr. Jones said that the United States Government was in constant touch with the British Government on the question and that one of the reasons for the delay in reaching a solution of the issue was the absence from London of British cabinet ministers.

Prince Feisal replied that absence of important cabinet ministers from London had not prevented the British Government from reaching decisions upon other important international questions.

Prince Feisal then launched into a long dissertation on the Buraimi issue, the most significant points of which were as follows:

(1) The lack of tangible results of United States efforts to help bring about a solution of the dispute was causing him to have "little doubts" about United States friendship with Saudi Arabia. Although he appreciated that the situation was a difficult one and that the United States was attempting to contribute to a mutually satisfactory solution, the Saudis still hoped for "deeds rather than words".

(2) The Saudi Government as well as Prince Feisal himself was beginning to be embarrassed by lack of United States assistance. The Saudi Arabian people were beginning to ask openly what advantages had accrued to Saudi Arabia from its friendship with the United States. In the light of these questions of the Saudi people, members of His Majesty's Government were asking Prince Feisal, who was one of the greatest proponents of Saudi-American friendship, what help had been given to Saudi Arabia by the United States during the recent years when a special relationship supposedly existed between the two countries. Prince Feisal said that he was "ashamed and abashed" when friends asked him what as-

[1] This memorandum of conversation was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 138 from Jidda, Oct. 11, 1953. Presumably it was prepared by Jones, as he was listed as the reporter on the despatch. (780.022/10-1153)

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sistance the United States had extended to the Saudi Government. He asked Mr. Jones directly what assistance the United States had given to Saudi Arabia.

(Mr. Jones replied that, in his opinion, the existence of Dhahran Airfield was mutually advantageous to Saudi Arabia and the United States. Moreover, he had understood that the activities of TCA had been beneficial to this country, and that the U.S. military training missions were contributing substantially to the development of the Saudi armed forces. He also believed that material benefits had accrued to Saudi Arabia from the activities in Saudi Arabia of private American companies.)

(3) The Saudi Government, in its reply despatched that morning to a "most impolite" note from the British, had intimated that it would send no further communications to the British Government on the Buraimi issue.

(4) Saudi Arabia was considering the advisability of submitting the Buraimi issue to the United Nations.

(5) Although Saudi Arabia realized that it was not sufficiently strong to harm the British Empire, it could cause some damage to the British. He added that even a goat, if in danger of its life, would use its horns to defend itself.

(6) The United States should keep in mind that there might be an "explosion without warning" unless there was some improvement in the present situation.

Mr. Jones said, with reference to the last two observations of Prince Feisal, that he hoped that the Foreign Minister would continue to exert his great influence on the side of restraint and moderation. While he realized that the situation was difficult for the Saudis he hoped that they would be patient awhile longer as he was certain that restraint would redound to the benefit of Saudi Arabia and to an increase in Saudi prestige throughout the world.

Mr. Jones also said that he would be glad to transmit the views expressed by Prince Feisal to the Department of State in Washington.

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No. 1536

780.022/10-1353: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Penfield) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 13, 1953—10 a. m.

1580. Foreign Office has just informed us that some weeks ago Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Ambassador here, told Foreign Office he proceeding Jidda see King in effort work out settlement Buraimi dispute. Subsequently Hafiz returned London with terms which he maintained had King's approval. Terms were discussed at length in series meetings in Foreign Office for which Pelham and Burrows were brought here (Embtel 1334, September 28 [2]). As results these talks, Foreign Office gave Hafiz statement of its understanding of his proposals with request he clear it with King.

Yesterday Hafiz informed Foreign Office its statement accepted by King and Hafiz proceeding Jidda this week open negotiations with British in which Foreign Office anticipates Pelham now on leave Cyprus and Burrows will be instructed participate.

Terms of proposed agreement are: (a) Saudis to withdraw Turki and his forces from Buraimi oasis with corresponding withdrawal British forces from oasis; (b) each side to maintain in oasis police force comprising not more than 12 persons; and (c) each to refrain from further aggravating situation.

Talks in Jidda would first cover above agreement and then arbitration agreement regarding which Foreign Office anticipates no particular difficulty.

Foregoing embodied in messages from Eden to Secretary which is before Eden for signature and expected go forward within next 24 hours. Foreign Office apologized for not informing us of proposals sooner, but stressed Hafiz had insisted on complete secrecy.

In commenting on above, Foreign Office official pointed out: (1) It difficult believe Hafiz actually has obtained King's approval of above proposals which however Foreign Office would welcome; and, (2) approval of Sultan Muscat must be obtained. Burrows now consulting Sultan.

PENFIELD

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[1] Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed. The Embassy informed the Department of State that a reply to Secretary Dulles' letter of Aug. 28 had been delayed because of disagreement between the Foreign Office and officers in the field on the answer. As a result Burrows and Pelham were returning to London for a discussion on the Buraimi question. (780.022/9-2853)

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No. 1537

780.022/10-1853: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

JIDDA, October 18, 1953—8 p. m.

163. Embtel 159, October 17. [2] Acting Head Foreign Office Kheireddin Zirickly told me this morning some progress had been made in yesterday's discussion between Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Ambassador to UK and British Chargé regarding Buraimi issue. He said following principles for arriving settlement had been agreed upon subject approval two governments:

(1) Agreement settle Buraimi dispute by arbitration was reaffirmed and settlement other boundary issues would proceed in accordance London Agreement concluded by Prince Feisal in August 1951.

(2) It was necessary re-establish tranquil conditions in area before proceeding arbitration.

(3) In order obtain foregoing conditions, both governments would send equal number guards to area to ensure maintenance public tranquility.

Kheireddin Bey stated British objected strongly continuance Turki in area, possibly because they considered him "more patriotic" than Saudis. Saudi Government was convinced every Saudi was as patriotic as Turki and might therefore be willing replace Turki with another official.

In reply my query regarding discussion Investigation Commission, Kheireddin Bey said there had been "change in tendency" since he had discussed matter with me yesterday and that present tendency was as indicated above.

I expressed hope negotiations would be successful and said that as SAG aware, US had always hoped two governments would be able achieve by direct negotiation mutually agreeable settlement AF issue.

Further UK-Saudi meetings are scheduled this afternoon and both morning and afternoon tomorrow. [3]

JONES

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed. It reported the acting head of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office had informed an Embassy officer of discussions in Saudi Arabia between the British and the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who had returned home for the talks. (780.022/10-1753)

[3] Telegram 170 from Jidda, Oct. 19, not printed, reported further information given to the Embassy by the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office on the progress of talks with the British on Buraimi. (780.022/10-1953)

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No. 1538

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "King Saud/Eisenhower"

President Eisenhower to King Ibn Saud [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 27, 1953.

YOUR MAJESTY: I am most happy to learn from reports received from the United States Embassy at Jidda that Your Majesty's health has considerably improved. I sincerely hope that this improvement will in no way be interrupted and that God may continue to spare Your Majesty for the welfare of your people and in the interest of the Free World.

Your Majesty will recall that my Government has for over a year been greatly concerned and preoccupied with all phases of the Buraimi problem. Our efforts on behalf of facilitating settlement of this matter were redoubled after receipt of Your Majesty's message of July sixth. [2] During discussions between Mr. Dulles and Lord Salisbury in Washington in July, the Buraimi problem occupied an important position on the agenda of the meetings. I am confident you will believe me when I say that Mr. Dulles and his colleagues had Saudi interests in this matter very much at heart and were motivated by a desire to assist in resolving the differences between the British and Your Majesty's Governments in order to eliminate causes for disturbances and pave the way for a just and equitable settlement. We have been very perturbed over reports of disturbances involving violent action in the Buraimi area, and we have urged all possible restraint and moderation.

Following the July discussions with the British on Buraimi, Mr. Dulles has several times been in direct communication with both Lord Salisbury and Mr. Eden, and the Secretary of State has vigorously represented our views concerning means whereby agreement upon outstanding issues might be hastened.

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[1] This letter was drafted by Fritzlan on Oct. 22. The original was transmitted to Jidda by pouch for delivery to the King. A copy was transmitted in telegram 129 to Jidda, Oct. 29, with a request that the Embassy deliver the message as an advance copy and explain that the signed original was en route. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "King Saud/Eisenhower")

Attached to a draft copy of the letter in Department of State files was a memorandum by Byroade to the Secretary of State, dated Oct. 22, recommending that the Secretary send the letter to the President for his signature. The memorandum stated that, since the Saudis and the British seemed close to agreement on several issues, it would be appropriate for the President to answer the King's message of July 6 requesting U.S. mediation. Also attached to the letter was a memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, dated Oct. 26, recommending that the President sign the letter. (780.022/10-2253)

[2] A summary of the message under reference here was transmitted in telegram 6 from Jidda, Document 1527.

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I have heard that substantial progress toward elimination of points of disagreement has been made in recent weeks between representatives of Your Majesty and of the British Government. It gives me great pleasure to observe this development, and it is my fervent hope that Your Majesty's wise statesmanship will continue to influence and guide these discussions to a successful conclusion.

It has been my intention since assuming office to strengthen still further the friendly ties between Your Majesty and the Saudi people and the Government and the people of the United States. These sentiments were expressed by me to His Royal Highness Prince Faisal last March and in subsequent communications to Your Majesty. In order to help achieve my objective, I am sending the Honorable George Wadsworth to be Ambassador at Your Majesty's Court. Mr. Wadsworth has been American Minister to Syria and Lebanon, and has served as Ambassador to Iraq, Turkey, and Czechoslovakia. I consider him to be one of our most eminent and distinguished Ambassadors, and I am confident that Your Majesty will render him every facility for the accomplishment of the important mission entrusted to him.

May God have Your Majesty in His safekeeping.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

No. 1539

780.022/11-253: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, November 2, 1953—4 p. m.

198. In accordance Foreign Office request, delivered President's message to King [2] to Crown Prince expressed appreciation President's solicitude regarding King's health and for efforts US assist working out solution Buraimi dispute. Crown Prince said, as US knew, SAG had agreed arbitration at behest US and had exercised greatest restraint in meeting aggressive action on part British in area. He regretted although negotiations looking towards implementation arbitration now going on between British Saudis, British had not ceased their provocative actions and referred Buraimi incident October 26 (Embtel 190, October 29 [3]). He indicated his hope

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed; it transmitted information concerning a memorandum sent by the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office to the British Embassy protesting further British activities in the Buraimi area. (780.022/10-2953)

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US could effectively assist preventing recurrence such incidents. He was happy President had decided appointment Ambassador Wadsworth and could assure US that Saudi Government would render Ambassador every assistance for accomplishment his mission further strengthening friendly ties between Saudi and American peoples.

Crown Prince's statement was on whole moderate and restrained; it contrasted strongly with sharpness his remarks on Buraimi during Hickenlooper [4] interview (Embtel 111, September 17 [5]). There was, however, undertone of bitterness, particularly when he spoke of continuing British aggressive acts in Buraimi area.

Suggest Department consider advisability again urging British do utmost prevent occurrence further incidents Buraimi area and authorizing Embassy inform SAG our representations. All possible action prevent further incidents such as those described Embtel 190 would seem accord British interests, particularly during this delicate period Saudi-British negotiations where Saudis considering retreat their position arbitration should be limited Buraimi oasis.

King's councilor, Khalid Bey Gargoni, who was present at interview, indicated that reply to President's message might be forthcoming after receipt by Saudis of signed original.

JONES

[4] Bourke Hickenlooper, Senator from Iowa.

[5] Not printed; it reported the visit of a Congressional party to Saudi Arabia. (033.1100 HI/9–1853)

No. 1540

780.022/11–653: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, November 6, 1953—4 p. m.

205. In conversation November 5 Khalid Bey Gargoni gave lengthy but moderate review Buraimi issue, stating in dealing recent developments SAG confronted three alternatives: (a) Meeting force with force; (b) referring issue to UN; (c) requesting mediation third party, and had adopted latter. In view Saudi-American friendship and particularly in light President Truman's letter, later confirmed by President Eisenhower, SAG had appealed US mediate. As time went by, SAG gradually reached conclusion in light US "attitude", another effort should be made expedite solu-

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

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tion through renewal negotiations with British and present negotiations were result.

According Khalid Bey it was position SAG arbitration was to be applied only to Buraimi oasis. He referred Prince Feisal's visit US during course of which Prince Feisal had informed US authorities Buraimi issue has peculiar aspects setting it apart from other boundary problems. Now British had submitted proposal for arbitration of large area in addition Buraimi and Ashebad informed British Ambassador Pelham that morning SAG would require time study implications this new proposal. He had also informed Pelham that, in addition withdrawal troops in Buraimi oasis, SAG desired removal British controlled forces from the thirteen points in disputed territory near but outside Buraimi oasis which had been established after beginning Buraimi affair

Kahlid Bey then asked directly if US could do following:

(a) Ask British cease aggressive actions in area, which they were still continuing, in order avoid further bloodshed;
(b) Attempt persuade British agree withdraw troops from thirteen points in disputed area as well as from Buraimi in exchange for Saudi acceptance general arbitration as proposed by British.

He emphasized (b) above was his personal proposal which had not been approved by SAG.

In reply Khalid Bey I stated President's message to King [2] had described what US had done assist solving dispute. Also said that, speaking personally, hoped UK and Saudi Arabia could reach agreement submit greatest extent possible disputed boundary to arbitration in order remove causes for tension in future.

Embassy will submit comments after it obtains more information regarding status 13 posts mentioned by Khalid Bey.

JONES

[2] Document 1538.

No. 1541

Editorial Note

Telegram 212 from Jidda, November 9, reported the death of King Ibn Saud and the accession to the throne of Crown Prince Saud. For additional information, see telegram 218 from Jidda, Document 1458.

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No. 1542

780.022/11-2253: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Jones) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, November 22, 1953—6 p. m.

244. Following are developments Buraimi issue:

(1) Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Ambassador to UK, informed me yesterday that in last conversation he had with British Ambassador Pelham he asked if UK Government would be willing remove their forces from posts established disputed territory if Saudi Government would accept extended scope arbitration (Embtel 205, November 6 [2]). Pelham expressed doubt such proposal would be satisfactory British Government but promised ask for instructions. In reply question by Pelham, Hafiz Wahba said extended arbitration would not be acceptable SAG if British insisted maintenance recently established posts disputed area. Richard Young, American legal adviser SAG, confirmed to Embassy that British had established numerous posts in disputed territory after beginning Buraimi incident. [3]

(2) Accroding Young, Hafiz impatient at necessity Pelham refer all Saudi proposals to London and appears prepared propose negotiations be transferred London.

(3) Hafiz Wahba also said prior his departure for Jidda Foreign Secretary Eden had told him complete mutual withdrawal forces both sides disputed area would be satisfactory to British. According Hafiz Wahba, Saudis could not accept this as it would not only conflict maintenance Saudi honor but would leave pro-Saudi adherents at mercy of Sagr Bin Sultan, local pro-British tribal chieftain. . . .

(4) Young informed Embassy Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast). Limited preparing sink deep test well at Jabal Dhannah, which is far within disputed territory. According Aramco official, this being done with Foreign Office approval. Action British this respect contrasts strongly with Saudi policy refraining from carrying out even preliminary exploratory work in disputed territory in accordance instructions given Aramco by Prince Feisal.

Hafiz Wahba also mentioned British plan sink well and said SAG planned make strong protest to British.

On basis information available from SAG and American advisers to SAG, Embassy inclined consider reasonable Saudi position agree extended arbitration provided all British controlled personnel withdrawn from area falling within scope arbitration except, of course, agreed number guards maintain order. Embassy also believe reported plan drill well in disputed area unfortunate, and will have

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Document 1540.

[3] Despatch 206 from Jidda, Dec. 1, not printed, transmitted a list of British posts in the disputed area. (780.022/12-153)

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unfavorable repercussions on Saudi-British negotiations. Therefore, suggest Department have frank talk British Embassy Washington regarding latest developments in order show our continuing interest in achievement early and equitable solution this difficult problem. [4]

JONES

[4] According to a handwritten note in the margin, Jernegan planned to discuss the matter with officers of the British Embassy if he had a chance to do so in an informal and general way.

No. 1543

780.022/2-1554

The British Foreign Office to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET

SAUDI ARABIA FRONTIER DISPUTE

H. M. Ambassador at Jedda has been instructed to tell Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (now in Saudi Arabia), with whom we have conducted extensive discussions here and who is already aware of the lines on which our minds are working, that we are ready to go to arbitration on the following basis:

(a) That the Tribunal should be asked to decide:

(i) The common Saudi/Abu Dhabi frontier; and
(ii) Sovereignty over the Buraimi zone (i.e. a circle of 20 kilometres round Buraimi village).

(b) That we should be ready to agree:

(i) To the withdrawal from Buraimi oasis of Turki and his men to undisputed territory in Saudi Arabia and of the Trucial Oman Levies to undisputed territory on the Trucial Coast, and the substitution in the oasis of a small police group of up to fifteen men on each side.
(ii) To withdraw to undisputed territory our five Levy posts at present in the other disputed areas in the West, on condition that no armed men shall be introduced into or maintained in the disputed areas by the Saudi Government.

(c) All the above *provided* the oil operations of I.P.C. and A.I.O.C. go on. The former Company (to whose land concession the latter

[1] This memorandum was handed to an officer of the Embassy by an official of the British Foreign Office and was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 2768, Feb. 15, not printed. (780.022/2-1554)

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Company's marine concession is contiguous) acquired its present interests before the Saudis advanced their 1949 claim and brought the area into dispute. Much time and money have already been spent on oil prospecting there, and it is quite unreasonable to ask that operations should now stop. Nor would it be to anyone's advantage.

Her Majesty's Government recognize that the Aramco concession from the Saudi Government would automatically extend, as things stand, to any area which as a result of arbitration might pass to Saudi sovereignty; and neither Her Majesty's Government nor their Oil Companies have any wish to impair Aramco's concessionary rights. Nevertheless, if the Saudi Government and Aramco were agreeable, the two British Oil Companies would in due course be interested in negotiating concessionary rights in any disputed area which might pass to Saudi sovereignty.

2. The idea of some oil arrangement came originally from the Saudis, who have from time to time told us that they would be ready to give I.P.C. and A.I.O.C. concessions in any disputed area which, as a result of arbitration, might pass to Saudi sovereignty. Latterly, we were also told, informally, that the Saudi Government had spoken with Aramco on the subject. But we have nothing in writing about this, and no firm indication of what, if anything, was said to the Company.

3. H.M. Ambassador at Jedda has therefore been instructed, in the clearest terms, to make plain to the Saudis that we have no wish whatever to prejudice Aramco's existing concessionary rights. It is only with the agreement of that Company that our two oil Companies would negotiate a concession in any disputed area that might pass to Saudi sovereignty. Our primary concern is that our oil Companies should go on working throughout the long period of arbitration; the area was brought into dispute by Saudis only so late as 1949, long after the I.P.C. concession was obtained from the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and after the Company had begun work. It was not right that the work should now be delayed indefinitely simply because the Saudis have advanced a new claim.

[LONDON,] 15th February, 1954.

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No. 1544

780.022/2-1654

The Petroleum Attaché in the United Kingdom (Moline) to the Chief of the Petroleum Policy Staff (Eakens)

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL–INFORMAL

LONDON, February 16, 1954.

DEAR BOB: By the time you receive this letter you may have seen a copy of despatch 2768, [1] written by Evan Wilson and transmitting a memorandum from the United Kingdom Government with regard to its proposals for going to arbitration on the Buraimi dispute. His despatch was sent before I had returned from a discussion with Belgrave [2] who had asked me to stop down for an explanation of the proposal. I send this information along because I think it amplifies the despatch somewhat though perhaps not sufficiently to warrant a separate one.

I suggested to Belgrave that it seemed to me that the British were running a considerable risk insofar as their relations with Abu Dhabi were concerned if IPC continued its work and was successful in finding oil only to have the area in question found later to belong to Saudi Arabia. He agreed this was at least an outside risk but thought there was little or no chance that arbitration would give the area of immediate concern to SAG.

Another point about which I inquired was why the British felt it necessary to refer to the possibility of IPC getting a concession from Saudi Arabia covering any territory which Saudi Arabia might acquire as a result of the arbitration. He explained that this was purely a face saving suggestion. SAG has stated publicly that IPC must stop working in the disputed area. To climb down from this position SAG must have some excuse. According to Belgrave Saudi Arab representatives have, on three or four occasions, said that they might be prepared to countenance continued work by IPC if IPC were to be given a concession on Saudi Arab account in any disputed territory acquired by the Saudi Arabs. Belgrave says further that Terry Duce said two years ago the Aramco was not interested in the territories, a statement which the British seemed to be interpreting as indicating Aramco willingness to see some other company taking a concession there.

My own view is that this is probably a misunderstanding of the Aramco position. It seems to me that there are two entirely differ-

[1] Despatch 2768 is not printed, but it transmitted the memorandum by the British Foreign Office of Feb 15, *supra*.

[2] Thomas Robert Belgrave, British Foreign Office.

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ent considerations involved in the statements that Aramco is not interested in the area and, therefore, is willing to see another company take it over. I remember that Aramco, even while it has been describing the huge reserves it has, has usually been opposed to having another company operating in Arabia. I remember too that when we urged that there might be protection in numbers, Aramco used to argue that Saudi Arabia did not want to deal with any one else than Aramco.

Whatever the situation may be, the British feel that they will be successful in one of their main objectives, namely to keep IPC operating on its present program since either SAG will accept the proposition or would be embarrassed to such an extent by turning down a proposal which it has itself suggested that it will not continue in its objection to IPC working in the disputed territories. It is said that IPC is anything but enthusiastic about the possibility of taking a concession from Arabia, whose recent actions they consider augur no good for oil company operations in Arabia. How true this is I don't know. I am somewhat inclined to add a grain of salt to the statement.

In any case, it seemed to me you should have this background for whatever it is worth and particularly to enable you to check Aramco's view of such a proposition if an appropriate opportunity for doing so should arise.

There are two other items I might as well dispose of in this letter. The first concerns the next meeting with the British on Middle East oil policy. As I remember it, it was suggested that such a meeting be held six months from the date of the last one and therefore it would be due about now. I believe the British propose suggesting such a meeting to discuss various problems other than Persia. One such matter will be the reported Onassis deal with Arabia which hit the headlines here last Saturday under a Washington dateline.[3] Incidentally, anything you may have on this point would be of interest.

I also wanted to let you know that Paul Frankel will be in the States for about three weeks from February 15 and hopes to have a chance to talk with you before he returns.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

ED

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[3] For documentation on the Middle East oil meetings with the British and the Onassis contract with Saudi Arabia, see Documents 242 ff.

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No. 1545

780.022/2-1654: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 16, 1954—3:56 p. m.

246. Dhahran for Ambassador. Department informed by British Embassy Foreign Office instructed British Embassy Jidda convey through Hafiz Wahba to SAG latest British proposals regarding arbitration agreement as follows:

1. Arbitration tribunal would be authorized determine frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi and sovereignty over area included within circle 20 kilometers radius having center Buraimi village.

2. (a) Turki's forces and Trucial levies in Buraimi complex to be withdrawn to undisputed territory and replaced by small police group up to 15 men each side.

(b) UK to withdraw the five levy posts in disputed area (area between Saudi 1935 and 1949 claims) on condition Saudis introduce no armed men or administrative personnel into disputed area.

3. Oil operations IPC and AIOC in disputed area to proceed during arbitration. However, UK recognizes Aramco concession would extend over any territory decided by arbitration tribunal as belonging to Saudi Arabia and has no wish impair Aramco rights. In event tribunal determined these operations being carried on in Saudi territory British companies would be happy subject Saudi and Aramco concurrence assume concession.

Department considers these proposals go far to meet Saudi demands and authorizes Ambassador support them should opportunity offer. [2]

Memorandum conversation covering foregoing being airpouches. [3]

SMITH

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Telegram 253 to Jidda, Feb. 26, informed the Ambassador this paragraph did not imply the Department of State supported the British proposal to obtain oil concessions for IPC and AIOC in the disputed area, but meant the Department felt the British proposals as a whole constituted a conciliatory gesture and a step in the right direction. (780.022/2-1554)

[3] Memorandum of conversation, Feb. 15, not printed. (780.022/2-1554)

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No. 1546

786A.00/3-954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, March 9, 1954—8 p. m.

384. 1. Ohliger, Aramco Vice President, came from Dhahran yesterday to discuss company's position re paragraph c, British proposals for frontier arbitration. [2]

Rentz of Aramco and Saudi legal consultant, Young (see last paragraph my telegram 358 February 20 [3]) had been given text British proposals March 3; Ohliger had been summoned Riyadh by King March 5.

He was first asked would Aramco be willing undertake exploration in disputed area if as result Saudi-British discussion that seemed best thing to do. He answered: Yes, but not immediately because some advance planning needed.

He was then asked if Aramco was willing surrender concessionary rights in disputed area (i.e., such, if any, part of it as arbitral commission might allocate to Saudi Arabia) in favor British companies. He answered no . . . .

2. Ohliger wished us know also that Rentz who had returned Riyadh March 7 as Young's interpreter reported:

(a) That Saudis had apparently understood Department's favorable reaction to British proposal (Deptel 246 February 16 [4] and mytel 131 February 19 from Dhahran [5]) as including support of British effort obtain concession disputed area; and

(b) That on this substantive issue Saudis' eventual position would depend in large measure on position taken by Aramco and attitude US Government.

3. In reply, I outlined my Riyadh discussion February 19 (Embtel 358 February 20) and assured him as I now categorically assure Department that while in fact I stated I considered proposals went far

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[1] Repeated to Dhahran.

[2] This reference is to the memorandum by the British Foreign Office to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Document 1543.

[3] Not printed; the Ambassador reported he had met on Feb. 19 with the Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister. Ambassador to London, and Councilor Gargoni, to receive their preliminary and informal views on the British proposals. The Saudi Arabians said they could not give an official reply to the British until they consulted their legal advisers, and they had requested Young's immediate return. (786A.00/2-2054)

[4] *Supra.*

[5] Not printed; the Ambassador reported he would support the British proposals at a meeting with the Acting Foreign Minister that evening. (786A.00/2-1954)

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towards meeting Saudi demands whole tenor my remarks was crystal clear that question British desire obtain concession was only "hope". Shaikh Yusuf, I added, should have clearly understood we did not now "support" any British pretension to oil concession in disputed area.

4. Following this discussion, I gave Ohliger letter in foregoing sense and he gave me memorandum briefing Aramco position. My immediately following telegram gives text.

I quote them in full because Ohliger understands Aramco President Davies and General Counsel Kay (who left Dhahran March 7 and is due New York today) will make early call at Department for full discussion company's interests.

I have read to Ohliger final paragraph Deptel 253 February 26 [6] and suggest Department consider with Davies advisability its making formal statement same sense to British Government.

As Ohliger is reiterating Aramco position at Riyadh tomorrow and will if it seems desirable show King my letter, I see no need for further action by me here pending Department's full consideration matter.

WADSWORTH

[6] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

No. 1547

786A.00/3-954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, March 9, 1954—8 p. m.

385. Reference: Embassy telegram 384, March 9, paragraph 4. [2]

1. Following is text my letter to Ohliger:

"With reference to our conversation of this afternoon it occurs to me that you may wish in your meeting with Shaikh Yusuf tomorrow to say that I assured you that in my conversation with Shaikh Yusuf in Riyadh on February 19 I was quite clear in saying that in my government's view the new British proposals for Buraimi arbitration seemed to go far towards meeting Saudi demands in the matter.

"At the same time the whole tenor of my discussion with Shaikh Yusuf should I feel sure have made it equally clear to him that we

[1] Repeated to Dhahran.

[2] *Supra*.

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did not support any British (IPC) pretension to an oil concession in the 'disputed area'.

"Our hope which I am sure you share is simply that these new proposals may be of real help in bringing the two parties to a mutually agreeable basis for arbitration."

2. Following is memorandum from Ohliger re Aramco position:

"As stated to the Saudi Arabian Government Friday, 5 March 1954 and as reported to you yesterday Aramco's position with respect to performing exploratory work in the 'disputed area' is that if as a result of an agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and the British Government the company is requested by the Saudi Arabian Government to resume such activity it would do so, but because of the advanced planning involved the company could not put a party in the area immediately.

"With respect to Aramco surrendering its concession rights in the disputed area, the company is definitely opposed to the suggestion and expects its position to be upheld by both the US Government and the Saudi Arabian Government.

"The company is especially interested in making known to the US Government its position with respect to surrendering its concession rights in this area because the Saudi Arabian Government has informed us that it interprets the British proposal to be contingent upon Saudi acceptance of the principle that in the event the territory in question should be awarded to the Saudi Arabian Government, the Saudi Arabian Government would grant concessions covering this specific territory to the British companies currently engaged in exploratory and drilling activity in the area.

"Our best information is that the Saudi authorities have understood from your support of the British proposals that the US Government supports this principle of granting concessions to these British companies over such areas."

WADSWORTH

No. 1548

780.022/3-1054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 10, 1954.

Subject: Buraimi Dispute: Aramco's Interest in latest British Proposals.

Participants: Mr. George Ray, General Counsel of Aramco
Mr. Chapman, of Aramco
NEA—Mr. Byroade
NE—Mr. Hart
NE—Mr. Fritzlan

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Mr. Ray had just returned from Saudi Arabia and wished to acquaint the Department with recent developments in respect to the latest British proposals for settlement of the Buraimi dispute. (See Department's telegram to Jidda No. 246 of February 16 [1] and London's despatch 2768 of February 15, 1954. [2]) Mr. Ray indicated that these developments had serious implications affecting Aramco's position in Saudi Arabia.

He began his statement with the remark that the Department had informed Aramco, during a recent conversation between Messrs. Davies, Duce, Young, Hart, and Fritzlan, at which time the British proposals were discussed, that according to the British both the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco had discussed with them questions relating to an oil concession in the disputed areas of the Trucial Coast. Mr. Ray added that Aramco had not been able to find evidence of any such discussions.

Mr. Byroade stated that in December 1952 [3] Prince Feisal had informed him that the Saudis were not interested in oil in the disputed area but in tribesmen who had indicated their allegiance to Ibn Saud, and that he (Feisal) personally was prepared to see the British obtain an oil concession in any of these areas which may be awarded to Saudi Arabia if this should serve to remove British claims to Buraimi. Mr. Byroade mentioned this as indicative of the thinking at that time of Prince Feisal and perhaps other members of the Saudi Arabian Government.

Mention was then made of conversations in the Department and in London with Mr. Duce, Vice President of Aramco, concerning Aramco's interest in oil in the disputed area. Mr. Ray's attention was drawn to a conversation with Mr. Duce in the Department on April 3, 1953, [4] concerning which the memorandum reporting the conversation attributes to Mr. Duce the statement that "Aramco had no present intentions to seek oil in Buraimi, or any other disputed area, and that the company had informed King Ibn Saud that if at any time it would alleviate his boundary problems the company would renounce its concessionary rights in disputed territories." Reference was also made to the statement made by Mr. Duce at a luncheon on April 16, 1953, in London, attended by Mr. Ross, Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office,

[1] Document 1545.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the memorandum by the British Foreign Office to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Document 1543.

[3] Prince Faisal was in New York in December 1952, where he spoke with Secretary Acheson on Dec. 2 and Edwin Plitt of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations on Dec. 4; see Documents 1493 and 1494. No record of a meeting between Faisal and Byroade in December 1952 has been found in Department of State files.

[4] See Document 1513.

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Messrs. Anderson and Stebinger, Jersey and Socony Directors of IPC, and Mr. Palmer of the U.S. Embassy, to the effect that "Aramco had no particular interest in the disputed areas. The undisputed portions of its concession were already sufficiently large to provide for its requirements. He (Duce) had, in fact, personally told Prince Feisal that Aramco would be willing to forego any claims which it might have to the disputed areas if that action would assist in promoting a settlement. He wished to tell the same thing to Mr. Ross . . ." (Quoted from memorandum of conversation enclosed with London's despatch 4998 of April 20, 1953. [5])

The foregoing references to statements made by Prince Feisal and Mr. Duce seemed greatly to surprise Mr. Ray, who took note of them.

Mr. Ray continued by way of reading a report written by Mr. Ohliger, Vice President of Aramco, concerning his talks with Saudi officials in Riyadh on March 5. Mr. Ohliger had been summoned to Riyadh by the King and had first had a few words with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Ambassador to London, during which Hafiz questioned him closely concerning a meeting which he said took place last year between an Aramco official and certain IPC and Foreign Office officials during which oil in the disputed area was discussed. Mr. Ohliger indicated his awareness of Mr. Duce's visit to London in April but did not believe he had gone into the question of oil in the disputed area. Following this meeting Mr. Ohliger had a lengthy conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yassin. (It is hoped that a copy of the report of this conversation may be obtained.)

During this conversation Sheikh Yusuf charged collaboration between the United States and UK Governments and Aramco in drawing up the latest proposals on Buraimi and specifically the third proposal dealing with present and future oil operations in any portion of the disputed areas which may be awarded by arbitration to Saudi Arabia. [6] Mr. Ohliger denied that Aramco had had any part in formulating these proposals. Sheikh Yusuf questioned him at great length and in a penetrating manner on Mr. Duce's discussions in London last April, but Mr. Ohliger reiterated his ignorance of any discussions concerning oil in the disputed areas.

When asked for Aramco's views of the British proposals, Mr. Ohliger . . . said categorically that Aramco would have no part in their acceptance and would absolutely refuse to give up its concession rights in any territory in the area which may be awarded to Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Yusuf's efforts to get Mr. Ohliger to modify his position somewhat were unsuccessful . . . . When asked by

[5] Document 1514. Ellipsis in the source text.
[6] Presumably this reference is to paragraph c of Document 1543.

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Sheikh Yusuf if Aramco would respond to a request by the Saudi Government to undertake operations in the disputed area in order to balance British operations, he replied in the affirmative but stated that there would be some delay as advance planning would be necessary.

. . . . . .

Mr. Ray concluded his remarks by saying he wished to clarify the question of United States participation with the British in formulating these proposals and also wondered how far we would be prepared to go to back Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government in any action which may be taken. Mr. Byroade stated categorically that the British proposals had not been formulated in collaboration with the Department. We first learned of these proposals when Mr. Beeley of the British Embassy informed us on February 15 [7] concerning them and stated that the Foreign Office had instructed the British Ambassador in Jidda to present them to the Saudi Arabian Government.

Mr. Byroade pointed out Sheikh Yusuf's misconception of the British proposals and said he could not understand how Aramco's position was in any way jeopardized since a British concession in the disputed area could result only from agreement by both Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government. Mr. Ray said he was doubtful that IPC would be willing to move out of any area awarded to Saudi Arabia upon an indication that Aramco did not wish to give up any of its concession rights there. Any agreement that IPC operations should continue until arbitration was completed would make it exceedingly doubtful that they would relinquish their work at the request of Aramco. He added that he felt the injection of the oil companies into a border dispute between sovereign governments most improper and an unnecessary complication. He stated further that the Executive Committee of Aramco had decided unanimously that Aramco's concession rights in the disputed area should in no way be impaired by agreeing to relinquish to IPC rights which Aramco may acquire in any disputed area awarded to Saudi Arabia. He personally felt that the company should now officially make this statement in order that the Saudis and the British would know exactly where they stood. Mr. Byroade stated that the nature of the British offer would seem to indicate such a step in the event Aramco should reach the decision mentioned by Mr. Ray. He did, however, raise the question whether such action might cause the Saudis to reject the proposals and thereby cause settlement of the dispute to be delayed. Mr. Ray fully understood the

[7] Memorandum of conversation of Feb. 15, not printed; for a summary, see telegram 246 to Jidda, Document 1545.

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nature of the dilemma in which Aramco was placed but seemed persuaded that it was in Aramco's interests to issue a public statement refusing to give up any concession rights which may be acquired in areas now in dispute.

Mr. Byroade inquired whether Aramco would need any oil which might be found in the disputed area in view of the vast oil reserves of other portions of their concession area. Mr. Ray said that he felt there would be a shortage of oil in 25 years and that Aramco would need access to all possible sources.

At this point the meeting adjourned to Mr. Hart's office since Mr. Byroade had another appointment.

There was considerable discussion of aggressive British intentions as Mr. Ray and his associates interpreted the recent British proposals. Mr. Ray felt that giving the IPC access to any Saudi territory would be the opening wedge for further British demands upon Saudi Arabia in, for example, the area bordering the Hadhramaut. Mr. Hart stated that from his experiences in Dhahran he would suggest that Aramco itself had not been entirely innocent of aggressive tactics. He elaborated somewhat on Aramco expeditions into Qatar and the disputed Sufuk Wells area to illustrate the point that, whatever Aramco policies at the present time might be, the tactics of Aramco exploration parties until recently could be characterized as aggressive. He felt that not unnaturally this had produced a reaction on the part of IPC causing them likewise to become somewhat aggressive.

At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Ray mentioned the recent Rub al-Khali incident at which time an Aramco exploration party had been halted by a British officer in an area well within Saudi Arabia on the pretext that the area belonged to the Aden Protectorate. Mr. Ray stated that Aramco was under pressure from King Saud to return to the spot in question in order to reinforce the Saudi position on the matter. Aramco, he stated, would naturally expect Saudi protection should an exploration party return.

Mr. Fritzlan stated that a British Embassy representative had recently informally indicated to him that the Foreign Office seemed to think that the Saudi complaint that a British party had trespassed on Saudi territory was justified. It did not appear, therefore, that any serious difficulties would arise in respect to this incident.

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No. 1549

786A.022/3-1254: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, March 12, 1954—11 p. m.

388. Re my telegram 387, March 12. [2] Following is text paragraph 3, British Buraimi proposals:

"All the above is provided that the oil operations of the IPC and AIOC go on. The former company acquired its present interests before the Saudi Arabian Government advanced their 1949 claim and brought the area into dispute and Anglo-Iranian's marine concession is contiguous to the former company's land concession. It would not be to anyone's advantage to stop these oil operations in the area. Much time and money have already been spent on them and there is no reason why they should not continue. It is recognized, of course, that Aramco's concessions would, as things stand, extend to cover any which as a result of arbitration might pass to Saudi sovereignty. It is not desired to impair Aramco's concessionary rights. Nevertheless, if the Saudi Government and Aramco were agreeable, the two British oil companies would in due course be interested in the negotiations of concessionary rights in any disputed area which might pass to Saudi sovereignty, it being understood that they would be offered on terms no less favorable than Aramco's. On this basis there is clearly every advantage and no disadvantage in agreement to the present oil operation."

WADSWORTH

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed; it reported that the wording of paragraph c of the British proposals on Buraimi handed to the Saudi Arabians differed slightly from paragraph c of the British Foreign Office memorandum handed to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Document 1543. The King's Councilors considered that paragraph to contain an implied commitment of Saudi willingness to grant a concession to a British company, and told the Ambassador they could make no commitment to the British regarding concession rights unless Aramco renounced its rights without qualification. (786A.00/3-1254)

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No. 1550

786A.00/3-1554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 16, 1954—6:44 p. m.

267. Embtel 391. [2] In any discussion Ambassador may have with King concerning Buraimi he should explain Department's position concerning British proposals as follows:

(1) Department saw no reason question desirability defining zone to be subjected to arbitration as described first proposal.

(2) While according Department's understanding agreement had been previously reached upon substance first portion second proposal, second portion to effect UK withdraw its levy posts in disputed area constituted concession by British to Saudi viewpoint. It was Department's understanding UK, having withdrawn its levy posts, would not introduce administrative personnel into area.

(3) Department did not consider third proposal would operate in manner to confer concession in any portion disputed area upon IPC or AIOC without specific agreement Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco. Department still cannot understand how acceptance third proposal necessarily impairs concession rights which Aramco may acquire.

(4) In expressing support for British proposals Department was impelled by belief proposals as whole constituted conciliatory gesture and step in right direction. However it was never Department's feeling position Saudi Arabian Government or Aramco on question of assumption by IPC and AIOC of concession would in any manner be prejudiced. [3]

(5) If Saudi Arabian Government or Aramco at present opposed awarding concessions to IPC and AIOC in any disputed area which may be decided to be Saudi territory, Department sees no reason why Saudi Government in replying British proposals should refrain from making statement to that effect.

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed; it reported the King was coming to Jidda and asked the Department of State to send in detail its views on paragraph c of the British memorandum. (786A.00/3-1554)

[3] Telegram 4004 from London, Mar. 17, reported the Foreign Office reaffirmed to an Embassy official that the only condition implied in paragraph c of the British memorandum was the continuance of IPC and AIOC exploration in the disputed area during arbitration. The British said they had no desire to prejudice Aramco's concessionary rights, and presumably would instruct their representative in Saudi Arabia along those lines. (780.022/3-1754)

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(6) Should Saudi Government desire explanations and elucidations proposals Department believes direct discussions with British would be helpful.

DULLES

No. 1551

780.022/3–1754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 17, 1954—7:45 p. m.

269. Davies, Spurlock and Chapman of Aramco called on Murphy in Department today in order express Aramco misgivings recent developments Buraimi dispute.

(1) Aramco representatives indicated agreement with SAG interpretation that paragraph 3 British proposals intended operate in such manner that British will inevitably and despite Aramco opposition obtain oil concession in disputed areas passing to Saudi Sovereignty.

(2) Davies referred to Ohliger's recent talk with King (summarized in Jidda telegram 392) [2] during which King reportedly expressed disappointment in American leadership and guidance and reflected possibility that Saudi Arabia may look to British for leadership. (In this connection Department interested in receiving any evidence tending corroborate or explain such feeling on part of King.)

(3) Aramco representatives provided memorandum their position with regard current British proposals summary of which follows:

(a) Aramco has and will continue urge early determination boundary and Aramco prepared cooperate this end. Aramco has not been party to British proposals nor is it prepared surrender any rights under concession.

(b) Aramco continues believe boundary should be determined on considerations allegiance, tradition and political history rather

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by BNA and NEA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Dated Mar. 15, not printed. It reported information received from Aramco officials who had recently spoken with the King. According to Aramco officials, the Saudi Arabian Government said it did not want to disregard Aramco's rights but felt it might have no alternative if the U.S. Government would not support Aramco or the Saudi Arabian Government against the British effort to "muscle in" on the concession in the disputed area. The King saw possible financial, territorial, and political advantages to having ties with the British, who gave aggressive support to their commercial interests and friends, in contrast to the U.S. Government, which imposed Israel on the Arab world and tied loans to conditions the Saudis felt infringed their sovereignty. (786A.00/3–1554)

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than considerations oil and oil concessions. Aramco withdrew from disputed area and has refrained from work there and believes competitors should do likewise.

(c) Suggestion that Aramco contribute to boundary solution by compromising rights seems improper as jeopardizing not only Aramco but Saudi interests. Abu Dhabi and Buraimi cannot be isolated from over-all boundary problem and threat of similar situation would confront Aramco on all but western boundary of concession.

(d) Aramco feels strongly USG should support it and SAG in protection of rights and that assurance such support should be given to SAG and British.

(4) Aramco representatives expressed hope Department would reconsider its position and issue appropriate instructions to Wadsworth for discussion problem with King who due shortly in Jidda.

Murphy suggested there has been some confusion in past regarding Aramco's position pointing out apparent flexible policy regarding relinquishment certain concession areas. Aramco representatives replied such has not only been policy but obligation through agreement. However Aramco had right decide which area it wished relinquish. In present instance there was every reason believe oil existed in disputed area of Trucial Coast and they had no intention relinquish any rights there.

Department representative stated further Department believes current confused situation could be cleared up through discussion with British and our Embassy London had been authorized engage in such and we had also authorized Wadsworth suggest Saudis approach British directly in order clarify any misunderstandings.

When queried Davies stated he considered it would be helpful for Embassy London in discussions with Foreign Office make clear Aramco opposition to relinquishing any concession rights it may acquire in disputed areas.

Davies inquired if Department would authorize Wadsworth clarify to SAG our position should SAG interpretation third British proposal prove correct.

For London: Embassy authorized disclose Aramco position regrading British proposals in discussions with Foreign Office.

For Jidda: In discussion with King Ambassador authorized inform him that should what we understand to be SAG interpretation third British proposal (Jidda telegram 387 [3]) prove correct Department would be unable endorse this proposal in present form.

DULLES

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 1549.

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No. 1552

Editorial Note

Telegram 401 from Jidda, March 18, not printed, reported that the Embassy had received a copy of the Saudi Arabian reply to the British memorandum on Buraimi, which had been handed to Pelham the previous evening. Telegram 402, March 18, not printed, transmitted the full text of the Saudi Arabian note to the British. (780.022/3–1854)

No. 1553

780.022/3–1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, March 19, 1954—4 p. m.

404. Regarding last paragraph my telegram 403, March 18, 11 p.m. [2] Following are high-lights Duce Ohliger Ray comment as put in letter addressed to me and wired verbatim Davies for discussion with Department:

1. Aramco favors prompt determination boundaries by sovereigns; and willing cooperate every proper way;

2. Any implication Aramco contribute to solution by agreeing to alternative concession arrangements highly improper and should be strongly opposed by USG;

3. Aramco will not surrender any concession rights and thinks to do so both unpatriotic and bad business judgment;

4. Aramco did not "suggest, collaborate in the preparation of, or approve" British proposal; it had no knowledge thereof until informed by Saudis; it will file statement with State Department clarify records this respect;

5. Aramco has right, in its discretion, explore and develop any areas covered by concession agreement; that it has refrained from doing so in disputed areas to expedite settlements by sovereigns; but that it may find it necessary proceed with exploration and development in area which British proposal concedes may be con-

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Duce, Ohliger, and Ray were preparing their comment on the Saudi Arabian Government reply to the British proposals. They informed the Ambassador they considered the best solution from the viewpoint of U.S. interests was for the British Government to withdraw the proposal it had made in paragraph c. (780.022/3–1854)

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firmed as Saudi territory, "particularly if the British Government insists that British companies be allowed to continue operations in the area or if Saudi Arabian Government requests Aramco so to do";

6. Failure stop all oil operations will render determinations more difficult;

7. Aramco strongly urges USG use influence bring about discontinuance oil operations and prompt boundary settlement all disputed areas;

8. USG attitude that British proposal will not embarrass Aramco is unrealistic and dangerous to USG as well as Aramco; "this point is beyond dispute because Aramco already has been greatly embarrassed by the proposal";

9. Aramco fears SAG may be on verge deciding deal with British on broad basis in oil matters failing positive USG support Aramco and early settlement; and

10. Nothing in Saudi reply inconsistent Aramco's strong conviction that all oil operations be discontinued.

WADSWORTH

No. 1554

780.022/3-2354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1954.

Subject: Buraimi Dispute: Aramco's Position

Participants: Mr. Davies, Chairman of Board of Aramco
Mr. Spurlock, of Aramco
Mr. Chapman, of Aramco
NEA—Mr. Byroade
NE—Mr. Fritzlan

Mr. Davies and his associates called in order to ascertain the Department's latest thinking on this subject.

Mr. Davies repeated his great concern over the situation in the light of Mr. Ohliger's talks with King Saud which revealed serious misgivings on the part of the King as regards United States leadership, etc. (Jidda's telegram 392 of March 15 [1]). Mr. Davies felt that it was important for the Department to back up Aramco fully and to take steps to test the good faith of the British in making their

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 1551.

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recent proposals. He felt strongly that the Buraimi dispute should be settled on the basis of tribal loyalties and affiliations rather than economics.

Mr. Byroade explained that when the British revealed their proposals to us we had considered their offer to make substantial concessions to the Saudis in the form of agreement to troop and control post withdrawal to be a very welcome development, and our understanding at that time of Aramco's position concerning its interest in the disputed areas made us believe that the third proposal would meet with Aramco's approval. We now understood Aramco's position and naturally it was our desire to help to the extent possible. However, we were interested primarily in getting this troublesome boundary dispute settled. Mr. Byroade wondered how important the disputed area was to Aramco and asked if their objection to the third British proposal was based on the likelihood of oil existing in the region.

Mr. Davies expressed the view that agreement by Aramco to relinquish a portion of its concession area in the Trucial Coast region would be the beginning of efforts by various groups to make serious inroads upon Aramco's whole concession territory, much of which adjoined disputed boundaries. He added that Aramco's opposition to the British proposal was also taken in the light of recent discovery of oil in the region. Mr. Spurlock felt that the opposition of the Saudi Government to the British proposals was grounds for the United States to oppose them. Such action would serve a useful purpose in indicating that the United States was willing to take an independent course and stand up to the British. Mr. Fritzlan questioned whether abandoning our policy of acting as honest broker without identifying ourselves with either side would contribute to settlement of the dispute.

Mr. Byroade reiterated our paramount desire to reach a settlement without of course sacrificing United States interests, and asked Mr. Davies for suggestions as to the course we should take.

Mr. Davies replied that in the opinion of the Company we should press the British to suspend their oil operations in the area pending arbitration. Such action would demonstrate good faith on their part.

Mr. Byroade said he understood these operations had been going on for some time and a great deal of money had been spent. He wondered if it would be an expensive matter to suspend operations and leave the area. Mr. Davies thought not, since it was only a matter of removing a few tents and other light equipment.

Mr. Byroade inquired if Mr. Davies thought well of the idea of an arrangement whereby both Aramco and IPC were allowed to operate in the area on the understanding that concessions would be de-

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termined by the arbitration award and each side would withdraw from the other side's territory.

There was some discussion of this point and various practical difficulties were mentioned. However, Mr. Davies made it clear that if the Saudi Arabian Government asked Aramco to enter the disputed area it would be obliged to do so. He also made clear his belief that a far better arrangement would be for the British to withdraw and for neither party to enter the disputed area until completion of arbitration. Mr. Davies and his associates expressed surprise that the British had taken the stand that continuation of their operations in the disputed area was an "absolute must" as far as their proposals were concerned.

Mr. Byroade stated we would study the matter further and hoped to be able to make certain suggestions to the Foreign Office through our Embassy in London. He assured Mr. Davies, who leaves tomorrow for Saudi Arabia, that the Department, in seeking to further the chances of settling this matter, will do everything it properly can to protect Aramco's interests.

No. 1555

780.022/3-3154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs (Fritzlan) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 31, 1954.

Subject: Buraimi Dispute

Participants:

Aramco	*State*
Mr. Spurlock	NEA—Mr. Jernegan
Mr. Noble	NE—Mr. Dorsey

[1] Filed with this memorandum of conversation was a memorandum by Dorsey to Jernegan, drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA and BNA, dated Mar. 31, discussing the meeting that was to take place with Aramco representatives later that day. Although the Department of State had previously given general support to the British proposals of Feb. 15, the memorandum suggested that in view of the position of Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government it might be in order to suggest suspension of IPC activities as a means to improve the atmosphere. It seemed unlikely, however, that the British would agree to suspend them and there seemed no way the United States could properly force them to comply. In that case, it seemed possible Saudi eagerness to settle the dispute would lead them to request the Department of State to persuade Aramco to agree to give up its concession rights in the area. The memorandum ended by stating that: "Should this happen we might conceivably consider it in the National interest for Aramco to comply with the Saudi request. Perhaps this point should be discussed with the Aramco representatives." (780.022/3-3154)

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Mr. Kopper NE—Mr. Fritzlan
Mr. Chapman

Mr. Spurlock opened the discussion by recalling the meeting between Mr. Byroade, Mr. Davies and others on March 23, [2] at which time Aramco's position in regard to the recent British proposals had been fully explained and Mr. Byroade had agreed to study the matter further in the hope that we might take it up with the British.

Mr. Spurlock stated that Aramco was about to address letters, specifically setting forth its position in this matter, to the Saudi Arabian Government and the British oil companies (IPC and AIOC). [3] A similar letter would be written to the State Department and it was his hope that a copy of this could be passed through official channels to the British Foreign Office. Mr. Spurlock repeated the grounds for Aramco's objection to the British proposals . . . . He regarded it as an urgent matter for the Department to take a strong position with the British in this regard and hoped that we would be able to let the Saudis know that we are doing this. He felt that failure to do so would be highly detrimental not only to Aramco prestige in the area but to American prestige in general. Mr. Spurlock wondered if the Department had now assumed a position concerning this question and what action it may have taken or intended to take.

Mr. Jernegan stated that the NEA Bureau was prepared to recommend to the Secretary that we tell the British that, in the light of recent developments, it would appear that they are on the wrong course and that in our opinion it would be helpful were they to agree that the British companies should suspend their activities in the disputed area pending conclusion of arbitration. We had had a number of informal conversations with the British before they had received the text of the Saudi reply to their proposals. It was probable that this reply had now been received and he felt we could profitably explore matters further with them.

Mr. Jernegan made clear our intention to impress upon the British the desirability of concluding boundary settlements without reference to oil considerations. He stated that we had already informed the Saudis that we did not support the notion that the British companies should necessarily obtain oil concessions in any areas which might be awarded to Saudi Arabia and that we had authorized our Ambassador to tell the Saudis that we would support a proposal which they might put forward permitting Aramco as well as IPC to operate in the disputed area. Mr. Jernegan felt

[2] *Supra.*
[3] See telegram 423 from Jidda, *infra.*

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that it would be desirable to let the Saudi Arabian Government know that we were discussing this question with the British but was not sure in his own mind as to the manner in which we should convey this information. It would certainly not be helpful for the Saudis to imagine that no further effort on their part was necessary. Mr. Spurlock expressed full agreement.

Messrs. Spurlock and Noble stressed the importance of early settlement of this matter and hoped the Department would emphasize this in any talks held with the British. Mr. Jernegan assured them that the Department had always wished to see this dispute settled as early as possible and we would certainly emphasize this aspect to the British.

Mr. Jernegan stated that, subject to approval by the Secretary, the Department would make early representations to the British and would prepare an appropriate communication to the Saudi Arabian Government. He could not of course give any assurance regarding the British reaction to such representations.

No. 1556

780.022/4-654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, April 6, 1954—2 p. m.

423. Regarding mytel 420, April 4. [2]

(1) Aramco General Counsel Ray handed me yesterday letter enclosing copies of five letters and one memorandum dated April 3 addressed by Board Chairman Davies respectively to Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary Byroade, King Saud, petroleum development (Trucial Coast) Ltd., Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and British Foreign Office.

All set forth *inter alia* Aramco's basic position that it is not prepared surrender any rights under its concession, that all activities by oil companies in disputed areas should be immediately discontinued and that all boundaries should be speedily determined.

Ray wished me have copies in case Department might desire refer thereto in instructions to me. He expects first two letters will be delivered at Department tomorrow together with original of memorandum (which Department is requested deliver to Foreign Office) and copies three other letters. Letter to King Saud will be

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.
[2] Not printed. (780.022/4-454)

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delivered earliest opportunity; those to oil companies were to be delivered in London yesterday.

(2) I discussed reftel with Ray. We hope Department, when receiving Aramco officials delivering letters, can discuss it fully with them. He had reached substantially same conclusion and was forwarding his colleagues careful memorandum same subject.

. . . . . .

WADSWORTH

No. 1557

780.022/4–1454: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 14, 1954—4:06 p. m.

288. Following developments concerning Buraimi took place April 13:

(1) Department reviewed developments with British Embassy representative pointing out Aramco opposition relinquishment any concession territory in disputed area Trucial Coast and apparent Saudi misinterpretation of meaning paragraph c British proposal. Mention made of letters written by Aramco to British oil companies and contents summarized. Department deplored possible conflict between US and UK companies for Saudi oil and suggested in circumstances British consider withdrawing paragraph c or modifying it substantially in order there should be no misunderstanding concerning its meaning. It was also stated that in Department opinion suspension oil operations in disputed territory pending conclusion arbitration would be helpful. Failure take this step might well prompt SAG request Aramco also engage in operations in disputed areas.

British representative expressed understanding Department position and renewed assurances re lack of British intention in any way prejudice Aramco rights in disputed areas. He expressed belief Saudis understood perfectly well meaning British proposals. He agreed with Department that demarcation boundaries should not be based upon oil considerations and conceded extent of operations in disputed area probably not so great as to make suspension difficult. However he considered continuation oil operations of vital importance to British position in area and expressed view Saudis understood and generally accepted this proposition. He stated con-

[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by BNA and NEA. Repeated to London and Dhahran.

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tinuation oil operations essential to maintenance *status quo*, which HMG considers should not be disturbed during pre-arbitration period, and that any cessation would cause loss of prestige and consequent disaffection of tribes. In connection with these oil operations Embassy representative wondered if purpose Aramco letters to British companies was to protect themselves against possibility having compensate British companies for equipment and installations in areas over which Aramco may obtain concession after arbitration. Department indicated no such consideration had come to its attention.

Embassy representative forwarding Department views to Foreign Office. He stated Saudi reply to British proposals considered unsatisfactory but preparation fresh instructions for Pelham had been interrupted by news that King Saud while recently in Kuwait suggested in formal manner to Political Agent before Ruler that arbitration Buraimi dispute be abandoned and direct negotiations resumed. Foreign Office had instructed Burrows discuss question with King in Bahrein and state Foreign Office willing consider matter but would expect receive from King general proposals for settlement dispute which could form basis negotiations.

(2) Aramco representative handed Murphy letter to Secretary dated April 12 setting forth Aramco position and requesting United States support in order achieve discontinuance all oil activities in disputed area and establishment boundaries without delay. This letter accompanied by a memorandum of Aramco position for British Foreign Office (which Aramco requested Department transmit) together with copies letters to King Saud and to AIOC and PDTC. Letter to King outlined Aramco position and denied Aramco collaboration in preparation British proposals and stated it advised by responsible officials US Government had no part in their preparation. (Department understands copies these documents being provided Embassies Jidda and London.)

Murphy stated Department would transmit memorandum to Foreign Office. He informed Aramco representative in general way Department's conversation with British and reiterated our desire assist Aramco in any feasible manner.

Action requested: Embassy Jidda should inform Foreign Office Department has had discussion with British Embassy during which Department outlined Aramco position and SAG views as revealed to us and indicated our misgivings concerning paragraph c in light recent developments. Department suggested British re-examine paragraph c and consider modifications and clarifications which would meet existing situation. Department believes Ambassador should discuss recent approach King Saud to British only if Saudis raise it. For time being British desire we withhold this information

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from Aramco. However Embassy asking Foreign Office if it objects our mentioning matter to Aramco should it become pertinent in discussions.

SMITH

No. 1558

780.022/4-1554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, April 15, 1954—4 p. m.

432. Since receipt Deptel 282, April 7, [2] following items re eastern frontier dispute and related matters have come my attention:

1. Aramco Vice Presidents Duce and Ohliger were received by King Saud in private audience April 7 and 8 in Riyadh and again April 10 at Dhahran on eve His Majesty's departure on official visits Bahrain and Pakistan. Aramco Jidda representative Owen tells me:

At April 7 meeting King did most of talking. He liked film "The Arab Island" Duce had shown him but suggested it be brought up to date by including something regarding his own succession. Then with view bringing Duce up to date SAG thinking, King made *inter alia* following points:

. . . . . .

At April 8 meeting Ohliger handed King letter (mytel 423, April 6 [3]) formally asserting Aramco position re no suspended concessionary rights in eastern disputed areas. . . . Further discussion was reserved for April 10 meeting subject of which I have not yet learned.

Duce and Ohliger were also told King had fixed date (April 23) for resumption important discussion begun January 1952 regarding price Aramco receives from parent companies for crude oil off-take and related questions.

2. British Ambassador Pelham has told me of King's proposal March 21 through British political agent Pelley at Kuwait for settlement eastern frontier claims by reverting to direct negotiation. In reply Foreign Office's request for comment, Pelham urged strongly that while informal negotiations direct bilateral settle-

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed; the Department of State informed the Embassy it would discuss paragraph c with the British Embassy and then send pertinent information and instructions. (780.022/4-454)

[3] Document 1556.

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ment might prove helpful, agreement to arbitrate dispute should be fully maintained pending their upshot; and he seemed pleased Burrows had been named British negotiator and instructed proceed on that basis. He will consult with Burrows on Bahrain next week. He does not know whether King has appointed Saudi negotiator.

Pelham also again insisted he had given Saudis no encouragement whatsoever in reply Shaikh Yusuf's last summer's *démarches* re "arranging" that Aramco renounce concessionary rights in disputed areas; it was only thereafter that Saudi Ambassador Wahbe apparently on orders sent him by Shaikh Yusuf had made suggestion to Foreign Office which had led it to inject oil issue into February 14 proposals.

WADSWORTH

No. 1559

780.022/4-2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 23, 1954—6 p. m.

4695. In discussion Buraimi question at Foreign Office today, Embassy officer was asked whether Department's suggestions to British Embassy (Deptel 5407 [2]) meant that USG was requesting HMG both (a) modify wording paragraph c in light Aramco's unwillingness surrender concessionary rights, and (b) suspend operations of British oil companies in disputed area. Foreign Office official pointed out USG had taken position British proposals on whole represented step forward and it would therefore be surprising if having done so, we should now ask British suspend oil operations when their continuance, as Foreign Office had repeatedly made clear, was essential part British proposals. Official confirmed statements made by British Embassy representatives to Department during April 13 conversation to effect continuation oil operations essential for political as well as commercial reasons. With reference to statement made during Hart's April 14 call at Foreign Office to effect force would be used if necessary prevent Aramco entering territory, official explained this based on assumption any Aramco party would be accompanied by Saudi guards. He stressed entry of latter into area would be resisted as HMG must regard it as Abu Dhabi territory in absence some determination to contrary.

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[1] Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

[2] Printed as telegram 288 to Jidda, Document 1557.

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Embassy officer replied to question above by citing substance Deptel 5407 and Deptel 5459, [3] i.e. (1) Department had suggested British reexamine paragraph c and consider withdrawing or modifying it substantially in order eliminate any possible misunderstanding, (2) Department believes suspension oil operations in disputed territory pending arbitration would be helpful, while failure take this step might well cause SAG request Aramco commence such operations, and (3) Department not inclined agree that British companies must continue operations while American company must not enter area. Embassy officer also stated (Deptel 5459) Department still disturbed at emphasis on British interest in obtaining concession in area and Department hoped British were not considering Saudi willingness, should such exist, to give away portions of American oil concession as justification for British acceptance since such Saudi attitude would obviously be motivated in part at least by expectation reaching more favorable territorial settlement. Officer added Ambassador Wadsworth authorized inform SAG we had suggested HMG reconsider paragraph c.

Foreign Office official remarked it possible Saudis might in fact be leading British into trap and also that Aramco might fear it may be forced by SAG give up part its concession. In circumstances, Embassy officer suggested one way around present difficulty might be as follows:

1. British (in view Aramco attitude) to eliminate from paragraph c all reference to interest of British companies in eventual concession, and make clear to SAG (a) previous reference based on false assumption and (b) in circumstances HMG has no interest in concessionary rights for British companies in area in question, if determined to be Saudi.
2. USG and HMG to reassure Aramco re British intentions and USG seek persuade Aramco and if necessary SAG that Aramco parties stay out of disputed area pending settlement of dispute.

Foregoing would of course involve continuance of operations by British companies.

Embassy officer made it clear he unable make any commitment re foregoing suggestion but would forward it to Department. Foreign Office official undertook consult his superiors on same basis.

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[3] Dated Apr. 16, not printed. It informed the Embassy in London that the Department of State was disturbed at the apparent British tendency to emphasize the interest of British companies in obtaining concessions in territory that might be given to Saudi Arabia by arbitration. The Department hoped the British were not taking the position that possible Saudi willingness to give away any part of the U.S. oil concession constituted justification for the British to accept, especially since such Saudi willingness would obviously be motivated by the expectation of reaching a more favorable territorial settlement with the British. (780.022/4–1554)

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It appears to Embassy that basic considerations in present situation are (1) British insistence on continuing their oil operations; (2) British determination use force against Saudis entering disputed area; and (3) Aramco's fears based on suspicion SAG may give away part of Aramco concession to British. Latter fears, and desire make its interest in area more evident, seem to us principal causes for Aramco letters to British companies and for Aramco's apparent intention send its parties into area. If these fears could be removed it seems to us there should be no great problem about continuance British oil operations since Foreign Office has repeatedly affirmed British have no intention disturbing Aramco's rights and would immediately withdraw their companies should territory eventually be determined to be Saudi.

Foreign Office has not yet received Aramco memo (paragraph 2 Deptel 5407) which we understood was being forwarded through British Embassy.

IPC and AIOC replies to Aramco's letter (Embtel 4562 [4]) have not yet been sent but Foreign Office confirms they will be couched in terms outlined that telegram.

Foreign Office states there have been no new developments re direct negotiations between SAG and HMG but official pointed out if present plans for such negotiations are carried out there may not be any arbitration and therefore question of modification of paragraph c need not arise.

ALDRICH

[4] Dated Apr. 15, not printed. It reported IPC and AIOC had received the Aramco letter and given it to the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office was disturbed at the tone of the letter, which an official described as "insulting," and repeated that since their proposals specifically stated the British Government had no intention of prejudicing Aramco's concessionary rights the Aramco letter was unnecessary. The Foreign Office official reiterated the British stand that Aramco would not be allowed into the area. (780.022/4-1554)

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No. 1560

780.022/4–2954: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Dhahran [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, April 29, 1954—4:31 p. m.

182. Dhahran for Ambassador. April 26 British Embassy [2] referring Jernegan-Beeley conversation April 13 [3] expressed Eden's views Buraimi developments substantially as follows:

(1) British company had obtained concession for Abu Dhabi territory 1936. Area now in dispute had not ever been claimed by Saudi Arabia until 1949. Unless and until this claim fully established HMG could not consider SAG had any rights at all in territory. There was therefore no basis for altering *status quo* and Aramco could have no present rights in area by virtue its concession from SAG.

(2) HMG had made it abundantly clear to SAG that granting oil concession to British companies is in no way condition attached to arbitration proposal. Entirely up to Aramco to decide whether or not it wishes relinquish any part its concession.

(3) Mr. Eden feels strongly on subject and asks that we advise Aramco against any attempt begin operations in disputed area before boundaries are settled.

April 29 Department conveyed substance point 2 above to Aramco.

Department added it had misgivings over possible developments should Aramco enter disputed area. Department stated further we realize SAG may exert pressure on Aramco commence operations disputed area but hope Aramco will consider matter carefully and consult with Department before taking such step.

SMITH

[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA. Repeated to London and Jidda.

[2] Memorandum of conversation of Apr. 26, not printed. (780.022/4–2654)

[3] A summary of the Apr. 13 conversation is in telegram 288 to Jidda, Document 1557.

No. 1561

Editorial Note

Telegram 168 from Dhahran, May 3, not printed, reported on a number of conversations between the Ambassador and various members of the Saudi Arabian Government regarding Buraimi. During the last conversation, on May 2, the Deputy Foreign Minis-

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ter informed the Ambassador his latest talks with British officials indicated that United States interest in the Buraimi settlement had had no effect on the British position, which remained "hard" and "inflexible." Yassin believed the questions of troop withdrawal and the size of the area to be submitted to arbitration could be resolved through direct negotiation with the British, but the question of oil operations in the disputed area could not. The next discussions between the two sides were expected to be held in London, with Saudi Arabia represented by its Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who agreed with Yassin that settlement would have to come through arbitration. (780.022/5–354)

No. 1562

886A.2553/5–1454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—6:07 p. m.

1257. For Wadsworth and Byroade. [2] In view statements by Yassin (Jidda telegram 454 [3]) and recent Saudi overtures to British re Buraimi Department believes it most desirable that attention be focused again upon arbitration process.

Principal difficulty at present is British insistence continue oil operations disputed area and Aramco and SAG opposition. With onset hot weather these operations would normally be suspended in May and not resumed until late in year. This factor might enable British give informal assurances to Saudis that they would suspend operations in disputed area on temporary basis without waiving any right they may consider they have carry out such operations.

Department considering sounding out British this matter stating we would be prepared if their reaction favorable make energetic representations to SAG in favor acceptance British proposals and making immediate beginning arbitration. We would also endeavor obtain Aramco's acquiescence. In our discussion with Aramco we would emphasize urgency getting matter settled, our conviction Aramco position safeguarded by British proposals and our determination insure Aramco rights following arbitration fully respected.

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[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA. Repeated to London, Jidda, and Dhahran.

[2] Wadsworth and Byroade were at the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul. For documentation on the conference, see Documents 210–212 and 824.

[3] Not printed. (780.022/5–654)

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We might also point out failure settle dispute by arbitration could possibly lead tc deal between parties at expense Aramco.

In our approach to SAG we would:

1. Reassert our belief in desirability early arbitration as most objective and equitable manner establishing and preserving Saudi claims and interests;
2. State our willingness approach British requesting informal assurances operations in disputed area would be suspended temporarily without implying waiver of right resume them;
3. State our belief SAG with this informal understanding should accept British proposals without delay and proceed with arbitration;
4. State our willingness impress upon British our hope they will treat Turki and his force with due consideration and in particular refrain from interference his water supply.

Department desires comments Byroade, Wadsworth and Embassy London re foregoing. [4] Comments which Jidda may wish make should be sent Wadsworth.

DULLES

[4] Telegram 5175 from London, May 18, not printed, reported Byroade considered arbitration the best course to follow and suggested the British temporarily suspend their oil operations during the summer, without prejudice to their eventual rights. British Foreign Office officials, however, repeated that the continuation of oil operations was a matter of principle on which the Government was not prepared to yield, since British prestige in the area was involved. (780.022/5–1854) Ambassador Wadsworth, in telegram 740 from Istanbul, May 19, not printed, said he was not up to date on the matter; but agreed it would be desirable to urge early arbitration on both British and Saudis. He also suggested that during the period of arbitration a line be drawn somewhere in the disputed area, south of which British companies would not operate and north of which Aramco would not operate, on the understanding that the arrangement would not prejudice either side's claims. (886A.2553/5–1954)

No. 1563

780.022/5–2154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 22, 1954—1:55 p. m.

6277. Embtel 5270. [2] Department concurs in desirability exploring Buraimi situation with Hafiz Wahba and authorizes Embassy inform him:

[1] Drafted by Fritzlan and cleared by NEA. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

[2] Dated May 21, not printed. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United Kingdom informed an Embassy officer that all of the Feb. 15 proposals of the British regarding arbitration were acceptable to the Saudi Arabian Government except for *Continued*

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1. We continue to believe British February 15 proposals [3] on whole constitute conciliatory gesture and step in right direction.
2. We have expressed to British our hope their oil operations would cease during summer and that arbitration agreement would be concluded and some progress in arbitration made in next few months.
3. We do not believe it would be helpful Aramco enter disputed area. We have so informed Aramco and also informing British our views.

Department believes Embassy should at same time make approach to Foreign Office, on level higher than Head Eastern Department along following lines:

1. SAG has intimated to Aramco its wish it enter disputed area and Department believes formal request from King may be imminent. [4]
2. Department has told Aramco it believes such move now would be unhelpful and we hope delaying tactics can be employed. However, if formal request received it is almost certain Aramco will feel impelled to comply and USG's objections are unlikely to restrain Aramco.
3. This situation can be averted by British decision suspend oil operations during summer when such activity normally ceases in Arabia. Such decision need not prejudice British rights in any manner and if taken would effectively preclude Aramco entry into disputed area.
4. With improvement in atmosphere following suspension we feel arbitration agreement could be concluded and some progress toward arbitration be made.
5. Situation being discussed with Wahba along lines indicated above.

Should HMG refuse to consider requesting British companies suspend operations for summer we would hope British parties in disputed area would be instructed avoid taking any step which might produce incident in event Aramco parties also enter disputed

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the continuing operation of British oil companies in the disputed area; and Saudi Arabia felt that if the British continued to operate in the area Aramco should move in there also. Wahba said, however, Saudi Arabia would be greatly influenced by the advice of the U.S. Government, and wanted to know if it would recommend that Saudi Arabia allow the British to continue their operations. The Embassy asked for advice for its reply. The Ambassador suggested the Embassy inform him it did not see any present prospect of British withdrawal and in the circumstances considered it unwise for Aramco to enter the disputed area. (780.022/5-2154)

[3] See Document 1543.

[4] On May 20, the Chairman of the Board of Aramco wrote to the Secretary of State and informed him the company was expecting the Saudi Arabian Government to request it to begin operations in the disputed territory, and the company would feel that it had to comply with an official request of the Government. He informed the Secretary, however, that the work party would be instructed to wait at least 5 days before entering the area, in order to give the Department of State additional time to help both sides find a way to settle the dispute. (886A.2553/5-2054)

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area. As we have reason believe any Aramco entry into disputed area would be at point remote from area British operations and probably be of a few days duration we feel British parties should ignore presence Aramco. Furthermore, should entry take place we believe it possible arrange via Aramco that Saudi guards accompanying Aramco party be unarmed and in such event we would hope British parties would likewise be unarmed. [5]

DULLES

[5] At 2:37 p. m. on the same day the Department of State received telegram 184 from Dhahran, May 22, not printed. It informed the Department that Aramco had received a confirmed request from the Saudi Arabian Government on that date to send its work parties into the disputed area. The Consulate General did not know if Saudi Arabian military guards would go with the party, but expected them to do so. (886A.2553/5–2254)

Telegram 200 to Dhahran, sent at 1:33 a. m., May 23, not printed, repeated as 6285 to London and 327 to Jidda, instructed the Consulate General to seek a delay of at least 5 days in the departure of the Aramco party. It also requested the Embassy in London to act on telegram 6277 with all possible speed. (780.022/5–2354)

No. 1564

780.022/5–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 24, 1954—7 p. m.

5314. Butterworth took Hoover with him to see Permanent Under Secretary Kirkpatrick and represented the considerations contained Department 6277 [2] as amended by pertinent part of Deptel 6285. [3] There ensued a discussion which lasted for more than an hour during which Kirkpatrick reviewed the history of the Buraimi dispute emphasizing particularly that Saudi Arabia had continuously extended its territorial claims and that the 1949 line was only put forward after Aramco had obtained information of the likely discovery of oil by the British companies which had been operating since 1936 although suspended during the war. Kirkpatrick vehemently rejected suggestion that IPC should suspend operations on the grounds that the territory was not technically in dispute. He drew the distinction that the territory was merely claimed by Saudi Arabia and was strictly speaking not a disputed area at all. He made it quite clear that if only for reasons of pres-

[1] Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 5, *supra.*

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tige the British had no intention of withdrawing. It was quite evident that the British had discovered oil in the area north of the Saudi 1949 claim and intend to bring in wells.

Kirkpatrick maintained that Aramco has no real justification for sending a party into the area for oil exploration purposes and implied that British had reason to believe that sole purpose of the exercise was to bribe the neighboring tribes.

Kirkpatrick emphasized again that if the Aramco party came into what the British regard as Abu Dhabi territory they would be put out. Butterworth strongly expressed the hope that any such action would not be taken without the most careful consideration and that in any case instructions would be issued not to shoot first and talk later. Kirkpatrick indicated that that would be the case but that after talking politely if the party attempted to persist and were contumacious, then force would be used.

Embassy will speak to Saudi Ambassador along lines Deptel 6277 as soon as possible. [4] Department may be interested to know that according to Kirkpatrick Saudi Ambassador has taken much the same line with Foreign Office as indicated our telegram 5270. [5]

ALDRICH

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[4] Telegram 5333 from London, May 25, reported an Embassy officer had conveyed the substance of the first three paragraphs of telegram 6277 to the Saudi Ambassador, who personally favored proceeding with arbitration as soon as possible. At the request of the Foreign Office, Sheikh Wahba had cabled his government the information that the British were unwilling to suspend the operations of their oil companies, and urging them not to send Aramco into the area. (780.022/5–2554)

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

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No. 1565

780.022/5-3154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, May 31, 1954—2 p. m.

491. 1. In further conversation with Yassin yesterday I made all points set forth in Deptel 337 May 29 [2] in reply my telegram 489 May 29. [3]

While grateful for Department's clear statement much of which he found reassuring he said he felt Department's position was not truly impartial because for SAG to accept arbitration with condition that British oil companies continue operations in disputed area would mean that two parties to dispute would not go before arbitral commission on equal footing.

He stressed that to Ambassador Pelham's last proposals re arbitration (Embtel 480 May 23 [4]) SAG had suggested three alternatives: That there be no operations in disputed area; or that Aramco as well as British companies conduct operations therein; or that British companies operate to north and Aramco to south of a provisional line dividing area.

When I suggested additional third alternative of words "without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties" he replied that this went without saying.

He added that while his latest word from Ambassador Wahba in London was that even this third alternative was unacceptable to British Government it would in his view be much better were British to accept it now. Otherwise he saw no recourse except to take dispute to UN. He could not see that SAG stood to lose anything by

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[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed. It suggested the Ambassador tell Yassin the British had assured the Department of State that oil as such was not an issue in Buraimi and the grant of an oil concession to British oil companies was not a condition to arbitration. While the United States had repeatedly told the British the removal of their oil companies would facilitate arbitration, there was a difference between continuing operations by a private company, acting on its own, and the initiation of operations by Aramco, acting contrary to its own plans at the request of a foreign government. The United States was not supporting either side in the dispute and did not think it was "letting Aramco down" by urging that its people not be put in danger as a result of a dispute between two governments. (780.022/5-2954)

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Not printed. It reported that Pelham's proposals restated and elaborated the British proposals of Feb. 15 (see Document 1543). (886A.2553/5-2354) Despatch 395 from Jidda, May 24, not printed, transmitted copies of both Pelham's letter and the Saudi Arabian answer. (780.022/5-2454)

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so doing and it might be that UN would recommend to both parties arbitration on that basis.

Re final point reference telegram he asked me inform Department in strict confidence that Saudi guards accompanying Aramco party "which might enter disputed area today" were instructed not to use their arms but that if ordered by British to withdraw they were to refuse.

2. I have shown Owen Deptel 335, May 29. [5] He comments that if its last two words were "crystalize issue" rather than "produce incident" last sentence would better reflect King's attitude as he understands it. Aramco party he says "crossed 1952 line into disputed area mid-morning May 30".

WADSWORTH

[5] Not printed. It informed the Embassy the U.S. Government had advised Aramco that, while the government would not officially intervene at that time, it was deeply concerned at the possibility of conflict between nationals of the United States and the United Kingdom. Regarding Aramco information that the King told the Aramco party it must not turn back unless forced by the British, the last sentence reads: "Duce interprets this as evidence that King is determined to produce incident." (888.2553/5–2954)

No. 1566

780.022/6–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY JIDDA, June 6, 1954—8 p. m.

500. Following information received from Aramco Jidda.

1. British aircraft dropped following message to Aramco party in disputed area at noon June 5:

"Addressed to Aramco party at location 51 degrees 12 minutes east, 24 degrees 30 minutes north (approximately). You are hereby warned you are committing trespass on territory of Abu Dhabi. Please return immediately to Saudi Arabian territory.

"By order of His Excellency, Political Resident Persian Gulf. Charles M. LeQuesne, First Secretary".

2. Aramco President Keyes sending following by courier today to Bahrain:

"His Excellency, Political Resident Persian Gulf Bahrain.

"Sir we have your note 5 June 1954 dropped to one of our seismograph parties in course of its work in vicinity of Khur al Odaid.

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

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"I am of course, familiar with long standing boundary dispute. Nevertheless, area concerned has long been claimed by Saudi Arabia. Our present work in area is undertaken with permission and approval of His Majesty's Government. [2]

"Our current field season is drawing to close and it is anticipated that party working toward coast will be dispersed in course of next week. Such dispersal is however, in course of seasonal programming and without prejudice either to rights and claims of Saudi Arabia or our concession rights in kingdom.

"Yours very truly, R. L. Keyes".

3. Keyes stated he has instructed party continue work to coast and has informed SAG Riyadh of foregoing. He also states he anticipates party will leave disputed area by evening June 8. [3]

WADSWORTH

[2] Telegram 347 to Jidda, June 7, not printed, informed the Embassy the Department of State was puzzled by the phrase "with permission and approval" of the Saudi Arabian Government, in light of previous Aramco assertions that the Saudi Arabians had ordered it into the disputed area. The Department wondered if Aramco's role had been more active than it appeared and it requested the Embassy's evaluation. (780.022/6–654)

[3] Telegram 5587 from London, June 8, not printed, reported that a fairly sizeable force was moving toward the Aramco party. A Foreign Office official informed the Embassy the matter had been discussed by the Cabinet over the weekend and the situation was causing "great concern" to the British Government. When an Embassy officer reported the Aramco party should be out by that night and said he hoped an incident could be averted, the Foreign Office official replied that the British shared that hope, but he pointed out that Aramco had been warned. (780.022/6–854)

No. 1567

780.022/6–1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, June 11, 1954—9 a. m.

506. Re Deptel 347, June 7. [2]

1. Since question of Aramco resuming exploration in disputed eastern area was first raised by SAG in conversations with Ohliger last March I have sensed Aramco's policy attitudes increasingly determined by following three primary considerations:

a. Desire avoid involvement in boundary dispute between governments. (A policy enunciated in writing to British following 1949 Stobart incident.) This led to Aramco taking basic position which it

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

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still holds as matter of principle that British companies should cease operation the disputed area during arbitration.

b. Desire maintain best possible relations with SAG. This led Aramco (when later it became clear that British Government would not receive from position that British companies must continue operations) to concur in SAG view that British and Saudi positions might be equalized by resumption Aramco explorations suspended in 1949 at SAG request.

c. Desire protect its own interests in valuable oil reserves disputed area a consideration rendered more acute by suspected Saudi intrigue designed make deal with British whereby SAG would gain sovereignty over disputed area in return for oil concession therein to British companies. This led Aramco to implement specific Saudi request by resuming operations in western part of area where it had earlier sent exploration parties first in 1937–1938 and again 1948–1949.

. . . . . .

4. Aramco states categorically "not taking more initiative than previously indicated".

WADSWORTH

No. 1568

Editorial Note

Telegram 5731 from London, June 15, transmitted a summary of an *aide-mémoire* which the Foreign Office had given to the Embassy concerning a new proposition the British were considering sending to the Saudis regarding the arbitral tribunal's determination of the boundaries and the withdrawal of forces by both sides from the Buraimi area. Despatch 4057 from London, June 16, transmitted a copy of the *aide-mémoire*. Telegram 5759 from London, June 16, informed the Department of State that the British proposals were confidential and the British did not want them discussed with Aramco or Saudi Arabia at that time. Telegram 512 from Jidda, June 17, reported the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia was in general agreement with the new British proposals, although he suggested some changes in the method of determining a dividing line in the disputed territory for the period of arbitration. Telegram 6959 to London, repeated as 359 to Jidda, June 18, informed the Embassies the Department of State welcomed the British effort to arrive at a compromise formula. The Department, however, was uncertain about the amount of public support it should give the proposals. The Department suggested it might, if Aramco agreed to the line proposed by the British, give the proposals general support if and when the Saudis asked the United States position. The above telegrams, none printed, are in Department of State file 780.022.

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No. 1569

Editorial Note

Despatch 432 from Jidda, June 30, not printed, transmitted a copy of the text of the British proposals on Buraimi which Ambassador Pelham submitted to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office on June 28. In their proposal, the British defined the "Buraimi zone" as an area within a radius of 20 kilometers from the village of Buraimi, and "disputed areas" as the Buraimi zone and all other land claimed by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi between the Saudi Arabian claim of 1949 and the claim put forward at the Dammam Conference in 1952 on behalf of the ruler of Abu Dhabi. The section regarding oil operations in the disputed zone proposed that for the purpose of oil operations only, and without prejudicing the rights of either side to the disputed territory, the region lying between the 1949 claim of Saudi Arabia and the 1952 claim of Abu Dhabi would be divided along a line called the Fuad Hamza line. (780.022/6–3054)

According to telegram 6 from Jidda, July 4, not printed, the Fuad Hamza line was a vaguely described line dating back to 1935. (780.022/7–454)

No. 1570

780.022/7–3154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET JIDDA, July 31, 1954—3 p. m.

45. Buraimi arbitration agreement signed yesterday by British Ambassador Pelham and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal.[2] British

[1] Repeated to London and Dhahran.

[2] Despatch 521 from London, Aug. 20, not printed, transmitted a copy of the July 30 "Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom (acting on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and His Highness Sultan Said bin Taimur) and the Government of Saudi Arabia." The Arbitration Tribunal was asked to locate a common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi within a line claimed by Saudi Arabia in 1949 and one claimed by Abu Dhabi in 1952; and to decide on the sovereignty in an area within a circle, the center of which would be in the village of Buraimi, and whose circumference passed through the point of junction of latitude 24°25' North and longitude 55°36' East. Attached to the treaty was an exchange of notes between Ambassador Pelham and Foreign Minister Faisal, dated July 30. The British note stated that there would be no oil operations in the Buraimi zone during the period of arbitration; but an area outside the Buraimi zone was indicated in

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Political Resident Burrows, who will be responsible for implementing various details of agreement, flew here from Bahrain to attend signature ceremony. After dining with King he and Pelham came to see me last evening. My general impression is that while each side feels it must continue support, it yielded more than other. Both are pleased long negotiations finally terminated in atmosphere mutual professions reaffirmed friendship.

Young and Rentz tell me Burrows also brought letter from Shaikh of Bahrain to King Saud proposing new basis (line cutting through Abu Saafah Reef) for settlement water boundary between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

WADSWORTH

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which the British oil companies would be allowed to conduct operations, and another area was labeled where Aramco would be allowed to do the same. Faisal's answer stated that he considered that letter and his answer to constitute a binding agreement between the two parties. (780.022/8–2054)

No. 1571

Editorial Note

Despatch 57 from Jidda, August 29, reported that the British had named as their delegate to the Buraimi Arbitration Tribunal Sir Reader William Bullard, British Minister to Saudi Arabia from 1936 to 1939; Amir Turki bin Ataishan had left Buraimi and arrived in Jidda on his way to report to King Saud; and both the British and Saudis were reporting minor infractions of the agreement by the other side. Telegram 85 from Jidda, August 31, informed the Department of State that Yusef Yassin had been named Saudi Arabian member of the Tribunal. It also reported that Yassin said he welcomed the chance to collaborate with his "old friend Reader Bullard", and suggested that Bullard join him in Saudi Arabia. The British Chargé, however, expressed a preference for a neutral country as the site for the first meeting and Yassin then suggested Bad Nauheim, Germany. Telegram 108 from Jidda, September 9, and despatch 732 from London, September 14, reported that Yassin and Bullard were expected to arrive at Bad Nauheim around September 23. By the end of September, the two members of the Tribunal agreed that of the three remaining members of the group to be chosen, one should be a European and one a Moslem. The question of the fifth arbitrator was not discussed at that time. (Despatch 951 from London, October 5) Despatch 1657 from London, December 8, reported that the three neutral members of the Arbitration Tribunal had all accepted the post. The

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chairman was to be Judge Charles de Visscher of Belgium. A British Foreign Office official told the Embassy the arbitration procedure would probably take at least 2 years, although the members of the Tribunal would not be fully occupied with the matter for the whole time. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 780.022.

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YEMEN

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN YEMEN [1]

No. 1572

Editorial Note

Despatch 206 from Aden, May 3, 1952, reported that the Sultan of Laheji, after having been accused of the murder of two cousins, had fled to Yemen. After the Sultan's departure, the Governor of Aden sent a British political officer and a detachment of troops from Aden to take charge of Laheji affairs and insure the maintenance of law and order. On April 22 the Governor met with the Laheji Electoral College, made up of representatives of five families of the Laheji nobility, and established a Provisional Regency Council to assume temporary responsibility for the administration of the Sultanate. One of the five members of the Regency Council was Arthur Watts, British Political Officer who had come from Aden, the other four were members of the Laheji nobility. (786H.00/5–352)

[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1192 ff.

No. 1573

786H.00/5–1652

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1952. [1]

Subject: Call of the Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires.

Participants: Mr. Abu-Taleb, Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires
NEA—Mr. Berry, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
NE—Mr. Awalt

[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted on May 19.

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Summary:

Mr. Abu-Taleb called this afternoon at his request. He said he had been instructed by his Government to call and request assistance in behalf of Lahej. He said that he, himself, lacked complete information and would call again if he received further word which would have an important bearing on the matter.

Mr. Abu-Taleb outlined briefly the circumstances leading to the Sultan's flight from Lahej to Yemen. He said that this action on his part was an embarrassment to the Imam who had no sympathy for the Sultan whose actions were reprehensible in the extreme. The concern of the Yemeni Government, he said, was directed toward the action of the British in sending forces to Lahej to control the country. He said this was in contravention of the treaty of 1934 which provided that neither Yemen nor the UK would interfere with the *status quo* in areas in dispute between the two countries. He said the Yemeni Legation in London had made representations to the Foreign Office but these were rejected. Consequently his Government wished to appeal to the United States to intercede with the British and persuade them to withdraw their forces from Lahej and remove the British representative from the Regency Council now governing that small State. [2] He added in this connection that the membership of the Regency Council was very satisfactory and made up of the best available Arab representatives.

Mr. Berry thanked Mr. Abu-Taleb for giving him such a clear and able exposition of events in Lahej. He said that the United States always supports the legitimate aspirations of all peoples and that the Department will study this problem which he has raised and see what it can properly do about it. He assured Mr. Abu-Taleb that he would be delighted to see him again if any further information came to the latter's attention. [3]

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[2] A memorandum by Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, to John F. Simmons, Chief of Protocol, dated May 16, transmitted a translation of a telegram by the Sultan of Lahej to the President. The Sultan appealed to the President to protect his small state against British colonialism. The memorandum recommended that no reply should be made by the President or the Department of State. (786H.00/5–1652)

[3] On July 14 the Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires again came to the Department of State. Awalt informed him that his fears of British influence in Lahej did not seem to have been realized, since the new Sultan who had been named was known to be friendly to Yemen rather than to the United Kingdom. (Memorandum of conversation of July 14, 1952; 786H.00/7–1452)

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